KInsella and Thin Air

[bmacwilliam]

I commend my article Causation and Aggression.

I printed off a copy to read later, glancing at the third paragraph though I see a very bizarre definition. Human action is defined as "intentional intervention in the physical world," where as behavior ("mere behavior") is a person's unintentional movements not aimed at any purpose, plan or design.

This is very philosophically suspicious. Action is action. Human action can be intentional or not, conscious, semiconscious, automatic, internal, external, etc. But it's action, all of it. The concept of intentional harmful consequences -- i.e., the results of an action, not the action itself -- is important because it relates to predicting future harmful action, but the concept of intentional action as such does not seem to be a very legally useful addition. It is only when we evaluate the action (picking up an apple (an action) vs. stealing it (an evaluation)) that we can attribute something meaningful in a legal context.

Shayne

I've read some Mises and I think the Human Action Theory stuff is very interesting. I think his definition makes sense because he wants to distiguish between intention/choice based action and the other non-purposeful types of things that might be otherwise thought of as "action". If you "do" something and could have chosen to "do" something else that is Mises' action (I think).

Bob

[sjw]

I've read some Mises and I think the Human Action Theory stuff is very interesting. I think his definition makes sense because he wants to distiguish between intention/choice based action and the other non-purposeful types of things that might be otherwise thought of as "action". If you "do" something and could have chosen to "do" something else that is Mises' action (I think).

Bob

There is no need to cleave action from behavior in order to have the distinction between purposeful action/behavior and non-purposeful action/behavior. The division is absurd on its face, however Mises might have productively used them.

Shayne

[nskinsella]

I've read some Mises and I think the Human Action Theory stuff is very interesting. I think his definition makes sense because he wants to distiguish between intention/choice based action and the other non-purposeful types of things that might be otherwise thought of as "action". If you "do" something and could have chosen to "do" something else that is Mises' action (I think).

Bob

There is no need to cleave action from behavior in order to have the distinction between purposeful action/behavior and non-purposeful action/behavior. The division is absurd on its face, however Mises might have productively used them.

Shayne

Newb alert. And you wrote a "book". wow.

[sjw]

Newb alert. And you wrote a "book". wow.

And when the lawyering doesn't work you resort to ad hominem. Wow.

But this action/behavior cleaving warrants further investigation. I suspect a con game afoot, probably some kind of bait and switch.

Shayne

[sjw]

From Part 1 of Mises' Human Action: "Human action is purposeful behavior." Thus ends his justification for defining all human action as purposeful behavior for all contexts. Since the subject of the book is purposeful human action and not law, I see no harm in his stipulative definition. It works for his purposes. His purpose was not a legal purpose. I have no beef with Mises.

Here is where Kinsella's cargo cult copying of Mises' definition gets him:

http://www.stephankinsella.com/2009/09/the-libertarian-approach-to-negligence-tort-and-strict-liability-wergeld-and-partial-wergeld

"So how should we view negligence? I believe it should be viewed as being on a spectrum between non-action or mere behavior, and fully intentional action (crime). It is “partially” intentional."

So, if you accidentally backed over a child with your car, then you "partially" intended to do so. Right. This is the bizarre consequence of misappropriating Mises' economic definition and trying to transplant it into a legal context. The truth is obvious that you didn't intend to run over the child at all, not even slightly; what you did is not attend to the morally/legally necessary obligations of driving the car. The result of not attending might be to run somebody over, but failing to be aware of one's obligations and the possible results is a far cry from actually consciously (partially or otherwise) intending the results.

I withdraw the con-game speculation; what's really afoot is incompetent borrowing of Mises' terms.

Shayne

Edited December 2, 2010 by sjw

[nskinsella]

From Part 1 of Mises' Human Action: "Human action is purposeful behavior." Thus ends his justification for defining all human action as purposeful behavior for all contexts. Since the subject of the book is purposeful human action and not law, I see no harm in his stipulative definition. It works for his purposes. His purpose was not a legal purpose. I have no beef with Mises.

Here is where Kinsella's cargo cult copying of Mises' definition gets him:

http://www.stephankinsella.com/2009/09/the-libertarian-approach-to-negligence-tort-and-strict-liability-wergeld-and-partial-wergeld

"So how should we view negligence? I believe it should be viewed as being on a spectrum between non-action or mere behavior, and fully intentional action (crime). It is “partially” intentional."

