Settling the debate on Altruism

[George H. Smith]

I have to be honest you've lost all credibility with me by refusing to admit you were appealing to authority when it's about as black and white as it gets no matter how hard you try to spin it. If you're willing to lie and sacrifice your integrity so you won't be "wrong" about something so petty I'd be extremely dubious of the rest of your scholarship. Of course you don't care what I think, but I'm calling you out on it anyway. You're a liar. Do you think everybody here is so stupid that you can just talk your way out of it? On top of that you try to convince us you, Mr. Insult himself (Mr. I'll decide who knows enough about Rand to speak in my presence) are the victim in this.You're a bully, plain and simple.

You're right. I don't care what you think. But I was impressed by your "Liar, liar, pants on fire!" reply. It is impossible adequately to respond to such a finely-honed and clever riposte, so I won't even try.

You and some other Rand-bashers on OL use insults as frequently as I do -- your latest post is a case in point -- even if many of your insults are directed at a dead woman. Your problem seems rooted in the fact that I am much better at formulating insults than you are. Eat your heart out, rookie.

Ghs

[Daniel Barnes]

Oh, so I am now the emperor with no clothes, am I? Well, as long as I have removed my clothes, I will also remove my gloves.

Sheesh, but you've got a hair trigger. You're not

are you?....;-)

No-one said you're the Emperor. The Emperor could have been Rand, or philosophy itself, I had nothing particular in mind other than the thrust of the fable.

[imurray]

I have to be honest you've lost all credibility with me by refusing to admit you were appealing to authority when it's about as black and white as it gets no matter how hard you try to spin it. If you're willing to lie and sacrifice your integrity so you won't be "wrong" about something so petty I'd be extremely dubious of the rest of your scholarship. Of course you don't care what I think, but I'm calling you out on it anyway. You're a liar. Do you think everybody here is so stupid that you can just talk your way out of it? On top of that you try to convince us you, Mr. Insult himself (Mr. I'll decide who knows enough about Rand to speak in my presence) are the victim in this.You're a bully, plain and simple.

You're right. I don't care what you think. But I was impressed by your "Liar, liar, pants on fire!" reply. It is impossible adequately to respond to such a finely-honed and clever riposte, so I won't even try.

You and some other Rand-bashers on OL use insults as frequently as I do -- your latest post is a case in point -- even if many of your insults are directed at a dead woman. Your problem seems rooted in the fact that I am much better at formulating insults than you are. Eat your heart out, rookie.

Ghs

Wow. You're a jackass. I didn't simply say you were a liar, I proved it. You'd rather ignore that and keep living in your fantasy world. You don't care what I think, but you continue to engage me and attempt to convince me you're right. Sticks and stones...tough guy. I'm not even anti-Rand, I came here to learn more about her - it's you I took issue with.

Edited March 27, 2010 by Panoptic

[George H. Smith]

Well, Bob (ref. post 640), I'd guess you are a conservative, perhaps in the Adam Smith sense.

I think it is misleading to call Adam Smith a "conservative," especially in the context of 18th century political thought -- though it might be appropriate to call him a "conservative libertarian."

I say this partially because Smith was a natural rights advocate, whereas most conservatives of his day repudiated the doctrine of natural rights owing to its revolutionary implications. Even so, Smith shared the concern of Hume (who was not a natural rights theorist) Burke (who was vague on this issue), and other 18th century contemporaries (such as Josiah Tucker) that social contract theory, which was based on natural rights, would logically delegitimize all governments, good and bad alike, and thereby generate social instability. Smith therefore adopted Hume's approach, according to which governments are justified by their utility, not via consent.

There are other reasons why it would be misleading to dub Smith a conservative, but this is a complicated subject, and I will stop here.

[George H. Smith]

Wow. You're a jackass. I didn't simply say you were a liar, I proved it. You'd rather ignore that and keep living in your fantasy world.

I must have missed your proof. Sorry about that. Bend over and I'll see if I can find it.

You don't care what I think, but you continue to engage me and attempt to convince me you're right.

I have no interest in convincing you of anything. I respond to your posts because this provides me with an entertaining pastime -- something to take my mind off my real work of meeting deadlines. When this diversion becomes boring for me, I'll stop.

Sticks and stones...tough guy.

Yeah, I'm a tough guy all right -- a real bully. Ask anyone who has met me (he said, to the sound of thunderous laughter echoing in cyberspace).

I'm not even anti-Rand, I came here to learn more about her - it's you I took issue with.

Two questions: (1) What have you learned? (2)What have you read by Rand?

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

Oh, so I am now the emperor with no clothes, am I? Well, as long as I have removed my clothes, I will also remove my gloves.

Sheesh, but you've got a hair trigger. You're not

are you?....;-)

No-one said you're the Emperor. The Emperor could have been Rand, or philosophy itself, I had nothing particular in mind other than the thrust of the fable.

I seem to have misunderstood your intention. As I recall, the same thing happened to me not long ago, but our new misunderstanding will not end in the same manner. I can't honestly say that I understand what your point was, but I assume you do, and I'll take your word for it.

As for your new link, does that video have a point, or did you pick it at random?

Ghs

[imurray]

Wow. You're a jackass. I didn't simply say you were a liar, I proved it. You'd rather ignore that and keep living in your fantasy world.

I must have missed your proof. Sorry about that. Bend over and I'll see if I can find it.

You don't care what I think, but you continue to engage me and attempt to convince me you're right.

I have no interest in convincing you of anything. I respond to your posts because this provides me with an entertaining pastime -- something to take my mind off my real work of meeting deadlines. When this diversion becomes boring for me, I'll stop.

Sticks and stones...tough guy.

Yeah, I'm a tough guy all right -- a real bully. Ask anyone who has met me (he said, to the sound of thunderous laughter echoing in cyberspace).

I'm not even anti-Rand, I came here to learn more about her - it's you I took issue with.

Two questions: (1) What have you learned? (2)What have you read by Rand?

Ghs

I'm not surprised that you wouldn't be a bully in person. Guys like you like to shoot your mouths off in online forums.

I've learned that there are a lot if people on here who I can learn from - excluding yourself.

I'll give you the last word on this. This is my last reply to you on this site as arguing with you is pointless and not very stimulating.

We've already done enough harm to this discussion - one of us has to stop and I volunteer.

[imurray]

Back to altruism...I volunteer to compile a list of the major arguments made here in order to help focus the conversation - it will help me at least and maybe benefit others also.

Edited March 27, 2010 by Panoptic

[Leonid]

Jeffrey Smith: Man is rational, productive being. This is self-evident fact. These properties are volitional but nevertheless essential. Man doesn’t exist as plant or animal, but only qua man-that is, by using his rational faculty, by creation artificial environment, a noosphere. The ultimate death doesn’t change the fact that as long man is alive in order to survive he has to use his specifically human tool of survival-his mind. If he doesn’t-he has two choices: 1. to perish. 2. To become second-hander, (a parasite, a tug, a dictator, an altruist).

This second option, however, has special prerequisite-consent of all rational creative people to be exploited. Ayn Rand calls this the sanction of the victims. Altruism is the exactly ethical system which gives moral basis to this sanction.

Daniel: Yes, you managed to find another word which designates two contradictory concepts: bad as good looking or attractive; in spite I think it isn’t normative English, but rather slang. Like in case of sacrifice which our dominant internalized philosophy views as good, it is a proof that deeply rooted Christian mentality views sexual attraction as bad.

You've said: "I will offer that the historical meaning is the exact opposite to what you claim: that, say, animal, human or other sacrifices were intended as exchanging a lesser value for a greater one - for example, human sacrifices to appease the gods' anger and avoid great natural disasters."

From the victims’ point of view, human sacrifice was an exchange of greater value (his life) to non-value (his death). What effect it had on the rest of the tribe was irrelevant to the sacrificed victim.

If you think that life’s value of one single man is lesser than alleged benefits for the all tribe, then you are truly altruist and collectivist.

Edited March 27, 2010 by Leonid

[Daniel Barnes]

I seem to have misunderstood your intention. As I recall, the same thing happened to me not long ago, but our new misunderstanding will not end in the same manner.

Now I don't know what you're talking about. Perhaps we'd best leave it.

As for your new link, does that video have a point, or did you pick it at random?

The point was that you seemed to be, like our Scouse lads, rather quick to take offense.

Clearly that fell flat. Never mind.

[Daniel Barnes]

Yes, you managed to find another word which designates two contradictory concepts: bad as good looking or attractive; in spite I think it isn’t normative English, but rather slang. Like in case of sacrifice which our dominant internalized philosophy views as good, it is a proof that deeply rooted Christian mentality views sexual attraction as bad.

Social-psychobabble. And irrelevant with it. Why don't you just admit you were wrong?

But of course this is the internet. That never happens...;-)

You've said: "I will offer that the historical meaning is the exact opposite to what you claim: that, say, animal, human or other sacrifices were intended as exchanging a lesser value for a greater one - for example, human sacrifices to appease the gods' anger and avoid great natural disasters."

From the victims’ point of view, human sacrifice was an exchange of greater value (his life) to non-value (his death). What effect it had on the rest of the tribe was irrelevant to the sacrificed victim.

If you think that life’s value of one single man is lesser than alleged benefits for the all tribe, then you are truly altruist and collectivist.

