Settling the debate on Altruism

[George H. Smith]

George, once more I ask you to write a critique of “The Ayn Rand Lexicon,” for wealth and fame. I don’t know how many copies it would sell (but just don’t have the word “anarchy” or “atheism” in the title and it might sell better.) Dissect the ideas of Rand. Improve them. Make them one hundred percent correct in the context of her entire philosophy up to 2010. And what about a critique of that little bitty book, “The Objectivist Epistemology?”

This brings up the big turning point in any philosophy. What Rand wrote was Randian Objectivism, but can David Kelley, or George H. Smith, or Leonard Peikoff also write Objectivism? Of course they can, if they are rationally correct! And if you are correct in your “fixes” you might be able to sell it thru The Atlas Society AND the Ayn Rand Institute (though I would not hold my breathe for them.)

I just bought two bio’s about Rand. There is a resurgence in interest and sales of “Atlas Shrugged.” And you George, could do as good or a better job than anyone.

Even if I were disposed to write such a book -- and I have thought about it from time to time -- how do you propose that I pay my bills during the writing process, which could easily take two years or more?

The last book I attempted to write without sufficient funding was The Disciplines of Liberty. This was to be a historical survey of five intellectual disciplines -- political philosophy, history, economics, sociology, and social psychology -- as analyzed in terms of their contributions to our understanding of freedom. After around eight years of little or no funding, and writing sporadically as I could get the time, I finally gave up; and I'm still sitting on many hundreds of pages of manuscript and detailed notes that I will probably never be able to use.

In the final analysis the continuous frustration was not worth it, and I'm not about to repeat that mistake. So I now live by the motto: Show me the money!

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

There are many "well-known" problems in philosophy that are more on the order of pseudo-problems.

Agreed, this may well be one of them.

I once took a philosophy course at the University of Arizona that was taught by an "ordinary language philosopher" -- a Wittgensteinian of sorts who was especially fond of the work of J.L. Austin. (This is how some quotations from Austin ended up in ATCAG.)

Around the second or third class, an undergraduate asked in all seriousness, "How can I be certain that I exist?" To this the professor replied, "Who wants to know?"

On a more serious note, many questions have been asked by philosophers, such as "Why should I be rational?" or "Why should I be moral?" etc., etc. Many years ago I wrote a fairly lengthy piece on such questions, and it may still be lurking somewhere amidst thousands of my computer files. I don't think I would want to post it, but I'll see if I can find it, read it over, and then summarize the analysis. If not, I could probably reconstruct the basics from memory.

As I recall, my treatment was predicated on the distinction between fundamental questions that are asked from within the framework of a cognitive discipline versus such questions that are asked from outside the discipline in question -- and which ask, in effect, "Why should I, as a personal matter, care about this discipline at all?"

These are two very different types of questions, and they yield fundamentally different answers.

Ghs

[Newberry]

I once took a philosophy course at the University of Arizona that was taught by an "ordinary language philosopher" -- a Wittgensteinian of sorts who was especially fond of the work of J.L. Austin. (This is how some quotations from Austin ended up in ATCAG.)

Around the second or third class, an undergraduate asked in all seriousness, "How can I be certain that I exist?" To this the professor replied, "Who wants to know?"

On a more serious note, many questions have been asked by philosophers, such as "Why should I be rational?" or "Why should I be moral?" etc., etc. Many years ago I wrote a fairly lengthy piece on such questions, and it may still be lurking somewhere amidst thousands of my computer files. I don't think I would want to post it, but I'll see if I can find it, read it over, and then summarize the analysis. If not, I could probably reconstruct the basics from memory.

As I recall, my treatment was predicated on the distinction between fundamental questions that are asked from within the framework of a cognitive discipline versus such questions that are asked from outside the discipline in question -- and which ask, in effect, "Why should I, as a personal matter, care about this discipline at all?"

These are two very different types of questions, and they yield fundamentally different answers.

Ghs

George you have a beautiful style of writing; it seems to effortlessly go to the point.

Michael

[George H. Smith]

George you have a beautiful style of writing; it seems to effortlessly go to the point.

Michael

Thank you.

Ever since my high school days, when I started reading Thomas Jefferson -- one of the most brilliant stylists in the history of American literature -- I have liked his famous remark in a letter to a friend. Jefferson apologized for having written a long letter, explaining that he didn't have the time to write a short one.

I vaguely recall that this remark was not original with Jefferson. In that regard it is similar to a comment that he made near the end of his life, viz., "that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace of God."

It's been many years since I looked into the original source of this metaphor, but I recall that the English historian Christopher Hill devoted an entire article to it. I don't recall the original source, but I think it dates from the latter part of the 17th century.

But I digress. The late hour -- and gin -- tend to have that effect on me. 8-)

Ghs

[Alfonso Jones]

The last book I attempted to write without sufficient funding was The Disciplines of Liberty. This was to be a historical survey of five intellectual disciplines -- political philosophy, history, economics, sociology, and social psychology -- as analyzed in terms of their contributions to our understanding of freedom. After around eight years of little or no funding, and writing sporadically as I could get the time, I finally gave up; and I'm still sitting on many hundreds of pages of manuscript and detailed notes that I will probably never be able to use.

In the final analysis the continuous frustration was not worth it, and I'm not about to repeat that mistake. So I now live by the motto: Show me the money!

Ghs

Well put, George. I've written lots of papers (academic) and many practitioner type articles also, but I've learned over the years that it is best to have a customer who is largely committed to the endeavor before putting forth the effort. As a result of this, most things I've written in the last 10 years have been invited papers.

