"Romanticist Art" Is Not The Essence Of The Objectivist Esthetics

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen,

I'm almost in agreement with you, actually I am for the most part. I'll talk about this below. Irrespective of anything else, I think you will find my Merrill discussion interesting.

But first, let me make a clarification. We could probably argue all day about whether a concept can be formed out of the mental state Rand described as sense of life. But that is not the part that drives me to write about it. (That's on the level of quibble to me.)

Still, for the sake of the interested reader, here is where I am coming from. I'm using the rules set by Rand's own form of concept formation. Abstractions can serve as conceptual referents (see ITOE), even floating abstractions can. A concept rooted in floating abstractions would lead to what Rand called a stolen concept, but it is still a concept. So I would phrase your position as considering the concept of sense of life to be a stolen concept. (Not that you have to agree with this.)

I have read some people say that a stolen concept is not a concept at all since its fundamental referents are not real. I prefer using language like "valid concept," "invalid concept," etc. Otherwise, it reminds me of an error Rand sometimes falls into when she gets wound up, like talking about modern art and saying it is not art. If it is not art, why call it modern art?

Here is a quote from "Art and Cognition" where Rand uses the term "modern art" to mean a valid category of school of art (my bold):

Decomposition is the postscript to the death of a human body; disintegration is the preface to the death of a human mind. Disintegration is the keynote and goal of modern art—the disintegration of man’s conceptual faculty, and the retrogression of an adult mind to the state of a mewling infant.

To reduce man’s consciousness to the level of sensations, with no capacity to integrate them, is the intention behind the reducing of language to grunts, of literature to “moods,” of painting to smears, of sculpture to slabs, of music to noise.

But there is a philosophically and psychopathologically instructive element in the spectacle of that gutter. It demonstrates—by the negative means of an absence—the relationships of art to philosophy, of reason to man’s survival, of hatred for reason to hatred for existence.

In other words, to Rand, modern art is an art form that demonstrates disintegration, i.e., hatred for reason and hatred of existence. Note that she cannot classify "the relationships of art to philosophy" if she is not talking about art. Thus modern art is a form of art.

Yet in the same essay, she wrote the following:

As a re-creation of reality, a work of art has to be representational; its freedom of stylization is limited by the requirement of intelligibility; if it does not present an intelligible subject, it ceases to be art.

In other words, since modern art (the kind Rand blasts) does not "present an intelligible subject, it ceases to be art." Does that mean it was art in the first place?

Even if that way of saying it is nothing but a form of rhetorical emphasis and modern art was never art in her view, I cannot reconcile as logically consistent when she denies that it is art and still calls it modern art and, further, discusses it as a school of art. At best, if one gives her an enormous benefit of the doubt and claims she is using two different concepts of art, using two different meanings for the word "art" in the same essay without clarifying this difference is sloppy.

That is the same error I am trying to avoid in using the term "concept." I prefer to use the term and add qualifications like "valid" and "invalid" (or whatever) instead of denying that a concept can be made of something if it does not exist (and is not intentional fantasy and stuff like that).

If you disagree with my approach, I don't mind.

Now on to the part that interests me and I believe will interest you. I am currently doing a lot of reading on Rand's literary methods to discover why most fiction by Objectivists (or people deeply impacted by Rand's ideas) sucks when they try to write according to her formal explanations.

I have noted that when they have talent, ignore or break free of her literary teaching and adopt other writing methods, like Terry Goodkind, Robert Bidinotto, Michael Prescott (for one who also gave up on her philosophy), etc., they become best sellers. I have come to some fairly interesting conclusions so far, but that is outside the scope of this post. (Just for the record, I'm a self-help dude, so I want to see if it is possible to come up with a teachable step-by-step process for newbies to learn how to write fiction in Rand's style without it sucking. )

The reason I am bringing this up is because, during my research, which includes a lot of rereading, I came across a passage by Ron Merrill from The Ideas of Ayn Rand. He was discussing The Fountainhead and how Rand resolved the problem of how to present an ideal man and make him interesting when there is no character arc. Rand's solution is to simply get him off stage for most of the book and make it about how imperfect people react to an ideal man. (She did this with both Roark and Galt.) But Merrill included a discussion that I believe is at the root of Rand's concept of sense of life. The following is from pp. 46-47:

On one level, The Fountainhead is a treatment of Ayn Rand's professed theme: the ideal man, Howard Roark. She set out initially to portray the ideal man. It is no coincidence, one may suspect, that the book begins and ends with the words, "Howard Roark".

