Rationally Selfish: "The Morality of Selling Your Body" by Dr. Diana Hsieh

[George H. Smith]

You are the one who is divorcing ethics from human behavior. Brain activity per se is not human behavior.

George,

Really?

This is the meaning you get from what I wrote?

Then I am piss-poor at writing right now or you are simply sloppy in reading what I write.

It's one or the other.

Michael

You said, or at least I think you said, that ethicists who don't regard neurophysiology as especially relevant to their discipline are denying the importance of observing human behavior. I replied, in effect, that we don't need to understand neurophysiology in order to observe human behavior. A Greek philosopher living 2500 years ago could observe human behavior as easily as we can now.

It may very well be that organic brain behavior might eventually be explained via Quantum Mechanics, or some variant thereof. Okay, but even if this happens, it wouldn't mean that we could not understand human behavior without a knowledge of QM.

There are different kinds of explanation. The relevant kind of explanation in a given situation depends on what we wish to explain. There is no absolute standard by which we can crown one kind of explanation as the best in all situations. There is no "best," absolutely speaking. There is only the "best" in a given context, for a given purpose. Neurophysiological explanations are not (usually) the best in an ethical context.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

You said, or at least I think you said, that ethicists who don't regard neurophysiology as especially relevant to their discipline are denying the importance of observing human behavior.

George,

Well, there's one problem. I didn't say that. I didn't intend it. I don't believe it.

I said the ancients ONLY had the human behavior they observed as a guide. What I meant was observed human behavior as the conceptual referents for their theories.

In addition to that, modern scientists not only have the human behavior they observe (and the wisdom of the ages), they ALSO have human behavior tested under controlled experiments AND they have physical meddling with the brain, including measuring brain activity through magnetically imaging blood flow in the brain (and some other means).

I hope that is clearer.

(btw - Quantum mechanics have not figured into my brain studies so far. I rarely see it referenced, at least in the things I have studied. Well... there are Law of Attraction "experts" who kinda throw it into their idea soup they serve up, but I don't take those folks seriously for anything fundamental.)

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

... this reminds me a bit of discussing stuff with Phil...

George,

Preemptive apology.

It's not THAT bad.

Michael

[George H. Smith]

I wasn't attempting to set you up. I was honestly confused about your position.

George,

It's hard to discuss something with someone who dismisses an idea out of hand without looking at it.

I'm sorry. I don't mean to sound impatient, but this reminds me a bit of discussing stuff with Phil when he poo-poos something and says he doesn't need to look into it to know it's wrong and you have made a lot of focused study about it. Then he takes stabs and makes presumptions that are consistently off the mark.

Michael

You are making this far too personal, but if you want to get polemical, then, fine, let's get polemical.

Why the hell should I spend time investigating a specialized field of science when you cannot explain the relevance of that field to ethics? Understanding how the brain works has many beneficial applications, such as in the treatment of mental abnormalities, but (for the most part) such knowledge has nothing to do with ethics.

Consider: For centuries philosophers have claimed that "self-preservation" is the strongest human impulse, and they proceeded to discuss how this impulse, which they regarded as inseparable from human nature, will frequently overpower everything else. Well, suppose these philosophers understood that this impulse originates in the "Lizard" part of the brain (or whatever). How would -- or should -- this knowledge have influenced their reasoning?

Not at all, that's how. One can know, from the observation of human behavior, that the "instinct" of self-preservation is a primordial drive of humans. To know, in addition, where in the brain this primordial desire originates, or how that part of the brain interacts with other parts, adds absolutely nothing to the basic observation itself. These philosophers called the desire for self-preservation an aspect of human nature. What modern science has done is to explain this feature of human nature in terms of neurophysiology.

Fine, but the basic fact remains the same. To know that self-preservation is a primordial drive of human beings is all that was necessary for ethicists. To know why this is the case, as explained by modern science, is important for some disciplines, but not for ethics.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Fine, but the basic fact remains the same. To know that self-preservation is a primordial drive of human beings is all that was necessary for ethicists. To know why this is the case, as explained by modern science, is important for some disciplines, but not for ethics.

