KInsella and Thin Air

[sjw]

Do I really need to give you a crash course on the libertarian theory of contracts, and how contracts involve far more than "communication"?

Contracts are a type of communication. If Rothbard contradicts that then that's a good reason not to read Rothbard.

Shayne

[sjw]

"destruction" of "values": but libertarainism doesn't prohbit "destruction" it prohibits aggression. And there is no property right in values. You are equivocating.

I never said there was a property right in values, I said that reputation could be used to claim many things, including property. The target of libel isn't the reputation per se, it is what the reputation can do.

You're chomping at the bit. But you can't preemptively argue against a case that hasn't been presented.

Shayne

[nskinsella]

Do I really need to give you a crash course on the libertarian theory of contracts, and how contracts involve far more than "communication"?

Contracts are a type of communication. If Rothbard contradicts that then that's a good reason not to read Rothbard.

Shayne

Contracts are transfers of title. They are accomplished by the owner manifesting his consent to the transfer, which usually invovles some kind of communication.

[nskinsella]

YES, of course. This is what libertarianism (and the political side of Objectivism) is all about. helloooo

I'm well aware that Objectivism holds the "non-initiation of force" idea, I was not aware that this was "libertarianism" too.

So I learned something, but still have to say that this makes no sense whatsoever. Don't you have to make all kinds of distortions to try to jam the "aggression" or "force" square peg in "deception's" round hole?

Bob

Bob, I dont know what to tell you. Objectivists and libertarians are oposed to aggression. We believe it is unjust. If you don't, you are not one of us, but what we would view as one type of criminal or socialist, in that you do not completely oppose aggression--just like criminals and statists. I mean do you oppoose aggression on principled grounds, or not? If you do, then you can't support a law that commits aggression.

[sjw]

Do I really need to give you a crash course on the libertarian theory of contracts, and how contracts involve far more than "communication"?

Contracts are a type of communication. If Rothbard contradicts that then that's a good reason not to read Rothbard.

Shayne

Contracts are transfers of title. They are accomplished by the owner manifesting his consent to the transfer, which usually invovles some kind of communication.

I agree, except for the "usually." When would a contract ever be accomplished without communication?

Shayne

[bmacwilliam]

Do I really need to give you a crash course on the libertarian theory of contracts, and how contracts involve far more than "communication"?

Contracts are a type of communication. If Rothbard contradicts that then that's a good reason not to read Rothbard.

Shayne

Rothbard : "In short, a contract should only be enforceable when the failure to fulfill it is an implicit theft of property. "

Rothbard = bonehead

OR

"Theft of property" has to be distorted beyond recognition for this to make any sense at all.

Bob

[bmacwilliam]

YES, of course. This is what libertarianism (and the political side of Objectivism) is all about. helloooo

I'm well aware that Objectivism holds the "non-initiation of force" idea, I was not aware that this was "libertarianism" too.

So I learned something, but still have to say that this makes no sense whatsoever. Don't you have to make all kinds of distortions to try to jam the "aggression" or "force" square peg in "deception's" round hole?

Bob

Bob, I dont know what to tell you. Objectivists and libertarians are oposed to aggression. We believe it is unjust. If you don't, you are not one of us, but what we would view as one type of criminal or socialist, in that you do not completely oppose aggression--just like criminals and statists. I mean do you oppoose aggression on principled grounds, or not? If you do, then you can't support a law that commits aggression.

No, no, Wait a second. I agree aggression is unjust. I disagree where the "aggression" boundaries lie. Big difference. In fact, my aggression boundaries appear wider than yours, not narrower and are fully principled.

Bob

[George H. Smith]

Do I really need to give you a crash course on the libertarian theory of contracts, and how contracts involve far more than "communication"?

Contracts are a type of communication. If Rothbard contradicts that then that's a good reason not to read Rothbard.

All joint endeavors, including contracts, involve communication. Football requires communication, for example, but we wouldn't say that football is merely a type of communication.

Similarly, joint criminal endeavors will involve some kind of communication, e.g., five guys who sit around a table to plan a bank robbery. But the aggressive act lies in the action of the bank robbery itself, not in the communication per se.

