Settling the debate on Altruism

tjohnson · March 26, 2010

Well, for the record, your own contradistinct foundational ideas are? And how are they possibly not philosophy?
--Brant

Mine are;

1. The word is not the thing it represents

2. There is no such thing as an object in perfect isolation

dan2100 · March 26, 2010

Just to back up a little: which of her "foundational ideas" do you disagree with here?
For starters, the "Law of Identity" and "Existence Exists".

You believe these are incorrect? Or do you believe that she misapplies them?

Brant Gaede · March 26, 2010

Well, for the record, your own contradistinct foundational ideas are? And how are they possibly not philosophy?
--Brant
Mine are;
1. The word is not the thing it represents
2. There is no such thing as an object in perfect isolation

1. So, man is not a man. What's the importance of that?

2. And therefore?

--Brant

Peter · March 26, 2010

George H. Smith wrote:

. . . To condemn a political system is to employ moral principles, so a moral system will tend to emerge naturally from an interest in politics, and in the process moral principles that were previously implicit will become explicit . . . It will take some self-control for me to bite my tongue on this one . . . (My tongue started to hurt, so I stopped biting it.)

End quote

When George is good, he is oh, so good, but when he is bad he was horrid . . . well, not horrid. He still does an excellent job, even of defending the indefensible.

I can’t hear you, George, so go ahead and bite your tongue again, if it keeps your tea kettle from boiling. Just don’t bite your typing fingers.

Excellent posting George.

Thanks for your support for the only comprehensively, rational philosophy in the universe.

Deconstruction of language is fun, more fun than diagramming sentences 8-)

For those of you who have been speculating, how did she come up with that, here is something from near the beginning of the road.

Semper cogitans fidele,

Peter Taylor

THE RAND TRANSCRIPT

By Chris Matthew Sciabarra

For many years, scholars have sought to understand Ayn Rand’s early education in an attempt to identify possible influences on her intellectual development. Regrettably, very little information has been available on one important phase of that education: her studies at the University of Leningrad in the years 1921-1924.

Having recovered Rand’s college transcript, I am now in a position to shed greater light on this subject.1 I have investigated the nature and significance of the courses that it lists, and the orientation of the professors who probably taught those courses. This essay provides a brief discussion of the transcript’s contents and concludes with some reflections on one important pattern that I see in Rand's studies . . .

Nevertheless, a more detailed examination of the university archives might reveal additional information both about the courses offered and the professors who taught them. That investigation awaits the attention of future scholars. At this stage of our inquiry, we can identify the following twenty-six courses, listed chronologically, and taken by Rand between the Fall of 1921 and the Spring of 1924:4

1. General Theory of the State and the State Structure in the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic) and the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) 5

This course was a fairly straightforward rendering of the Bolshevik politics of the Soviet Union, presented in proletarian class-conscious, Marxist-Leninist terms. Konecny (1994) informs us that during this period "obligatory courses on topics such as political economy, the history of the Russian Communist Party, and the Soviet Constitution" were introduced into the university (111). These party courses did not become compulsory until 1925. While there were few bona fide communist professors in 1921, the courses were still highly recommended for all students (117).

2. History of the Development of Social Forms

This examined the development of human social relations from the perspective of both Marxist and non-Marxist political thinkers. It included a study of social formations--and their effects on the lives of individuals--as they emerged over time. Heavily infused with notions of historical materialism and evolutionary development, the course was probably taught by the Marxist, K. M. Takhtarev.

3. Psychology

Courses in psychology were actually courses in philosophical psychology, offered by the Department of Philosophy.6 Such coursework focused on the philosophy of mind, and on the nature of introspection, self-observation, and volition.7 The most likely teacher of this course was the celebrated neo-Kantian, Ivan Ivanovich Lapshin.8 Like Lossky, Lapshin stressed the importance of mutual immanence in his rejection of solipsism and its "‘false metaphysical dualism between things in themselves and the knowing subject'" (quoted in Zenkovsky 1953, v.2, 689). Lapshin had taught this course several times between 1897-98 and 1917-18.9 But as a critic of dialectical materialism, he was eventually exiled in 1922, along with many other intellectuals, including Lossky.

4. Logic

This Department of Philosophy course featured all the traditional discussions of the Aristotelian syllogism, deduction, and inductive inference, as well as an examination of typical logical fallacies. From 1889, it was usually taught by the chair of the department, Aleksandr Ivanovich Vvedensky, also a Russian Idealist philosopher and psychologist, and one of the most important representatives of the neo-Kantian movement in Russia. Vvedensky had served as the president of the St. Petersburg Philosophical Society in 1899. He taught the reality and efficacy of free will, and argued that "the function of logic is to verify what is known and not to reveal the unknown" (GSE 1974, v.4, 647). Despite his deep disagreements with the Marxists, he remained an active participant in the debates over materialism in the early 1920’s, until his death in 1925. He had been a mentor to Lapshin, Askoldov, and Lossky, and was an exceptionally gifted lecturer who attracted thousands of students during his tenure at the university.10

After 1923, the Marxist, Borichevsky, taught the course in logic--but his expertise was limited to Spinoza, Epicurus and materialism. Given that Rand took this course early in her academic career, probably in the fall of 1921, it seems certain that she studied with Vvedensky.11 It is of some interest that this was not the only course on logic that Rand ever took. After graduating Leningrad University, she entered a two-year program at the State Institute for Cinematography, in Leningrad, as a means of honing her writing craft for the screen. Screenwriting was not offered in the first--and only--year of the program in which Rand enrolled. But she did take courses in art history, stage fencing, biodynamics, film make-up, social studies, dance, cinematography and logic (Rand 1999, 10).

5. French Language

Rand had been exposed to the French language from a very young age, as her mother had insisted, since this would enable her to read many of the classics of modern literature in their original language, including the works of her beloved Victor Hugo. To take this elective was hardly a surprising choice for the young Rand, who probably sought college credit for a language in which she was already fairly proficient.

6. Historical Materialism

A formal study of historical materialism was recommended for undergraduates. It was this course that probably led the mature Rand to reject "dialectics"--since the Soviets virtually identified the two concepts. For the Soviet Marxists of the period, dialectics was historical materialism, a study of the primacy of the economic forces in history and their predominating effects on other aspects of the social totality. The course would have examined the so-called "inexorable laws of historical development," with an emphasis on the resolution of internal contradictions that would propel the world toward the triumph of communism.

7. History of World-Views (Ancient Period)

In her interviews with Barbara Branden (1986), Rand claimed that she had taken "an elective course on the history of ancient philosophy" with the distinguished N. O. Lossky, wherein she studied the pre-Socratics, Plato, and Aristotle (42). In Russian Radical, I argued that the relationship between Rand and Lossky was "of paramount historical importance because it was probably Lossky who introduced Rand to dialectical methods of analysis" (41). But the book raised some doubts about Rand's claims. Because of these doubts, some critics dismissed my attempts to link Rand and Lossky, even though this dismissal damned the integrity of Rand's recollections.

When it first came to my awareness that the Estate of Ayn Rand had secured a copy of the transcript, it was the possibility of a full resolution of the Lossky puzzle that most interested me. In my failed negotiations to secure a copy of the transcript from the Estate, the ARI officials claimed that they could not identify any listed courses on the history of ancient philosophy. I had hypothesized originally that such a course might be untraceable, since it may have been offered as an elective through the university's annex, to which Lossky had been relegated in the 1921-22 academic year. But I was convinced that the ARI’s officials simply did not know what to look for in the transcript. When I finally received an official transcript copy from the Central State Archives, my suspicions were vindicated. The presence of this course--on the "History of World-Views" or Weltanschauungen in the "Ancient Period"--constitutes further evidence in support of Rand's memories of this period. Moreover, growing evidence since the publication of Russian Radical has lent greater credence to my case for a Lossky-Rand relationship. For instance, I had examined, in that book, Rand's discussion of the 1917-18 academic year, in which she befriended a classmate, Olga Vladimirovna, sister of the author, Vladimir Nabokov. I discovered that the Nabokov sisters, both Olga and Helene, had attended the Stoiunin Gymnasium during the period in question. The gymnasium was founded in 1881 by Maria Nikolaievna Stoiunina and Vladimir Stoiunin, the parents of Lossky's wife. Lossky actually taught classes in logic and psychology at the school from 1898 to 1922. It is now virtually certain that the young Rand learned of him while she studied at this famous school for young women . . .