George,

Actually this leaves out a whole lot on the fundamental ethical level. Like when and how the neocortex can override the lizard brain and identifying how the neocortex is not all that involved with basic survival.

When you know how the seesaw works, you can understand why values vary within the same person and from person to person and do a pretty good job of predicting them. Then, you can devise ethical principles more suited to the variation that will work--short term, medium term and long term.

If you don't think this is important, though, I'm not going to press it. My time is running out for now.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Why the hell should I spend time investigating a specialized field of science when you cannot explain the relevance of that field to ethics?

Well, Phil,

I've dropped some big hints and actually made some pretty good explanations that you are pretty good at ignoring.

(I couldn't resist.)

Michael

[George H. Smith]

Fine, but the basic fact remains the same. To know that self-preservation is a primordial drive of human beings is all that was necessary for ethicists. To know why this is the case, as explained by modern science, is important for some disciplines, but not for ethics.

George, Actually this leaves out a whole lot on the fundamental ethical level. Like when and how the neocortex can override the lizard brain and identifying how the neocortex is not all that involved with basic survival. When you know how the seesaw works, you can understand why values vary and do a pretty good job of predicting them. Then, you can devise ethical principle more suited to the variation that will work--short term, medium term and long term. If you don't think this is important, though, I'm not going to press it. My time is running out for now. Michael

You need only do one thing. You need only give one example of a prediction, even if only a probable prediction, about human behavior -- one based on neurophysiology -- that would have surprised any good philosopher before the age of modern science. Just one.

Keep in mind that much of what used to be called "philosophy" is now called "psychology." Read the works of the best observers of human behavior -- from Aristotle to Augustine to Montaigne to Pascal to Spinoza to Machiavelli to Smith to Schopenhauer to Nietzsche, etc. -- and you will quickly learn that there is little if anything new under the Sun in this area.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

You need only do one thing. You need only give one example of a prediction, even if only a probable prediction, about human behavior -- one based on neurophysiology -- that would have surprised any good philosopher before the age of modern science. Just one.

George,

You're roping me into an agenda I said I am not promoting, but this is so easy right off the top of my head that I can't resist.

Autism.

The moral behavior of certain autistics would have probably surprised the ancients in the total lack of a good and evil compass. For many acts, it is simply not there.

No devil.

And later, no noumenal realm from which to get categorical imperatives.

No nothing.

(God, I hate playing what would the ancients have thought? Or what would Ayn Rand have thought? Etc.)

EDIT: I should add to this. In the autistic person, certain physical neural pathways simply do not exist. The ancients thought these poor souls were possessed. Now we know about neuroplasticity and how to create NEW neural pathways (and it ain't through traditional teaching). Thus an autistic person who lacks a "moral compass" can now develop a fairly functional one.

Put that in your ancient ethics pipe and smoke it.

Michael

[George H. Smith]

You need only do one thing. You need only give one example of a prediction, even if only a probable prediction, about human behavior -- one based on neurophysiology -- that would have surprised any good philosopher before the age of modern science. Just one.

George, You're roping me into an agenda I said I am not promoting, but this is so easy right off the top of my head that I can't resist. Autism. The moral behavior of certain autistics would have probably surprised the ancients in the total lack of a good and evil compass. For many acts, it is simply not there. No devil. And later, no noumenal realm from which to get categorical imperatives. No nothing. (God, I hate playing what would the ancients have thought? Or what would Ayn Rand have thought? Etc.) Michael

You have raised the subject of abnormal behavior. If you had paid any attention at all to what I have written so far, you would know that this is not what I was talking about. If you wish to ground a theory of ethics in such behavior, be my guest.

Even so, such cases were discussed, and sometimes in a reasonable manner, by earlier philosophers. Or do you think that autism is a new phenomenon? Your caricatures of earlier philosophers cannot come from having read them.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

You have raised the subject of abnormal behavior. If you had paid any attention at all to what I have written so far, you would know that this is not what I was talking about. If you wish to ground a theory of ethics in such behavior, be my guest.