So, if you accidentally backed over a child with your car, then you "partially" intended to do so. Right. This is the bizarre consequence of misappropriating Mises' economic definition and trying to transplant it into a legal context. The truth is obvious that you didn't intend to run over the child at all, not even slightly; what you did is not attend to the morally/legally necessary obligations of driving the car. The result of not attending might be to run somebody over, but failing to be aware of one's obligations and the possible results is a far cry from actually consciously (partially or otherwise) intending the results.

I withdraw the con-game speculation; what's really afoot is incompetent borrowing of Mises' terms.

Shayne

Stick to derivatives.

[sjw]

Stick to derivatives.

Nobody with enough intellectual fuel to escape the ancap orbit would have any objection at all to my common-sense analysis. No one with any sense is going to buy the idea that when they accidentally did something then it was (partially) on purpose.

Shayne

[nskinsella]

Have you guys read anything by Bernays?

I see your entire premise excluding the effects of propaganda (now called "public relations") on large masses of people.

Lynch mobs don't exist because people rationally decide to violate the rights of someone. They get lathered up with emotions driven by psychological triggers. And there are ways to do that with entire countries. There are techniques for this.

I believe one of the reasons libertarianism is not spread to the mainstream by libertarians, but instead by people like Glenn Beck, is because he knows about the techniques and knows how to use them, while libertarians don't and sometimes deny that such techniques even.work.

One of the things my research has been taking me into is how well the Left is familiar with persuasion techniques. Visit any site on animal rights, environmental issues, global warming, minority causes in general, unions, etc., and you will not only find articles on how to put together influence campaigns, you will also find reference to what books they should read on these things. (A favorite, for example, is Doing Democracy: The MAP Model for Organizing Social Movements by Bill Moyer› JoAmn McAllister, Mary Lou Finley and Steven Soifer.)

Although a pure democracy is nothing but an exalted lynch mob and one can be devised--like a republic--that deals with this problem, no government can possibly exist for long if the majority of its citizens are hostile to it. Not even a dictatorship. If the people are indifferent to supportive, the government--whatever it is--generally stays. All you need for a libertarian government to fall (if one should ever come to pass) is one good propaganda campaign to make people hostile to it.

But of course, the propagandists will be exercising their rights--that is until they jockey themselves into a position of power where they can take the rights from everyone.

Here's a book that gives a particularly nasty and cancerous partial blueprint according to what I have been told. I have not yet read it, but it is on my reading list.

Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein

This is the same Cass Sunstein who is Obama's regulatory czar. He's the guy who is writing the rules that will be used by the cops as the reason they show up at our doorsteps regarding health care, financial matters, etc. (essentially, the new laws passed by the federal government).

One of the reasons I am bringing this up is that propaganda falls into the same category as libel: public persuasion that leads to damages and violations of rights.

I think this whole issue needs a better treatment than simple dismissal.

Michael

Michael, I agree that you could be responsible for, say, inciting a riot. I give reasons why in Causation and Responsibility. www.stephankinsella.com/publications

But this does not, IMO, justify libel law. In the case of inciting a riot or a crime there is (in my view) potentially responsibilty on the part of the inciter/speaker, *because* they are playing a causal role in an act *of aggression*. That is, your action serves to bring about not merely damage or harm, but actually aggression against, the victim.

In the case of libel, you are not persuading someone to violate the "victim's" rights--the people who are swayed by your lies are doing what they have a *rihgt* to do--think poorly of you, not buy from you, etc. Conceivably the persons you deceive have a claim against you, but then, there is no general right not to be lied to; it would have to be an actual case of fraud, which means the liar/defrauder is misstating something intentionally to trick the victim into handing over property under false pretenses--thus fraud is a form of theft by trick, something like this. But even here, the victim is the person defrauded, not people that are lied about.

Another problem with treating lies as a form of incitement is similar to why we only treat certain *imminent* threats as a subset or type or species of aggression. The threat has to be immediate and real, to count as aggression. (That said I do think forms of stalking count as aggression too, even though they are less immediate than other threats. But we have to be careful.)

Edited December 2, 2010 by Stephan Kinsella

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Stephan,

I have to think about this.