8. Biology

Prior to 1922, biology was taught by Sergei Nikolaevich Vinogradsky, who became an honorary member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Vinogradsky left the Soviet Union in 1922, and went to France to direct the division of agricultural microbiology of the Pasteur Institute (GSE, v.5, 1974, 482). In the Spring of 1922, when Rand took biology, Lev Semenovich Berg was its most likely teacher. Berg was one of the organizers, in 1918, of the Geography Institute (GSE, v.3, 1973, 186). He worked in the area of Russian geography and biology. As the author of Theories of Evolution, he embraced an idealist and teleological approach, which emphasized the evolution of biological and social forms.

9. History of Greece

In Russian Radical, I suggested that Rand had enrolled in several literature courses. The transcript shows, however, that Rand did not register for such classes. But literary works were integrated into her history and philosophy studies. This was not unusual, considering the Russian penchant for synthesizing the literary arts with social critique. The State Academic Council had attempted to reduce "parallel" courses in the different departments so as to highlight the "organic" connections among disciplines. In a course on the "History of Greece," Rand studied such classic Marxist texts as A. I. Tiumenev's three-volume, Essays on the Socioeconomic History of Ancient Greece and his Did Capitalism Exist in Ancient Greece? (both of which I highlight in Russian Radical). The Tiumenev works were typical in their stress upon history as a developing unity of complementary "moments": culture, politics, aesthetics, literature, art, economics, sociology, and philosophy. Such dialectical integrations were taught even by non-Marxist scholars, like Faddei Frantsevich Zelinsky, whose classes on ancient Greece stressed the works of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Greek mythology. Zelinsky focused too on the recovery of antiquity in the works of Friedrich Nietzsche.23 Other teachers, such as the archaeologist Boris Vladimirovich Farmakovsky, stressed the Hellenistic period of Greek sculpture (GSE, v.27, 1981, 104).

10. History of Rome

Previously, Michail T. Rostovtsev had taught the history of Rome. He was praised by Anatoly V. Lunacharsky, the head of the Commissariat of Enlightenment, for his archeological expertise. Around the time of Rand's tenure, however, it was O. F. Val’dgauer, a 1903 graduate of the university and an historian of ancient art, who probably taught this course. Val’dgauer studied at the University of Munich (1900-03) with the classical archaeologist A. Furtwängler.24 He was an expert in ancient artifacts and documents who "was among the first to introduce scientific methods of organizing museum exhibitions" (GSE, v.4, 1974, 478). Val’dgauer linked his studies of the ancients to crucial issues current in Soviet art studies of the period, including the problems of realism and the portrait. This course used such Marxist texts as V. S. Sergeev’s History of Rome (discussed in Russian Radical).

11. Russian History

It seems odd that in her studies of history, Rand did not focus extensively on the experiences of her native land. Yet, this course was essential for any history major. Taught until 1925 by Sergei Fyodorovich Platonov, a specialist in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Russian history, it used such texts as S. I. Kovalev's General History Course. A representative of the conservative-monarchist tendency in Russian historiography, Platonov was a renowned professor at St. Petersburg from 1899. He eventually became director of the Pushkin House, the Institute of Russian Literature in the Academy of Sciences, from 1925 to 1929. Platonov may have been the target of Marxist critics who doubted his ability to understand "class contradictions," but his work was highly respected. He surveyed the Time of Troubles and focused on social conflict in Russian society. As with Rand's study of ancient history, this course probably included some literary readings. Here, the emphasis would have been on the Golden Age of Russian literature, in which such writers as Tolstoy, Chekhov, and Dostoyevsky represented the "dialectical" conflict of ideas through the characters of their stories.

12. Medieval History

This was the first of five courses that Rand attended on European medieval history. It is no coincidence that Rand studied the Middle Ages so intensely. The Petrograd history department was an internationally acclaimed center of medieval scholarship.25 "Medieval History" was probably the last course that Professor Lev Platonovich Karsavin taught prior to his exile at the end of 1922. A student of Ivan Mikhailovich Grevs, and brother of the Russian ballerina, Tamara Platonovna Karsavina, he earned his degree at St. Petersburg. He began teaching in 1912 at the St. Petersburg Institute of History and Philology, and was appointed professor of history at the University of St. Petersburg in 1916. He held the chair of the history department until his departure. Karsavin was a close intellectual associate of Lossky. Influenced by Solovyov, he sought to create a unified religious world-view. As the Great Soviet Encyclopedia puts it, Karsavin interpreted Solovyov’s concept of "total-unity" as a dynamic principle of development, of "growth of being," and consequently as a fundamental category of the historical process: any existing thing does not so much "exist" as "become" and thus appears as one of the manifestations of total-unity. Interpreted in this manner, historicism becomes a universal principle in Karsavin's metaphysical system, rendering it in certain respects similar to Hegel's dialectical process. (GSE, v.11, 1976, 463)

As a specialist in the history of medieval religions and spiritual life, Karsavin stressed, in all his works and lectures, the interlocking coincidence of opposites in historical development. For Karsavin, as Zenkovsky (1953) puts it, "everything is connected in one whole" (v.2, 851). Historical science is a structured totality, an organic unity, in which different levels of generality--the person, the family, the nation--relate internally, with each constituting and expressing the other. Studying with Karsavin, Rand may have rejected his spiritualist monism--much as she had rejected the materialist monism of the Marxists. But she would have learned, yet again, the dialectical form of social and philosophical analysis. As a nonreductionist orientation, dialectics cautions against the reification of culture, politics, economics, ethics, ideology or language as wholes unto themselves. Each aspect is mutually implied in every other aspect, Karsavin declared, and all the aspects taken together are dynamically and systemically related in the constituted whole.

In "Medieval History," Rand would have also studied important historical works, including such pre-Marxist classics as P. Vinogradov's Book of Readings on the History of the Middle Ages and D. N. Egorov's The Middle Ages through Their Monuments.

13. History of Socialism

Among the standard Marxist social science courses that were recommended for study was this survey of the history of socialism (David-Fox 1997, 61). Part intellectual history, part social history, the course covered the gamut from ancient Platonic expressions of collectivism through the utopians, Marxists, and revisionists. Among the teachers of this course was Aleksandr Evgen’evich Presniakov, a 1907 graduate of the university who, despite his socialist politics, did not agree entirely with Marxist ideology. Presniakov began as a privatdocent at St. Petersburg, and was appointed professor in 1918. A member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR from 1920, Presniakov taught also at the Institute of Red Professors. The Bolsheviks had "attempted to convert the existing higher education structure into a network of academic institutions training specialists for the demands of a socialist society" (Konecny 1994, 1). The Institute was a graduate-level Bolshevik training center for higher learning that sought to boost Marxist university scholarship in the social science programs, achieving a veritable "Revolution of the mind" (David-Fox 1997, 133, 23).

There was a marked change in the content of Presniakov’s scholarship over time. His prerevolutionary works expressed a "positivist" sociology that centered on such topics as the history of political relations and state formation in pre-sixteenth-century Russia, the sources of sixteenth-century Russian chronicles, and the history of nineteenth-century social thought (GSE v.20, 1977, 524). But after the 1917 revolution, Presniakov moved toward mastering Marxist dialectical methods, as reflected both in his writings and lectures. He focused primarily on socioeconomic questions and the history of revolutionary movements--the important and inseparable link between theory and practice, an omnipresent theme throughout Russian intellectual history.

