Settling the debate on Altruism

[Brant Gaede]

There can be little doubt that Rand's experiences in the Soviet Union imbued her with a hatred (I wouldn't call it "fear") of totalitarianism and the altruism on which it was based.

Calling it "hatred" is better, yes.

In terms of calling totalitarianism "altruistic", one runs into a problem imo. According to that premise, Lenin, Stalin, Hitler and virtually every dictator would qualify as "altruists" since they all demand to put the need of the state first.

They effectively if not overtly advocated altruism--i.e., subservience to the state and society. The noxious question is whether they lived selfish lives which in turn brings up objective/subjective. Subjectively, they did. Objectively, they did not.

--Brant

no need to repeat your mantra: no objective in the mirror on the right and no objective in the mirror on the left and consequent infinite subjective regress.

[George H. Smith]

There can be little doubt that Rand's experiences in the Soviet Union imbued her with a hatred (I wouldn't call it "fear") of totalitarianism and the altruism on which it was based.

Calling it "hatred" is better, yes.

In terms of calling totalitarianism "altruistic", one runs into a problem imo. According to that premise, Lenin, Stalin, Hitler and virtually every dictator would qualify as "altruists" since they all demand to put the need of the state first.

They effectively if not overtly advocated altruism--i.e., subservience to the state and society. The noxious question is whether they lived selfish lives which in turn brings up objective/subjective. Subjectively, they did. Objectively, they did not.

This evening, while browsing through some essays by Rand that I haven't read in years, I happened across this passage from "Philosophical Detection" (1974), reprinted in Philosophy: Who Needs It? (p. 20). I present it without comment.

Rand quote:

Observe that, in spite of their differences, altruism is the untouched, unchallenged common denominator in the ethics of all these philosophies. It is the single richest source of rationalizations. A morality that cannot be practiced is an unlimited cover for any practice. Altruism is the rationalization for the mass slaughter in Soviet Russia—for the legalized looting in the welfare state—for the power-lust of politicians seeking to serve the "common good"—for the concept of a "common good"—for envy, hatred, malice, brutality—for the arson, robbery, highjacking, kidnapping, murder perpetrated by the selfless advocates of sundry collectivist causes—for sacrifice and more sacrifice and an infinity of sacrificial victims. When a theory achieves nothing but the opposite of its alleged goals, yet its advocates remain undeterred, you may be certain that it is not a conviction or an "ideal," but a rationalization.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

If you should find the time to address my # 316 post to you on the 'Moral Certainty' thread, TIA. http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=8291&st=300

It would take a substantial essay to address all the issues you raise that post. You will need to narrow it down to one or two points.

Ghs

[Peter]

I figured out why I thought you were in the Air Force and not the Army, Brant. USASF? I never noticed the "S" before. Could that be United States Air Surfing Force? Were you a sky diver?

Brant wrote:

From: BrantUSASF@etc.,etc.,etc.,

To: Atlantis@wetheliving.com

Subject: ATL: rights and emergencies

Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2001 16:56:25 EST

If in an emergency you violate someone else's property rights to get you through that emergency then having to make restitution and exposure to judicial redress is part of the price paid to meet that emergency. Such a context creates extenuating circumstances that might help you and the property owner might forgive you in whole or part--perhaps by not pressing charges. But if the law is not fair then it itself can constitute a gross violation of rights, yours and others. Rights violations, theoretical and real, exist along a continuum and all have contexts. I think it is insane to state that any violation of property rights is absolutely wrong and you should not do it ever. You won't believe it when I refuse to break into a truck to retrieve a fire extinguisher to put out your car fire with your babies trapped inside the car. Would that maintain my moral purity and integrity and make me feel good the next morning, shaving, looking at myself in the mirror?

--Brant Gaede

Excellent point, in your above post, though not about altruism per se, it does show a situation where it is objectively moral to put your life at risk. Emergencies are a totally different situation from mundane, everyday altruism.

I think what I give from my pocket is charity, but when I take from your pocket to give to charity, it is stealing. I don't care if the theft is sanitized by calling it taxation or helping the neediest among us, altruism in the political realm inevitably morphs from a supposed ideal to evil totalitarianism.

Semper cogitans fidele,

Peter Taylor

[Brant Gaede]

United States Army Special Forces.

--Brant

[Peter]

Brant Gaede replied to my question what do the initials USASF denote:

United States Army Special Forces.

Ah, so you were a sky-diving, surfer dude. I ran the recondo course a few times as a kid at Fort Campbell Kentucky (when they weren't around.) I can see why one of them is killed in training every once in a while. No doubt the Special Forces course is tougher. Again, thank you for your service to your country,Brant.

I gave 25 bucks to JD Hayworth who is running against McCain in Arizona. I wrote him asking about his lack of military credentials but he has not responded.

Peter

[Peter]

Ghs quoted Rand:

Observe that, in spite of their differences, altruism is the untouched, unchallenged common denominator in the ethics of all these philosophies. It is the single richest source of rationalizations. A morality that cannot be practiced is an unlimited cover for any practice. Altruism is the rationalization for the mass slaughter in Soviet Russia—for the legalized looting in the welfare state—for the power-lust of politicians seeking to serve the "common good"—for the concept of a "common good"—for envy, hatred, malice, brutality—for the arson, robbery, highjacking, kidnapping, murder perpetrated by the selfless advocates of sundry collectivist causes—for sacrifice and more sacrifice and an infinity of sacrificial victims. When a theory achieves nothing but the opposite of its alleged goals, yet its advocates remain undeterred, you may be certain that it is not a conviction or an "ideal," but a rationalization.

End quote

I have just started reading, “The Goddess of the Market,” written by a non-Objectivist. In the first two chapters, it chronicles the affects of the ultimate totalitarian and altruistic system, Communism, on a young Ayn Rand’s (Alisa Rosenbaum’s) family. Early on in my own life, Rand convinced me of the goodness of *benevolence* and the horror of *Altruism.* Nothing has, or will ever change my mind.

Before the Russian Revolution, Rand’s family, the Rosenbaums had to suffer thru pogroms and anti-Semitism during the Czarist Regime. Mobs chased Jews down the streets and Jewish heads were cracked. Jewish shop windows had bricks thrown through them. There were restrictions on Jews going to college. Ayn’s grandfather, her Mom’s Dad, was a tailor to the Army, thankfully, which gave them great personal safety. However, as a child can you imagine the fear and trauma she must have suffered?

The author, Jennifer Burns, also makes Ayn (Alisa) seem a bit like a sufferer of Asperser’s Syndrome, though she and her younger sister Nora got along well, and her middle sister Natasha was a pianist, but not as great a confidante. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s “Lost World,” was one of their favorite books.

From page twelve of “The Goddess of the Market, Ayn Rand and the American Right:”

“Alisa’s most enthusiastic audience for these early stories were her two sisters. Nora the youngest, shared her introversion and artistic inclinations. Her specialty was witty caricatures of her family that blended man and beast. Alisa and Nora were inseparable, calling themselves Dact 1, and Dact 2, after the winged dinosaurs of Arthur Conan Doyle’s fantastic adventure story, “The Lost World.” The middle sister Natasha, a skilled pianist, was outgoing and social. Both Nora and Natasha shared a keen appreciation for the elder sister’s creativity, and at bedtime Alisa regaled them with her latest tales.”