If I have a business that has demonstrable profit margins during years based on my reputation, and someone comes along spreading a a public lie and causes that reputation to be damaged, thus my profits go way down--presuming it can be demonstrated that people no longer buy because they believed the lie, I believe this is a kind of vandalism.

But I see a deeper issue here. In my studies, I am coming across the idea that the frame is just as important to influencing buying as the quality/price, etc, of the product.

If we can hold a seller to a standard of false advertising that creates damage for the customer (like selling one thing, but claiming it is another and this causes the customer to use it for things that cause loss or injury), we certainly can hold a competitor (or someone with a grudge) responsible for intentional false advertising that damages his trust before his customer base.

Maybe we think differently on this. I hold that a business is property, not just the products it sells. A business is a process in addition to the buildings, products, vehicles, etc. The customer base is a fundamental part of a business and there are definite measurable aspects of ti that are connected through causality. This is something that has provable physical transaction value and it can be vandalized.

If we remove causality and time from the concept of being inherent aspects of property, I can see how an argument can be made against this. But I don't agree with that. (My stance is based on my view of human nature, but I'm still working on the normal rights individual issue right now--how rights flow from human nature and what that nature is. I need to get to IP later to really develop the argument with any real meat on its bones.)

I will have to read your piece a little later, so I can't comment on it now. I will when I do.

(Man, that last sentence sounds lousy, doesn't it? )

btw - I don't think the current intellectual property laws are any great shakes. They are a mess.

Michael

[sjw]

If I have a business that has demonstrable profit margins during years based on my reputation, and someone comes along spreading a a public lie and causes that reputation to be damaged, thus my profits go way down--presuming it can be demonstrated that people no longer buy because they believed the lie, I believe this is a kind of vandalism.

The ancap idea is, I think, that you don't own the opinions of others, which is (they allege) all that has changed in this scenario.

But as I've said, I think it can be demonstrated that rights violation has happened. The more I think about it the more I think it can be proven, though the argument is not trivial to make. So I think your intuition is in the right direction.

Where the ancaps should be credited relative to Objectivists is an actual concern for rigorous, systematic proof of these ideas. I don't think they do a strikingly good job of it, but at least they try. And even if their arguments aren't successful, they have such a big pile of verbiage that they can overwhelm the enemy by force if necessary ;)

Shayne

[George H. Smith]

Stephan,

I have to think about this.

If I have a business that has demonstrable profit margins during years based on my reputation, and someone comes along spreading a a public lie and causes that reputation to be damaged, thus my profits go way down--presuming it can be demonstrated that people no longer buy because they believed the lie, I believe this is a kind of vandalism.

But I see a deeper issue here. In my studies, I am coming across the idea that the frame is just as important to influencing buying as the quality/price, etc, of the product.

If we can hold a seller to a standard of false advertising that creates damage for the customer (like selling one thing, but claiming it is another and this causes the customer to use it for things that cause loss or injury), we certainly can hold a competitor (or someone with a grudge) responsible for intentional false advertising that damages his trust before his customer base.

Your first example constitutes fraud; your second example does not.

Any lie, especially any significant lie, can potentially cause harm to an individual, a group, a company, etc. Suppose a Christian claimed that I lied about Christianity in ATCAG and thereby caused harm to his church by diminishing its membership -- the number of customers, in effect. Could I legitimately be sued for damages? By your reasoning, I don't see why not.

Ultimately, you will be unable to make your case without arguing that lying per se is a rights-violating activity, provided some "harm" is caused to someone, somewhere. This is not merely a slippery slope; it is the bottom of the slope itself.

The crime of seditious libel is deeply rooted in English common law. Would you agree that someone who lies about his government and thereby causes it harm -- e.g., by diminishing the allegiance of its citizens -- should be liable to prosecution? If not, why not? (In later interpretations of seditious libel, even truth was not a defense. See Leonard W. Levy, Freedom of Speech and Press in America: Legacy of Suppression, Harper Torchbooks, 1963.)

Ghs

[BaalChatzaf]

sx

The crime of seditious libel is deeply rooted in English common law. Would you agree that someone who lies about his government and thereby causes it harm -- e.g., by diminishing the allegiance of its citizens -- should be liable to prosecution? If not, why not? (In later interpretations of seditious libel, even truth was not a defense. See Leonard W. Levy, Freedom of Speech and Press in America: Legacy of Suppression, Harper Torchbooks, 1963.)