Even so, such cases were discussed, and sometimes in a reasonable manner, by earlier philosophers. Or do you think that autism is a new phenomenon? Your caricatures of earlier philosophers cannot come from having read them.

George,

You didn't start off talking. You started off totally missing my point and poo-pooing it.

Take it to any place you want. I have no doubt if I don't like it, all I need to do is wait a minute and it will change. You have discussed everything from channeling the ancients to quantum mechanics so far, including some real zingers in getting what I wrote wrong.

Frankly, it's weird to see you ask why you should correctly identify something (or study it) before you evaluate it. This is a pure example of the normative before cognitive thinking process.

It would be useful if we could finish one point before going off in thirty different directions, all seemingly attempts to keep the poo-poo in place without doing any real work.

Are you done with the "nothing is new" agenda or do I have to repeat my position? Or maybe you have a new spin on it you want to try out?

Michael

[George H. Smith]

You have raised the subject of abnormal behavior. If you had paid any attention at all to what I have written so far, you would know that this is not what I was talking about. If you wish to ground a theory of ethics in such behavior, be my guest. Even so, such cases were discussed, and sometimes in a reasonable manner, by earlier philosophers. Or do you think that autism is a new phenomenon? Your caricatures of earlier philosophers cannot come from having read them.

George, You didn't start off talking. You started off totally missing my point and poo-pooing it. Take it to any place you want. I have no doubt if I don't like it, all I need to do is wait a minute and it will change. You have discussed everything from channeling the ancients to quantum mechanics so far, including some real zingers in getting what I wrote wrong. Frankly, it's weird to see you ask why you should correctly identify something (or study it) before you evaluate it. This is a pure example of the normative before cognitive thinking process. It would be useful if we could finish one point before going off in thirty different directions, all seemingly attempts to keep the poo-poo in place without doing any real work. Are you done with the "nothing is new" agenda or do I have to repeat my position? Or maybe you have a new spin on it you want to try out? Michael

I am not evaluating neurophysiology before I study it, because I am not evaluating the discipline at all. I am quite willing to accept all its scientific conclusions, or your intepretations of those conclusions, for the sake of argument. All I want to know is what relevance this knowlege has for ethics. Suppose I said that knowledge of geology is indispensable for ethics, and that if you refuse to study geology then you have no right to "evaluate" it. How would you reply? Would you say, "Golly gee, I will read some geology texts right away"? Or would you demand that I first explain what geology has to do with ethics?.

A problem in this exchange is that you have skipped over a number of my objections without addressing them at all. Do you want to focus this discussion? Okay, then focus on this and then answer it:

Consider: For centuries philosophers have claimed that "self-preservation" is the strongest human impulse, and they proceeded to discuss how this impulse, which they regarded as inseparable from human nature, will frequently overpower everything else. Well, suppose these philosophers understood that this impulse originates in the "Lizard" part of the brain (or whatever). How would -- or should -- this knowledge have influenced their reasoning?

If you prefer to ignore this passage a second time -- which, in my judgment, addresses your major point directly -- then please explain what your point is.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

The moral behavior of certain autistics would have probably surprised the ancients in the total lack of a good and evil compass. For many acts, it is simply not there.

No devil.

And later, no noumenal realm from which to get categorical imperatives.

No nothing.

(God, I hate playing what would the ancients have thought? Or what would Ayn Rand have thought? Etc.)

EDIT: I should add to this. In the autistic person, certain physical neural pathways simply do not exist. The ancients thought these poor souls were possessed. Now we know about neuroplasticity and how to create NEW neural pathways (and it ain't through traditional teaching). Thus an autistic person who lacks a "moral compass" can now develop a fairly functional one.

Put that in your ancient ethics pipe and smoke it.

Michael

That mental abnormalities are the result of brain abnormalities was asserted in the 5th century B.C. by Hippocrates. This truth was subsequently affirmed by Aretaeus, Soranus, Galen, and others.

Ancient enough for you?

Ghs

[Xray]

You said: "It is not the business of ethics to explain the causes of human behavior."

