Galt's Oath

[Brant Gaede]

39 minutes ago, merjet said:

Occam's razor.   Rand's razor.  

If it were "Rand's Razor" she wouldn't have put it in quotation marks in her text. Thus she adopted it, not created it. Overall, she seems to have been poor in her attributions. If you take apart her philosophy piece by piece you can make a strong case for her lack of originality, especially with human rights, but if it's taken as a whole it holds up extremely well as an original construct.

--Brant

[anthony]

12 hours ago, Peter said:

Tony, standing before the Roman Senate spoke in a voice not unlike Cicero’s: From there you went through a confused, subjective and skewed - and narrow - interpretation of "rational selfishness". Reprising, it's easy to see now that I needed to stick firmly to my initial 'guns', to trust myself and to give Rand that "charitable read" - no charity at all, actually, only to read her exact words, exactly and clearly. end quote

 

And this sort of analyses is why we are so attached to this thread.

Peter

 

OPAR pages 138-139. The principal of “Rand’s Razor.” A razor is a principle that slashes off a whole category of false and/or useless ideas. Rand’s Razor is addressed to anyone who enters the field of philosophy. It states: “name your primaries.” Identify your starting points, including the concepts you take to be irreducible, and then establish that these ‘are’ objective axioms. Put negatively: do not begin to philosophize in midstream. Do not begin with some derivative concept or issue, while ignoring its roots, however much such issue interests you. Philosophical knowledge, too, is hierarchical.  end quote

Cicero, hah. Was I declaiming somewhat, Marcus Aurelius? (thanks, Peter).

Cicero: "The absolute good is not a matter of opinion but of nature". Not a subjectivist. Which goes to show there's nothing new under the sun, not much in the realm of fundamental ideas, anyway. But like a thousand-piece jigsaw puzzle, it takes some smarts to piece them all together into a whole. Further, to cohesively evaluate the best and real ideas and toss out the others is another mighty step. And who can deny that anything totally original discovered (in epistemology and ethics, say) over and above those, takes sheer brilliance.

"Do not begin with some derivative concept or issue, while ignoring its roots..." AR's "Razor" is most fitting to this topic. Know the roots.

Quote from a Stephen Boydstun essay: "The existence of the external world is perceptually self-evident and not to be proven by deduction from contents of consciousness, contra Descartes. Knowledge of the world is "derived from perception of physical facts", contra Rationalism, and knowledge of the world is not "by direct perception of immediate facts, with no recourse to concepts", contra Empiricism."[Perception and Truth, Kant and Rand]

And L. Peikoff: "Man's knowledge is not acquired by logic apart from experience, or by experience apart from logic, but by the application of logic to experience".

(The twin rocks an objectivist has to steer safely through - empiricism to port; rationalism to starboard. Mind as she goes. On the nautical theme of novels and writers you enjoy too, have you read CS Forrester and his series of Captain Horatio Hornblower, RN? Early favourites for me).

 

 

[Peter]

Tony wrote: (The twin rocks an objectivist has to steer safely through, empiricism to port and rationalism to starboard. On that theme of nautical novels you enjoy too, did you read CS Forrester and his series of Horatio Hornblower, RN? Early favourites for me). end quote

I think I read them in my late teens but I may reread Forrester, as I recently did with Patrick Obrian’s “Master and Commander” seagoing series, and detective writer John D. McDonald’s Travis Magee series. Then I donate the books to a local library. Those that were hardbound, (and all were in good shape with only one or two readers) were stamped and put on the shelves, as if the library had bought them, for the rest of the world to read. I liked that.

Peter

Whew. In the following, Arianna was a real potty mouth.

From: "George H. Smith" <To: "*Atlantis" <atlantis. Subject: ATL: Re: "Analytical Philosophy" (Was "Objectivist metaphysics") Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2001 01:08:38 -0600. Ariana Binetta wrote: "All analytic philosophy is BULLSHIT. Life is just too short for this crap!"

And Bill Dwyer replied: "By "analytic philosophy" Ariana evidently means any kind of philosophical analysis.  But the term "analytic philosophy," refers to a philosophical movement (otherwise known as "logical positivism," or "logical empiricism") that ~rejects~ metaphysics as inferior to science...."

Actually, the term "analytic philosophy" does not normally refer to logical positivism or its variants, but to "linguistic analysis," or "ordinarily language philosophy." This approach, which was inspired by the "later Wittgenstein," became popular after logical positivism had been widely discredited, especially after WWII.

Philosophers had long observed that many philosophical puzzles are generated by a misuse of language, and linguistic analysts maintained that these pseudo-problems (analysts viewed virtually every metaphysical problem as a pseudo-problem generated by a misuse of language) can be resolved through an analysis and correct understanding of conventional word-meaning. Hence the label "linguistic analysis" or "analytic philosophy."

Although the pendulum has fortunately moved away from the simplistic view of philosophy that was upheld by some linguistic analysts, their writings still retain some value. I am thinking specifically of works like those by J.L. Austin (e.g., *Other Minds,*) Gilbert Ryle (e.g., *Dilemmas*), and Antony Flew, whose early writings display a strong analytic tendency.

The worst effect of analytic philosophy, in my judgment, was that it trivialized discussions of ethics and political philosophy. Indeed, it was difficult for a "serious" philosopher to discuss natural rights, etc., until the publication of John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* in 1971, and Nozick's *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* a few years later.

On the other hand, the strongest aspect of linguistic philosophy was in the area of philosophical psychology. It is primarily in this field -- e.g., in understanding the various meanings of words like "motives" "purposes," and "intentions" --  that the reader may still find much of value.

In a later post (11/25/01), Ariana Binetta wrote: "It surprises me, but perhaps I really DO side up with Bill's modern "analytic" philosophes. I do indeed trust science FAR more than philosophy. I think the Goddess of Philosophy would be far less unruly if she were subject to the strict dictates of Holy Science. But the "analytics's" wholesale rejection of philosophy per se (as I understand it), or even abstract philosophy, is NOT one I share."

A deep distrust of metaphysics really began in the seventeenth century, especially with empiricists like Francis Bacon and John Locke, who viewed the metaphysical theories of an earlier scholasticism as mere word-play, and who maintained that many "metaphysical" issues were properly the concern of experimental science. (This view was later embraced by Immanuel Kant.) It is during this period that philosophy underwent a shift of focus from metaphysics (as conventionally understood) to epistemology. Although some Objectivist philosophers are highly critical of this shift, I view it as among the most productive and beneficial periods in the history of philosophy.