But she did not get far into the construction of the novel before encountering two serious problems. First, she simply was not ready to portray the ideal man; her ideas, her ideals, were in a state of flux at this time and she was far from having developed them sufficiently to accomplish her self-assigned task.

Second, from the point of view of literary technique, problems arise in writing a story about an 'ideal' person. To use a central character who is morally perfect makes it difficult to center the story on an internal moral conflict. Adopting a hero who has no psychological problems rules out centering the story on psychological conflict. Thus when we encounter an 'ideal' hero, the story usually involves a basic dilemma of some less fundamental sort, such as a physical challenge.

Rand resolved this problem in The Fountainhead by removing Roark from the lead role. In the novel as it exists, Roark is 'off stage' for over half of the book. Instead, Dominique Francon becomes the real protagonist. The plot-theme of the book now becomes something different: 'How would imperfect people react to the ideal man?' This makes it possible to center the plot on a moral conflict within Dominique--and, later in the book, Gail Wynand.

For, on this level, The Fountainhead is a novel about the sin of despair. Though Rand would no doubt have been horrified to hear it thus described, the book has a theme prominent in Christian theology. Hope (as in 'faith, hope, and charity') is a virtue in Christian doctrine because its antithesis, despair, leads one to feel that it is permissible to sin. If evil is destined to inevitable triumph, why struggle to achieve virtue? This is precisely the fundamental premise of Dominique and Wynand. Having despaired, not believing that good can triumph, they permit themselves to do evil. Wynand uses his 'power' to exalt the banal in human existence, and to crush men who show signs of integrity. Dominique wastes her talents and, like Wynand, leaves a trail of agony behind her, as she does her best to destroy that which she most values, from statues, to Roark, to her own soul.

I included a longer section than I wanted in order to establish context, but the real interesting part that caught my eye was when Merrill started talking about the Christian form of despair (as a sin).

I can see where that can easily morph into a "tragic sense of life" or a "death premise" after filtering through Rand's internal reasoning, and where the Christian version of hope (as a virtue) can morph into a "heroic sense of life."

In all the discussions of sense of life I have ever read by Rand, I have seen her insinuate (to varying degrees) that those with a bad sense of life will tolerate evil (or practice it) while those with a good sense of life will not. Christian despair leads Christians to tolerate evil (or practice it) and hope leads them away from evil and toward good (and to seek forgiveness and atonement when they fall from grace, but that part is not my focus here).

That's a pretty convincing parallel to me.

So, like I said at the start, I mostly agree with you that sense of life does not exist in the universal form Rand prescribed. But I do see plausibility in "sense of life" including a despair/hope component that has roots in antiquity. And when I look around me, I see this dichotomy generally tends to work as described. So I think there is something to it.

Not the whole enchilada, but definitely as one of the core parts.

I know you are pretty familiar with Jung's archetypes, which I consider valid as mental templates (without speculating on whether they come from a "collective unconscious"). I see "sense of life" in a similar light. Not "sense of life" precisely as Rand described it, but the general idea rooted in antiquity, in Christianity's attachment of moral significance and propensity to despair and hope.

It is an overall mental predisposition template that includes a moral component. This takes it beyond personality types like the ancient 4 temperaments (choleric, melancholic, sanguine, and phlegmatic), or Myer-Briggs classifications, or the enneagram, or all that kind of stuff. They do not include morality whereas the Christian hope/despair and Rand's sense of life do.

(When I squint my eyes, I can see Jung's shadow archetype in there. )

So, at this stage of my studies, I see some validity in the idea of a default moral-emotional personality resonance, but one that varies from individual to individual, as a normal part of the human mind.

You don't have to agree with me, but I am interested in what you think about it.

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

Michael,

I found your post above really interesting.

On the issue of whether "sense of life" - Rand's meaning - is a concept, I'm glad that you're understanding that my problem with the term as Rand uses it stems from my not believing that she's identifying an actual phenomenon. I'd opt for "pseudo-concept" rather than "invalid concept" (I wouldn't categorize it as a "stolen concept"), but the classification isn't the part that drives me to write about it either.

Coincidentally, I just re-read two nights ago the material you quoted from "Art and Cognition," along with other sections of that and others of her aesthetic essays. I agree that she says yea and nay on modern art within the same essay, both calling it "art" and saying that it isn't.

Now turning to the passage you quoted from Ron Merrill's The Ideas of Ayn Rand:

I read maybe two-thirds of Merrill's book at the time when Marsha Enright's book was published. Something came up so that I didn't finish it, or manage to read Marsha's book either. I expect to get back to both at some point.

