dlewis

Stephen, Wow-- thanks for that link and your thoughts. Those articles in "Objectivity" are incredibly thorough-- I read some of Merlin Jetton's "Pursuing Similarity" as well as your own-- both of these articles would have simplified some of my understanding and research for the book--kicking myself! Although I wasn't sure whether the angular momentum and charge measurements were still more theorectically entwined (you're saying quantities for charge and angular mometum can be interchangable like for mass and energy?) , I was aware that scientists have measured a constant amount of mass-energy for our universe, though I very much believe this is just what we have measured within our cosmologic horizon, and that space actually extends on infinitely in some way, and while yes, I agree it is likely possible that matter-energy (probably as a single unit and not divided yet into masses with different intrinsic energies), or at least some kind of potential, existed with genesis singularity (as another way to further confirm simultaneity as a baisc physical principle), I think conceiving of a genesis singularity in terms of pure space-time, i.e. in terms of its geometry and directional motions, is probably more advantageous to linking our small and large scale "worlds" together (as I think is being attempted with string/M theories, though I don't understand their methodologies especially). Stephen, you mention at the end of your article you cited about trying to determine whether space-itme or matter-energy is more fundamental in another article-- did you write that article, and could you post a link? I think it is interesting in your book that you (I think) are starting with the idea that all things are physical "concretes"(am I correct in this, or did I read wrong somewhere?)-- is your "concretes" different than my thinking all things are "physical," yet some "metaphysical," my definition of metaphysical meaning enless/infinite in some way? If it is I'll be intested how you conceive of some of the "essences" I put forth in my book. Peter, I would love to hear your thoughts in a review! As I've said in the book (and will claim now), I'm not a trained scientist myself, so I wouldn't worry about criticisms to that extent-- i expect them. The science in the book is highly theoretical-- it is a philosophy book and could be reveiwed in any number of ways, too, so feel free to surprise if you choose to do it. I do find you to be a very thoughtful person so I'd appreciate what you'd have to say, postive or negative. Just to prove some of my unfortunate lack of scientific vigor, I noticed a couple conceptual errors that I thought I should point out and need to change in chapter's 2 and 3-- they really don't affect the possible validity of my theory, but they nonetheless are amatuerish mistakes-- both my equation and description of Hooke's law on page 103 are not accurate-- Hooke's law equation is F=-kx (force equals constant stiffness [as of constant tension on a spring] times distance) NOT T=-kx (I used tension here instead of force, not understanding that k was actually a constant tension instead of tensile stress [which equals pressure and has different units]), so T=(tensile stress/pressure)x(distance), putting strain and stress in direct proportion. And on page 141, my "logical progression of d2=A, A2=V should oibviously be d, d2=A, d3=V. Sorry about these mistakes-- please fill me in if you find more. I've already corrected several gramatical errors throughout the book thanks to Derek (we proof-checked/commented on each other's books). EDITING--HOW CRUEL THOU ART!!!!!!!!

I'm going to get started on new work, and because I am terrible at committing to a lot of things at once, I probably won't be on OL that much anymore, maybe once/twice a month. Just wanted to say if anyone has a question about the book (or anything really) I can be reached at danieljaylewis@gmail.com or dlevergreen@gmail.com. Thanks so much for all the thoughtful discussion on this site-- it's been a pleasure.

I think I overstepped bounds in talking about mathematics as a way nature would have to unfold-- I'm not talking about predeterminism or even a rigid mechanistic or "bottom-up" determinism-- what I mean at this "basic" level would be in terms of "possibiolities" to "probabilities," as has been talked about in other threads, and also I meant to imply axiomatic structure as a kind of matematical base starting from infinities, thus much, much freer at the base than might be thought of in convertional mathmatic conceptions of the universe.

Peter wrote that Ba'al Chatzaf wrote: Dark matter and Dark Energy are both place holders for our ignorance. Our current gravitational theories do not account for the matter we can observe with our various instruments. So there is stuff we can't "see" or our gravitational theories are off. end quote I agree with you Ba'al-- the science behind "dark matter" and "dark energy" (especially dark energy) are very associational and aren't based on direct, first-hand measurements of "stuff"-- at least from what I've read, either. This is the reason, in combination with all the speculations from scientists/science writers, such as these few major ones as Peter has presented, with good examples above, that make me think philiosphy should enter the realm of science on these highly abstract and basic levels, because I think scientists are kind of grasping at straws at these levels and probably could use some help from something like axiomatic structure. One example I found strange myself was the "infinite density " and/o "infinite temperature" scientists are proposing are conditions of a Big Bang genesis singularity. The unit for density is mass per unit volume. Now, some things like light don't even exhibit mass as we commonly perceive it, and at the start of the Big Bang there is supposedly an infinite amount of it-- where did it all go? Also, volume being infinite seems like a contradiciton, because isn't volume inherently some kind of containment? So as much as I respect science, I think a lot of scientific theory is misguided/misunderstood, and frankly, may be a lot simpler than many are making it. I'm a fan of Roger Penrose's use of geometry to explain the univese (though I think that too may be overly complex)-- similarly, understanding my metaphysical mathemetics is key to understanding my scientific basis behind axiomatic structure. Peter wrote: "Dan wrote, on this thread, (in the beginning 8 -) So if we know existence is a self-proven concept, then we know the “self-proven” and some kind of “knowledge” should also exist, whereas with other ideas we cannot make these same direct assumptions. end quote That is a concept I get, and then I don’t get it. I think mathematical formula, axioms, and the like, are products of consciousness plus universe, since we know consciousness is a process that began sometime after the beginning of existence, and axioms do not exist without consciousness. They cannot be pointed to: There is a three legged axiom and there is a mathematical formula of the apod variety. I don’t think the formulas exist in *the universe,* but in *the universe plus volition/consciousness*. (Dan Lewis’s term cholce.) Are modern philosophical musings better than old musings? They are better thought out” perhaps, but they could be just as wrong. Is “Big Bang” Science really science? If you can think up provable math formulae to verify your theory is that proof? Only proof that we thought it up." The arguement in Evolition with my ideas of the metaphysical, i.e. essences, quanities, qualities, e.g. things like mathematical formulae, axioms. etc., is that these things too have concrete existence, but just no exact/one end in space-time, so for example, the computer in front of you is one quantity, the table on which it sits another, the wall and room behind it yet another,interconnected with a whole building which has air in it, which could be measured within it to some quantity (as well as air outside the structure) within any environmental parameter that may be there, and in between all the molecules of air, man-made spaces and land to ocean to land stretching around the whole earth can be quantified as well, whether we know what exactly it is or not-- that it can have a quantity not just contained by the volume of earth or even our cosmologic horizon -- ultimately I think this "something" filling in between masses, other matter and energy is really infinite, some boundless spatial substance, just as numbers/quantities can be infinite. I suppose some poeple might want to call it an "infinite nothing"-- I think that is epistemoplogically problematic but fine, say it's "nothing"... in sum, because we have something in our minds (e.g. a concept/perception/idea of some space between particles or cosmic matter-energy) which relates to something we can point to in the outside universe (some space between two particles or cosmic matter-energy) , the concept of quantity (like other essences/ metaphyical concepts mentioned above) can be never-ending in TO-TAL, yet also describe divisions where one thing stops and another begins. So I think matematics does relate to actual concrete things--it is not just an abstraction in our heads, or "proof we thought up," Peter, but something with "meta"physical reality. Thus I think the basic levels of mathematics could hold systematic relations that inform us of how the universe had to unfold, in ways we maybe can't discover just through scientific experiments. Is there a way basic physical data can be looked at more simply? I think axiomatic structure does a good job of making sense of a lot of data in a more coherent way, and I hope I've explained it clearly enough in the book to make some headway. I probably should edit it some more-- I'm open to suggestions.

Stephen: The ideas for your book sound great-- I'm especially interested on what you have to say on the philosophy of logic, and the natures of mathematical and scientific truths-- the contrast of your philosophy with Rand's will be interesting. I wish you the best on that two year mark-- so hard to know for sure. Lol-- yeah, I, in general, agree with you--scientists will ultimately be the ones to measure and conclude what is going on in space, but I don't think speculation and anaylsis of the theories they've put out there is a waste-- if philosophy can make sense of the data in a more clear way, then I don't see why it shouldn't be used. I think now the primary theory is that both "dark matter" and "dark energy" are what is "filling" about 95% or our space-time and/or matter-energy continuum. I guess dark matter, as you've explained, has been measured and calculated to some degree from the "missing mass-energy" that could be explained through emperical data of gravitational lensing arcs as well as other similar curvatures in outer space. Dark-energy though, is a lot more theorectical from what I understand--I'm not even sure they think it is energy in the traditional sense--it seems like they think of it more abstractly as a courterforce to gravity that can explain why the universe is expanding. I guess that Is why I left my description more vague, though it would probably be wise to add "and/or matter-energy" in there to cover my bases.