Ariana wrote: "Any serious student of philosophy has to know about the major rat-bastards of post-Parmenides Greece called "sophists." These folks simply TORTURED philosophy. Their words don't really bear reading or scrutiny -- except to denounce and hate them. But no Objectivist philosopher that I'm aware of has ever taken them seriously enough or condemned them strongly enough. Ayn Rand and others have lamely IGNORED these word (and world) destroyers -- and silence here implies consent. The sophists's sly evil words live on -- and go on hurting people."

This is scarcely a fair depiction of the "sophists," which is but a general label for a diverse group of thinkers and teachers. Plato denounced these itinerant "teachers of wisdom" as intellectual prostitutes, because they sold their wares in the open market to all comers, and did not restrict their teaching to intellectual elites. For example, in his *Protagoras,* Plato attacks the sophists for assuming that consumers can distinguish good learning from bad, without the guidance of authoritative experts. This is the perhaps the first "market failure" argument ever penned in regard to education, and it is scarcely coincidental that both Plato and Aristotle were strong advocates of state education (modeled after the Spartan system), in contrast to the free-market educational system that then prevailed in Athens.

If anything the sophists were hated, first, because many of them were foreigners teaching in Greek cities; and, second, because some of them were the libertarians of their day. The sophists (unlike Plato and Aristotle) were among the first to denounce slavery, and some (such as Antiphon) advocated what today we call a consent theory of government, maintaining that a government should restrict itself to the protection of individual rights. (Aristotle discusses this sophistic doctrine, only to reject it, in his *Nicomachean Ethics.*) In other words, the sophists -- like the "philosophes" of the French Enlightenment – were the preeminent social critics of their day.

Unfortunately, we possess very little in the way of original sophistic writings, so we are heavily dependent on a few hostile secondary accounts. But, from what scholars have been able to piece together, the sophists appear to have been pioneers in the theory of language, social theory (including social anthropology), and other fields. From their extensive travels, the sophists were well aware of cultural variations, and they sometimes used this knowledge to criticize the smug self-complacency of those Greeks like Aristotle, who regarded all non-Greeks as lesser "barbarians" fit for a life of slavery. Moreover, sophists were typically skeptics (or outright atheists) in matters of religion, and this did not endear them to more orthodox thinkers. Ghs

[anthony]

37 minutes ago, Peter said:

Tony wrote: (The twin rocks an objectivist has to steer safely through, empiricism to port and rationalism to starboard. On that theme of nautical novels you enjoy too, did you read CS Forrester and his series of Horatio Hornblower, RN? Early favourites for me). end quote

I think I read them in my late teens but I may reread Forrester, as I recently did with Patrick Obrian’s “Master and Commander” seagoing series, and detective writer John D. McDonald’s Travis Magee series. Then I donate the books to a local library. Those that were hardbound, (and all were in good shape with only one or two readers) were stamped and put on the shelves, as if the library had bought them, for the rest of the world to read. I liked that.

Peter

Whew. In the following, Arianna was a real potty mouth.

 

O' Brian is also great, in a similar vein to CSF. I believe I have the full paperback collection of Travis MacGee, the private detective on his houseboat at Fort Lauderdale. A wonderful character with a touch of the Randian romantic, independent man of integrity and professional righter of wrongs. Barbara Branden also loved the books and told me in a brief exchange here 6-7 years ago how she had foolishly loaned out all her books, never to be returned. She agreed that JD McDonald did not receive the significance from critics he deserved. Ah well, here's to a gracious lady.

[anthony]

6 hours ago, merjet said:

Tony pats himself on the back. 478 words. The word breach appears once, quoting Ayn Rand. Oh, my.  

I'm not getting you. Are we not agreed that ~without~ a breach, actor and beneficiary are one? As it should be?

[anthony]

I think that it is rare for Rand to dictate "categorical imperatives", such as this one seems/is. ("Man must be the beneficiary of his own moral actions"). Consider this though, it's not so much aimed at the "moral actor" (and yes, it provides him with moral sanction for his actions) as much as directed at those who'd deprive him of his 'rewards', those who'd cause the "breach", the sacrificing altruists..

The only other "imperative" which comes to my mind is in Galt's speech, her words through his mouth, broadcast to a nation (obviously not to the rational producers, the "moral actors"):

"To interpose the threat of physical destruction between a man and his perception of reality, [that "breach" again] is to negate and paralyze his means of survival"..."So long as men desire to live together, no man may INITIATE--do you hear me? no man may start--the use of physical force against others".

Once more, here is a general Imperative and warning to the populace, largely - and evidently for the sake of the immoral numbers - to never "interpose" a breach by force upon their victims. When Rand is categorical, there is always a full rationale she gives. First case is in developing her ethics, now in developing individual rights via the NIOF principle. A nice symmetry there.

[Wolf DeVoon]

10 hours ago, Brant Gaede said:

you can make a strong case for [Rand's] lack of originality, especially with human rights

I like this very much, Brant. Her strong suit was romantic triangles in fiction and in her personal life. I should post something about that.

[Peter]

“When there is life, there is still hope.” Cicero in 40 BC.

 

I’ll bet you’ve never seen this. An interview with Ayn Rand from way back when. Thanks to Sir George H. Smith, who was recently knighted by Queen Elizabeth.

Peter

 

From: "George H. Smith to Atlantis" Subject: ATL: A closer look at Rand's emergency case

Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2001 14:20:45 -0600. Here is my take on the entire interview. My comments are in [brackets].

 

Norman Fox: Miss Rand, a particular example has been brought to my attention, involving suicide, or apparent suicide, and it goes as follows. If Man B is placed in a situation where he is under a threat of death by Man A, and the threat is contingent on Man B killing Man C, what is the resolution of this situation philosophically? What are the moral explanations of the possible actions of Man B?

 

Ayn Rand: In a case of that kind, you cannot morally judge the action of Man B. Since he is under the threat of death, whatever he decides to do is right, because this is not the kind of moral situation in which men could exist. This is an emergency situation. Man B, in this case, is placed in a position where he cannot continue to exist. Therefore, what he does is up to him. If he refuses to obey, and dies, that is his moral privilege. If he prefers to obey, you could not blame him for the murder. The murderer is Man A. No exact, objective morality can be prescribed for an issue where a man's life is endangered.

 

Norman Fox: Just one point that bothers me. Isn't Man B then shifting the initiation of force, made against him, to Man C?

