Rationally Selfish: "The Morality of Selling Your Body" by Dr. Diana Hsieh

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

George,

I almost hesitated to use the term "social science" because of all the crap out there.

There are some very good people working in this field who do out-of-the-box research, stage tests and get repeatable results. Here are two: Malcolm Gladwell and Dan Ariely.

Blink by Malcolm Gladwell deals with automated value judgments. Outliers with some surprising characteristics of high-end achievers.

Predictably Irrational by Dan Ariely is an eye-opener into some weird suff we humans do, with test results that he didn't even expect.

These are just two. I admit that my focus is on generally on books suggested by marketers. They like repeatable results. So do I.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Neuroscience can do no such thing. If we know from experience that X is (or seems) impossible, neuroscience may tell us why X is impossible. But without this previous knowledge of human behavior, neuroscience can tell us nothing. You are using "identify" in a sloppy manner.

Why do you keep doing this--arguing as if I blank out previous knowledge?

I will say this one more time and then I will not repeat it again.

Knowledge to me is cumulative. It is not exclusionary.

Anyway, I'm glad to see that you have suddenly become an expert in neuroscience.

Suppose we encounter an alien who knows everything we know about human neuroscience, but who has never actually observed human behavior, and who has no personal experience of human desires and emotions. From his knowledge of the brain alone, this aiien wouldn't be able to tell us zilch about human behavior.

I will not suppose any such thing. I'll let you deal with the Martians. I focus on human beings.

I have to do some productive work now.

I tried...

Michael

[George H. Smith]

Neuroscience can do no such thing. If we know from experience that X is (or seems) impossible, neuroscience may tell us why X is impossible. But without this previous knowledge of human behavior, neuroscience can tell us nothing. You are using "identify" in a sloppy manner.

Why do you keep doing this--arguing as if I blank out previous knowledge? I will say this one more time and then I will not repeat it again. Knowledge to me is cumulative. It is not exclusionary. Anyway, I'm glad to see that you have suddenly become an expert in neuroscience.

Suppose we encounter an alien who knows everything we know about human neuroscience, but who has never actually observed human behavior, and who has no personal experience of human desires and emotions. From his knowledge of the brain alone, this aiien wouldn't be able to tell us zilch about human behavior.

I will not suppose any such thing. I'll let you deal with the Martians. I focus on human beings. I have to do some productive work now. I tried... Michael

If I claim that knowledge of higher mathematics can improve the foundation of ethics, you don't need to claim expertise in mathematics in order to reject my claim. This is simply a matter of knowing what kinds of knowledge are relevant to ethics and what kinds are not.

It is obvious that your study of neuroscience has introduced you to certain aspects of human behavior that you may have been unaware of previously. That's great -- honestly. The study of history has done the same thing for me. But I don't confuse history with philosophy.

The "hard" sciences are cumulative in nature. Philosophy, including ethics, is not.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

George.

We just have to agree to disagree, especially about philosophy not being cumulative and there being some kind of major "not to be crossed" division between science and philosophy.

I do agree that changes in science are more dynamic than those in philosophy, but I hold the boundary between the two is quite fuzzy.

From what I have seen and read, several parts of human nature are evolving. I don't think you would agree with this. But there is plenty of evidence out there. Alterations in how the brain processes data caused by the vast quantities of information humans now process is merely one. Life span is another. There are some others, too. I just can't look at stuff and say it doesn't exist because it doesn't fit with my preconceived notions.

In fact, in several instances, I see science and philosophy overlapping quite nicely--where it is almost impossible to judge where one ends and the other begins.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

If I claim that knowledge of higher mathematics can improve the foundation of ethics, you don't need to claim expertise in mathematics in order to reject my claim. This is simply a matter of knowing what kinds of knowledge are relevant to ethics and what kinds are not.

George,

Just a quick note. This equivalence bothers me.

Higher math does not intrinsically deal with the study of human values. So it doesn't make any sense claiming it is relevant to ethics

Studying the parts of the brain that process human values is relevant. Ethics is a code of human values.

There's more to this observation, but that's the gist of it.

Michael

[9thdoctor]

I think Sam Harris’s claim that free will is an illusion is relevant here. He’s trying to derive moral principles from “the latest” in brain research. I think he’s missed the boat, of course.

