dlewis

There in also a forum "Universal Will" on OL that addresses some of these same issues

Interesting Ellen-- I like your descriptions of the sweeping motion through space. You have a poetic way of looking at things. I'm curious of both you and Jonathan-- what are your backgrounds/fields of study-- what draws you to aesthetic analysis, and what are your views on Objectivist aesthetics?

Yeah, I'm not sure it is that constructive of an argument to pit determinism against free will or vice versa because of course we always have to explain why some things seem to be determinable, and on the other hand why we (or at least I'm guessing most conscious humans) feel like they have choices to some degree. Maybe we are programmed to think we have choice, but we don't-- still pure determinism. Or maybe there it some level of "choice" in any "multifunctional" being down the evolutionary ladder (see my description of "cholce" in post #73)? Or maybe there are clear divisions between things that can choose and those that can't? I think most "Objectivists" think choice (at least how we experience it) begins with consciousness. I still use the term choice in this way. But I've grown to the conclusion that any multifunctional entity must have some level of what we experience as "choice" for such emergent properties to form in the first place-- and here is an example to try to clarify: We obviously have basic natural impulses, e.g. for food, to breathe, all the time-- things that we have to eventually cater to or we will die. But we can simultaneously have an impulse e.g. to eat, and then also to not eat-- something that challenges that notion like-- I'll eat too much if I eat more, and/or I'll get fat and out of shape, and/or I need to save that food for later, and/or I don't have time right now-- all these decisions and values can come into our minds in what seems like an instant to motivate us to take one action or another. Now, what can we say determines the eventual outcome here? Evolutionarily, genetic (and even "learned") programming (like genetic predispositions towards food and how we learned to eat) in combination with environmental factors (the current situation-- like I have to get to work and thus I can't eat) , have often been presented as the predominant factors determining what has to cause the outcome. But then how do things, actions, behaviors ever change? Is it possible that besides such internal/external programming,there is some ability of an entity if it has contained within it, many preprogrammed functions, that it can direct energy as a whole towards one or more of those functions-- and when it combines those functions in such a way that the outcome is different to some certain degree, it can creatively push itself forward. For example, with the environmental influence of "I have to get to work" one may automatically make the conclusion " so I can't eat" but perhaps one has had an experience of taking the bus to work, so referencing that information, one knows that if that option is taken, one can eat food on the way. It comes back to seeing the larger framework of oneself and ones multiple capabilities to take creative pathways. So I think that even if you believe in determinism, you can't deny that creative processes have to be there for new changes to come up-- that is some kind of "freedom" that perhaps we have (and perhaps many more things than us have). And perhaps this freedom can be held internally by us, (and perhaps other multifunctional entities down the evolutionary chain). Prhaps this creative freedom drives through our conscious processes as "choice." Otherwise aren't we left with some kind of external "randomness" as a casual force for change? And isn't "random" just the scientists equivalent of giving up, or putting all things/actions that don't make sense in a neater miscellaneous drawer?

I wanted to reopen this forum-- I read the whole thing, though not entirely critically, and I think many people have brought up some very good insights-- it seems most concluded or came to understand that there was some level to which human/higher animal (i.e. "conscious") life is predetermined, and some level/degree in which conscious beings have control over their own actions, following from this that "choice" does not necessarily equate to entirely "free" will, but at least some level of freedom. I agree with this assessment. My reason for wanting to reopen this topic is due to some conversations I've been having in the forum "DL's book," (Evoltiion: A Theory of Everything), with Peter Taylor especially. And the main question is: How does choice form from the inanimate on the level we/higher animals experience it -- is choice only conscious? Here is a segment from my book where I propose the idea of "cholce," or "holistic choice," as a potential option for understanding how the inanimate may possess some kind of the same mechanism of functioning by "self-regulating" their internal states: --------------------------------------------------- "Things can maintain themselves, grow, or devolve as they change, depending on their different contexts. However, apart from any specific evolution, changes must always go from one state to another, thus involving at least two actions. Two (or more) actions can either happen either at the same time or one before/after another. Thus, versus ideas like growth that can describe progressive change, more generally, simultaneous or sequential actions seem to carry knowledge processes forward first.[1] When considering that different events seem to happen alongside one another all the time, both externally and introspectively, simultaneity as a basic active context is not hard to fathom. Simultaneous effects could be seen as different pathways (or records) of action occurring at the same time. We experience this phenomenon astutely through our synchronous levels of consciousness, highlighted further by our volitional capabilities, or through the plethora of states from instincts to choices, that fuel all our actions. Although all things do not possess our conscious levels, all co-effects or simultaneous actions, because they occur within one referential frame, could be seen as holistic choices, or cholces—two or more effective states held within and/or used by any entity. I realize predetermination or the probabilities implicit in physics could be used to explain away volition-like capabilities, especially for things that don’t experience choice (human cholce) like we do. A common evolutionary argument is that life-forms are predetermined products of both their genetics and environments, so any “choices” are at best, secondary affectations of self-awareness. Thus, the phenomena we experience as choice could be dismissed as a dubious power, despite other “freedoms” (like “random” mutations or sporadic quantum movements) that may be at work in nature. Similarly, disbelief in authentic “will” could be argued from the standpoint of evolutionary reduction—since the same physical mechanisms already underlie all things, at what level do some have cholce while others don’t? However, cholce, being removed from any mental and human constraints, could qualify a level of control (however strong or weak) within all entities, without discounting any physical causality. I envision cholce reduced to some basic “self-regulatory" mechanism, perhaps like an electrical feedback loop of conductance (yes) and resistance (no). Any "self-regulatory" process of basic complexity in an entity could be seen as exhibiting a level of self-control simply because some internal force (like strong nuclear) is holding its various components together, thus to some degree internally-modulating its own properties and/or powers. Cholce could describe any or all of these internal, self-regulatory processes.[2] That said, it is neither uncommon nor unwise to think that until the creation of life (or animals or even the human mind), the forces that drove and composed inanimate matter had no dominant self-regulation. But if self (as will be examined later) holds as an axiomatic concept, this could implicate some kind of all-pervading separating, or individualizing force on all levels of existence. Such self-regulatory forces seem necessary for entities to maintain their unique positions and powers in space-time. Basic self-regulation (as cholce) within all entities could help establish a better evolutionary context for the emergence of new forms, qualities or abilities, without having to revert only to ideas of predetermination combined with “chance” or “randomness”(which for living entities, could be genes interacting and mutating “spontaneously” in their environments). Still, cholce is easy to dismiss as an unnecessary anthropomorphic term—genes within environments (or whatever the predetermined probabilities) may be capable of explaining most if not all evolutionary phenomena. Even if cholce can be broadly defined as any/all self-regulated states, if it reduces to these more basic causes, does it really add anything useful to our understanding of knowledge capacities? Following the logic of evolutionary gradualism, if complex things first evolve from one or two basic things (like genes and environments), it is not unreasonable to assume in a naturally-caused universe, these things should self-replicate. And self-replication seems often to involve some regulated containment or enclosure of information, where things of complementary nature surround and siphon from themselves in order to grow and/or reproduce; particles within particles like nuclei in atoms and cells, or suns within celestial systems, seeds rooting plants, brains controlling bodies, or even “minds” (like our frontal cortex) within brains giving rise to new levels of awareness—all these similar, significant organizational patterns up and down the evolutionary ladder suggest that entities grow in complexity by some cumulative balance around centers or nexuses. An idea like cholce could help inform us of even greater potential, self-regulatory controls or “freedoms,” e.g. by better understanding how knowledge is held, used and compounded through and by entities, so that “higher”level patterns, i.e. new evoltuoinary abilities, could emerge or be created. Again this doesn’t mean that a rock, or water, or any more basic form of nature, has or can have the same volitional capabilities as human beings. Cholce just unifies all inherent multiple or simultaneous actions by self-capacity. So water changing to a solid, liquid or gas state with fluctuations in temperature would be similar to us wearing clothes or seeking shelter to adapt to or “survive” the same changes. One could say we choose to go in or outside or take on or off our clothes despite the weather, while the water can’t choose its state. But just as knowledge need not presume life, cholce need not presume the consciousness of actions—there are many processes that happen within us automatically that also could be considered cholce." [1]. Although growth adds the idea of ‘progress’ to change, change itself can involve both/either growth and/or decay processes. It may even be probable that decay processes sometimes ‘advance’ things. Thus, logically, it becomes more accurate to say initially, one thing must become two (or more) things without itself being replaced, if we want to encompass a fuller sense of evolution or progressive change. This is why simultaneous events/effects (as will be described as cholce) seem to work more fluidly to elaborate our ideas of knowledge, specifically of what follows after a single change or effect. [2]. Objectivist philosopher Harry Binswanger may have been the first to suggest volition as a kind of focused or “goal-directed” action in his essay, “Volition as Cognitive Self-Regulation.” I am not completely convinced with this definition, since a goal hints more at a specialized level of volitional processing, rather than a defining quality of choice, but the idea of self-regulation intrigues me, since this idea could extend beyond cognition as we know it altogether. Experimentally, we do not currently know enough to predict how far volition extends down the chain of life (notwithstanding matter), but choices abstracted to any internal or self-regulatory processes as cholces, give us an edge to start comparing how simultaneous events, i.e. knowledge pathways, can work together to create new, emergent abilities in all entities. All entities, being physical (rather than metaphysical), may have a level of cholce due to their more separable forms. So some things (like perhaps “particle-waves”) may not possess cholce, being completely determined by set variables, inseparable from the universal matrix, and only capable of changing one way. On the other hand, entities (e.g. particles) would have at least more than one pathway to move simply by way of their greater separation. Note that self-separation or self-regulation does not mean evolution or growth is automatically ‘willed’—sometimes the only path to growth may be to succumb to outside forces. ----------------------------------------- I think when Michael was discussing the truine brain, he was touching upon some of the physical mechanisms that may be involved in what we normally consider such "lower" and "higher" cognitive abilities--but he doesn't take this to unscncious living levels (e.g. those of plants), and I think Pope touches on and challenges this also with his comments about emotion vs. reason in this forum-- how reason is often favored in Rand's/common Objectivist as the "right" (if not the only right) way to really think and pursue truth. I think most people on here probably agree that there are other pathways to true and moral outcomes besides just reason, but why should reason (or even "conscious choice") be given superiority as a process over something like emotion, if, for example, someone is incredibly intuitive and following their emotions, and this has lead them down good paths? I'm not even saying that reason doesn't deserve a higher standing to emotion in general, but can we really prescribe this to all conscious contexts and/or all people? I'd like to hear what you all feel/think about this, especially in an Objectivist forum, inundated with us "rational" thinkers:).