 

Ayn Rand: No. Because he isn't initiating the force himself; Man A is. What a man does in a position where, through no fault of his own, his own life is endangered, is not his responsibility, it is the responsibility of the man who introduced the evil, the initiation of force, the threat. You cannot ask of a man that he sacrifice his life for the sake of the third man, when it's not his fault that he's been put in that position.

 

Gerald Goodman: But Miss Rand, what right does Man B have to take Man C's life, instead of his?

 

Ayn Rand: No rights are applicable in such a case. Don't you see that that is one of the reasons why the use, the initiation of force among men, is morally improper and indefensible? Once the element of force is introduced, the element of morality is out. There is no question of right in such a case.

 

[Rand specifically says that, although this is an "emergency situation," the rights of C are not nullified. As she puts it in a later passage (below), "The rights of Man C are still valid...." They are not applicable relative to B, because B is under the duress of force initiated by A. But B's rights are still valid relative to A, the initiator. The solution, according to Rand, is not to nullify the rights of C, but to trace the chain of moral responsibility to the real initiator of force, namely, A. This is highly significant, for Rand, unlike Bill, is not willing to throw the rights of C out the window, just because B may have to kill C in order to save his own life. The rights of C do not somehow disappear; he still has them, but they are being violated by A, not by B. Rand is here using rights an a method to understand the delegation of moral responsibility in an emergency -- something she does in the shipwreck case as well. This would be impossible if she believed that the rights of C simply disappeared.]

 

Norman Fox: Miss Rand, I think I see a distinction here that would be very important because there may be some doubt in the mind of a listener. A distinction between a situation in which a person in which the force is initiated, or a person who is in an unfortunate circumstance. To go back to the original example, if a man were merely in an unfortunate circumstance, he has no right, as far as I can see, to take something from another man just because he's in an unfortunate circumstance."

 

Ayn Rand: No (agreeing with Norman Fox).

 

[Rand here agrees with Fox that "a man....has no right...to take something from another man just because he's in an unfortunate circumstance."]

 

Norman Fox: He is not under coercion. No one has initiated force against him. He's merely in an unfortunate circumstance. I should think this is an important distinction when we're dealing with morality.

 

Ayn Rand: Are you referring back to your argument of the three men, and one of them has a gun?

 

Norman Fox: Yes.

 

Ayn Rand: Well here you have to take your example literally. If a man is under threat of losing his life, then you cannot speak of his right, or the right of Man C, since the rights have already been violated. All you can say is that the rights of Man B and Man C are still valid, but the violator is Man A, with Man B as merely the tool. Therefore you cannot say that rights do not exist. They do exist, but the violator is the initiator of force, not the transmission belt. However this does not apply to any other kind of misfortune, and it does not apply to a dictatorship, because here you would be speaking metaphorically. For instance, you couldn't claim that the men who served in the Gestapo, or the Russian secret police, they couldn't claim (as some of the Nazis did) that they were merely carrying out orders, and that therefore the horrors they committed are not their fault, but are the fault of the chief Nazis. They were not literally under threat of death. They chose that job. Nobody holds a gun on a secret policeman and orders him to function all the time. You could not have enough secret policemen. Therefore I took your example literally. Actually, such a thing does not happen, because if somebody wants to murder someone, he picks a willing executioner. He cannot go with a gun in the back of Man B, and order him to shoot Man C, because that does not relieve him of the responsibility, nor the guilt, for the crime. Only in that literal sense could one say that Man B is absolved, but not in the metaphorical sense; not if he is a willing official of a dictatorship, and then claims "I had no other way to make a living"" That does not absolve him. His life was not in danger."

 

[Rand is here distinguishing between literal and metaphorical emergencies, while re-emphasizing her earlier argument that rights apply to both situations ("you cannot say that rights do not exist"). It's a matter of tracing responsibility to the appropriate agent.]

 

Gerald Goodman: Miss Rand, then you would say that a person who was starving, and the only way he could acquire food was to take the food of a second party, then he would have no right, even though it meant his own life, to take the food.

 

Ayn Rand: Not in normal circumstances, but that question sometimes is asked about emergency situations. For instance, supposing you are washed ashore after a shipwreck, and there is a locked house which is not yours, but you're starving and you might die the next moment, and there is food in this house, what is your moral behavior? I would say again, this is an emergency situation, and please consult my article "The Ethics Of Emergencies" in “The Virtue Of Selfishness” for a fuller discussion of this subject. But to state the issue in brief, I would say that you would have the right to break in and eat the food that you need, and then when you reach the nearest policeman, admit what you have done, and undertake to repay the man when you are able to work. In other words, you may, in an emergency situation, save your life, but not as "of right." You would regard it as an emergency, and then, still recognizing the property right of the owner, you would restitute whatever you have taken, and that would be moral on both parts.

 

[Rand is here applying a rights-analysis to another kind of emergency, one in which the starving man is not being coerced by anyone, but must *himself* violate the property rights of another in order to survive. Her point is that, like the first scenario, rights still apply, but, *unlike* the first scenario, we cannot absolve the starving man of responsibility for the violation of rights by passing that responsibility to another agent who is forcing him to steal.  Hence the theft, though morally justified in this abnormal case  is not "of right" -- i.e., of justice -- so the starving man must pay restitution to do "what would be moral on both parts."]

 

Gerald Goodman: Miss Rand, this discussion has dwelled on ethics in abnormal situations, but can't Objectivist ethics lead to a positive contribution to a normal life?

 

Ayn Rand: Why certainly. I don't quite understand your question. This is only the choice of the questioner here that asks what one does in abnormal situations, on the basis of what the ethics of Objectivism prescribes for normal situations. In normal situations, each man is responsible for himself and his own life, and that, socially, he should deal with others as a trader, meaning trading value for value, and dealing with others only by mutual voluntary consent. Never initiating force against another human being. Never sacrificing himself to others, or others to himself. That, in very brief, is the essence of the Objectivist ethics.

 

[In other words, in normal situations justice -- respecting the rights of others --and rational self-interest do not conflict, but such a conflict can occur "in abnormal situations." In this latter case, one should try to do "what would be moral on both parts."]

Ghs

 

From: "George H. Smith To: "*Atlantis" Subject: ATL: A technical glitch

Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2001 14:41:14 -0600. Not that anyone will notice, but I made an error in my first bracketed comments about Rand's emergency case."

 

I wrote: "But B's rights are still valid relative to A, the initiator."