Notions like "contract" and "principal-agent relationships" are moral and/or legal concepts . They involve communication, of course, but they are not merely types of communication. You must think in order to wage war. This doesn't mean that war is merely a type of thought.

Why is it even necessary to explain any of this?

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

Do I really need to give you a crash course on the libertarian theory of contracts, and how contracts involve far more than "communication"?

Contracts are a type of communication. If Rothbard contradicts that then that's a good reason not to read Rothbard.

Shayne

Rothbard : "In short, a contract should only be enforceable when the failure to fulfill it is an implicit theft of property. "

Rothbard = bonehead

OR

"Theft of property" has to be distorted beyond recognition for this to make any sense at all.

Bob

Rothbard's remarks are relevant to things like slavery contracts and the enforcement of specific performance contracts. I disagree with Rothbard on some issues here and there, but he is very clear on what he means by "theft of property." Have you actually read him, or did you randomly pull that quote from a website? The latter is my guess.

Here's a little test. If you are unfamiliar with the "title-transfer theory of contracts," then you don't know zilch about Rothbard's views.

Ghs

[sjw]

Do I really need to give you a crash course on the libertarian theory of contracts, and how contracts involve far more than "communication"?

Contracts are a type of communication. If Rothbard contradicts that then that's a good reason not to read Rothbard.

All joint endeavors, including contracts, involve communication. Football requires communication, for example, but we wouldn't say that football is merely a type of communication.

Similarly, joint criminal endeavors will involve some kind of communication, e.g., five guys who sit around a table to plan a bank robbery. But the aggressive act lies in the action of the bank robbery itself, not in the communication per se.

Notions like "contact" and "principal-agent relationships" are moral and/or legal concepts . They involve communication, of course, but they are not merely types of communication. You must think in order to wage war. This doesn't mean that war is merely a type of thought.

So, the best argument you can come up with for contracts not being a type of communication is to list some things that are not types of communication? Come on George, stop being silly.

And you're really being silly on two levels. Even if you do have a point (I am being very generous here as you have made no actual points), it makes no difference to the wider argument I was making. When somebody takes out a contract, the action of communication is the physical act that creates the contract. It is the initial causal action behind the ultimate attack on the target. So even if we separate contract from communication, that only moves the cause from contract to communication. So even if you succeed in your current diversion you fail.

Why is it even necessary to explain any of this?

Good question.

Shayne

[George H. Smith]

So, the best argument you can come up with for contracts not being a type of communication is to list some things that are not types of communication? Come on George, stop being silly.

You made the bald assertion that contracts are merely a type of communication, so you have the responsibility to justify the claim. So come on, smart guy, let's see some proof. I'm afraid we will need more than your assurance that your position is not controversial.

You are obviously making up your argument as you go along, in the hope of developing a case for libel qua aggression. If you have no interest in what other libertarian thinkers have said on this subject -- thinkers, I might add, who were far sharper than you -- then that's your business. But beginning tabula rasa on well-trodden ground like this is always a tricky business. I doubt if you have either the brains or the balls to pull it off.

So let's see an argument for your theory of contracts. You might begin by defining what you mean by "communication" and "contract." Then you will need to differentiate between different types of communication, and explain why some types of communication create moral and/legal obligations while others don't. After you complete these elementary tasks, I will have some questions for you.

Ghs

[nskinsella]

YES, of course. This is what libertarianism (and the political side of Objectivism) is all about. helloooo

I'm well aware that Objectivism holds the "non-initiation of force" idea, I was not aware that this was "libertarianism" too.

So I learned something, but still have to say that this makes no sense whatsoever. Don't you have to make all kinds of distortions to try to jam the "aggression" or "force" square peg in "deception's" round hole?

Bob

Bob, I dont know what to tell you. Objectivists and libertarians are oposed to aggression. We believe it is unjust. If you don't, you are not one of us, but what we would view as one type of criminal or socialist, in that you do not completely oppose aggression--just like criminals and statists. I mean do you oppoose aggression on principled grounds, or not? If you do, then you can't support a law that commits aggression.

