Rationally Selfish: "The Morality of Selling Your Body" by Dr. Diana Hsieh

[Xray]

Question from a perplexed soul.

Why is enjoying "artsy" pornography un-condemnable, but enjoying a striptease results in brutish and crude desires?

Doesn't "artsy" porn arouse brutish and crude desires?

Hell, it should if it's competently made.

But you don't even have to go to porn. Doesn't Ayn Rand's rough sex scenes qualify as brutish and crude desires? You know, bruises and biting until the bleeding starts and stuff like that?

Sounds brutish and crude to me.

Now here's the kicker.

Do you really have to take a striptease all the way into explicit sex--albeit "artsy"--in order to make it un-condemnable?

Hmmm...

I don't get it.

I can't find the standard.

It's all pretty muddled, yes.

[MSK quoting from Baumeister and Tierney]:

<...>Turn up the heat, and the unthinkable becomes surprisingly thinkable.

I think you could easily paraphrase this last sentence and have it hold true for many, many Objectivists: Turn up the heat, and the immoral becomes surprisingly moral.

In other words, the lizard brain will not be denied unless he is at rest. You may or may not act on what he wants, but if you don't, he will make your life hell during the "heat."

I never see this kind of thing discussed within the context of Objectivist morality.

To phrase this another way, our values can change drastically depending on the "heat" of the moment. And this includes some very important values.

Michael

Would be interesting to open a thread on this issue.

I can imagine that those Objectivists who actually try to live according to the required morality find themselves under constant pressure. But is the constant pressure to be 'fully consciously aware', to always pass moral judgement, to be fully rational (even in one's most intimate moments!) really compatible with the bio-psychological make-up of us humans? Imo, no.

[Xray]

I knew nothing about Hsieh until I learned of the despicable stunt that she pulled with Chris Sciabarra, who had done nothing other than mentor and encourage her. This is still basically all I know about her in this regard. I didn't know anything about her former relationships with Branden and Kelley.

Hsieh's spiteful attack on David Kelley, where she condemned his thinking as "open system folly", clearly shows what a dogmatic ideologist she is.

In the first case, I argued, the decision would be purely prudential. The atheist would ask himself questions like: Do I have the time? Do I want to spend the money? Is this movie any good? These are prudential rather than moral questions because they do not require the atheist to dig very deep into his hierarchy of values.

Could one also use the term "rational" instead of prudential here?

[Brant Gaede]

Yes, of course, but without "the other guy" do we even start to think about this subject?

--Brant

Suppose a modern Robinson Crusoe is a member of PETA and a fervent believer in animal rights. If, while stranded on an island, this Crusoe has no choice but to kill animals in order to survive, then this will be a moral dilemma for him, for the reasons I explained previously.

Ghs

Yeah, but she'll solve it--and eat. The stomach is more powerful than the mind.

--Brant

yum, yum

[Dennis Hardin]

I knew nothing about Hsieh until I learned of the despicable stunt that she pulled with Chris Sciabarra, who had done nothing other than mentor and encourage her. This is still basically all I know about her in this regard. I didn't know anything about her former relationships with Branden and Kelley.

Ghs

Here is her account.

My History with Nathaniel and Barbara Branden

The Brandens, to my knowledge, have never bothered to give their own version. I'm quite certain they felt the issue did not merit their time and energy. The one comment I remember NB making was that he felt Diana was far too intelligent and independent to remain in Peikoff’s camp for long. She would soon be disillusioned by the intellectually stifling, quasi-religious atmosphere and get the hell out. Obviously Nathaniel was giving her way too much credit. (Or perhaps he just misjudged her motives for making the switch.)

As you can see from the other link I posted, Diana has been vociferous in her denunciation of Branden since she left his employ. I suspect this was largely motivated by her wish to ‘make her bones’ (in Mafia speak) and worm her way into Peikoff’s good graces. It obviously worked. She was smart enough to see that Peikoff has never recovered from his well-deserved inferiority complex toward Branden. In some of Peikoff’s podcasts, he addresses her with atypical deference--the deference due someone who has discovered the “evil” that lurks within the soul of the man who, for all those years, not only relegated Peikoff to a secondary role but had a unique personal relationship with Rand he could never emulate.

[Brant Gaede]

I find it extremely offensive for people to set themselves up as authorities to dispense personal advice for life conduct respecting specific situations. Ann Landers and a few others do a decent job. Sometimes I might make a tentative suggestion that might help someone based on my personal knowledge and experience, but not out of philosophical intellectualizations. Frankly, D. Hsieh hasn't lived enough, long enough, to do what she's doing. That goes too for her turn-on-a-dime-throw-Branden-in-a-can-damn over six years ago, not to mention what she did to Chris Sciabarra, all so she could get in with the right crowd. But like Benedict Arnold, she'll find out England is not such a congenial place if she hasn't already.