 

I should have written: "But C's rights are still valid relative to A, the initiator."

Ghs

[Peter]

A bit off the topic of “the oath.” From “The Ayn Rand Lexicon, Objectivism From A to Z,” Ayn Rand wrote in "Textbook of Americanism" pamphlet #5: It is *not* society, nor any social right, that forbids you to kill – but the inalienable *individual* right of another man to live.  This is not a "compromise" between two rights -- but a line of division that preserves both rights untouched.  The division is not derived from an edict of society -- but from your own inalienable individual rights.  The definition of this limit is not set arbitrarily by society -- but is implicit in the definition of your own right.  Within the sphere of your own rights, your freedom is *absolute*. end quote

 

Sorry if I have reposted something from last year. I seem to remember Rand talking about the desert island scenario. I blame my poor memory on being dropped on my head as a baby. And maybe I am posting too much. Again I blame it on . . .

 

Ross Levattor was a friend of Ghs who never claimed to be an O’ist but instead if I remember correctly, he did say he was a libertarian. If you want to really twist your brain around ethical dilemmas, then Ross and Bill Dwyer (a soft determinist) are the guys to read. Here are a few of his letters.

Peter

 

From: DXIMGR@ To: Atlantis. Subject: ATL: Three Quick Questions for Bill Dwyer Date: Sun, 4 Feb 2001 10:22:37 EST. 1. Could Bill please address what he imagines the legal code of a free society, working under Objectivist legal principles, would be as regards his view of emergencies? It would seem that in any putative rights violation, judges and juries would have to not only deal with objective issues (A ate B's bread) but also extremely subjective issues (A claims he was in an emergency situation...A claims he *thought* he was in an emergency situation...expert witness C claims A could have lasted x more days without B's bread...neighbor D claims he would have offered bread to A had A asked...etc...) Does Bill have no concern that arbitrating such more

elaborate issues might aggregate more power than is prudent in the hands of the government? Would he be surprised, for example, to find politically favored groups or individuals find themselves in more emergency situations than others?

 

2. Does Bill claim Rand's famous aphorism in Atlas Shrugged should, more explicitly, be read as: "I swear, by my life and my love of it, that I will never live for the sake of another man, nor ask another man to live for mine, unless I find myself in an emergency, in which case I will be free to ignore the second clause."?

 

3. Assuming Bill's interpretation of Rand's philosophy is correct, there is an interesting question arising from the Atlas Shrugged plotline; on the assumption that the collapse of the entire economy constitutes a true emergency (transportation was breaking down; Mouch couldn't get his grapefruit juice, mass starvation was likely only days away), why were Wesley Mouch and Jim Taggert wrong to torture Galt in order to force him to save the economy? Surely Galt has no right not to be tortured if Mouch and the others find themselves in an emergency situation and torturing Galt is the only way they see they might be able to save themselves. Does Bill think they were right to torture Galt? Ross (just dropping in for a moment) Levatter

 

From: DXIMGR To: Atlantis Subject: ATL: The Conflict in Non- Conflicting Principles Date: Sun, 4 Feb 2001 18:03:33 EST

Gayle Dean, before admitting defeat to George Smith, made the following claim:

>Bill and I are not saying that one must NEVER lie as a categorical imperative.  We are saying that in *each case* the moral action is to either lie or to not lie. It cannot be both and it cannot be either/or.     It must be *only one* of the two options. There cannot be conflicting principles."

 

This is an amazing claim. Consider this story...

------

Story:

My wife, who is undergoing a difficult labor, has previously made it plain to me that she detests lying, and would leave me if I ever lied to her. Her dearest sibling has, unknown to her, just died in a tragic accident on the way to visit her in the hospital.

 

She asks me when he'll arrive. I know that the truth might create such stress for her that her health and the life of the unborn baby will be endangered. Yet I also know if I don't answer her truthfully she may never forgive me.

----

Now surely we can all come up with arguments favoring lying or not lying. Many of us may even feel strongly that one answer is clearly correct. Yet I believe it takes an extremely rigid and unsophisticated view of the matter to argue that moral principles and moral principles alone dictate THE ONE AND ONLY answer to such a moral dilemma, and that the alternative view could NEVER be correct. Yet that is how I read Gayle's claim. Furthermore the fact that Bill and to a lesser degree Gayle demonstrate in their posts that they believe argumentation consists of simply repeating the same points over and over gives us some evidence they see the matter this way. If there is only one acceptable answer, simply repeating it would make sense. It is only when one develops more nuanced approaches, involving the weighing of competing but mutually incompatible values, that one realizes ethics involves more than a mantra ("there cannot be conflicting principles"...but how about conflicting results depending on differential weighings of mutually accepted principles?)

 

From: DXIMGR@ To: Atlantis Subject: ATL: Nothing New Under the Sun... Date: Sun, 4 Feb 2001 20:52:05 EST. Bill Dwyer is nothing if not consistent. The following comes from a discussion I engaged in with him back in 1999...

 

Dear List-readers,

Hmmm...this is very bad. According to Bill Dwyer, I am not simply wrong. I am WRONG! See for yourself:

 

I said:   > It does not follow...that because in some unusual situation it might be ethical to steal, that therefore such theft does not violate the rights of those from whom one stole. Rights are social, not individual ethical, principles.

 

Bill replied: > WRONG!  If Ross has a right to a certain piece of property, then Bill should refrain from stealing it. However, if it is ETHICAL for Bill to steal it, then it is NOT the case that Bill should refrain from stealing it, in which case, Ross cannot have a right to it.

 

Furthermore, I said: > I believe those who have been writing that ethical principles can NEVER broach ANY exceptions are inadvertently falling back on a religious RULE-ORIENTED view of ethics. This was not Rand's approach ....

 

And Bill replied: > WRONG!  A principle admits of NO exceptions QUA PRINCIPLE Bill clarified that the principle is not "stealing is always wrong" (which might admit of exceptions), but > The principle is: STEALING IS ALWAYS WRONG, except when one's survival requires it! And to that principle, there are no exceptions.

 

So, to summarize:

1. Bill objects to my distinguishing categories of behavior: I suggested that because they deal with different questions (ethics dealing with individual choice based on principles of value; rights dealing with political principles over proper control of scarce resources), an action might (rarely) be rights-violating, though ethical. Bill argues that if it is ethical for him to take something of mine, I do not have a right to it. (Fortunately, Bill does not know where I live. :-> ) Bill createsa modus tollens to "prove" this, but as is typically the case with syllogistic reasoning, the difficulty is in the premises. Bill's major premise ("If Ross has a right to the property, then Bill shouldn't steal it.") is the issue in contention. My very point was that ethics and rights do not superimpose, so that (rarely) an action might be ethical (it is right for you to do it) and still violate rights.