[Xray]

I think no one would deny that an ethics based on a rational assessment of the human mind has to stay au courant with current research on that mind. For example, research on the human mind/brain have to be taken into account when it comes to scrutinizing assertions in field of ethics like e. g. "Man’s values control his subconscious emotional mechanism that functions like a computer adding up his desires, his experiences, his fulfillments and frustrations—like a sensitive guardian watching and constantly assessing his relationship to reality. " http://aynrandlexico...con/values.html But Is it really 'Man's values' that do the controlling here? Suppose neurological research should come to a different conclusion, it would disprove the above assertion.

The passage by Rand that you quoted is not an ethical claim. It is a psychological claim about the relationship between values and emotions.

I think it is a both a psychological and an ethical claim. The assertion being that man's ('rational') values control his subconscious emotional mechanism, his desires, etc, and that's how it morally 'ought to' be.

Nevertheless, I fail to see how neurophysiology per se could either prove or disprove this claim. Dissect a brain as much as you like. If you find something called "values" somewhere in the parts, please let me know, for I would like to know what a particle called "value" looks like. I would also like to know what the "subconscious" looks like.

Quite interesting to see you argue here somewhat like Bob (aka Ba'al Chatzaf), OL's resident reductionist.

I recall a post of his where he pointed out that one cannot see a 'mind' in a brain scan.

What do you think of Sam Harris's take on the 'free will' issue? (see ND's # 81 post).

[Brant Gaede]

I think no one would deny that an ethics based on a rational assessment of the human mind has to stay au courant with current research on that mind. For example, research on the human mind/brain have to be taken into account when it comes to scrutinizing assertions in field of ethics like e. g. "Man’s values control his subconscious emotional mechanism that functions like a computer adding up his desires, his experiences, his fulfillments and frustrations—like a sensitive guardian watching and constantly assessing his relationship to reality. " http://aynrandlexico...con/values.html But Is it really 'Man's values' that do the controlling here? Suppose neurological research should come to a different conclusion, it would disprove the above assertion.

The passage by Rand that you quoted is not an ethical claim. It is a psychological claim about the relationship between values and emotions.

I think it is a both a psychological and an ethical claim. The assertion being that man's ('rational') values control his subconscious emotional mechanism, his desires, etc, and that's how it morally 'ought to' be.

Nevertheless, I fail to see how neurophysiology per se could either prove or disprove this claim. Dissect a brain as much as you like. If you find something called "values" somewhere in the parts, please let me know, for I would like to know what a particle called "value" looks like. I would also like to know what the "subconscious" looks like.

Quite interesting to see you argue here somewhat like Bob (aka Ba'al Chatzaf), OL's resident reductionist. ;)

I recall a post of his where he pointed out that one cannot see a 'mind' in a brain scan.

The only way for the conscious mind to control the unconscious mind is by the way it programs it. Otherwise it's likely to be vice versa. And for sure, if it's garbage in it'll be garbage out, just like a computer.

--Brant

GIGO

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

The only way for the conscious mind to control the unconscious mind is by the way it programs it. Otherwise it's likely to be vice versa. And for sure, if it's garbage in it'll be garbage out, just like a computer.

Brant,

I wish it were that simple.

But then again, I'm glad it isn't.

Lizard says hi...

Michael

[Selene]

The only way for the conscious mind to control the unconscious mind is by the way it programs it. Otherwise it's likely to be vice versa. And for sure, if it's garbage in it'll be garbage out, just like a computer.

Brant,

I wish it were that simple.

But then again, I'm glad it isn't.

Lizard says hi...

Michael

[Xray]

Attempts to ground ethics in hard science have been very popular in recent centuries, as we see in Herbert Spencer's later work in his Principles of Ethics, which is strewn with outdated organismic analogies. And the result has been invariably the same: As soon as the science becomes outdated, as it invariably does, the ethics is left without a foundation.

Imo this happens if one makes the mistake of building an 'edifice of moral absolutes' on a current level reached by scientific research without taking sufficiently into account the possibility of the premises being exposed as false.

But the Spencer example also shows that ethics evolves as science evolves, and that an ethical system whose premises have been refuted by scientific research is faced with substantial difficulties.