--Brant

[Brant Gaede]

I'd bet Branden meant more to Rand to her dying day than Peikoff ever did. They had the same motto, didn't they? "Take what you want, said God, and pay for it." They sure did. All Peikoff did was take orthodox Objectivism and ride it to its grave. Well, not quite. Taxidermy has preserved it somewhat.

--Brant

[anthony]

I'd bet Branden meant more to Rand to her dying day than Peikoff ever did. --Brant

Most perspicacious, Brant.

Then again, I've had the same conjecture, so I'm biased.

[Xray]

I'd bet Branden meant more to Rand to her dying day than Peikoff ever did.

ITA. The reason why she turned against N. Branden was purely personal, not philosophical.

Into NB, Rand had projected everything that John Galt meant to her, and even after the bubble burst and it all ended in a "Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned" disaster, the sheer amount of emotional and mental energy she had invested in Branden during all those years makes it unlikely that she would ever have remained indifferent to him.

As for Peikoff, imo she mostly thought of him as a dutiful and loyal disciple.

He turned out to be a loyal disciple who fights tooth and nail to preserve his idea of Objectivism against any process of transformation.

[George H. Smith]

I knew nothing about Hsieh until I learned of the despicable stunt that she pulled with Chris Sciabarra, who had done nothing other than mentor and encourage her. This is still basically all I know about her in this regard. I didn't know anything about her former relationships with Branden and Kelley.

Hsieh's spiteful attack on David Kelley, where she condemned his thinking as "open system folly", clearly shows what a dogmatic ideologist she is.

In the first case, I argued, the decision would be purely prudential. The atheist would ask himself questions like: Do I have the time? Do I want to spend the money? Is this movie any good? These are prudential rather than moral questions because they do not require the atheist to dig very deep into his hierarchy of values.

Could one also use the term "rational" instead of prudential here?

"Prudential" is better because it signifies good judgment, i.e., the application of reason to a particular situation. "Rational" has a broader meaning.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

If you don't properly identify the human mind, most of the rules you make up for it to obey will be arbitrary. If some rules work better than others (like in the different religions), it's because these rules have shown to produce certain results by trial and error over mankind's history. Argument from authority coupled with traditionally held views and results is about as much identification of the mind as you are going to get using that method.

Michael

Knowledge of the human mind is not the same thing as knowledge of the human brain. The latter is not necessary for a theory of ethics. The ancient Greeks came up with a number of plausible ethical theories, and they knew virtually nothing about the human brain.

The characteristics that you attribute to the Lizard Brain have been known for ages; such fundamental drives were typically attributed to the animalistic aspect of human nature and were known as "instincts" (or by a simlar term). A knowledge of brain physiology might enchance ethical theory here and there, but it cannot provide a foundation for ethical theory. So far as ethics is concerned, we can learn more about human nature by reading a keen observer of human behavior who lived 2000 years ago than we will ever learn from a modern brain specialist.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

George,

You should bone up a bit on the literature before you dismiss it so cavalierly. You sound like Rand discussing Kant or claiming that humans have no instincts.

I, for one, don't dismiss ancient ethical theory. There's a lot of wisdom there.

But I don't dismiss knowing about how the brain affects the mind, either.

The entire field of advertising and propaganda (now called public relations) is based on targeting the lizard brain. The basic rule of any salesman is to sell with emotion and justify with logic. (Hey! That even sounds like what Rand did with ideas! )

And don't forget that "lizard brain" is a "virtual" division of the brain, not a totally physical one. It is basically made up of the brain stem going up to the hippocampus and some interactions with it from the higher levels. It is used to explain why humans constantly act at variance with their rationally chosen values and under which conditions they do so.

If that isn't an ethical question--a foundational one at that, I don't know what is.

If you don't think this applies to ethics, then please explain to me what makes young kids go off to be slaughtered in wars they don't even believe in. After all, they have been doing that since ancient times. (You could go for the cop-out, I suppose, and say "lack of ethics," but that simply isn't accurate.)

I have yet to read a satisfactory reason why from ethical philosophers. But I do know how people get that result from reading about neuroscience, behavior psychology and related fields.

Many of the studies I have read have been repeated many times with consistent results. If you are interested, I could point you in some directions so you could read them yourself.

The difference between the ancient Greeks and modern scientists is that the ancients only had the results of human action they observed to use as basis, whereas modern scientists have controlled testing and actual physical meddling with the brain.

But, hey, don't let facts like that get in the way of your ethical theory foundations.

Michael

[George H. Smith]

Michael,

I conceded that a "knowledge of brain physiology might enhance ethical theory here and there." What I denied is that it can "provide a foundation for ethical theory."