I didn't see this post (#137) by Stephen (his words in italics)-- thought I should answer these questions: “Daniel, on page 8 where you mention “ninety percent or more of space has yet to be accounted for,” did you mean “ninety percent or more of the mass-energy in the universe has yet to be accounted for?"” Yes, sort of, but I didn’t know if I should categorize the “void” in our universe as “mass-energy,” since I’m assuming, it hasn’t really been measured as such yet? I see space as more primal so that's what I put, but maybe that is somehow scientifically inaccuate? “You write at the outset of the chapter on Existence that it “can be anything or everything, in any state, context, or form . . . “. And such at any or every time. You then go on to say “Given the openness of this definition, existence becomes an axiomatic concept—a self-proven idea by its own definition.” By its definition, I take it you mean “Existence is anything or everything, in any state, context, or form . . .”. Are you thinking of this definition as being a sort of performative or demonstrative one in which particular things, states, contexts, or forms are known without abstractness, unlike the concept that is existence subsuming them?” Yes—with or without abstractedness—I’m putting no categorization on what things are, inside or outside the mind, abstract or concrete—but you are right that "existence" as I am defining it is not just a concept subsuming all other things—it is ANY/ALL things—you actually helped me understand this in my original essay sent to you years ago-- perhaps I didn't need "any/all times" in there, since "things" really takes care of all of it, but I found some people reading the book were thinking of things only as objects, so I added times to try to clarify. “You write that with its open-ended character, “Existence provides at least some context for any or all of our subsequent thoughts or philosophies.” One such context has preceded that statement, which is the opposition of existence to nothing. The further context existence provides seems to be lain out in what follows that statement, which is your notice of various distinctions such as change, permanence, essence, connection, quantities, qualities, entities, and environments. I would suggest that the unitary context your concept existence provides is only its generality, its any thing and every thing. The logical terms any and every, and the idea of thing or item, are doing the global work. Those guys—any, one, some, and every—are logical concepts we use tacitly in grasping any concept including change, permanence, essence, . . . . and in doing any thinking with them. To put existence to work for global context of those characters and distinctions would seem to require our grasp and notice of the notion and assertion “Existence exists,” and notice that there are no existents without some distinctive character or other, and notice that some of those characters, including their presentation as existing,—such as change, permanence, connection, and surround—are given in perception, and notice that perception is root for any existential assertions.” Humm, I think I differ with you on this. I do not think perception is necessary for existence (or even to know existence if you understand my wider definition of knowledge)—maybe to consciously assert that I know existence, to be able to use it deliberately as an axiomatic concept, but not for existence itself to be. I hate to say this Stephen, but I think this is where the body-mind trap starts. The beauty of the axiomatic concept is that it already includes its axiom—the axiom is a further bifurcation of the concept, splitting it into object and action so that we may better separate things from their actions, space from time, but to have a holistic, evolutionary philosophy from ground “everything,” means just one universal thing should engulf all others, and then split into whatever it splits into. So no, I don’t really think that the axiom needs to be stated /recognized or perceived from the get go, though it may help to explain it here (I do do this later on in the book). Also, I should say that I do think there are four axiomatic concepts we experience as separate individuals within this universe, and these require more qualifications. Existence is the primary one of course, but as you will read my arguments for the other three, they are much tougher to ground than existence—lol. My axiomatic concept "knowledge" takes the place of Rand's "consciousness" and helps to understand how existence exists within us and simultaneously within everything.

Stephen you mentioned: “The last two models had really become abstract sculptures, and they suffered somewhat in practicality. Were the wheels removed and the form there filled in they would be simply abstract sculpture, a kind of dynamic, graceful, and complete serenity. (I do not possess the models or photos of them; if they still exist, they are in possession of an estranged part of my family.)” These sound amazing—your description of the abstract transformation of these models reminds me of the abstract transformation in Mondrian’s paintings that Ellen posted ( I LOVE these—kinda wished he would have stayed in this stage a little longer—though I am generally attracted to his more formally reduced works tooJ) “I doubt that a dimension(s) along which one might range design-to-art coincides with a dimension(s) along which one might range abstract art to representational art.” I think you are right Stephen, but it seems like there is something to be said about making a “sign” or “representation” out of whole form—pulling out only some of its content/elements and reusing it to link us with the original thing, that often can “dumb down” further and further with more abridging. This of course doesn’t always happen, and sometimes it is more advantageous to do this—it can create efficiency and elegance, and as Jonathan said, it can just offer a new way of looking at that content, allowing in sum a fuller experience. But it seems like when most people talk about the difference between design and art, they are taking about this “signage” reduction of the original—taking a few essential characteristics of the original form, often to create an easier template for mass production. Maybe ultimately it’s not a useful division of categories? Do we need any hierarchy of form to separate “fine art” from other kinds of objects/art? If so, does anyone have any suggestions? If not, does this make “fine art” a purely subjective categorization? What allows a form to be set aside to be contemplatively valued vs. used for another, e.g. manual, purpose (one that could likely degrade its form more)? I think Stephen gives a little of his thoughts on this... perhaps it is in some very broad/general limitations of elements/principles of design/art that could separate an object suited more to contemplative function rather than manual function—repeating what he said above… “Any adequate definition of art should be able to capture not only feeling-dynamics of experience of art to related dynamics of experience of nature, but to related dynamics in experience of design in art or design neighboring art. Thinking about effect of variations in scale and in the other factors to painting might show clusters into classes one would reasonably call art or would reasonably call design.” Stephen you mention finishing a book… “I would like to add here an update on my plans. I had mentioned a few weeks ago that I would try to continue the “Beauty, Goodness, Life” thread at reduced pace as I worked on my book on other areas of philosophy. After only three days, it became clear that that was not feasible. The book took over, and painfully I had to gather up all the books spread out on the big coffee table by the fireplace, where I have been working this winter, and put them onto a shelf, with a distant hope of completing the thread after the book is completed.” I’m so excited for you-- I hope you can just get lost in it for a while—it will be fantastic to see even more synthesis of your ideas! I’m just assuming it will include many of the essays you’ve been posting on here? Is there one area of philosophy on which you’re focusing, or what do you imagine the scope of the book to cover? Please let me know when I can secure a copy, even if that is a year or more from now. Oh, I just wanted to mention to Michael that I have no expectations of anyone who is reading or who potentially will read my book, so please don’t feel any pressure or judgement from me (I'm glad you bought the book anyway!). I’ve been enjoying the feedback and conversation on here, and that’s something that was only possible because a brainiac like you formed this site—thank you!!!

Ok-- I'm using Michael's and Brant's argument here to shamelessly plug my book--can't resist--it's an interesting issue! Here are a couple of excerpts: From the section, “Existence” in Chapter 1. “Existence can be anything or everything, in any state context or form—not only all that has been, is or will be, but all that could be in any referential frame. As such, it has no exclusivity, referring to no particular thing as anything and/or everything at any and/or every time. A strong scientific argument against the primacy of existence is that some inherent duality, i.e. simultaneous elements, qualities or forms, unable to be removed from all other things (like space and time), hold equal weight as fundamentals, thus there is no one primal concept that can underscore or include everything. And from an empirical end, there seems no way to prove that outer space doesn’t exhibit emptiness, since to date, beyond the hypothesis of dark substances (as will be addressed in Chapter 2), as much as ninety percent or more of observed space has yet to be accounted for. Likewise, from a philosophic angle, who is to say that our experiences aren’t merely imagined, or some permutation of an otherworldly force? But propositioning a multiplicity, paradox, void, illusion or mystic something as reality, doesn’t negate the fact that any of these things would still exist. Remember that this fundamental has no specific reference, only the premise that whatever is, is. Even for “nothing” to be posited, it must first exist.[1]” And from the section, “A Case for Infinity and the Finite” in Chapter 2. "More than a century ago, the predominant thought was that our chemical elements (or at least most of them) were irreducible—atomic elements could combine into compounds, but could not be broken down themselves. The First Law of Thermodynamics (a form of energy conservation) works beautifully to explain how mass and energy in chemical reactions is never lost. But as physicists started to explore the subatomic realm more, it became clear that atomic elements could be taken apart (as well as formed), and they have been for many years in our nuclear reactors, particle accelerators, and laboratories. A few of the heaviest elements on the periodic table today were manmade discoveries, which could be conceived as “inventions.” Since then physicists have defined more basic substances, deeper than atomic levels, tinier than protons, neutrons and electrons (e.g. quarks and photons), that may or may not be irreducible. Logically and experimentally, there are intrinsic problems with the reducible “particle” construct, for on tiny quantum levels, individual particles start to fuse into “particle-waves,” binding together more and more inseparably so that the particle structure does not accurately describe their natures. The simplest logic following from these observations could be that the most primitive substance is completely fluid and inseparable, leaving no gaps, no “nothing,” in our space-time continuum. This idea would allow all physical things a substantive base through which they can materialize. In other words, any physical thing must have some substance supporting its finite reality or form, whatever that may be. This could describe a Law of Physicality.[2] The particle construct, a kind of enclosed membrane, also has problems when applied to large scale conceptions of the universe, creating a paradox of regress, i.e., what lies beyond the farthest, outermost reaches of the universe—what stands outside its observable horizon or “membrane?” The most probable answer in a naturally cogent universe is that there is no point “beyond” another, but instead there is some sort of infinite stretch or context to space. Substantive infinity often seems to go against our natural observations—not only the everyday limits we experience, but many finite physical quantities and constants measured through science. However, just like axiomatic concepts underscore certain infinities within all knowledge to stop infinite regress, some physical infinity seems necessary to put into context any/all space-time. Even if one believes that God made and stands outside our finite universe as a supernatural source for its genesis, one still would likely conclude God as infinite rather than finite, because the same question above arises—of what would lie outside of God if he/she/it were physically limited—the same as if supernatural causation were not posited. Instead, some spatial-temporal infinity can make the creation-destruction process continuous and sinuous on all levels, from macro to microscopic, whether basic or evolved, and no matter its package. Infinity, capable of pervading and encompassing all space or space-time, also coincides well with our idea of existence (as any/all things and times), working well as a primary physical principle, and one that can universally ground nature. Until disproven with some “nothingness” outside our cosmos, such will be posited as an Infinity Precondition. An infinite stretch or context to space-time favors a kind of never-ending creative capacity, further emphasizing the idea of something over nothing in our Law of Physicality. If matter and energy move in and out of some primal infinity, they could still from a standpoint of relativity, have some “original” point or points of creation (and destruction), since some most essential form, for all intents and purposes, could be completely recycled. However, total destruction, or conversion of all evolved forms to one primal substance, would be implausible. If total destruction were possible, then likely no natural impetus would have existed for things to first materialize, at least in the context of non-spontaneous evolution. This suggests that our infinity must have certain physical limits, even if not contained in its extent by space. Formal limits, or at least some kind of physical differences, supported by our axiomatic concept self and its derivatives, should be present. These facts may seem to contradict the idea of infinity itself, highlighting the question of how the infinite and finite function together. As finite beings, it may be hard to understand how anything can be unlimited—how can there be anything that doesn’t eventually end? Many of us at some point have grappled with this angering paradox, making it all too easy to conclude that where space ends, “God” or “nothingness” begins. But if we try to make sense of how our universe forms its own boundaries without succumbing to something “outside” of its nature, it follows that infinity could be of real physical substance, allowing the universe to be its own complete, yet potentially limitless, creative source. If we don’t ultimately root reality in some substantive infinity that can create the finite, it seems unlikely age-old dichotomies of physics and philosophy could ever be logically unified to full extent, unless a more limited logic is embraced (like a finite space-time), or a more mystical explanation is invoked. I think it’s not unreasonable to believe that open space forms closed spaces, where both the infinite and finite (like existence to self or essence to reality) can be present in all evolution. Current multiverse theories in many ways are an attempt to understand external, finite boundaries of an infinite universe. A multiverse could be any or all potential multiple or alternative entities, dimensions, realities and/or universes that together compose everything in existence. .[3] Multiverses have been explored in many subjects from philosophy to religion to the arts, but have been in recent decades of specific curiosity within physics. Something must lie beyond our visible cosmologic horizon if we believe in infinity and reject the notion of complete finity and/or “empty” space (nothing). The multiverse logic goes like this: Our universe is well thought to be an expanding Hubble volume or “bubble universe,” where we rest on its outer surface, becoming subject to the physical laws and constants of those parameters. Thus, if the universe is infinite, it should support an infinite number of Hubble “bubbles.” It seems likely that with infinity, some of these membranes, “bubbles” or dimensions, would be very different than our own, perhaps even having different physical laws, while others would be practically the same. Multiverses, considering our Law of Physicality, would still require between themselves, some sort of physical continuity in order to unify in space-time. However, even if they possess this continuity, this does not necessarily mean the universe should be entirely filled with macroscopic, particle-like or “bubblesque” dimensions; the fact that our visible universe is of measurable extent and seems to have curvature may impress upon our senses that everything should be repetitively formed and shaped in a similar way. It even seems highly likely that the universe contains many “cosmological horizons” or boundaries beyond our own. But the infinity of space to me, if it is truly never-ending, fundamentally implies no extremital shape at all—that in its most basic, holistic form, the universe should have no outer, spatial definition." [1]. Parmenides may be first credited with discovering the idea of existence, but he defined it as a type of static material permanence. Closer to my physical beliefs a century before, Anaximander can be credited with attributing the “apeiron” as some kind of creative base to all things. Runes, Dictionary of Philosophy,14, 225. However, neither of these philosophers approached existence in a completely open-ended way. My definition of existence reflects Rand’s in Binswanger’s Ayn Rand Lexicon, 155-156, in that it does not, in and of itself, specify its nature. Nonetheless like Rand, I think that ‘nothing’ as a primary substance, is a dead-end notion, becoming meaningless due to its own qualifications. But as a relative concept, referring to things that once existed or could exist, but now don’t or won’t, “nothing” could be quite useful. [2]. As discussed in footnote 12, several Classical Greek philosophers including Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Parmenides, and Aristotle, posited some physical continuity or substance as a base constituent for everything else. Though perhaps most akin to Anaximander’s ‘aperion,’ or Aristotle’s ‘substance,’ what I’m more broadly suggesting with this Law of Physicality is that all space-time, whatever its specific nature, has some substance that manifests its finite forms (in terms of modern-day physics, these ideas could translate as some sort of “aether,” discussed more in this chapter’s Principles of Matter). [3]. My summary of multiverses was aided by Barrow’s The Constants of Nature, 275-290 and Wikipedia article, “Multiverse.” Paraphrased by William James in 1895, “multiverse” has held other related, alias conceptions, e.g. metaverse, alternative reality, quantum universe, parallel dimension/plane, and/or ‘other’ world.