If the Czars were bad, what horrors awaited them after The Communist Revolution! A closet for an apartment, a young Ayn teaching piggish red soldiers to read, carrying water up to their apartment in buckets and no electricity. “Rusty nails on the walls, showed the places, where old paintings had hung. So little food, she was always a hungry adolescent girl. Ayn remembers begging her Mom for (literally) their last dried chick pea to stave off hunger.

From Page 14:

“At parties hostesses could offer their guests only dubious delicacies, such as potato skin cookies and tea with saccharine tablets instead of sugar.”

And now we have a President and a philosophy of Government that extols as a virtue, *The Redistribution of Wealth.* what has happened to us? Where did Xray’s (Angela German’s) thinking go wrong? If I could mean it, I would pray for her.

Semper cogitans fidele,

Peter Taylor

[Xray]

[All quotes framed in green: George H. Smith]

[Xray]:

Moralists - I think we can agree that Rand was also a moralist (evidenced in her presenting a catalog of cardinal (objectivist) values and virtues) - in their zeal to attack the position opposing the morality they value, tend to throw out the baby with the bathwater.

This can happen, of course, but I don't think it happened to Rand.

I think it did happen to her. For example, in her zeal to make the case for "Objectivism" ("objective" = 'good'), she labeled everything "subjective" as 'bad', presenting an alleged definition of subjective which is no definition at all, but merely her personal connotation with a term:

"The subjective means the arbitrary, the irrational, the blindly emotional." The Romantic Manifesto "Art and Moral Treason", p. 150.

Imo Rand's erroneous belief that her individual connotations/associations with a word constituted an 'objective' definition has caused a lot of confusion in the controversy about definition here at OL.

If denotation and connotation are not clearly separated, confusion will necessarily result.

And even if it did, there is a certain value in those moral philosophers who articulate and defend a "pure" and uncompromising moral position. This can bring clarity to a subject and better enable us to determine the strength of the underlying principles and how much they should be qualified, if at all.

If the goal is to check premises, a clearly voiced moral position of the examined is indeed of value to the examiner.

For example, when the muslim A. Vlahos who posts here wrote "I'm a slave of the Creator", it couldn't get clearer.

The next step is then to check the premise(s) on which this "pure and uncompromising moral position" is based ...

People give advice to other people all the time, e.g., "You should stop smoking. It's bad for you." Or, "You should see a doctor; the pain you are having might be serious." In such cases we are telling people what we believe is in their best interests.

The "should" here is used to phrase it politely in order not to appear too blunt and direct in communication.

For when it comes to biology and health issues, to nature in general, there exist no "should", no "ought to from an is" only if - then: "If you don't see a doctor, then you won't find out what s wromg". "The cough you are having from smoking won't go away if you don't stop".

If you want to survivive it's not "you should take in nourishment" - you must.

"If man is to survive, he must value food" you wrote in TCAG, p. 292).

I disagree. He must eat if he wants to survive. There is no choice involved in that I can 'choose' to survive without taking in food. No choice, hence no values involved (see Rand's elaborations on this).

What you call "objective values" are actually means necessary to achieve a goal, like heat as a suitable means if your goal is to cook. While heat will be valued if the goal is to cook, it does not mean heat itself is an objective value. It becomes of (instrumental) value only after an individual has attributed value to it in the specific context of a chosen goal.

In Atheism: The Case Against God (1974), I distinguish between moral principles qua standards and moral principles qua rules, and I devote considerable space to explaining the differences between these perspectives.

In which chapter is that?

Significantly, some of my discussion was taken from an earlier article, "Objectivism as a Religion," in which I apply the rules-standards distinction to Objectivism.

Can the article be accessed via internet?

In that article, I contend that those Objectivists who view moral principles as inflexible rules will find no warrant in Rand's basic approach to ethical theory, though I go on to discuss some ancillary issues in which Rand does encourage such a view, even though it cuts against the grain of her metaethics.

But don't such contradictions violate Rand's own principles? For a philospher to whom non-contradiction is of supreme value, Rand contradicts herself remarkably often.

In addition, I frankly have never agreed with some of Rand's specific prescriptions about what is necessary to achieve happiness. I object to these not because I think they are wrong per se (a person might achieve happiness by following them) but because I think they are too specific, narrow, and exclusive. People can find happiness in a myriad of different ways, including by "serving" (I prefer to say "helping") others.

ITA. Specific prescriptions in that field are also contradictory to the idea of individualism.

Insofar as Rand sticks to the Comteian view of "altruism" as a moral duty to place the interests of others above one's own, I agree with her views, and I think she makes some extremely important points.

Her attacking altruism as a dogma is excellent indeed.

But Rand doesn't always adhere to this conception. Her distinction between benevolence and altruism notwithstanding, she sometimes lapses into the looser, more popular conception of altruism, and this leads her to make some unjustified judgments about how people will never be happy if they pursue altruistic X instead of egoistic Y.

The many contradictions in Rand's argumentation indicate inconsistency in thinking imo. She flip-flops, sometimes on the same page, from argument A to argument B contradicting A.

Frankly, I believe that without her novels, ITOE would never have gotten off the ground.

Imo Rand was primarily an ideologist presenting her system of values in novels.

In fairness to Rand, we should remember one of her fundamental objections to altruism (in the Introduction to VOS), namely, that it rests on a "beneficiary-criterion of morality." She goes on to say:

"The choice of the beneficiary of moral values is merely a preliminary or introductory issue in the field of morality. It is not a substitute for morality nor a criterion of moral value, as altruism has made it. Neither is it a moral primary: it has to be derived from and validated by the fundamental premises of a moral system."

This interesting observation, which reduces the altruism-egoism distinction to a secondary status, has rarely received the attention it deserves.

This leads to the key question: can there exist any such thing as objective morality? Imo no.

In addition, a "one set of objective moral values/virtues for all" contradicts the notion of individualism.

Xray: An example is Toohey's dialogue with the unhappy Catherine in TF:

This dialogue is also interesting in that it shows Rand was well aware of self-interest underlying all human action:

(Chapter 13, Elsworth Toohey section in TF, page 364 pb.), Toohey confronts Catherine with the "selfishness" underlying her altruistic acts:

"Don't you see how selfish you have been? You chose a noble career not for the good you could accomplish, but for the personal happiness you expected to find in it."

I think you have misconstrued what Rand is getting at here, but I'll let it pass, since I don't want to get diverted into too many detours.

Still, the word "selfish" is there.

But in Catherine's case, selfishness is not regarded as a "virtue", more as a vice.

So it is quite obvious what Rand is getting at: Catherine has the "morally wrong" selfishness.

Just because Rand may not have solved the relevant problems doesn't mean that they cannot be solved within her basic ethical framework.

Which would imply as a first step to check the premise(s) on which this ethical framework is based on. Which do you regard as the root premise of her ethical framework?

Btw, to my knowledge, Rand never spoke of an "absolute good." This notion (or at least the way you use it) is foreign to her way of thinking.