I also have a horror story, however - of a book which I and a colleague wrote about 15 years ago without sufficient commitment from the publisher, only to find that the book never saw the light of day. Fortunately, I've been able to recover some return on my effort by mining my portions of the manuscript for other publishing purposes, but never enough to justify all the effort.

Regards,

Bill P

[George H. Smith]

As long as I'm digressing, here's an interesting footnote to histories of Objectivism for which which there exists no primary evidence.

After finishing Atheism: The Case Against God in 1974, I returned home (from Hollywood to Tucson) to recuperate from the trauma of writing my first book, only to be presented by friends with a transcript of a lecture by Professor Jeffrie R. Murphy (then head of the philosophy department at the University of Arizona) that characterized Ayn Rand as "the worst philosopher in the history of Western Civilization."

Duly offended in a manner that only someone in their early twenties can be offended, I arranged a debate with Professor Murphy. Believe it or not, the official topic was: "Is Ayn Rand the worst philosopher in the history of Western Civilization?"

The debate was held in the large, luxurious home of an Objectivist friend, and attended by around 50 people. I began my part of the debate in a humorous manner, by suggesting that Professor Murphy could surely think of at least one philosopher who was worse than Ayn Rand -- in which case, I would win the debate. (I offered some candidates, but I don't recall who they were.)

Professor Murphy graciously conceded that my point was well-taken, and that his original judgment may have been exaggerated. He then launched into a critique of Rand's approach to the Is-Ought problem and her approach to definitions, claiming that "man" could be defined as a being who uses urinals.

I was expecting all of this, so I came well prepared. Too bad no recording was made of this debate, which went on for several hours.

I should mention that Jeffrie Murphy was at least sympathetic to the libertarian perspective. He used Hayek's Constitution of Liberty as a text in his political philosophy course, and he wrote a short but excellent book titled Kant: The Philosophy of Right. (I still own a copy), which argues that Kant was a classical liberal, if not an outright libertarian.

Ghs

[Leonid]

George H. Smith,"Let me be blunt: Rand’s contextualism, as interpreted by Peikoff and his colleagues, has become virtually indistinguishable from epistemological relativism."

I know you deleted this, but just out of curiosity, where did you find in Peikoff's writing epistemological relativism? Can you cite any textual evidence?

[George H. Smith]

The last book I attempted to write without sufficient funding was The Disciplines of Liberty. This was to be a historical survey of five intellectual disciplines -- political philosophy, history, economics, sociology, and social psychology -- as analyzed in terms of their contributions to our understanding of freedom. After around eight years of little or no funding, and writing sporadically as I could get the time, I finally gave up; and I'm still sitting on many hundreds of pages of manuscript and detailed notes that I will probably never be able to use.

In the final analysis the continuous frustration was not worth it, and I'm not about to repeat that mistake. So I now live by the motto: Show me the money!

Ghs

Well put, George. I've written lots of papers (academic) and many practitioner type articles also, but I've learned over the years that it is best to have a customer who is largely committed to the endeavor before putting forth the effort. As a result of this, most things I've written in the last 10 years have been invited papers.

I also have a horror story, however - of a book which I and a colleague wrote about 15 years ago without sufficient commitment from the publisher, only to find that the book never saw the light of day. Fortunately, I've been able to recover some return on my effort by mining my portions of the manuscript for other publishing purposes, but never enough to justify all the effort.

Regards,

Bill P

Jeff Riggenbach and I used to argue about the merits of writing for no money. Jeff liked to quote the remark by Samuel Johnson (and I quote from memory), "Nobody but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money." I eventually responded with an amended version of that famous remark, viz., "Nobody but a blockhead ever wrote, if he expects to make money." 8-)

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

George H. Smith,"Let me be blunt: Rand’s contextualism, as interpreted by Peikoff and his colleagues, has become virtually indistinguishable from epistemological relativism."

I know you deleted this, but just out of curiosity, where did you find in Peikoff's writing epistemological relativism? Can you cite any textual evidence?

I refer you to the section from Why Atheism? that I posted a while back in the Articles section.

As for the more extreme claim that I mentioned in the deleted passage, to the effect that a syllogism may be valid for one person but not for another (depending on their understanding of logic), there is a little history behind this.

Around 1997. while I was living in San Francisco, I had a conversation with an old friend (from my high-school days) who was a contributor to the Ayn Rand Institute and who had attended many lectures by Peikoff and his "colleagues" (as I characterized them in the deleted passage). My friend told me of an argument that he found incredible, , i.e., that a valid syllogism was not in fact "valid" for someone who didn't understand the rules of deductive logic.

I simply could not believe that any Randian would defend such an absurd position, so my friend sent me a two-tape set on "Contextualism" in which that is exactly the argument presented. I still have those tapes somewhere, but I'm too lazy to rummage through my closets. I believe the lectures were by Peter Schwartz, the Madame Defarge of Objectivism.

Ghs

[Alfonso Jones]

I believe the lectures were by Peter Schwartz, the Madame Defarge of Objectivism.

Ghs

Now, that's funny!!!

Bill P

[Leonid]

George H. Smith,""I refer you to the section from Why Atheism? that I posted a while back in the Articles section."

Unfortunately I couldn't find this article. Nevertheless, can you provide any citations from Peikoff himself which confirms your claim? Your referral to your friend who attended Peikoff lecture reminds me the old Jewish joke in which one guy asked his friend's opinion about Pavarotti. Friend said “his voice is rubbish!" “And how do you know? Did you hear him?" “No, my wife hummed it for me."