If you know of one instance where a scientific knowledge of the brain can provide a foundation for ethical theory, then let's see it.

Your claim that we can now "explain why humans constantly act at variance with their rational values and under which conditions they do so" is irrelevant to ethics, unless you can predict in specific cases when this will occur and when it will not. And I daresay that no one can do this.

Explanations are contextual. Ethicists have traditionally said that elemental human passions are so strong that they frequently overrule rational judgment. You say that the Lizard Brain "is basically made up of the brain stem going up to the hippocampus and some interactions with it from the higher levels." The latter explanation means absolutely nothing to most people. The traditional explanation is much better, in an ethical context..

As for boning up on the literature on the brain, I don't feel the need to bone up on geological literature either. Neither is relevant to the basic problems of ethics

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

If you don't think this applies to ethics, then please explain to me what makes young kids go off to be slaughtered in wars they don't even believe in. After all, they have been doing that since ancient times. (You could go for the cop-out, I suppose, and say "lack of ethics," but that simply isn't accurate.)

I have yet to read a satisfactory reason why from ethical philosophers. But I do know how people get that result from reading about neuroscience, behavior psychology and related fields.

It is not the business of ethics to explain the causes of human behavior.

As for kids running off to fight in wars they don't believe in, many people do not do this. And this raises the question, Why? If we all have the same basic brain structure, then why don't we all respond to similar situations in the same way? Why the many exceptions?

Yesterday a cable channel aired a bunch of episodes of "Fear Factor." It is interesting to observe how people respond so differently to fear. Some cower or flee, while others attempt to take control of a situation. The variations are considerable, and no references to a monolithic "Lizard Brain" can explain these differences.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

George,

You don't start over and build ethics from the ground up with science.

But you do mess with some of the foundations.

Here's one: free will.

Science is now understanding that willpower (let's call willpower the staying power part of free will) is organic, just like every part of our existence. This means that it becomes depleted with use and replenished with rest and nourishment. The part of the brain that processes will--at least the ones that light up during fMRI scans under controlled conditions--uses more glucose than the rest of the brain.

You don't see this messing with ethical foundations?

That's just one example.

Michael

[BaalChatzaf]

This is not even taking into account what the guy's kids are going to feel when it finally dawns on them that he masturbated for them to be born. I see lizard turning into Godzilla there, at least in some of the cases.

Conception requires one live sperm and one live egg. How they got together is totally irrelevant.

Which reminds me of a story. An egg and a rooster just had carnal intercourse and they are lying together afterward. The Rooster turns to the Egg and says: Well I guess we found the answer to THAT question.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

It is not the business of ethics to explain the causes of human behavior.

As for kids running off to fight in wars they don't believe in, many people do not do this. And this raises the question, Why? If we all have the same basic brain structure, then why don't we all respond to similar situations in the same way? Why the many exceptions?

Yesterday a cable channel aired a bunch of episodes of "Fear Factor." It is interesting to observe how people respond so differently to fear. Some cower or flee, while others attempt to take control of a situation. The variations are considerable, and no references to a monolithic "Lizard Brain" can explain these differences.

George,

Interestingly enough, you are making the "monolithic" human error. You ask why the differences in behavior between different people as if each individual were a monolithic being who had only one way of acting and reacting. The real question is why the differences in the same person during different times and in different situations.

You are also making a presumption that is false. You are presuming that I hold that the lizard brain is a static button you push that gets the exact same response from all people under all conditions at all times in their lives.

I simply don't have the time to go into all the details of how the other parts of the brain interact with the lizard brain, what part of the mind choice governs as opposed to to what part instinct governs, and under which conditions each typically kick in to dominate behavior.

You said: "It is not the business of ethics to explain the causes of human behavior."

Maybe not, but then what is the business of ethics if you divorce human behavior from it?

In my world, concepts start with observation and the field of ethics is for humans.

I thought Rand called ethics "a code of values to guide man's choices." Do you divorce human behavior from the choices man makes? If so, if you are not going to do anything with a choice you made, then why is choosing important to human life?

These, to me, are foundational ethical questions.

Michael

[George H. Smith]

George,

You don't start over and build ethics from the ground up with science.

But you do mess with some of the foundations.

Here's one: free will.

Science is now understanding that willpower (let's call willpower the staying power part of free will) is organic, just like every part of our existence. This means that it becomes depleted with use and replenished with rest and nourishment. The part of the brain that processes will--at least the ones that light up during fMRI scans under controlled conditions--uses more glucose than the rest of the brain.

You don't see this messing with ethical foundations?

That's just one example.

Michael

That "willpower" varies according to the physical condition of humans has been discussed for centuries by philosophers. Do you think, for example, that no one knew that a drunk person has less willpower than a sober person until neurologists came along? Earlier philosophers did not understand the brain chemistry involved, granted, but they didn't need to know this for the purpose of ethics.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

That "willpower" varies according to the physical condition of humans has been discussed for centuries by philosophers.