It was me who threw in the "absolute good", since imo without the notion of an absolute good, no objective values are possible.

For if objective values are merely defined instrumentally (I think this is what you have tried in the passage I quoted from your book, and also here at OL, with the "good" knife example),

then, as Dragonfly wrote,

"not only Objectivist virtues as "productivity" or "independence" are objective, but such un-Objectivist values as "parasitism", "initiation of force", etc. are then equally objective values." (DF)

DF's comment quoted in #316 here: http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=8291&st=300

Xray: Imo a debate between advocates of altruism and advocates of Objectivism would resemble more a war between believers. Interesting also how moralists seem to have little tolerance for shades of gray getting in the way of the black and white picture they present. From the moralists' standpoint, it makes sense why they are against acknowledging those shades of gray: for it might open the door for a dreaded intruder called DOUBT. Doubt creeping in leading people to check premises, to start thinking that which they are not supposed to think...

There you go again. You have an uncanny ability to mix good specific points with some goofy generalizations.

Would you point out the alleged "goofy generalizations"?

Xray: Which is why non-moralists have far more inner freedom allowing them to integrate contradiction-free the aspects discussed above.

I don't know what you mean by "moralist," in this context.

By "moralist" I mean everybody presenting a catalog of moral values he thinks others "ought to" follow, whether it is a priest preaching from the pulpit, an Imam, or a private person trying to verbally impose his/her set of moral values on others. In German, we have the term "Moralapostel", which has a pejorative touch; I just looked up the Engliih translation: 'moralizer'. That comes close to what I meant. Sorry about not having been clearer in my post where I spoke of Rand as a moralist (in the sense of moral philosopher), but also had "moralizers" in mind.

Edited March 28, 2010 by Xray

[Xray]

George H. Smith: You raise the topic of psychological egoism, a position that has been thoroughly refuted time and again by philosophers since the 18th century, most notably by Bishop Butler.

Nathaniel Branden also wrote a good piece on psychological egoism, "Isn't Everyone Selfish?", for "The Objectivist Newsletter" (Sept., 1962), and I'm not sure if I want to go over the same ground again.

I haven't read those "thorough refutations", but imo what Branden writes on those few pages can hardly be called making his case.

He starts off with quoting fundamental insights by the opposing party, but his attempted rebuttal is far from being a match to the arguments he set out to refute.

NB: quoting the opposing party:

Since every purposeful action is motivated by some value or goal that the actor desires, one always acts selfishly, whether one knows it or not.

Branden is very quick to allege that "intellectual confusion" is involved in this viewpoint, but then, quite abruptly (but not unexpectedly) unpacks his Randian suitcase, speaking of man needing a code of values to guide his actions, a standard of value, but what does this have to do with the above argument? It looks like Branden is the one who is intellectually confused.

He then proceeds to hammer away against "altruism", ignoring that the above viewpoint denies it exists.

Then comes a passage where he tells the reader what constitutes self-interest and "how to achieve it", again way off topic since the opposing party acknowledged self-interest as a given, and not something one has to "achieve".

Then he mentions the "genuinely selfish man" who "chooses his goals by the guidance of reason"; ignoring that the opposing party said nothing about the contents of the self-interest, since this was not the issue. Off topic again by NB.

In short, NB gives value judgements, lashing out against the pressure of altruist ethics, and no surprise, has difficulties in seeing the self-interest of the boy who renounces the career he chose by "rational" standards (what are these btw?) in order to please his is mother who prefers that he pursue a different career, one that will have more prestige.

In the boy's hierarchy of self-interests (when it comes to deciding, we often have to choose between conflicting self-interests), value 1 (not going against the wishes of his mother, thus avoiding a conflict) tops value 2 (choosing the career he wants).

The chosen value is always the value regarded as higher by the chooser; how others judge the choice is irrelevant here.

It is about a principle at work. It is also irrelevant here what effects on "long-term happiness" a choice has.

The boy decided in favor of avoiding a conflict with his mother, and every avoiding of conflict is motivated by self-interest. Can you think of an example where this is not the case?

NB has not been able to refute the opposing party's claim imo; for he fails to see the distinction between the content of a person's choice and the operative principle 'self-interest' at work in every choice.

There is one sentence in it though which alone makes reading the whole thign wort it. For it reveals where the core problem of Objectivist ethic lies:

NB: "Just as feelings are not a tool of cognition so they are not a criterion in ethics."

The lack of empathy revealed in this statement is hard to miss. Claiming that feelings are not a criterion in ethics is ignoring their influence in ethical (!) choices like e.g. becoming a vegetarian after visiting a slaughterhouse or becoming a human rights activist after reading articles by Amnesty International.

I would like to ask NB of what worth is an ethics to him which denies that feelings like empathy for those who suffer are a criterion?

Edited March 28, 2010 by Xray

[Brant Gaede]

I never skydived, Peter. I had 13 jumps, the last out of a helicopter in North Carolina. Special Forces training today is much tougher than when I went through in the 1960s. I'd need one or two years of prep to tackle it as a young man today. I'd do the prep so I'd still be successful in the training. I could never be a navy seal; I hate water too much and am a lousy swimmer. I'd have to do some swimming for SF today, but I could hack that. I'd also teach myself Spanish. The caveat is I wouldn't sign up today for zilch. Not with drug wars and that Middle Eastern crap.

One thing I've never understood: When I was in jump school I didn't make it through the first week. You had to jump out of the 34' tower with a certain form. So I had to repeat it. I was the only guy who failed that first week who didn't quit, so I was given the job of marching the 20 or so quitters across Ft. Benning to where they would formally quit. A couple of soldiers may have then changed their minds, but I had no way to know. That lack of psychological strength and perseverance is also very troubling. But don't get me wrong; I was in a world of hurt then and wrung out physically.

Parenthetically, the idea of going on strike as depicted in Atlas Shrugged--quitting--runs completely against my grain. The siren call of Galtland is for the heroes, Dagny and Hank, to give up the hero business and take it easy in Colorado. If heroes don't break a sweat, I'd hardly call them heroic.

--Brant

Edited March 28, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[Xray]

5) GHS is wrong.

Option #5 should not have been included at all, because it is beyond the realm of possibility.

Ghs

Having a sense of humor (self-irony actually) is clearly an asset in this discussion.

I don't think Rand was much of an individualist save perhaps to herself and I don't think such a controlling personality was so much attractive as interesting considering her brainpower and certainty.

I can't see much individualism in an Objectivist 'one set for all values and virtues' either.

Edited March 28, 2010 by Xray

[tjohnson]

The "should" here is used to phrase it politely in order not to appear too blunt and direct in communication.

For when it comes to biology and health issues, to nature in general, there exist no "should", no "ought to from an is" only if - then: "If you don't see a doctor, then you won't find out what s wromg". "The cough you are having from smoking won't go away if you don't stop".

I don't think medical science is this exact yet.

[George H. Smith]

I haven't read those "thorough refutations", but imo what Branden writes on those few pages can hardly be called making his case....