Maybe not, but then what is the business of ethics if you divorce human behavior from it? In my world, concepts start with observation and the field of ethics is for humans.

Human behavior consists of the actions that people take. Neuroscientists attempt to correlate certain parts of the brain and their activities with specific desires, actions, and so forth. Fine, but one needn't know any of this to be a good ethicist. You are the one who is divorcing ethics from human behavior. Brain activity per se is not human behavior.

I think no one would deny that an ethics based on a rational assessment of the human mind has to stay au courant with current research on that mind.

For example, research on the human mind/brain have to be taken into account when it comes to scrutinizing assertions in field of ethics like e. g.

"Man’s values control his subconscious emotional mechanism that functions like a computer adding up his desires, his experiences, his fulfillments and frustrations—like a sensitive guardian watching and constantly assessing his relationship to reality. " http://aynrandlexico...con/values.html

But Is it really 'Man's values' that do the controlling here? Suppose neurological reseach should come to a different conclusion, it would disprove the above assertion.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

A problem in this exchange is that you have skipped over a number of my objections without addressing them at all. Do you want to focus this discussion? Okay, then focus on this and then answer it:

George,

I think I prefer to go back to where this started and get to the points in order of misunderstanding. They kinda grew from and upon each other.

If you don't properly identify the human mind, most of the rules you make up for it to obey will be arbitrary. If some rules work better than others (like in the different religions), it's because these rules have shown to produce certain results by trial and error over mankind's history. Argument from authority coupled with traditionally held views and results is about as much identification of the mind as you are going to get using that method.

Knowledge of the human mind is not the same thing as knowledge of the human brain. The latter is not necessary for a theory of ethics. The ancient Greeks came up with a number of plausible ethical theories, and they knew virtually nothing about the human brain.

The characteristics that you attribute to the Lizard Brain have been known for ages; such fundamental drives were typically attributed to the animalistic aspect of human nature and were known as "instincts" (or by a simlar term). A knowledge of brain physiology might enchance ethical theory here and there, but it cannot provide a foundation for ethical theory. So far as ethics is concerned, we can learn more about human nature by reading a keen observer of human behavior who lived 2000 years ago than we will ever learn from a modern brain specialist.

Let's dig in.

My point was that the efficacy of ethical rules were developed over time through trial and error. (That's why I used the term, "trial and error," i.e., because that's what I meant.) But to be clearer, in this context I meant trial and error in terms of observing human behavior. (How else could trial and error work for ethics and the mind in ancient times?)

For the record, I didn't mean trial and error like in modern scientific experiments, but instead in terms of simply observing when humans did XXX, one result consistently happened. When they did YYY, another result happened. When they did ZZZ, erratic stuff happened. This includes noting the things that didn't work--that didn't produce any kind of result for anyone--or worse, caused damage to the doer. All this got put on the gradually evolving map of understanding the human mind accordingly.

This was all the ancients had. (Well, there was introspection, too.)

They didn't have more modern ways of trial and error to use for conceptual referents.

You responded with this: "Knowledge of the human mind is not the same thing as knowledge of the human brain."

No shit, Sherlock. This did not address what I said. It is something new you just threw in.

There's an implication here that the brain has no influence over the mind, but since you did not come out and say that, I will not attribute it to you.

This is how this discussion started. With such a poor start, is it any wonder we got to talking past each other?

Then you followed up with this pearl of wisdom: "The latter is not necessary for a theory of ethics."

And whoever claimed it was?

Your strawman?

I will not address the other observations in this post except the following two:

You wrote: "A knowledge of brain physiology might enchance ethical theory here and there, but it cannot provide a foundation for ethical theory."

That's quite a dogmatic statement. It means something far different than your pearl, that knowledge of the brain is not necessary to come up with an ethical theory. Here you are claiming that you cannot do so at all.

I don't know if that is worth refuting. You are entitled to your opinion, I guess. I can also make up arbitrary statements about stuff like that--stuff that I claim that can't be done--and demand you refute them. I don't see any value in it.