Argument having utterly failed, out come the programmatic Objectivist denunciations. What are you going to call me next? A jabbernowl? A mooncalf?..;-)

[Xray]

So if per Rand, (the fictional character Toohey expressing her views here), "altruists" don't exist because it impossible for humans to live that way, then doesn't her crusade against those alleged altruists resemble a Don Quijote fighting against windmills?

Rand didn't say that altruists don't exist. She said, in effect, that altruism cannot be practiced consistently. Big difference.

Ghs

I don't think Rand's assessment of altruism was as sine ira et studio as your comment makes it appear.

Imo Rand dowright hated the thought of serving others. For the old fear, reflecting her traumatic life in Russia where so many rights had been denied her, never left her.

Moralists - I think we can agree that Rand was also a moralist (evidenced in her presenting a catalog of cardinal (objectivist) values and virtues) - in their zeal to attack the position opposing the morality they value, tend to throw out the baby with the bathwater.

If Jim X decides to give away all his money to the poor, who is anyone to judge whether it is "in his best interest"? Who is anyone to decide (for Jim) what is to be the "higher" value for him?

"The purpose of morality is to teach you, not to suffer and die, but to enjoy yourself and live."

Source: For the New Intellectual Galt’s Speech, For the New Intellectual, 123. http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/morality.html

But suppose Jim never enjoyed himself more and felt happier after he decided to serve the poor? Then per Rand, he would be behaving "morally".

But this would of course conflict with Rand's other conviction that one can't feel happy serving others first.

An example is Toohey's dialogue with the unhappy Catherine in TF:

This dialogue is also interesting in that it shows Rand was well aware of self-interest underlying all human action:

(Chapter 13, Elsworth Toohey section in TF, page 364 pb.), Toohey confronts Catherine with the "selfishness" underlying her altruistic acts:

"Don't you see how selfish you have been? You chose a noble career not for the good you could accomplish, but for the personal happiness you expected to find in it."

But again, the baby is thrown out with the bathwater. For "the good" one feels that can be accomplished by serving others is not in opposition to the feeling of happiness derived from the action. On the contrary, they are interrelated.

For example, Jane volunteering in an animal shelter is happy because she has the feeling of doing something "good", in sync with her personal values.

So there's a lot of aspects to consider which imo can't be integrated contradiction-free into a philosophy based on the principle of 'absolute good' and "objective" value.

Imo a debate between advocates of altruism and advocates of Objectivism would resemble more a war between believers.

Interesting also how moralists seem to have little tolerance for shades of gray getting in the way of the black and white picture they present.

From the moralists' standpoint, it makes sense why they are against acknowledging those shades of gray: for it might open the door for a dreaded intruder called DOUBT. Doubt creeping in leading people to check premises, to start thinking that which they are not supposed to think: that "It ain't necessarily so", to quote from the famous song in Porgy and Bess

Which is why non-moralists have far more inner freedom allowing them to integrate contradiction-free the aspects discussed above.

So why not keep it simple and acknowledge that we are all motivated by self-interest (we would be unable to survive without this being biologically hardwired in us), which does not contradict the other fact that we as group animals are also no stranger to performing acts of serving others, since we depend on each other for cooperation.

There don't just exist a couple of "prime movers", with the rest being regarded as of lesser value. Would Rand have had any paper to write on without the woodcutter's work? What happens if trash workers don't come to pick up the garbage in a city?

Edited March 27, 2010 by Xray

[imurray]

So why not keep it simple and acknowledge that we are all motivated by self-interest (we would be unable to survive without this being biologically hardwired in us), which does not contradict the other fact that we as group animals are also no stranger to performing acts of serving others, since we depend on each other for cooperation.

There don't just exist a couple of "prime movers", with the rest being regarded as of lesser value. Would Rand have had any paper to write on without the woodcutter's work? What happens if trash workers don't come to pick up the garbage in a city?

Xray,

I generally agree with your assessment, but I'm not sure it's accurate to say that altruism is impossible because we are biologically hardwired for survival. While passing on one's genes is in every organisms self interest and absolutely necessary for the preservation of the gene pool, man, being a rational being, is in a unique position where he able to subordinate his biological drives for other interests. For example humans choose to smoke or do drugs, engage in sports where there is great risk of bodily harm or even death, couples choose not to continue their genetic line by not procreating, etc.

Here's another example:

I assume that you would agree that the drive for survival is hardwired in organisms to insure the preservation of genes.

What if a couple decides not to procreate because they feel that their society has become a horrible place and decide that it would be unfair to a child to be brought into such a place. Is that not an act of altruism (in your system) - sacrificing the perpetuation of one's genes for a child?

Edited March 27, 2010 by Panoptic

[George H. Smith]

Rand didn't say that altruists don't exist. She said, in effect, that altruism cannot be practiced consistently. Big difference.

I don't think Rand's assessment of altruism was as sine ira et studio as your comment makes it appear. Imo Rand downright hated the thought of serving others. For the old fear, reflecting her traumatic life in Russia where so many rights had been denied her, never left her.

I don't understand how you drew this conclusion from my comment, especially since I tend to agree with your observation about Rand. There can be little doubt that Rand's experiences in the Soviet Union imbued her with a hatred (I wouldn't call it "fear") of totalitarianism and the altruism on which it was based.

Moralists - I think we can agree that Rand was also a moralist (evidenced in her presenting a catalog of cardinal (objectivist) values and virtues) - in their zeal to attack the position opposing the morality they value, tend to throw out the baby with the bathwater.

This can happen, of course, but I don't think it happened to Rand. And even if it did, there is a certain value in those moral philosophers who articulate and defend a "pure" and uncompromising moral position. This can bring clarity to a subject and better enable us to determine the strength of the underlying principles and how much they should be qualified, if at all.

If Jim X decides to give away all his money to the poor, who is anyone to judge whether it is "in his best interest"? Who is anyone to decide (for Jim) what is to be the "higher" value for him?

"The purpose of morality is to teach you, not to suffer and die, but to enjoy yourself and live."

Source: For the New Intellectual Galt’s Speech, For the New Intellectual, 123. http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/morality.html

One person judging what is in the best interests of another person doesn't involve any serious problem, though such judgments needn't be moral judgments. People give advice to other people all the time, e.g., "You should stop smoking. It's bad for you." Or, "You should see a doctor; the pain you are having might be serious." In such cases we are telling people what we believe is in their best interests.

But suppose Jim never enjoyed himself more and felt happier after he decided to serve the poor? Then per Rand, he would be behaving "morally". But this would of course conflict with Rand's other conviction that one can't feel happy serving others first.

To address this issue satisfactorily, I would need to distinguish Rand's thoughts on this problem from my own. That's a big job, so I will rest content with some brief comments.

In Atheism: The Case Against God (1974), I distinguish between moral principles qua standards and moral principles qua rules, and I devote considerable space to explaining the differences between these perspectives. Significantly, some of my discussion was taken from an earlier article, "Objectivism as a Religion," in which I apply the rules-standards distinction to Objectivism. In that article, I contend that those Objectivists who view moral principles as inflexible rules will find no warrant in Rand's basic approach to ethical theory, though I go on to discuss some ancillary issues in which Rand does encourage such a view, even though it cuts against the grain of her metaethics.

In addition, I frankly have never agreed with some of Rand's specific prescriptions about what is necessary to achieve happiness. I object to these not because I think they are wrong per se (a person might achieve happiness by following them) but because I think they are too specific, narrow, and exclusive. People can find happiness in a myriad of different ways, including by "serving" (I prefer to say "helping") others.

Insofar as Rand sticks to the Comteian view of "altruism" as a moral duty to place the interests of others above one's own, I agree with her views, and I think she makes some extremely important points. But Rand doesn't always adhere to this conception. Her distinction between benevolence and altruism notwithstanding, she sometimes lapses into the looser, more popular conception of altruism, and this leads her to make some unjustified judgments about how people will never be happy if they pursue altruistic X instead of egoistic Y.

In fairness to Rand, we should remember one of her fundamental objections to altruism (in the Introduction to VOS), namely, that it rests on a "beneficiary-criterion of morality." She goes on to say:

"The choice of the beneficiary of moral values is merely a preliminary or introductory issue in the field of morality. It is not a substitute for morality nor a criterion of moral value, as altruism has made it. Neither is it a moral primary: it has to be derived from and validated by the fundamental premises of a moral system."

This interesting observation, which reduces the altruism-egoism distinction to a secondary status, has rarely received the attention it deserves.

I realize that my comments thus far have been scattered and rather vague, but this is a complex subject, and I am attempting to lay some groundwork for later comments that I may wish to make.

An example is Toohey's dialogue with the unhappy Catherine in TF:

This dialogue is also interesting in that it shows Rand was well aware of self-interest underlying all human action:

(Chapter 13, Elsworth Toohey section in TF, page 364 pb.), Toohey confronts Catherine with the "selfishness" underlying her altruistic acts:

"Don't you see how selfish you have been? You chose a noble career not for the good you could accomplish, but for the personal happiness you expected to find in it."

I think you have misconstrued what Rand is getting at here, but I'll let it pass, since I don't want to get diverted into too many detours.

But again, the baby is thrown out with the bathwater. For "the good" one feels that can be accomplished by serving others is not in opposition to the feeling of happiness derived from the action. On the contrary, they are interrelated.

For example, Jane volunteering in an animal shelter is happy because she has the feeling of doing something "good", in sync with her personal values.

Apart from the baby/bathwater remark, I agree with you.