Thanks so much Jonathan and Ellen for the compliments! Jonathan, I'm with you, it seems aesthetic and art-based philosophy is rarely that comprehensive and insightful--I was so frustrated in college trying to find material I could actually use, or that applied well to my work--artists don't seem too concerned about it--some even hate it profusely since we have such a history of narrow mindedness in the arts--I definitely understand where they coming from (I'll take vagueness over dogmatic practices in the arts if it comes down to it), but being the analytical person I am, I needed to search out more solid groundwork addressing the importance of what I was doing with my life. On Room of Wind, my main visual purpose at the time I created it was to describe atmosphere-- how the movement of air and light through the room had as much physical importance as the room itself, carrying energy through it and defining it with its subtle pressures. Metaphorically, I meant the image to represent a clearing of one's mind, some return to a basic state of wholeness and presence, and in that, giving us a more firm grounding or direction to move forward. The piece was created with only horizonal and vertical sharp/striking lines of different pressure-- no erasure, but the visual effect was meant to recreate what you, Ellen, talk about audibly, as a bell or loud, but clear, resonant vibration, channelling us and shaking us into some meditative clarity (e.g. versus a trapped kind of focus). So Jonathan, I wasn't thinking consciously about any exponential growth or contraction, but I did want a kind of spatial undulation-- the visual effect you may be sensing with the "larger" columns, is not actually that they are drawn out of perspective, but the fact that by keeping close parallel lines of differing weights together, natural optical illusions start to flatten the space-- where the background subtlely moves forward and back or visually vibrates-- I did want to describe a vast space, but with an end. Your question is interesting Jonathan because you are right--although Room of Wind is only a one-point persceptive, it suggests a wider perspective--it is using two different kinds of visual illusions in tension with each other (the parallel lines vs. the point perspective) to create a kind of composite, new space, perhaps stretching their potentials. I'll have to think about the visual mechanics of this more, but it is interesting. My dad more than a few years ago said he felt looking a this picture like he felt when looking at some portraits-- like the eyes were following him as he moved to different viewing perspectives in our living room. I wonder if there is some connection between these illusions there-- of three-dimensionality on a flat surface somehow giving us more sense of depth than a three-dimensional object itself? I'll have to think on this issue! If anyone has some insight please share! I had a respected friend recommend to me today that I should take the visual arts (or perhaps the aethetics and visual arts) section of my book and focus that in a condensed form for a more general reader or perhaps targeted to visual design classes for colleges-- what you both think about that idea? I kind of like it. Since my epistemologic groundwork is set in Evolition, my plan was definitely to write a book simply on aesthetics, and besides addressing visual art, include sections developing the axiomatic desgns of music, literature, and performance (or find people of like mind who could articulate these fields and their axiomatic structures more intuitively), as well as addressing the creative process in general. But maybe I can market the writing as several vignettes-- may be easier to digest this way?

Stephen, Thanks again for sharing your poetry-- I want go back and read it again-- will/does it remain on here for at least a while? Thanks also for explaining where physics stands on all these issues--I do think it is important that physics remain empirically objective and not be swayed by theory alone. I do agree that physics informs philosophy, but just that it doesn't dictate all of it. How you've described action is how I see it as well-- the inanimate and the living stem from some common "action," but still of course have their important, special differences-- I think my view of knowledge is a new kind of view where physical information is stretched to eternal levels, though I do not go so far as Eastern philosophies/religions do in thinking that consciousness stretches beyond animal awareness (as we currently know it). My attempt is to congeal philosophy with science without becoming reductionistic, so I take a holistic stand, proposing axiomatic structure (starting from existence) as the most wide-reaching basis for that holism. I forgot to locate the passage to site from ITOE or Objetcivism--From A to Z, but I think there is a passage in which Rand talks about why axiomatic concepts are important to understand beyond mere axioms. With axioms, as you explain, the object/thing is linked with its action (like Existence exists)--axioms help us describe the action of such a whole (supposedly complete within the statement)... but I think such a thing and its action are already, intrinisically (not just implicitly), automatically linked within axiomatic concepts-- with axiomatic concepts "thing" and "action" are already fused into some complete and all-encompassing whole, where all things and all their actions are simultaneously explained on a vey basic, fundamental level-- that's why Rand's framing of these ideas as "axiomatic concepts" was significant , even though other philosophers had discovered such content before. Rand did state the axioms Existence exists. Existence is Identity and Consciosness is identification. I only fully agree with the first axiom-- that axiom is trully self-reflexive, or at least self-reflexive in a different way. I think the other two stretch the relationships too much to be used effectively all the time. I don't see them as fundamentally axiomatic. I'm not entirely sure of these axioms, but I attempt to replace her latter two axioms in the last chapter of my book with these three others: Knowledge is knowing, Self self-exists and Identtiy is indentifying, or self-knowing, to try to expand and explain their definitions from their own nature. I do think you're right that it is a good idea to try to split these "things" from their "actions" to see how the concepts relate and first evolve, and I agree that other propositions and axioms can be added, but I think they should be derivative and of course don't have to connect as self-intrinsically. I agree with you that there can be other approaches to the foundations of everything-- because anything must be dervied from everything, there will always be some special link of any particular to a grand totality. But there are more efficient and useful philosophies, and I'm hoping that my structure has the comprehensiveness, beauty and brevity to be used, and to hold up, for future generations (I can hope anyway:). I'm hoping to apply it in more immediately practical fields to try to demonstate its capabilities. The most practical structure I've built in the book is probably the one for visual art-- it expands and organizes visual design elements in ways I think can create new levels of sensory visual experinece-- the other fields I'm not as trained, and they are probably more abstract, so I don't know how practical yet they can be. I do hope you enjoy the reading/thinking experience, if nothing else.