 

2. Bill reiterates, though never really grappling with my point about principles as heuristics, that principles are absolutes, when interpreted contextually.

 

But here's the problem: If I'm WRONG that, say, stealing Bill's wallet, when my life depends on it, is still rights-violating, why does Bill think he has a right to his wallet? And if I'm WRONG that Bill has a right to his wallet when taking it is necessary for my survival, why does Bill continue to want to call it "stealing"?

 

According to Bill, it would seem we have no rights to anything. For

> if it is ETHICAL ... to steal [A], then [you] cannot have a right to [A].

 

But,

  > The principle is: STEALING IS ALWAYS WRONG, except when one's survival requires it!

 

It follows that if A's survival depends on anything, no one has a right (against A) to that thing. We could imagine Rand's response: "You are saying my RIGHTS are hostage to the survival needs of the next bum who comes along?" :-)

...

 

It is, in fact, established law that in emergency circumstances A *can* use B's property without his permission. One classic example is a ship in a storm using someone's dock without permission. However it is also established law that the ship owner must pay for the use of the dock after the storm (and also that the dock owner can charge only standard fees, not the market-clearing price during storms). This seems completely consistent with my point (that it is ethical to use the dock, but you still violated the dock owner's rights, and subsequently have to pay for the use, a form of restitution). It seems inconsistent with Bill's interpretation, for if survival turns an otherwise right-violating action into an act that doesn't violate rights, why should you be forced to pay anything?

 

Let's examine the case of the ship in the storm more carefully, because Bill has clarified that an important ethical principle is:

 

  > STEALING IS ALWAYS WRONG, except when one's survival requires it!

and furthermore clarified that to this principle there are no exceptions.

 

So let's stipulate that your life, and the crew's life, are not in danger from the storm. It's merely that if you don't dock, the ship will founder and be rendered economically worthless, costing you millions. Apparently then it *would* be unethical to dock without permission, because your life wasn't in danger, and there are no other exceptions to the *rule* about not stealing. Similarly, if your house is burning down, you and the family are safely out, using your neighbor's hose on your house is unethical (...you and your neighbor hate each other and he has made it EXPLICITLY clear you cannot use his property without permission). And would it be ethical to use the hose if you were safely out but your loved ones weren't. Is "the survival of loved ones" also an exception to "STEALING IS ALWAYS WRONG"?

 

But perhaps Bill would like to add other Ptolomeic-like contexts to STEALING IS ALWAYS WRONG. Epicycles like "except when the owner of the thing stolen, if rational, would freely offer it" or "except in emergencies" or "except when the value of the thing lost by not stealing exceeds the value of the thing stolen" come to mind. Then we'd have an inviolable principle, with no exceptions (except it's getting a little hard to remember the principle in all its contextual detail).

 

And yet, at that point, isn't it sounding a lot like what I described in the first place: principles as heuristics that admit of rare exceptions based on standards? We have two methods of describing ethical principles. Both lead to the same conclusions. In one we describe principles as rules that accept no exceptions, and develop progressively more complicated contexts to account for anything that would seem to be an exception. In the other we describe principles as heuristics, with occasional exceptions anticipated since principles are guides to the achievement of goals based on standards, and like all guides occasionally fail to reach the goal.

 

... I think viewing principles as guidelines with the appreciation you should have justifications for exceptions is simply a more honest and clear-headed view than claiming principles are rules that one never deviates from and then announcing new contexts for the application of the rules whenever one comes across what would otherwise be a deviation. I hope my clarifications have convinced Bill that I'm not WRONG!, but at most only wrong. Perhaps even right.

Sincerely, Ross Levatter [Clearly, my hope here was a false one.]

 

OWL: The ethics of exceptions... Date: Wed, 8 Sep 1999 16:56:26 -0600 (MDT)

From:  Ross Levatter   To: objectivism. Dear list members, ... we'll focus on principles and whether or not they may properly take of exceptions.

 

> Ross Levatter takes my example of an absolute, unexceptionable principle -- namely,

> "Stealing is wrong, except when one's life depends on it" --  and points out that even that principle would seem to have exceptions.  What if the lives of your LOVE ONES depend on your stealing?  Should you let them die, rather than violate your principle?

 

Bill here is almost making my point for me. Notice what he considers "an absolute, UNEXCEPTIONABLE principle...":

 

"Stealing is wrong, EXCEPT when one's life depends on it".

 

Bill asks me what is the point of principles if there can be exceptions to them. But he agrees with me if those he loved were in danger, he'd violate the principle and then accept the consequences.

 

I guess I could therefore in return ask him what is the point of inviolable principles if sometimes the proper thing to do is to violate them? Or is Bill saying the proper thing to do is not violate the principle and let those one loves die, but that he (and most other people) are just too "weak" to "do the right thing"? Isn't that sounding a lot like familiar defenses of altruism and socialism, claims that these systems are fine, but people aren't good enough for them.

 

I guess, in the final analysis, the question is whether we want the principle tail wagging the life's value dog.

 

As Rand points out, ethics serve a purpose: to aid man in living. He needs principles to do that, because principles crystallize vast amounts of information he needs to live in easily useable form. But the principles are not ends in themselves. They are guides to living well. As such, they sometimes fail, because sometimes particulars—things important to Bill's life, but not mine, or vice versa--lead one to realize that the application of the principle in THAT particular instance leads to a clearly wrong result (but don't the principles, properly applied, *determine* what is the right result? NO! [ahem...No.] Your life, lived happily, determines the rightness of the result.)

 

If the principle, properly applied, leads to the death of your loved ones, it *probably* should be ignored, an exception made (Not always; remember that great Star Trek episode, written by Harlan Ellison: The City On the Edge of Forever...). Does Bill want unhappy but principled wretches failing to live the life Objectivism holds as its goal (a life without pain, or fear, or guilt) because they saw themselves as forbidden to deviate from enunciated principle and perhaps weren't as clever as he in appreciating contextual detail? Or would it be better to say to them: live a happy life. Here are principles to use as tools. Like all tools, they can be applied properly or improperly to their task. They are here to serve you. You are not here to serve them. Just like computers--another powerful tool--can have glitches and bugs, so occasionally the principles offered will not lead you where you should go (based on Objectivist standards of life and happiness). You may then recognize an exception (the tool is not to be used here). Or you may call for a contextual clarification--you may modify the tool--and then use it. Of course, with enough contextual clarifications the tool may be so greatly modified you have trouble remembering how to use it.