14. Special Course: Social Movements in 14th Century France

This was the first of several "special courses" that Rand attended. A special course, in which a half-dozen students participated, was similar in style to a seminar. Seminars, however, were usually open only to senior undergraduates majoring in history. During this period, more and more seminar-like courses, stressing "activity methods of teaching," were introduced into the university's social science curriculum. "Social Movements in 14th Century France" was probably taught by the famous liberal historian, Nikolai Ivanovich Kareev, who, as an Idealist, was somewhat critical of Marxism. Like Lossky, Kareev stressed the "personalist" credo that "‘the individual is the supreme principle in the philosophy of history’" (quoted in Zenkovsky, v.1, 375). Stressing the role of ideas, he was, like the mature Rand, extremely critical of the monistic approach of Marxists who advocated "economic materialism" as the sole causal agent in social evolution. Moreover, he was adamantly opposed to censorship. In 1899, he had actually been expelled, along with the historian Grevs, by the Ministry of Education, following his demonstration against Tsarist police intervention at the university (Konecny 1994, 31). Kareev was an outstanding Russian sociologist and an expert in historiography. With Grevs, he lamented the post-revolutionary impediments to genuine democratization in higher education, and worked tirelessly to augment one-on-one personalized study between students and professors.26

Kareev counted among his influences Nicholas G. Chernyshevsky (who had made a huge impact on Lenin), N. A. Dobroliubov, D. I. Pisarev, and the Populists, P. L. Lavrov and N. K. Mikhailovsky. But he was also affected by Marx's Capital--making him a rather eclectic intellectual. Though Kareev's work on the French peasantry exhibited certain "positivist" assumptions, Marx himself praised it as "first-rate." Kareev's The Peasants and the Peasant Question in the Last Quarter of the 18th Century (1879) was among his many published books. Others included: Studies in the History of the French Peasants From Earliest Times to 1789 (1881); a 3-volume dissertation, Basic Questions of the Philosophy of History (1883-90); a seven-volume History of Western Europe in Modern Times (1892-1917); and a three-volume study of Historians of the French Revolution, praised by the Soviets as "the first composite survey--not only in Russian but anywhere in the historical literature--of the historiography of the Great French Revolution" (GSE, v.11, 1976, 441).

In a course such as this, Kareev would have stressed the interlocking political, economic, military, and religious dynamics of the period, during which France warred with England, and was internally divided by peasant restlessness and the spread of the "money economy." Kareev brought to his students the high quality of his scholarship.

15. Special Course: History of the Crusades

In this special course, Rand probably studied with the renowned historian, Ol'ga Antonovna Dobiash-Rozhdestvenskaia. "Dr. Dobiash," as she was known, was widely acknowledged for her work in medieval history and paleography. Of greater significance, perhaps, was her status as "the first woman in Russia to receive a master's degree (1915) and doctorate (1918) in general history." Her work, in scholarly descriptions and the printed catalogs of early Latin manuscripts, was central to her position, from 1922 to 1939, in the manuscript section of the Saltykov-Shchedrin State Public Library (GSE, v.8, 1975, 329). Dr. Dobiash was originally a teacher at the Bestuzhevskii Women's Courses, a higher or post-secondary school for women that by the turn of the century was granted university accreditation for most of its offered classes.27 But as a Leningrad University professor, a member of the Academy of Sciences, and a model for women educators, Dr. Dobiash was first and foremost a cultural historian. Her lectures on the crusades focused on the importance of culture and its interconnections with religion, politics, and economics. Almedingen (1941) describes her as "thorough." In fact, Dr. Dobiash was known for grilling her students, especially those in "formal seminar studies" (209).

16. Modern History

This was the first in a series of courses that Rand took on "modern history." It was probably taught by Evgenii V. Tarle, whose work in Marxist historiography was fast becoming even more important than the work of Kareev. A frequent lecturer at the Petrograd House of Scholars, he was decidedly "non-Marxist," however (Konecny 1994, 140). Tarle was a student of I. V. Luchitsky. He wrote many works, including those on Royer-Collard, G. Canning, C. Parnell, L. Gambetta, Lord Rosebery, an analysis of More's Utopia (his master's thesis), and a two-volume doctoral dissertation on The Working Class in France During the Revolutionary Epoch. In fact, he qualified as "the first historian of the Russian school to focus on the history of the working class" (GSE, v.25, 1978, 385). Tarle's prolific writing drew from his archival work in Paris, London, and the Hague. After defending his doctoral thesis in 1911, he went on to write such books as The Continental Blockade (1913) and The Economic Life of the Kingdom of Italy During the Reign of Napoleon I (1916). His later work centered on European imperialism, Napoleon, Talleyrand, the history of diplomacy, the French bourgeoisie, and the Crimean war. These works contributed to his receipt, in the 1940’s, of three State Prizes. He also authored textbooks on higher education.

In terms of his historiography, Tarle moved closer to the Marxists as he interpreted modern history from "a historical viewpoint" (GSE, v.25, 1978, 386). This process-oriented approach was reflected both in his books and lectures.28

17. Modern History of the West

It seems likely that Rand studied with Kareev, who probably taught course #14 as well. Indeed, Kareev's work in Western history was unparalleled. The class probably used Kareev's own seven-volume work on The History of Western Europe in Modern Times, which, despite its "eclecticism," was praised by the Soviets, who cited "its wealth of factual material" in which "socioeconomic processes are accorded an important place" (GSE, v. 11, 1976, 441). He presented a general review of historical conflict from a Marxist perspective, as well as topical studies on the Reformation, the development of culture, and the English Revolution.

18. History of Modern Russia

N. Rozhkov taught "History of Modern Russia" in 1923. It was a survey course that included an examination of everything from the Great Reforms to the February and October Revolutions to the New Economic Policy. It was most likely skewed toward Marxist explanations in terms of economic forces, drawing from such works as M. N. Pokrovsky's Russian History in Briefest (1923).

19. History of Pedagogical Doctrines

In his tenure as head of Narkompros, Lunacharsky had stressed progressive pedagogy, influenced heavily by the teachings of John Dewey. "Activity methods of learning," with increased pupil participation and student-teacher meetings, was the educational credo of the day. Dewey’s works on educational theory and practice were published in the Soviet Union. In fact, from 1918 to 1923, five of Dewey's books were translated.29 As I argue in Russian Radical, it is entirely possible that Rand studied progressive pedagogy closely; this early exposure to Dewey's educational theories may have left an impression, since she remained deeply critical of the progressive approach.30

"History of Pedagogical Doctrines" was probably taught by V. A. Zelenko.31 In addition to stressing progressive pedagogy, Zelenko incorporated crucial dialectical insights into his lectures, noting especially the links between education and socio-economic principles, and the integration of socialist culture, science, and art.

20. Methodology of the Social Sciences

Whether this course was actually taught by Tarle or Kareev or even Takhtarev, it centered on one essential theme: dialectical method as applied to the social sciences.32 Most certainly, this dialectical application was heavily infused with Marxist concepts steeped in historical materialism. It was this kind of "dialectic materialism" that Rand rejected unequivocally.33 But the dialectical form of its presentation was crucial. It required that one view society as a developing system, that is, not as a random conglomeration of unrelated organizations and institutions, but as an integrated, evolving totality of related structures and processes. It stressed "reciprocity between things and the reciprocity of aspects and moments within a thing" (GSE, v.8, 1975, 190). It celebrated Lenin's "methodological conclusion," "one of the basic principles of the dialectic," that "in order to genuinely know an object, one must seize it and study it from all sides, with all its interconnections and [mediations]" (GSE, v.8, 1975, 186).34

21. The Politics and Organization of Popular Education in the USSR

This course, which discussed the branches of Soviet education, was probably taught by Zelenko, who was the likely teacher of course #19. Given that Rand was enrolled in the Department of Social Pedagogy, both courses were probably part of the curriculum, which sought to increase the number of educators in the Soviet Union.

22. Special Course: History of Medieval Trade

This "special course" was most likely taught by Grevs, who was a specialist in medieval European history. He focused on the fathers of the Latin Church and on the medieval humanists, Dante and Petrarch, but was also well-known for his work on the development of socio-economic forms. Like N. D. Fustel de Coulanges, Grevs saw continuity between the social structure of the late Roman period and the early Middle Ages. He authored such works as Essays From the History of Roman Landownership and Essays on Florentine Culture (GSE, v.7, 1975, 418). Of greatest significance, perhaps, was Grevs's prominent advocacy of higher education for women. He was a pioneer of the seminar system and of university field trips, and it is likely that Rand would have benefited from his intense interest in promoting the intellectual success of his women students. Among the texts that would have been used by Grevs was D. M. Petrushevsky's Essays on the Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe, despite its decidedly non-Marxist tenor.

23. Political Economy

Part of the standard Marxist social science curriculum (David-Fox 1997, 61), this course may have been taught by the Marxist, N. A. Trebesnul, who also taught on the "Sociology of Labor." It entailed a study of contemporary Marxist concepts of economic analysis, including the labor theory of value, the exploitation theory, the critique of capitalism--and the communist alternative as exemplified by the new Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

24. Seminar in Modern History (16th Century England)

In what was probably Rand's final semester at the university, she registered for senior-level seminars in history, the first of which was probably taught by Sergei Rozhdestvensky, who specialized in sixteenth-century landholding and lectured at the university throughout the 1920’s. He used important Marxist texts by N. M. Pakul and I. I. Semenov on the Dutch and English revolutions, which stressed the interconnections of economics, politics, culture, and ideology. He may have also surveyed some of the period’s great literary works of poetry and drama.