Imo avoiding the 'Spencerian trap' can be achieved in keeping one's system flexible and open by pointing out the contextuality of knowledge, which implies that, should new scientific research make corrections necessary, this task won't be ignored.

Following generations are going to take care of that anyway (which is why e. g. no one today would still call themselves a Rousseau-ian, defending the tabula rasa principle), but should it turn out that the premises themselves will be exposed as false and one is still alive to see it, then they are going to be discarded as well, tough as it may be. (No one likes to admit they have been wrong, let alone on a fundamental issue, and I have the impression that the number of philosophers whose errors have been pointed out during their lifetime, and who were willing to correct their premises, is very small) .

When "pure" scientists have done philosophy, the result, as often as not, has been bad philosophy and bad science.

Which is why the desirable goal should not be purism, but a fruitful mutual exchange from which both parties profit.

[BaalChatzaf]

When "pure" scientists have done philosophy, the result, as often as not, has been bad philosophy and bad science.

Ghs

A very cogent reason for competent scientists to stay far away from philosophy.

By the way, do you have any facts to back up what you said? If so, pray do share a few with your audience.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[George H. Smith]

When "pure" scientists have done philosophy, the result, as often as not, has been bad philosophy and bad science. Ghs

A very cogent reason for competent scientists to stay far away from philosophy. By the way, do you have any facts to back up what you said? If so, pray do share a few with your audience. Ba'al Chatzaf

I gave numerous examples in earlier discussions of physics on OL. The case of Eddington comes to mind. Percy Bridgman wrote some godawful stuff as well, as did Ernst Mach. Another example, which I haven't discussed, is various treatments of "evolutionary ethics" by Huxley and others.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

Attempts to ground ethics in hard science have been very popular in recent centuries, as we see in Herbert Spencer's later work in his Principles of Ethics, which is strewn with outdated organismic analogies. And the result has been invariably the same: As soon as the science becomes outdated, as it invariably does, the ethics is left without a foundation.

Imo this happens if one makes the mistake of building an 'edifice of moral absolutes' on a current level reached by scientific research without taking sufficiently into account the possibility of the premises being exposed as false. But the Spencer example also shows that ethics evolves as science evolves, and that an ethical system whose premises have been refuted by scientific research is faced with substantial difficulties. Imo avoiding the 'Spencerian trap' can be achieved in keeping one's system flexible and open by pointing out the contextuality of knowledge, which implies that, should new scientific research make corrections necessary, this task won't be ignored. Following generations are going to take care of that anyway (which is why e. g. no one today would still call themselves a Rousseau-ian, defending the tabula rasa principle), but should it turn out that the premises themselves will be exposed as false and one is still alive to see it, then they are going to be discarded as well, tough as it may be. (No one likes to admit they have been wrong, let alone on a fundamental issue, and I have the impression that the number of philosophers whose errors have been pointed out during their lifetime, and who were willing to correct their premises, is very small) .

When "pure" scientists have done philosophy, the result, as often as not, has been bad philosophy and bad science.

Which is why the desirable goal should not be purism, but a fruitful mutual exchange from which both parties profit.

I don't really disagree with anything you say here, but I would like to emphasize one point: When I speak of philosophy and the specialized sciences as distinct cognitive disciplines, I don't mean that these disciplines must necessarily be the domains of different people. There is no reason why a scientist cannot also be a good philosopher, especially if he understands that philosophy deals with the fundamentals of human knowledge. Science presupposes certain epistemological standards, as investigated by the "philosophy of science."

Crappy philosophical writing by scientists typically occurs when the scientist embraces scientism i.e., when he believes that the particular methodology of his particular science should be used as an exemplar for all other cognitive disciplines, including philosophy and the social sciences. Physicists seem to be the worst in this regard.

The Hungarian chemist Michael Polanyi wrote some excellent works on philosophy, including Personal Knowledge, The Tacit Dimension, and The Logic of Liberty. His critiques of reductionism and defense of emergence theory, which are similar to those of Arthur Koestler in some respects, are among the best ever written.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

The only way for the conscious mind to control the unconscious mind is by the way it programs it. Otherwise it's likely to be vice versa. And for sure, if it's garbage in it'll be garbage out, just like a computer.