 

Bill, reasonably, says:  > Whatever the consequences, paying them has got to be better than letting a loved one die. But what is the principle that one is using to make that decision? Expedient self-interest?

 

No, Bill; NO principle is being applied. A *standard* is being applied. The standard says applying the principle *now* harms your goal of achieving a happy and fulfilled life. Where did you get those principles, anyway? Were they not derived from the standards? Aren't the standards primary?

 

> Moreover, if principles are not unexceptionable, then how do you decide if and when they're violated?

 

By reason.

 

> By what standard?

 

By the standard of my life, and my love of it.

 

> A principle is BY DEFINITION unexceptionable, isn't it?

 

Only if you define it that way.

 

> Otherwise, it doesn't make sense to call it a "principle".

 

It depends on what you want of principles. If you want a rule-book for life (apply these principles; never deviate. Happiness guaranteed. No thought required.) then you might need principles that are unexceptionable. If, on the other hand, you (like Bill) are a thoughtful person able to know when you're in an unusual context, you'll not find the fact that, rarely, principles have exceptions frightening. (Apply these principles; deviate only when appropriate. Happiness never guaranteed. Thought always required.)

 

And that gets us back to where we started, my initial post suggesting that some people, typically religionists, though not always (as we've seen), view ethical principles as rules: Do this; don't do that. Why? BECAUSE THAT'S THE RULE! Others view ethical principles as guides to action, derived from standards, directed toward goals. The goals are what one is after. The standards are primary. The principles are tools. And as tools they work well even when they're not the Swiss Army type tools that can be used in every and all contexts.

 

Sincerely,

Ross Levatter

 

While it is often considered bad form to speculate why people hold fast to clearly fallacious reasoning, I do think it worth asking why Dwyer feels it so horrible to contemplate that principles might rarely admit of exceptions, to consider that applying ethical principles to one's life is slightly more complicated than being the dealer at a game of 21, having nothing to do except follow the rules? It is true that introducing the concept of ethical JUDGMENT into the picture introduces as well the possibility of error. Is the possibility of potentially having to admit error, ethical or intellectual, as frightening for Dwyer as it was for Rand?

[merjet]

16 hours ago, anthony said:

I'm not getting you. Are we not agreed that ~without~ a breach, actor and beneficiary are one? As it should be?

Answering the first question, 'yes' for some actions, 'no' for other actions. See here.  

Regarding the second question, I try to put the cognitive before the normative, as MSK says it, or identify before evaluate, as Peikoff and other people have said.

[anthony]

10 hours ago, merjet said:

Answering the first question, 'yes' for some actions, 'no' for other actions. See here.  

Regarding the second question, I try to put the cognitive before the normative, as MSK says it, or identify before evaluate, as Peikoff and other people have said.

Merjet: How do you measure "value"? How does one know who is the greater beneficiary of an action, the 'giver' or the 'receiver'?

I quote from your article: [Galt] ""Do you ask if it's ever proper to help another man? No -- if he claims it a right or as a moral duty that you owe him. Yes--if such is your own desire based on your own selfish pleasure in the value of his person and his struggle". (AS975)

[Merlin] "This strikes me as an odd use of "selfish" when the primary beneficiary of such action is somebody else.. Moreover, her use of the term has caused Rand's arguments to be frequently misrepresented and made a frequent target for critics"".

---

The above by Galt is a TRUE representation of AR's arguments; being altruist, the critics choose to pretend they don't grasp it..

I haven't seen that you refer much or at all to 'values', and that's where you miss the critical point:

Value perceived by the 'giver'.

So long as his beneficent act is unforced, and someone's plight is recognised (identified), (dis-)valued, or sympathized with by him, individually/selfishly -

and it is his "own selfish pleasure in the value of [another's] person and his struggle" -

AND, helping that specific individual/institution is of higher value to him on his personal scale of values than the 'cost' of the action (so, not sacrificial: i.e. he is outlaying a lesser value for a greater) -

Then, it is "proper" that he does so - in fact - why not, "rational and moral"?

That's "cognitive and normative" (more accurately, I think - cognitive, evaluative and ethical).

The "primary beneficiary"? How do you know which he is? It could well be the "giver" who gets the most out of it.

Sorry, merjet, but your rendition ( I suppose in trying to make more palatable, "rational selfishness") I find idiosynchratic. Rand is usually the one accused of this, but in terms of reality, man's nature, and 'objective value' - hers is the completely and only rational theory.

There can't be yes-no compromise or equivocation - NO "breach" is permissible: what a moral actor thinks, creates, produces and then profits from, is morally his. This is indeed a cognitive, evaluative, moral principle, nullifying the Is-Ought false dichotomy again, I think. ("As it should be"). And btw, 'profiting' from his moral acts, his efforts, is precisely how he can afford to help out someone struggling whom he sees worth in, a 'value' to him, in the first place.

(You are a defender of Capitalism, what did you think of "You didn't build that!")

[KorbenDallas]

It might help to define primary, from the OED 2nd edition:

3. Of the first order in any series, sequence, or process, esp. of derivation or causation: with various shades of meaning. a. Not subordinate to or derived from something else; original; independent; often with the connotation Having something else derived from, or dependent on, it; fundamental, radical.

[anthony]

Korben, Doesn't "primary" imply secondary, tertiary...etc.?

I think "primary beneficiary" is a red herring which takes us off point. I'll repeat an earlier observation that there are two distinct areas here. What Rand wrote in the Introduction, is simply that a man, the actor, must be THE beneficiary of his moral acts. Period. ( You recall she's writing against the background of altruism). Therefore, he must get what he strives for and deserves, despite all claims/demands by others who want to interfere and "breach" him from - let's call it - his "input" (his income, profit, knowledge, leisure time, etc.). That's the one side of the coin.

Then, simultaneously, he has all kinds of values - human, material entities, 'spiritual' goals, recreational activity, and so on - that support his life and help him pursue his happiness. They require his "output" and virtues to gain and keep. On what or whom he dedicates some part of his input, how much and in what order and priority, is moot and irrelevant. It may be on his daughter, some good person in trouble, a swimming pool, or one of his many other values - or on all of them, at once. He receives his unbreached input, and then disperses it as he sees fit, but we are hardly going to call all these a 'secondary beneficiary', are we?! They are all HIS objective values, held hierarchically, and his existence and life's work is the source. This second part, Rand simply posed as the moral justification for the first, I think is clear.