[George H. Smith]

George H. Smith,""I refer you to the section from Why Atheism? that I posted a while back in the Articles section."

Unfortunately I couldn't find this article. Nevertheless, can you provide any citations from Peikoff himself which confirms your claim? Your referral to your friend who attended Peikoff lecture reminds me the old Jewish joke in which one guy asked his friend's opinion about Pavarotti. Friend said “his voice is rubbish!" “And how do you know? Did you hear him?" “No, my wife hummed it for me."

See the thread at: http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=8329&view=findpost&p=92014

Ghs

[Leonid]

Thank you for the link. You have said :

“This statement, through reasonable on its face, leads to the rather peculiar conclusion – peculiar at least for those who stress the objectivity of knowledge – that there exist different truths for people who work from different contexts of knowledge. Consider one of Peikoff’s examples: the belief of early medical researchers that four types of blood (A, B, AB, and O), while incompatible with each other, are each compatible with their own type. It was later discovered that this was not always the case: a recipient of blood from a donor with the same type occasionally responded negatively – a problem that was later explained by the RH factor, which is present in the blood of some individuals but not others.

The philosophical question raised by this story is this: Was the early belief -- that each blood type is compatible with its own type – true or false?”

In order to answer this question one should first understand the philosophical meaning of context within Objectivist theory of knowledge. As everything else, knowledge has identity. Context represents such an identity. Knowledge is necessary limited in each and every present moment; to claim the opposite is to claim omniscience. True knowledge which is corresponds to reality is necessary has to be incorporated into the new body of knowledge without contradictions. Newtonian physics are easily incorporated into the Einstein’s theory but medivial cosmology is not. So the answer to your question is : this is true that people have four different blood groups and this is also true , as we know today, that people have many other blood groups and RH factor. The current knowledge doesn’t contradict the previous one, doesn’t make it false.

Rand also provides detailed explanation of possible, probable and certain knowledge.

I don’t think that her or Peikoff’s position is amount to epistemological relativism. The denial of contextual nature of knowledge, its identity, is.

Edited April 11, 2010 by Leonid

[Daniel Barnes]

True knowledge which is corresponds to reality is necessary has to be incorporated into the new body of knowledge without contradictions. Newtonian physics are easily incorporated into the Einstein’s theory but medivial cosmology is not.

Errr...Leonid, are you sure you've actually thought this one through?...;-)

Edited April 11, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[jeffrey smith]

Around 1997. while I was living in San Francisco, I had a conversation with an old friend (from my high-school days) who was a contributor to the Ayn Rand Institute and who had attended many lectures by Peikoff and his "colleagues" (as I characterized them in the deleted passage). My friend told me of an argument that he found incredible, , i.e., that a valid syllogism was not in fact "valid" for someone who didn't understand the rules of deductive logic.

Ghs

I don't think the position is too absurd. If someone doesn't understand (at least intuitively) the way logic works, then they will be unable to recognize when a syllogism is true, or why. In other words, for them, if P then Q would be as "valid" a syllogism as if P then not Q.

Of course, this assumes that this is what the ARIans intended in making that claim.

Jeffrey S.

[imurray]

Around 1997. while I was living in San Francisco, I had a conversation with an old friend (from my high-school days) who was a contributor to the Ayn Rand Institute and who had attended many lectures by Peikoff and his "colleagues" (as I characterized them in the deleted passage). My friend told me of an argument that he found incredible, , i.e., that a valid syllogism was not in fact "valid" for someone who didn't understand the rules of deductive logic.

Ghs

I don't think the position is too absurd. If someone doesn't understand (at least intuitively) the way logic works, then they will be unable to recognize when a syllogism is true, or why. In other words, for them, if P then Q would be as "valid" a syllogism as if P then not Q.

Of course, this assumes that this is what the ARIans intended in making that claim.

Jeffrey S.

Jeffrey,

I agree with you, but think you've make a subtle distinction in your analysis that is not made in the original. There's a difference between somebody who is unable to recognize a syllogism as valid because they don't understand the rules of deductive logic and a syllogism being "invalid" for somebody who doesn't understand the rules of deductive logic. The former seems rather obvious because the error in or lack of logic rests in the person, the latter seems to imply that the syllogism itself somehow loses its inherent validity to a person who does not understand logic.

This is the duty/obligation in relation to moral/immoral argument all over again and I'm beginning to see that Ayn's detractors are rightly confused.

Ian

[Peter]

I was searching for the phase, “Why should I be” for George and found this gem, along with a lost thread on situational emergency ethics, also with a lot of letters from George. It was tucked into a bigger thread I called Ethics One.

If George can give me some different key words, I will look for what he describes as:

“As I recall, my treatment was predicated on the distinction between fundamental questions that are asked from within the framework of a cognitive discipline versus such questions that are asked from outside the discipline in question -- and which ask, in effect, "Why should I, as a personal matter, care about this discipline at all?"

These are two very different types of questions, and they yield fundamentally different answers.”

end quote

It's a great day to mow the lawn. Bye.

Peter

From: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

Reply-To: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

To: "*Atlantis" <atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: Ragnar, Rearden, and Justice

Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2001 13:38:08 -0600

What's so special about rights, according to Ayn Rand's moral theory? After all, she defends egoism -- if of the natural-law variety – and rights appear to be "other regarding," in the sense that they demand we take the interests of others into account while pursuing our own interests.