Jonathan, Thank you for inquiring about aesthetics and my art-- my philosophy in Evolition really comes out of my love for design, and my roots are in visual art-- I really believe in that beautiful, eternal pattern or "golden braid" idea that a few philosophers (like Douglas Hofstadter in his Godel, Escher and Bach) have kicked around for a while. Instead of outlining a lot my aesthetic views on here, I'm just going to redirect you to my website. I'm not really finished with it yet, but it has long, even full sections from my book on there-- the portion on visual art is there for now (I may reduce this at a leter time but I want as much exposure and understanding of what I'm getting at as possible right now). My work is also there in color (though some of the images are still a little out of focus!). Anyway this site should give you a good idea of my work and aestheitc views: http://dlevergreen.wix.com/visionsofevergreen

Peter-- Yeah, you're right, "Evergreen" has a sound of loftiness I don't particularly like either, but I like the meaning that evergreen has for me-- as something returning, to be eternally old or wise, yet also potentially young and naive.. that really describes me-- I'm an old soul who will probably kill himself falling in a manhole someday. Sometimes I think I'm close to Alzheimers with how many everyday facts/information just flows through my head like nothing is there--lol. I also like the idea of evergreen as a deep, rich color somethies more dark than black is as a pigment so that you can practically lose yourself in it (it's my favorite color). I thought it'd be good as an pen name for art/writing since Dan Lewis is pretty common, even though I don't want to use it in my daily life. I also needed a name to register my permaculture business under, so that worked well. Thanks for posting my Amazon description and for your excitement about the ideas. I also enjoy your science fiction references and how they pertain to this idea of knowledge-- once we grasp the physical informational roots of it, it opens up all sorts of possibilities in terms of artificial intelligence, medical fields, neurology, psychology, language, aesthetics, etc. etc (really all fields of knowledge, even all things). I love your lie detector example addressing complexity of thought and how that doesn't necessarily equate to more truth--or some more efficient arrangment of knowledge. I address this in my next concept after cholce-- reason. Here's another passage: "Conversely in many cases, two (or more) changes or effects, although ultimately connected, happen at different times; if two or more actions are not concurrent, it seems logical to assume they must happen before or after one another. Beyond simultaneity, sequence seems key to the nature of action or evolution itself. It is true we often do not know what changes in various processes occur first or later, or at more primal or more evolved levels, but considering our experiences of progressive effects in time’s forward motion (time’s “arrow”), it is likely safe to say that some things happen before and/or after others. In other words, for any causes to produce any new effects, whether operated by God or evolutionary forces or something we haven’t yet conceived, there needs to be an order to when those actions emerge, whether that order holds any other significance. This means forward time in a universe of growth and decay must happen from causes to effects, containing inherent reasons for how and why things happen, no matter how complicated or seemingly irrational their processes. Reason is a broad enough term to envelope all sequential changes, even though it also relates to our evolved abilities as humans to unravel causes and effects in more detail, separating apart and connecting together information to better understand its order. Induction is one of two main classifications for human reasoning, stemming from external, sensory-perceptual data. The other is deduction, stemming from what is internally or inherently known. As externalized and internalized abilities, induction and deduction link together causes and effects in very different ways. However in contrast to cholce (which is internally self-contained), induction and deduction are interdependent modes of reason, bridging external and internal boundaries together between entities.[1] This ability of reason to link the causes and effects of otherwise distinctly different entities together, helps establish it as a barometer for truth, both grounding and expanding knowledge, where effects can be traced back to causes or projected forward from them (even when very removed from each other). Like choice (vs. cholce), consciousness or the mind, I will consider truth a primarily human reasoning trait, though similar truth qualities may be echoed down the evolutionary ladder (via reason). Truth relies not simply on the amount of what we know, but the depth of what is known, measuring how clearly the mind connects causes and effects. So knowing what is true is not the same as knowing a lot, or even having a high I.Q…. even a lot of information at one’s disposal does not mean it will be efficiently or effectively applied. Rather than absolute, truth is important and practical to understand as this comparative knowledge state, so that it doesn’t collapse into other concepts like reality or knowledge, standing on its own as a human standard for reasoning. But in understanding truth as our degree of knowledge connection, of our internal with external states, what level of connection (or lack thereof) would separate a false claim from a true one? The amount of knowledge clarity or usefulness that would classify something as true vs. false is obviously up for debate, but forgoing any complicated hypothesis, I would like to suggest some general classifications that may help address the issue.[2]" [1]. Induction and deduction could be seen as primary forms of logical reasoning, but this is not to say there aren’t potentially different or more specific types. Francis Bacon was the first to attribute induction (from particular to general) and deduction (from general to particular) when using the scientific method (Runes, Dictionary of Philosophy, 74, 145-146). My take on induction and deduction is a bit different. I think induction relies on what we experience as observation, or gathering information primarily from the external world. Deduction instead, pieces together this information from the inside-out. This does not necessarily dictate that information moves from general to specific or vice-versa. This is also is different than empiricism and rationalism, because it doesn’t put favor on any one level of our consciousness, like through our sensory-perceptual versus our conceptual faculties. One can blend two specific things into a generalized concept through either induction or deduction. For instance, one could conceptualize chairs and tables to furniture either by seeing them used for some common purpose in the same room (induction), or by seeing a table and chair separately in different rooms and linking their purposes together primarily in one’s mind (deduction). The same is true of general to specific reasoning, and on any conscious level. Young toddlers, for example, may think many people are their mommies based-off some internal feeling of closeness with all of them (deduction) or because all people that look like mom, e.g. all young females carrying children must be mommies (induction). Yet regardless of personal approaches, both outside experiences and internally initiated connections seem necessary for us to shape our ideas. [2]. The classifications listed here for types of truth are not original ideas. These ideas have been discussed by many philosophers for centuries. What is original is the gradation of the concepts on a scale of degree, showing generally how truth can be conceived as relative, yet still measurable and applicable to different psychological states or levels of consciousness. The the levels go through the ideas (from less to more truth): ignorance, deceit, fantasy, paradox, instinct, experience, rationale, certainty. It is a pretty controversial way of looking at truth, I understand, but I think its more valid than conventional black & white notions, or those that tie truth one-to-one with reality. "Reason" is also used more abstractly here than it is normally used and this ties into what you were saying Peter about us needing to open up our perspectives in order to grow. I really feel that Rand's and even most common understnadings of the term were/are too constrictive. If there is cause and effect then we can say things have some reason(s) for being, orders and/or progressions which tie causes and effects, and more demonstably if they are repeatable, whether we are conscious of these causes and effects or not. Oh-- I wanted to make a clarificaiton about consiousness and the mind, and whether the mind can be "free" of consciousness. I do relate mind in the book to a something that has achieved at some point in time, a conscious ability, thus for us I think this is when we begin to develop our brains, but this doesn't mean brain and mind are the same thing-- I thnk there could be certain essential kinds of patterning to different levels of physical self-containment (for "life" perhaps as kinds of chemo-electrical stimulation in bodies/brains) that could signify whether somehting is "alive," has a "mind," and also on what level of awareness it is operating. Does that make sense?