Especially seeing as how I would never claim that a person well versed in "brain physiology" would be totally ignorant of everything else and would attempt to devise an ethical theory in a vacuum with only some limited science to go on. (Did you really think I was saying that?) Nor would I claim that a neuroscientist's sole focus is "brain physiology." (I think you were kinda bluffing here because, judging from your statements in this discussion, I don't think you really know much about what neuroscientists do.)

There is so much wrong with that statement that I feel that this little I wrote about it is too much. You complained that I ignored certain things? That, to me, is a hell of a good reason to ignore it.

You also wrote, "So far as ethics is concerned, we can learn more about human nature by reading a keen observer of human behavior who lived 2000 years ago than we will ever learn from a modern brain specialist."

Once again, I never claimed that any such contest existed. This is your contest, not mine. and you picked the winner of your strawman duel.

Wanna see just how silly this sounded to me? The first things I asked myself when I read that was, "Who is we?" and "More in terms of what?" and "What parts of human nature are you referring to?" and "What do you even mean by human nature?" and even "Why would a brain specialist devise an ethical system in the first place" and "Have there been any brain specialists who have done this?"

I had to ask myself this stuff because what you wrote didn't have anything to do with what I was discussing, except maybe your dogmatic claim that knowing about brain physiology is not enough to devise the foundations of ethics.

In my world, knowledge is cumulative, not exclusionary. In other words, I don't see past knowledge VERSUS present knowledge as being a valid form of reasoning. I see present knowledge being an outgrowth of past knowledge and an addition to it.

There is no winner and loser in some kind of virtual contest.

Just because past knowledge had certain limitations that present knowledge does not, this, to me, does not mean we take an eraser to everything that has gone before. It does mean we try to understand how ideas were arrived at.

From this post on, I have had the distinct impression that you are not talking to me, but instead to someone in your head.

Every time since I have tried to answer a question, you have come up with more stuff like this.

So, before I move on, I would like for us to come to some common understanding about these points. I believe it will not only make the rest of the discussion easier and make it harder for misunderstandings to grow, it will allow us to see where they already happened and why so we can just jump over them.

Michael

EDIT: I will even try to make this clearer.

The ways ethics were devised in the past:

1. Trial and error. i.e., observing human nature.

2. Introspection and reasoning.

The ways ethics are devised now:

1. The methods used in the past, including the knowledge accumulated from them over the centuries.

2. Scientific behavior experiments under controlled conditions (modern trial and error).

3. Neuroscience.

This ain't either-or stuff. And this is how I understand the start of this issue.

[George H. Smith]

I simply don't have the time to go into all the details of how the other parts of the brain interact with the lizard brain, what part of the mind choice governs as opposed to to what part instinct governs, and under which conditions each typically kick in to dominate behavior.

This isn't necessary unless you are defending determinism. Is that your point?

You said: "It is not the business of ethics to explain the causes of human behavior." Maybe not, but then what is the business of ethics if you divorce human behavior from it? In my world, concepts start with observation and the field of ethics is for humans.

Human behavior consists of the actions that people take. Neuroscientists attempt to correlate certain parts of the brain and their activities with specific desires, actions, and so forth. Fine, but one needn't know any of this to be a good ethicist. You are the one who is divorcing ethics from human behavior. Brain activity per se is not human behavior. Ghs

I think no one would deny that an ethics based on a rational assessment of the human mind has to stay au courant with current research on that mind. For example, research on the human mind/brain have to be taken into account when it comes to scrutinizing assertions in field of ethics like e. g. "Man’s values control his subconscious emotional mechanism that functions like a computer adding up his desires, his experiences, his fulfillments and frustrations—like a sensitive guardian watching and constantly assessing his relationship to reality. " http://aynrandlexico...con/values.html But Is it really 'Man's values' that do the controlling here? Suppose neurological research should come to a different conclusion, it would disprove the above assertion.

The passage by Rand that you quoted is not an ethical claim. It is a psychological claim about the relationship between values and emotions.