No, no, Wait a second. I agree aggression is unjust. I disagree where the "aggression" boundaries lie. Big difference. In fact, my aggression boundaries appear wider than yours, not narrower and are fully principled.

Bob

yes, libertarians disagree on how to draw the lines of where there is or is not aggressio. but if you agree that that's the issue, this is progress. But then you can't just use metaphors to say "harm" is aggresion. Which is it? harm or aggression? etc.

[nskinsella]

Do I really need to give you a crash course on the libertarian theory of contracts, and how contracts involve far more than "communication"?

Contracts are a type of communication. If Rothbard contradicts that then that's a good reason not to read Rothbard.

All joint endeavors, including contracts, involve communication. Football requires communication, for example, but we wouldn't say that football is merely a type of communication.

Similarly, joint criminal endeavors will involve some kind of communication, e.g., five guys who sit around a table to plan a bank robbery. But the aggressive act lies in the action of the bank robbery itself, not in the communication per se.

Notions like "contract" and "principal-agent relationships" are moral and/or legal concepts . They involve communication, of course, but they are not merely types of communication. You must think in order to wage war. This doesn't mean that war is merely a type of thought.

Why is it even necessary to explain any of this?

Ghs

B/c the Internet has allowed newbs to write books.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

So to falsely accuse a company of selling a dangerous product, even if no one has actually been harmed (as yet) by that product, would not qualify as libel, in your theory?

George,

This is an interesting example, but we are talking around the essence of--and reason for--libel law, which is loss by the defamed party. We are going from different premises.

Your premise is based strictly on NIOF. And I don't believe that NIOF qualifies as the be-all end-all of social premises because I don't see it deriving that way from human nature. I hold that it is one of the premises and a very good one at that, but I place human nature where you place NOIF. For example, I am not sure, but I don't think you would consider something like psychological abuse to be a crime. I do, depending on the type and the damage.

In the case of libel, my definition of property extends to include mental work that results in wealth. This is because I consider mental work to be work and it has market value as an input into the final product. Your definition of property apparently covers only the end result--the wealth.

(Note - I recognize that created wealth is different than the wealth nature provides on its own and we simply take as it is, like, say, land. I won't go into this here other than mention it, though. It would take this discussion too far off course. And I have a tendency to meander as it is. )

Going from your premise, the customer--as an individual person--is the sole proprietor of his share of the producer's public reputation on a specific issue, because he is the proprietor of his mind and no one has a right to anything in it.

Is that fair to say?

In my view, propaganda exists and has provable impact on the minds of unsuspecting people--people who did not choose to think the way they were induced to think. (I consider smearing with statements of fact that are untrue--i.e., libel--to be a form of propaganda. Other forms of smearing are propaganda, also, but they are outside the scope of the present discussion.) This issue of human nature cuts to the core of the different premises we are using. I am going to respond to one of Stephan's posts (the one on killing off slave holders) where what I am saying about human nature will become much clearer.

But for now, there are two points to be made clear. The first is that, by any standard, libel consists of loss that has to be proven and it is specific to an individual (even if that individual is part of a larger group).

Since we go from different premises, in my view, the defamer has to name the individual or specific company by name--or by some other form of singling out the individual or company, state the incorrect fact as an authority or based on some authority (at least enough authority to get people to believe it as a fact), and it has to be established that there was specific measurable loss to the defamed person (or legal entity) due to the propagation of that information.

In your conception (as I understand it from your posts), if you make a blanket statement about a group, you have done the same thing as naming and singling out an individual within that group. And you do not consider the work involved in establishing a public reputation as deserving any legal protection, so there is no actual measurable loss that can be protected under law, even though there is in fact a measurable loss in business that can be proven to be caused by the false information.

The second point is about common law and this cuts into a fundamental premise I believe we do not share. I love the idea that USA law was derived from common law since it allows for common sense to be applied to law. In countless court cases, people lament the division between the spirit of the law and the letter of the law.