A friend recently led me on to book called "The Brain that Changes Itself"-- I haven't read it yet, but here's the description at www.normandoidge.com/normandoidge/ABOUT_THE_BOOK.html -- pretty interesting: ABOUT THE BOOK THE BRAIN CAN CHANGE ITSELF. It is a plastic, living organ that can actually change its own structure and function, even into old age. Arguably the most important breakthrough in neuroscience since scientists first sketched out the brain’s basic anatomy, this revolutionary discovery, called neuroplasticity, promises to overthrow the centuries-old notion that the brain is fixed and unchanging. The brain is not, as was thought, like a machine, or “hardwired” like a computer. Neuroplasticity not only gives hope to those with mental limitations, or what was thought to be incurable brain damage, but expands our understanding of the healthy brain and the resilience of human nature. Norman Doidge, MD, a psychiatrist and researcher, set out to investigate neuroplasticity and met both the brilliant scientists championing it and the people whose lives they’ve transformed. The result is this book, a riveting collection of case histories detailing the astonishing progress of people whose conditions had long been dismissed as hopeless. We see a woman born with half a brain that rewired itself to work as a whole, a woman labeled retarded who cured her deficits with brain exercises and now cures those of others, blind people learning to see, learning disorders cured, IQs raised, aging brains rejuvenated, painful phantom limbs erased, stroke patients recovering their faculties, children with cerebral palsy learning to move more gracefully, entrenched depression and anxiety disappearing, and lifelong character traits altered. Doidge takes us into terrain that might seem fantastic. We learn that our thoughts can switch our genes on and off, altering our brain anatomy. Scientists have developed machines that can follow these physical changes in order to read people’s thoughts, allowing the paralyzed to control computers and electronics just by thinking. We learn how people of average intelligence can, with brain exercises, improve their cognition and perception in order to become savant calculators, develop muscle strength, or learn to play a musical instrument, simply by imagining doing so. Using personal stories from the heart of this neuroplasticity revolution, Dr. Doidge explores the profound implications of the changing brain for understanding the mysteries of love, sexual attraction, taste, culture and education in an immensely moving, inspiring book that will permanently alter the way we look at human possibility and human nature.