The question is not merely how Rand justified rights, but also *why* she placed such great emphasis on justice within her egoistic ethics. This is a very complex issue, but one place to begin is by exploring the views of Ragnar Danneskjold and Hank Rearden in "Atlas Shrugged."

Ragnar describes the state of the world as follows: "There are two modes of living left to us today: to be a looter who robs disarmed victims or to be a victim who works for the benefit of his own despoilers. I did not choose to be either."

Ragnar depicts the world of "Atlas Shrugged" as having degenerated, in effect, into a Hobbesian state of nature, a world of conflicting interests (or what Hobbes called "a war of every man against every man") in which one must choose between exploiting others or being exploited by others. Thus it also represents a variant of the "emergency" situation that we have been discussing.

Yet Ragnar "did not choose to be either" exploited or exploiter. What did he choose instead? When he is asked by Rearden, "But what sort of life have you chosen? To what purpose are you using your mind?" -- Ragnar replies with the single word, "Justice" (AS, Signet pb, 539)

Now Ragnar appears to the public as the most "selfish" of individuals in the conventional sense, a pirate who steals from others for his own benefit. Yet even in the degenerate social situation in which he finds himself, he nonetheless presents "justice" as the motive power of his life. Ragnar had devoted himself to the cause of justice in the sense that his "piracy" was an ambitious scheme to provide restitution to those who, like Rearden, had had their wealth expropriated by others.

Ragnar was fighting "the idea that need is a sacred idol requiring human sacrifices," and he was opposing the popular symbol of Robin Hood, according to which "need, not achievement, is the source of rights" Ragnar, in other words, was combating the altruistic notion that "in order to be placed above principles, above morality, placed where anything is permitted to him, even plunder and murder, all a man has to do is to be in need" (p. 540).

Such passages (which recur throughout Rand's writings) are a clear indication that Rand did not believe that the rights of one person are contingent on the needs of others, even during an emergency where interests conflict, for Ragnar was operating within precisely that kind of crisis situation -- a global emergency, so to speak, in which the world was in "ruins" (p. 543).

More interesting, however, is the question of how an egoist like Ragnar could devote himself to the cause of justice, even in cases where he did not appear to benefit personally. Here is what Ragnar says:

"Because my only love, the only value I care to live for, is that which has never been loved by the world, has never won recognition or friends or defenders: human ability. That is the love I am serving -- and if I should lose my life, to what better purpose could I give it" (p. 543).

Thus Ragnar was willing to *lose* his life in pursuit of the ideal of human ability, and while engaged in the struggle for justice. Moreover, although Rearden initially disapproves of Ragnar's methods, he too expresses a similar devotion to principles:

"I'll tell you that I have no hope left, but I have the knowledge that when the end comes, I will have lived by my own standards, even while I was the only one to whom they remained valid. I will have lived in the world in which I started and I will go down with the last of it."

This reinforces the point that the entire scenario of "Atlas Shrugged" is a prolonged state of emergency, in which some of the protagonists do not even expect to survive. Yet what do these "egoists" do in this situation? They adhere to their principles, especially the principle of justice, as essential to their well-being. As Rearden says elsewhere, "I do not recognize the good of others as a justification for their seizure of my property or their destruction of my life....[N]obody's good can be achieved at the price of human sacrifices....[W]hen you violate the rights of one man, you have violated the rights of all...." (p. 452).

The relevant point here is that, according to Rand, adherence to the principle of justice -- a respect for the rights of others – is inextricably linked to one's *rational* self-interest, even during the kind of emergency situation that is depicted in "Atlas Shrugged." Indeed, Ragnar, Rearden and other Randian heroes are willing to sacrifice their own lives in pursuit of justice, including (in Ragnar's case) justice for others.

I won't here discuss why Rand took this view; I merely wish to emphasize that this was in fact her view. She did not adopt the position that your rights are contingent on my needs, or on my personal calculations of self-interest. Your rights are to be respected, period, to whatever extent is possible in a given situation. Does this mean that Rand was not really an egoist? Of course not. Rather, it means that Rand was correct in distinguishing her conception of "self-interest" from the conventional view.

Those who claim otherwise need to examine with care how Rand viewed the role of abstract principles, such as justice, in one's pursuit of happiness. Adherence to principles, for Rand, is an essential component of moral integrity, and such integrity, in turn, is necessary for happiness. And this is so even if it may result in one's death.

Ghs

[Peter]

Oh, all right. Before I cut the grass I will pass along the Norman Fox interview of Rand, thanks to the benevolence, foresight, and pack-rat tendancies of George.

Peter

From: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

Reply-To: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

To: "*Atlantis" <atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: A closer look at Rand's emergency case

Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2001 14:20:45 -0600

Participants and others who are interested in the emergency debate should go to the link provided by Norman Fox, to wit: "Here's the complete Q&A for those who are interested-" http://www.jeffcomp.com/faq/murder.html

$$$

Here is my take on the entire interview. My comments are in [brackets].

Norman Fox:

Miss Rand, a particular example has been brought to my attention, involving suicide, or apparent suicide, and it goes as follows. If Man B is placed in a situation where he is under a threat of death by Man A, and the threat is contingent on Man B killing Man C, what is the resolution of this situation philosophically? What are the moral explanations of the possible actions of Man B?

Ayn Rand:

In a case of that kind, you cannot morally judge the action of Man B. Since he is under the threat of death, whatever he decides to do is right, because this is not the kind of moral situation in which men could exist. This is an emergency situation. Man B, in this case, is placed in a position where he cannot continue to exist. Therefore, what he does is up to him. If he refuses to obey, and dies, that is his moral privilege. If he prefers to obey, you could not blame him for the murder. The murderer is Man A. No exact, objective morality can be prescribed for an issue where a man's life is endangered.