So there's a lot of aspects to consider which imo can't be integrated contradiction-free into a philosophy based on the principle of 'absolute good' and "objective" value.

This conclusion doesn't follow from your previous example. Just because Rand may not have solved the relevant problems doesn't mean that they cannot be solved within her basic ethical framework. I think Rand misapplied some of her own principles, so let's not throw the baby out with the bathwater. 8-)

Btw, to my knowledge, Rand never spoke of an "absolute good." This notion (or at least the way you use it) is foreign to her way of thinking.

Imo a debate between advocates of altruism and advocates of Objectivism would resemble more a war between believers. Interesting also how moralists seem to have little tolerance for shades of gray getting in the way of the black and white picture they present. From the moralists' standpoint, it makes sense why they are against acknowledging those shades of gray: for it might open the door for a dreaded intruder called DOUBT. Doubt creeping in leading people to check premises, to start thinking that which they are not supposed to think...

There you go again. You have an uncanny ability to mix good specific points with some goofy generalizations.

Which is why non-moralists have far more inner freedom allowing them to integrate contradiction-free the aspects discussed above.

I don't know what you mean by "moralist," in this context. In philosophy, a "moralist" is simply one who engages in moral philosophy, as when historians speak of the 18th century British moralists. You seem to be confusing the term with "moralistic."

I may or may not respond to the remainder of your post later on. You raise the topic of psychological egoism, a position that has been thoroughly refuted time and again by philosophers since the 18th century, most notably by Bishop Butler. Nathaniel Branden also wrote a good piece on psychological egoism, "Isn't Everyone Selfish?", for "The Objectivist Newsletter" (Sept., 1962), and I'm not sure if I want to go over the same ground again.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

I'll give you the last word on this. This is my last reply to you on this site as arguing with you is pointless and not very stimulating.

Without you around to call me a liar, a bully, and a jackass, how shall I keep myself entertained?

Ghs

[Peter]

Ghs wrote:

I may or may not respond to the remainder of your post later on. You raise the topic of psychological egoism, a position that has been thoroughly refuted time and again by philosophers since the 18th century, most notably by Bishop Butler. Nathaniel Branden also wrote a good piece on psychological egoism, "Isn't Everyone Selfish?", for "The Objectivist Newsletter" (Sept., 1962), and I'm not sure if I want to go over the same ground again.

End quote

I insist we go over the same ground again.

From:

Date: Sat, 3 Feb 2001 22:21:29 -0600

To:

Date: Sat, 31 Mar 2001 13:15:38 -0600

As part of the Darma Initiative, I Jacob, have turned the dial back in time. Notice that the quality of opposition to George, engenders quality answers. We on the Island like to joke, that engaging George in a discussion is like a loud, clumsy burglar trying to steal from a cop’s house. It can be done, but you should come prepared.

Jacob

From: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

Reply-To: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

To: "Atlantis" <Atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: Re: Randian hermeneutics

Date: Sat, 3 Feb 2001 22:21:29 -0600

Gayle Dean wrote:

"I do not think that George's method of interpreting textual quotes from Rand (while ignoring her fundamentals) is productive. When abstract "text interpretations" contradict fundamental premises, then I'm going to stick with the fundamentals and assume that it is the interpretations that are incorrect."

Translated: We should not pay attention to what Rand actually wrote when attempting to ascertain what she meant. All we need do is to consult Gayle about "fundamentals" and go from there.

Okay, Gayle, let's deal with fundamentals. Rand attacked what she called a "beneficiary criterion" of ethics, i.e., she opposed the notion that the beneficiary of an action should be our primary consideration in determining the moral worth of an action. That sounds pretty fundamental to me. If you have textual citations to the contrary, I would like to see them -- or do you regard *everything* Rand wrote as irrelevant in matters of interpretation?

I previously joked about Gayle "channeling" Rand's views from beyond the grave. I thought this was a far-fetched joke, but now I'm not so sure.

Gayle wrote:

"Bill has provided many quotes from Rand which have been interpreted differently by George."

Such as? It would take no more time for Gayle to actually quote these passages than it does to explain, over and over again, why she needn't quote them.

Gayle wrote:

"As far as my providing textual evidence, I forwarded lengthy papers by Ari Armstrong that carefully examined the parts of Rand's text where most people go astray and Ari dispensed with many of George's points in those papers."

If Ari would like to participate in this discussion, then he is more than welcome. As things stand now, however, I am arguing with Gayle, and I will not bow to her constant appeals to authority.

Gayle wrote:

"And to suggest that Rand is not an egoist --as George did in an earlier post-- is the height of nonsense. I consider Rand to be a narrow, consequentialist, egoist. But, if George won't even take Rand's word for that basic fact --i.e., that Rand is an egoist -- then how can he be expected to correctly interpret anything else she has to say in support of her egoism?"

I never said or suggested that Rand was not an egoist of some sort. I merely said -- what Rand herself admitted -- that her egoism is of a highly unusual variety, and that her conception of "self-interest" is not the same as has been widely understood in the history of ethical theory. (Read the Introduction to VOS, where Rand says much the same thing.)

I notice that Gayle conveniently dodged two questions from my earlier post, so I will quote them in the hope that they will catch her attention this time:

"I would therefore ask Gayle the following questions: (1) If your interpretation of Rand is correct, then why did she insist that her "egoism" was not of the conventional variety? (2) And what did Rand mean in stressing the importance of *justice* in her ethical theory?"

In asserting that Rand is "a narrow, consequentalist egoist," Gayle has partially answered the first question. She is saying that Rand differs not at all from the egoists who preceded her, so Gayle is also saying that Rand was incorrect in attempting to distinguish her ethics in any fundamental way from many earlier egoists. But I would like Gayle say this explicitly, so there can be no doubt in anyone's mind that Rand (according to Gayle) was simply advocating the same garden-variety egoism that we have seen many times before.

But this interpretation, if correct, leaves hanging the second question, namely, "What did Rand mean in stressing the importance of *justice* in her ethical theory?" Rand's stress on the concept of justice is very difficult to reconcile with a "narrow consequentialist egoism." Yet she leaves no doubt that the concept of justice is a *fundamental* element in her *social* ethics, one that distinguished her approach from other

egoistic theories. So why did Rand say this? Was it just something that popped out during an unthinking moment, something that she really didn't mean to say? Is this what Gayle thinks? Or just Gayle prefer to deal with this like she deals with other inconvenient passages, i.e., by ignoring it altogether? That's some method of interpretation.

Ghs

From: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

Reply-To: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

To: "Atlantis" <Atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: Re: Checking Premises

Date: Sat, 3 Feb 2001 23:13:37 -0600

I wrote:

"Moral principles, as Rand emphasizes, are *guides* to actions; they are not categorical imperatives that must be obeyed unconditionally, apart from context."

Gayle wrote:

"Right, but in any given context, principles cannot conflict and if an action is the moral action to take (in a particular context), then it must be taken. Rand held that any action that is not in one's self-interests (i.e., moral) is against one's interests (i.e., immoral.)"

Exactly where does Rand say "that any action that is not in one's self-interests (i.e., moral) is against one's interests (i.e., immoral.)" -- or am I once again out of line in asking for textual corroboration of Gayle's arbitrary assertions? Rand's analysis was far from being this simplistic.

In any case, Bill previously agreed with me (or at least I think he did) that the starving man in an emergency scenario is not faced with one, and only one, legitimate moral alternative. He *may* choose to steal, but he also may choose *not* to steal, and in either case his choice would be morally justified.

Now these two options conflict in the sense that they may lead to incompatible consequences. The man would survive with the first option, but possibly not with the second. But if *either* of these two conflicting results may be morally justified, then each must be based on the application of a moral principle that "conflicts" with the other. It's quite simple, really, for those who are not trapped in a dogmatic and unduly narrow view of "obligation."

Or does Gayle contend that the starving man has the moral *duty* to steal food, that this is morally *mandatory,* and that no other option is even morally *permissible*? If so, then Gayle is even more of Kantian than I previously imagined.

But if this is not Gayle's position, if she agrees that the starving man is faced with legitimate moral options, and that stealing food is not his *sole* moral alternative, then where do these legitimate options come from, if not from different moral principles, not all of which can be applied *simultaneously* to this situation?

In short, if various options with incompatible results can be justified in an emergency situation, then those legitimate options can be justified only by appealing to different (and "conflicting") moral principle which will generate those incompatible results. If, when deciding whether to sacrifice myself or the life of a close friend in a "lifeboat" emergency, an egoistic ethics cannot proclaim that one alternative alone is my moral "duty" (as Bill conceded) -- i.e., if either option can be justified -- then we are indeed dealing with the conflicting *application* of moral principles, since the application of one principle will lead to one justifiable result, while the application of the other principle will lead to another justifiable result. (Note that I said conflicting *applications,* rather than conflicting principles per se.)

I eagerly await Gayle's defense of the view that the starving man has only one moral option, and that he is "immoral" if he chooses *not* to steal -- for this duty-based view of egoism is the only way she will be able to support her otherwise untenable view of moral principles. I eagerly await, in other words, Gayle's version of Kantian egoism.

Gayle wrote:

"George is still missing the argument. While it's true that one can (morally) choose to lie in contextual circumstance #A, it is not the case that in circumstance #A the moral course can be --either to lie or to not lie. And this is what George is saying, in essence. George himself is dropping the very context he is advocating. Bill and I are not saying that one must NEVER lie as a categorical imperative. We are saying that in *each case* the moral action is to either lie or to not lie. It cannot be both and it cannot be either/or. It must be *only one* of the two options. There cannot be conflicting principles."