The passage you quoted was in the part of the Merrill book which I read, and I was especially struck by it. I thought that Merrill was right about Rand's making Dominique "the real protagonist" (the same can be said of Dagny in Atlas), and I thought that his point about the sin of despair was very insightful.

I remind you that I've speculated about Rand's getting her technical meaning of "sense of life" as a result of Unamuno's The Tragic Sense of Life. She told Frank Lloyd Wright, in a letter written after The Fountainhead was published, that she hadn't read but would read The Tragic Sense of Life. I don't know if in fact she did read the book, but certainly she made reference to the term in her talk about aesthetics at the University of Michigan in 1961 (and the 1962 Columbia University radio talk which I surmise was the same talk).

I've only read snatches of the Unamuno myself. I'm planning to read the whole book soon. I know enough about Unamuno's thesis to think that it meshes well with your suggestion:

I can see where [the sin of despair] can easily morph into a "tragic sense of life" or a "death premise" after filtering through Rand's internal reasoning, and where the Christian version of hope (as a virtue) can morph into a "heroic sense of life."

Yeah!! So can I easily see the morphing.

In all the discussions of sense of life I have ever read by Rand, I have seen her insinuate (to varying degrees) that those with a bad sense of life will tolerate evil (or practice it) while those with a good sense of life will not. Christian despair leads Christians to tolerate evil (or practice it) and hope leads them away from evil and toward good (and to seek forgiveness and atonement when they fall from grace, but that part is not my focus here).

That's a pretty convincing parallel to me.

To me also.

However, I don't know about "this dichotomy [hope/despair] generally tend[ing] to work as described." And even if it does, I think that's a different dynamic from a person's characteristic emotionality, the temperamental types classified in the sorts of typologies you mention. I agree that those typologies "do not include morality whereas the Christian hope/despair and Rand's sense of life do."

I think that with general personality types there isn't any correlation to philosophy, character, or artistic productions or tastes, the way Rand entwines those with her idea of "sense of life."

Allan Blumenthal told me that he once did an informal study attempting to see if he found any correlation between the temperamental characteristics of his clients and their artistic tastes. He said he found no patterns. My prediction, if a formal study were done, is that no significant correlations would be found. But of course significant correlations should be found if Rand's theory (or, precisely, her pronouncements) were correct.

So that's one problem I have with how she says "sense of life" operates.

Another is her turning "the subconscious" into an ongoing-judgment-day recorder, rewarder/avenger.

Another is her presumption - ironic for a supposed exponent of reason - that all humans are epistemological dunces who inevitably generalize from their assessments of themselves to cosmic conclusions about the nature of the universe and of humanity as such,

Another is that I think that the "benevolent/malevolent" universe idea smacks of theology.

Another is the way her theory makes artistic production and response a morality exam.

In short, I'm not enthused.

Thanks again for that post. I thought it was super.

Ellen

[Brant Gaede]

I don't know how anybody would think of Dagny as other than the real protagonist of Atlas Shrugged. That was obvious to me from the initial description of her on that train riding coach. But in The Fountainhead I always gave that to Howard (you know, Roark).

--Brant

[anthony]

I will point out that I have no duty to answer to these schoolmarmish tests, especially if they are asked in poor faith.

Great use of the standard Objectivish tactics, Tony! People are imposing "duties" on you by challenging your silly ideas and asking you to back them up with substance. And doing so is an act of "poor faith"!!!!

Hahahahahaha!

J

Well, no. "People" are demanding 'empirically falsifiable proof' by showing one example or other of artworks. Show me the 'formula'! in effect : for sense of life; for naturalism; for romanticism; for metaphysical value judgments; for the volitional consciousness...and what they have to do with morality!

As though one size(of art)fits all, and all sizes fit one. But there is no lazy way - you have to experience it for yourself and think for yourself. One has to APPLY one's self, which is all of one's being.

No secret that Rand painted with a very broad brush -- tough, that's philosophy. There's going to be plenty that falls between the cracks, and gets pushed aside. Which leaves a lot of responsibility on one to paint in with one's own narrower and ever finer brush strokes, and make one's own distinctions.

As usual, empiricism/universalism gets falsely confused by some with objectivity.

Nevr mind about my "silly ideas". Let me see you refute Rand's (presumable) silly ideas.

To remind you, "it isn't so", is not an argument.

[anthony]

Repeating in case Tony missed these questions the first time.

[....]

Re "volitional consciousness" in the Degas paintings you mentioned and in Dali's "Corpus Hypercubus," may I take "no" for the Degas and "yes" for the Dali as your answers?

What of the other examples in post #405?

Ellen

Yes.