You managed to bypass a key paragraph in Branden's essay, viz:

"Obviously, in order to act, one has to be moved by some personal motive; one has to want, in some sense, to perform the action. The issue of an action's selfishness or unselfishness depends, not on whether or not one wants to perform it, but on why one wants to perform it. By what standard was the action chosen? To achieve what good?"

Many of the other things that Branden has to say, and which you so cavalierly dismiss, are explanations and elaborations of this theme.

He starts off with quoting fundamental insights by the opposing party, but his attempted rebuttal is far from being a match to the arguments he set out to refute.

NB: quoting the opposing party:

Since every purposeful action is motivated by some value or goal that the actor desires, one always acts selfishly, whether one knows it or not.

Branden is very quick to allege that "intellectual confusion" is involved in this viewpoint, but then, quite abruptly (but not unexpectedly) unpacks his Randian suitcase, speaking of man needing a code of values to guide his actions, a standard of value, but what does this have to do with the above argument? It looks like Branden is the one who is intellectually confused.

I find it hard to believe that you made a serious effort to understand Branden's basic points, since you don't seem to have a clue what they are. It's as if you read one paragraph, decided that it doesn't solve the problem, read another paragraph, decided that it doesn't solve the problem -- and so on, without making an effort to put the paragraphs together.

For example, in the "Randian suitcase" passage that you regard as irrelevant, Branden is in fact introducing an important distinction in ethics, one that is essential to the remainder of his argument, namely: "Who should be the intended beneficiary of [a person's] actions?" He then points out, correctly, that egoism and altruism give "conflicting answers" to this question.

As Branden indicates in the first passage I quoted above, it is true that we must "want" to perform an action, whether egoistic or altruistic, because all purposeful actions are motivated. Psychological egoism therefore reduces to the trivial claim -- trivial so far as ethics is concerned -- that all actions are motivated. But this says nothing about what our motives are.

To put it another way: I act because I want to satisfy a subjective desire of some kind. But just because it is my desire doesn't make that desire egoistic. That is a different issue, one that depends on the object of my desire. Do I desire to promote my own interests? If so, my desire is self-interested (egoistic). Do I desire to place the interests of other people above my own? If so, my desire is other-regarding (altruistic).

Branden makes all this quite clear in his penultimate paragraph, which you also managed to overlook:

"The basic fallacy in the "everyone is selfish" argument consists of an extraordinarily crude equivocation. It is a psychological truism -- a tautology -- that all purposeful behavior is motivated. But to equate "motivated behavior" with "selfish behavior" is to blank out the distinction between an elementary fact of human psychology and the phenomenon of ethical choice. It is to evade the central problem of ethics, namely: by what is man to be motivated?"

I daresay that my summary of Branden's argument bears no resemblance to yours. It's as if you read a different article altogether -- one with no focus or key arguments, just a bunch of random, disconnected assertions.

Ghs

[tjohnson]

I find it hard to believe that you made a serious effort to understand Branden's basic points, since you don't seem to have a clue what they are.

Translation: If you don't agree with me you are stupid.

[tjohnson]

2. The practice of good manners is a value sought and encouraged on this forum. Obnoxious and offensive behavior is not welcome. Excessive profanity, trash talk, bigoted remarks and such should be avoided. Should members start insulting each other (flame wars), the site owners will take discreet measures to resolve the issue. If this fails, harsher measures will be used. This should not be seen as a harness on anyone's intellectual ideas and expression. It is merely a standard for behavior between posters and the bar is fairly high on this forum.

IMO, "since you don't seem to have a clue what they are" is an insult.

[George H. Smith]

I find it hard to believe that you made a serious effort to understand Branden's basic points, since you don't seem to have a clue what they are.

Translation: If you don't agree with me you are stupid.

Wrong. You would be stupid, for example, even if you agreed with me; and Jeff Riggenbach is brilliant, even though he disagrees with me about a lot of things. (We've been arguing about stuff since 1971.)

Xray is not stupid; far from it (as I made clear in a post a few days ago). But she does tend to be careless when reading articles with which she expects to disagree. It's a common problem. It has even happened to me on many occasions, believe it or not.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

"since you don't seem to have a clue what they are" is an insult

So is your very presence on OL, but you're still here.

Ghs

[tjohnson]

"since you don't seem to have a clue what they are" is an insult

So is your very presence on OL, but you're still here.

Ghs

More insults. Well at least I attempt to follow the posting guidelines. If Micheal doesn't want to enforce them maybe he should remove the link to them.

[George H. Smith]

"since you don't seem to have a clue what they are" is an insult

So is your very presence on OL, but you're still here.

Ghs

More insults. Well at least I attempt to follow the posting guidelines. If Micheal doesn't want to enforce them maybe he should remove the link to them.

I'm curious: You don't consider your suggestion that I and other people with a serious interest in philosophy (which includes most people on OL) are "mentally ill" to be an insult? I suppose that was just a scientific diagnosis.

Here's the basic difference between you and me -- aside from than the fact that I'm a lot smarter than you are: I don't deny that I sometimes insult people. I don't dance around the issue; I just do it and own up to it, and I try to do it in a fairly clever way.

You in contrast, have insulted Rand time and again -- and, by implication, the many people on OL who admire Rand -- but you do it in that godawful boring style, and then you deny that you ever use insults, while complaining about those who do.

I find your insults offensive not because they are insults, but because they are so hackneyed and unimaginative. You are like that guy in Rostand's play who tells Cyrano he has a big nose.

Ghs

[tjohnson]

-- aside from than the fact that I'm a lot smarter than you are

Well, I don't know about smarter but you're way more vain than I am.

[George H. Smith]

-- aside from than the fact that I'm a lot smarter than you are

Well, I don't know about smarter but you're way more vain than I am.

That's because I have a lot more to be vain about.

I pretty much stopped responding to your posts after your "mental illness" howler, figuring that I had a better chance of teaching my dog to read Korzbyksi than reading anything reasonable by you. And then it looked like you had ceased responding to my posts.

I suggest we return to this modus vivendi. That way I won't have to insult you, and you won't have to whine about being insulted.

You can have the last word, if you like.

Ghs

[tjohnson]

This was a pretty decent site for the last couple of years, there seems to be much more verbal abuse going on now. Maybe it's the political climate in the US spilling over.

[Leonid]

In philosophy, egoism is the theory that one’s self is, or should be, the motivation and the goal of one’s own action. Egoism has two variants, descriptive or normative. The descriptive (or positive) variant conceives egoism as a factual description of human affairs. That is, people are motivated by their own interests and desires, and they cannot be described otherwise. The normative variant proposes that people should be so motivated, regardless of what presently motivates their behavior. Altruism is the opposite of egoism. The term “egoism” derives from “ego,” the Latin term for the English word “I”. “Egoism” should be distinguished from “egotism,” which means a psychological overvaluation of one’s own importance, or of one’s own activities.