Wow --Peter and Stephen, great questions/responses! I'm glad you "more than like" the artwork Stephen-- I'm wasn't sure of its effectiveness in black and white, since most of the pieces are much better in color (and in the flesh--espoecially Moral's Gold, The Beholder, and States of Matter). I read your poems and man, thats the best contemporary use of rhyme I'm seen in poetry in a long time. I love the circular nature of the meter and word associaition and how that ties into ideas like "oneness" (first poem), the meter of days/natural time (Solistice), and life and death (His Day just made me cry-- beautiful!). It seems rare that such an analytical thinker can also write so creatively... in poetry espectially-- which othen requires so much content with so little language to be good. Stephen-- in post #43 you address what might be the difference between the ideas of broad and narrow. I may have to think about it a little more, since some of what you're posting resonates with me, but my inkling is that you're defining the terms too specifically. If you're talking about broad and narrow synonymously with the ideas general and specific (or are we talking about the epistemological with the first and the metaphysical in the second?), then how I normally concieve it, is that axiomatic concepts are the objective beginning on the general side of things, and concrete realities help define the objective, more narrow endings for things--so the concepts of general and specific are any relative qualities based within most wide-reaching abstract and most present, concete forms possible. Your idea of substantive propogation is very similar to how I'm using the idea of knowledge as "physical information," so yes, in the broasdest sense of knowledge in any/all timescapes, I see that as before causality. I think what gets confusing is this broad sense of how I'm using knowledge versus just physical information-- information recorded only in the referential present. Inertia may inform us of how physical reality is in its most basic form--very true-- so we see the universe as a uniformity on grand spatial scales through cosmologic measurements, and observe very basic substances like light as having uniform speed and these seem to suggest that things tend to act the same way in their primary forms and this doesn't change, and energy is always conserved when it changes, and that in and of itself is a constancy. But we can't automatically take such facts and then say it is constancy before causality (or vice versa), because science, e.g. is incapable of measuring what lies outside the cosmologic horizon at present moment and even then we don't know if there other things outside whatever is found on the other side, and what is all the darkness around light? Could gravity and "dark energy" interact to create electromagnetic radiation? You're right that physics narrows down the possibilities for philosophy, but if there is an explanation that can take those laws and arrange them in a more functional way, then I think that at least should be considered if not eventually accepted. To me for a self-caused or "naturally-caused" universe to really exist on its own (without some supernatural creation) requires both generation and destruction of matter and energy, not just eternal conservation on a purely physical level. But here is how I see conservation working on the metaphysical (perhaps purely spatial-temporal level) level-- if we take anything and everything substance can be (i.e. can exist) it becomes in some way spatially-temporally infinite, where there must be some constant eternal substance/context that also is inclusive of changes, causes, effects, etc. Now if we simply started with only one "blank slate" of the universe-- one one constant thing (not even change in location) with no causality, or different things.substances/contexts to catalyze new forms, then there would be no self-caused universe. So there has to be some give and take between things, even if one is some eternal source/first context. It is only thorugh the idea of constant and/or causal action that that some change from one thing to another makes sense in a purely self-caused evolutionary sense. So it seems that action comes first in the logic, not constancy or causality. This primary active context roots my "knowledge"-- some eternal physical propogation that can ground the present with past and future -- not just though the psychological kinds of continuity that Peter (and Rand) talks about, but also on all physical levels for all times-- this isn't simply the real present, but all of the physical actions we don't or can't contain within our minds because we are inherently limited by our bodies and the limitations within all specific forms and the physical laws of nature themselves. Now as to whether causality comes before constancy, thats a little more debatable to me, but I tend to think the next logical step from any eternal context or thing that has to have different states/things within it to be self-caused or self-propogated (or to act), is the idea of "eternal beginnings and endings"-- i.e. causes and effects. Constancy then comes as the next step after when considering any (but not all) first states/things/contexts (adding more restraints upon the beginning and ending) and then how it changes into the next thing. I should say I think all these italicized terms (except maybe effects) should be metaphysical (in the eternal way I define metaphycial) ideas or "essences." So the law of inertia as some constancy should always be there, even if it isn't as basic as these other things.

Peter, You are right-- I realize I don't need (at early developmental stages) there--we can choose to put ourselves in a non-conceptual state (like inducing a coma). But by doing so we are simultaneously shutting off that level of volitional capacity--I think this is why a term like cholce is needed to understand self-regulation on different levels. It seems harder to go from a lower to a higher level than from a higher to lower level, especially if we look at emergence in evolution though mutation and environmental change, don't you think? Would this alawys be due to the increased complexity of the action or context?

Peter, I wholeheartedly agree with your statement (italics mine), "But the mind IS free of concepts and higher level thinking (at early developmental stages)." I too think concepts come about later in development, after birth, due to enviromental conditioning in combination with the right human/higher animal "programming," (DNA and/or otherwise) which as a by product creates a new volitional "self-concious" state of awareness. Here, you are right, we gain a new level of freedom. But I also think there is some lower level of this same kind of freedom in the self-regulatory processes of any "multifunctional" entity (because it is somehow containing as a whole more than one way of functioning). I don't think programming innately discounts this kind of freedom. I think internal constraints and freedoms are always at work in "multifunctional" individuals. We as individuals are innately limited forms of knowledge (here is where the soucre of our error comes about that tmj questioned in an eariler post), constrained by our "genetics" (internal contriants) and "environments" (external constraints), but if individuals on any level have more than one way they function, still retaining their essential cores, this is an active freedom-- the best example I give in a footnote is that the potential "cholce" within water, seen in all its flexibilities as an entity, from its various states, bodies and atmospheric formations, to is permeation underground, in plants, animals and so much of our own bodies-- it is quite versatile and therefore can maintain its core structure, even without any form of what we call living awareness. This idea is really very Buddhist/Hinduist, but without the notion that "consciousness" permeates or is everything. I'm just trying to see how knowledge, as some eternal physical informaton propogation, would evolve to the effect that new properties could emerge more gradually-- I don't think our kind of volition (e.g. choice), as remarkable as it is, is so fundamentally different rom other potential forms of "cholce"--I think it is perhaps a higher level of functioning, but it doesn't necessarily offer us more freedom or at least success than other individual multifunctions. What are your thoughts on this?

