dlewis

Thank you both, Darrel and Stephen, for such excellent explanations-- these clarify some things for me about Rand's view of identity, and how likely most Objectivists define identity. It is good to know she didn't slide identity and truth together into the same concept. I actually agree with most all both of you are saying as well. Darrell-- you are absolutely right-- definitions are epistemological-- I didn't mean to confuse epistemology with metaphysics. I know what you mean when you say things have a specific identity, and this is what allows them to be identified, yet the identity itself and the process of identification are different things. But let me see if can explain my problem with her, and most Objectivists definiton of identitiy more succinctly. As you explain Darrell, the Objectivist notion of identity rests on the fact that all things have a specific identity that makes it possible for us to identify their natures. I don't dispute this idea in general, but I'm wondering how you, Stephen, Rand, other Objectivists, would define the term "specific" in this context. Most would probably say that quantum physics today reveals that that the exact, often minute qualities and quantities within entities change every instant, so that their identities (especially any of their dual properties [as explained by the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle]), as we apprehend or grasp them, are not this exact. Rand's open-endedness of concept formation helps us understand that we don't need this level exactitude to get at or scope out something's identity (e.g. her identity as "what-ness" vs. "it-ness" as explained previously). And concepts like Rand's existnece are so wide they can include everything, so this concept is not specific at all. The concept existence is also axiomatic, or self-proven, which to me makes me think its definition automatically links with anything or everything that lies inside or outside our mind, or all things metaphysical. So if "Existence is identity" (thank you Stephen for expalining how Rand arrived at that statement) then why can't it be as wide-reaching as her notion of existence. Any/all relationships (whether within or outside any mind) would broaden the idea so that we could include any interactions of matter, thoughts, imaginings, whatever, and still be able to do away with ideas like "mind-body" irreconsilable dichotomies because it underscores that any/all things interconnect. Can't the idea of truth instead, depending on how it is defined, do away with the need for having to link the identity of any/all things to some "specific" character. Also, if identity is not dependent on our minds anyway, how can we say with axiomatic certainty that "what things are" has some "what-ness" level of specificity, just by positing the concept identity? I know this is a redefining of identity, especially as Objectivists define it. I guess I would ask what term you would give to what I am saying, if you don't think identity is capable of this wider abstraction? Do you think this wider abstraction is acutally axiomatic like I do? If not, why not?

I find this topic of spatial infinity and (or versus) finitude pretty interesting. I think, Dennis, you are right--this topic hasn't been addressed as much as it should be by philosophers. However, although I think agnosticism is an honest answer to the question, I don't think agnosticism in general is where any philosophy should end--shouldn't we always probe the mysteries of things to better understand them, and use the best logic or sustem we can attain at the time, even if the questions can't ever be fully centain to us? I generally agree with Ted that there can be a finite matter-energy in the universe yet an unbounded construct to space-time, making sense with what scientists have observed and Big Bang theorists have posited. But I may even go further than this. For example, in comment to the post by George H. Smith above: "The concept of 'infinity' has a very definite purpose in mathematical calculation, and there it is a concept of method. But that isn't what is meant by the term "infinity" as such. "Infinity" in the metaphysical sense, as something existing in reality, is another invalid concept. The concept "infinity," in that sense, means something without identity, something not limited by anything, not definable. Peikoff, OPAR, p,. 31-32." This to me is too limited an observation. Isn't Rand's concept of "existence" as anything and everything, really not limited by anything as well, yet still definable? If Peikoff means that metaphysically, in the context of space-time, that infinity cannot be defined, what about the idea that space could nave no external spatial boundary, yet have internal ones, as may have been already suggested when Ted explained the universe as "self-bounded." Couldn't some infinite, most basic, spatial substance isotropically be moving inward at the same rate and "inward" direction (like gravity) from all points in space to manifest or evolve into finite forms? Furthermore, I don't think infinity has to be caught up in the idea of curvature to be classified only that way as "unbounded." For example, what exists on each side of that curve? If "something" permeates all space, then there shouldn't be any gaps in the space-time continuum, right?

Well, I guess it may undermine Rand's notion of identity to some degree, but I don't think it destabilizes identity axiomatically-- I think understanding identity as any/all relations of, within or between things actually helps strengthen the concept to include all ideas, all contexts, all knowledge, not just denotative, or essential definitions of things.