I see the "spirit" as a matter of context or frame. Common sense both allows a judge to use this context, and use a principle that is not often brought up in these kinds of discussions: balance. Specifically, the letter-spirit balance. No law, in my view, exists in isolation and contexts change as people change. In your view--the libertarian view (once again, from what I understand), NIOF exists in isolation and is applicable to all cases as the fundamental premise irrespective of the context.

If you judge my view from this last premise (the libertarian one), it will be seen as a blanket license for moral equivocation. The argument will be that since I claim that contexts change, the principles will have to change, and that makes what is true for one person not true for another. If I judge your view from my angle, I can make a similar complaint and claim that you want to allow bullies to take over the world, even as you protest against their use of force.

I don't think this kind of stuff is productive, so I will refrain from it and try to look at things from both angles, even as I am convinced of one.

The fact is that perception of the truth plays just as much a part in human affairs as the actual truth, often to devastating loss and injury to innocents. So even though a fact is the same fact in changing contexts, the perception of the truth and the value of that fact actually changes. This can be good or bad, depending on the case and other standards involved.

For an extreme case, a false propaganda-based widespread perception of the truth can make a country like, say, Germany, willingly follow a leader like Hitler. And we know where that went. I think we both can agree that the distorted perception of the truth by the German people was at root (with respect to the part pertaining to the public) in Nazism gaining power. Where we disagree--I believe--is on what to do about it before it gets to that stage. And this falls right in the middle of the premises of whether libel laws are justified or not.

I believe the law has to address such perception, and one way this is done is to include the context (or frame).

A good example of taking context into account that I approve of, but I don't imagine you do, is libel laws as applied to celebrities. The law as it is currently practiced (in general terms) recognizes that the context (or frame) of a famous person like an entertainer or politician is far different than the average Joe. So it is much harder for a celebrity to win a libel lawsuit than it is for a person without fame. If the celebrity claims that fame is the value that is lost with a public lie, certainly more notoriety is more fame. If he claims that his measurable assets have been altered for the worse by a public lie, he has to prove the causal link. Too often, the celebrity's measurable assets actually increase due to the controversy. So that makes it tough for him to win a case.

I believe rightly so, too. I find this to be a perfect example of applying common sense to arrive at the balance between the letter of the law and its spirit.

The thing is, my position goes from a view of human nature that recognizes that, even though all humans are equal under the law on basic rights, their unequal contexts--or at least their different ones--form part of how to implement this in practice.

I don't know how far you will agree with me on this. I don't suspect very far, but I am interested in your thoughts.

Now, to address your example as to whether a false accusation of selling a dangerous product, but where no one has been harmed (yet), is libel, I fear I am going to say something that will possibly be unsatisfying to you.

I say it depends.

There are not enough elements present in the example to make a call. Such elements include loss to the individual entity being defamed and proof of causal link. But there are other missing elements and contexts as well.

This is an interesting debate and, as you can see, I don't believe we will be able to elaborate entire premise-level understandings from just a discussion. But being aware that the premises are different helps to understand where the other is coming from. (And, please, keep in mind that all my writing in these discussions is off the top of my head. I consider these discussions as mulling over stuff, not to be considered in the same category as a book or formal researched article.)

You keep speaking of individual entities and their actions. But a company or corporation cannot "act" at all, except in a fictitious legal sense. Only individual human beings can act.

Obviously, only the employees, managers, owners and other involved personnel of a business can act in the sense an individual human being can act, but since my property definition of legal entity includes the processes inherent to its existence, those specific acts carried out by the entity's members are what I mean when I say action by a legal entity. In other words, supplying and selling a product on the open market for a business, staging public meetings for worship services for churches, etc.

The notion that a huge corporation like General Electric, because it is an "individual" legal entity, should be able to sue for libel, whereas a collection of smaller individual companies should not have this right, strikes me as quite arbitrary.

This is where I believe other values enter. I don't believe GE would be what it is today within a free market. I believe it exists in the form it exists because of a lot of backstage legal monkey-business and being in bed with different governments. So in the specific case of GE, I think a good dose of common sense is useful. Let's say that, company-wise, it is a "celebrity" and, in my view, should be treated as such.

You are a difficult man to pin down.

Is that an invitation for something more intimate?