25. Seminar in Modern History (17th Century France)

This seminar was probably taught by Tarle, who was the most likely teacher of course #16.

26. Seminar in the History of the Middle Ages (the Medieval Estate)

This seminar was probably taught by Grevs, who was the most likely teacher of course #22. Grevs used such texts as D. M. Petrushevsky's Essays on Medieval Society and State.

Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical proposed a daring idea--that Rand had absorbed a dialectical orientation from her teachers. Because there was not much archival information available at the time that I authored my book, I was compelled to "combine significant factual evidence with a certain degree of reasonable speculation" (Sciabarra 1995, 67). The recovered transcript provides more persuasive evidence of Rand’s exposure to some of the finest dialectically-oriented Russian scholars of the Silver Age. Many of these scholars I had previously identified and discussed in Russian Radical as among Rand’s most probable teachers. We now have a clearer picture of the high caliber of Rand’s education; indeed, the quality of her undergraduate coursework was on a par with current doctoral programs in the social sciences--minus the dissertation requirement.

Most importantly, the transcript strengthens the central historical argument of Russian Radical, a thesis quite apart from the question of whether Rand studied with Lossky, or with any other particular scholar. Ultimately, it is the content and method of her education that matters. Indeed, "[w]hether she was reading her Marxist texts or attending the lectures of her non-Marxist professors, Alissa Rosenbaum was fully exposed to the dialectical methods distinctive to Russian thought and scholarship" (81-82). We now have more credible evidence than ever in support of this contention.

Given the character of the subject-matter and of the teachers with whom she probably studied, it is clear that the dialectical motif was present quite explicitly in nearly three-quarters of the courses in which Rand enrolled. In those courses where that motif was distorted by Marxist propaganda, the young Rand still may have gleaned important lessons. For instance, in studying "Historical Materialism" (#6) or "Political Economy" (#23), Rand may have comprehended a key dialectical principle in terms quite different from its materialist monist exposition: that there are reciprocal interactions among the different aspects of society--economics, politics, aesthetics, culture, and psychology--and that these interactions are at the foundation of social change. And while Rand may have rejected the notion of "socialist" culture, science, and art, as put forth in such courses as "History of Pedagogical Doctrines" (#19), she may have learned to appreciate organic connections among seemingly disparate factors, branches of knowledge, and social practices. Even in "Biology" (#8), Rand would not have escaped the process-orientation of dialectical method, since this theme was present in the work of its most likely teacher, L. S. Berg.35

In her full-bodied study of ancient, medieval, and modern history--in courses on Greece (#9), Rome (#10), France (#14, #25), the West (#17), Russia (#18), England (#24), among others--Rand would have been taught to view each society as a structured, dynamic totality of many interrelated aspects. The university historians of the period taught their students to grasp the whole from the vantage point of any part--be it literature, architecture, or social structures--and to synthesize these diverse perspectives into a coherent totality. Through the use of such techniques, Rand's professors provided her with an interdisciplinary, multitextured approach to history that highlighted the integration of theory and practice.

While we will never be completely sure just what Rand learned from her studies, we are now in a better position to understand, at the very least, what Rand studied. On the basis of the transcript, I reaffirm my deeply-held conviction that Rand was educated in the methods of dialectical inquiry, and that this sensibility informed her entire literary and philosophical corpus.

dan2100 · March 26, 2010

Well, for the record, your own contradistinct foundational ideas are? And how are they possibly not philosophy?
--Brant
Mine are;
1. The word is not the thing it represents
2. There is no such thing as an object in perfect isolation

How do these contradict or replace the Law of Identity or Existence Exists?

Furthermore, did Rand maintain, anywhere, that the word is the thing? Who are the other thinkers of note you believe maintain the word is the thing?

And who maintains that there are things existing in perfect isolation? (I wouldn't rule out the possibility, but something existing in perfect isolation would never enter into relations to be known as long as continued to be perfectly isolated. I'm unsure why this becomes a basis for much of anything. It seems to me like a non-issue.)

bmacwilliam · March 26, 2010

From Dan: "Just to back up a little: which of her "foundational ideas" do you disagree with here?"

Any argument based on "Man's survival qua man" is utterly meaningless if it is just "pronounced" and not justified. I could construct any ethical system I can dream of (and I'm not a Philosopher!) if I get to choose what "qua man" is.

Her concept of Tabula rasa is also really dumb, but it's a useful tool to ultimately justify some of her nastier "evil" condemnations and accusations because every man has actively and entirely chosen his character right? Of course, we know this is false.

That's just a start.

From George:

"I agree. In other words, your speculations are irrelevant, and no legitimate inferences about Rand's philosophy follow from them."

I am not infering anything from my speculations other than perhaps offering a possible explanation of "why" she came to such silly conclusions (well, premises in this case). The nonsense of her premises condemn the philosophy, I don't need speculation for that.

"They are not distinct, airtight compartments. To condemn a political system is to employ moral principles, so a moral system will tend to emerge naturally from an interest in politics, and in the process moral principles that were previously implicit will become explicit."

Well, I'd say that's backwards and an interest in politics "will tend to emerge naturally" from a moral system (implicit or explicit) - but they are connected and on that I'm sure we'd agree. However, the bottom line here is the question of whether "truth" she really cared about, or was it "the destruction of that which she hated"? In one way it doesn't matter, her arguments can be evaluated as they stand. In another way though it does matter, she either made simple errors OR she deliberately ignored the truth in support of her true goal. And in a circular way, says a great deal about her own personal morality.

"I have spent some 45 years years in a serious and sustained study of philosophy, and I have a high regard for Rand's philosophic abilities, however much I may disagree with her in some respects. The same is true of John Hospers (former head of the USC philosophy department and author of many highly-regarded articles and books on philosophy), Chris Sciabarra (author of several first-rate books on philosophy), and many other serious philosophers, such as Doug Den Uyl and Doug Rasmussen. So are we all dupes and/or fools who, lacking your keen insight, have been taken in by Rand's tricks? "

Well, what does it mean if a troglodyte like me sees obvious glaring foundation errors? Wow - "45 years years in a serious and sustained study of philosophy". Sorry 'bout that, but just every once in while you might wanna check to see if reality intersects any of this. Even though your argument from authority is never a good idea, let me just attack the argument itself. Let's interrupt your fantasy with one of mine that subjects your fantasy to reality and do a thought-experiment poll of, say, 1500 "serious philosophers". How many would share your "high regard"? You can argue that they're wrong, but don't pretend Rand is held in anything that could be described as "high regard", by any proportion of "serious philosophers".

What does it mean if a lowly moron like myself can read and understand Rand, but never come across a single example of a unique or "brilliant" insight? Clever, consistent, logical, yeah OK. But Newton, Einstien, Bohr - that's unique - that's brilliance. But to each his own I suppose.

I quite depise Rand. This I'm sure is no shock, but I don't argue backwards. I subject her premises to the scrutiny of reality and they fail miserably. She may have had well constructed arguments, but that makes things worse, not better. Hence my disdain.

"So are we all dupes and/or fools"

Very intelligent people can be wrong. You are certainly wrong about Rand. You may or may not be a fool.

"If you have any other speculations -- say, about alien abductions or Scientology -- please feel free to share them as well."

In fact I do. It's not a bad general rule to be wary of the mentally ill trying to convince you of things that aren't real.

Bob

Dragonfly · March 26, 2010

No George, Rand's ethical "theory" was built backwards to justify her politics. In this way it works - it's rational and consistent (but wrong), and it leads her to clearly nonsensical, if not tautological premises. Man qua man, or man's survival qua man to be more accurate - fine, is WHAT SHE DECIDED IT TO BE! Guaran-friggin-teed this proper "survival" of hers is indeed the same "survival" of a good Objectivist. Is that a "technical" tautology? I don't know, you tell me, it smells like it. Perhaps it is a "begging the question" fallacy because the conclusion is completely built right into the premises/definitions. But it's certainly a big steaming pile.

Rand's "man qua man" trick has already been discussed extensively on this forum. See for example here, here and here.

bmacwilliam · March 26, 2010

I don't need a Philosophy PhD to groc it
Kudos to GHS for the above takedown. I just have a minute to pick a nit: Bob, it’s spelled grok, not groc. Don’t antagonize the ghost of Heinlein.