Nevertheless, I fail to see how neurophysiology per se could either prove or disprove this claim. Dissect a brain as much as you like. If you find something called "values" somewhere in the parts, please let me know, for I would like to know what a particle called "value" looks like. I would also like to know what the "subconscious" looks like.

Nevertheless, I disagree with Rand, at least in part. But I would appeal to introspective psychology, not to neurophysiology, to support my criticism.

Attempts to ground ethics in hard science have been very popular in recent centuries, as we see in Herbert Spencer's later work in his Principles of Ethics, which is strewn with outdated organismic analogies. And the result has been invariably the same: As soon as the science becomes outdated, as it invariably does, the ethics is left without a foundation.

When "pure" scientists have done philosophy, the result, as often as not, has been bad philosophy and bad science.

Ghs

[Xray]

Suppose a modern Robinson Crusoe is a member of PETA and a fervent believer in animal rights. If, while stranded on an island, this Crusoe has no choice but to kill animals in order to survive, then this will be a moral dilemma for him, for the reasons I explained previously.

Ghs

This was about the only scenario I could think of regarding Rand's claim that on a desert island, man needed morality most. But I doubt she had this kind of moral dilemma in mind.

[George H. Smith]

Let's dig in. My point was that the efficacy of ethical rules were developed over time through trial and error. By this, I meant trial and error in terms of observing human behavior. (How else could trial and error work for ethics and the mind in ancient times?) For the record, I didn't mean trial and error like in modern scientific experiments, but instead in terms of simply observing when humans did XXX, one result consistently happened. When they did YYY, another result happened. When they did ZZZ, erratic stuff happened. This includes noting the things that didn't work--that didn't produce any kind of result for anyone--or worse, caused damage to the doer. All this got put on the gradually evolving map of understanding the human mind accordingly. This was all the ancients had. They didn't have more modern ways of trial and error to use for conceptual referents. You responded with this: "Knowledge of the human mind is not the same thing as knowledge of the human brain." No shit, Sherlock. This did not address what I said. It is something new you just threw in. There's an implication here that the brain has no influence over the mind, but since you did not come out and say that, I will not attribute it to you.

Good, because precious few philosophers have ever said this.

This is how this discussion started. With such a poor start, is it any wonder we got to talking past each other? Then you followed up with this pearl of wisdom: "The latter is not necessary for a theory of ethics." And whoever claimed it was?

If you believe that knowledge of neurophysiology is not necessary for a theory of ethics, then we have nothing to argue about. I'm glad to see that we agree.

Of course, this leaves me a bit mystified as to what your original point was supposed to be, but I can live with this uncertainly.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

George,

Let's put it this way.

1. A theory of ethics that is based on modern knowledge--knowledge that includes neurophysiology (to use your term)--can correct parts of theories of ethics that did not use such information in their formulation--including the foundations--with fairly accurate predictable results.

2. If and when needed, it is entirely possible for neurophysiology (to use your term) to be included in devising ethical foundations for new situations or newly known situations that were misunderstood in the past. (A few examples, autism and other brain anomalies, information overload rewiring the brain, interaction with communities on a daily basis without geographical limitations, subliminal crowd manipulation, brain mood medication, plain old vanilla-flavored brainwashing, mass advertising, etc.)

Using the modern knowledge I refer to, which includes neurophysiology (to use your term), will make such ethical systems far more sound than if this knowledge is ignored.

These are my beliefs. Like I said before (in other words), I did not pull this out of my ass. This comes from a lot of study.

Michael

[George H. Smith]

George,

Let's put it this way.

1. A theory of ethics that is based on modern knowledge--knowledge that includes neurophysiology (to use your term)--can correct parts of theories of ethics that did not use such information in their formulation--including the foundations--with fairly accurate predictable results.

2. If and when needed, it is entirely possible for neurophysiology (to use your term) to be included in devising ethical foundations for new situations or newly known situations that were misunderstood in the past. (A few examples, autism and other brain anomalies, information overload rewiring the brain, interaction with communities on a daily basis without geographical limitations, subliminal crowd manipulation, brain mood medication, plain old vanilla-flavored brainwashing, mass advertising, etc.)