Michael

[sjw]

So, the best argument you can come up with for contracts not being a type of communication is to list some things that are not types of communication? Come on George, stop being silly.

You made the bald assertion that contracts are merely a type of communication, so you have the responsibility to justify the claim. So come on, smart guy, let's see some proof. I'm afraid we will need more than your assurance that your position is not controversial.

You are obviously making up your argument as you go along, in the hope of developing a case for libel qua aggression. If you have no interest in what other libertarian thinkers have said on this subject -- thinkers, I might add, who were far sharper than you -- then that's your business. But beginning tabula rasa on well-trodden ground like this is always a tricky business. I doubt if you have either the brains or the balls to pull it off.

So let's see an argument for your theory of contracts. You might begin by defining what you mean by "communication" and "contract." Then you will need to differentiate between different types of communication, and explain why some types of communication create moral and/legal obligations while others don't. After you complete these elementary tasks, I will have some questions for you.

Ghs

Contracts are created by communication. Communication is the initial act that causes them to be. Since it was not relevant to my argument to define the precise nature of contracts, it was not where my attention was focussed, so I made a mistake.

I think you're more interested in attacking points of perceived weakness than in the truth. I don't clam to be "sharp", but I would claim to have more concern for the truth than some who are a lot sharper than me. The field of individual rights is not the pissing match you seem to want it to be. Knowing individual rights requires devotion to the truth and standing by what is right more than it requires "balls" or being sharp.

When I said a contract was a type of communication I was focusing on the relevant issue here: that the initial action was the creation of a contract through communication. Evidently, because my argument utterly demolished yours, you wish to focus on the pointless side issue of what exactly is the nature of a contract. Unlike me, you are not arguing in good faith. Will sharpness prevail over the truth? Perhaps. It always seems to have. Those guys using the government to usurp our rights are pretty damn sharp.

Shayne

[sjw]

B/c the Internet has allowed newbs to write books.

I find it fascinating that a man of your position and self-professed stature would feel so threatened by someone of no position and who you think is an intellectual weakling that you would find it in good taste to attack his good faith efforts at changing the world for the better. This kind of behavior reveals that you are not particularly confident in your position and approach. I think your lack of confidence is warranted.

Shayne

[George H. Smith]

Contracts are created by communication. Communication is the initial act that causes them to be. Since it was not relevant to my argument to define the precise nature of contracts, it was not where my attention was focussed, so I made a mistake.

Communication of some kind is a necessary but not sufficient condition for contracts. (I say "of some kind" because implied contracts, such as a tacit agreement to pay for food in a restaurant, do not involve overt communication.) But a contract requires consent, and consent depends on one's subjective intention. An intention is not the same thing as communication.

Moreover, a contract creates a moral and/or legal obligation -- and such obligations are not merely forms of communication.

I think you're more interested in attacking points of perceived weakness than in the truth.

I am interested in reasonable arguments that operate with clearly defined terms. I am not impressed by arguments that begin with vague and undefined notions like "intellectual force" and "communication that constitutes interference." Nor, when such notions are challenged, am I impressed by the response, "It is "intellectual force" in the sense I intended that phrase to mean."

"The field of individual rights is not the pissing match you seem to want it to be."

Then let's see an argument.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

BTW I have long held the view that opposition to bullying may be one reason some people are amenable to libertarian ideas. See these posts.

Stephan.

I read too slowly for my own good. (I'm working on speed reading in my spare time, but trying to keep up at times seems like trying to fit the ocean in a backyard swimming pool.)