Ok, that gets us somewhere. Can you now say what characteristic(s) the paintings in post #405 have which all Vermeer paintings lack such that you see "volitional consciousness" in the former group and only "voluntary action" in Vermeer's paintings?

I will point out that I have no duty to answer to these schoolmarmish tests, especially if they are asked in poor faith.

You aren't obligated to answer questions. I will point out, however, that the questions aren't asked "in poor faith" but instead from curiosity as to what if anything you can actually specify which differentiates "volitional" from "voluntary" action in visual art.

Ellen

"Curiosity". Excuse my chortle.

I will let you in on one, surefire way to spot poor faith argumentation. When in a lengthy discussion the other debaters do not articulate one, at least one, agreement with you. I.E. Everything one says to others is received as automatic dross, without anyone conceding a single, truthful point.

But- it's a human and intellectual IMPOSSIBILITY to fault everything from another person--if, that is, one is being honest.

E.g. I would agree Adolf Hitler on one thing, the enjoyment of our dogs.

[Brant Gaede]

"Curiosity". Excuse my chortle.

I will let you in on one, surefire way to spot poor faith argumentation. When in a lengthy discussion the other debaters do not articulate one, at least one, agreement with you. I.E. Everything one says to others is received as automatic dross, without anyone conceding a single, truthful point.

But- it's a human and intellectual IMPOSSIBILITY to fault everything from another person--if, that is, one is being honest.

E.g. I would agree Adolf Hitler on one thing, the enjoyment of our dogs.

Tony, the best way to deal with what you are taking as "poor faith argumentation" is to factually reply with substance, not to dish it back or reflect it back. I know it seems as if Jonathan and Ellen seem to be doing a good cop/bad cop routine on you, but it's only their common style of address to everyone. The difference is in the respective personalities. They are not using you as a back and forth beach ball and if one were absent that would not be a reason for the other to be absent. Or, all that is needed to counter "poor faith argumentation" is to ignore it as such and treat it as if it were good faith which, I assure you, would be absolutely devastating to anyone actually trying to do a bad thing to you. Why? Bad guys need traction. You are giving them traction, if they be bad. You are also leaving them with the upper hand, all apart from all else, but that's something of a digression. (I tend to go on and on sometimes.)

--Brant

[anthony]

Brant: I did the "good faith" back at the start (of both discussions).

I tried the old give and take, to no avail. It seems some people just want polarization, and will shove back any concessions for their own unknown reasons. See the skeptical attitudes both threads began with.

Sorry man, it's not me you should be cautioning, albeit gently.

It's a big conceptual picture Rand portrayed, and if that's not being seen clearly or at least somewhat acknowledged, all the single instances of art analysis will get me nowhere. To repeat, this subject is as much -or more- about consciousness as about art; that's what excites me. I am not going to even try convince anyone from one or two pictures. Each has to induce it from many, many personal and private experiences.

[Brant Gaede]

What you are doing, Tony, is not working.

--Brant

[anthony]

What you are doing, Tony, is not working.

--Brant

Then so be it. Despite that, it's man's mind I will always argue for. Any dull, collective compromising of art, is also an attack on man's consciousness. There's no need to question why peoples are killing each other in so many places - it's their consciousness that perished first.

[Roger Bissell]

Michael and Ellen, I see no problem whatever with the concept of "sense of life." Not to say that we should automatically agree with everything that Rand and Branden said, but I think they nailed it. NB's discussion in The Psychology of Self-Esteem is a helpful alternative, in case Rand's comments in The Romantic Manifesto are too off-putting. Certainly the idea of sense of life can be misunderstood, even abused (i.e., used to control or abuse other people), but that's true with many ideas, including morality. And yes, it seems to posit an unobservable mental phenomenon...except it *is* observable, in oneself through introspection and in others by inference (and/or operation of mirror neurons). If we reject the idea that we have faculties that are partly inborn, partly developed parts of our nervous systems, then we're going to have trouble not just with the existence of sense of life, but with a *lot* of mental faculties, including reason, memory-recall, imagination, etc.

Michael, Rand's apparent waffling or vacillating between calling modern art "art" or "anti-art" does seem to involve a fallacy, but I think it really doesn't. I wrote about this (ouch) 41 years ago, and it's been posted on my web site(s) for 15 years or more. If you haven't read it yet, check it out. (http://www.rogerbissell.com/id11bbbb.htm) It's my essay about the Fallacy of the Frozen Abstraction, which Rand identified over 50 years ago in "Collectivized Ethics." As I noted in my essay, she herself commits this fallacy in rather flagrant form. E.g., in "The Age of Envy," she continually bounces back and forth in discussing those who "hate the good for being good", sometimes calling them human beings or "men" and sometimes drumming them out of the human race.