Ghs

Any entity that taxes its subjects should be deconstructed. Lying is the non-violent form of insurrection and subversion. Besides the government, almost by its nature is a lie machine. So lying about the liars is fair dinkum.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

George,

I don't see the comparison working.

If you wrote that Pastor so-and-so, or his church XYZ, preached a Satanist or explicitly atheistic doctrine to a different congregation in secret, and you published doctored photos, etc., that is different than taking on the entire philosophy/religion.

The idea is similar to the ad hominem argument, but with allegations of acts performed by a specific person or legal entity that were not.

We have people preach against capitalism all the time with false information and that is not a reason for libel.

Michael

[George H. Smith]

George,

I don't see the comparison working.

If you wrote that Pastor so-and-so, or his church XYZ, preached a Satanist or explicitly atheistic doctrine to a different congregation in secret, and you published doctored photos, etc., that is different than taking on the entire philosophy/religion.

You applied the notion of libel to an institution, i.e., a commercial company. I merely expanded your application to a broader group of institutions, i.e., Christian churches. I fail to see any essential difference.

Suppose someone circulates a lie about a product that is produced by 10 different companies, and that all these companies suffer serious financial losses as a result. I see no reason why your case for libel would not apply to this case as well. And if 10, institutions, then why not 20, or 50, or 100, or 1000? And if commercial companies, why not churches? Suppose an atheist claims that all Christian preachers are frauds, I see no reason why any Christian preacher who can prove "harm" from this "libel" could not sue for damages. Any given preacher, after all, would be included in the category of "all."

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Suppose someone circulates a lie about a product that is produced by 10 different companies, and that all these companies suffer serious financial losses as a result. I see no reason why your case for libel would not apply to this case as well.

George,

I find it hard to suppose this.

This is because I understand libel to be relative to an individual entity (person or legal entity), not a collective.

I am not a lawyer and am not up on the case law, but I don't even see your kind of supposition in our already messed up laws.

Michael

[George H. Smith]

Suppose someone circulates a lie about a product that is produced by 10 different companies, and that all these companies suffer serious financial losses as a result. I see no reason why your case for libel would not apply to this case as well.

George,

I find it hard to suppose this.

This is because I understand libel to be relative to an individual entity (person or legal entity), not a collective.

I am not a lawyer and am not up on the case law, but I don't even see your kind of supposition in our already messed up laws.

Michael

The following is from the January 20, 1998, episode of the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer. (My emphases.)

Oprah Winfrey and representatives of the Beef industry went to trial in a case that tests the boundaries of food defamation laws passed by Texas and 12 other states recently. Winfrey made disparaging remarks about beef on her popular talk show two years ago, which cattlemen say caused a drop in the price of beef. Winfrey says it wasn't her fault. What effect will food defamation laws have? Are they fair to food safety laws or are they a tool to help food packagers and producers protect their interests. After a background report, Elizabeth Farnsworth explores the issues.

...

PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH: I do not like broccoli. And I haven't liked it since I was a little kid and my mother made me eat it, and I'm President of the United States. And I'm not going to eat any more broccoli.

ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: Former President George Bush's public disparagement of broccoli did not go far enough to bring on a lawsuit. But if he had said the vegetable endangers people and not had proof, then in some states broccoli farmers could have sued. Since 1990, 13 states, from Georgia to Idaho, have adopted food defamation laws. That, in effect, allowed broccoli to stay in court. Under these laws individuals can be sued for questioning the safety of any food product without verifiable scientific proof, for ridiculing radishes or picking on pears, for example, or, as TV personality Oprah Winfrey discovered, belittling beef.OPRAH WINFREY: Today's show may cause you to diet for all the wrong reasons. We're talking about the hidden dangers in our food.

ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: Last year in the first court test of these laws Texas cattle ranchers filed suit against Winfrey and one of her guests, a Humane Society official, for defaming beef during an April 1996 Oprah show.

Here's what was said. "Oprah Winfrey, you said Mad Cow Disease could make AIDS look like the common cold?"

Lyman: "Absolutely."

Winfrey: "That's an extreme statement, you know."