Anyway, that's why I went back over this thread trying to find the post about killing slave holders. I wanted to make sure I didn't skim over something important. I have several premise-level comments to make. I saw your link above and I had not gone there when I first read the post (due to woeful lack of time, not lack of interest), so this time I did. Here is part of a paragraph from what I found:

Which leads me to my main point here: it's astonishing, to me, that bullying is permitted and laughed off as some natural kiddie thing, order Lumigan online no prescription. Even in good schools, bullies exist, and they mercilessly prey on smaller, Where can i find Lumigan online, weaker, meeker kids. We are talking serious violent crime here: assault and battery. Physical violence. Beatings. Order Lumigan online no prescription, Theft. Why is there no outcry over this. Why is it tolerated. I am not fond of the over-litigiousness of modern American society, order Lumigan no prescription, but if my boy were attacked by another kid in school, I would sue the attacker and his parents for assault and battery. It's outrageous. I just don't get why there are so many bullies: why don't they teach them never to be cruel to the weak and innocent and defenseless, order Lumigan online no prescription. Followup: Lew agreed with the bullying point, and pointed out that "The creation of the kid culture, separate from parents and other family members, Buy Lumigan without prescription, encourages this sort of evil. Thanks, public schools. We will never know the proper educational organization until we allow freedom. Mothers cooperatives, etc. Order Lumigan online no prescription, As it is, the government defines what a school is."

I fear you have been spammed quite badly.

btw - If you are interested, according to Wikipedia, Lumigan is used "to control the progression of glaucoma and in the management of ocular hypertension."

(Damn! I had hoped it was for penis enlargement or something so I could clown around with it... )

Michael

EDIT: I just saw that I will have to find the post I want on another thread, it is not in this one...)

[sjw]

Communication of some kind is a necessary but not sufficient condition for contracts. (I say "of some kind" because implied contracts, such as a tacit agreement to pay for food in a restaurant, do not involve overt communication.) But a contract requires consent, and consent depends on one's subjective intention. An intention is not the same thing as communication.

Moreover, a contract creates a moral and/or legal obligation -- and such obligations are not merely forms of communication.

Sure. Not relevant to the point you want to ignore though.

I am interested in reasonable arguments that operate with clearly defined terms. I am not impressed by arguments that begin with vague and undefined notions like "intellectual force" and "communication that constitutes interference." Nor, when such notions are challenged, am I impressed by the response, "It is "intellectual force" in the sense I intended that phrase to mean."

Seems as convenient point as any to hide behind. Who's the one who needs some "balls"?

"The field of individual rights is not the pissing match you seem to want it to be."

Then let's see an argument.

Ghs

Those following the context here will see the argument -- and your attempt at diversion. I'm not going to waste any more time restating the context.

Shayne

[bmacwilliam]

Do I really need to give you a crash course on the libertarian theory of contracts, and how contracts involve far more than "communication"?

Contracts are a type of communication. If Rothbard contradicts that then that's a good reason not to read Rothbard.

Shayne

Rothbard : "In short, a contract should only be enforceable when the failure to fulfill it is an implicit theft of property. "

Rothbard = bonehead

OR

"Theft of property" has to be distorted beyond recognition for this to make any sense at all.

Bob

Rothbard's remarks are relevant to things like slavery contracts and the enforcement of specific performance contracts. I disagree with Rothbard on some issues here and there, but he is very clear on what he means by "theft of property." Have you actually read him, or did you randomly pull that quote from a website? The latter is my guess.

Here's a little test. If you are unfamiliar with the "title-transfer theory of contracts," then you don't know zilch about Rothbard's views.

Ghs

I don't know much about Rothbard, but I have read some and disagreed on a fundamental level on some things. Although I do agree that the slavery argument makes sense and some other types of promises (ie no title transfer stuff) he was concerned with.

However (it's foggy now) but didn't he use promises to get married as an example of contracts that shouldn't be enforced? Be that as it may, I recall thinking that this was a bit disingenuous.

I remember thinking there were a whole host of Promise-based contracts that he did not address that caused damages but no theft. If he was clear on theft, then he didn't deal with this type of damage as I recall - or at least what I read.

Bob

[bmacwilliam]

YES, of course. This is what libertarianism (and the political side of Objectivism) is all about. helloooo

I'm well aware that Objectivism holds the "non-initiation of force" idea, I was not aware that this was "libertarianism" too.

So I learned something, but still have to say that this makes no sense whatsoever. Don't you have to make all kinds of distortions to try to jam the "aggression" or "force" square peg in "deception's" round hole?