Thanks for the correction.

But what type of "takedown" would that be? The one that offered absolutely nothing in defense of any of the core issues at all, or the imaginary flying triple tag-team suplex?

Bob

Brant Gaede · March 26, 2010

I quite depise [sic] Rand.

Why don't you flesh this out with any positive comments you may have about her, because as it stands it's kind of disorienting? Or some brief comments about where you are politically-philosophically in contrast? Not that one can't find out, but it would be nice to have something up here for referencing.

--Brant

imurray · March 26, 2010

From Dan: "Just to back up a little: which of her "foundational ideas" do you disagree with here?"
Any argument based on "Man's survival qua man" is utterly meaningless if it is just "pronounced" and not justified. I could construct any ethical system I can dream of (and I'm not a Philosopher!) if I get to choose what "qua man" is.
Her concept of Tabula rasa is also really dumb, but it's a useful tool to ultimately justify some of her nastier "evil" condemnations and accusations because every man has actively and entirely chosen his character right? Of course, we know this is false.
That's just a start.
From George:
"I agree. In other words, your speculations are irrelevant, and no legitimate inferences about Rand's philosophy follow from them."
I am not infering anything from my speculations other than perhaps offering a possible explanation of "why" she came to such silly conclusions (well, premises in this case). The nonsense of her premises condemn the philosophy, I don't need speculation for that.
"They are not distinct, airtight compartments. To condemn a political system is to employ moral principles, so a moral system will tend to emerge naturally from an interest in politics, and in the process moral principles that were previously implicit will become explicit."
Well, I'd say that's backwards and an interest in politics "will tend to emerge naturally" from a moral system (implicit or explicit) - but they are connected and on that I'm sure we'd agree. However, the bottom line here is the question of whether "truth" she really cared about, or was it "the destruction of that which she hated"? In one way it doesn't matter, her arguments can be evaluated as they stand. In another way though it does matter, she either made simple errors OR she deliberately ignored the truth in support of her true goal. And in a circular way, says a great deal about her own personal morality.
"I have spent some 45 years years in a serious and sustained study of philosophy, and I have a high regard for Rand's philosophic abilities, however much I may disagree with her in some respects. The same is true of John Hospers (former head of the USC philosophy department and author of many highly-regarded articles and books on philosophy), Chris Sciabarra (author of several first-rate books on philosophy), and many other serious philosophers, such as Doug Den Uyl and Doug Rasmussen. So are we all dupes and/or fools who, lacking your keen insight, have been taken in by Rand's tricks? "
Well, what does it mean if a troglodyte like me sees obvious glaring foundation errors? Wow - "45 years years in a serious and sustained study of philosophy". Sorry 'bout that, but just every once in while you might wanna check to see if reality intersects any of this. Even though your argument from authority is never a good idea, let me just attack the argument itself. Let's interrupt your fantasy with one of mine that subjects your fantasy to reality and do a thought-experiment poll of, say, 1500 "serious philosophers". How many would share your "high regard"? You can argue that they're wrong, but don't pretend Rand is held in anything that could be described as "high regard", by any proportion of "serious philosophers".
What does it mean if a lowly moron like myself can read and understand Rand, but never come across a single example of a unique or "brilliant" insight? Clever, consistent, logical, yeah OK. But Newton, Einstien, Bohr - that's unique - that's brilliance. But to each his own I suppose.
I quite depise Rand. This I'm sure is no shock, but I don't argue backwards. I subject her premises to the scrutiny of reality and they fail miserably. She may have had well constructed arguments, but that makes things worse, not better. Hence my disdain.
"So are we all dupes and/or fools"
Very intelligent people can be wrong. You are certainly wrong about Rand. You may or may not be a fool.
"If you have any other speculations -- say, about alien abductions or Scientology -- please feel free to share them as well."
In fact I do. It's not a bad general rule to be wary of the mentally ill trying to convince you of things that aren't real.
Bob

George pronounced, in another thread, that Wittgenstein wasn't a "good" philosopher of language despite what I suspect a majority of serious philosophers might think (even if they don't agree with him they certainly respect his scholarship and contributions). That alone contradicts his attempt to name drop a few notable philosophers, who he happens to agree with, to prove Rand's philosophic abilities. If invoking Wittgenstein isn't good enough for George, then he must know that naming these also-Rands is surely not good enough.

George H. Smith · March 26, 2010

George pronounced, in another thread, that Wittgenstein wasn't a "good" philosopher of language despite what I suspect a majority of serious philosophers might think (even if they don't agree with him they certainly respect his scholarship and contributions). That alone contradicts his attempt to name drop a few notable philosophers, who he happens to agree with, to prove Rand's philosophic abilities. If invoking Wittgenstein isn't good enough for George, then he must know that naming these also-Rands is surely not good enough.

What I said was that I don't regard Wittgenstein as an "especially good" philosopher of language. I said this because, despite his flashes of insight, Wittgenstein's remarks about language are mainly aphoristic, and I don't regard aphorisms as a good way to do philosophy. I would say a similar thing about Nietzsche -- even though I like him in some respects -- to the extent that some of his more significant points, however suggestive, are expressed in aphorisms that lack detailed arguments and analyses. Various philosophers, such as Bertrand Russell and Brand Blanshard, have made similar observations about Wittgenstein's' approach to linguistic philosophy.

Moreover, I didn't mention various philosophers who take Rand seriously to "prove" anything. Learn to read, for crying out loud.

Ghs

George H. Smith · March 26, 2010

Just to back up a little: which of her "foundational ideas" do you disagree with here?
For starters, the "Law of Identity" and "Existence Exists".

Okay, so (1) a thing is not what it is; rather, it is something else, which is also something else, which is also something else, and so on, ad infinitum. And (2) existence does not exist.

These should prove useful guides in my journey back to sanity. Dare I hope that I may one day be as sane as GS, so that I too can say silly things with a straight face?

Ghs

dan2100 · March 26, 2010

George pronounced, in another thread, that Wittgenstein wasn't a "good" philosopher of language despite what I suspect a majority of serious philosophers might think (even if they don't agree with him they certainly respect his scholarship and contributions). That alone contradicts his attempt to name drop a few notable philosophers, who he happens to agree with, to prove Rand's philosophic abilities. If invoking Wittgenstein isn't good enough for George, then he must know that naming these also-Rands is surely not good enough.
What I said was that I don't regard Wittgenstein as an "especially good" philosopher of language. I said this because, despite his flashes of insight, Wittgenstein's remarks about language are mainly aphoristic, and I don't regard aphorisms as a good way to do philosophy. I would say a similar thing about Nietzsche -- even though I like him in some respects -- to the extent that some of his more significant points, however suggestive, are expressed in aphorisms that lack detailed arguments and analyses. Various philosophers, such as Bertrand Russell and Brand Blanshard, have made similar observations about Wittgenstein's' approach to linguistic philosophy.
Moreover, I didn't mention various philosophers who take Rand seriously to "prove" anything. Learn to read, for crying out loud.
Ghs

I'm in general agreement with you on Wittgenstein and on his approach to philosophy. (Even his notebooks are much the same. I'd originally thought, when I approached studying him, that he was too busy moving from one idea to the next to write out a long treatise for mere mortals to read and had hoped his notebooks and other writings would contain such a treatise.) In my opinion, Wittgenstein does have some merit, but I think he's vastly overrated and I see him as, in many ways, a distraction if not a deadend, in the history of philosophy.