Norman Fox:

Just one point that bothers me. Isn't Man B then shifting the initiation of force, made against him, to Man C?

Ayn Rand:

No. Because he isn't initiating the force himself; Man A is. What a man does in a position where, through no fault of his own, his own life is endangered, is not his responsibility, it is the responsibility of the man who introduced the evil, the initiation of force, the threat. You cannot ask of a man that he sacrifice his life for the sake of the third man, when it's not his fault that he's been put in that position.

Gerald Goodman:

But Miss Rand, what right does Man B have to take Man C's life, instead of his?

Ayn Rand:

No rights are applicable in such a case. Don't you see that that is one of the reasons why the use, the initiation of force among men, is morally improper and indefensible? Once the element of force is introduced, the element of morality is out. There is no question of right in such a case.

[Rand specifically says that, although this is an "emergency situation," the rights of C are not nullified. As she puts it in a later passage (below), "The rights of Man C are still valid...." They are not applicable relative to B, because B is under the duress of force initiated by A. But B's rights are still valid relative to A, the initiator. The solution, according to Rand, is not to nullify the rights of C, but to trace the chain of moral responsibility to the real initiator of force, namely, A. This is highly significant, for Rand, unlike Bill, is not willing to throw the rights of C out the window, just because B may have to kill C in order to save his own life. The rights of C do not somehow disappear; he still has them, but they are being violated by A, not by B. Rand is here using rights an a method to understand the delegation of moral responsibility in an emergency -- something she does in the shipwreck case as well. This would be impossible if she believed that the rights of C simply disappeared.]

Norman Fox:

Miss Rand, I think I see a distinction here that would be very important because there may be some doubt in the mind of a listener. A distinction between a situation in which a person in which the force is initiated, or a person who is in an unfortunate circumstance. To go back to the original example, if a man were merely in an unfortunate circumstance, he has no right, as far as I can see, to take something from another man just because he's in an unfortunate circumstance."

Ayn Rand:

No (agreeing with Norman Fox).

[Rand here agrees with Fox that "a man....has no right...to take something from another man just because he's in an unfortunate circumstance."]

Norman Fox:

He is not under coercion. No one has initiated force against him. He's merely in an unfortunate circumstance. I should think this is an important distinction when we're dealing with morality.

Ayn Rand:

Are you referring back to your argument of the three men, and one of them has a gun?

Norman Fox:

Yes.

Ayn Rand:

Well here you have to take your example literally. If a man is under threat of losing his life, then you cannot speak of his right, or the right of Man C, since the rights have already been violated. All you can say is that the rights of Man B and Man C are still valid, but the violator is Man A, with Man B as merely the tool. Therefore you cannot say that rights do not exist. They do exist, but the violator is the initiator of force, not the transmission belt. However this does not apply to any other kind of misfortune, and it does not apply to a dictatorship, because here you would be speaking metaphorically. For instance, you couldn't claim that the men who served in the Gestapo, or the Russian secret police, they couldn't claim (as some of the Nazis did) that they were merely carrying out orders, and that therefore the horrors they committed are not their fault, but are the fault of the chief Nazis. They were not literally under threat of death. They chose that job. Nobody holds a gun on a secret policeman and orders him to function all the time. You could not have enough secret policemen. Therefore I took your example literally. Actually, such a thing does not happen, because if somebody wants to murder someone, he picks a willing executioner. He cannot go with a gun in the back of Man B, and order him to shoot Man C, because that does not relieve him of the responsibility, nor the guilt, for the crime. Only in that literal sense could one say that Man B is absolved, but not in the metaphorical sense; not if he is a willing official of a dictatorship, and then claims "I had no other way to make a living"" That does not absolve him. His life was not in danger."

[Rand is here distinguishing between literal and metaphorical emergencies, while re-emphasizing her earlier argument that rights apply to both situations ("you cannot say that rights do not exist"). It's a matter of tracing responsibility to the appropriate agent.]

Gerald Goodman:

Miss Rand, then you would say that a person who was starving, and the only way he could acquire food was to take the food of a second party, then he would have no right, even though it meant his own life, to take the food.

Ayn Rand:

Not in normal circumstances, but that question sometimes is asked about emergency situations. For instance, supposing you are washed ashore after a shipwreck, and there is a locked house which is not yours, but you're starving and you might die the next moment, and there is food in this house, what is your moral behavior? I would say again, this is an emergency situation, and please consult my article "The Ethics Of Emergencies" in _The Virtue Of Selfishness_ for a fuller discussion of this subject. But to state the issue in brief, I would say that you would have the right to break in and eat the food that you need, and then when you reach the nearest policeman, admit what you have done, and

undertake to repay the man when you are able to work. In other words, you may, in an emergency situation, save your life, but not as "of right." You would regard it as an emergency, and then, still recognizing the property right of the owner, you would restitute whatever you have taken, and that would be moral on both parts.

[Rand is here applying a rights-analysis to another kind of emergency, one in which the starving man is not being coerced by anyone, but must *himself* violate the property rights of another in order to survive. Her point is that, like the first scenario, rights still apply, but, *unlike* the first scenario, we cannot absolve the starving man of responsibility for the violation of rights by passing that responsibility to another agent who is forcing him to steal. Hence the theft, though morally justified in this abnormal case is not "of right" -- i.e., of justice -- so the starving man must pay restitution to do "what would be moral on both parts."]