However, the case of Rand's seeming inconsistency about the status of modern art is easily enough understood as her referring to it as "modern art" for the purpose of discussion -- a la: these objects that people refer to as "modern art." In other words, Rand's not really saying "this art really isn't art." She's saying "this stuff called 'modern art' really isn't art." Rand may be wrong in her interpretation of what (some or all) modern art is doing; she may be wrong in her definition of "art;" or both. But I think the "principle of charity" (or benevolence, if you will) should be extended in this case.

True, Rand has a kind of moral-conceptual fastidiousness that she extends to numerous categories, expelling from the category things she disapproves of, even though they clearly belong in the category as she has defined it. E.g., her extended rant about "haters" not being (and then being, and then not being, and then being...etc) human beings -- qua animals that are capable of rationality -- is a blatant example of this moral condemnation and conceptual ostracism masquerading (not too well) as hard-headed epistemological purity. On the other hand, I think that -- given the way she defines "art" and the way she interprets what modern art is doing (disintegrating for the sake of disintegrating) -- the way she categorizes "modern art" as non-art or anti-art is not an example of the Frozen Abstraction fallacy.

Again, the problem may be with her definition (though I don't think so) -- in which case, it would really have been interesting if someone back in the 60s or 70s could have come up with a better (hopefully valid) definition of art that was consistent with reality (and hopefully withy more basic Objectivist ideas), and then gotten Rand's take on how to apply it to "modern art" -- or modern art, if you will. Personally, however, I think the problem is with the interpretation and application (by Rand and others) of her definition, and that modern art really is art. She notoriously claimed that architecture is a form of art, even though she also on the same page noted that it does not re-create reality. If she couldn't even formulate and express the nature of architecture well enough for it to be included as an entry in The Ayn Rand Lexicon, then is it any surprise that she stumbled so badly about modern art?

Even granting Rand's claim that some modern art is nihilistic and/or disintegrative in its intent, however, what she didn't realize is that those creations are just as much art as philosophic nihilism is philosophy. Just ask Leonard Peikoff, who regards Kant as one of the greatest philosophers, yet also spends a great deal of time in The DIM Hypothesis unjustly lambasting Kantianism as a nihilistic, disintegrative philosophy. Kantianism is the D in Peikoff's DIM. (For further details, see my review of DIM which appeared in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies last year.) We can, if we want to accept Rand's framework, legitimately refer to certain philosophies, artworks, concepts, etc. as "anti", in the sense of deliberately disintegrative and nihilistic. But "anti" does not mean "non."

REB

[Jonathan]

Michael and Ellen, I see no problem whatever with the concept of "sense of life."

I think that the main problem is that it doesn't apply to everyone, despite Rand's believing that it does. Rand experienced it, but that doesn't mean that everyone does.

Not everyone gets emotionally worked up over "a new neighborhood, a discovery, adventure, struggle, triumph — or: the folks next door, a memorized recitation, a family picnic, a known routine, comfort."

Not everyone feels an inherent, contextless, black-or-white, love-it-or-hate-it, orgasm-or-tantrum, prejudicial reaction to "a heroic man, the skyline of New York, a sunlit landscape, pure colors, ecstatic music—or: a humble man, an old village, a foggy landscape, muddy colors, folk music."

Not all people have a “kind of universe which is right for me, in which I would feel at home,” but are capable of understanding and experiencing different perspectives, contexts and nuances.

J

[Ellen Stuttle]

I think that the main problem is that it doesn't apply to everyone, despite Rand's believing that it does.

I think that the process she said happens didn't apply to her either. Yes, she had strong artistic favorites, and started categorizing art from early childhood as "her" and "not her," and, yes, she lumped certain categories as producing certain emotions in her.

But this doesn't demonstrate that her subconscious was a recorder adding every conclusion and mental action and producing a "sum" which was a constant emotion underlying her every emotion, "set[ting] the nature of [her] emotional responses and the essence of [her] character" - or, alternately, that her subconscious retained only those values which she considered "important" and produced an "integrated sum" of these "basic values." (She changes her own story about how the mechanism supposedly works.)

Ellen

[Ellen Stuttle]

I will point out that I have no duty to answer to these schoolmarmish tests, especially if they are asked in poor faith.

You aren't obligated to answer questions. I will point out, however, that the questions aren't asked "in poor faith" but instead from curiosity as to what if anything you can actually specify which differentiates "volitional" from "voluntary" action in visual art.

Ellen

"Curiosity". Excuse my chortle.