People act for many reasons; but for whom, or what, do or should they act—for themselves, for God, or for the good of the planet? Can an individual ever act only according to her own interests without regard for others’ interests. Conversely, can an individual ever truly act for others in complete disregard for her own interests? The answers will depend on an account of free will. Some philosophers argue that an individual has no choice in these matters, claiming that a person’s acts are determined by prior events which make illusory any belief in choice. Nevertheless, if an element of choice is permitted against the great causal impetus from nature, or God, it follows that a person possesses some control over her next action, and, that, therefore, one may inquire as to whether the individual does, or, should choose a self-or-other-oriented action. Morally speaking, one can ask whether the individual should pursue her own interests, or, whether she should reject self-interest and pursue others’ interest instead: to what extent are other-regarding acts morally praiseworthy compared to self-regarding acts?

Table of Contents (Clicking on the links below will take you to those parts of this article)

1. Descriptive Egoism and Psychological Egoism

2. Normative Egoism

a. Rational Egoism

b. Ethical Egoism

i. Conditional Egoism

3. Conclusion

4. References and Further Reading

1. Descriptive Egoism and Psychological Egoism

The descriptive egoist’s theory is called “psychological egoism.” Psychological egoism describes human nature as being wholly self-centered and self-motivated. Examples of this explanation of human nature predate the formation of the theory, and, are found in writings such as that of British Victorian historian, Macaulay, and, in that of British Reformation political philosopher, Thomas Hobbes. To the question, “What proposition is there respecting human nature which is absolutely and universally true?", Macaulay, replies, "We know of only one . . . that men always act from self-interest." (Quoted in Garvin.) In Leviathan, Hobbes maintains that, "No man giveth but with intention of good to himself; because gift is voluntary; and of all voluntary acts the object to every man is his own pleasure." In its strong form, psychological egoism asserts that people always act in their own interests, and, cannot but act in their own interests, even though they may disguise their motivation with references to helping others or doing their duty.

Opponents claim that psychological egoism renders ethics useless. However, this accusation assumes that ethical behavior is necessarily other-regarding, which opponents would first have to establish. Opponents may also exploit counterfactual evidence to criticize psychological egoism— surely, they claim, there is a host of evidence supporting altruistic or duty bound actions that cannot be said to engage the self-interest of the agent. However, what qualifies to be counted as apparent counterfactual evidence by opponents becomes an intricate and debatable issue. This is because, in response to their opponents, psychological egoists may attempt to shift the question away from outward appearances to ultimate motives of acting benevolently towards others; for example, they may claim that seemingly altruistic behavior (giving a stranger some money) necessarily does have a self-interested component. For example, if the individual were not to offer aid to a stranger, he or she may feel guilty or may look bad in front of a peer group.

On this point, psychological egoism’s validity turns on examining and analyzing moral motivation. But since motivation is inherently private and inaccessible to others (an agent could be lying to herself or to others about the original motive), the theory shifts from a theoretical description of human nature--one that can be put to observational testing--to an assumption about the inner workings of human nature: psychological egoism moves beyond the possibility of empirical verification and the possibility of empirical negation (since motives are private), and therefore it becomes what is termed a “closed theory.”

A closed theory is a theory that rejects competing theories on its own terms and is non-verifiable and non-falsifiable. If psychological egoism is reduced to an assumption concerning human nature and its hidden motives, then it follows that it is just as valid to hold a competing theory of human motivation such as psychological altruism.

Psychological altruism holds that all human action is necessarily other-centered, and other-motivated. One’s becoming a hermit (an apparently selfish act) can be reinterpreted through psychological altruism as an act of pure noble selflessness: a hermit is not selfishly hiding herself away, rather, what she is doing is not inflicting her potentially ungraceful actions or displeasing looks upon others. A parallel analysis of psychological altruism thus results in opposing conclusions to psychological egoism. However, psychological altruism is arguably just as closed as psychological egoism: with it one assumes that an agent’s inherently private and consequently unverifiable motives are altruistic. If both theories can be validly maintained, and if the choice between them becomes the flip of a coin, then their soundness must be questioned.

A weak version of psychological egoism accepts the possibility of altruistic or benevolent behavior, but maintains that, whenever a choice is made by an agent to act, the action is by definition one that the agent wants to do at that point. The action is self-serving, and is therefore sufficiently explained by the theory of psychological egoism. Let one assume that person A wants to help the poor; therefore, A is acting egoistically by actually wanting to help; again, if A ran into a burning building to save a kitten, it must be the case that A wanted or desired to save the kitten. However, defining all motivations as what an agent desires to do remains problematic: logically, the theory becomes tautologous and therefore unable to provide a useful, descriptive meaning of motivation because one is essentially making an arguably philosophically uninteresting claim that an agent is motivated to do what she is motivated to do. Besides which, if helping others is what A desires to do, then to what extent can A be continued to be called an egoist? A acts because that is what A does, and consideration of the ethical “ought” becomes immediately redundant. Consequently, opponents argue that psychological egoism is philosophically inadequate because it sidesteps the great nuances of motive. For example, one can argue that the psychological egoist’s notion of motive sidesteps the clashes that her theory has with the notion of duty, and, related social virtues such as honor, respect, and reputation, which fill the tomes of history and literature.

David Hume, in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (Appendix II—Of Self Love), offers six rebuttals of what he calls the “selfish hypothesis,” an arguably archaic relative of psychological egoism. First, Hume argues that self-interest opposes moral sentiments that may engage one in concern for others, and, may motivate one’s actions for others. These moral sentiments include love, friendship, compassion, and gratitude. Second, psychological egoism attempts to reduce human motivation to a single cause, which is a ‘fruitless’ task—the "love of simplicity…has been the source of much false reasoning in philosophy." Third, it is evident that animals act benevolently towards one another, and, if it is admitted that animals can act altruistically, then how can it be denied in humans? Fourth, the concepts we use to describe benevolent behavior cannot be meaningless; sometimes an agent obviously does not have a personal interest in the fortune of another, yet will wish her well. Any attempt to create an imaginary vested interest, as the psychological egoist will attempt, proves futile. Fifth, Hume asserts that we have prior motivations to self-interest; we may have, for example, a predisposition towards vanity, fame, or vengeance that transcends any benefit to the agent. Finally, Hume claims that even if the selfish hypothesis were true, there are a sufficient number of dispositions to generate a wide possibility of moral actions, allowing one person to be called vicious and another humane; and he claims that the latter is to be preferred over the former.

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2. Normative Egoism

The second variant of egoism is normative in that it stipulates the agent ought to promote the self above other values. Herbert Spencer said, “Ethics has to recognize the truth, recognized in unethical thought, that egoism comes before altruism. The acts required for continued self-preservation, including the enjoyments of benefits achieved by such arts, are the first requisites to universal welfare. Unless each duly cares for himself, his care for all others is ended in death, and if each thus dies there remain no others to be cared for.” He was echoing a long history of the importance of self-regarding behavior that can be traced back to Aristotle’s theory of friendship in the Nichomachaean Ethics. In his theory, Aristotle argues that a man must befriend himself before he can befriend others. The general theory of normative egoism does not attempt to describe human nature directly, but asserts how people ought to behave. It comes in two general forms: rational egoism and ethical egoism.