I have stated before that I agree that there should not be any conflict in one's theoretical ethics. But we are here discussing the *application* of highly abstract principles to complex real-life situations. And since an emergency situation, by definition, is one in which there is a legitimate conflict of interests, it stands to reason that the *application* of moral principles, which were *not* formulated with emergencies in mind, might easily compel us to choose among conflicting values. This, after all, is the purpose of moral deliberation and judgment -- concepts that would be unnecessary if moral choices consisted of nothing more than the mechanical application of imperatives to particular situations, including emergencies.

Ghs

From: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

Reply-To: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

To: "*Atlantis" <atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: Food for thought

Date: Sun, 4 Feb 2001 01:28:17 -0600

It is hardly surprising that the issues now being discussed on Atlantis -- specifically, the relationship between self-interest and rights -- was discussed in some detail by 18th century moral philosophers. For this was the age when "self-interest" -- or "cool self-love," as Joseph (aka Bishop) Butler called it -- was in the ascendancy. Self-interest was often compared to Newton's law of gravitation, for it was the universal principle of human action, the fundamental principle of social "attraction" which could explain the spontaneous harmony of interests (both moral and economic) that resulted from voluntary interaction. The writings of Bishop Butler (his "Sermons" and "Dissertation Upon Virtue") are especially interesting in this respect. Butler is well

known among moral philosophers for three things: (1) his discussion of "conscience" and its role in moral decision making (something that would have a profound impact on Adam Smith and other moralists); (2) his refutation of psychological egoism, according to which all actions are necessarily egoistic, because every action is necessarily motivated by some "interest" or "end" of the acting agent; and (3) his defense of "cool self-love" as fully compatible with benevolence and other actions which are supposedly "other regarding." (Thus his reconciliation of benevolence and self-interest would also apply to rights.)

Butler, like many philosophers of his day, distinguished between two kinds of "self-interest." The first (which we might call irrational or short-sighted self-interest) was often dubbed "selfishness," whereas the other was called self-love, or rational self-interest -- or "cool self-interest," in Butler's memorable phrase.

Butler's analysis is quite subtle and complex, so I cannot possibly do it justice here. But I will quote a brief passage or two, in the hope that this may motivate others to read him in more detail:

"Self-love and any particular passion may be joined together; and from this complication it becomes impossible in numberless instances to determine precisely, how far an action, even of one's own, has for its principle general self-love, or some particular passion....The very idea of an interested pursuit necessarily presupposes particular passions or appetites; since the very idea of interest or happiness consists in this, that an appetite or affection enjoys its object. It is not because we love ourselves that we find delight in such and such objects, but because we have particular affections towards them. Take away these

affections, and you leave self-love absolutely nothing at all to employ itself about; no end or object for it to pursue, excepting only that of avoiding pain.....

"The truth of that observation might be made appear in a more formal manner of proof: for whoever will consider all the possible respects and relations which any particular affection can have to self-love and private interest, will, I think, see demonstrably, that benevolence is not in any respect more at variance with self-love, than any other particular affection whatever, but that it is in every respect, at least, as friendly to it.

"If the observation be true, it follows, that self-love and benevolence, virtue and interest, are not to be opposed, but only to be distinguished from each other; in the same way as virtue and any other particular affection, love of arts, suppose, are to be distinguished. Every thing is what it is, and not another thing. The goodness or badness of actions does not arise from hence, that the epithet, interested or disinterested, may be applied to them, any more than that any other indifferent epithet, suppose inquisitive or jealous, may or may not be applied to them; not from their being attended with present or future pleasure or pain; but from their being what they are; namely, what becomes such creatures as we are, what the state of the case requires,

or the contrary. Or, in other words, we may judge and determine, that an action is morally good or evil, before we so much as consider, whether it be interested or disinterested....Self-love in its due degree is as just and morally good, as any affection whatever."

These passages are from the two-volume anthology *British Moralists* ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge, which has been reprinted in one very thick volume (around 900 pages) by Bobbs Merrill. This invaluable anthology contains very long excerpts from 17th and 18th century works that are exceedingly difficult to find, such as those by Hutcheson, Cudworth, Clarke, Wollaston, Price, and others. I don't think this book is in print, so you should definitely buy any used copy that you are fortunate enough to find. I cannot think of any anthology that is as useful as this one is, since many of the discussions focus on various problems relating to

self-interest (which, as I said, was a dominant theme during this period).

Ghs

From: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

Reply-To: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

To: "*Atlantis" <atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: AR on interests

Date: Sun, 4 Feb 2001 04:50:49 -0600

In Ayn Rand's essay, "The Conflicts of Men's Interests," she discusses four aspects of that "wide abstraction" called "interests." These are Reality, Context, Responsibility, and Effort. And it is highly significant that in at least two of these discussions she explicitly argues that a rational man must take the moral status of *others* as "ends in themselves," into account when determining his *own* interests.

For example, under "Context," Rand writes:

"A rational man does not indulge in wistful longings for ends divorced from means. He does not hold a desire without knowing (or learning) and considering the means by which it is to be achieved. Since he knows that nature does not provide man with the automatic satisfaction of his desires, that a man's goals or values have to be achieved by his own effort, *that the lives and efforts of other men are not his property and are not there to serve his wishes* [my emphasis] -- a rational man never holds a desire or pursues a goal which cannot be achieved directly or *indirectly* by his own effort" (VOS, p. 52).

Under "Responsibility," Rand writes:

"In dropping the responsibility for one's own interests and life, one drops the responsibility of *ever having to consider the interests and lives of others* [my emphasis] -- of those others who are, somehow, to provide the satisfaction of one's desires" (p. 54).

This last statement -- that a responsible person must take "the interests and lives of others" into account when determining his own interests --is a clear a repudiation of the solipsistic egoism that Bill and Gayle have been attributing to Rand. And Rand's earlier statement -- that context demands that a rational person keep in mind "that the lives and efforts of other men are not his property and are not there to serve his wishes" -- is a remarkably clear formulation of her argument that my interests do *not* determine your rights, but rather the reverse, viz: *Your* rights define and delimit the sphere of *my* morally legitimate interests.

These comments, remember, come from Rand's most detailed discussion of how she viewed the notion of "self-interest." Thus, from Rand's perspective, Bill and Gayle have everything 180 degrees in reverse. This was the point of my earlier (and somewhat over the top) Bizarro analogy. No doubt Gayle will once again accuse me of quoting irrelevant, out-of-context passages which are not consistent with her mystical insights into Rand fundamental premises. Be that as it may, I prefer sticking with what Rand actually said (time and again), since I have a inherent distrust of crystal balls.

When it comes to understanding Rand's position, Gayle bids me to read Ari -- whereas I bid her to read Ayn.

Ghs

From: BB

To: atlantis@wetheliving.com

Subject: Re: ATL: what's wrong with 'solipsistic' egoism?

Date: Sun, 4 Feb 2001 09:14:22 EST

Luka wrote:

<<What is wrong, logically, with the claim that the standard of value for any given person is the type of life that he wants for himself? For those of you who disagree with this claim, I'd like to hear a non-duty based reason to reject that standard.>>

A lot is wrong with the idea that the standard of value for any given person is the type of life that he wants for himself. First and foremost, it is utterly subjective. If, for instance, I decide that I value idleness, then it is perfectly legitimate for me to mooch off other people in order to have the money to be idle. If I decide that I value being thought an innovator, then it is perfectly legitimate for me to lie and cheat about my accomplishments and to steal other people's work, in order to achieve this goal. And there go rights, and reason, and objective values.

As Ayn Rand stated, with which I agree -- and for which she gave a lengthy and important validation in Galt's speech -- *life,* not subjective preferences, is the standard of value. If survival is the good, then man's life (according to his nature as a rational being) is the only defensible standard of value. May I suggest, Luka, that you reread this section of Galt's speech. I consider it probably the most important and innovative identification in her philosophy: the proof that values arise from facts; that man's life is rationally his highest value because he requires the acceptance of that value in order to survive.

Barbara

From: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

Reply-To: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

To: "Atlantis" <Atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: Re: Emergencies

Date: Sun, 4 Feb 2001 09:51:09 -0600

Barbara Branden wrote:

"You can't simply pick and choose among rights, Luka. Rights are not separable into different categories according to whatever situation one happens to be in or according to what suits one's convenience of the moment."

And Gayle Dean replied:

"Sure they are!! What happened to the context, Barbara?? Criminals lose some, but not all of their rights. Mentally ill people lose some, but not all of their rights and both can either lose or retain them, depending on the situation. A thief loses his right to freedom (when he robs people) but retains the right to not be physically attacked while in jail. What are you talking about??"

It is highly instructive, is it not, that Gayle defends the theory of (partially) vanishing rights by comparing the ex-rights of a completely innocent person -- whose only "crime" happens to be that someone else needed his property -- to rights which are taken from criminals. We are thus moving, by the inner logic of vanishing rights, closer and closer to a kind of outright altruism of most vicious sort -- wherein Gayle's *needs* can make you the moral equivalent of a criminal by depriving you of the selfsame rights that we take from criminals, even though your only "crime" was to own something which Gayle needed in order to

survive.