Wow Stephen-- those are excellent excerpts from your articles/esseays--they bring up crucial ideas about kinds of causality, its primacy in in different fields, and its tie in to different physical laws. The conclusion of your "Induction and Identity" analysis above that " Again as to efficient cause, the principle evidently does not hold in the narrow mode for elementary particles. There is no narrow cause of a particle decay, so there can be no narrow cause of the decay products. Remember, too, the proverb of particle physicists: “Seek not reasons for decay, but seek the barriers to decay.” At the level of elementary particles, we seek reasons for stability (Frauenfelder and Henley 1974, 83–87; Sachs 1987, 100–103, 175-77; Weinberg 1981).[26]" makes sense. I think causality, like any wide enough philosophic principle, does not have to be consiously considered as a variable in order for more narrow, focused or specific contexts to have scientific or more braodly, some internal validity/logic. In fact many times trying to take in those larger ideas simply distracts one from more immediate or direct explanations, thus creating confusion. This is where the ideas, limits and the ways in which holarchy works --where things are nested within one another from general to specifc-- becomes really important to understand. I still struggle with discovering and correctly analyzing holarchies--I think a lot of this stems from the fact that I/we live most immediately in a concrete world where relatively, the very small and very grand are cloaked in layers from our percepts. Writing the book it became clear to me how important ideas like only, some, any and all became to try to clarify general and specific realities and essences. I'm still not exactly sure how to phrase holarchies in a good syllogistic way-- has a defined methodology for this been discovered beyond the traditional laws of inference? I tend to find the laws of inference more confusing and restrictive than really helpful in discovering a truth--again, like with science, there seems to be a problem with limiting variables in logic as well, because the premises almost always are incomplete in some way (perhaps demonstrated by Godel's incompleteness theorem) --that's why I was so drawn to axiomatic concepts and axiomatic structure, as ways to really link and secure the foundational roots of epistemology in metaphysics in a way so inclusive and holarchic, that all other things or knowledge would have to be nested within that structure somehow. The lynchpin for me was when I finally realized existence, being anything and everything, no matter the time, place or context, (which you, Stephen, originally helped show me btw), had to mean that there was in fact a completely unavoidable self-proven or "axiomatic" idea, engulfing both metaphysics and epistemology. With this, the other three ideas of self, proof (primally as identity, e.g. A=A) and some idea (e.g. knowledge or consciousness) had to also be there. Of course the more exact nature, function and order of those concepts was a lot of other work-- but I figured there had to be some primary system including those four things! The connections and differences between the metaphysical and physical, what I describe as manifesting as "essences" and "realities" (my two first derivatives from existence), was also a turning point for me-- in how abstact ideas like quantities and qualities (e.g. essences) could have a kind of physical embodiement within some never-ending space-time context(s), thus beiing metaphysical. This seemed to explain why metaphysical things could easily be construed/misconstrued as "otherworldly," because essences would be always underneath realities, "fueling" them. Specifically geometries of the universe in the way you site Penrose (I have read sections of The Road to Reality-- what a book!), I also find really important to understanding the "metaphysical" or universal laws of nature. I think the geometries, directional paths and motions within space-time (not all that different from "strings" in theorectical physics) could uncover foundational pathways echoing though things of similar quality on different scales, structures and levels, so that we may be able to more potently visualize, harmonize and evolve holarchic structures on multiple levels at once (in a way this thought is very Buckminster Fulleresque).

Note also that I don't think cause is axiomatic, or self-proven, like the concepts I'm positing. I just think cause makes the best sense as an intermediary concept from knowledge to state and change.

Sorry for the physics question, but why are you calling a state of uniform motion "change"? Ellen That's really not a physics question, but an epistemological one: It's about Stephen's using different definitions/meanings of the same word in the same paragraph, and apparently confusing them, and confusing how others use them. J Expanding on this same idea, I think science informs philosophy on what has to be considered, but cannot dictate all of what things are, just because something is discovered. Science by its empirical methodology always has to limit variables in some way (perhaps the most noted claims of this are Hiesenburg uncertainty and observations of our "cosmological horizon"). Thus science on its own really doesn't seem able to prove something completely and fundamentally--the gaps left by science need to be filled in by some kind of associative logic (I think axiomatic concepts are the most brilliant solution). So I don't think classical physics, just because it doesn't pressuppose cause with its law of inertia, can rule out cause as something more fundamental to inertia, and it seems more logical to me that a change of location still requires cause, something (or at least context) that initiates or at least allows that change to occur.

Peter, I'm afraid I've researched only a little into neuroscience and cognitive psychology. My footnotes in the first passage clarify most of what I know. So when you ask what other pre-programming humans have, I really can't answer authoritatively, though I find the fields important and fascinating. My approach mainly is from epistemology and systemology-- from the logic of natural, or evolutionary design-- my professional training has been as a visual artist and educator, which led me to study philosophy, mainly Rand, some scientific theory and general philosophy, so that over the course of almost twenty years, I've been able to develop an axiomatic structure/system that I think can be used as a mechanism to organize, at least the basic structures, for all fields of knowledge. I've created about 20 different structures-- the most thoroughly researched ones are in the book, covering the elements and principles physics, epistmology, ethics, aesthetics and visual art. The other structures look promising-- I've started ones for literature, music, performance, mathmatics, logic, psychology, biology, politics, sexuality, meteorology, permaculture, botany, and evolution, but they aren't researched or developed well enough yet. Stephen's prior book references on cognitive development look really interesting-- that precipice between matter and life then "mind" is at the crux of a lot of issues, not just epistemological, but potentially ethical and sociopolical. My non-expert thoughts on how humans develop from DNA is that DNA given the right environmental context, becomes living or aware at conception-- on perhaps an unconsious level-- the level e.g. of plants, and that it probably goes through stages of "subconsicousness" as a fetus, first at some invertebrate level and then taking on higher vertebrate qualities as the spine and neural network begin to form. There are likely some prenatal forms of consciousness, or memories/percepts that develop in the brain as a result of tactile-emotional responses to stimuli in the womb (research has been done to observe that fetuses respond to music/sound as well), but I don't know exactly when that normally occurs. As you state, most neuroscientists say the third trimester is when cognitive functioning and our brains becomes developed (perhaps that pre-frontal lobe that separates humans from other animals). I'm not sure the development of this, as "consciousness," is where we necessarily should draw the line for human autonomy-- even thought the baby may be able to survive as a conscious human outside of the womb at some third-trimester stage, it may be that birth itself signifies an assertion of that child's first natural "rights." That is an interesting debate. There may be another thread on this issue on OL.

Lol--sorry--not "more primal" or even "stable" for state--wrong connotation-- I mean "first context"

Ok--my last comment today-- just to amend what I said above in post #22: "I believe cause to be a more primary concept, seeding both inertial action (what I call "state") and change (i.e. a cause involves some action (state) in the process of changing into something else)." I mean "state" to be any inertial or stable action. So I think the holarchy is: Knowledge: any/all "actualizations" (probable and actual things). Cause (probable): any first/primary actualizations--things/actions that could or do lead to other things/actions. State: any more primal constant/stable active thing. Change: Any actions from one thing to another. Note: Effects are the missing "actual" part completing my idea of knowledge.

Tmj, you ask, "I think trying to equate information/data with knowledge leaves no explanation of error, or even volition." I hope the except on my "cholce" above explains this at least to some degree. Also realize that I don't think knowledge is exactly the same thing as physical information-- I think physical information only is what is presently recorded in space-time, but it does not really include the future or the lost past-- I'm conceiving of knowledge within an infinite timescape. You also question, "How would the information/knowledge paradigm be affected in the example if instead of two men in a field, it was one man viewing a holographic image of another man?" Initially the communication may be very similar in viewing a holographic image versus a real person, although the holographic image itself would not possess the same internal information (There are some fascinating Star Trek episodes dealing with this issue as you are probably aware). It would be quite an illusory device that could keep up that charade for a long time, I would think, before the observer would start to detect inconsistencies with the world he/she normally experiences.

Thanks Michael-- I've enjoyed reading a lot of your posts. I read several of your comments just yesterday--on the video of the homeless people dancing-- and your comments made me tear up. There is so much hope and happiness in the world in so many different forms.

Stephen, You also address my use of the term axiomatic, which is very understandable, since I am stretching its meaning to the metaphysical realm. I do think that this use is warranted though. I think the concepts Rand called axiomatic were intended to have a special quality-- a grounding for all other knowledge-- maybe she left open the possibility that there were more concepts than existence, consciousness, self (in the appendix of ITOE) and identity that could be axiomatic-- (if so I think they'd probably be precursors or hybrids of these concepts), but nonetheless, I think these concepts warrant a special category. Existence may be in an even more fundamental category too-- as it seems to require far less demonstration/logical verification of its primacy compared to the others--it is more immediately obvious. But I don't feel good just calling knowledge, the way I've defined it, as simply a certainty, equal among other kinds of certainty. What I'm trying to establish is the simultaneous metaphysical and epistemological certainty these concepts possess. Perhaps there is a better word than axiomatic for this, but I don't know of any. On the nature of symbols and their role in cognitive development, I concede I have done only a little scientific research in this area beyond pure introspection, and being a visual artist I'm very interested in how language works in words and images, so I appreciate your references, and I'm eager to look at them as they seem pretty interesting. Thank you!