Okay, Rand stated "Existence is Identity." Does she mean by this that existence is exactly the same concept as identity? I wouldn't think she'd say that. There would be no reason for the two ideas if they were exactly the same thing. She must be using the statement to mean existence is very very close to the idea of identity. And I don't think she'd say identity is dependent on consciousness either, right? I mean consciousness as far as we know it is only an animal ability, but all things are what they are within certain spatial-temporal contexts, and some spatial-temporal contexts seem to lie outside of our conscious abilities. So I understand how the idea of existence underscores how anything, to be real, must exist. "Nothing" if it is real, must still exist, for example. So to me if existence is anything and everything, it is the widest possible concept that can be posited-- and that is why it grounds all other knowledge and is axiomatic. I just think Rand failed to broaden the idea of identity to this same level as existence, just enough to separate it from that concept, and still make it wide enough to be an inescapabe idea-- an axiomatic concept. Identity, beyond things merely being themselves (which may be better encapulated with an axiomatic concept like "self"), as any/all relations of, within or between things, seems to more accurately unfold its wider definition, making this definiton more worthy of axiomatic distinction, whereas if we entwine the idea of identiy with truth, then I think it gets unecessarily caught up in the idea of consciousness, of how well the mind and outside world relate ( which is how I think of truth--as more contextual). I think the law of the excluded middle, which you may be saying she has embeded within her idea of identity, may be causing this error. From what I understand of this idea, it means a thing is either true in one respect, or true in some negation of that respect. However the excluded middle seems to restrict truth, not to mention identity, in a way that is not entirely useful or even, to me, fully accurate. For example, the way we view light bouncing off an object can make that object appear red to us even if the natural color, with different lighting, or standing in a different position, is green. Rand seems to want to make the context specific when it suits her argument (i.e. red cannot be green in the exact same context as discussed above), and then change that argument with identity, in trying to define it loosely as "A=A," so that mind and outside world automatically connect to ideas of truth, consciousness and concept formation, yet still give the idea a broader idea as "what-ness" as opposed to "it-ness." Why not make the concept of identity wider to include all relations, if we can still understand it as including the idea that things are what they are, whatever that is? Doesn't such a definition instead expand our ideas of truth, and help us understand contextual relationships within an Obejectivist philosophy rather than undermine Rand's notion of identity?

Ah, I'm back from vacation! Thanks so much Stephen for that amazing answer (you're right Ba'al)! Your description helps me understand more clearly the extent to which Rand likely defined identitiy-- her "A=A" "what-ness" versus merely "it-ness" is a great summation of Objectivist philosophy as I understand it in ITOE. I even agree with this idea in trying to set denotative definitons for things-- I think it is important, and probably essential for any effective language, communucation, or understanding to set formal (no matter how broad-based) limits on our commonly held conceptions of things. Science and mathematics often seem to help us better fine-tune these denotative defintions to essential attributes. There is no doubt in my mind that the mind and outside world connect somehow, that any rational basis for knowledge needs identity underpinning it, and even that there are likely common attritbutes existing from object to conceptualization that can be isolated and integrated from world to mind, to other minds, and back into the larger world. I guess my problem, Stephen, is that by proposing identity, or the idea of "A=A" as an axiomatic concept, as an inescapable, all-encompassing truth, in effect removes from its own defintion the luxury of attributing any specific connection of mind to outside world. The second we specify those connections, the idea seems to become too limited to be all-emcompassing. I imagine why many Objectivists do not want to lose that specificity in their conception of identity, is the fear that it will destabilize the validity of concepts-- if identities can involve any relation of mind to outside world, then a lot of nonsensical concepts could arise without critical analysis of their truth or actuality. I get it. But can't these more specific limitations to identities be handled as knowledge/things naturally become more specific, perhaps with concepts like "form" and "content," that would start to deal with how a basketball, cup, top (or any of the actions or attritbutes that make those things move or function) more specifically connect with, or more denotatively exist in, the outside world?