George,

Another bad presumption.

I did not restrict depletion of willpower to the physical condition of humans--although that can be a factor.

Willpower is also depleted when you use it in a solely mental way.

Think of this similar to using a muscle.

Here's an example. Under countless tests, people who have to resist the temptation of something (say a candy they love) for an extended period do not have the same patience to finish an unrelated mentally challenging task immediately after their "resist" session as people who did not have to resist.

It takes willpower to resist temptation and it takes willpower to complete mentally challenging tasks. The people who resisted temptation were more "tired" than the ones who did not have to resist.

Like I said, I can point you to all kinds of studies. The variety of ways they have tested this and the consistency of results are impressive.

Going back to the muscle idea, you can also develop stronger willpower by exercising it. And you do not need to restrict yourself to the area where you want to use it. Once again, this is borne out by testing.

Michael

[George H. Smith]

I simply don't have the time to go into all the details of how the other parts of the brain interact with the lizard brain, what part of the mind choice governs as opposed to to what part instinct governs, and under which conditions each typically kick in to dominate behavior.

This isn't necessary unless you are defending determinism. Is that your point?

You said: "It is not the business of ethics to explain the causes of human behavior."

Maybe not, but then what is the business of ethics if you divorce human behavior from it? In my world, concepts start with observation and the field of ethics is for humans.

Human behavior consists of the actions that people take. Neuroscientists attempt to correlate certain parts of the brain and their activities with specific desires, actions, and so forth. Fine, but one needn't know any of this to be a good ethicist. You are the one who is divorcing ethics from human behavior. Brain activity per se is not human behavior.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

This isn't necessary unless you are defending determinism. Is that your point?

George,

Nope.

And you are not going to set me up as one so you can argue against it, either.

I am saying what I mean within the small window I have right now.

Michael

[George H. Smith]

That "willpower" varies according to the physical condition of humans has been discussed for centuries by philosophers.

George,

Another bad presumption.

I did not restrict depletion of willpower to the physical condition of humans--although that can be a factor.

Willpower is also depleted when you use it in a solely mental capacity.

Think of this similar to using a muscle.

Here's an example. Under countless tests, people who have to resist the temptation of something (say a candy they love) for an extended period do not have the same patience to finish an unrelated mentally challenging task immediately after their "resist" session as people who did not have to resist.

It takes willpower to resist temptation and it takes willpower to complete mentally challenging tasks.

Like I said, I can point you to all kinds of studies. The variety of ways they have tested this and the consistency of results are impressive.

Going back to the muscle idea, you can also develop stronger willpower by exercising it. And you do not need to restrict yourself to the area where you want to use it. Once again, this is borne out by testing.

Michael

I merely gave one example. That willpower is lessened in a person who is mentally exhausted has also been discussed for centuries. None of this is new.

As for developing stronger willpower via exercise, this was a dominant theme, going all the way back to the Greeks, of those philosophers who stressed the roles of habit and education in the formation of character. The point here was that willpower can be strengthened through repetition, especially at an early age. Again, none of this is new.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

You are the one who is divorcing ethics from human behavior. Brain activity per se is not human behavior.

George,

Really?

This is the meaning you get from what I wrote?

Then I am piss-poor at writing right now or you are simply sloppy in reading what I write.

It's one or the other.

Michael

[George H. Smith]

This isn't necessary unless you are defending determinism. Is that your point?

George,

Nope.

And you are not going to set me up as one so you can argue against it, either.

I am saying what I mean within the small window I have right now.

Michael

I wasn't attempting to set you up. I was honestly confused about your position.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I merely gave one example. That willpower is lessened in a person who is mentally exhausted has also been discussed for centuries. None of this is new.

As for developing stronger willpower via exercise, this was a dominant theme, going all the way back to the Greeks, of those philosophers who stressed the roles of habit and education in the formation of character. The point here was that willpower can be strengthened through repetition, especially at an early age. Again, none of this is new.

George,

You keep saying "new."

I see your "new" as a gigantic package deal concept right now. I have the distinct impression you don't want to understand what I am getting at. You keep sidestepping it and defending "nothing is new," as if I am trying to present something divorced from the past.

I have already said I am not. I'm not going to keep saying it.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I wasn't attempting to set you up. I was honestly confused about your position.

George,

It's hard to discuss something with someone who dismisses an idea out of hand without looking at it.

I'm sorry. I don't mean to sound impatient, but this reminds me a bit of discussing stuff with Phil when he poo-poos something and says he doesn't need to look into it to know it's wrong and you have made a lot of focused study about it. Then he takes stabs and makes presumptions that are consistently off the mark.

Michael