Some great discussion :cheer: ! Just wanted to say Peter-- that you explain the roots of Evolition, how I'm trying to approach it, very well! The only exception I make is that I don't really believe in the tabula rasa idea. The whole idea of knowledge permeating all things is meant to say we must have SOME pre-programiing there, so the "mind" (unless we are talking about this as consciousness itself) really isn't ever a "blank slate." But you are right that our ability to choose, if it is actually a special ability, must have some power (however small or large) over the purely determistic or "random" forces of nature. I try to formulate the roots of this ability with an idea derived from my idea of knowledge (and its derivatives as I have reasoned: cause, effect, state, and change) that I coin in my book as "cholce," or "holistic choice"-- here is an excerpt: "Things can maintain themselves, grow, or devolve as they change, depending on their different contexts. However, apart from any specific evolution, changes must always go from one state to another, thus involving at least two actions. Two (or more) actions can either happen either at the same time or one before/after another. Thus, versus ideas like growth that can describe progressive change, more generally, simultaneous or sequential actions seem to carry knowledge processes forward first.[1] When considering that different events seem to happen alongside one another all the time, both externally and introspectively, simultaneity as a basic active context is not hard to fathom. Simultaneous effects could be seen as different pathways (or records) of action occurring at the same time. We experience this phenomenon astutely through our synchronous levels of consciousness, highlighted further by our volitional capabilities, or through the plethora of states from instincts to choices, that fuel all our actions. Although all things do not possess our conscious levels, all co-effects or simultaneous actions, because they occur within one referential frame, could be seen as holistic choices, or cholces—two or more effective states held within and/or used by any entity. I realize predetermination or the probabilities implicit in physics could be used to explain away volition-like capabilities, especially for things that don’t experience choice (human cholce) like we do. A common evolutionary argument is that life-forms are predetermined products of both their genetics and environments, so any “choices” are at best, secondary affectations of self-awareness. Thus, the phenomena we experience as choice could be dismissed as a dubious power, despite other “freedoms” (like “random” mutations or sporadic quantum movements) that may be at work in nature. Similarly, disbelief in authentic “will” could be argued from the standpoint of evolutionary reduction—since the same physical mechanisms already underlie all things, at what level do some have cholce while others don’t? However, cholce, being removed from any mental and human constraints, could qualify a level of control (however strong or weak) within all entities, without discounting any physical causality. I envision cholce reduced to some basic “self-regulatory" mechanism, perhaps like an electrical feedback loop of conductance (yes) and resistance (no). Any "self-regulatory" process of basic complexity in an entity could be seen as exhibiting a level of self-control simply because some internal force (like strong nuclear) is holding its various components together, thus to some degree internally-modulating its own properties and/or powers. Cholce could describe any or all of these internal, self-regulatory processes.[2] That said, it is neither uncommon nor unwise to think that until the creation of life (or animals or even the human mind), the forces that drove and composed inanimate matter had no dominant self-regulation. But if self (as will be examined later) holds as an axiomatic concept, this could implicate some kind of all-pervading separating, or individualizing force on all levels of existence. Such self-regulatory forces seem necessary for entities to maintain their unique positions and powers in space-time. Basic self-regulation (as cholce) within all entities could help establish a better evolutionary context for the emergence of new forms, qualities or abilities, without having to revert only to ideas of predetermination combined with “chance” or “randomness”(which for living entities, could be genes interacting and mutating “spontaneously” in their environments). Still, cholce is easy to dismiss as an unnecessary anthropomorphic term—genes within environments (or whatever the predetermined probabilities) may be capable of explaining most if not all evolutionary phenomena. Even if cholce can be broadly defined as any/all self-regulated states, if it reduces to these more basic causes, does it really add anything useful to our understanding of knowledge capacities? Following the logic of evolutionary gradualism, if complex things first evolve from one or two basic things (like genes and environments), it is not unreasonable to assume in a naturally-caused universe, these things should self-replicate. And self-replication seems often to involve some regulated containment or enclosure of information, where things of complementary nature surround and siphon from themselves in order to grow and/or reproduce; particles within particles like nuclei in atoms and cells, or suns within celestial systems, seeds rooting plants, brains controlling bodies, or even “minds” (like our frontal cortex) within brains giving rise to new levels of awareness—all these similar, significant organizational patterns up and down the evolutionary ladder suggest that entities grow in complexity by some cumulative balance around centers or nexuses. An idea like cholce could help inform us of even greater potential, self-regulatory controls or “freedoms,” e.g. by better understanding how knowledge is held, used and compounded through and by entities, so that “higher”level patterns, i.e. new evoltuoinary abilities, could emerge or be created. Again this doesn’t mean that a rock, or water, or any more basic form of nature, has or can have the same volitional capabilities as human beings. Cholce just unifies all inherent multiple or simultaneous actions by self-capacity. So water changing to a solid, liquid or gas state with fluctuations in temperature would be similar to us wearing clothes or seeking shelter to adapt to or “survive” the same changes. One could say we choose to go in or outside or take on or off our clothes despite the weather, while the water can’t choose its state. But just as knowledge need not presume life, cholce need not presume the consciousness of actions—there are many processes that happen within us automatically that also could be considered cholce." [1]. Although growth adds the idea of ‘progress’ to change, change itself can involve both/either growth and/or decay processes. It may even be probable that decay processes sometimes ‘advance’ things. Thus, logically, it becomes more accurate to say initially, one thing must become two (or more) things without itself being replaced, if we want to encompass a fuller sense of evolution or progressive change. This is why simultaneous events/effects (as will be described as cholce) seem to work more fluidly to elaborate our ideas of knowledge, specifically of what follows after a single change or effect. [2]. Objectivist philosopher Harry Binswanger may have been the first to suggest volition as a kind of focused or “goal-directed” action in his essay, “Volition as Cognitive Self-Regulation.” I am not completely convinced with this definition, since a goal hints more at a specialized level of volitional processing, rather than a defining quality of choice, but the idea of self-regulation intrigues me, since this idea could extend beyond cognition as we know it altogether. Experimentally, we do not currently know enough to predict how far volition extends down the chain of life (notwithstanding matter), but choices abstracted to any internal or self-regulatory processes as cholces, give us an edge to start comparing how simultaneous events, i.e. knowledge pathways, can work together to create new, emergent abilities in all entities. All entities, being physical (rather than metaphysical), may have a level of cholce due to their more separable forms. So some things (like perhaps “particle-waves”) may not possess cholce, being completely determined by set variables, inseparable from the universal matrix, and only capable of changing one way. On the other hand, entities (e.g. particles) would have at least more than one pathway to move simply by way of their greater separation. Note that self-separation or self-regulation does not mean evolution or growth is automatically ‘willed’—sometimes the only path to growth may be to succumb to outside forces. I also propose "evolition" as another potential level of human cognitive awareness-- when the mechanisms of evolution its pattenrs/designs are able to be grasped and used on a conceptual level, to push ourselves and our surroundings/world/universe forward in harmony. Evolition reinforces what I begin with (though on a more advanced level) in the book, when I state at its beginning that I believe in some kind of "evolutionary purpose." So Stephen, despite where physics in the classical/Newtonian "inertia" sense may stand on the nature of causality, I do believe that everything has cause-- I believe cause to be a more primary concept, seeding both inertial action (what I call "state") and change (i.e. a cause involves some action (state) in the process of changing into something else). So I do see the universe as a kind of substance in perpetual motion-- although I do not necessarily believe in aether as in was conceptualized, I do believe in what theoretical physicists today call "dark energy" and "dark matter," and I think gravity is or is an effect from some "base substance" or at least some base context. But you are right-- I don't want to diverge too much into physics, though I do address these concerns, very important ones, in chapters 2 and 3 in the book.