Brant,

I wish it were that simple.

But then again, I'm glad it isn't.

Lizard says hi...

Michael

I was referring to the Higher functions.

--Brant

sniff

[Xray]

The Hungarian chemist Michael Polanyi wrote some excellent works on philosophy, including Personal Knowledge, The Tacit Dimension, and The Logic of Liberty. His critiques of reductionism and defense of emergence theory, which are similar to those of Arthur Koestler in some respects, are among the best ever written.

Thank you George for providing the info on M. Polanyi.

From the Wikipedia article on MP:

http://en.wikipedia....Michael_Polanyi

Mind is a higher level expression of our capacity for discrimination. Our pursuit of self-set ideals such as truth and justice enriches our awareness of the world. The reductionistic attempt to reduce higher level realities into lower level realities generates what Polanyi describes as a moral inversion, in which the higher is rejected in favour of the lower. This inversion is pursued with moral passion. Polanyi identifies it as a pathology of the modern mind, and traces its origins to a false conception of knowledge; which although relatively harmless in the formal sciences, generates nihilism in the humanities.

If I understand this correctly, emergence theory is based on the fact that higher level structures develop from simple structures, from which it is derived that it makes no sense to (exclusively) argue from the standpoint of reductionism when dealing with higher level structures.

http://en.wikipedia....Michael_Polanyi

The process by which meanings are generated shows us that intentions are downward causal forces.

What is meant by "downward causal forces"?

[bmacwilliam]

Back to the original question of the morality of selling your body. Two things I don't understand from the folks who consider prostitution a simple transaction between consenting adults are:

If sex was a simple commodity, why isn't rape morally equivalent to shoplifting?

If sex was a simple service, why shouldn't rape be just punishable by simple restitution at a certain hourly rate?

I think prostitution as a simple transaction is a very weak rationalization.

[Brant Gaede]

Back to the original question of the morality of selling your body. Two things I don't understand from the folks who consider prostitution a simple transaction between consenting adults are:

If sex was a simple commodity, why isn't rape morally equivalent to shoplifting?

If sex was a simple service, why shouldn't rape be just punishable by simple restitution at a certain hourly rate?

I think prostitution as a simple transaction is a very weak rationalization.

If you don't understand human rights your questions are understandable.

--Brant

[9thdoctor]

If sex was a simple commodity, why isn't rape morally equivalent to shoplifting?

If sex was a simple service, why shouldn't rape be just punishable by simple restitution at a certain hourly rate?

Ooh, an argument from analogy. I’m convinced!

This gives me an idea. How about instead of locking people up for committing assault and battery, we make them compensate the person they beat up according to the rates customarily paid to an amateur boxer? Sure, the “victim” didn’t consent to take part in a one way boxing match, but the prisons are overflowing…

This calls for a song, and it needs to be one that makes absolutely no sense:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PrmBWtOWYsA

[bmacwilliam]

Back to the original question of the morality of selling your body. Two things I don't understand from the folks who consider prostitution a simple transaction between consenting adults are: If sex was a simple commodity, why isn't rape morally equivalent to shoplifting? If sex was a simple service, why shouldn't rape be just punishable by simple restitution at a certain hourly rate? I think prostitution as a simple transaction is a very weak rationalization.

If you don't understand human rights your questions are understandable. --Brant

Well, I understand and accept the idea of inalienable rights - like liberty. I just don't accept that sexual liberty should be excluded. I think the same logic (and perhaps even more forcefully from a natural/evolutionary perspective) applies to sexualy liberty - inalienable.

I think to think otherwise is usually just a weak rationalization. Usually it's somebody trying to defend their immoral decisions.

Bob

[Brant Gaede]

Back to the original question of the morality of selling your body. Two things I don't understand from the folks who consider prostitution a simple transaction between consenting adults are: If sex was a simple commodity, why isn't rape morally equivalent to shoplifting? If sex was a simple service, why shouldn't rape be just punishable by simple restitution at a certain hourly rate? I think prostitution as a simple transaction is a very weak rationalization.

If you don't understand human rights your questions are understandable. --Brant

Well, I understand and accept the idea of inalienable rights - like liberty. I just don't accept that sexual liberty should be excluded. I think the same logic (and perhaps even more forcefully from a natural/evolutionary perspective) applies to sexualy liberty - inalienable.