I will let you in on one, surefire way to spot poor faith argumentation. When in a lengthy discussion the other debaters do not articulate one, at least one, agreement with you. I.E. Everything one says to others is received as automatic dross, without anyone conceding a single, truthful point.But- it's a human and intellectual IMPOSSIBILITY to fault everything from another person--if, that is, one is being honest.

E.g. I would agree Adolf Hitler on one thing, the enjoyment of our dogs.

Tony,

I find the large majority of what you write so utterly nebulous, I don't know what you're trying to say. There might be some of it I'd agree with if you'd state it clearly enough I could tell what it was.

Where the issue of "volitional consciousness" in a painting started was a long while back, with your signing on to Rand's description of Vermeer's paintings as displaying "the bleak metaphysics of Naturalsim."

For one thing, she was talking anachronistically there. She'd started using "Naturalism" as a catch-all opposite to "Romanticism" instead of using it to mean a particular type of late-19th- through early-20th-century literature.

She'd furthermore defined the difference between "Romanticism" and "Naturalism" as acknowledging versus denying volition.

I think that you'd forgotten the way she defined the categories, as she used them, and that you were speaking only in terms of "life as it is" versus "life as it might be and should be."

When I reminded you of Rand's definition, and said that I think that it doesn't make sense with the visual arts, you came up with a difference between "volitional" and "voluntary" action, saying that Vermeer's paintings only display the latter but none of the former.

I think that you came up with this difference on the spur of the moment and can't defend it with anything specific you can point to in paintings. But I'm curious to see what if anything you would point to if you'd actually give it a try instead of continuing to avoid the issue.

I think the avoidance itself is a pretty convincing demonstration that you can't make good on specifying.

Ellen

[Ellen Stuttle]

If we reject the idea that we have faculties that are partly inborn, partly developed parts of our nervous systems, then we're going to have trouble not just with the existence of sense of life, but with a *lot* of mental faculties, including reason, memory-recall, imagination, etc.

I don't reject "the idea that we have faculties that are partly inborn, partly developed parts of our nervous systems." Accepting this idea doesn't entail accepting what Rand says on "sense of life."

Ellen

[anthony]

When I reminded you of Rand's definition, and said that I think that it doesn't make sense with the visual arts, you came up with a difference between "volitional" and "voluntary" action, saying that Vermeer's paintings only display the latter but none of the former.

I think that you came up with this difference on the spur of the moment and can't defend it with anything specific you can point to in paintings. But I'm curious to see what if anything you would point to if you'd actually give it a try instead of continuing to avoid the issue.

I think the avoidance itself is a pretty convincing demonstration that you can't make good on specifying.

Ellen

Ellen,

Hadn't we gone over this with Rand's "importance"? We know the artist has control over every aspect of a picture or novel. If he has the conviction that man is a being of volitional consciousness, the painting or fiction should usually reflect this in content, style, etc. Same, if he wants no more than to show life as 'au naturel', reflecting man as ordinary, in ordinary pursuits. Or, without hope in a dull existence he has no power over.

Because I think it is the EXTRAordinary that separates Romanticism. "Hypercubus" gives a sense of grandeur, I've remarked: Extraordinary subject, extaordinary light, pose, background, colour, styling, perspective - high drama - with the other figure uplifting her gaze on him.

Importance.

'Doing something' is present in many artworks and all novels. But a "voluntary" action (woman writing at desk) is not necessarily - and often not- redolent of a man or woman of stature, of purposeful action, overcoming adversity and achieving goals and unique character.

Degas shows scenes as accurately as if he were a photographer who'd spent time hanging around the wings of a theatre, shooting candid pics.

My ex-dancer lady has always had some copies around; she admires that he captured the grittiness of the often painful discipline of dance, and typical backstage scenes so well. (Maestro Cecchetti himself is featured teaching dancers in one painting).

Which is by the way.

[Brant Gaede]

I believe Rand eschewed romanticism in literature in favor of "romantic realism." Did she talk of romanticism in any other art?

--Brant

[william.scherk]

When I reminded you of Rand's definition, and said that I think that it doesn't make sense with the visual arts, you came up with a difference between "volitional" and "voluntary" action, saying that Vermeer's paintings only display the latter but none of the former.

I think that you came up with this difference on the spur of the moment and can't defend it with anything specific you can point to in paintings. But I'm curious to see what if anything you would point to if you'd actually give it a try instead of continuing to avoid the issue.

We know the artist has control over every aspect of a picture [...] If he has the conviction that man is a being of volitional consciousness, the painting or fiction should usually reflect this in content, style, etc.

[...]