This has become a heated discussion I’m a little tentative to join, but it is also very interesting are I hope I can add constructively to the conversation. First, I don’t think most of the “determinists” on this thread are of the pure reductionistic strains--correct me if I am wrong--but most don’t believe that our minds/consciousness are only the product of external environment + genes (or more broadly, all our biologic/internal components), but has to be of some special context or pattern of chemoelectric processing to compose our thinking brains, invoking certain “higher” or more complex functionings, integrative abilities and responses. In other words, green is not just yellow plus blue, or certain browns minus the reds, but green also has its own special place on the pigment color wheel, with its own special effects—things just don’t reduce to their “simpler” or even more inclusive components, but have, create, or take on special emergent properties and effects in their more complex patterns and/or contexts. I think Dean is right in post #231 when he states: “One's ideas are embodied as the relationships between parts of one's brain. Its encoded in sensory and actuator neural signal streams that correspond with real observations/sensations and actions. Our brain can perform induction and deduction to abstract/compress/simplify our observations to improve memory storage efficiency. We can simulate reality and plan and change our worldview and do all sorts of things dynamically... We can make new conclusions about our situation in the world, and reevaluate our actions and character in order to increase one's goal attainment. Is this last process what you want to call free will or volition or consciousness? Do you claim that you are _cause_? You are causing? You are causal. You are determining? You are deterministic.” ___________________ With this in mind, I don’t understand how determinism has to threaten in any way, the idea of “free will.” I don’t think most of the people on here arguing for free will think it means we can do anything we want to do—unrestrained by any laws of nature (in general or human), our environment, genes or biologies. I just think most are saying there are some things (perhaps even very few things, but some), as beings (on whatever level) that come under our ability to control… or that we as wholes, more than any of our parts, most directly determine. I would ask the determinists—how are we not to some degree as wholes, as “I”s or “selves,” agents for change within this deterministic flux of existence? E.g. just like atoms to molecules, we as individuals influence our societies. Should we really be reduced only to external agents plus our “preprogrammed” or even fuller "deterministic" biologic, causal parts? Michael gets to the point in post #237: “I'm not speaking of the fact that consciousness can emerge from brain evolution, but instead that the state of consciousness as a form of existence only comes about that way. It's a subtle difference, but it's important. One is a speculation based on observation (one I share) and the other is a dogmatic proclamation. For the record, it might be as in the dogma, but I don't think anyone can do more than speculate at the present state of human knowledge. From the volume of unexplainable evidence and personal accounts that keep cropping up, there is good reason to prefer a position that there a lot more to this mind stuff than just a deterministic byproduct of processing animated meat , and we have to keep looking to find out what it is.” ____________________________________ This same kind of issue came up in a contention I had with Darrell a while back (I think in the forum "Does Consciousness Affect Matter?"), along the lines of whether or not the brain/brain chemistry and the mind were really different things, or different ways of looking at the same things. I think Peter, using William Dwyer and George H. Smith in #244, helps to clarify this difference: “It is true that one cannot know, simply by looking at a certain part of the active brain (externally), that it is the organ that performs mental activity, just as one cannot know by engaging in mental activity that a certain part of the active brain is the organ performing it. Further study is needed to make the connection, just as further study was needed to make the connection between the morning star and the evening star, or between lightening and thunder. But once having made that connection, it is folly to deny it on the grounds that the brain's activity _appears_ different from a subjective perspective than it does from an objective one.” -- Bill and “If you answer that the "it" is the physical brain, then this merely reaffirms what few would deny, namely, that physical brain activities cause a state of consciousness. But this "mind" may have emergent properties and abilities that make it much different than the physical causes on which it depends. The cause of X is NOT the same thing as X; if it were, the cause and its effect would be indistinguishable.” Ghs ________________________________________________ So, I think it is important to think of wholes, or these connections, as different than just a collection of scientific parts/processes—the ”top-down” and “bottom-up” do congeal—form and content are integrally connected--but in thinking from the bottom-up there is a time-delay in the process of connecting all the parts and processes to make the whole, as well as gaps in information that likely occur in the scientific breakdown—such dissection may be more detailed and accurate at locating key parts, but can also be much less efficient to use in practice. So I think wholes, abstractions, connections, generalities, can have their own special properties and powers that can’t be fully mimicked by piecing them apart by science. Belief in "free will," "will," or "choice" (whatever it is), in general, just sums up our unique power as macroscopic beings, a power we don’t assimilate as well by trying to look at all the particular external and internal deterministic factors that may come to play upon our bodies and brains as humans. So if we accept that cause and effect, i.e. "determinism," and "free will" do not really have to threaten one another, we can start to look at how they congeal and function more in depth. I think Peter helped us to understand the depth of this issue when he brought up in post #264, “Just keep in mind that a silent break to consider the potential benefits of the situation is usually a good idea when (1) you're working on something you want to complete and (2) the difficulties are making you frustrated and tired. Or when (1) you're in a position when your attention is especially beneficial to you but (2) negative emotions are for whatever reason affecting your concentration. Some of these things came to my attention when reading about artificial neural networks (computer science, artificial intelligence). In one of these models (NN using back propagation and two output nodes.), the output result of a consideration of several inputs is just a yes or no, and to which degree. If you have a set of correct answers, you feed it back to the network that produced the result. If it made an error, it will correct the specific path that produced the error, changing more where the influence was higher, all the way through the internal hierarchy up to the input nodes("senses"). By using a set of "questions and answers" you can train the net until it responds correctly to each question, assuming it can hold enough information.(Sometimes it learns the logic that leads a set of input to the corresponding answer, other times it just remembers all the combinations) Similarly, in a brain, positive (emotional) feedback about a thought (such as pride of accomplishment), strengthens the paths that lead to that "result". For instance, a child feeling good about completing a math task using the logic of arithmetic, strengthens the "paths" that used that logic to solve the problem. Also, when faced with a similar problem, the child is more likely to solve it using the same method, and each time making the task more of a task for the subconscious (and memory). My point is that the positive emotion about the result might make the brain trace the result back to the problem, strengthening the "path" by which the result was made, as with the artificial NN. Of course, this is rather theoretical(and deterministic), but might serve as a useful model/analogy. Keeping this effect of a positive emotion (or positive moral judgment) in mind, consider the following example: Why do you think so many speeches start with a joke? Because telling a joke in a speech not only gets the audiences attention, if also causes them to attempt to retain more information. This causes them to remember the content of the speech more easily, because the positive emotion in laughter causes strengthening of a "link", in this case attention to the speaker. At the other end of the emotional scope, is the characteristic flaw of forgetting facts that a person don't like. Uninteresting facts are easily forgotten. Theories to which you attach negative emotions are easily ignored. Lack of confidence in your ability to understand the theory has the same effect. An exception worth mentioning here, is that the pride of the accomplishment of a proper refutation of those ideas makes the theories easier to remember.” ________________________ This is interesting. It got me thinking about how volition may emerge from similar self-regulatory patterns down our biological chain. In life-based evolutionary processes, genetic (“core” internal) or early developmental changes are usually attributed to mutations in the womb (or seed, whether “random” or not—I want to address randomness later). Now these changes often seem instigated by reproductive/pregnancy “stress,” whether first more externally generated (e.g. by ingesting certain foods , drugs [e.g. fetal alcohol syndrome], or positively as some studies of musical stimulus seem to attest), or internally instigated from bio-emotional states of the female/mother (as some science seems to suggest--see http://www.schizophrenia.com/prevention/Stress.child.html ) E.g. autism may be a prime example of something dominated more by infections/ birthing stress than pure environmental or genetic factors ( http://bjp.rcpsych.org/content/195/1/7.long ). Autism is interesting because certain hyperfocuses/ savant-like capabilities can emerge in strains like Asperger’s – could this be a response to a mother’s mental stresses—a way a compensating by giving birth to a baby that can channel/focus mentally in certain ways more? I’ve read that although instances of Down syndrome can lead to higher rates of leukemia, the syndrome also seems to be a protector against solid cancers like carcinomas (which account for most cancers) later in life—I wonder if there is some relation here where the mutation is a reaction to a mother’s health, trying to protect the newborn from such cancers later on? I guess what I’m saying is that ultimately, this gestation and birthing “stress,” how environmental and genetic factors are recoded within the womb during this time, seems more a key in understanding evolutionary change, than any one contributing factor—e.g. even though we know it is a cell division creating an extra chromosome 21 that causes Down syndrome now, we are still left with WHY that cell division ultimately occurs. Because the chromosome offers protection against so many kinds of cancer, perhaps looking into cancer development in human history could give us a better understanding of how Down syndrome may have evolved? My point is, instead of the chromosome jut being slotted as a “random” mutation, it may be more advantageous to look at the natural ”intelligence” behind what we call a disability, to see why the change occurred from a systematic, more purpose-driven, perspective. This is what I’m getting at with my idea of “cholce” vs “randomness” (though I prefer “probabilities”). I don’t discount that randomness/probability, as a philosophic/mathematic construct has uses (and as several [especially Darrell] have discussed, does not have to discount cause and effect), e.g. in quantum physics, game theory and some other statistical models, but I would like to suggest that it works better when less possibilities are available for an action—as in quantum physics—here I would think that probabilities can work well because the limiting factors for actions are less—shouldn’t quantum forms be more basic, their actions in general being more reduced than the macroscopic things they compose? But in macroscopic form… here is where I think things “self-contain” or close upon themselves (I describe this in my book as a loop or spiral-like motion, that can gradually increase its mass and “levels”). In doing this we suddenly have “external” and “internal” individual forms. Now the actions become self-contained and naturally can have some degree of separate self-regulation—the more complex these internalized systems build, the more internalized self-regulation occurs. This creates multi-functional beings that can direct or determine to some degree their own actions, however minute. I think giving a name to this process, (whether “cholce” or otherwise) will help us to understand complexities of cause and effect within multifunctional individuals, better than simple randomness/probability models—e.g. for wave and particle wave forms, there is likely not enough internal complexity for these things to act much outside of external factors in combination with their internal natures—here I think probability models suffice yet can be developed in their intricacy. Multidimensional individuals I think must have some control over what is going on inside them—otherwise in an infinite, entropic universe, I see no reason why they would continue to grow at all. How can more order come from chaos? Why evolutionary growth from an isotropic and homogenous self-similarity? To me cholce is a start to understanding this—one that focuses first on the natural actions/purposes within individuals rather than a scientifically reductive “bottom up” mechanical matrix. I don’t doubt that matrix exists and is important, but it is ultimately inefficient to understanding things as wholes. I think axiomatic structure and ideas like cholce are better for creative, systematic applications.

Peter-- I had never thought of black holes/singularities to be used like gravitational "whips" to speed up space travel-- that 's an awesome possibility! Not sure I follow the "finite" space (infinite time?) time scenario you are talking about, but I'm sure there are more possible scenarios of how space-time could work than what I have conceived in the book-- though I don't think any of them could get around some substantive infintiy without falling into an infinite regress problem for any "self-caused" universe.

Ellen and Jonathan, Thoughtful posts... I tend to agree with you Jonathan, that the distinction between "illustrator" and "artist" is probably a pretty arbitrary one, but if "art" differentiates from other forms of creation (e.g. nature's creations (not manipulated by humans-- like a tree in a field), orf technologies (like medicine, electronics, etc), then exactly how? I can see that art could more broadly house all human creations,with technologies being mainly for direct human contact vs. more contemplative, "at a distance" contact which we might prescribe more to our senses of sight and sound.e.g., thus as categories for "fine arts" vs. "applied arts"( although these categories may have an aire of judgement and status unduly placed upon them). Do you agree with this assessment, or do you think the labels are altogether unneccessary? Post #120-- I love how Jonathan originally paired these representational and abstract images together to show how there doesn't have to be that much formal difference between the two -- or for one to become the other-- Ellen, I think that last painting by Kandinsky is a wonderful example of how something that may appear "simpler" in appearance, may be actually much more creative and intellectually complex than other more "complex" appearing imagery. Funny, I've never really been too attracted to Kandinsky's work (better in person but still not one of my favorite artists), but seeing this painting here, and then comparing it to all the images above it, I have to say I'm most interested in the design elements of the Kandinsky, perhaps because they are strangely unpreditacble-- there is a "skill" or at least a hard at attain sensitivity in work that has both simplicity of form, yet can hold one's interest with an internal dynamism. I get this same sense of playful mastery from Ben Shahn. Children's paintings sometimes have the same attentive uniqueness to them-- and I have been able to see the difference in young students (of no apparent skill level) work where they have been sensitive to the marks and design elements they put of a page-- same as if they were observing an object intently and putting and down what they see, versus the students that more randomly and/or without the same care, scribble something down-- there are happy accidents of course, but those are more rare. I used to think most non-representational art was not very good btw-- it took me a long time to understand some of the actual intricacies of application, materials, and creative uses of design elements. On the Kandinsky above it seems nothing strongly repeats across the whole canvas. I think repetition can kill the motion within visual art if it becomes too monotonous and/or looks too "designed". MC Escher would be a good example of an artist that often uses repetition in what woud normally be considered a "template-like," static "design" motif, except that Escher has such creative dynamism of thought, through his use of positive-negative spaces and figures in braids of illusion, that an incredible variety of interest develops out from his "illustrative" or "design" artwork. Kandinsky approaches his work from a very different angle, reducing the repetition of form and creating more simple heirarches and transitions of shapes and colors that can freely dance upon the surface. I guess another question that arises for me out of this is, how is formal merit (irrespective of moral, social or other kinds of artistic/aesthetic merit), even just technical skill, to be judged, if simple forms can be put together in such a way that they can still elicit a complex response? Are there any solid standards for good artistic judgement , even when reduced to formal/ technical qualities? I tend to think there are visual forms that break up perception so much that an image can't really be integrated well (e.g. colors to glaringly bright it causes pain to look at them, forms too spatially distant from one anohter to make a relation within our visual views, motions happening too quick or outside of a series of events to detect them,etc.) as well as on the other spectral end, forms that are so simple/common or ingrained in normal experience, they aren't often noticed/separated/absttracted enough to warant contemplation (e.g. a wall of a single neutral color, average/common landscapes/object, etc.) Could these be some formal starting/ending points to qualify "good" art from others?

Jonathan, Shephen, anyone who may have some insights... One issue brought soemtimes with my artwork, or sometimes with my love of much of Andrew Wyeth's work (and I think Jonathan--there is some connection here) , is that it sometimes may fall into being "just" design or illustration, and not "art." Is this an arbitrary division? Can something was once illustration/design become "art" and/or vice versa? What could be some main factors that separate one from the other, and is one a "lower" or "higher" expression than the other? I think it is connected to the idea my high-chool art teacher often brought up-- the idea of "showing" vs "telling" --that somehow through the meduim, scale, and/or context of the expression,etc, what people are classifying as "art" more viscerally leads us throughthe experience, whereas in visual design/ illustration all we have is some more brief element, symbol or story to get at a meaning. Almost the difference between pure "aesthetics" vs. its "langauge" -- where more conrtent is infused in the elements and context of the object itself in art vs "design," and I think it might have something to do with how removed we are (bodily and mentally) in the perception process, feeling/relating closer to an object or further removed from it (e.g. when we touch an object it can do more bodily harm than looking at an object) Has anyone thought about clearer distinctions in these divisions?