[Wolf DeVoon]

This thread is so far off the rails, all of it. Get real. Men and women have contrary moral interests, purpose, and standards of right and wrong. Children are incompetent legally and morally, until age 16, unless the kid lives in Africa or the Arab world, where no one has any right to anything unless you're in the royal circle jerk. Jeez.

[Brant Gaede]

3 hours ago, wolfdevoon said:

This thread is so far off the rails, all of it. Get real. Men and women have contrary moral interests, purpose, and standards of right and wrong. Children are incompetent legally and morally, until age 16, unless the kid lives in Africa or the Arab world, where no one has any right to anything unless you're in the royal circle jerk. Jeez.

But we appreciate your contributions.

--Brant

[Wolf DeVoon]

I said the Oath repeatedly over the years. I would say it again because it's a claim to live for my own sake.

[KorbenDallas]

7 hours ago, wolfdevoon said:

This thread is so far off the rails, all of it. Get real. Men and women have contrary moral interests, purpose, and standards of right and wrong.

So does this imply that someone should succumb to any ol' moral interest, purpose, or standard of right and wrong just because those are interests, purposes, or standards of right and wrong qua interests, purposes, or standards of right and wrong?

7 hours ago, wolfdevoon said:

Children are incompetent legally and morally, until age 16,

But they are developing, can develop epistemologically by a matter of choice, volition, as it pertains to their individual.

7 hours ago, wolfdevoon said:

unless the kid lives in Africa or the Arab world, where no one has any right to anything unless you're in the royal circle jerk.

Non-sequitur, we live in America where living by a rational code of values is possible

7 hours ago, wolfdevoon said:

Jeez.

Jeezus Christ Superstar!

[KorbenDallas]

8 hours ago, anthony said:

Korben, Doesn't "primary" imply secondary, tertiary...etc.?

I think "primary beneficiary" is a red herring which takes us off point. I'll repeat an earlier observation that there are two distinct areas here. What Rand wrote in the Introduction, is simply that a man, the actor, must be THE beneficiary of his moral acts. Period. ( You recall she's writing against the background of altruism). Therefore, he must get what he strives for and deserves, despite all claims/demands by others who want to interfere and "breach" him from - let's call it - his "input" (his income, profit, knowledge, leisure time, etc.). That's the one side of the coin.

Then, simultaneously, he has all kinds of values - human, material entities, 'spiritual' goals, recreational activity, and so on - that support his life and help him pursue his happiness. They require his "output" and virtues to gain and keep. On what or whom he dedicates some part of his input, how much and in what order and priority, is moot and irrelevant. It may be on his daughter, some good person in trouble, a swimming pool, or one of his many other values - or on all of them, at once. He receives his unbreached input, and then disperses it as he sees fit, but we are hardly going to call all these a 'secondary beneficiary', are we?! They are all HIS objective values, held hierarchically, and his existence and life's work is the source. This second part, Rand simply posed as the moral justification for the first, I think is clear.

anthony, I was referring more to the 3a sense with the context, "Not subordinate to or derived from something else; original; independent;" so I was kind of agreeing with you.  To add to the above, if the man was an Objectivist and bought the daughter braces, or perhaps bought his own family swimming pool, he could have done it for the emotional reward (benefit) unto himself: that he was the one that provided it for them---but as long as he doesn't consider them needing mercy or pity, rather he considers them to be a high value, I would see this as a rational value trade.

Another thing to consider, is a question that went unanswered before is: what is a value?  A value presupposes three things:  a standard, purpose, and necessitated action in the face of alternatives---these three things are required before calling something value, otherwise it's an object or idea with non-value, or non-identification (not selecting).  This is important in the conversation about value, the Oath, and the paragraph above.  Anytime someone speaks of value, I ask: what standard?  In the braces example or buying his own family a pool, what's the value the children are giving him?  Is their benefit based off a rational standard?  Or is he buying these things without educating them about their worth, of how to get them?

[Wolf DeVoon]

5 hours ago, KorbenDallas said:

So does this imply that someone should succumb to any ol' moral interest, purpose, or standard of right and wrong just because those are interests, purposes, or standards of right and wrong qua interests, purposes, or standards of right and wrong?

Respectfully, I think it's observable and metaphysically ordained that men and women have contrary moral interests, purpose and standards. Almost everything said in this thread was couched in male language about doing things that benefit others, specifically children. Women don't think twice about feeding and nurturing them. Those are overly broad generalizations and should be noted as such, especially in the modern world (or should I say post-modern?) But indefinite or elective sexuality is not the problem, although it points at it. We live, as all people throughout history have lived, in a chowder of diversity, contained by power structures of state, religion, and economy. It's fine to say that America is #1 (or was) if you wish. But internally we're governed by factions. The genius of America was accommodating and tolerating those factions, which took a series of emergencies and failures to obtain by compromise in 1787 and again during the Civil War with unwanted and untoward consequences. It's a little crazy and a little blind to say that we live in a free society today, or that reason is universally obligatory or could be made so. We live in a soup of institutions and contentious idolatry. Objectivist principles cut no ice in American law, politics, family life, or pop culture.

 

[Brant Gaede]

1 hour ago, wolfdevoon said:

Respectfully, I think it's observable and metaphysically ordained that men and women have contrary moral interests, purpose and standards. Almost everything said in this thread was couched in male language about doing things that benefit others, specifically children. Women don't think twice about feeding and nurturing them. Those are overly broad generalizations and should be noted as such, especially in the modern world (or should I say post-modern?) But indefinite or elective sexuality is not the problem, although it points at it. We live, as all people throughout history have lived, in a chowder of diversity, contained by power structures of state, religion, and economy. It's fine to say that America is #1 (or was) if you wish. But internally we're governed by factions. The genius of America was accommodating and tolerating those factions, which took a series of emergencies and failures to obtain by compromise in 1787 and again during the Civil War with unwanted and untoward consequences. It's a little crazy and a little blind to say that we live in a free society today, or that reason is universally obligatory or could be made so. We live in a soup of institutions and contentious idolatry. Objectivist principles cut no ice in American law, politics, family life, or pop culture.