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a. Rational Egoism

Rational egoism claims that the promotion of one’s own interests is always in accordance with reason. The greatest and most provocative proponent of rational egoism is Ayn Rand, whose The Virtue of Selfishness outlines the logic and appeal of the theory. Rand argues that: first, properly defined, selfishness rejects the sacrificial ethics of the West’s Judaic-Christian heritage on the grounds that it is right for man to live his own life; and, Rand argues that, second, selfishness is a proper virtue to pursue. That being said, she rejects the “selfless selfishness” of irrationally acting individuals: “the actor must always be the beneficiary of his action and that man must act for his own rational self-interest.” To be ethically selfish thus entails a commitment to reason rather than to emotionally driven whims and instincts.

In the strong version of rational egoism defended by Rand, not only is it rational to pursue one’s own interests, it is irrational not to pursue them. In a weaker version, one may note that while it is rational to pursue one’s own interests, there may be occasions when not pursuing them is not necessarily irrational.

Critics of rational egoism may claim that reason may dictate that one’s interests should not govern one’s actions. The possibility of conflicting reasons in a society need not be evoked in this matter; one need only claim that reason may invoke an impartiality clause, in other words, a clause that demands that in a certain situation one’s interests should not be furthered. For example, consider a free-rider situation. In marking students’ papers, a teacher may argue that to offer inflated grades is to make her life easier, and, therefore, is in her self-interest: marking otherwise would incur negative feedback from students and having to spend time counseling on writing skills, and so on. It is even arguably foreseeable that inflating grades may never have negative consequences for anyone. The teacher could conceivably free-ride on the tougher marking of the rest of the department or university and not worry about the negative consequences of a diminished reputation to either. However, impartiality considerations demand an alternative course—it is not right to change grades to make life easier. Here self-interest conflicts with reason. Nonetheless, a Randian would reject the teacher’s free-riding being rational: since the teacher is employed to mark objectively and impartially in the first place, to do otherwise is to commit a fraud both against the employing institution and the student. (This is indeed an analogous situation explored in Rand’s The Fountainhead, in which the hero architect regrets having propped up a friend’s inabilities).

A simpler scenario may also be considered. Suppose that two men seek the hand of one woman, and they deduce that they should fight for her love. A critic may reason that the two men rationally claim that if one of them were vanquished, the other may enjoy the beloved. However, the solution ignores the woman’s right to choose between her suitors, and thus the men’s reasoning is flawed.

In a different scenario, game theory (emanating from John von Neumann’s and Oskar Morgenstern’sTheory of Games and Economic Behaviour, 1944) points to another possible logical error in rational egoism by offering an example in which the pursuit of self-interest results in both agents being made worse off. This is famously described in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.

Prisoner B

Confess Don't confess

Prisoner A Confess

5,5 ½,10

Don't Confess 10,½ 2,2

From the table, two suspects in a crime are individually offered different sentences by their captors. A, for example, is offered 5 years in prison if he confesses, and he is told that if his partner doesn’t confess he will be given 6 months in jail and his partner 10 years. If he refuses to confess, then A faces 10 years in prison if his partner does confess; however, both would only serve two years in prison if they both do not confess.

A prior agreement between A and B not to confess would result in the best solution for the two of them, but that is not allowed by the game because they must make their decision by themselves without communicating with the other person. The incentive that each personally faces to avoid spending time in prison is to squeal in the hope that the other does not confess. If each does this, then both will end up serving the non-optimal solution of 5 years each.

The Prisoner’s Dilemma offers a mathematical model as to why self-interested action could lead to a socially non-optimal equilibrium (in which the participants end up in the worst scenario). Supporters identify a game “as any interaction between agents that is governed by a set of rules specifying the possible moves for each participant and a set of outcomes for each possible combination of moves.” They add: “One is hard put to find an example of social phenomenon that cannot be so described.” (Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis, p.1). Nonetheless, it can be countered that the nature of the game artificially pre-empts other possibilities: the sentences are fixed, so the choices facing the agents are fixed; although this may certainly be applied to the restricted choices facing the two prisoners or contestants in a game, it is not obvious that every-day life generates such limited and limiting choices.

Game theory introduces a variety of different outcomes and presents other ethical dilemmas (e.g., in the 1980s, a "mutually assured destruction" version was popular in which two superpowers face each other with nuclear weapons and similar incentives to the prisoners above), but the outcomes and hence restrictions on the agents remain necessarily decided upon by the "game master." Typically the solutions show self-interested behavior as reducing social welfare, and some solutions may be so determined as to be non socially-optimal and unstable, leaving us to believe that selfish behavior is consequentially both bad and destabilizing. The implied conclusion in such games is that either individuals ought to reject their own interests in favor of collective gain and/or that individuals ought to submit their choices to an overarching "game master" or Hobbesian Leviathan – that is, the state and its experts, politicians, committees, and possibly referenda, and so forth – who would then choose the "correct" collective solution on their behalf. Since egoists tend to disparage others’ choosing for them as immoral, such an implied solution is to be rejected (indeed, a third set of values could be added to the game that reflect the captives’ gross dismay at having the decision made for them!); more importantly, the egoist may reply that life is not a game of fixed values and that the solutions are mere contrivances.

At a deeper level, some egoists may reject the possibility of fixed or absolute values that individuals acting selfishly and caught up in their own pursuits cannot see. Nietzsche, for instance, would counter that values are created by the individual and thereby do not stand independently of his or her self to be explained by another "authority"; similarly, St. Augustine would say "love, and do as you will"; neither of which may be helpful to the prisoners above but which may be of greater guidance for individuals in normal life.

Rand exhorts the application of reason to ethical situations, but a critic may reply that what is rational is not always the same as what is reasonable. The critic may emphasize the historicity of choice, that is, she may emphasize that one’s apparent choice is demarcated by, and dependent on, the particular language, culture of right and consequence and environmental circumstance in which an individual finds herself living: a Victorian English gentleman perceived a different moral sphere and consequently horizon of goals than an American frontiersman. This criticism may, however, turn on semantic or contextual nuances. The Randian may counter that what is rational is reasonable: for one can argue that rationality is governed as much by understanding the context (Sartre’s facticity is a highly useful term!) as adhering to the laws of logic and of non-contradiction.

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b. Ethical Egoism

Ethical egoism is the normative theory that the promotion of one’s own good is in accordance with morality. In the strong version, it is held that it is always moral to promote one’s own good, and it is never moral not to promote it. In the weak version, it is said that although it is always moral to promote one’s own good, it is not necessarily never moral to not. That is, there may be conditions in which the avoidance of personal interest may be a moral action.

In an imaginary construction of a world inhabited by a single being, it is possible that the pursuit of morality is the same as the pursuit of self-interest in that what is good for the agent is the same as what is in the agent’s interests. Arguably, there could never arise an occasion when the agent ought not to pursue self-interest in favor of another morality, unless he produces an alternative ethical system in which he ought to renounce his values in favor of an imaginary self, or, other entity such as the universe, or the agent’s God. Opponents of ethical egoism may claim, however, that although it is possible for this Robinson Crusoe type creature to lament previous choices as not conducive to self-interest (enjoying the pleasures of swimming all day, and not spending necessary time producing food), the mistake is not a moral mistake but a mistake of identifying self-interest. Presumably this lonely creature will begin to comprehend the distinctions between short, and long-term interests, and, that short-term pains can be countered by long-term gains.