Las Vegas-- Yeah, who wasn't annoyed by the STNG episodes with Troy's mother--lol--though I happened to like Troy, she presented different psychic capabilities that were sometimes interesting, I though, in contrast to all the technological bravado and more "rational" judgement of the other characters-- yeah, her lines were sometimes pretty stupid, and I haven't watched it in a long time, so who knows, it may all seem cheesy to me now:) I was a fan of Voyager too (7-of-9!), some of DSpaceNine (could have done without Odo and Quark though (Whoopi [Guinan] was such a better character for a bartender). Peter-- Yeah, I suppose "collective" does have a lot of negative connotations in an Objectivist forum--I did mean it to be essentially synonymous with society, not as a mind-dead drone state as may be insinuated with a Borg, "bee-hive"-like "collective." I hope you've realized in reading the book that this is my intention. I used collective instead of society becasue I think it is more entity-neutral-- it doesn't just reference living or human populations. The Wikipedia article "Collective" states, "A collective is a group of entities that share or are motivated by at least one common issue or interest, or work together to achieve a common objective.[citation needed] Collectives differ from cooperatives in that they are not necessarily focused upon an economic benefit or saving, but can be that as well.... The term "collective" is sometimes used to describe a species as a whole—for example, the human collective." The Wikipedia arctile "Society" says, "A society, or a human society, is a group of people involved with each other through persistent relations, or a large social grouping sharing the same geographical or social territory, typically subject to the same political authority and dominant cultural expectations. Human societies are characterized by patterns of relationships (social relations) between individuals who share a distinctive culture and institutions; a given society may be described as the sum total of such relationships among its constituent members. In the social sciences, a larger society often evinces stratification and/or dominance patterns in subgroups.... More broadly, a society may be illustrated as an economic, social, or industrial infrastructure, made up of a varied collection of individuals. Members of a society may be from different ethnic groups. A society can be a particular ethnic group, such as the Saxons; a nation state, such as Bhutan; or a broader cultural group, such as a Western society. The word society may also refer to an organized voluntary association of people for religious, benevolent, cultural, scientific, political, patriotic, or other purposes. A "society" may even, though more by means of metaphor, refer to a social organism such as an ant colony or any cooperative aggregate such as, for example, in some formulations of artificial intelligence." ------------------ Yes-- your paraphrasing of my section on the Principles of Time, "The Speed of Knowledge" is very good/accurate. Essentially, I think some "base substance" or "singularity" at the genesis of the universe or otherwise (as black holes, etc.) likely either moves/moved at the speed of light or faster, because if it moved slower, we'd likely be able to observe it/measure it. And I tried to describe how, through spatial geometry, such a base substance/singularity could still reach points faster tthan light, without having to actually move at an intrinsically faster "speed." The idea of "velocity" as a combination of both direction and speed iwas central to this idea. Thanks for piecing together all that information on singulariites-- that is really interesting-- although I'd read about postulations of different geometries of singularities, I hadn't read the about the ones you presented specifically. I think the way that light/EM radiation reacts with black holes especially (e.g. Hawking radiation), holds some geometric key to unlocking primal patterns of space-time. I like the idea of a center of a black hole as a worm hole, but I tend to think (as I think most scientists do) that all matter and even light/EM radiation, rips apart and becomes some primal "base substance" after entering a black hole-- though this may lead to an expansion/contraction between the cosmologic boundary of two different universes or between our inner space and a larger infinity of space-time. You state "quantum mechanics does not permit particles to inhabit a space smaller than their wavelengths." This is a main reason why I think space is externally infinite and internally finite, and why the universe, if starting form an isotropic, homogenous singularity, has to move inward-- and why I think gravity delocalizes/echoes this inward movement after amounts of substance/masses form. For the universe (in the grand sense-- not just to our cosmologic horizon) to create itself, yet still encompass all physicality, it has to have both some infinite capacity and some self-limiting capacity inherent in its nature (if there isn't an external "God" or other force ouside nature). This "outward-inward" construct is the simplest geometric way I could conceive of it-- though "inward" and "outward" may be three-dimensional boundaries that dont exactly function like I/we may visualize them at this most primal level of space-time, or points of singularity.

Peter, Lol-- yeah, I was thinking of volitional reprogramming of genes/biologies mainly in the medical sense, although I do think there is something to be said for states of mediative clarity and good thinking for channeling our biologies in the right direction (thanks for The Principles of Objective Thinking reference). There are some interesting stories of people having "spiritual" awakenings that have helped them overcome diseases/health problems, for instance, but of course all we really have in these cases is testimonials (or maybe someone has done detailed MRI scans trying to document what is going on there, I don't know). I don't doubt that there is some power of positive/spiritual thinking,in reaching out to a "higher" power or something at the base of things that seems more alive or tangibly real in relation to our inner state, in short, some base connection to the wider scope of things-- I don't think people who believe in God in this sense are crazy at all. Maybe there are other directive levels of consciousness too, but a lot of the parapsychology "science" out there is pretty weak right now--that seems more hocus-pocus to me than any simple faith in a larger "purpose" that can at least center us, if not more. There are definitely altered states of consciousness and/or various levels of it, too (e.g. in sleep, drug induced, in early development, etc.), but these are not necessarily synthesizing information with any "higher" level of control, where consciousness itself may be evolving, as perhaps what happens when we become self-conscious in early childhood, or perhaps what may be happening with prefrontal human language development or our logical/analytical abilities (e.g. in piecing together things or objects with their actions, attributes, relations), or perhaps at some "volitional" level where creative thinking occurs instead of pre-programmed and/or mimicry-trained thinking. I think it is curious that all these abilities we often see as more "human" seem to start around the same time-- traditionally as kids move out of infant stages, begin verbally communicating, piecing together concepts, understanding the word "I," and defying parents intentionally (more volitionally) or for no "good" reason (versus the crying of a baby for comfort or food-- a more automatic response to bodily pleasure and pain). I don't feel good either with marking this developmental stage as the beginning point of a true "human" being, but it may be a place where certain rights could be granted a child that it wouldn't have simply at birth (or even within the womb at latter stages). The alternative of not drawing any lines seems to leave us tied-up in ambiguity, leading to our current debates on abortion rights, the death penalty, the right-to-die, and legal ages for adulthood, as well as other rights like sexual consent, drug use, marriage, as well as other legal and economic rights and privileges. If we can start to more accurately define the mental and/or physical qualifications needed to operate on certain volitional levels, it may help resolve many of the social tensions that are caused by leaving it up in the air-- what are your thoughts? I love to jump around in books-- so I wrote the book figuring people could treat it more like a reference book if they wanted-- and the Humanities section is definitely easier reading than Chapter 3 anyway.

Lol Peter-- I too share a love for Stak Trek, so I know who/what you are referencing when you bring up these scenarios ( I was truly disappointed when they took the lastest Star Trek: Enterprise off the air-- Next Generation was my favorite--I grew up on it). On the idea of cadavers and genomes, I think that human life and consciousness is more than this, yes. I think the patterns of chemical and electrical stimuli produced through or directed by genomes and in different regions of the body and brain, and within our systems and brains as wholes, probably hold many secrets to the science behind human-specific knowledge and consciousness. But I also think it is important how those patterns compare to chemical and electrical patterns of the stimuli reacting off of external objects—I think there has to be some self-similar physical thread that allows us to define traits of objects and construct percepts inductively. Deductively, I think axiomatic structure may be a key to how synergies between things can be unwound and understood more clearly, and also how we could more easily in creative processes, understand how to put together knowledge to have it actually work or be of significance. Data and Seven-of-Nine I think were my favorite characters of all the Star Trek characters because they brought to light in me how it could be possible for an inanimate thing to become an entity that could value itself—artificial intelligence seems so possible to me now. Seven-of-Nine was so interesting because she was a biological being that in a mental sense was forced to become an inanimate part in a big Borg machine, and had to relearn becoming an individual, of controlling her own actions, I being of her own volition—that was a fascinating (and yes sexy) character. You, Peter, ask about soul, and its relation to volition in this way, and make good points about where one would draw the line between a volition that would make one human? I honestly do not know, because we seem to start our lives in volitional states very comparable or even below that of other animals, so I understand why you would want to trace some kind of human “soul” to DNA, as a potential way to trace and differentiate us from other animals. I’m not sure this is possible because as Michael stated and what I hope I explained in the preceding paragraph, life and consciousness, I think, require certain chemical and electrical stimulations to activate genomes and inanimate substances into living ones—I address this somewhat in footnote 24 of the book, explaining how scientists have indeed already created amino acids (the building blocks of proteins and life) from electrically charge elemental gases as early as 1953—in 2010 scientist successfully programmed an otherwise “blank” cell to self-replicate. So I think there is some energetic, self-regulating patterning that converts an otherwise inanimate or “dead” substance to a living one— Binswanger talks about self-regulation in his article “Volition as Cognitive Self-Regulation.” Perhaps somehow this volition, or the ability to go in a different direction within oneself, some internal, multifunctional capacity, may be what evolves things creatively from the inside out, evolutionarily, into “higher” capabilies, “higher” states of being, in some intrinsic way/sense, e.g. actually helping to reprogram our environments and perhaps even our genes/biologies. I do not think “souls” are outside of nature itself, but are a manifestation of the mechanism of self-creation that I think the universe/existence possesses. I just framed this idea as “abstract” because it is more removed from what we may experience as our souls. So I think “souls” really could be attributed to any individual thing, although the term may be more fitting to address life-forms, conscious or even just self-conscious entities, because the term maybe implies a kind of self-reflection? I think what sets humans apart from other animals eventually is our high development of creative capacities—our ability to have a lot of options at our fingertips and to go in many different directions—we may fail at a lot of them, but eventually we gain as a collective at a much higher speed I think, because we can find out what works among all those options much quicker. I see “creative” and “evolutionary” as synonymous in some sense, and I think volition in some sense is a creative internal capacity caused by the level of freedom an entity possess. We are getting to the point though “volition,” or at least out conscious capacities of knowledge (more successfully than “random” mutations btw) , that we are able to actually reshape genetic material, control the innate processes that guide our beings—now isn’t that incredible! We don’t have to wait multiple generations, perhaps hundreds of thousands of years to have a part of our very basic, bodily nature change. This is why I think volition comes from some more basic creative force within all self-regulating things. If we access and use that, we seem to have much more power than waiting for “random” changes and/or genetic/environmental deterministic forces to guide our actions. I appreciate your humor and interesting reflections, Peter. Yeah, poor Data.. all that intellect and he often doesn’t know how to direct it—I suppose he could fantasize is someone directed or told him to--lucky he was is such an awesome environment to sculpt his values—he could have been way more screwed up than just having some trouble wrapping his head around sex! Thanks Michael for purchasing the book—I’m honored—Steven is actually one of the key people who helped me formulate/clarify some of its most important concepts by asking me some very good questions years ago, so I’m really interested to hear more of his responses as well as yours.