"Men" and "women"? How about man qua man and woman qua woman for your thesis? This would too let us lucidly focus on their human commonality. Men are from Mars and woman are from Venus isn't too helpful for that. The biological sequence is men provide for women and women in turn provide for the children made possible by protection and produced goods. There is also the man-woman synergy with its psychological rewards and the rewards of having/being part of a family. Finally, individuality. All men are different though men. All women are different though women. All children are different though children. All humans are different but belong to "The Family of Man."

--Brant

[anthony]

6 hours ago, KorbenDallas said:

 

Another thing to consider, is a question that went unanswered before is: what is a value?  A value presupposes three things:  a standard, purpose, and necessitated action in the face of alternatives---these three things are required before calling something value, otherwise it's an object or idea with non-value, or non-identification (not selecting).  This is important in the conversation about value, the Oath, and the paragraph above.  Anytime someone speaks of value, I ask: what standard?  In the braces example or buying his own family a pool, what's the value the children are giving him?  Is their benefit based off a rational standard?  Or is he buying these things without educating them about their worth, of how to get them?

You ask the most pertinent question. ("What is a value?") Why - value? A book could be filled with the Objectivist explanation (and probably has) to expound further on Rand's well known words:

"It is only an ultimate goal, an _end in itself_ that makes the existence of values possible".

"Values are the motivating power of man's actions and _necessity_ of his survival, psychologically as well as physically....The form in which man experiences the reality of his values is - *pleasure*".

"..try to imagine an immortal, indestructible robot...which cannot be affected by anything...which cannot be damaged, injured or destroyed. Such an entity would not be able to have any values; it would have nothing to gain or to lose; ...."

(I'd suggest superfluously that in contrast to "the robot", now envisage man and individual man. Mortal and destructible (physically, mentally, emotionally) who CAN be "affected" and with EVERYTHING "to gain or to lose". Thus, values - and the virtues required to get and keep them).

"Is he buying these things without educating them [his children] about their worth ..." (Korben) That's a great topic on its own, initially I think that "value" given and received (traded) visibly shows itself in action, and so the objective standard is passed on and learned by others, like the youngsters involved.

[merjet]

23 hours ago, anthony said:

Merjet: How do you measure "value"? How does one know who is the greater beneficiary of an action, the 'giver' or the 'receiver'?

I quote from your article: [Galt] ""Do you ask if it's ever proper to help another man? No -- if he claims it a right or as a moral duty that you owe him. Yes--if such is your own desire based on your own selfish pleasure in the value of his person and his struggle". (AS975)

Money provides a measure in some cases, but I don't claim to know for many others. I can't say, and wouldn't even try to say, how to "measure" -- ranking is not measuring -- how much I value some other things and some other people.

Suppose the following as an example satisfying Galt's statement. I am driving on the highway and see an old man who is a stranger to me on the side of the road with a car that has a flat tire. He is obviously struggling. So I stop to change his tire. He offers to pay me as a token for my help, but I decline. In that case I'd say the old man is the primary/greater beneficiary of my action. How would I measure his value to me, or how would he measure the value I gave him? I have no idea. Do you have a "value measuring stick" for such an example? 

23 hours ago, anthony said:

I haven't seen that you refer much or at all to 'values', and that's where you miss the critical point:

Value perceived by the 'giver'.

I think you are grasping at straws. Is the value perceived by the recipient, like the old man with the flat tire, irrelevant? What if the action is a trade, in which both parties both give and receive?

23 hours ago, anthony said:

The "primary beneficiary"? How do you know which he is? It could well be the "giver" who gets the most out of it.

The last might be true once in a while. Who do you believe is the "primary beneficiary" in my tire-changing example? Who do you believe is the "primary beneficiary" in my example of a father buying braces for his daughter? How do you know? I say unreservedly the old man and the daughter.

[Brant Gaede]

1 hour ago, anthony said:

You ask the most pertinent question. ("What is a value?") Why - value? A book could be filled with the Objectivist explanation (and probably has) to expound further on Rand's well known words:

"It is only an ultimate goal, an _end in itself_ that makes the existence of values possible".

"Values are the motivating power of man's actions and _necessity_ of his survival, psychologically as well as physically....The form in which man experiences the reality of his values is - *pleasure*".

"..try to imagine an immortal, indestructible robot...which cannot be affected by anything...which cannot be damaged, injured or destroyed. Such an entity would not be able to have any values; it would have nothing to gain or to lose; ...."

(I'd suggest superfluously that in contrast to "the robot", now envisage man and individual man. Mortal and destructible (physically, mentally, emotionally) who CAN be "affected" and with EVERYTHING "to gain or to lose". Thus, values - and the virtues required to get and keep them).

"Is he buying these things without educating them [his children] about their worth ..." (Korben) That's a great topic on its own, initially I think that "value" given and received (traded) visibly shows itself in action, and so the objective standard is passed on and learned by others, like the youngsters involved.

Rand's "robot" might as well be a rock. This seems to be an attempt to short-circuit discussion by her by capping it off. Every living thing has values, even a virus. These values expand and get complicated as you go up the chain of living complexity to human (cognitive) beings, sometimes lost or obscured in a swirl of possible choices, many poorly made, usually from lack of serious, critical thinking.

--Brant

[Wolf DeVoon]

12 hours ago, Brant Gaede said:

There is also the man-woman synergy with its psychological rewards and the rewards of having/being part of a family. Finally, individuality. All men are different though men. All women are different though women. All children are different though children. All humans are different but belong to "The Family of Man."

--Brant

Concur absolutely, Brant. My chief interest intellectually is the rights of children. My mentor pointed at it, as an unsolved problem.

[anthony]

On 2016/08/21 at 5:01 PM, Brant Gaede said:

Rand's "robot" might as well be a rock. This seems to be an attempt to short-circuit discussion by her by capping it off. Every living thing has values, even a virus. These values expand and get complicated as you go up the chain of living complexity to human (cognitive) beings, sometimes lost or obscured in a swirl of possible choices, many poorly made, usually from lack of serious, critical thinking.

--Brant

Well - a mobile and calculating "robot" for it to be a reasonable metaphor I guess, unlike the rock.

"Every living thing has values, even a virus". Brant I figure you're joking. Else, this is the n'th degree of biological reductionism. Air, water and nutrients are sufficient for all living organisms, nowhere near enough for a 'proper' man's life, man who has the consciousness to know and to value. Raw survival - except for a very brief period under an uncommon emergency - isn't life, it's just breathing oxygen. ("*Man's life* is the standard of value")