Also, for Pantopic, I would never gauge a thinker -- in philosophy or any field -- by looking at what the majority in that field -- even a majority of the serious -- at a given time think or believe about said thinker. Of course, I'd likely read or listen to what they wrote or have to say, but what they wrote or said would be judged, by me, based on how reasonable it was and how well it fit the facts (allowing, true, as I see reasonability and facts) and not merely on their authority. I hope you'd agree with me on this. If not, then I suppose you should read off what you think of all thinkers based on polls and let's forget about a serious discussion here.

imurray · March 26, 2010

George pronounced, in another thread, that Wittgenstein wasn't a "good" philosopher of language despite what I suspect a majority of serious philosophers might think (even if they don't agree with him they certainly respect his scholarship and contributions). That alone contradicts his attempt to name drop a few notable philosophers, who he happens to agree with, to prove Rand's philosophic abilities. If invoking Wittgenstein isn't good enough for George, then he must know that naming these also-Rands is surely not good enough.
What I said was that I don't regard Wittgenstein as an "especially good" philosopher of language. I said this because, despite his flashes of insight, Wittgenstein's remarks about language are mainly aphoristic, and I don't regard aphorisms as a good way to do philosophy. I would say a similar thing about Nietzsche -- even though I like him in some respects -- to the extent that some of his more significant points, however suggestive, are expressed in aphorisms that lack detailed arguments and analyses. Various philosophers, such as Bertrand Russell and Brand Blanshard, have made similar observations about Wittgenstein's' approach to linguistic philosophy.
Moreover, I didn't mention various philosophers who take Rand seriously to "prove" anything. Learn to read, for crying out loud.
Ghs

I can read just fine, perhaps you should work on being clearer "for crying out loud". I didn't realize you were name dropping for the sake of name dropping - I thought you were trying to imply that because you (a learned philosopher) and a few other "serious" philosophers take her philosophy seriously it's improbable that one could say that you are wrong (or have been duped or that you're a fool, as you put it) - especially by someone who you don't hold in the same high regard as these men. Should I have thought you meant something else by this? Seems like a blatant appeal to authority to me. Oh wait, I'm wrong - I said you said "good" instead of "especially good" - that changes everything! I must not know how to read for crying out loud!

Edited March 26, 2010 by Panoptic

bmacwilliam · March 26, 2010

I quite depise [sic] Rand.
Why don't you flesh this out with any positive comments you may have about her, because as it stands it's kind of disorienting? Or some brief comments about where you are politically-philosophically in contrast? Not that one can't find out, but it would be nice to have something up here for referencing.
--Brant

Ugh, I "depise" typos too.

With regards to your request - fair enough. I'll be brief.

Positive comments - Reality, Rationality, Logic and Life are all good. I admire and share much what she said on these topics themselves and admire what she described before she began "constructing" things. I share her fierce dedication (or proclamations to that effect) to productive work, self-esteem, personal ambition and achievment and things like that. I agree with her that it's OK to seek personal excellence, wealth etc., and to be proud and morally "good" all at the same time.

I think it is transparently obvious and quite a shame that her politics poisoned her constructions so fatally. If we want to think of Morality/Ethics based on what we are, then man indeed DOES have a "duty" to his fellow man. This does not mean that he is a slave. A better Ethics is based on a scientific "qua", not a personal proclamation. That being said, I do not believe there is a fundamentally objective basis for Ethics at all. Is/ought separation is entirely intact. However, that being said, we either have no ethics at all, or we construct a "Objectivist-like" system as best we can, but based on a firmer footing in reality.

This would lead to "my ideal" of ethics and politics that recognized that man should indeed be "forced" to be altruistic but only partially. I have no problem at all with "forced" charity - taxes - to take care of people who cannot take care of themselves and infrastructure/defense/and even education. I do have a problem with those who abuse this charity and who can take care of themselves, but don't. I believe that wealth and prosperity are the cornerstone of human progression. Wealth gives us better lives, better Medicine, better everything. Capitalism is necessary, as far as I know, to foster mass wealth creation.

It is morally good to be selfish AND it is morally good to be altruistic. Either extreme is not good. Therefore, while achievment and riches should be admired, so should generosity. This is not a contradiction. I admire great industrialists for their achievments and admire their generosity when they are generous. I believe we're overall better off when generous and I think this idea is supported mathematically.

Small, efficient government is ideal. Markets can be free, but rules must be enforced. Socialized medicine for example is not necessarily automatically evil, and neither is private of course. All of us being required to pay a flat fee, then using necessary services as we need them is philosophically just fine by me. Of course there's the problem of the fat smoker who intentionally increases his risk, so maybe he should pay more.

The person who screws up their own life and ends up old and destitute should receive help if he can no longer help himself. But if he's young and able, he should be expected to work. Even if he's on Welfare, he should work for his money. Nobody should die on the street (unless they choose to) we indeed DO have a moral obligation, not necessarily to the beggar, but to the helpless and there's a big difference.

That's a start.

Bob

imurray · March 26, 2010

George pronounced, in another thread, that Wittgenstein wasn't a "good" philosopher of language despite what I suspect a majority of serious philosophers might think (even if they don't agree with him they certainly respect his scholarship and contributions). That alone contradicts his attempt to name drop a few notable philosophers, who he happens to agree with, to prove Rand's philosophic abilities. If invoking Wittgenstein isn't good enough for George, then he must know that naming these also-Rands is surely not good enough.
What I said was that I don't regard Wittgenstein as an "especially good" philosopher of language. I said this because, despite his flashes of insight, Wittgenstein's remarks about language are mainly aphoristic, and I don't regard aphorisms as a good way to do philosophy. I would say a similar thing about Nietzsche -- even though I like him in some respects -- to the extent that some of his more significant points, however suggestive, are expressed in aphorisms that lack detailed arguments and analyses. Various philosophers, such as Bertrand Russell and Brand Blanshard, have made similar observations about Wittgenstein's' approach to linguistic philosophy.
Moreover, I didn't mention various philosophers who take Rand seriously to "prove" anything. Learn to read, for crying out loud.
Ghs
I'm in general agreement with you on Wittgenstein and on his approach to philosophy. (Even his notebooks are much the same. I'd originally thought, when I approached studying him, that he was too busy moving from one idea to the next to write out a long treatise for mere mortals to read and had hoped his notebooks and other writings would contain such a treatise.) In my opinion, Wittgenstein does have some merit, but I think he's vastly overrated and I see him as, in many ways, a distraction if not a deadend, in the history of philosophy.
Also, for Pantopic, I would never gauge a thinker -- in philosophy or any field -- by looking at what the majority in that field -- even a majority of the serious -- at a given time think or believe about said thinker. Of course, I'd likely read or listen to what they wrote or have to say, but what they wrote or said would be judged, by me, based on how reasonable it was and how well it fit the facts (allowing, true, as I see reasonability and facts) and not merely on their authority. I hope you'd agree with me on this. If not, then I suppose you should read off what you think of all thinkers based on polls and let's forget about a serious discussion here.

I wasn't making an appeal to Wittgenstein as an authority figure in any of my comments, Dan. I was stating that George was indeed trying to appeal to the authority of the men he mentioned to prove that he couldn't have been "duped" or "fooled" (or maybe he was just mentioning their credential for the fun of it). I agree with you, I don't care what the majority of the field says as I really don't care that George can name three or four people who agree with him - that was my point. I used Wittgenstein as one example of a "good" philosopher of language who may say something contrary to what George stated in his comment: "as any good philosopher of language will tell you, to employ metaphors in definitions is rarely a good idea." I didn't realize that George was the arbiter of who is and isn't considered a "good" philosopher (I had no idea at the time that aphorisms = not good). So I was pointing out that if George can deny Wittgenstein, why shouldn't I or anybody else deny the men he's used to back up his claim? It was silly of him to make a claim that started with "any good philosopher of language" anyway as it was a meaningless statement without an agreed upon conception of what a "good" philosopher of language even is (that's why I've been putting "good" in quotes all along).

Another question: Why do you feel the need to come to George's defense, especially when you're not familiar with the whole context of the argument?

Edited March 26, 2010 by Panoptic

George H. Smith · March 26, 2010

George pronounced, in another thread, that Wittgenstein wasn't a "good" philosopher of language despite what I suspect a majority of serious philosophers might think (even if they don't agree with him they certainly respect his scholarship and contributions). That alone contradicts his attempt to name drop a few notable philosophers, who he happens to agree with, to prove Rand's philosophic abilities. If invoking Wittgenstein isn't good enough for George, then he must know that naming these also-Rands is surely not good enough.
What I said was that I don't regard Wittgenstein as an "especially good" philosopher of language. I said this because, despite his flashes of insight, Wittgenstein's remarks about language are mainly aphoristic, and I don't regard aphorisms as a good way to do philosophy. I would say a similar thing about Nietzsche -- even though I like him in some respects -- to the extent that some of his more significant points, however suggestive, are expressed in aphorisms that lack detailed arguments and analyses. Various philosophers, such as Bertrand Russell and Brand Blanshard, have made similar observations about Wittgenstein's' approach to linguistic philosophy.
Moreover, I didn't mention various philosophers who take Rand seriously to "prove" anything. Learn to read, for crying out loud.
Ghs
I can read just fine, perhaps you should work on being clearer "for crying out loud". I didn't realize you were name dropping for the sake of name dropping - I thought you were trying to imply that because you (a learned philosopher) and a few other "serious" philosophers take her philosophy seriously it's improbable that one could say that you are wrong (or have been duped or that you're a fool, as you put it) - especially by someone who you don't hold in the same high regard as these men. Should I have thought you meant something else by this? Seems like a blatant appeal to authority to me. Oh wait, I'm wrong - I said you said "good" instead of "especially good" - that changes everything! I must not know how to read for crying out loud!