This is really getting creepy, like something straight out of the mouths of villains in *Atlas Shrugged.*

On a more technical and less polemical note: We can (ideally) deprive criminals of rights in proportion to the crimes they have committed (hence the notion of proportionality in justice, i.e., the punishment should "fit" the crime). But what crime have I committed, if I am unfortunate enough to be the object of Gayle's "emergency" needs? What crime have I committed against which we can measure which rights I should lose, and which rights I should be permitted to retain, as in the case of a criminal?

The answer, of course, is that I have not committed any crime whatsoever. I have done nothing to *deserve* being stripped of any rights, but have merely found myself, through no fault of my own, in the unfortunate position of being the object of Gayle's emergency *needs.* Thus my rights exist in an inverse ratio to Gayle's needs. If she needs my food, and if I am not at home at the time, then she may graciously concede that I still retain my right to life, since she doesn't *need* to kill me to get the food. But if she does *need* to kill me (e.g., if I am at home but refuse her entry or assistance of any kind), then I lose my right to life as well.

The case of a criminal and the case of a person in need therefore constitute two radically different cases. Rights can be proportionally taken away in the former instance, because the criminal has committed specific acts of injustice which can serve as a measure of sorts. But in the latter case, I have committed no injustice against others, so the only measure of my rights -- i.e., the only criterion as to which rights do and don't vanish -- is Gayle's needs. And if she should need to kill me, then *all* my rights vanish, including my right to life.

Hence the only security that my right to life will not vanish in an emergency scenario is if I am lucky enough not to be home at the time that Gayle barges in demanding food. In other words, my right to life exists only if I am too far away from Gayle for it to do me any good. And at the moment that my right to life does become relevant (i.e., at the moment that I might come into physical contact to Gayle), then my right to life suddenly vanishes, according to Gayle's theory.

All this is a purely a matter of happenstance, not principle, according to the theory of vanishing rights. For all intents and purposes, I have lost all rights, including my right to life, when confronted with Gayle's overriding need to my property. For the moment when I most need my right to life is precisely the moment when my right to life disappears in a puff of moral sophistry.

Ghs

From: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

Reply-To: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

To: "atlantis" <atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: Getting it (was "Emergencies")

Date: Sun, 4 Feb 2001 18:16:47 -0600

I wrote:

"All this is a purely a matter of happenstance, not principle, according to the theory of vanishing rights. For all intents and purposes, I have lost all rights, including my right to life, when confronted with Gayle's overriding need to my property. For the moment when I most need my right to life is precisely the moment when my right to life disappears in a puff of moral sophistry."

And Luka replied:

"Finally! George finally gets it!"

Actually, Luka, I got it all along. I was previously trying to be polite by not identifying the vanishing rights theory for what it really is -- a species of moral cannibalism.

Ghs

From: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

Reply-To: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

To: "*Atlantis" <atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: Re: Checking premises

Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2001 10:57:41 -0600

Gayle Dean wrote:

"It was clear the parties who were being abusive and no one thought it was you. Part of the unfairness is the fact that from the start, I have repeatedly said that the reason I am not arguing in depth is *because* I don't have time to debate it right now-- not that I can't defend my views."

(1) Gayle apparently feels that she has been the victim of intellectual abuse. Yet, if your scan her recent posts, you will find an abundance of comments like the following (which were directed at me).

"That's the kind of inconsistencies one must deal with, when logic (as a tool of reason) is tossed out the window...people can evade and somehow justify (to themselves) becoming intellectually dishonest hypocrites."

"If he can't make a logical argument, then he uses the filibuster, when the filibuster fails, he uses bully-ism and when the bullyism fails, he unilaterally declares himself the king."

"While George may be a good filibusterer --and may have endless nights to stay up writing these kinds of rants -- his logic and interpretations and are in error, as usual."

Thus, according to Gayle, I am an intellectually dishonest hypocrite, a bully (whatever that means), and my posts are nothing more than "rants." Are these remarks not "abusive" by Gayle's standards?

Of course, Gayle will doubtless defend her polemics as justified, but who among us would not say the same thing about ourselves?

I have no problem with polemical exchanges. If one enters a ring of controversy, then one should expect to take some punches. But what does Gayle do? She dishes out insults, but when someone dishes them back she retreats to a neutral corner and yells, "Foul!"

(2) Gayle has repeatedly appealed to a paper by Will Thomas, which she represents as a thorough refutation of my errors. Yet I can fine virtually nothing in Will's paper to disagree with. For example, Will writes:

"Rights by this theory are those freedoms that are natural to people, in that they are native capabilities, which it is advantageous to respect. Rights are justified by human nature, and they are justified by the character of each individual. To the extent that someone is reasonably expected to live within the code of rights, that someone deserves to have his rights respected. Rights are inalienable from the rights-respecting people, but are alienated in some degree by the character of rights-violator. Any violator of the code of rights is a

threat to the interests of other people, and is no longer entitled to the full respect of his rights."

I completely agree that "rights are justified by human nature," that people "deserve" to have their rights respected, that it is "advantageous to respect" these rights, that the rights of innocent people are "inalienable," and that a person who violates the rights of others --and is therefore "a threat to the interests of other people. --

"is no longer entitled to the full respect of his rights." (Will believes that "a regard to the interests of other people" is a relevant egoistic consideration, and I wholeheartedly agree.)

Does Gayle agree that "rights are justified by human nature," rather than by personal calculations of self-interest? If so, then we are in complete agreement, and I cannot imagine why Gayle has objected to any of my arguments thus far. But if Gayle does *not* agree with this position, then why does she keep referring to Will's paper when it clearly defends my position rather than hers?

I also agree with Will's analysis of emergency situations:

"The Objectivist Ethics is a contextual guide to living, not a collection of acontextual duties. Even in this sort of emergency context, the basic trader orientation is still relevant: one should trade value for value, and take responsibility for one's actions. But the implications of being a trader are different in the context. If one's life is truly at risk, as against an act of breaking and entering, it is not hard to see what is the right thing to do. Of course, one must be prepared to be punished for the crime, and to compensate the owner when possible."

"Does this mean that the foregoing argument for rights-respecting behavior can be abandoned at convenience? The argument applies in the normal context. When one is out of the normal context, it is usually obvious, and in that case one has to fall back on a simpler egoism." I agree with Will that the "trader principle" (which is closely related to rights) is relevant "even in this sort of emergency context," and that one should abide by the maxim of "value for value" by providing restitution to the victim. Note that Will refers to "rights respecting behavior." He does *not* say that rights vanish during emergencies; on the contrary, his stress on punishment and restitution indicate precisely the opposite.

So, again, why has Gayle been harping on Will's excellent article, when it clearly supports the selfsame views that I have been defending? So much for that bogeyman.

Ghs

From: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

Reply-To: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

To: "*Atlantis" <atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: Re: Checking Premises

Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2001 13:23:58 -0600

Bill Dwyer wrote:

"It is true that a "categorical imperative" is one that is unconditionally and universally binding, so that its universality is considered a necessary condition of its existence. But to say that a categorical imperative is "defined" as one that admits of no exceptions is problematical, because no principle, moral or otherwise, can admit of exceptions ~qua principle~."

I previously said that Bill's notion of "obligation" is remarkably similar to a categorical imperative, since an "obligation" (in Bill's view) necessarily overrides all other moral considerations. In other words, Bill confuses an "obligation" with a "duty."

This is a complex issue, so I want to digress for a moment and consider what Immanuel Kant had so say about a similar subject in *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.* In his discussion of the hypothetical (if-then) imperatives that we adopt in our pursuit of happiness, Kant wrote:

"[W]e cannot act on determinate principles in order to be happy, but only on empirical counsels, for example, of diet, frugality, politeness, reserve, and so on -- things which experience shows contribute most to well-being on average. From this it follows that imperatives of prudence, speaking strictly, do not command at all..., that they are rather to be taken as recommendations, than as commands, of reason...."

(trans. H.J. Paton, p. 82)

It is a mistake, as Mortimer Adler has suggested, to view the "good life" as a summum bonum (supreme good), if by this we mean a single, unitary good at the pinnacle of a hierarchy. Rather, the good life (or happiness, which is the subjective side of the good life) consists, not in a single good, but in a *totality* of particular goods (which Adler calls the totum bonum -- see his excellent book, *The Time of Our Lives*).

This is also what Kant was getting at (more or less) when he said that the hypothetical imperatives that lead to happiness are often indeterminate. By this he meant that, given the variations in individual humans beings and their circumstances, reason cannot prescribe one, and only one, course of action that will necessarily apply to every human being in every situation. Thus, prudential imperatives (the maxims of self-interested behavior) are more like counsels and recommendations than strict commands.

I agree with this view, and I cannot understand why a fellow egoist like Bill would wish to treat "obligations" as if they were commands than leave no legitimate options available to the acting agent. (Indeed, I am doubtful what it means even to speak of "obligations" to oneself, at least in the conventional sense -- but that is another story. I have elsewhere explained my view of obligations as a type of rational constraint.)

A good deal of this (and other) problems stem from the fact that Bill tends to attach his own (and sometimes peculiar) definitions to terms like "moral obligation." He even seems to think that every "should" is equivalent to a *moral* obligation of some kind. Yet this is not the way that philosophers have generally treated this concept. For example, it may be the case that I *should* drive my car, *if* I want to get to the store as fast as possible. But no philosopher I can think of (including myself) would call this hypothetical imperative a moral obligation.