Using the modern knowledge I refer to, which includes neurophysiology (to use your term), will make such ethical systems far more sound than if this knowledge is ignored.

These are my beliefs. Like I said before (in other words), I did not pull this out of my ass. This comes from a lot of study.

Michael

Do you have a problem with the label "neurophysiology"? Would you prefer "brain science," which has a somewhat broader meaning? If you prefer some other label, let me know, and I will use it.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

George,

I use neuroscience, which is very broad. Also social science or, a far far better term, behavioral science (not behaviorism, but some behaviorism can be included here).

They both go hand in hand.

Frankly (and don't laugh), I own a bunch of books that are categorized by their publishers as "neuromarketing."

This stuff has taken off like greased lightening over the last 15 years or so.

Here are a couple of icky terms for you on the social side. The first is courtesy of Cass Sunstein: choice engineering. For the second, old Bernays used to call this the engineering of consent.

(On a side note, I am thoroughly convinced that Ayn Rand was familiar with the work of Bernays. As just one example, her description of how Toohey consolidated his power practically follows the way Bernays worked and wrote about it, step-by-step.)

Michael

[George H. Smith]

George,

Let's put it this way.

1. A theory of ethics that is based on modern knowledge--knowledge that includes neurophysiology (to use your term)--can correct parts of theories of ethics that did not use such information in their formulation--including the foundations--with fairly accurate predictable results.

2. If and when needed, it is entirely possible for neurophysiology (to use your term) to be included in devising ethical foundations for new situations or newly known situations that were misunderstood in the past. (A few examples, autism and other brain anomalies, information overload rewiring the brain, interaction with communities on a daily basis without geographical limitations, subliminal crowd manipulation, brain mood medication, plain old vanilla-flavored brainwashing, mass advertising, etc.)

Using the modern knowledge I refer to, which includes neurophysiology (to use your term), will make such ethical systems far more sound than if this knowledge is ignored.

These are my beliefs. Like I said before (in other words), I did not pull this out of my ass. This comes from a lot of study.

Michael

1. Again, please give one example how neurophysiology (to use my term) can correct the foundations of an ethical theory. Here, for example, is what Spinoza wrote in 1676 -- an observation that most philosophers would (a) agree with and (b) regard as essential to ethics:

It is necessary to know the power and the infirmity of our nature, before we can determine what reason can do in restraining the emotions, and what is beyond her power.

Suppose that Spinoza had all the knowledge of the human brain that is available today. How would -- or should -- this superior knowledge have affected his statement? Unless you address this kind of question (which I have asked before), we will never get anywhere.

2. Scientific knowledge has greatly increased our knowledge of abnormal behavior. This has led to successful treatments in some cases. But this is technological knowledge, and such knowledge is value-free. The Nazis obviously knew that mental retardation has physical causes, but this didn't lead to humane treatment of mental patients. It is only when technological knowledge is combined with correct moral principles that we get better results.

For many philosophers throughout history, the purpose of ethics is to teach us how to live a good life, i.e., how to attain happiness. Many technological advances, such as anesthetics, birth control and computers, have facilitated this pursuit. The same is true of neurophysiology in some cases, e.g., if a person has an abnormality or needs an operation. But none of these technological advances is necessary to the discipline of ethics per se.

Can I become a happier person by studying the human brain? -- in contrast, say, to studying history or economics? If so, please let me know how this is possible, for I haven't a clue.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

George,

I use neuroscience, which is very broad. Also social science or, a far far better term, behavioral science (not behaviorism, but some behaviorism can be included here).

They both go hand in hand.

Frankly (and don't laugh), I own a bunch of books that are categorized by their publishers as "neuromarketing."

This stuff has taken off like greased lightening over the last 15 years or so.

Here are a couple of icky terms for you on the social side. The first is courtesy of Cass Sunstein: choice engineering. For the second, old Bernays used to call this the engineering of consent.