Gerald Goodman:

Miss Rand, this discussion has dwelled on ethics in abnormal situations, but can't Objectivist ethics lead to a positive contribution to a normal life?

Ayn Rand:

Why certainly. I don't quite understand your question. This is only the choice of the questioner here that asks what one does in abnormal situations, on the basis of what the ethics of Objectivism prescribes for normal situations. In normal situations, each man is responsible for himself and his own life, and that, socially, he should deal with others as a trader, meaning trading value for value, and dealing with others only by mutual voluntary consent. Never initiating force against another human being. Never sacrificing himself to others, or others to himself. That, in very brief, is the essence of the Objectivist ethics.

[in other words, in normal situations justice -- respecting the rights of others --and rational self-interest do not conflict, but such a conflict can occur "in abnormal situations." In this latter case, one should try to do "what would be moral on both parts."]

Ghs

[Xray]

I don't think I gave Peikoff a "pass" at all. But I will concede that I made a last minute decision to delete two polemical paragraphs that originally appeared near the end of my discussion. They read as follows:

[begin quote]

Let me be blunt: Rand’s contextualism, as interpreted by Peikoff and his colleagues, has become virtually indistinguishable from epistemological relativism. And this is the most vicious kind of relativism imaginable – one that, if consistently applied, leads to inane and sophomoric paradoxes. It is strange indeed to hear, from the mouths of self-professed defenders of reason and objective knowledge, that what is “true” for you may not be “true” for me; that a theory, though false today, was “immutably true” at an earlier time; that a valid syllogism, if the reasons for its validity are not properly understood by a particular individual, is not “valid” for that person; and that there is no such thing as “absolute truth,” but only truths that are “contextually absolute.” .

If this is not epistemological relativism, crude and unadorned, then I cannot imagine what could possibly qualify. Yet all of these claims (and more) are now being promoting under the banner of “Objectivism.” The mind boggles – and eventually grows weary of deceptive labels.

[close quote]

I deleted these paragraphs primarily because I thought they focused too much on the internecine conflict between the Orthos and the Neos in the Objectivist movement, and also because they referred to some controversial arguments that I didn't explain elsewhere in my discussion.

My personal belief was, and still is, that Peikoff pushed some of Rand's epistemological ideas to absurd limits that she would have rejected. Thus, had I left the above passage in the book, I would have needed to explore this problem, and I didn't want to get sidetracked into that in-movement controversy.

Ghs

Thanks for providing the passage, George. Suppose you had left those crucial paragraphs in the book, imo most readers would have understood and accepted if you had told them that the limited space of the book restricts the detailed exploration of this problem.

As for the paragraphs possibly fueling the conflict between Orthos and Neos, imo it depends on where you yourself saw your place there. (My interests in those turf wars is only marginal, they always remind me of fights between denominations about the "true" belief).

In case you were neither an "Ortho" nor a "Neo", would publishing the passage and leave it to the Orthos and Neos to get upset about it have been an option?

An option chosen with the attitude: "In the book, I'm going to point out those contradictions. Should opposing Objectivist groups hit the roof over the content, it is their problem, not mine."

Which takes me to the question: Is it possible to be an Objectivist at all without belonging to one of those groups - "Orthos", "Neos" (who I suppose are again split up in sub-groups)?

GHS: I began my part of the debate in a humorous manner, by suggesting that Professor Murphy could surely think of at least one philosopher who was worse than Ayn Rand -- in which case, I would win the debate. (I offered some candidates, but I don't recall who they were.)

Professor Murphy graciously conceded that my point was well-taken, and that his original judgment may have been exaggerated. He then launched into a critique of Rand's approach to the Is-Ought problem and her approach to definitions, claiming that "man" could be defined as a being who uses urinals.

I was expecting all of this, so I came well prepared. Too bad no recording was made of this debate, which went on for several hours.

Hearing a recording would certainly have been interesting, especially what Murphy said on the "Is-Ought" issue.

That the debate went on for several hours indicates that there were two seasoned debaters at work, neither of whom was going to throw in the towel.

Has J. Murphy published articles on Objectivism?

What would an argument for the "logical basis" of one's "commitment to logic" even look like? The very process of explaining this "logical basis" would presuppose one's commitment to logic, would it not?

There are many "well-known" problems in philosophy that are more on the order of pseudo-problems.

"It is the use of logic that enables man to determine what is and what is not a fact" (Rand)

But "logical" conclusions can be also drawn from false premises not corresponding to fact.

For example, a child drawing conclusions based on the premise that monsters exist, it is a logical act to look under the bed to check if one is lurking there.

View Post Panoptic, on 08 April 2010 - 01:50 PM, said:

Rand seems to occasionally slip between denotative and technical meanings and violates propriety within the context of her own work.

DB: I agree with this too, and have frequently referred to the way Rand seems to confuse herself sometimes.

Rand often presented as 'objective definition' the mere personal connotation she had with a term.

The result was often this:

Shorter Rand:

"What you mean by up, I mean by down, and what you mean by down, I mean by up. Now, let's talk about elevators...."

:-)

Typical example is her 'personal meaning' of "selfless".

Edited April 15, 2010 by Xray

[Peter]

Xray wrote:

Rand was quite committed to logic, but her claim that "It is the use of logic that enables man to determine what is and what is not a fact" disregards that "logical" conclusions can be also drawn from false premises not corresponding to fact.

For example, a child drawing conclusions based on the premise that monsters exist, it is a logical act to look under the bed to check if one is lurking there.