So Peter, I guess on your question of a soul within DNA-- I think that "soul" or "spirit" in the abstract sense comes from this creative, self-manifesting force within nature itself. On a specifically human level, our "souls" in context of others might somehow be linked to our level of volitional capacities? I don't know how much volitional capacity is actually programmed into the human genome itself, or how much comes about from reaction from our genetics with our environments, and how we evolve from these more deterministic factors. There may be some way to a percentage, but I think it's important to realize that changing our environments can also increase our level of choices, as well as other organization strategies, both internal and external (like learning structures, language, computational devices, etc) so I don't know how important just focusing on our specific genetic/biological evolution is. What are your thoughts on this--did you have other specific reasons for inquiring about souls in relation to DNA?

Thanks Peter, I see the discussion “Does Matter Affect Consciousness” has exploded with some great insight/analyses, but I found yours especially to be getting at the core of what I’m trying to discover as well. The problem for me is not determinism vs. free will. The problem is understanding how causal agents have come to be states of "mind," on all levels, including consciousness and what we experience as volitional states. I like what you stated in that discussion, and yet I would hope more people would respond to this idea you talk about in Kelly’s argument. I think it starts to address how different “levels” of being can control one another. I’ll quote some of what you said from post #157. “In contrast, Kelley argues that the Aristotelian/Objectivist account of causality, in which “causality is a matter of the nature or identity of the objects which act,” does not limit causality to antecedent factors. Rather, it allows for “many different modes of causality in nature,” including simultaneous causality between the levels of organization that emerge in complex systems, such as in conscious organisms. Kelley discusses two basic forms of such simultaneous causality: upward causation and downward causation. In upward causation, entities acting at a lower level of organization simultaneously cause effects on the entities in a higher level of organization. Downward causation is simply the reverse, such that entities acting at a higher level of organization simultaneously cause effects on the entities in a lower level of organization. For Kelley, consciousness is “a higher level phenomenon distinct from the electrical activity of specific parts of the brain.” Unfortunately, Kelley leaves implicit perhaps the most critical point about such simultaneous causality within complex systems, namely that these lower and higher levels are equally real, with causal powers of their own. Modern analytic philosophy, in contrast, tends to be deeply reductionistic about such levels of organization, such that the higher levels are seen as really “nothing but” the lower levels, such that everything eventually reduces to the microphysical. Consequently, higher levels of organization (including the perceptual level) are seen as less real (if real at all) and the existence of downward causation is denied. The rejection of this “collapsing levels” metaphysics is clearly critical to Kelley's account of causation, even though never explicitly discussed. Based upon this rich understanding of causality, Kelley argues that both upward and downward causation are involved in consciousness through an example of an animal seeing a predator and fleeing. After tracing the “antecedent factor” causality in both the brain (the lower level) and the mind (the higher level) in this situation, Kelley turns to the connections between these levels of organization. In upward causation, the brain causes changes in consciousness. Thus the visual cortex might upwardly cause perception and the limbic system might upwardly cause recognition and fear. In downward causation, consciousness causes changes in the brain. Thus perception might the “affect the visual cortex by keeping its activities centered on the appropriate object” and fear might determine “which particular set of neural impulses gain control of the motor cortex.” Such simultaneous upward and downward causation, on Kelley's account, is an integral part of any conscious process. Kelley then specifies the role of all three forms of causality (upward causation, antecedent factors, downward causation) with respect to free will. The “capacity to focus” is an instance of upwards causation because it owes its existence “the nature and structure of the brain.” A person's “specific knowledge,” “hierarchy of values,” and “thinking skills” are all antecedent conditions which “set limits on what it is possible ... to focus on.” But within those limits, the choice to focus or not, to raise or lower one's level of consciousness or not is “pure downward causation.” The theory of mind Kelley sketches in these lectures is far from complete, but nevertheless promising. His detailed explanation of the Objectivist/Aristotelian alternative to Humean causality and his non-reductionistic view of levels of organization seem indispensable for accounting for mental causation in an Objectivist theory of mind.” --------------------------------------------- Michael also address this idea in post #161, but frames, if I’m understanding correctly, within this panel discussion, generally of scientific determinism vs. religious determinism, where scientific determinism approaches the problem from the ground up—e.g. from sub-atomic to chemical to biological to psychological etc., and religiion approaches it from the top down, e.g. from God to human dominated hierarchy of life to the inanimate, etc., where a portion of the post reads, “Finally, very near the end (2:27:37 to 2:30:07), Nye sums up the problem clearly. He is discussing intelligent design. He finally admits that the view of religion is from the top down and the view from science is from the bottom up, and that the two are incompatible. Taking religion out of it, I would like to know why this is incompatible. That's rhetorical wondering because I know better. I hold that both top and bottom are fundamental.” This, I think, is a very important point—so if I’m re-contextualizing this right, I think both general and specific fundamentals, essentially fuse or at least reflect from one another, at their most basic levels. For example, there need be little difference in content between, say, the principles of the universe or the universe itself, and all the parts that make up that universe, or whatever base substances, context, or elements hold the universe together at a fundamental level… just like consciousness could describe the holistic experience of interactions that happen from physical brain chemistries/components operating in certain ways . One problem I have with the determinism vs. free will arguments is that with determinism, causal factors often are seen to exist as “outside” or external forces, versus the “internal” causal slant that free will can fall into, often wrongly tying it to something mystical, subjective, illusory or non-existent in the determinist’s eye. But don’t both external and internal factors balance and affect one another, perhaps one with more strength or control over the other at any given time? I personally believe if the universe is truly self-created, that those forces we see as “external,” are also self-manifesting within us, giving us potential access to that self-manifesting mechanism—things may not be able to go against the basic nature of that mechanism, but things can, on different levels of complexity, evolve internally from it (e.g. whether from microscopic, genetic mutations or from our macroscopic choices, or actions of consciousness). The difference in my philosophy is that I don’t see this “top-down” side as starting from “God” or “consciousness,” “will” or “freedom” but instead being intrinsically provided from a logical structure established from axiomatic concepts-- in understanding the infinite metaphysical and epistemological fusion behind the concepts existence, knowledge, self and identity (as I think their definitions can hold), and that this impresses upon all things, both externally and internally, a certain self-structural power. Of course on different extents and levels of complexity, but nonetheless, I do think this idea lends itself to a kind of innate creative force. I think we just happen, as conscious/self-conscious/volitional beings, to be aware of this within ourselves, and this gives us a lot more creative control of our individual actions. Still because our knowledge is inherently limited in some way, this self-conscious volitional ability doesn’t always work in our favor or guarantee good outcomes, but even so it is a pretty awesome ability, and I feel damn honored to be human!

I should also state, besides "existence" as a primal , that I personally think "knowledge, self, and identity" are self-proven/axiomatic concepts, inescapable both metaphysically and epistemologically, but I'm not convinced they are as "self-known" or "self-evident" like eixstence is. If existence is anything and/or everything, there seems no good way to rationalize around that idea.

Hummmm, whYNOT-- I basically agree that humans possess volitional capabilities, but I wouldn't call volition "axiomatic" per se-- I don't even think consciousness is really-- e.g. humans sometimes are in subconsicous or unconscious states, states where we normally would say we don't "choose" what we are doing. But I do think we can direct ourselves somehow on these different levels, even if by different means, or even if we don't direct all of our actions-- for example, I could be in the line of a tornado and I may choose to turn and run, but the tornado nonetheless in this scenario, ultimately determines that I end up as bird fodder on some other side of the landscape. So I think it is sane to say probably something determined, structured, permanent, etc. outside (and inside) ourselves likely exists (in whatever form) that has caused and contiues to cause things to be, and try to reconcile how we possess "volition," which does seem engrained in our conscious or at least self-conscious awareness from those set factors. I don't think I'm necessarily painting myself into a corner by thinking this, or diving down some slippery slope-- I mainly was trying to see where Dean was coming from, because my brothers tend to share his views, and I was curious how he would structure the ideas of freedom and will and predetermination and such, under a an umbrella of "complete determinism," in which he offered some interesting answers (responses below). Although perceptive, I wouldn't go so far to reduce Dean's determinism, the way he seems to be describing it, under the same umbrella as a "secular mysticism" that removes us as a casual "self-determining" force within that "total determinsm," and thus removes us from individual responsibility (though I do think this does happen with some extreme determinists)-- his post #88 seems to clear that up a little bit. I'm not sure I agree with it, but at least it is a discussion about how we how we have developed our "freedoms" from something "determined." I would argue though, that the only "determinable" fundamental thing/idea we can completely, axiomatically know is "existence" itself... as anything and everything, infinite in scope and possibility. Dean-- Correct me if I'm wrong, but I'm taking, based on your descriptions, that you do not really believe in the "predetermined" because you see reality in a constant state of flux? Maybe only in terms of more basic vs more complex realities? Is this accurate? How would you reconcile this with the idea of existence as "anything and/or everything in any/every time frame." Isn't it possible to have a concept like this, in your view, that engulfs all other things? And if so, then isn't existence, in a way, predetermined-- a constant and permanent source for everything else? To me the way you've described what controls things (e.g. internal vs. external) as, "I think that our reality is kind of like a giant continual state manchine... and our reality exists as an equation (the laws that determine how it changes) and the inreadibly vast dataset that is its current state. To change the data by any means other than the equation would violate the equations, and hence "external" control would be a contradiction. Entities that exist within the dataset can only behave through the processes of the equation, their "actions" are fully consistent with the equation's determination of next state." may be reductionistic, but how do you see determination-- I'm taking it is not an open-eded kind of "probability to actuality" idea-- like (A) I have so many possible roles of the dice, but not until the dice are rolled do things punctuate into a specific outcome, but instead, (B) more like what I think of when I think of "predetermination"-- that there is only one possible action for all things no matter if the time has come yet for that action to manifest, because there is a "data set" or "equation" already lined up for one specific result. If your idea is neither (A) nor (B), please describe the process if you can, more for me-- you may be on to something new! On your last point, I disagree that "competition" (within natural selection) is the primary determining factor forcing us (especially as humans with the complexity of our consciousness) to make "choices," though I do think natural selection in some form is an essential factor, because we depend on natural and social resources to most basically survive. Although I too think of natural selection of resources hones our values or needs as human beings on some fundamental level, what you explain as "self-determination" seems more on track as some defining factor in how our "freedoms" or "choices" more directly come about-- I use the term "self-regulation" in a similar sense in my book to describe "cholce" (holistic choice). Could we say that that humans (and perhaps all "multi-functional" beings) posses the ability to some degree "self-regulate" or "self-determine" what happens to them?