Lyman: "Absolutely." One hundred thousand cows per year in the United States are fine at night, dead in the morning. The majority of those cows are rounded up, ground up, fed back to other cows. If only one of them has Mad Cow Disease, it has the potential to infect thousands."

Winfrey: "It has just stopped me cold from eating another burger!"

After the broadcast, cattle prices dropped to near 10-year lows and ranchers blamed their losses on the show. Winfrey and her lawyers cite other reasons behind the drop. The talk show host has relocated her show from Chicago to Amarillo, Texas, where the trial is being held, until the jury reaches a decision. The cattlemen are claiming more than $12 million in damages. The only other Texas food defamation lawsuit is before the same court in Amarillo:

The case of Emu Vs. Honda. An emu is the smaller cousin of the ostrich, raised for feathers, skin, and most of all meat. In early 1990, the going price for a pair of emu was about $40,000. Today that same pair would sell for being 100 and 400 dollars. And some Texas emu ranchers blame the Honda Motor Company for the drop. Six ranchers are suing Honda over the car commercial that pokes fun at a guy named Joe who looks for a job in some odd places, including an emu ranch.

PERSON IN COMMERCIAL: Emu, Joe. It's the pork of the future.

ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: The ranchers' lawyer says the commercial defames emu meat and the emu industry.

JOHN SCOTT, Emu Ranchers' Lawyer: The message that most viewers get of this commercial is that anyone associated with the emu industry is a flimflam or scam artist.

ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: The case is expected to be heard later this year. The food libel laws currently on the books in Texas and other states were triggered by a 1989 "60 Minutes" segment, "A is for Apple." It alleged that alar, a chemical used to lengthen the time that apples ripen on trees, could cause cancer, especially in children. Washington State apple growers sued for damages, but the suit was dismissed on the grounds that the product, not the producers, were defamed. And under the law at that time food could not be defamed. In reaction, the American Feed Industry Association hired lawyers to draft a bill against the defamation of agricultural products. The bill was then dispersed among the states where some legislatures passed it. But whether the new food defamation laws are a limitation of free speech remains to be tested. Meanwhile, in 13 states if you can't say anything nice about perishable products, it's safest not to say anything at all.

ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: Now, two different perspectives on two defamation laws. John Bode was assistant secretary of agriculture for food and consumer services in the Reagan and Bush administrations. He now practices law in Washington, D.C. And David Bederman is a law professor at Emory University. Thank you both for being with us.

John Bode, you're a rancher and also your law firm helped draw up the statutes on which some of this legislation was based. Why is this legislation important? What, besides alar, propelled it?

JOHN BODE, Attorney: Well, right now, generally, libel law exists so that if a knowing statement is made to falsely defame Acme brand hamburger, the Acme Company can sue. However, if a knowingly false statement is made disparaging hamburger generally and great damage is done, many courts will not allow that case to be brought because they feel historically the law has held that the identification of the producers of that hamburger is not close enough. This law simply says that if farmers get hurt by someone knowingly making a false statement about the safety of the food, the farmers can go to court and try to prove their case.

ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: And, Mr. Bederman, is that your understanding for how these laws came to be and also for what they are saying?

DAVID BEDERMAN, Emory University Law School: Well, many of these laws were particularly advocated by agribusiness and food industry interests in this country precisely, I think, as John has said, to provide a cause of action in these cases and also, I think, to send a message to media and food safety advocates to be quiet, to don't speak out.

See: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/jan-june98/fooddef_1-20.html

The case against Winfrey failed, but, so far as I know, "food defamation" laws are still on the books in various states. Do you object to such laws? If so, why? I don't see why they wouldn't fall within the parameters of your argument for libel laws.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

The case against Winfrey failed, but, so far as I know "food defamation" laws are still on the books in various states. Do you object to such laws?

George,

Yup. I object to things like food defamation laws in kind, number and degree.

(That's a Brazilian expression--I'm not so sure it translates well. It means I totally object.)

If so, why? I don't see why they wouldn't fall within the parameters of your argument for libel laws.

Because such laws do not involve an act by an individual entity that was singled out as such for public notice.

I don't support collectivist libel through generalizations.

In my conception, in this case, for libel, an individual would have to have been specifically (nominally) accused of poisoning someone and the fact be untrue.