I made the remark about philosophers who respected Rand in the course of asking a question. I wanted to know what implications, if any, Rand's supposed fakery carried for those philosophers. I cannot understand why you misconstrued this as "an appeal to authority." And it had nothing to do with "name dropping." Where do you come up with this crap?

As for my comment about Wittgenstein, you should have asked what I meant before mouthing off. There was a reason why I qualified my remark with "especially." I even considered writing a brief explanation in the original post, but since the point wasn't relevant to anything, I decided against including one.

Ghs

dan2100 · March 26, 2010

I'm in general agreement with you on Wittgenstein and on his approach to philosophy. (Even his notebooks are much the same. I'd originally thought, when I approached studying him, that he was too busy moving from one idea to the next to write out a long treatise for mere mortals to read and had hoped his notebooks and other writings would contain such a treatise.) In my opinion, Wittgenstein does have some merit, but I think he's vastly overrated and I see him as, in many ways, a distraction if not a deadend, in the history of philosophy.
Also, for Pantopic, I would never gauge a thinker -- in philosophy or any field -- by looking at what the majority in that field -- even a majority of the serious -- at a given time think or believe about said thinker. Of course, I'd likely read or listen to what they wrote or have to say, but what they wrote or said would be judged, by me, based on how reasonable it was and how well it fit the facts (allowing, true, as I see reasonability and facts) and not merely on their authority. I hope you'd agree with me on this. If not, then I suppose you should read off what you think of all thinkers based on polls and let's forget about a serious discussion here.
I wasn't making an appeal to Wittgenstein as an authority figure in any of my comments, Dan. I was stating that George was indeed trying to appeal to the authority of the men he mentioned to prove that he couldn't have been "duped" or "fooled". I agree with you, I don't care what the majority of the field says as I really don't care that George can name three or four people who agree with him - that was my point. I used Wittgenstein as one example of a "good" philosopher of language who may say something contrary to what George stated in his comment: "as any good philosopher of language will tell you, to employ metaphors in definitions is rarely a good idea." I didn't realize that George was the arbiter of who is and isn't considered a "good" philosopher (I had no idea at the time that aphorisms = not good). So I was pointing out that if George can deny Wittgenstein, why shouldn't I or anybody else deny the men he's used to back up his claim?
Another question: Why do you feel the need to come to George's defense, especially when you're not familiar with the whole context of the argument?

I truly didn't think George was appealing to authority when he wrote "any good philosopher of language..." I thought he was appealing to a standard of what should be good philosophy of language. That is, that definition by metaphor is a bad way of defining things -- at least, if clarity and precision is the goal of definition. I thought George gave a good reason for this -- one that should not be controversial -- too. That is, that metaphors always have to be reduced to non-metaphor anyway and, so, [not his exact words] any metaphor is even further removed and introduces further problems with being unclear or other mistakes.

I also didn't think him mentioning Russell and Blanshard was an appeal to authority. I thought he was merely telling everyone that others have also criticized Wittgenstein. (Russell actually could be considered a mentor of sorts of Wittgenstein. Not that that matters -- just bringing in some biographical detail.) Nor did I think it name-dropping. In other words, it didn't seem to me he was saying, "Oh, Russell and Blandshard thought Wittgenstein was a dufus, so let's dump on W." (I must confess to liking "Dump on W," but he's no longer in office, so it seems kind of old hat now, no? ) Rather, I thought he was trying to show that others have brought up reasons for doubting Wittgenstein's views. Of course, he didn't go over the particulars... That would be the next step here, but, my guess is, no one's going to take that.

I wanted to give my opinion on Wittgenstein in the context of this discussion more than defend George's view. It just so happens that, in this case, his and my views on the subject are much the same.

Minor quibble with this whole discussion: I think we should start another topic on the board -- just to separate this out of the ethics or altruism discussion.

imurray · March 26, 2010

George pronounced, in another thread, that Wittgenstein wasn't a "good" philosopher of language despite what I suspect a majority of serious philosophers might think (even if they don't agree with him they certainly respect his scholarship and contributions). That alone contradicts his attempt to name drop a few notable philosophers, who he happens to agree with, to prove Rand's philosophic abilities. If invoking Wittgenstein isn't good enough for George, then he must know that naming these also-Rands is surely not good enough.
What I said was that I don't regard Wittgenstein as an "especially good" philosopher of language. I said this because, despite his flashes of insight, Wittgenstein's remarks about language are mainly aphoristic, and I don't regard aphorisms as a good way to do philosophy. I would say a similar thing about Nietzsche -- even though I like him in some respects -- to the extent that some of his more significant points, however suggestive, are expressed in aphorisms that lack detailed arguments and analyses. Various philosophers, such as Bertrand Russell and Brand Blanshard, have made similar observations about Wittgenstein's' approach to linguistic philosophy.
Moreover, I didn't mention various philosophers who take Rand seriously to "prove" anything. Learn to read, for crying out loud.
Ghs
I can read just fine, perhaps you should work on being clearer "for crying out loud". I didn't realize you were name dropping for the sake of name dropping - I thought you were trying to imply that because you (a learned philosopher) and a few other "serious" philosophers take her philosophy seriously it's improbable that one could say that you are wrong (or have been duped or that you're a fool, as you put it) - especially by someone who you don't hold in the same high regard as these men. Should I have thought you meant something else by this? Seems like a blatant appeal to authority to me. Oh wait, I'm wrong - I said you said "good" instead of "especially good" - that changes everything! I must not know how to read for crying out loud!
I made the remark about philosophers who respected Rand in the course of asking a question. I wanted to know what implications, if any, Rand's supposed fakery carried for those philosophers. I cannot understand why you misconstrued this as "an appeal to authority." And it had nothing to do with "name dropping." Where do you come up with this crap?
As for my comment about Wittgenstein, you should have asked what I meant before mouthing off. There was a reason why I qualified my remark with "especially." I even considered writing a brief explanation in the original post, but since the point wasn't relevant to anything, I decided against including one.
Ghs

Let the bullying continue, George. It's what you said, be a big man and own up to it for a change instead of weaseling your way around it with your fancy dance steps and quick insults. You're not g-damn infallible.

I have spent some 45 years years in a serious and sustained study of philosophy, and I have a high regard for Rand's philosophic abilities, however much I may disagree with her in some respects. The same is true of John Hospers (former head of the USC philosophy department and author of many highly-regarded articles and books on philosophy), Chris Sciabarra (author of several first-rate books on philosophy), and many other serious philosophers, such as Doug Den Uyl and Doug Rasmussen. So are we all dupes and/or fools who, lacking your keen insight, have been taken in by Rand's tricks?

Are you really telling me you believe it when you say that you didn't mention these distinguished people and the fact that you've spent 45 years studying philosophy to imply that you and these men know better than whoever it was you were arguing with - as an appeal to your collective authority? Were you not being sarcastic when you said "lacking your keen insight"? That's really the serious question you were in the middle of asking? You're telling me that this is what you intended to solicit form that question: "I wanted to know what implications, if any, Rand's supposed fakery carried for those philosophers". Bull! The question was sarcastic and intended as an insult and you know it.

And then you try to make it look like I'm the crazy one for thinking that's what you meant by your constant insults? Your stuff wouldn't be published in the undergraduate review here and I know that for a fact because I've been on the committee that selects entries. So you can be as smug as you'd like in the incestuous self-selecting little club you 'publish' in - I'm not scared of you. I can hurl insults too if that's your idea of arguing.