Thanks for the welcome btw. Looks like there's some amazing discussions taking place on this site. Thank you to any or all who had a hand in creating it:)

Good question Ba'al-- I wonder how you'd respond to that Stephen. Stephen when you talk about Rand's inclusion of "perceptual similarities in terms of identical dimensions common to similar things having different magnitudes along those dimensions," it sounds like your'e talking about the difference between "kinds" and "degrees" of something, like vertical vs. horizontal categorization. Is this a fair assessment? I guess I'm trying to understand your "identical dimesions common to similar things" idea. "Identical" from what I gather of how she/you are using the A=A notion, means one thing is exactly like another thing in some way. I'm not sure that really holds physically speaking, since for example, two cups of the same kind, although they will have a similarity of shape and a common function (normally for drinking), if examined physically, they have different space-time placements for one, and probably a lot of minute differences in their microscopic compositions, and of course cups can be used for very different things-- e.g. one for drinking and the other for holding objects. If the idea of identity is simply made more general to include any/all relationships-- that things have to relate somehow, but not pin identity's axiomatic nature to any exacting contexts (yet stemming from it's one exception--that things also are what they are at any specific moment in time [since this doesn't seem to contradict physics]), then I think it alleviates having to tie the axiomatic notion of identity to our perceptual processes, and still allows us to say that, for example, that there is no "mind-body" dichotomy, because all things have to relate somehow, no matter if we are able to define those relations. I'm not arguing that Rand's notion was pretty inclusive (I think it was the best idea of its time), but pretty inclusive is not all-inclusive-- I think axiomatic concepts need to be all-inclusive.

Oh, I apologize for my earlier red-green example, because I didn't correctly read Rand had said "all red" or "all green" at the same time-- she's correct.

Responding to an earlier post by Roger Bissel, what he says about the Law of Non-Contradiction is absolutely logical--a thing cannot both be itself and not itself at the same time in the same context (although he explains it much better than this). What I would ask then, is the Law of Non-Contradiction the only thing encompassed within the idea of identity? Could it also include the idea that all things are interconnected somehow? Would this make the concept more useful? more accurate? more all-emcomssing to better ground its axiomatic nature?

Wouldn't the idea above morph Rand's ideas of "measurement ommission" in Intro to Objectivist Epistemology, to also include within its process "mesurement inclusion," much like how we use both induction and deduction to form an idea, if there isn't just one specifc identity in anything we are trying to define?

Posted 05 October 2007 - 12:22 PM Stephen Boydstun, on Oct 5 2007, 12:01 PM, said: Yeah, I like most people would at least agree that things are what they are at any specific moment in time. But the "A=A," Law of Non-Contradiction, Objectivist notion of identity seems like too narrow a definiton for identity, I think. Why can't an identity be any relationship where one thing connects with another, both as "A=A" and "A is similar to A" (or B or C or whatever it connects closely [or even distantly] to). This would make identity a wider concept, one more general and seemingly more fundamental. To me all things seem interconnected somehow, both within and outside the mind. Because we don't know an object or entity or thing only at one specific moment in time, but at many moments in time (being that change seems inevitable through the active state of our lives and/or consciousness), why can't identity be a synthesis of these two ideas? Just like existence doesn't fix down any exact idea in its definiton, because it is everything (or subsumes everything?), why do identities have to concretize things only to thier exact, "denotative" definitions? In art, for example, I find it refreshing when there are several layers of interpretation that can be suggested for a meaning-- that doesn't have to take away from any essential meaning in the work, or even the denotative list of subject matter, materials, techniques etc used to create the effect-- these layers instead seem to add to the meaning of art, help give it more nuance, or a larger, more penetrating identity. For example, in Rand's examples above, a leaf could exist in petrified or decaying form within a stone, red and green in an impressionist painting blend to brown when standing at a certain distance from a painting-- so that brown is both red and green at the same time. If you wanted to isolate the red and the green to their specific shapes, one could move even further in within the red shape and perhaps see green specks, as long as those specks were dominated and surrounded by a red more intense so that in backing up again they disappear to red. And doesn't liquid nitrogen literally both freeze and burn our skin at the same time? Again I'm not denying that things are what they are at any moment in time, but shouldn't identity, to be posited as a useful axiomatic concept, have an extended definition... like to any/all relationships? Isn't what we are trying to get out of identity the idea that there is some way to expain A as A because it connects to this or that content in some way, not simply because it can only be one thing at any moment in time?