Michael

[George H. Smith]

The case against Winfrey failed, but, so far as I know "food defamation" laws are still on the books in various states. Do you object to such laws?

George,

Yup. I object to things like food defamation laws in kind, number and degree.

(That's a Brazilian expression--I'm not so sure it translates well. It means I totally object.)

If so, why? I don't see why they wouldn't fall within the parameters of your argument for libel laws.

Because such laws do not involve an act by an individual entity that was singled out as such for public notice.

I don't support collectivist libel through generalizations.

In my conception, in this case, for libel, an individual would have to have been specifically (nominally) accused of poisoning someone and the fact be untrue.

Michael

So to falsely accuse a company of selling a dangerous product, even if no one has actually been harmed (as yet) by that product, would not qualify as libel, in your theory?

You keep speaking of individual entities and their actions. But a company or corporation cannot "act" at all, except in a fictitious legal sense. Only individual human beings can act. The notion that a huge corporation like General Electric, because it is an "individual" legal entity, should be able to sue for libel, whereas a collection of smaller individual companies should not have this right, strikes me as quite arbitrary. So does your distinction between a company and a product. If a product is defamed, the unnamed company that produces that product may suffer considerable harm. If I falsely claim that a nonfiction book is full of lies and thereby cause sales of that book to plummet, how does this differ from defaming the author himself? The same reasoning applies to companies and their products.

You are a difficult man to pin down.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

sx

The crime of seditious libel is deeply rooted in English common law. Would you agree that someone who lies about his government and thereby causes it harm -- e.g., by diminishing the allegiance of its citizens -- should be liable to prosecution? If not, why not? (In later interpretations of seditious libel, even truth was not a defense. See Leonard W. Levy, Freedom of Speech and Press in America: Legacy of Suppression, Harper Torchbooks, 1963.)

Ghs

Any entity that taxes its subjects should be deconstructed. Lying is the non-violent form of insurrection and subversion. Besides the government, almost by its nature is a lie machine. So lying about the liars is fair dinkum.

All you need do is apply my example to your ideal form of government. You are perfectly happy with the government you have, but trouble-makers are spreading egregious lies about it (e.g., that it has constructed secret concentration camps) that are causing enormous discontent and making it difficult for your ideal government to function. So do you think the principle of "seditious libel" (the exact words are immaterial) should be applied in this case?

Ghs

[BaalChatzaf]

All you need do is apply my example to your ideal form of government. You are perfectly happy with the government you have, but trouble-makers are spreading egregious lies about it (e.g., that it has constructed secret concentration camps) that are causing enormous discontent and making it difficult for your ideal government to function. So do you think the principle of "seditious libel" (the exact words are immaterial) should be applied in this case?

Ghs

No bubbah. I am not perfectly happy with the government I have. I have no ideal form of government besides reason and self-control. All governments are bad. but some are very much worse than others. There has never, in human history, been a good government. The origin of government, as Tom Paine pointed out, is the evil that men do to each other. Society is a blessing. Government, is at best, a necessary evil.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[George H. Smith]

All you need do is apply my example to your ideal form of government. You are perfectly happy with the government you have, but trouble-makers are spreading egregious lies about it (e.g., that it has constructed secret concentration camps) that are causing enormous discontent and making it difficult for your ideal government to function. So do you think the principle of "seditious libel" (the exact words are immaterial) should be applied in this case?

Ghs

No bubbah. I am not perfectly happy with the government I have. I have no ideal form of government besides reason and self-control. All governments are bad. but some are very much worse than others. There has never, in human history, been a good government. The origin of government, as Tom Paine pointed out, is the evil that men do to each other. Society is a blessing. Government, is at best, a necessary evil.

Ba'al Chatzaf

For some reason I thought that you are a minarchist. My mistake. Perhaps some minarchist who also believes in libel laws would like to address my hypothetical.

Ghs

[nskinsella]

The case against Winfrey failed, but, so far as I know "food defamation" laws are still on the books in various states. Do you object to such laws?

George,

Yup. I object to things like food defamation laws in kind, number and degree.

(That's a Brazilian expression--I'm not so sure it translates well. It means I totally object.)

If so, why? I don't see why they wouldn't fall within the parameters of your argument for libel laws.

Because such laws do not involve an act by an individual entity that was singled out as such for public notice.