I want to keep this post fairly short, so I will take up some of Bill technical points about "principles" at a later time. I do want to say, however, that Bill's general approach to ethics strikes me as almost religious in nature. He is what philosophers call a "rigorist" in matters of ethics, and he engages in a kind of moral casuistry that is foreign to my view of ethics. He demands simple, clear-cut answers to everything, even if this involves treating ethics in a highly unrealistic way by endowing an abstract theory of ethics with powers that *no* theory could possibly have.

For example, Bill wrote:

"George says that moral principles are "guides to action" not "inflexible commands", but how can a moral principle guide you, if it doesn't specify one course of action ~rather than~ another? If it doesn't prescribe what you should do under a specific set of circumstances, then it's no guide at all. Yet the fact that a principle applies universally to all of the cases it covers qua principle does not make it a categorical imperative."

This simply makes no sense to me at all -- and I don't say this for any polemical purpose. I previously explained in some detail (in a long excerpt from *The Disciplines of Liberty*) my view that our fundamental moral principles do not always prescribe one specific course of action over others. Rather, they often serve as moral filters, in effect, which delimit our range of legitimate options. (Bill either has not read that excerpt or he doesn't feel it is sufficiently important to address. In any case, it is essential to my entire conception of moral principles and their role in human life.)

Bill -- perhaps inspired by his deterministic perspective – treats principles as if they are a substitute for deliberation and judgment. But they are not. Principles (intellectual capital, in effect) are guides that we use to assess the most desirable course of action in a specific case. But the principles don't make the decision for us. The acting agents makes the decision *based* on his principles. The acting agent, using deliberation and judgment, must take the relevant factors into account and then reach the best decision he can.

Thus, to say that if a moral principle "doesn't prescribe what you should do under a specific set of circumstances, then it's no guide at all" almost leaves me at a loss for words. (Almost, but not quite.) Has

Bill ever played monopoly? If so, does he think the rules of monopoly give him detailed guidance as to every move he should and shouldn't make? Do the rules tell him whether he should purchase Boardwalk when another player already owns Park Place? Is Bill unable to reach any precision as to what move he "should" make, if that move is not spelled out in advance in the rules?

Moral principles, to repeat, are not commands, but counsels and guides. Ethics is not akin to a geometric science where every action can be deduced with logical rigor from axiomatic first principles. If the application of moral principles will sometimes appear to "conflict," this is simply because *we often face various alternatives, all of which are desirable in some fashion, but not all which can be achieved simultaneously.*

Thus if I am the starving man in Rand's scenario, then I would like to follow the principle that tells me to respect the rights of others. But I also wish to survive, and if I cannot do both at the same time, then I must choose one course of action over the other -- i.e., I must give precedence to one *value* over another -- and then take the responsibility for my decision.

In other words, I am here faced with the problem of opportunity costs, because in choosing one course of action I must forego the value of the other course of action. We make these kinds of decisions every day, and not only in emergencies. And any realistic moral theory should be able to take such opportunity costs into account. A moral code is not a set of rules given from on high, but rather principles of conduct that guide us in our pursuit of a good life.

If a principle cannot absolutely decide what I should do in a given case, this is because principles don't "decide" anything in the first place. Human beings, not principles, make decisions -- and if you are looking for principles that will absolve you of this responsibility, then you should look somewhere other than Objectivism.

I am becoming even more convinced that Bills soft determinism – wherein a person somehow "chooses" even though is choice was "determined" by other values, etc. -- has vitiated his general view of ethics, and has left him no appreciation for the role of deliberation and judgment, which involve far more than the rote application of mechanical principles. And I think this determinism, which Ayn Rand repudiated, has caused him to twist the Objectivist ethics into a shape that bears little resemblance to Rand's own conception.

Ghs

From: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

Reply-To: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

To: "*Atlantis" <atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: Re: Three Quick Questions for Bill Dwyer

Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2001 14:25:30 -0600

Bill Dwyer wrote:

"The starving man is not asking the owner to live for him, i.e., to sacrifice for his sake. He is simply doing what he has to in order to survive. Unless the owner is willing to hand him the food voluntarily, he and the owner have a conflict of interest. In that case, each party should pursue his own interest to the exclusion of the other's"

True, the starving is not asking his victim to live for him, because he is not *asking* the owner for anything. In Bill's scheme, he simply takes what he "needs" while denying that the owner possesses any rights whatever to that property.

In fact, the starving man (in Bill's interpretation) is not "simply doing what he has to in order to survive." He may have to steal the food in order to survive, but he doesn't have to *deny* that he is in fact *stealing.* He doesn't have to deny that he is taking another person's property. His survival does *not* require that he rearrange the moral universe for his own convenience, just so he can sleep with a clear conscience. .

Didn't Rand repeatedly say that without property rights, no other rights are possible? Does Bill really believe that one must literally enslave others before one can be said to be treating him as a sacrificial animals?

It is not the taking of another's property that is inexcusable here, but the claim that my *needs* can strip another of his *rights.* To say, "You have no right to something if only I need it," is literally to render other people right-less beings, on a moral par with lumps of clay. And if this is not treating other people as sacrificial animals (at least potentially), then I don't know what could possibly qualify.

Why doesn't Bill simply say what his argument really implies? --viz: "If I need something badly enough, then you can have no right to it whatever. Your rights -- including your right to life -- can be sacrificed to *my* needs."

Often, when reading Bill's explanations, I feel like Alice must have felt during her conversation with Humpty Dumpty. For Bill, as for his egg-shaped soulmate, words mean precisely what *he* wants them to mean,

nothing more and nothing less.

Ghs

From: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

Reply-To: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

To: "*Atlantis" <atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: What saith the Billygayle theory? (Was: Question for Gayle)

Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2001 15:35:26 -0600

Gayle Dean wrote (in response to Ellen Stuttle):

"in order for a right to even exist, it must be in the interests of *both* ....So, if it is NOT in the interests of both parties (say on the sinking lifeboat) then rights do not exist."

Gayle is apparently out of the loop, so the following is addressed to anyone who may agree with her position.

Consider the case of the seven inmates who recently escaped from a Texas prison. (Six were subsequently captured, and one committed suicide.) After these prisoners killed a police officer, there was no doubt in anyone's mind that some or all of them would face the death penalty if caught.

May we assume that a visit to the gas chamber was not in their self-interest? If so, then the interests of these men conflicted with those of virtually anyone they might meet, and who might recognize them and turn them in.

Thus, according to Gayle's argument, it seems that the rights of many people would vanish if they were confronted with the need of these men to survive. The escapees could kill, more or less with impunity, any

innocent person that objectively constituted a threat to their survival. And in so doing -- according to the Billygayle theory -- they would not be violating anyone's rights, for no such rights could exist given this conflict of interests.

Those escapees were in an emergency situation relative to many other people (their very lives were at stake), so the Billygayle theory should conclude that these escapees could kill others without violating their rights, if those people constituted a legitimate threat to their freedom (and therefore to their survival).

I would like to see a response to this, for I would like to see if adherents of the "vanishing rights" school have the courage of their convictions. We shall see.

Ghs

From: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

Reply-To: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

To: "*Atlantis" <atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: Re: Three Quick Questions for Bill Dwyer

Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2001 16:31:17 -0600

Victor Levis wrote:

"Actually, though, Bill does not deny that the owner possesses ANY rights. He has stated that the owner has the right to restitution of a successful taking, as well as the right to resist a taking in progress."

"What Bill denies is that the taker in difficult circumstances has an overriding obligation to refrain from taking the food. Everyone in this debate actually agrees with Bill on his conclusions, but disagrees over terminology and formulation."

This does not comport with my understanding of Bill's position.

(1) Bill does indeed deny that the owner had any rights relative to the starving man's needs. Thus, if he had to kill the owner to get food, the owner would not even possess the right to life. The owner retains only those rights that are not directly relevant to the starving man's needs. (2) Bill does not deny that the owner has a right to defend himself, but this is the kind of unlimited, noncontextual right that we find in the Hobbesian state of nature. The starving man has the "right" to kill the owner if necessary, and the owner has the "right" to kill the starving man if necessary. Hence the right of neither man imposes any kind of obligation on the other.

(3) I am still unclear as to how Bill justifies restitution, but from what I can tell it appears to be a legal right, not a juridical right. Bill recently explained that a legal system must make a decision about which side to defend, and it should (for whatever reason) come down on the side of the owner. But this legal right does not correspond to any rights-claim based on justice, so Bill apparently believes a government should not restrict its activities to the protection of rights, but may "punish" someone even if they have not previously committed an unjust act. (Needless to say, I find this very troublesome.)

(4) It is not the case that Bill denies that the "taker in difficult circumstances has an overriding obligation to refrain from taking the food." (which is my position). Rather, he maintains that the taker has NO such obligation at all.

(5) There is far more involved here than a disagreement over "terminology and formulation." Bill and I do agree that the starving man is justified in stealing food, but we argue from different foundations.

What troubles me is not Bill's emergency argument per se, but it's broader implications for a theory of rights. (See my earlier posts about the prison escapees.)

Ghs

From: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

Reply-To: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

To: "*Atlantis" <atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: Re: Questions for George & Co.

Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2001 21:02:54 -0600

Will Wilkinson wrote:

"I have a few questions for George and others regarding the contextual theory of rights (or the "theory of vanishing rights" in George's relentlessly pejorative lingo).