Stephen, on your comments from post #9 on my statement, "Because thoughts, instincts, behaviors, in general all our actions can be considered a natural consequence or embodiment of our knowledge, its axiomatic nature may seem as obvious as the concept of existence. In other words, to be aware of things requires at the very least, acknowledgment of some substance behind that capacity—if we can think of objects, life-forms, the mind, or anything, we must ultimately submit to the idea that something makes that process happen." I'm not sure I stated it well, but I was implying that every action seems to require something that fuels it (but not necessarily separate from it)-- it doesn't have to be just a thinking process--you are right, I just started with that because intuitively, we are constantly at one with our own internal "actions," and such things often commonly seem to be associated as or with our knowledge, as internalized reflections on or of our consciousness. But then I also go on in the next paragraghs to debate why those states of awareness/consciousness should not be automatically be considered axiomatic certainties (in the way I am classifying the terms), even though we may always be in some state of awareness. (this is also reiterated in footnote 3).

Note above: I meant to say Rand christened the idea of "consciousness" axiomatic, not knowledge-- sorry if that was confusing.

Thanks Stephen for starting this as a new thread, and Peter, I used to be a big fan of Star Trek... though I haven't watched any episodes for a while--that episode sounds interesting. Evolition is the correct title -- a fusion of evolution and volition. I guess my description of knowledge does have a sci-fi edge to it, though I was trying to formulate what knowledge may be very basically and more abstractly. Tmj, you say: "I see consciousness/awareness as axiomatic, but not knowledge. Knowledge is an aspect of consciousness, the content or product of awareness but not seperable from consciousness." This is a more common idea of what knowledge is for sure, and I struggled for years with this same assumption, especially since Rand christened the idea "axiomatic" and I was fully drawn in by her philosophy. But think about it further. Only us, and some animal life, are known to be "conscious," or aware of our surroundings in a way which, by epistemologic standards, we can recognize entities outside of ourselves. Yet we are not always fully conscious (as a fetus, doing mind-altering drugs, in sleep, in a coma, etc)--and in such cases, don't automatic "knowledge" (or at least "information") processes take over? In footnote 3, I state: "It is important not to think a concept axiomatic just because it is inescapable from one’s mind or being. For example, ideas like ‘humanity,’ (stripped of its ethical associations) may be inescapable because we are human, but the idea is far from axiomatic because not all things are human. So an axiomatic concept needs not only internal, logical consistency and certainty, but also some way it can exist outside of ourselves and still permeate things in some infinite way, so that the idea is really inescapable. This is what would give epistemology its metaphysical power." Tmuj, you also state: "Trying to apply 'axiomaticness' to knowledge doesn't seem to make sense , or I do not understand his argument. I have the sense that by axiomatic he means something other than irreducible." The sentence above, "So an axiomatic concept needs not only internal, logical consistency and certainty, but also some way it can exist outside of ourselves and still permeate things in some infinite way, so that the idea is really inescapable." is an attempt to clarify my qualifications for what would make something axiomatic --being internallly and externally inescapable. In order to be always relable as a first order, a priori, concept I think consiocusness has to be expanded to the wide-reaching definition of knowledge I have posited, as any "actualization" in space-time, past, present and future, to have an idea that can actually be irreducible. I know I am redefining knowledge perhaps far outside of common understanding-- perhaps a new word like "existledge" is warranted, but I think we are really falsely constraining what knowledge is by making it a subset or aspect of consciousness, simply a product of it. Especially since DNA is how we start, and it is not even living in the scientific sense. Doesn't it make more evolutionary sense that consciousness is a product of knowledge-- or the way that "information" arranges? You also state: "As to whether or not his printed words contain knowledge per se, by my understanding the answer is no, knowledge would refer to my understanding of the information communicated by the symbols. The symbols themselves are just symbols. A means by which the author communicates his ideas or knowledge to another consciousness that recognizes the information and assimilates the information or data into its own 'knowldege', not a direct transference of an enity called knowledge." I agree with you that the symbols/words outside our minds are of a very different nature than the thoughts in our heads, but I do think there must be some, however loose, physical/metaphysical thread from the symbol to those thoughts in our minds for there to be any consistency at all between our thoughts (whether conceptual, perceptual or sensory) and what they represent outside of us. I'm positing the universal thread of matter to mind, mind to matter to be knowledge-- any or all physical information taken in any or all timescapes. Imagine how humans may have communicated before words--or concepts. Primitive man (and perhaps many animals do this) may have picked up a stick and held it up to another man, and then pointed at another stick at the ground so that that man knew to pick it up. There is not much of an extra symbol there, just perceptually very similar objects and actions-- the pattern, or information communicated, is the motion of picking up the stick itself. Perhaps this pattern of motion is abstracted to a pictogram at a later date showing a simplified hand or person picking up a stick. Years later the idea is abstracted even further to a simpler image of a stick in a certain position which tells us what to do with it. Even later the ideas of "picking up" and "stick" can be separated into two different visual symbols, and eventually those symbols could morph into letters and words. I think the problem in understanding this is often tied up in the complexity of our conceptual thought processes, now often being so far removed from more tactile connections we would have to utilize more to communicate things if the words were not there.