'Doing something' is present in many artworks [...] But a "voluntary" action [...] is not necessarily - and often not- redolent of a man or woman of stature, of purposeful action, overcoming adversity and achieving goals and unique character.

Sometimes I have to work a bit to get at just what Tony is trying to illustrate. I think his point is more or less this:

-- If a given painter is convinced that man is a being of volitional consciousness**, then the painter's control over every aspect of a painting means that his paintings usually reflect his sense of life.

This can make sense, if I understand what volitional consciousness is, and if I understand what sense of life means, and if I understand that in content, a Romanticist painter will show people of stature, of unique character, in purposeful action, defeating adversity, achieving goals. A Romanticist painter (as opposed to a Naturalist painter -- as if they were the only two divisions of 'school' possible) will paint uplifting and beautiful scenes in which people act as if they were in control of their lives and destinies.

It's a crapshoot whether I understand Tony or not. I am with those folks who wish he would illustrate his contentions with reference to actual paintings. I get the feeling that Tony knows what is Romanticist painting, and has many favoured Romanticist artists and would post such paintings if he felt his collocutors were operating in good faith.

Could it be that Tony has the goods on art, but is not really wanting to argue about particulars?

Degas shows scenes as accurately as if he were a photographer who'd spent time hanging around the wings of a theatre, shooting candid pics.

My ex-dancer lady [...] admires that he captured the often painful discipline of dance, and typical backstage scenes so well.

Tony cites a painter! Though Tony hasn't really tied together the notions explicitly, I think he is saying that Degas has a good 'sense of life' and that he therefore viewed human beings as possessing a rational will** -- and thus Degas' paintings represent a Romanticism through and through.

To paraphrase Tony again, if a given painter is convinced that man is a being of volitional consciousness, then the painter's control over every aspect of a painting means that his paintings usually reflect his sense of life.

_____________________

** the more times a see "a being of volitional consciousness," the less I like it. Volition is, in most dictionaries, a kind of will -- the kind of will that compels action, which action has been chosen by a rational mind. By my own volition. His action was volitional. He meant to do the action. By your own volition you came here today. (but, his action was voluntary. You volunteered the information. Your voluntary admission. The action was not automatic, it was voluntary.

Fudge.

By adding 'volitional' as a modifier to 'consciousness' the concept seems to mean that a subset of human beings achieve a consciousness beyond mere conscious awareness and knee-jerk or conditioned actions. These better humans' consciousness is volitional. Their minds' wills are informed by reason, by decisions taken in full light of knowledge. Their consciousness wills things to happen, and happen the things do.

(how this volitional consciousness can be portrayed by an artist, and how one can close-to-objectively discern such portrayals, I have no idea, really. I hope someone can help me out with my lack of discernment as to 'volitional consciousness' and with a method of testing for it)

That confusion aside, glad that Tony brought up Degas. This is my favourite Degas. These are beings of volitional consciousness, but probably having an early evening after their busy day backstage ...

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Michael and Ellen, I see no problem whatever with the concept of "sense of life." Not to say that we should automatically agree with everything that Rand and Branden said, but I think they nailed it.

. . .

Michael, Rand's apparent waffling or vacillating between calling modern art "art" or "anti-art" does seem to involve a fallacy, but I think it really doesn't.

Roger,

I want to engage you here, but your invitation to discuss is about a topic (or better, subtext) I have grown weary of.

The reason I bring up my disagreements with Rand's concept of sense of life and her sometimes stylistic inconsistencies in using the same terms with different definitions in the same essay without making the differences clear to the reader is not because I am bashing Rand, want to show I know more than Rand, want to show she is a goddess with feet of clay, elevate myself over Rand, or any of that stuff.

My premise, subtext, starting point, purpose, whatever you want to call it is to try to understand something correctly. Especially when a nagging thought in my mind will not let go. And the more I learn about certain issues, the louder the nagging gets. So I think it through, come to conclusions and discuss them.

It's a very innocent intention. And from my perspective, your post came off more in line with defending Rand against an attack by an enemy than talking about the substance of my comments (validity, partial validity, nuance, what do you mean?, etc.).

I use the epistemological form of identify something correctly first, then evaluate it. The tone of your post made me feel like my comments have been evaluated first, then somewhat identified to back up the evaluation.

If you are interested in what I have to say and wish to discuss it (and disagree with it to your heart's content), I'm all ears and eagerly wish to do that. I love slogging through concepts and polishing my understanding. And you have one hell of a good mind. If you just want to say Rand was right and I am wrong, get hostile and aggressive (like you have done before with me like in discussing DIM--and I admit to sloppy writing back then), defend Rand's honor, or something like that, I love you dearly as a friend, but I am not interested.