Dean-- That was an extensive extrapolation-- wow-- yeah, I agree that things have to be at least in some way, deterministic, and perhaps you are right, in all essential ways, that things are ultimately "determined." I agree with you that randomness is a sort of dead end concept except in terms of probabilities and/or what we do or don't already know. I guess I would ask, if total determinism is the case, do you see any difference in the ideas of "predetermination" vs. "determination?" And if so, could you define that for me? Also, could you explain how you see causality and change working in a fundamental scientific sense-- what do you think ifs the primary causal mechanism that turns one thing to another, e.g. is it all about balance, conservation of energy and mass, for example? Is there ultimately any internal or external cause/control over actions-- do you see "internal" and "external" as valid ideas of containment-- e.g. is it always a balance between internal and external that provides the boundaries for things? Also, then, how would you, if you believe cause and change to be contexts of or within the entirely determinable, define a state of "freedom?" Is this a mental illusion, some evolutionary mechanism designed to motivate us perhaps? Could/would freedom be a function simply of probabilities? As to "will," can we as human exist as an "I," or as a mental whole, to the extent that we ever have some control over things that happen, meaning as a conscious whole, act on our own as a determinate factor within our environments-i.e. still determinable, just as a source for actions within the wider "other"?

Stephen-- Man, you are such a wealth of information-- I can't keep up! The references look good-- thanks for tracing them to TTU library for me-- it's the only diverse public library where I live. Questions/reflections from your post #85: "II.C Beauty – Kovach …. The intuitiveness of esthetic cognition enlisting intellect is like the intuitiveness in the grasp of first principles of being and of thought. The difference lies in the categories of object in the two kinds of intuition. Materially beautiful objects are concretes perceived or imagined. First principles are suprasensory objects of apprehension. “Sensory perception is an intuition with a sensory subject and object, . . . the grasp of self-evident principles is an intuition with suprasensory subject and object, [and] aesthetic cognition is an intuition sensory in its object and suprasensory in its subject” (PB 311)." This is interesting-- It seems like he's using "intuition" to be any automatic cognitive ability-- which could be either/both inductive (sensory-perception) and/or deductive (as with self-evident principles [like would include processes from "axiomatic concepts"]), where the aesthetic experience is some combination of the two, where the sensory information from an object is processed more automatically (or "essentially" as you mention with Schopenhauer) by a perceiver or subject. Is this a viable interpretation? That seems like a useful idea. So with Schopenhauer, although I don’t agree with his idea of “Will” because I think it seems to push consciousness into being an attribute of all existence, I do think he is on the right track in The World as Will and Presentation as you quoted: “. . . [Art] replicates the eternal Ideas that are apprehended through pure contemplation, that which is essential and enduring in all the world’s phenomena, and depending on the material in which it replicates them, it is plastic or pictorial art, poetry, or music. Its single origin is cognizance of Ideas, its simple goal communication of this cognizance. While science, following the unresting and insubstantial stream of quadruply configured grounds and consequences [see Schopenhauer 1813], is always, with the achievement of each goal, directed to something else—and can as little find an ultimate goal or full satisfaction as one could reach the point where the clouds touch the horizon by walking—art, to the contrary, is always at its goal. For it tears the object of its contemplation out of the stream of the world’s course and holds it isolated before itself. And the individual thing, which was a vanishingly small part of that stream, becomes for it a representative of the whole, equivalent to infinitely many things in space and time. It stays, therefore, with the individual thing, it stops the wheel of time, relations vanish for it; only that which is essential, the Idea, is an object for it. (W1 §36, 217–18)” Which in the complete sense of his “Idea,” your final interpretation states: “In Schopenhauer’s understanding, concepts are useful for life and science, but they are unfruitful for art. Apprehended Idea is the source of art. By the true artist, Idea is “drawn in its primal force only from life itself, from nature, from the world . . . . Precisely because the Idea is and remains perceptual, the artist is not conscious in abstracto of the intention and goal of his work; he has not a concept, but rather an Idea in mind” (W1 §49, 278). Idea in this role is parallel the role of sense of life in Rand’s theory of art.” From what you’re saying, I think I get what Schopenhauer is going after, and what you’re stating his “Idea” really represents—some “sense of life,” As you mention, Schopenhaur tends to see the object as the source of this “Idea” while Rand would see that rooted in a subject’s mind as his/her “sense-of-life,” and thus they get caught up in a specialized kind of "mind-body" clash, where you admit, like I believe, that it is in the process between object and subject (yet I think art, versus aesthetics in general has to be primarily rooted in the external object) where “sense of life" could arise. Still, I don’t think the root of understanding art is in this special “sense-of-life” per se, though some quality of art may be. A dominant/primary/essential quality of art, if we are to use “sense-of-life,” could refer, I think, to when various levels of consciousness/awareness (i.e. internal action) co-mingle into some dominant “whole” from some similar informational pattern generated from an external object, like what would be sensed by Kovach's "intuition" above, but also perhaps, more akin to beauty as I see it. I think it is important to try to understand essential differences between beauty vs. aesthetics vs. art vs. quality of art. I see beauty as some positive value gained from an aesthetic experience—it is a value, and thus much more relative to the specific individual than these other concepts. I envision aesthetics very broadly, involving any/all processes that nest in one another, creating “object” or source and “subject” or reaction from that source, whether inside or outside any mind, so that things ultimately resonate with what is essential in the “object.” This relates to Schopenhauer’s idea, but is not applied just to art, but aesthetics in general. I was inaccurate to say in an earlier post that aesthetics had to be sourced internally-- it could be sourced internally, just as a reflection on an idea (in the broad sense), or also could be a reflection from external source (e.g. art)--but I think art should relate first from the external source so that it is primarily grounded in the “material” world, helping relate our aesthetic-values to objects that exist outside of our minds, often connecting through their more essential “elements” or “materials.” The main problem I have with my own definition of art here is that I still am not convinced there is a further abstraction of the external object that would set art apart from other objects in nature, or whether all objects/externally perceived things, could essentially be art simply from us abstracting them. I think at least with any “good” art there would have to be, for this is how the object would become more “essential” to us. When we talk about quality of art then, we could reference the elements of design and material components within a work and how they resonate with the essential, holarchic aesthetic experience these things produce in our minds, to start talking about the essential meaning of a piece. Then how we assess that in relation to other objects and react morally to it are even more complex layers to the interpretive process. Am I making any sense here? A divergent question, Stephen, do you mean to delineate “essential” or perhaps “abstract” vs. “concrete” identities when you speak of “specific” and “particular” identities? I know you address this in some other article but I can’t remember the distinction—and I find those adjective distinctions confusing, because I have up to this point, considered them essentially synonymous.

Peter-- I'm glad you find the text readable--the first chapter (especially after the section "Existence") and the third perhaps, are the most difficult to read, so if you make it through the first chapter and the ideas resonate with you, then the rest of the book should be easier. It took a long time for me to be able to find the right words to express more than a few of the concepts/ideas. I'm so happy, with the backgrounds and intelligence of several people on this site, that you are interested and willing enough to take time to read the book, and then give feedback! Really an honor for me. Jonathan-- Your work is technically stunning-- very "Vermeer-like" quality-- very still, beautifully quiet. How big are these images in person and what media? I appreciate you explaining the visual way of arriving at the center of a architectural space in perspective-- I did learn this at one point in time, thus a "duh" moment for me! I share your (and Brant's, Ferrer's, Ellen's) disdain for more than a few "Objectivist" approaches to art I've seen, not only often misinformed but then being morally judgmental in a way that definitely doesn't help the conversation (to be polite). I feel even worse because I used to share some this close-mindedness, looking down at some forms of art in college I just didn't really understand very well yet. What was hard for me is that Rand was/is such an inspiring writer, that I figured she must somehow, at the core, be right in her aesthetic principles. Her principles of literature, like I believe you mentioned before, are astute and interesting, in ways that I feel her generalizations on sense-of-life and what art is, fail to measure-up as critically. However, I feel in a way, grateful for Rand's potential failings (in what many seem to see) in her political and aesthetic philosophies, because being an artist and seeing what seemed like blatant errors in judgment (like photography cannot be art, or in politics, women can't be presidents) was what helped out of the rose-colored glasses stage of simple love for her work, to a stage that helped me analyze it much more critically.