(On a side note, I am thoroughly convinced that Ayn Rand was familiar with the work of Bernays. As just one example, her description of how Toohey consolidated his power practically follow the way Bernays worked and wrote about it, step-by-step.)

Michael

Yes, I think "neuroscience" is probably better. I will us that from now on.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

George,

I don't get it. Why did you serve up the Spinoza statement as if it had bearing on this issue?

I think I see... you are still fighting in your imaginary contest.

Here is what I see you doing. You are essentially saying, prove to me how science can trump philosophy.

Here is my approach: I don't know much about Spinoza, but I don't see anything wrong with the statement you quoted. However, I have no idea how he would be able to know "the power and the infirmity of our nature" except by direct observation or introspection--or reading the direct observations or introspections of others.

Neuroscience can actually identify "what reason can do in restraining the emotions, and what is beyond her power," and in some cases drastically alter it, although this stuff is in its infancy.

The person who wishes to use this knowledge has a vast advantage in terms of improving achievement, happiness, self-control, etc. than people did in Spinoza's time.

You said, "Can I become a happier person by studying the human brain? -- in contrast, say, to studying history or economics? If so, please let me know how this is possible, for I haven't a clue."

Why in contrast? More contest stuff? I ain't playing. I just don't think that way.

As to whether you can gain neuroscience and behavior science knowledge that provides you a very good chance of improving your happiness lot, I offered to point you in some good directions. You then decided to play at being Phil and said you didn't need to look.

But what the hell. Here's a book I mentioned earlier: Willpower: Rediscovering the Greatest Human Strength by Roy F. Baumeister and John Tierney.

This is a fantastic start. This book was published this year. It's more behavior science oriented than neuroscience. (It even mentions Nathanial Branden, although the idea of self-esteem is not treated too flatteringly as an impact on willpower.)

A book that specifically deals with neuroscience from a marketing standpoint (with a very nice bibliography of neuroscience stuff) is Instant Appeal by Vicki Kunkel.

Both of these are light reading and extremely eye-opening. But I have a butt-load more.

Michael

[George H. Smith]

George, I use neuroscience, which is very broad. Also social science or, a far far better term, behavioral science (not behaviorism, but some behaviorism can be included here). They both go hand in hand.

I have read a lot of "social science" over the years -- hundreds of books and countless articles. Some of it is insightful and useful, but much of it -- especially the more modern stuff -- is crap.

This discipline should be called "social theory," not "social science." Despite the desire of social theorists to apply the honorific label of "scientists" to themselves, their discipline is not in the same category as what we nomally think of as science today, e.g., physics and chemistry. The closest thing to "science" in the field of social theory is economics, but I would be hard-pressed even to call that a science.

See Stanislav Andreski's classic book, Social Sciences as Sorcery. Also excellent is A.R. Louch, Explanation and Human Action.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

George, I don't get it. Why did you serve up the Spinoza statement as if it had bearing on this issue? I think I see... you are still fighting in your imaginary contest. Here is what I see you doing. You are essentially saying, prove to me how science can trump philosophy.

This is not a matter of "trumping" at all. It is a matter of understanding the cognitive functions of different kinds of knowledge.

Here is my approach: I don't know much about Spinoza, but I don't see anything wrong with the statement you quoted. However, I have no idea how he would be able to know "the power and the infirmity of our nature" except by direct observation or introspection--or reading the direct observations or introspections of others. Neuroscience can actually identify "what reason can do in restraining the emotions, and what is beyond her power..."

Neuroscience can do no such thing. If we know from experience that X is (or seems) impossible, neuroscience may tell us why X is impossible. But without this previous knowledge of human behavior, neuroscience can tell us nothing. You are using "identify" in a sloppy manner.

Suppose we encounter an alien who knows everything we know about human neuroscience, but who has never actually observed human behavior, and who has no personal experience of human desires and emotions. From his knowledge of the brain alone, this alien wouldn't be able to tell us zilch about human behavior.

Neuroscience can correlate certain types of feeling and behavior with certain brain functions, but without a previous knowledge of the former, no such correlation would be possible.

Ghs