Bob

Bob, I dont know what to tell you. Objectivists and libertarians are oposed to aggression. We believe it is unjust. If you don't, you are not one of us, but what we would view as one type of criminal or socialist, in that you do not completely oppose aggression--just like criminals and statists. I mean do you oppoose aggression on principled grounds, or not? If you do, then you can't support a law that commits aggression.

No, no, Wait a second. I agree aggression is unjust. I disagree where the "aggression" boundaries lie. Big difference. In fact, my aggression boundaries appear wider than yours, not narrower and are fully principled.

Bob

yes, libertarians disagree on how to draw the lines of where there is or is not aggressio. but if you agree that that's the issue, this is progress. But then you can't just use metaphors to say "harm" is aggresion. Which is it? harm or aggression? etc.

Good. Progress is progress.

"harm or aggression" The question is not "OR" but where harm and aggression intersect.

I still haven't seen justification that makes any sense to me why libel should not be enforced. To say it is not aggression is only quibbling about definitions.

I'd happily read dissenting opinions, but am looking for logical justification.

Bob

[George H. Smith]

Communication of some kind is a necessary but not sufficient condition for contracts. (I say "of some kind" because implied contracts, such as a tacit agreement to pay for food in a restaurant, do not involve overt communication.) But a contract requires consent, and consent depends on one's subjective intention. An intention is not the same thing as communication.

Moreover, a contract creates a moral and/or legal obligation -- and such obligations are not merely forms of communication.

Sure. Not relevant to the point you want to ignore though.

What point would that be?

I am interested in reasonable arguments that operate with clearly defined terms. I am not impressed by arguments that begin with vague and undefined notions like "intellectual force" and "communication that constitutes interference." Nor, when such notions are challenged, am I impressed by the response, "It is "intellectual force" in the sense I intended that phrase to mean."

Seems as convenient point as any to hide behind. Who's the one who needs some "balls"?

Hey, I have a great argument for you!. When Jack corrects a mathematical error by Jill, leaving her no logical option except to accept the correction, he has used "intellectual force" against her. Let's see...maybe we can spin that out to explain how reason is a type of force.

Then let's see an argument.

Ghs

Those following the context here will see the argument -- and your attempt at diversion. I'm not going to waste any more time restating the context.

So you've already made your argument? Sorry, I must have blinked.

Ghs

[sjw]

So you've already made your argument? Sorry, I must have blinked.

Ghs

You must not have been following along. Go back to the point where you started getting blinded by your outrage at the fact that I said contracts were communication, you'll see that the argument there didn't depend on them actually being communication, only on the fact that they are caused by the act of communicating.

Shayne

[George H. Smith]

So you've already made your argument? Sorry, I must have blinked.

Ghs

You must not have been following along. Go back to the point where you started getting blinded by your outrage at the fact that I said contracts were communication, you'll see that the argument there didn't depend on them actually being communication, only on the fact that they are caused by the act of communicating.

Shayne

Yeah, I got that point. What I missed was the argument that communication can constitute "intellectual force." True, communication can be one element is a series of actions that eventuate in aggression, but this doesn't mean that communication per se can be a type of aggression. Only if the final act is itself an aggressive act can the communication be regarded as part of a causal chain.

I recall that you made a similar point in a reply to (I think) Bob Mac. Fine, but that won't get your key argument anywhere. But if you would like to attempt the logical leap, be my guest.

Ghs

[sjw]

Yeah, I got that point. What I missed was the argument that communication can constitute "intellectual force." True, communication can be one element is a series of actions that eventuate in aggression, but this doesn't mean that communication per se can be a type of aggression. Only if the final act is itself an aggressive act can the communication be regarded as part of a causal chain.

I recall that you made a similar point in a reply to (I think) Bob Mac. Fine, but that won't get your key argument anywhere. But if you would like to attempt the logical leap, be my guest.

Ghs

I'm unclear on what you're objecting to. The first action in the chain in the hitman case is communication. So that's an example of the first causal act, that also happens to be communication. The act of communicating in this case is like pulling a trigger on a gun. Should pulling a trigger be illegal? Of course not. Only when you've aimed at harming someone.

You're making a big deal about something that seems trivial and uncontroversial, I have no idea what you think the problem is.

Shayne