Edited March 26, 2010 by Panoptic

imurray · March 26, 2010

I'm in general agreement with you on Wittgenstein and on his approach to philosophy. (Even his notebooks are much the same. I'd originally thought, when I approached studying him, that he was too busy moving from one idea to the next to write out a long treatise for mere mortals to read and had hoped his notebooks and other writings would contain such a treatise.) In my opinion, Wittgenstein does have some merit, but I think he's vastly overrated and I see him as, in many ways, a distraction if not a deadend, in the history of philosophy.
Also, for Pantopic, I would never gauge a thinker -- in philosophy or any field -- by looking at what the majority in that field -- even a majority of the serious -- at a given time think or believe about said thinker. Of course, I'd likely read or listen to what they wrote or have to say, but what they wrote or said would be judged, by me, based on how reasonable it was and how well it fit the facts (allowing, true, as I see reasonability and facts) and not merely on their authority. I hope you'd agree with me on this. If not, then I suppose you should read off what you think of all thinkers based on polls and let's forget about a serious discussion here.
I wasn't making an appeal to Wittgenstein as an authority figure in any of my comments, Dan. I was stating that George was indeed trying to appeal to the authority of the men he mentioned to prove that he couldn't have been "duped" or "fooled". I agree with you, I don't care what the majority of the field says as I really don't care that George can name three or four people who agree with him - that was my point. I used Wittgenstein as one example of a "good" philosopher of language who may say something contrary to what George stated in his comment: "as any good philosopher of language will tell you, to employ metaphors in definitions is rarely a good idea." I didn't realize that George was the arbiter of who is and isn't considered a "good" philosopher (I had no idea at the time that aphorisms = not good). So I was pointing out that if George can deny Wittgenstein, why shouldn't I or anybody else deny the men he's used to back up his claim?
Another question: Why do you feel the need to come to George's defense, especially when you're not familiar with the whole context of the argument?
I truly didn't think George was appealing to authority when he wrote "any good philosopher of language..." I thought he was appealing to a standard of what should be good philosophy of language. That is, that definition by metaphor is a bad way of defining things -- at least, if clarity and precision is the goal of definition. I thought George gave a good reason for this -- one that should not be controversial -- too. That is, that metaphors always have to be reduced to non-metaphor anyway and, so, [not his exact words] any metaphor is even further removed and introduces further problems with being unclear or other mistakes.
I also didn't think him mentioning Russell and Blanshard was an appeal to authority. I thought he was merely telling everyone that others have also criticized Wittgenstein. (Russell actually could be considered a mentor of sorts of Wittgenstein. Not that that matters -- just bringing in some biographical detail.) Nor did I think it name-dropping. In other words, it didn't seem to me he was saying, "Oh, Russell and Blandshard thought Wittgenstein was a dufus, so let's dump on W." (I must confess to liking "Dump on W," but he's no longer in office, so it seems kind of old hat now, no? ) Rather, I thought he was trying to show that others have brought up reasons for doubting Wittgenstein's views. Of course, he didn't go over the particulars... That would be the next step here, but, my guess is, no one's going to take that.
I wanted to give my opinion on Wittgenstein in the context of this discussion more than defend George's view. It just so happens that, in this case, his and my views on the subject are much the same.
Minor quibble with this whole discussion: I think we should start another topic on the board -- just to separate this out of the ethics or altruism discussion.

Dan! I didn't say George was appealing to authority when he wrote that I said he was appealing to authority when he name dropped the three or four philosophers and their titles that happen to agree with him. It wasn't his mentioning of Russel or Blandshard that I was talking about either. It also has nothing to do with Wittgenstein's philosophy. You're confused and I'd advise you to go back and read our discussion before you reply. This all started earlier on than the examples you're citing. I think even George would agree with this assessment of your comments.

Edited March 26, 2010 by Panoptic

dan2100 · March 26, 2010

I truly didn't think George was appealing to authority when he wrote "any good philosopher of language..." I thought he was appealing to a standard of what should be good philosophy of language. That is, that definition by metaphor is a bad way of defining things -- at least, if clarity and precision is the goal of definition. I thought George gave a good reason for this -- one that should not be controversial -- too. That is, that metaphors always have to be reduced to non-metaphor anyway and, so, [not his exact words] any metaphor is even further removed and introduces further problems with being unclear or other mistakes.
I also didn't think him mentioning Russell and Blanshard was an appeal to authority. I thought he was merely telling everyone that others have also criticized Wittgenstein. (Russell actually could be considered a mentor of sorts of Wittgenstein. Not that that matters -- just bringing in some biographical detail.) Nor did I think it name-dropping. In other words, it didn't seem to me he was saying, "Oh, Russell and Blandshard thought Wittgenstein was a dufus, so let's dump on W." (I must confess to liking "Dump on W," but he's no longer in office, so it seems kind of old hat now, no? ) Rather, I thought he was trying to show that others have brought up reasons for doubting Wittgenstein's views. Of course, he didn't go over the particulars... That would be the next step here, but, my guess is, no one's going to take that.
I wanted to give my opinion on Wittgenstein in the context of this discussion more than defend George's view. It just so happens that, in this case, his and my views on the subject are much the same.
Minor quibble with this whole discussion: I think we should start another topic on the board -- just to separate this out of the ethics or altruism discussion.
Dan! I didn't say George was appealing to authority when he wrote that I said he was appealing to authority when he name dropped the three or four philosophers and their titles that happen to agree with him. It wasn't his mentioning of Russel or Blandshard that I was talking about either. It also has nothing to do with Wittgenstein's philosophy. You're confused and I'd advise you to go back and read our discussion before you reply. This all started earlier on than the examples you're citing. I think even George would agree with this assessment of your comments.

Why not just point me to the comments you mean? This would all be better in person. I would be able to extract the information from all of you much more easily.

bmacwilliam · March 26, 2010

I cannot understand why you misconstrued this as "an appeal to authority." And it had nothing to do with "name dropping."

Orrrrlllllllyyyy???

George H. Smith · March 26, 2010

If we want to think of Morality/Ethics based on what we are, then man indeed DOES have a "duty" to his fellow man. This does not mean that he is a slave. A better Ethics is based on a scientific "qua", not a personal proclamation.

Oh, I get it! If you personally proclaim a conception of "qua" to be "scientific," then it's not a personal proclamation at all. Thanks for clearing that up.

That being said, I do not believe there is a fundamentally objective basis for Ethics at all. Is/ought separation is entirely intact. However, that being said, we either have no ethics at all, or we construct a "Objectivist-like" system as best we can, but based on a firmer footing in reality."

Let's see. No system of ethics can be "objective," but some can be "based on a firmer footing in reality" than others. What kind of reality are you speaking of here -- a purely subjective one?

This would lead to "my ideal" of ethics and politics that recognized that man should indeed be "forced" to be altruistic but only partially.

According to your acceptance of the logical chasm between Is and Ought, no moral "shoulds" can be objective. I must therefore assume you mean to say that how much force should be used depends on your personal proclamations.

It is morally good to be selfish AND it is morally good to be altruistic. Either extreme is not good. Therefore, while achievment and riches should be admired, so should generosity...

In order to avoid descending into the same depths of philosophical ineptitude as Rand, you should preface all such statements with, "I personally proclaim that...." No need to thank me for this sound advice. I wouldn't want you to become another Ayn Rand, after all.

Ghs

Brant Gaede · March 26, 2010

Well, Bob (ref. post 640), I'd guess you are a conservative, perhaps in the Adam Smith sense.

I'll try to start a thread addressing morality and politics in a day or so, but I do not study or worry much about the Objectivist catechism and it won't be my intention to present myself as an authority on Rand ideas. I came up with my ideas on morality and individual rights in the late 1950s as a young teenager without any reference to man qua man or the Objectivist Ethics. For me it's pretty simple stuff. To the extent I agree with the Objectivist Ethics, I see it as a kind of backfilling. Morality, especially altruism, is essentially a weapon for controlling people and totalitarian justification and an attack on individualism and self interest. Objectivism doesn't get a free ride here, however.

--Brant

Edited March 26, 2010 by Brant Gaede

dan2100 · March 26, 2010

Well, Bob (ref. post 640), I'd guess you are a conservative, perhaps in the Adam Smith sense.

What is meant by "Adam Smith sense" conservative? (Not being sarcastic. I really want to know what you mean here.)

I'll try to start a thread addressing morality and politics in a day or so, but I do not study or worry much about the Objectivist catechism and it won't be my intention to present myself as an authority on Rand ideas. I came up with my ideas on morality and individual rights in the late 1950s as a young teenager without any reference to man qua man or the Objectivist Ethics. For me it's pretty simple stuff. To the extent I agree with the Objectivist Ethics, I see it as a kind of backfilling. Morality, especially altruism, is essentially a weapon for controlling people and totalitarian justification and an attack on individualism and self interest. Objectivism doesn't get a free ride here, however.

No philosophy should get a free ride, in my view.

Settling the debate on Altruism

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