Stephen-- I thought I'd address the issues in your previous post according to the categories: Aesthetics vs. art., Defining art., and Creative Processes to help sort them out. Aesthetics vs. art. Stephen Boydstun, on 24 Jan 2014 - 05:44 AM, said: Dan writes: Quote Perhaps this is more specifically what sets an experience or object apart as "aesthetic"---some validation or preservation of core content. . . . Tying things back to their essential, material content-forms, could be a worthy aesthetic primal. . . . (254-55) Schopenhauer asked me to tell you he approves. I appreciate you aligning the philosophical roots of that idea-- I'll have to do some Schopenhaur research:). I think it is important to clarify my essential distinciton between aesthetics and art-- I think aesthetics originiates internally as some response to internal or external things/stimuli, but I think art always depends on there being some external reference that intiates the internal response. I think this is the core difference. It allows us to distinguish what an artist does as different from mere aesthetic experience (e.g. that which could happen in dreams, imagination, emotional responses, etc.)--I think a good artist turns something material, i.e. externally physical, into a more aesthetic form. So in relating this to the definition above, my view is that the artist most basically transforms material "content" into more other/new forms for our lives-- if successful, the artist adds to and/or pulls out more content from the material forms around us. This is different than what the scientist/philosopher does because they primarily decode forms (by different means)-- the artist/designer/technitican (on different levels) primarily puts such forms together into some external object/expression. So on Defining art., you explain, "...Rand settled on her definition of art: a selective re-creation of reality according to an artist’s metaphysical value-judgments. Thus far I stay with Rand’s general view that art is a selective re-creation of reality. I have concurred that metaphysical value-judgments can be theme of an artwork, but contrary to Rand, I conclude there can be artworks showing only, in the ways art shows, something significant and meaningful that does not show as vital some vital relationship to man’s life. For now I’ll define art as selective re-creation of reality showing concretely the notable and meaningful (sometimes metaphysical value-standings) through craft of parts integrated into a unified whole conducive to contemplation for its own sake. Where parts are proportionate in the integral unity of their multitude or variety, beholding the work will issue in delight by beauty." "The wider functions of art include the one centered by Rand: respite from struggle of, and regeneration for, life-goals, through art-experience of one’s aims and ideals as fulfilled and enshrined concretely. Another wider function of art we have encountered is pause for fresh or refreshed awareness-cum-perspective of concrete existents and one’s cognitive processes. We shall encounter more functions, wide and narrow, in the sequel." ---------------- So the part of Rand's defintion of art you generally agree with is a "selective re-creation of reality." I think all creations may be selective buy default-- something new is being formed which must be different than its progeny-- e.g. "natural selection" and genetic channeling seem to puch new kinds of things into being-- so my core question here is what Rand meant with art being a "re-creation"-- I think she meant creation as some manifestation of the externally physical, but creation really can also reference internal happenings. But "re-creation" does seem to hint at the Aristotlean "imitation" that Michael previously hinted may be its source, and that may have influenced Rand into that specific defintion. But imitation seems too narrow to me-- it suggests that everything has arleady been created and the artist simply "re-creates" it. That's why I prefer a definiton of art linked to material (i.e. externally physical) "content-forms." I think the "metaphysical value-judgments" part of Rand's definiton takes it into a psychological realm that I wouldn't automatically prescribe to all art. You also state: "I concur with Rand that art is not didactic. The ways in which literary art shows its ideas are more than the means by which I make this composition and communication. I rejected Rand’s view that literary “mood studies” cannot be art." Thus far I concur in Rand’s condition that what is to be isolated under an explanatory definition of art (coordinate with the particular dictionary sense quoted at the outset) is developed crafts with parts integrated to a unified whole conducive to contemplation for its own sake. In “The Goal of My Writing” (1963), Rand indicated that facility of contemplation for its own sake means an art object cannot also be utilitarian. Perhaps Rand did not express herself precisely on that point in that composition, nor again in her reiteration of the point in 1965 and 1971. Be that as it may, I have rejected that position and its derivative that architecture cannot be art. End-in-itself contemplation can be engendered in a developed craft, utilitarian or not, where its expressive parts are integral to a unified whole expression. In that same 1963 essay, Rand indicated that not every subject was worthy of contemplation for its own sake. I broadened the contexts of viewing, which made more subjects worthy of some moments of end-in-itself contemplation. I should add, however, that were a work, unworthy of such contemplation in its subject, to consist of parts integrated to a unified whole conducive to such contemplation, it would still be art in the target sense of the concept. The question remains open to me to this point whether there could be such a combination, that is, one in which a given beholder of a work found the subject unworthy of end-in-itself contemplation, yet discerned in the work parts integrated into a unified whole. Rand maintained in this essay that Rembrandt’s means in his painting of a side of beef is no esthetic justification of the choice of subject matter, which she found unworthy of end-in-itself contemplation. I incline to think any lack of integral unity between subject and means necessarily yields demerit, though not necessarily failure to cross the threshold of art. That inclination may have been Rand’s also in this essay; her statements were indefinite on the point. Joan Blumenthal has faulted Rand’s understanding concerning the subject of this Rembrandt painting on grounds that will come to issue when we reach thinkers beyond Kant in this series." ----------------------- Yeah, definietely, this goes back to the comments Jonathan, Ellen and Michael have made, and which I responded to in another post. Many times it seems people try to put judgements about the quality of art in the definition of art itself, and Rand unfortunately did that by proclaiming things like photography weren't even art! My definiton on the other hand is VERY broad-- it includes potentially any knowledge "abstracted" or "perceived" or even "taken in" by another that is then "made" or "remade" into a material form -- therefore I think art becomes the perceptual basis for all language, design and technological creations. It holarchically is the basis for the other fields so yes, art can be more than contmplative-- it can also be utilitarian, but it is interesting to note that if a material form is being tactilely used, it may be harder to perceive it by the other senses, and so it may lose its power, e.g. as a visual or auditory, contemplative object, if we are tactilly using it-- also, tactile use also tends to (although not always), degrade the material form, so it may more quickly damage its other aethetic qualities. But according to our definition of aesthetics, when art provides further, essential significance of or through material forms, then I think we can start to qualify what art is of a higher quality than others, without having to succumb to simple moralization. This I think depends on the efficiency and power of the link between an object's form and content-- and that's a very complex issue, that may be best left for specific arists, linguists, designers, technicians to extrapolate in their particualar fields. I'm working on a generalized framework to measure aestheitc quality in objects, but I'm a long way from finished. Any thoughts on this? Creative processes. Stephen you ask: "Dan, do you think you have only one sense of life? Do you think your sense(s) of life ends up expressed in your creations? On poetry I'd say Yes to the second question for me. And it does seem to me that looking at my own past poetry, there may be only one sense of life in them. But when it comes to all the different kinds of poetry or painting I can love, created by others, I incline to think I have more than one sense of life. (Related to this, there is an exchange about "owning" the creation, as between creator and viewers, in Fountainhead between Roark, Dominique, and Wynand.) I've gathered that Rand's concept sense of life is a concept many readers find a delight and take to immediately upon exposure to it. But I wonder lately if it is really a right-headed concept at all concerning ourselves." Ellen and Jonathan are right I think, that "sense-of-life" is a problematic terminology the way Rand used it, vaguely defined, and often as a biased overlay to make her own moral-aesthetic cross-over judgments about people's mind-sets in relation to works of art (and other things). Although I do think the term is somewhat valid in referencing one's dominant emotional state-of-being for some extended period of time, trying to determined what that "dominant" state is on a complex level is difficult--perhaps that is what predominately draws us to art, because it can, as you say, enshine these states externally, or concretely in material forms. You use the term "intuition' as well in your essay-- do you see this as primarily different than sense-of-life-- how would you contrast these ideas? I think if we accept sense-of-life as a valid idea, then yes-- peole can definitely change their sense-of -life and have different one at different times, as perhaps epitomized in the various "periods" or style chagnes that artists go through. If you Stephen, identify with only onle sense-of- life in your poetry, I think that is normal-- If we strive with our art to attain material forms that express and support the more essential states of our characters, our core material values, then it seems normal to return ot a particular way of working. I perceive of your poetry in general a cyclic, rhythmic, grounded, to-and-fro-ness, stable transformations between the close spellings of words, yet with moments of calm transportation, almost transcendence (at the end of stanzas/poems when the rhyme gracefully changes) where I'm left with the existential feeling, "This moment can stand still, and it is mine, before I go on" I don't know if this is how you feel about your own work-- I'd like to know how you perceive your poems.

Excellent critiques of Objectivist aesthetics... Jonathan and Ellen-- thank you for clarifying the happy perspective accident in Room of Wind-- I hadn't thought of that at all-- correct me if i'm wrong, but you're saying if a 3-D room were built to architectural specification based on the visual perspective there-- if i walked down that corridor in real-time, I would be walking farther between the columns as I progessed--and Jonathan, you think almost double? That's really interesting-- I'll have to look into the illusion there more-- I know there are ways to translate visual to "real" space mathmatically, but yeah, besides some potential observational studies for certain details, I almost always work intuitively now (as I did on that piece). It does allow for more to happen, though I have to have some general idea/purpose before I start working or I lose my focus too much. One of my big issues in art school was many of my teacher's dislike of "preconceived ideas"-- yet I had to think a lot before I was motivated enough to start working-- I couldn't just get into the materials like most other student seemed to be able. What is your artistic process like Jonathan-- do you have images of your work you can share? Jonathan, Ellen and Michael-- Yeah, isn't the moral-aesthetic dilemma still so engrained in most people's thinking about art (and life in general), even in this post-modernist age of "anything goes?" Alison Lapper Pregnant, the The Hunchback of Notre Dame, and Helen Keller's story are all spot-on examples of how limited moral-aesthetic world-views can be, that remove the subject content from the artist's context, and then start making moral judgements about the work! Even within the artist's context, purely moral judgement about aesthetics should, I think, be approached with caution, because, I think, what is good/bad is often a more relative thing. What is good in one context might not be good in another, and the same context that might be good for one person might be bad for another. Take Alison Lapper Pregnant--the figure is portrayed in a raised, dignified manner despite "deformities," which I think is quite a noble portrayal, much braver to put forth than stale classic portrayals, one that I agree implies that all of us have dignity despite our bodily states/natures (Jonathan's and Michael's descriptions above ring true to me). But for another, it may seem to threaten their values of traditional human form (like is often done with human sexuality too), yet for another, they may even celebrate the form (e.g. perhaps people into body modification, or people who have similar "disabilities" who can relate to the scullpture more personally)--any/all these views may function in good or bad ways depending on when/where/how they are expressed or depending on what they cause us to do. Maybe my view, one of a kind of equality for all humans despite their physiques, would cause me not to recognize the actual limitations that disabled people face. Maybe being threatened by the sculpture is a type of bigotry, but maybe being threatened creates in a person an very cautious nature, care and appreciatiion for their own able bodies. Maybe celebrating the form leads the body-modifier to amputate one of their limbs (which in itself may result in bad (loss of mobility) or good (making a statement about free will and dignity) results. I'm not saying the subject does matter or have moral implications in a work of art, but so does the artist's context (stylization, etc), the viewing context (where and how the how is presented and well as the viewers value set), the historical context, the moral-practical context.... This all makes art (and aesthetics in general) a very tough thing to analyze-- and simple moral judgments about artwork/aestheitcs often just don't seem very insightful.