End quote

But that is not all she said, Angela. Of course, considering the child’s contextual knowledge it would be prudent to check under the bed for monsters, but not for an adult. Rand knew that logical conclusions could be drawn from false premises. She said roughly eighty thousand times, “Check your premises!” False thinking people with their phony ideals deserved the havoc they wreaked.

Ayn Rand wrote:

The man at the top of the intellectual pyramid contributes the most to all those below him, but gets nothing except his material payment, receiving no intellectual bonus from others to add to the value of his time. The man at the bottom who, left to himself, would starve in his hopeless ineptitude, contributes nothing to those above him, but receives the bonus of all of their brains. Such is the nature of the “competition” between the strong and weak of the intellect. Such is the pattern of “exploitation” for which you have damned the strong.

John Galt speaking on page 989 of “Atlas Shrugged”:

Jennifer Burns in, ”Goddess of the Market,” responded to the above passage:

In these passages Rand entirely drops the populism, and egalitarianism that characterized her earlier work, reverting to the language used by earlier defenders of capitalism. Although she did not use explicit biological metaphors, her arguments were like a parody of social Darwinism. “Atlas Shrugged” was an angry departure from the previous emphasis on the competence, natural intelligence, and ability of the common man that marked the Fountainhead.”

Why such a dramatic shift in thirteen years? Partly Rand was simply tending back to the natural dynamics of pro-capitalist thought, which emphasized (even celebrated) innate differences in talent. These tendencies were exaggerated in Rand’s work by her absolutist, black-and-white thinking. Her views on the “incompetent” were particularly harsh because she was so quick to divide humanity into world-shaking creators and helpless idiots unable to fend for themselves. This binarism, coupled with her penchant for judgment, gave the book much of its negative tone. Because she meant to demonstrate on both a personal and a social level, the result of faulty ideals, Rand was often merciless, with her characters, depicting their sufferings, and failings with relish. In one scene she describes in careful detail the characteristics of passengers, doomed to perish in a violent railroad crash, making it clear that their deaths are warranted, by their ideological errors. (566-568). Such spleen partially explains the many negative reviews that Rand received. After all, by renouncing charity as a moral obligation she had voluntarily opted out of any tradition of politeness or courtesy. “Atlas Shrugged” demanded to be taken on its own merits, and most book reviewers found little to like.

From “Goddess of the Market, Ayn Rand and the American Right,” page 173-174:

Wow. “Little to like,” Burns writes. What foolish little minds critics have. No offense. What do you like about Ayn Rand, Angela? Did you become inspired from reading Fountainhead or AS? Or does her resurgent elitism repel you?

Not me. I see infinite possibilities, made possible by The Men and Women of the Mind.

Semper cogitans fidele,

Peter Taylor

[imurray]

"In one scene she describes in careful detail the characteristics of passengers, doomed to perish in a violent railroad crash, making it clear that their deaths are warranted, by their ideological errors. (566-568)."

She obiously didn't read or understand Crime and Punishment. Ayn Rand is a lot like dear Rodya except she didn't attempt to really live her philosophy. She insulated herself within a close knit inner-circle and never left herself open to feel the cruelty and alienation that a strict adherence to her ideals may have caused, but we'll never know for sure since the way she lived excluded her from being a testament to her own philosophy. Perhaps she would have gone crazy like our friend Friedrich - imagine how crazy he would have been if he had to hock his books or defend his philosophy on the Phil Donahue show!

Edited April 16, 2010 by Panoptic

[Brant Gaede]

"In one scene she describes in careful detail the characteristics of passengers, doomed to perish in a violent railroad crash, making it clear that their deaths are warranted, by their ideological errors. (566-568)."

Or caused by the absence of the right philosophy.

--Brant

[Xray]

Xray wrote:

Rand was quite committed to logic, but her claim that "It is the use of logic that enables man to determine what is and what is not a fact" disregards that "logical" conclusions can be also drawn from false premises not corresponding to fact.

For example, a child drawing conclusions based on the premise that monsters exist, it is a logical act to look under the bed to check if one is lurking there.

End quote

But that is not all she said, Angela. Of course, considering the child’s contextual knowledge it would be prudent to check under the bed for monsters, but not for an adult. Rand knew that logical conclusions could be drawn from false premises. She said roughly eighty thousand times, “Check your premises!”

That's precisely what I was getting at with my post, Peter: the premises.

For if the premises on which a philosphy is based can be exposed as false, the edifice has no foundation and will collapse. So it is actually checking the premises, and not, like Rand claimed, the use of logic, that "enables to man determine what is and what is and what not a fact".

PT: Of course, considering the child’s contextual knowledge it would be prudent to check under the bed for monsters, but not for an adult.

"Contextual knowlege" is another odd Objectivist term. Actually the child's conclusion that a monster exists is constitues no knowledge at any point, but is a simple error.

J. Burns: In one scene she describes in careful detail the characteristics of passengers, doomed to perish in a violent railroad crash, making it clear that their deaths are warranted, by their ideological errors. (566-568). Such spleen partially explains the many negative reviews that Rand received. After all, by renouncing charity as a moral obligation she had voluntarily opted out of any tradition of politeness or courtesy. “Atlas Shrugged” demanded to be taken on its own merits, and most book reviewers found little to like.

From “Goddess of the Market, Ayn Rand and the American Right,” page 173-174:

Peter Taylor: False thinking people with their phony ideals deserved the havoc they wreaked.

This is a value judgement I don't share. For it reveals an attitude of non-empathy and revenge for those who don't happen to share one's own values.