I don't support collectivist libel through generalizations.

In my conception, in this case, for libel, an individual would have to have been specifically (nominally) accused of poisoning someone and the fact be untrue.

Michael

So to falsely accuse a company of selling a dangerous product, even if no one has actually been harmed (as yet) by that product, would not qualify as libel, in your theory?

You keep speaking of individual entities and their actions. But a company or corporation cannot "act" at all, except in a fictitious legal sense. Only individual human beings can act. The notion that a huge corporation like General Electric, because it is an "individual" legal entity, should be able to sue for libel, whereas a collection of smaller individual companies should not have this right, strikes me as quite arbitrary. So does your distinction between a company and a product. If a product is defamed, the unnamed company that produces that product may suffer considerable harm. If I falsely claim that a nonfiction book is full of lies and thereby cause sales of that book to plummet, how does this differ from defaming the author himself? The same reasoning applies to companies and their products.

You are a difficult man to pin down.

Ghs

Corporations should not be viewed as having personhood at all. The state promotes the idea that legal personhood is necessary for incorporation; that it's a privilege, not a right; and the same with the "grant" of "limited liability"; so that the state grants it, and can condition this grant on regulations and double-taxations (if it's a person it has to pay income tax; then its shareholders pay again). But as Hessen showed decades ago in In Defense of the Corporation, legal personality is not necessary for corporations to form; private individuals can form corporations by means of private contracts; and as Hessen and Pilon have argued (google my site for Hessen and Pilon), there is no reason to attribute vicarious liability to passive shareholders for tortious acts of employees of the corporation anyway, so the limited liability "grant" is not necessary for shareholdres to have "limited liability" in the first place.

The problem I have seen over and over when libertarians talk about corporations, limited liability, libel, IP and fraud, is there is almost always a lot of confusion in their minds about basic legal doctrines and concepts like contract (its nature as title transfer NOT as binding promises), fraud (they too loosely equate it with "lying", instead of its precise context of misrepresentation as part of a trade to illegitimately gain title or possession to something, where the fraud has vitiated the "consent" of the owner so that it's not informed or genuine), limited liability (they do not understand that shareholdres are passive anyway; they often think limited liability applies to managers and employees instead of to shareholdres; they have no theory of causation or any way to prevent a broad implicit view of causation broad enough to make shareholdres liabiltiy, from also making creditors, vendors, customers, co-employees, also vicariously liable for the torts of employees); and a host of related doctrines. Michael, I think if you will think carefully about this and restrict yourself to clear, concrete examples, you'll see that you cannot make out an argument like you are trying to do. You are keeping it general and vague--talking about owning "a business" and "being harmed" or "damaged"--this is too vague. We have to specify and be careful, since owning things has to refer to an exact concrete resource with discernible property boundaries or borders; and we know that SOME types of harm or damage are permissible in a libertarian society, so we have to talk instead of trespass or aggression, and then try to identify it. We cannot just generally talk of some "fraud" or "lies" and assume this is enough to prohibit it, since lying is not a crime, and there is no crime of fraud unless there is a concrete victim who has *been defrauded* in a particular way. Etc.

For eample you say "Maybe we think differently on this. I hold that a business is property, not just the products it sells. A business is a process in addition to the buildings, products, vehicles, etc. The customer base is a fundamental part of a business and there are definite measurable aspects of ti that are connected through causality. This is something that has provable physical transaction value and it can be vandalized."

WEll, it is true that one way businessmen measure the value of their business in practice using standard GAAP is to consider the "good will"--the tendency of repeat business from customers. This does not mean you have a property right in customers or their business. Owning a business is just a shorthand for meaning you own the facilities and related property, you have the means to serve customers, you have certain contracts in place, certain relationships, and so on. You can call it a process but you cannot own a process. This is the danger of overly metaphorical or sloppy use of language -- I do not mean to criticize you here. It is natural to use loose language in a variety of concepts. But we have to be careful NOT to equivocate. Equivocation, whether intentional or not, and over/mis-use of metaphors, is one of the most common errors I see made in normative reasoning. It is just rampant.