Lol--Okay Selene. This is directly from my book--the first part of the chapter about knowledge. This is the best and easiest way I know how to expalin it. "Because thoughts, instincts, behaviors, in general all our actions can be considered a natural consequence or embodiment of our knowledge, its axiomatic nature may seem as obvious as the concept of existence. In other words, to be aware of things requires at the very least, acknowledgment of some substance behind that capacity—if we can think of objects, life-forms, the mind, or anything, we must ultimately submit to the idea that something makes that process happen. However, whether it is through perception or blind faith, a seemingly obvious idea of something alone cannot be used to justify its ultimate certainty unless both its logic and external reality prove inescapable. Popular associations and beliefs have been rationalized and used for centuries to try to prove the existence of God, as well other ephemeral concepts like ethical and aesthetic principles, base substances, and non-empirical worlds.[1] Such ideas on the surface may seem no different than a concept like knowledge, but there are some crucial differences. Unlike God or other essences, if existence is an inescapable or axiomatic concept (as was hopefully just demonstrated), then to know this automatically, reciprocally, indicates a concept or “knowledge” was involved. So if we know existence is a self-proven concept, then we know the “self-proven” and some kind of “knowledge” should also exist, whereas with other ideas we cannot make these same direct assumptions. Though similar, this deduction is not the same as Descartes’s proclamation, “I think, therefore I am.”[2] Rather, it is first posited that existence exists (not that “I” am or “think”), and in knowing this axiom, both self-proof and the conceptualization must also be inescapable. This does not mean that existence, self-proof and/or knowledge have to be conceptualized to be real. However, because existence is all-pervading, and knowledge is needed to know any existent, knowledge at least carries with it some active self-proof. Just as some notion of existence must predicate all things, some kind of knowledge, at the very least, must be a given for any act of “knowing.” But for knowledge to fulfill all our qualifications to be an axiomatic concept, it needs some kind of infinite presence, some basic or never-ending link to the external world beyond any mind, or even any action.[3] Existence is axiomatic in part because it makes no necessary discernment between the mind and what may lie outside of it. As explored in footnote 18, on a basic level, it doesn’t matter if everything is a mental construct or if the mind exists at all, because everything has the common quality of existence. Knowledge may be mentally or even actively self-proven (if abstracted to envelop all our actions [of awareness or otherwise]), yet if there is no way to really discern the mental from the physical (or an action from its object) though our axiomatic definition of existence anyway, then why should we prejudge knowledge as only “mental” either? We know knowledge must somehow differ from existence, or it would become the same concept, but we have not yet explored what knowledge could include or be, thus we should not preset its limitations. So in some way knowledge is just self-proven to us—in other words, something, whatever it is, allows us to be and/or act. The remainder of this section attempts to understand more specifically how this something should be defined, how knowledge needs to be understood to become an all-encompassing idea. Common ideas of knowledge usually to tie it with awareness/consciousness, truth, language, or more narrowly, simply brain functions. However, even beyond theories of mind, many scientific discoveries, e.g. in gene sequencing, brain mapping and animal intelligence,[4] have led us to consider wider definitions for knowledge. For example biologically, knowledge could be any/all that composes life-forms, from DNA to neurons to conceptual structures. Still, if knowledge is to be considered an axiomatic concept, philosophic problems arise with a definition that applies only to DNA and living things, or even broader scientific ideas. As suggested before, a concept only can be axiomatically purposeful if it defines a universal, inescapable condition of both the mind and outside world. The same philosophic difficulty arises in “life” being a defining qualification for knowledge, as if “universe” were substituted for “any/everything” in the definition of existence. “Life” and “universe” are scientific concepts with composite associations such as “carbon compounds” or “stellar space.” Scientific concepts do not rest on their own self-logic; instead, they depend primarily on external observations and measurements. Ultimately, because scientific method involves studying things by limiting their variables, experimental proof can never be fully inclusive.[5] For example, doesn’t a corpse contain knowledge, with its reusable organs, post-sequential reflexes or signature biology? How about the “inanimate” DNA composing our biologies? Couldn’t some “non-biological” extra-terrestrial, new element, invention or anomaly—one that may alter our ideas of life and the universe—possess knowledge? What about the words on this page? If they hold no knowledge, then how is any meaning reaching your brain? Yes, knowledge seems to encompass a wider framework than it is normally granted, and it needs a much wider one to fully perform its axiomatic duties. Because biologically speaking, many would include the non-living DNA composing life-forms as knowledge, then why not stretch this physical idea to any active quality that makes-up things, like some universal “life-force.” Perhaps knowledge manifests in space-time as wave-cycles not that unlike RNA/DNA helix structures, being able to stretch, bend and/or shift into different patterns of motion, binding together any/all forms and processes. Any motion “recorded” in the fabric of space-time, whether or not it is living, could construct and channel at least all physical events, similar to how DNA programs our bodies and brains.[6] This idea of knowledge as physical information[7] is already alive today in fields such as theoretical physics and data systems analysis. Physical information in such contexts may be generally defined as any material record and/or “data capacity” of matter-energy in space-time. Such an idea abstracted further, could support an axiomatic definition of knowledge as “the way things have been, are, and/or will be”… slightly different than the concept existence in that knowledge would be any or all actualizations of things. So knowledge wouldn’t be any or all possible things at any or all possible times, but only the way things actually express, have expressed, or will express themselves, whatever context that may be. Knowledge as some infinite physical expression, or eternal propagation of information, could frame it as a fundamental active quality within all things, whether inside or outside the mind.[8] [1]. This argument is similar to ontological arguments, used by philosophers like Anselm, Leibniz and Kant (to greater and lesser extents). As summarized in Magee’s Story of Philosophy, 57, an ontological argument purports that ‘perfect’ or ‘ultimate’ thoughts or beliefs (like God, Truth, or even our axiomatic concepts) must have external reality, because some most ideal state must exist, because even if our thoughts do not accurately depict this, there would still be something existing outside our conceptions to allow for the best of all possible worlds. However, I think ontological arguments on their own, with no other logic or proof, often reverse cause and effect, where many very abstract, metaphysical ideas can quickly become ‘perfect,’ a priori premises. One example would be the “perfection” often seen in mathematics, or numerology. This can lead to favoring ‘unprovable’ presuppositions versus delving into more cogent logical and/or scientific ideas. [2]. St. Augustine could have first (informally) uncovered a kind of axiomatic nature in awareness (as consciousness) as is discussed in Rand’s, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 262-263, precluding this famous claim by Descartes. [3]. It is important not to think a concept axiomatic just because it is inescapable from one’s mind or being. For example, ideas like ‘humanity,’ (stripped of its ethical associations) may be inescapable because we are human, but the idea is far from axiomatic because not all things are human. So an axiomatic concept needs not only internal, logical consistency and certainty, but also some way it can exist outside of ourselves and still permeate things in some infinite way, so that the idea is really inescapable. This is what would give epistemology its metaphysical power. [4]. Studies on many animals such as elephants, parrots, and primates, have proven not only more computational and language intelligence than previously acknowledged, but also much more self-awareness, creativity, long-term planning, and intra/inter-species empathy (Murchie, The Seven Mysteries of Life, 283-287). Combined with relatively recent biological insights and innovations (e.g. as seen in medical technologies and genetic engineering), these scientific studies have revealed both how limited and non-physical our conceptions of knowledge have been. [5]. This seems to be due to both mental and physical constraints. Purely physical support for this idea comes from the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. It in effect surmises that the exact position and momentum for anything never can be simultaneously pinpointed—the more precise one measurement, the more potential for inaccuracy with the other (Rohmann, World of Ideas, 412-413). Yet also, because there is always some lag time between an occurrence and its observation, there should always be some natural deviation between an object and its perception. The moment we know precisely where and when one thing has occurred, that thing (as well as other things outside one’s empirical field) would have already changed to some degree. [6]. This wider conception of knowledge may be implicated by our growing understanding of life’s material origins. The physical nuances of atomic substructures and ‘self-regulated’ entities are being increasingly delineated through fine-tuned experiments. Of biological note as documented in Oparin, Genesis and Evolutionary Development of Life, 76-77, amino acids (the building blocks of proteins [which are seen as the building blocks of life]) have been produced from electrically charged elemental gases as early as the 1953 Miller experiment. Gill reports in “‘Artificial life’ breakthrough announced by scientists,” that half a century later in 2003, the first artificial virus was constructed, and in 2010, scientists from the J. Craig Venter Institute planted a completely synthesized DNA sequence (a genome) inside a “blank” cell that then successfully self-replicated. The quasi-living status of viruses and what separates mere organic substances from intelligent ones still contentious in the fight over what life is. How exactly to define the ‘inanimate’ in contrast to ‘life’ is still unclear, often fuelling a wider debate about ‘self-regulation’—a capacity that could be stretched to apply to all natural, cyclic processes. Considering knowledge as this broader kind of self-regulation could unify all things within one ‘life-like’ continuum of information, helping us better understand and harness all self-regulative processes. [7]. Generalizing from the Wikipedia article, “Physical Information,” physical information could refer to any or all defining properties contained within a material system. In Barrow’s Constants of Nature, 169-172, he abstracts information into a possible broad-based “memory,” connecting “thinking,” or “information processing” into some wider physical context. These ideas do stretch the limitations of both the physical world and knowledge as we commonly conceive them, but into substantive concepts that are not implausible. [8]. The reason I do not use ‘information’ in place of knowledge as a more ‘objective’ axiomatic concept is because I think knowledge has better association with an active quality in all things, combining the animated quality of life or awareness with the physical nature of all reality. ‘Action’ also is not a good axiomatic term because it cannot be self-proven deductively. Knowledge more directly associates us with our own minds, all its thoughts and processes, and this is how it functions axiomatically within us. The fact that we attribute knowledge mainly or only to life forms is, I think, unnecessarily limiting. If we rethink the idea of knowledge as an infinite context, it can help us understand more deeply the active processes steering evolution within all things.