Imo Atlas Shrugged is basically a huge revenge phantasy put in writing.

Ayn Rand wrote:

The man at the top of the intellectual pyramid contributes the most to all those below him, but gets nothing except his material payment, receiving no intellectual bonus from others to add to the value of his time. The man at the bottom who, left to himself, would starve in his hopeless ineptitude, contributes nothing to those above him, but receives the bonus of all of their brains. Such is the nature of the “competition” between the strong and weak of the intellect. Such is the pattern of “exploitation” for which you have damned the strong.

John Galt speaking on page 989 of “Atlas Shrugged”:

Rand's both elitist and wooden thinking here is hard to bear. The litmus test can easily be done if you visualize instead of John Galt going on strike for years, garbage men in NYC going on strike for a mere month.

PT: Wow. “Little to like,” Burns writes. What foolish little minds critics have. No offense.

Don't worry about AS, Peter. Despite all those "foolish little minded critics", the novel is hugely popular. It looks like what people want is not what critics want. The Bible btw shares the same fate as AS: Widely criticized, but hugely popular. Such is life. ;)

PT: What do you like about Ayn Rand, Angela?

I like her advice "Check your premises", Peter. It is one of the best advices a philosopher can give. Together with Kant's "Sapere aude", it will take you very far on a journey which has the destination to find out the truth about an issue.

Did you become inspired from reading Fountainhead or AS?

No.

I got interested in Rand in the course of a discusssion on atheism, and reading her novels was a mere task in order to get better acquainted with her work.

PT: Or does her resurgent elitism repel you?

It sure does. But what I find the most disturbing is her lack of empathy.

Edited April 18, 2010 by Xray

[Peter]

I wrote about Atlas Shrugged:

False thinking people with their phony ideals deserved the havoc they wreaked.

Angela with her XRAY vision replied:

This is a value judgment I don't share. For it reveals an attitude of non-empathy and revenge for those who don't happen to share one's own values . . . Imo Atlas Shrugged is basically a huge revenge phantasy put in writing.

end quote

First off, spelling fantasy with a “ph” is melodramatic. Secondly, revenge if properly applied is called, “Justice.” Yet it was heavy reading, that part where Ayn cataloged the reasons for the train passenger’s deaths. I remember arguing this very point, with the guy who introduced me to “Atlas Shrugged,” when I was sixteen. What if some of these people are innocent? Why should they die? Of course it is artistic license to assume all are guilty, and I understood that after his explanation. And I do feel empathy for those who think wrongly and suffer the consequences, many times because the consequences are way out of proportion to the bad thinking.

XRAY wrote:

Rand's both elitist and wooden thinking here is hard to bear. The litmus test can easily be done if you visualize instead of John Galt going on strike for years, garbage men in NYC going on strike for a mere month.

End quote

That’s not equivalent at any level. But it is funny! Wooden thinking and a wooden heart equals Objectivism? That is a new perspective, from The Mother Teresa School of Poverty and Penance. The Judas, “kiss of death,” to Ayn bearing her cross.

Angela, I wish Rand had kept the dictionary versions of definitions. Since she redefined things, it’s caused some terrible misunderstandings. Someone already mentioned the following but I want to give my take on it.

From Merriam Webster, Altruism.

1 : unselfish regard for or devotion to the welfare of others

2 : behavior by an animal that is not beneficial to or may be harmful to itself but that benefits others of its species.

From The Ayn Rand Lexicon:

Altruism: What is the moral code of altruism? The basic principle of altruism is that man has no right to exist for his own sake, that service to others is the only justification of his existence, and that self-sacrifice is his highest moral duty, virtue and value.

Do not confuse altruism with kindness, good will or respect for the rights of others. . .

End quotes

I think Ayn saw Altruism (and not might makes right) used as the usual rationale for establishing Statist and Ultra-Nationalistic Governments AND justification for the worst atrocities of those Totalitarian Governments. The Soviet Union and Communist China all used Altruism as their excuse to create a supposed classless state but with a informal ‘monarchy’ in charge, just as American Liberal/Progressives see themselves as the ultimate ruling elite. Communism destroyed Ayn’s family. And The Soviet Union’s nukes could have destroyed Truth, Justice and the American Way.

Nazi Germany used Altruism to foster Nationalism and Der Fuhrer. Do it for the fuhrer. Do it for the Fatherland. Do it for the Race. Just do it, or die.

The dictionary version does not sound so malevolent, but go to the creative writing section and read David Lee’s “Charity.” That will creep you out on “The Good Nuns” forever. “The hills are alive with the sound of music . . .”

Semper cogitans fidele,

Peter Taylor

[Peter]

Once again Altruism is used to bolster Totalitarianism and right here in America.

Peter

From a speech given to a Tea Party by Robert Tracinski:

If there's a war between these classes, between the government class and the producer class, then they started it. What is driving this war is that the government class has a contempt for producers and for wealth creation. You can see this expressed in thousands of little ways. Nancy Pelosi tried to sell the health care bill by saying how good it would be for unemployed artists: "Think of an economy where people could be an artist or a photographer or a writer without worrying about keeping their day job in order to have health insurance." So notice that these people are considered to be in nobler and more worthy professions, which should be supported by government, as opposed to those who hold productive jobs.

And then there is Michelle Obama's advice to college graduates encouraging them to "move out of the money-making industry" and "into the helping industry." So if you work for government, you're the good guys because you're "helping" people, which makes you better than those money-grubbing jerks in the private sector.

All of this goes against the grain of American history and American culture.