Edited December 3, 2010 by Stephan Kinsella

[bmacwilliam]

sx

The crime of seditious libel is deeply rooted in English common law. Would you agree that someone who lies about his government and thereby causes it harm -- e.g., by diminishing the allegiance of its citizens -- should be liable to prosecution? If not, why not? (In later interpretations of seditious libel, even truth was not a defense. See Leonard W. Levy, Freedom of Speech and Press in America: Legacy of Suppression, Harper Torchbooks, 1963.)

Ghs

Any entity that taxes its subjects should be deconstructed. Lying is the non-violent form of insurrection and subversion. Besides the government, almost by its nature is a lie machine. So lying about the liars is fair dinkum.

All you need do is apply my example to your ideal form of government. You are perfectly happy with the government you have, but trouble-makers are spreading egregious lies about it (e.g., that it has constructed secret concentration camps) that are causing enormous discontent and making it difficult for your ideal government to function. So do you think the principle of "seditious libel" (the exact words are immaterial) should be applied in this case?

Ghs

I have some questions with this. Accusing all preachers of fraud cannot be shown to be a lie.

Saying you don't like a food might be harmful (if you're a celebrity) to a producer, but there's no lie involved - so too bad. Saying a food is harmful (if it isn't) is a lie, and if it causes harm I don't see a problem with a law against this.

Same with your government example, I don't see a problem with a law against this. Don't get me wrong, I'm not saying you're wrong, I'm saying I don't see the problem. Can you help me see it?

Bob

[nskinsella]

sx

The crime of seditious libel is deeply rooted in English common law. Would you agree that someone who lies about his government and thereby causes it harm -- e.g., by diminishing the allegiance of its citizens -- should be liable to prosecution? If not, why not? (In later interpretations of seditious libel, even truth was not a defense. See Leonard W. Levy, Freedom of Speech and Press in America: Legacy of Suppression, Harper Torchbooks, 1963.)

Ghs

Any entity that taxes its subjects should be deconstructed. Lying is the non-violent form of insurrection and subversion. Besides the government, almost by its nature is a lie machine. So lying about the liars is fair dinkum.

All you need do is apply my example to your ideal form of government. You are perfectly happy with the government you have, but trouble-makers are spreading egregious lies about it (e.g., that it has constructed secret concentration camps) that are causing enormous discontent and making it difficult for your ideal government to function. So do you think the principle of "seditious libel" (the exact words are immaterial) should be applied in this case?

Ghs

I have some questions with this. Accusing all preachers of fraud cannot be shown to be a lie.

Saying you don't like a food might be harmful (if you're a celebrity) to a producer, but there's no lie involved - so too bad. Saying a food is harmful (if it isn't) is a lie, and if it causes harm I don't see a problem with a law against this.

Same with your government example, I don't see a problem with a law against this. Don't get me wrong, I'm not saying you're wrong, I'm saying I don't see the problem. Can you help me see it?

Bob

you don't have a problem with laws against sedition?? ..... The problem ... first, the state is criminal. It should make no laws--much less laws that ban criticism of it! The other, more general, problem, is the only laws that are legitimate are laws that prohibit aggression--that is, the use of others' property without their consent; that is, the invasion of others' property borders. The reason is any law is a use of force, and if it is not in response to an initiation of force, it, itself, is the initiation and is aggression and thus illegitimate (by libertarian lights). So, for you to "not hae a problem with" a given law, as a libertarian, you need to show that the law is in RESPONSE to some action that is itself aggression (initiated force). A law against criticism of/lying about the state is not directed at aggression, since lying is NOT AGGRESSION.

[BaalChatzaf]

you don't have a problem with laws against sedition?? ..... The problem ... first, the state is criminal. It should make no laws--much less laws that ban criticism of it! The other, more general, problem, is the only laws that are legitimate are laws that prohibit aggression--that is, the use of others' property without their consent; that is, the invasion of others' property borders. The reason is any law is a use of force, and if it is not in response to an initiation of force, it, itself, is the initiation and is aggression and thus illegitimate (by libertarian lights). So, for you to "not hae a problem with" a given law, as a libertarian, you need to show that the law is in RESPONSE to some action that is itself aggression (initiated force). A law against criticism of/lying about the state is not directed at aggression, since lying is NOT AGGRESSION.

In a free state a person should be allowed to say anything he wishes to say about the government, as long as he is not fomenting a riot.

We cannot simply tolerate riots or lynchings. They simply will not do.

Ba'al Chatzaf