James Valliant cured me of discussing that stuff in that tone for good.

Michael

EDIT: God! What an insinuation! I don't mean to compare you to Valliant at all. That would be like comparing the speed of a gazelle (you) to that of a sloth. I was just talking about the "Rand was right, Rand was wrong subtext" I see way too much in forum life. Sorry...

[anthony]

That confusion aside, glad that Tony brought up Degas. This is my favourite Degas. These are beings of volitional consciousness, but probably having an early evening after their busy day backstage ...

Natch. It figures. One of Degas' most naturalist, determinist and dispiriting paintings. For its sense of life - PLUS its value-judgments.

William makes Rand's case for her, with his prime example.

William should at least understand what "a being of volitional consciousness" means. It's a consciousness which is effortfully self-generated and directed, William: not a consciousness "that wills things to happen", magically.

Strangely, it is an attribute of all mankind, not just "a subset". For all who activate it anyhow. Arch- skeptics may not apply.

[Roger Bissell]

No problem, Michael. I've been likened to far worse than James Not-So-Valliant. (Names are being withheld to preserve my future chances of ascending to the Throne of Objectivism.

Your analysis of the motives behind my post is very sophisticated, unnecessarily so. I simply am cautioning against throwing out the trail-blazingly-insightful baby with the moralistic-Randian bathwater. (Same for Peikoff's DIM, which has been badly applied, but which IMO has genuine validity and merit.)

There is a very smart and well-published neuroscientist named Antonio Damasio who gets into this territory (sense of life or whatever else you might want to call it) in his latest book "Self Comes to Mind." I recommend it especially to Ellen, but also to you.

But I get the feeling that I'm coming into the discussion a bit late, like the train shipping out Rand's concept of sense of life has already left the station, and that her and Branden's idea has already been judged to be more like "phlogiston" or "elan vitae" than one recognizing a legitimate psychological phenomenon. If so, so be it.

REB

[Roger Bissell]

In the Epilog to his 2009 book on Objectivism, Nathaniel listed a number of Rand's ideas and attitudes that he no longer endorsed after his split with her, and some of which he thought were actually counter-productive and destructive. Unlike his stern review and abandonment of these ideas of Rand's, Nathaniel has continued to recognize "sense of life" as a valid concept about a real phenomenon. Are you folks saying that perhaps this is a blind spot in his thinking, after all these years?

REB

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Roger,

I'm going out right now, but a quick note.

Notice I did not say sense of life is an invalid idea. Ellen says that it does not exist at all (if I understood her correctly).

I believe it is part of something bigger, not the whole enchilada. I add biology and surrounding culture and probably a few other things, so I don't believe it is just an integrated subconscious sum of choices made over a lifetime. Basically, I think it is a template (like some Jungian archetypes are) that colors a person's inner storytelling.

btw - Thanks for the Damassio recommendation. I have that book, but have only skimmed through it. (I have three others by him, too. sigh... life is short and books are long and I read too damn slow... ) I have a nice little library of works by leading neuroscientists and psychologists who write for laypeople.

One of my favorite neuroscientists in terms of videos on YouTube is V.S. Ramachandran. (I have a couple of books by him, too.) If you have never seen anything by him, Google his name. The stuff he studies can get weird, even creepy, but it's an eye-opener when you start thinking about how the mind works. And some of it it applies directly to ideas like sense of life.

Later I might look up a few and post them.

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

In the Epilog to his 2009 book on Objectivism, Nathaniel listed a number of Rand's ideas and attitudes that he no longer endorsed after his split with her, and some of which he thought were actually counter-productive and destructive. Unlike his stern review and abandonment of these ideas of Rand's, Nathaniel has continued to recognize "sense of life" as a valid concept about a real phenomenon. Are you folks saying that perhaps this is a blind spot in his thinking, after all these years?

REB

What book is this Roger?

--Brant

[Roger Bissell]

Hey there, Brant -- the 2009 book by NB is "The Vision of Ayn Rand," and it is his 20 lectures on Basic Principles of Objectivism, as codified in his recordings for Academic Associates about 1968-69, and transcribed by me, Jerry Biggers, Robert Campbell, and whoever else I'm forgetting to name (sorry!).

Caveat: the index for "Vision," which I threw together under duress and with embarrassing incompetence, is so faulty that I had to redo it. It's available as a separate item, packaged with a Study Guide, and it's marketed by Jim Peron who runs an online book service called Fr33 Minds, or something like that. Good luck!

REB

[Brant Gaede]

Thx, R, I never thought of it as a new book!

I need the index.

--Brant