I think to think otherwise is usually just a weak rationalization. Usually it's somebody trying to defend their immoral decisions.

Bob

The law is concerned with rights and there is simplicity. Morality overlaps rights completely but is a much bigger subject we can talk about until the cows come home but daddy with a paddle and shotgun enforces the balance whatever the fuck that might be in his mind.

--Brant

my intentions are honorable--I've got a Yaris

http://youtu.be/LAMmDqtlR-Q

[caroljane]

Back to the original question of the morality of selling your body. Two things I don't understand from the folks who consider prostitution a simple transaction between consenting adults are: If sex was a simple commodity, why isn't rape morally equivalent to shoplifting? If sex was a simple service, why shouldn't rape be just punishable by simple restitution at a certain hourly rate? I think prostitution as a simple transaction is a very weak rationalization.

If you don't understand human rights your questions are understandable. --Brant

Well, I understand and accept the idea of inalienable rights - like liberty. I just don't accept that sexual liberty should be excluded. I think the same logic (and perhaps even more forcefully from a natural/evolutionary perspective) applies to sexualy liberty - inalienable.

I think to think otherwise is usually just a weak rationalization. Usually it's somebody trying to defend their immoral decisions.

Bob

The law is concerned with rights and there is simplicity. Morality overlaps rights completely but is a much bigger subject we can talk about until the cows come home but daddy with a paddle and shotgun enforces the balance whatever the fuck that might be in his mind.

--Brant

my intentions are honorable--I've got a Yaris

http://youtu.be/LAMmDqtlR-Q

Back to the original question of the morality of selling your body. Two things I don't understand from the folks who consider prostitution a simple transaction between consenting adults are: If sex was a simple commodity, why isn't rape morally equivalent to shoplifting? If sex was a simple service, why shouldn't rape be just punishable by simple restitution at a certain hourly rate? I think prostitution as a simple transaction is a very weak rationalization.

If you don't understand human rights your questions are understandable. --Brant

Well, I understand and accept the idea of inalienable rights - like liberty. I just don't accept that sexual liberty should be excluded. I think the same logic (and perhaps even more forcefully from a natural/evolutionary perspective) applies to sexualy liberty - inalienable.

I think to think otherwise is usually just a weak rationalization. Usually it's somebody trying to defend their immoral decisions.

Bob

The law is concerned with rights and there is simplicity. Morality overlaps rights completely but is a much bigger subject we can talk about until the cows come home but daddy with a paddle and shotgun enforces the balance whatever the fuck that might be in his mind.

--Brant

my intentions are honorable--I've got a Yaris

http://youtu.be/LAMmDqtlR-Q

The cows come home though. Tiptoeing on their hooves up the back stairs, or arriving at the front door brazenly in a taxi, morally they come home.

I don't know what Dr Mrs Dr originally said about selling her body, nor much care. But in society, the value-trade negotiation for violation of personal rights is dealt with currently by laws, imperfect and behindhand as they are. In an anarchist society it would be daddy with the shotgun., or wergild. The value of an individual body or a soul would be nobody else's business.

[john42t]

I find Hsieh quite attractive. Her intelligence and Machiavellian psychology give her an edgy "bad girl" quality. My kind of woman.

I'm intrigued. Maybe you can recommend other videos/texts by her that show the Machiavellian side a bit more? :-)

[caroljane]

I find Hsieh quite attractive. Her intelligence and Machiavellian psychology give her an edgy "bad girl" quality. My kind of woman.

I'm intrigued. Maybe you can recommend other videos/texts by her that show the Machiavellian side a bit more? :-)

WSS produced a great one but I think Michael asked him to take it down.

[Selene]

I find Hsieh quite attractive. Her intelligence and Machiavellian psychology give her an edgy "bad girl" quality. My kind of woman.

I'm intrigued. Maybe you can recommend other videos/texts by her that show the Machiavellian side a bit more? :-)

WSS produced a great one but I think Michael asked him to take it down.

I like the one where she is preening from the limbs of the tree because they provide lots of tying points for some intricate rope bondage, e.g.,

Shibari art.

Adam