Actually I can't take credit for this bit of "pejorative lingo." I believe it was Ellen Stuttle who first referred to the theory of "disappearing rights," and then someone (I don't recall who) later substituted "vanishing" for "disappearing."

Will wrote:

"Background: According to Rand, rights are not, strictly speaking, properties of people, but principles ("defining and sanctioning a man's freedom of action in a social context")that apply to people. Rights principles are based in human nature not in the sense that human nature is intrinsically valuable (because nothing is intrinsically valuable) and thus others are obligated to respect that value. Rather the principles are based in human nature in the sense that they relate facts about proper human goals and the nature of the human mind to the realm of social action. That is, rights principles point out the desirable relationship between human nature and the realm of action if people are to jointly satisfy their moral purposes."

This is an excellent summary, and I agree with it entirely.

Will wrote:

"(1) If human nature was different (we could think only in symbiotic thriplets, say) would rights principles be different?"

I don't know about this specific example, but here is one that I have often used in lectures. If humans beings were cannibalistic by nature, if they had to eat the flesh of other freshly-killed human beings in order to survive, then a theory of rights (as we currently understand it) would be nonsense, because it would lead to the extinction of the human race.

Thus rights are indeed closely linked to the "natural harmony of interests" doctrine, but not in the simplistic way that is sometimes portrayed. If our "rightly-understood interests" (to use the classic phrase) do not conflict, this is largely owing to the recognition of rights themselves. In other words, it is not as if we first have a harmony of interests and *then* arrive at rights; rather, rights are the *method* by which interests are synchronized in a social context. The two notions cannot be separated. Rights, by defining and delimiting our legitimate interests in a social setting, are responsible for the fact that interests do not conflict in voluntary interaction. Remove the rights, however, and all bets are off -- for there would no longer be a way to define "interests" in such a way that they don't conflict.

There is far more involved than this, granted, but this should indicate why I disagree with the notion that rights somehow vanish when interests conflict -- for those selfsame rights, by drawing moral boundaries to our legitimate interests, are the means by which we establish social harmony in the first place. This is what I understand Rand to mean when she described rights as the application of "moral law" to social interaction.

In short, there is no way objectively to define "interests" in a social context without referring (at least implicitly) to rights.

I think these remarks also cover Will's question #3.

Ghs

From: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

Reply-To: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

To: <atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: Re: Rights Questions

Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2001 15:41:14 -0600

Jason Alexander wrote:

"Rand flushed the Augean Stables of Philosophy, but George seems dedicated to fouling it up again by dragging in every coropolite that catches his historian's immagination. Never have I encountered such a toddy-headed notion of rights as the Jack and Jill illustration George proudly posted in his summa libertarian exegisis, ATL: The Theoretical Issues (was Rand's emergency ethics), Jan 24."

Okay, Jason, I won't ignore you any more. You got me back into the ring. But before you begin taking wild swings, you should first remove your blindfold so you at least stand an outside chance of hitting something.

Anyone who bothered to read, with any degree of care, my Jack and Jill excerpt will understand that it had *nothing* whatever to do with the moral *justification* of rights. It was a *psychological* analysis of how our fundamental moral principles delimit our range of legitimate options. I was setting the stage for a later discussion in the book, where I discuss the importance of basing freedom on moral rather than on pragmatic values. This is so because, although both kinds of freedom exhibit similar *external* characteristics, they nonetheless differ profoundly in their implications for the individual and society. (This is part of my broader treatment of the crucial relationship between moral values and social institutions.)

I cannot imagine why any Objectivist would have a problem with this analysis, since it fully supports Rand's contention that moral values -- respect for individual rights, moral limitations on government, etc.--are indispensable components of a truly free society.

Jason wrote:

"I pointed out the twisted logic (malevolent universe) of George's freedom by which the good guy (Jill) got rights-denying pragmatics in return, and the bad guy (Jack) got rights affirming morality in return."

Once again, Jason has missed the point entirely. The point is that we should strive for a society composed of Jills rather than Jacks, because only the former can provide a solid foundation for a free society. The latter, on the other hand, will quickly degenerate into statism, owing to its general lack of concern for moral principles, especially rights.

Does Jason think that Rand would have opposed this kind of argument? Does Jason oppose it? Does he deny that moral values are essential to the preservation of a free society?

Admittedly this was only an excerpt, so the later application of my Jack and Jill hypothetical may not have been entirely clear in every detail. But Jason knew that this was merely one section of one chapter, and there is no excuse for his egregious misrepresentation. If a particular conclusion was unclear to him, he could at least have had the courtesy to ask me where I was going with the argument, rather than rushing in like a bull in a china shop, except with less grace.

Jason and I disagree about many things, but I don't think my argument about the role of moral principles in maintaining a free society is one of them. So rather than advising me to "go back to the drawing board," perhaps Jason should teach himself some basic precepts of intellectual courtesy and fair play.

Ghs

From: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

Reply-To: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

To: "*Atlantis" <atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: AR on altruism, needs, and justice

Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2001 00:16:40 -0600

A while back, Debbie Clark quoted the following passage from Ayn Rand's *Textbook on Americanism*:

"It is *not* society, nor any social right, that forbids you to kill -- but the inalienable *individual* right of another man to live. This is not a "compromise" between two rights -- but a line of division that preserves both rights untouched. The division is not derived from an edict of society -- but from your own inalienable individual rights. The definition of this limit is not set arbitrarily by society -- but is implicit in the definition of your own right. Within the sphere of your own rights, your freedom is *absolute*."

The first line of this passage ("It is *not* society, nor any social right, that forbids you to kill -- but the inalienable *individual* right of another man to live) is of course completely incompatible with the interpretation of Rand that has been promoted by Gayle, Bill, others.

Readers may also find the following passages to be of interest. I have previously insisted that Rand's notion of altruism was closely tied to her repudiation of the idea that your rights are contingent on my needs, and some of the following passages support this claim. Beyond this I won't explain the relevance of these passages (which are only samples). Make of them what you will -- but keep in mind that Rand was a superb writer who chose her words (like "rights" and "justice") very carefully.

Ghs

From: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

Reply-To: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

To: "*Atlantis" <atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: Re: Moral Standards As Ideals

Date: Sun, 18 Feb 2001 03:54:44 -0600

Jeff Olson wrote:

"In my opinion, it is this personal kind of consistency, not the abstract acknowledgment that rights must be consistently respected in order to have a peaceful society, which provides the ultimate motivation for respecting the rights of others -- the motivation from which a personal sense of justice and integrity is born. Individuals may (and do) selectively ignore the dictates of rights theory without affecting the validity or the effectiveness of universally consistent rules; it is much more difficult and costly to ignore the standards by which we judge others -- and to pretend that these judgments don't equally apply to ourselves."

I have argued previously that although the rights of others do not depend for their justification on my personal calculations of self-interest, it is nevertheless true that my motives for respecting those rights in specific situations will depend a good deal on self-interested considerations.

I agree with Jeff that these self-interested factors are primarily matters of character and are not based on estimates of social utility, such as the need for reciprocity by others. (By this latter I mean something like, "If I didn't deal voluntarily with others, they wouldn't deal voluntarily with me, in which case no one, including me, could reap the rewards of freedom.") And I think Jeff's valuable insights are fully in accord with Ayn Rand's views, which are more complex and subtle than even some of her admirers may realize.

As just one example of what I mean here, consider this passage from Roark's courtroom speech in *The Fountainhead*:

"The first right on earth is the right of the ego. Man's first duty is to himself. His moral law is never to place his prime goal within the persons of others. His moral obligation is to do what he wishes, provided his wish does not depend *primarily* upon other men. This includes the whole sphere of his creative faculty, his thinking, his work. But it does not include the sphere of the gangster, the altruist and the dictator.

"A man thinks and works alone. A man cannot rob, exploit or rule -- alone. Robbery, exploitation, and ruling presuppose victims. They imply dependence. They are the province of the second-hander.

"Rulers of men are not egoists. They create nothing. They exist entirely through the persons of others. Their goal is in their subject, in the activity of enslaving. They are as dependent as the beggar, the social worker, and the bandit. The form of dependence does not matter."

I won't explore the implications of this fascinating passage, except to note that Rand clearly regards the coercive exploitation of others as a form of dependence, and therefore as incompatible with the virtue of independence -- which is a character trait.

There are many passages like this scattered throughout Rand's writings, both fiction and nonfiction, and they point to a theory of character and motivation that is far different -- and far more sophisticated – than what we find in most theories of ethical egoism.

Ghs

From: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

Reply-To: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

To: "*Atlantis" <atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: Re: Reason as Absolute: Rand vs. Jefferson

Date: Sat, 31 Mar 2001 13:15:38 -0600

Bill Dwyer wrote:

"What is morality? According to Rand, it is a code of values to guide one's choices and actions, the choices and actions that determine the purpose and course of one's life."

And Ming Shan replied:

"But "morality" or "ethics" could just as easily be an inquiry into the ideal human life, such as in of Plato's Republic, Books VI and VII, in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Book X, and Spinoza's Ethics, Parts IV and V. There is no metaphysical necessity to Rand's conception of ethics, and hers is therefore biased in favor of her own conclusions."

There is "no metaphysical necessity" to *any* conception of "ethics" -- or to any intellectual discipline, for that matter -- but this doesn't mean that a philosopher is necessarily "biased in favor of her own conclusions" (or at least in any sense that is undesirable).