In addition, opponents argue that even in a world inhabited by a single being, duties would still apply; (Kantian) duties are those actions that reason dictates ought to be pursued regardless of any gain, or loss to self or others. Further, the deontologist asserts the application of yet another moral sphere which ought to be pursued, namely, that of impartial duties. The problem with complicating the creature’s world with impartial duties, however, is in defining an impartial task in a purely subjective world. Impartiality, the ethical egoist may retort, could only exist where there are competing selves: otherwise, the attempt to be impartial in judging one’s actions is a redundant exercise. (However, the Cartesian rationalist could retort that need not be so, that a sentient being should act rationally, and reason will disclose what are the proper actions he should follow.)

If we move away from the imaginary construct of a single being’s world, ethical egoism comes under fire from more pertinent arguments. In complying with ethical egoism, the individual aims at her own greatest good. Ignoring a definition of the good for the present, it may justly be argued that pursuing one’s own greatest good can conflict with another’s pursuit, thus creating a situation of conflict. In a typical example, a young person may see his greatest good in murdering his rich uncle to inherit his millions. It is the rich uncle’s greatest good to continue enjoying his money, as he sees fit. According to detractors, conflict is an inherent problem of ethical egoism, and the model seemingly does not possess a conflict resolution system. With the additional premise of living in society, ethical egoism has much to respond to: obviously there are situations when two people’s greatest goods – the subjectively perceived working of their own self-interest – will conflict, and, a solution to such dilemmas is a necessary element of any theory attempting to provide an ethical system.

The ethical egoist contends that her theory, in fact, has resolutions to the conflict. The first resolution proceeds from a state of nature examination. If, in the wilderness, two people simultaneously come across the only source of drinkable water a potential dilemma arises if both make a simultaneous claim to it. With no recourse to arbitration they must either accept an equal share of the water, which would comply with rational egoism. (In other words, it is in the interest of both to share, for both may enjoy the water and each other’s company, and, if the water is inexhaustible, neither can gain from monopolizing the source.) But a critic may maintain that this solution is not necessarily in compliance with ethical egoism. Arguably, the critic continues, the two have no possible resolution, and must, therefore, fight for the water. This is often the line taken against egoism generally: that it results in insoluble conflict that implies, or necessitates a resort to force by one or both of the parties concerned. For the critic, the proffered resolution is, therefore, an acceptance of the ethical theory that “might is right;” that is, the critic maintains that the resolution accepts that the stronger will take possession and thereby gain proprietary rights.

However, ethical egoism does not have to logically result in a Darwinian struggle between the strong and the weak in which strength determines moral rectitude to resources or values. Indeed, the “realist” position may strike one as philosophically inadequate as that of psychological egoism, although popularly attractive. For example, instead of succumbing to insoluble conflict, the two people could cooperate (as rational egoism would require). Through cooperation, both agents would, thereby, mutually benefit from securing and sharing the resource. Against the critic’s pessimistic presumption that conflict is insoluble without recourse to victory, the ethical egoist can retort that reasoning people can recognize that their greatest interests are served more through cooperation than conflict. War is inherently costly, and, even the fighting beasts of the wild instinctively recognize its potential costs, and, have evolved conflict-avoiding strategies.

On the other hand, the ethical egoist can argue less benevolently, that in case one man reaches the desired resource first, he would then be able to take rightful control and possession of it – the second person cannot possess any right to it, except insofar as he may trade with its present owner. Of course, charitable considerations may motivate the owner to secure a share for the second comer, and economic considerations may prompt both to trade in those products that each can better produce or acquire: the one may guard the water supply from animals while the other hunts. Such would be a classical liberal reading of this situation, which considers the advance of property rights to be the obvious solution to apparently intractable conflicts over resources.

A second conflict-resolution stems from critics’ fears that ethical egoists could logically pursue their interests at the cost of others. Specifically, a critic may contend that personal gain logically cannot be in one’s best interest if it entails doing harm to another: doing harm to another would be to accept the principle that doing harm to another is ethical (that is, one would be equating “doing harm” with “one’s own best interests”), whereas, reflection shows that principle to be illogical on universalistic criteria. However, an ethical egoist may respond that in the case of the rich uncle and greedy nephew, for example, it is not the case that the nephew would be acting ethically by killing his uncle, and that for a critic to contend otherwise is to criticize personal gain from the separate ethical standpoint that condemns murder. In addition, the ethical egoist may respond by saying that these particular fears are based on a confusion resulting from conflating ethics (that is, self-interest) with personal gain; The ethical egoist may contend that if the nephew were to attempt to do harm for personal gain, that he would find that his uncle or others would or may be permitted to do harm in return. The argument that “I have a right to harm those who get in my way” is foiled by the argument that “others have a right to harm me should I get in the way.” That is, in the end, the nephew variously could see how harming another for personal gain would not be in his self-interest at all.

The critics’ fear is based on a misreading of ethical egoism, and is an attempt to subtly reinsert the “might is right” premise. Consequently, the ethical egoist is unfairly chastised on the basis of a straw-man argument. Ultimately, however, one comes to the conclusion reached in the discussion of the first resolution; that is, one must either accept the principle that might is right (which in most cases would be evidentially contrary to one’s best interest), or accept that cooperation with others is a more successful approach to improving one’s interests. Though interaction can either be violent or peaceful, an ethical egoist rejects violence as undermining the pursuit of self-interest.

A third conflict-resolution entails the insertion of rights as a standard. This resolution incorporates the conclusions of the first two resolutions by stating that there is an ethical framework that can logically be extrapolated from ethical egoism. However, the logical extrapolation is philosophically difficult (and, hence, intriguing) because ethical egoism is the theory that the promotion of one’s own self-interest is in accordance with morality whereas rights incorporate boundaries to behavior that reason or experience has shown to be contrary to the pursuit of self-interest. Although it is facile to argue that the greedy nephew does not have a right to claim his uncle’s money because it is not his but his uncle’s, and to claim that it is wrong to act aggressively against the person of another because that person has a legitimate right to live in peace (thus providing the substance of conflict-resolution for ethical egoism), the problem of expounding this theory for the ethical egoist lies in the intellectual arguments required to substantiate the claims for the existence of rights and then, once substantiated, connecting them to the pursuit of an individual’s greatest good.

i. Conditional Egoism

A final type of ethical egoism is conditional egoism. This is the theory that egoism is morally acceptable or right if it leads to morally acceptable ends. For example, self-interested behavior can be accepted and applauded if it leads to the betterment of society as a whole; the ultimate test rests not on acting self-interestedly but on whether society is improved as a result. A famous example of this kind of thinking is from Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, in which Smith outlines the public benefits resulting from self-interested behavior (borrowing a theory from the earlier writer Bernard Mandeville and his Fable of the Bees). Smith writes: "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages." Wealth of Nations, I.ii.2.