There have been various conceptions of ethics throughout the history of philosophy, and there is certainly nothing original or idiosyncratic about Rand's view, which is very much in the Aristotelian tradition. There are also different perspectives from which we can view the same ethical tradition -- e.g., from theoretical or practical viewpoints -- so Ming's references to Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza are highly misleading. There are times when Rand herself speaks of ideal values and virtues. For example, in one discussion of "philosophically objective

value," Rand wrote: "I mean a value estimated from the standpoint of the best possible to man, i.e., by the criterion of the most rational mind, possessing the greatest knowledge, in a given category, in a given period, and in a defined context...." (CUI, p. 24)

I am not suggesting that Ayn Rand did not differ in some ways from the classical conceptions of ethics, but to contrast her approach sharply with that of (say) Spinoza is going too far. For example, Spinoza's definition of the "good" as "that which we certainly know to be useful to us," is quite comp

[Dragonfly]

Another fucking long post that nobody will read.

[George H. Smith]

Another fucking long post that nobody will read.

I suggest that Peter post these long reprints in the Articles section and then let people know they are there. Although I appreciate the spirit in which Peter posted his latest missive, I can understand why others would find it distracting and annoying.

Ghs

[9thdoctor]

But what type of "takedown" would that be? The one that offered absolutely nothing in defense of any of the core issues at all, or the imaginary flying triple tag-team suplex?

I don’t think you need me to explain GHS’s posts to you. If you feel points weren’t answered, restate them, perhaps use bullet points. As it is, the progress of your duel reminds me of this:

<object width="425" height="344"><param name="movie" value="

name="allowFullScreen" value="true"></param><param name="allowscriptaccess" value="always"></param><embed src="

type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" width="425" height="344"></embed></object>

At least you can still bleed on GHS, and try to bite his legs off.

This debate/flame war has progressed too far for me to just jump in, particularly after the huge dump Peter just took on it. It looks like some good nutrient-packed fertilizer, Peter, but Jesus you’ve buried the crops!

[Peter]

Ghs graciously wrote:

I suggest that Peter post these long reprints in the Articles section and then let people know they are there. Although I appreciate the spirit in which Peter posted his latest missive, I can understand why others would find it distracting and annoying.

end quote

Good idea, George. I was trying to save your fingers and your patience.

Ninth Doctor said of my compilation: “It looks like some good nutrient-packed fertilizer,”

It is a lot of excellent posts. It will slow down the replies and hopefully make those replies more informed.

While Dragonfly, gorged on diseased insects, replied:

Another fucking long post that nobody will read.

end quote

If an Altruist thinks he is altruistic in his actions, then the altruist *believes* he is behaving altruistically. Since a human's mind is free to think and come to conclusions about reality, it is absurd for the altruist to try to convince a proponent of selfishness to be altruistic in his *feelings.* The altruist must rely on *acceptance* of the truth of his free-will choice of altruism, in the thinking of the selfish person.

And there is the selfish person’s argument that altruists are really just doing what they want to do for selfish reasons, but they just won’t admit it. The believer in universal selfishness believes the altruist is really *selfish* because he is doing just what he wants to do and that just so happens to be that he helps others.

Conversely, if altruism is a forced action, then we have no way of freely being altruistic. Instead the Selfish person is being coerced, and that is not altruism, which must be freely given.

Thus, the altruist, to advocate his doctrine, must place himself and his theory inside the realm of universally free choices. It is self-contradictory to use force to require altruistic actions because that would negate the altruism. The selfish person would selfishly be helping others simply to protect himself from harm.

An Ode to Dragonfly

Who cut the cheese?

Who cut the cheese?

Please tell me please.

Who cut the cheese?

And who loves kids?

Charlie Waffles!

[Xray]

[Xray]: So why not keep it simple and acknowledge that we are all motivated by self-interest (we would be unable to survive without this being biologically hardwired in us), which does not contradict the other fact that we as group animals are also no stranger to performing acts of serving others, since we depend on each other for cooperation.

There don't just exist a couple of "prime movers", with the rest being regarded as of lesser value. Would Rand have had any paper to write on without the woodcutter's work? What happens if trash workers don't come to pick up the garbage in a city?

Xray,

I generally agree with your assessment, but I'm not sure it's accurate to say that altruism is impossible because we are biologically hardwired for survival. While passing on one's genes is in every organisms self interest and absolutely necessary for the preservation of the gene pool, man, being a rational being, is in a unique position where he able to subordinate his biological drives for other interests. For example humans choose to smoke or do drugs, engage in sports where there is great risk of bodily harm or even death, couples choose not to continue their genetic line by not procreating, etc.

Panoptic, I agree with your points, but find it problematic to attribute e. g. the choice to smoke to man being a "rational" being, since this can provoke the counterargument "How 'rational' is it to smoke"?

Which is why I would phrase it differently: humans have a brain highly developed enough to allow them to make choices which can go against the biological program, for example by deciding not to produce offspring.

Here's another example:I assume that you would agree that the drive for survival is hardwired in organisms to insure the preservation of genes.

Yes. But, as mentioned above, humans can decide against it.

What if a couple decides not to procreate because they feel that their society has become a horrible place and decide that it would be unfair to a child to be brought into such a place. Is that not an act of altruism (in your system) - sacrificing the perpetuation of one's genes for a child?

In order to call it a sacrifice, one would first have to find out if, under ideal circumstances, the couple would have opted for children. For if not, then the subject of producing offspring is simply of no interest to them, and not having children would not be regarded by them as giving away something of value.

But let's assume the couple would have opted for children, given better circumstances (and your post does suggest this possibility). A "sacrifice" is always performed in order to achieve what the sacrificer feels is the higher value, which is why the term altruism is not needed. The couple "sacrifices" (trades) the value X (wanting to have a child) for what is the higher value to them - value Y: sparing a child the experience of having to live in a society they consider as a horrible place.

Instead of using the term altruism which seems to cause more confusion than clarity, imo "empathy" would be far more apt and effective for an ethics discussion, since "empathy" is clearer than the fudgy "altruism" which both dogmatics (who claim one "ought to" serve god, one's country etc., first) and biologists use (I recently read an article about apes showing "altruistic" behavior, but the type of behavior described I would simply have called "cooperative").

For example, someone deciding to become a vegetarian after visiting a slaughterhouse does this because he/she feels empathy for the animals.

To me, a code of ethical values which does not imply empathy is unlivable. And it is empathy which I largely miss in Rand's code of ethical values. That "rational" man she posits as an ideal comes across to me mostly as a pretty unfeeling creature. I'm glad I never met one in reality. Meeting Roark, Galt & Co in fiction only was tough enough.

Edited March 27, 2010 by Xray

[Daniel Barnes]

GHS (I presume) wrote:

>There have been various conceptions of ethics throughout the history of philosophy, and there is certainly nothing original or idiosyncratic about Rand's view, which is very much in the Aristotelian tradition.

My question is then: How come Rand's ethics are presented by Objectivists as being so unique and revolutionary?

Some possibilities:

1) Objectivists don't understand Rand's ethics

2) Objectivists don't know much about the history of philosophy

3) It's false advertising in an attempt to differentiate the Objectivist brand

4) Some combination of the above

5) GHS is wrong.

[George H. Smith]

GHS (I presume) wrote:

>There have been various conceptions of ethics throughout the history of philosophy, and there is certainly nothing original or idiosyncratic about Rand's view, which is very much in the Aristotelian tradition.

My question is then: How come Rand's ethics are presented by Objectivists as being so unique and revolutionary?

Some possibilities:

1) Objectivists don't understand Rand's ethics

2) Objectivists don't know much about the history of philosophy

3) It's false advertising in an attempt to differentiate the Objectivist brand

4) Some combination of the above

5) GHS is wrong.

The best answer is #2, provided we add the qualification "Many Objectivists...."

Option #5 should not have been included at all, because it is beyond the realm of possibility.

Ghs

[Leonid]

Leonid "If you think that life’s value of one single man is lesser than alleged benefits for the all tribe, then you are truly altruist and collectivist."

Daniel "Argument having utterly failed, out come the programmatic Objectivist denunciations. What are you going to call me next? A jabbernowl? A mooncalf?..;-)"

How it failed? Can you prove it? And why denunciation? Observe I said " If you think..." If you don't think so then you shouldn't feel denunciated.

If you do, you have no business to feel insulted. BTW, when last time you called pretty atractive girl "bad"?

[Xray]

There can be little doubt that Rand's experiences in the Soviet Union imbued her with a hatred (I wouldn't call it "fear") of totalitarianism and the altruism on which it was based.

Calling it "hatred" is better, yes.

In terms of calling totalitarianism "altruistic", one runs into a problem imo. According to that premise, Lenin, Stalin, Hitler and virtually every dictator would qualify as "altruists" since they all demand to put the need of the state first.

One person judging what is in the best interests of another person doesn't involve any serious problem, though such judgments needn't be moral judgments.

I can imagine some pretty serious situations in case the judger can interfere with the judged person's life. While for example it does not affect Britney Spears's ex Kevin Federline if John Doe judges him to be a gold digger, it can affect John Doe's daughter if her father calls the man she wants to marry a gold digger and tells her he is going to cut her out of his will.

More later today or tomorrow.

If you should find the time to address my # 316 post to you on the 'Moral Certainty' thread, TIA. http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=8291&st=300