As Smith himself admits, if egoistic behavior lends itself to society’s detriment, then it ought to be stopped. The theory of conditional egoism is thus dependent on a superior moral goal such as an action being in the common interest, that is, the public good. The grave problem facing conditional egoists is according to what standard ought the limits on egoism be placed? In other words, who or what is to define the nature of the public good? If it is a person who is set up as the great arbitrator of the public, then it is uncertain if there can be a guarantee that he or she is embodying or arguing for an impartial standard of the good and not for his or her own particular interest. If it is an impartial standard that sets the limit, one that can be indicated by any reasonable person, then it behooves the philosopher to explain the nature of that standard.

In most “public good” theories, the assumption is made that there exists a collective entity over and above the individuals that comprise it: race, nation, religion, and state being common examples. Collectivists then attempt to explain what in particular should be held as the interest of the group. Inevitably, however, conflict arises, and resolutions have to be produced. Some seek refuge in claiming the need for perpetual dialogue (rather than exchange), but others return to the need for force to settle apparently insoluble conflicts; nonetheless, the various shades of egoism pose a valid and appealing criticism of collectivism: that individuals act; groups don’t. Karl Popper’s works on methodological individualism are a useful source in criticizing collectivist thinking (for example, Popper’s The Poverty of Historicism).

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3. Conclusion

Although psychological egoism is fraught with the logical problem of collapsing into a closed theory, and hence being a mere assumption that could validly be accepted as describing human motivation and morality, or be rejected in favor of a psychological altruism (or even a psychological ecologism in which all actions necessarily benefit the agent’s environment), normative egoism engages in a philosophically more intriguing dialogue with protractors. Normative egoists argue from various positions that an individual ought to pursue his or her own interest. These may be summarized as follows: the individual is best placed to know what defines that interest, or it is thoroughly the individual’s right to pursue that interest. The latter dividing into two sub-arguments: either because it is the reasonable/rational course of action, or because it is the best guarantee of maximizing social welfare. Egoists also stress that the implication of critics’ condemnation of self-serving or self-motivating action is the call to renounce freedom in favor of control by others, who then are empowered to choose on their behalf. This entails an acceptance of Aristotle’s political maxim that "some are born to rule and others are born to be ruled," also read as "individuals are generally too stupid to act either in their own best interests or in the interests of those who would wish to command them." Rejecting both descriptions (the first as being arrogant and empirically questionable and the second as unmasking the truly immoral ambition lurking behind attacks on selfishness), egoists ironically can be read as moral and political egalitarians glorifying the dignity of each and every person to pursue life as they see fit. Mistakes in securing the proper means and appropriate ends will be made by individuals, but if they are morally responsible for their actions they not only will bear the consequences but also the opportunity for adapting and learning. When that responsibility is removed and individuals are exhorted to live for an alternative cause, their incentive and joy in improving their own welfare is concomitantly diminished, which will, for many egoists, ultimately foster an uncritical, unthinking mass of obedient bodies vulnerable to political manipulation: when the ego is trammeled, so too is freedom ensnared, and without freedom ethics is removed from individual to collective or government responsibility. Egoists also reject the insight into personal motivation that others – whether they are psychological or sociological "experts" – declare they possess, and which they may accordingly fine-tune or encourage to "better ends." Why an individual acts remains an intrinsically personal and private act that is the stuff of memoirs and literature, but how they should act releases our investigations into ethics of what shall define the good for the self-regarding agent.

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4. References and Further Reading

Aristotle. Nichomachaean Ethics. Various translations available. Book IX being most pertinent.

Baier, Kurt. “Egoisim” in A Companion to Ethics. Ed. Peter Singer. Blackwell: Oxford. 1990.

Feinberg, Joel. “Psychological Egoism” in Ethics: History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 1998.

Garvin, Lucius. A Modern Introduction to Ethics. Houghton Mifflin: Cambrirdge, MA, 1953.

Hargreaves-Heap, Shaun P. and Yanis Varoufakis. Game Theory: A Critical Introduction. Routledge: London, 1995.

Holmes, S.J. Life and Morals. MacMillan: London, 1948.

Hospers, John. “Ethical Egoism,” in An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis. 2nd Edition. Routledge, Kegan Paul: London, 1967.

Hume, David. Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.

Peikoff, Leonard. Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand. Meridian: London, 1993.

Popper, Karl. Poverty of Historicism. Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, 1976.

Rachels, James. Elements of Moral Philosophy. Mcgraw-Hill: London, 1995.

Rand, Ayn. Virtue of Selfishness. Signet: New York, 1964.

Rand, Ayn. The Fountainhead. Harper Collins: New York. 1961.

Sidgwick, Henry. The Methods of Ethics. MacMillan: London, 1901.

Smith, Adam. Wealth of Nations.

Smith, Adam. Theory of Moral Sentiments.

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Author Information:

Alexander Moseley

Email: alex@classical-foundations.com

© 2006

I think, this article covers all topics, discussed on this thread.

Edited March 29, 2010 by Leonid

[bmacwilliam]

I only proclaim my "qua" is better, not immutable, based on E-V-I-D-E-N-C-E. A concept that seems to be very frightening to you. Whether one should choose a "qua" or not is separate from the fact that she chose poorly. The point is that even if we leave her system fully intact, allowing the breach, reality kills it anyway.

Okay, so you personally proclaim that your qua theory is based on evidence. So where are the facts that you personally proclaim to be E-V-I-D-E-N-C-E?

Rand believed that she had justified her moral theory (including her qua statements), and she presented her arguments. But you have personally proclaimed, without presenting any counter-evidence, that this is smoke and mirrors and that Rand was a fraud.

Your arrogance seems to be exceeded only by your stunning ability to miss the point.

My evidence?? My evidence is the thin, weak theory we call Evolution. You know, the tenous one, the crazy, unsupported one.

The point is Goeorge, you know - the point you've refused to address - is that her qua man/individual life as the standard of value crap does not hold up to gene-centric evolutionary theory. This simply implies that man, in order to survive (gene-centrically), should have developed a combination of selfish (self preservation and survival etc.) behaviours combined with altruistic behaviours to support his own genes in others, and that predicatably the strength of these behaviours should be in general relation to kin distance.

Evolution say "qua" is very different than Rand's nonsense. Rand had to make the "break" between humans and animals as a difference of "kind" and not "degree" if I remember her words correctly. Of course this is nonsense, but Rand needed to justify her crap because animals fit another model. Humans are simply animals that occupy a cognitive niche. Rand would have us as evolved beyond evolution - about as contradictory as you can get.

"Make a name for myself" - a little projecting there don't you think?

I cannot state more clearly that "my" evidence is evolution. See if you can try to stay within reality for just one second.

What's it gonna be?

1. Evolution doesn't count for us?

2. Evolution is a crappy theory?

What George, what? But do try to understand the topic at hand here will you??

Bob

[bmacwilliam]

-- aside from than the fact that I'm a lot smarter than you are

Well, I don't know about smarter but you're way more vain than I am.

That's because I have a lot more to be vain about.

Ghs

GS,

The reality, that George can try to pretend doesn't exist all he wants, is that someone who considers himself a serious Philosopher and a Rand supporter is a contradiction in terms, but he can still be vain. After all, Hulk Hogan was very vain as well proclaiming he was a great wrestler. But even the Hulkster didn't really believe it.

Bob