A Criticism of David Harriman's Thesis

regi · October 30, 2010

<a name="top"><div align="center" style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:16pt;">Saving Science</div></a>

<div align="center" style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:13pt;">A Criticism of the Thesis in David Harriman's The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics</div>

<div align="center" style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:13pt;">by Reginald Firehammer</div>

<div align="center" style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:13pt;">Contents</div>

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Harriman's Thesis

<a href="#a">Cause</a>

<a href="#b">Origin of the Concept Cause</a>

<a href="#c">Induction Is Generalization</a>

<a href="#d">Mathematics, The Basis of Everything</a>

<a href="#e" >Summary</a>

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Critique and True Nature of Science

<a href="#f" name="" target="">Beginning With Cause</a>

<a href="#g" name="" target="">More Than a Semantic Difference</a>

<a href="#h" name="" target="">Principles, not Cause</a>

<a href="#i" name="" target="">First-level Concepts</a>

<a href="#j" name="" target="">Identification, Not Generalization</a>

<a href="#k" name="" target="">Mathematics is Only a Method</a>

<a href="#l" name="" target="">Limits of Mathematics</a>

<a href="#k1" name="" target="">Not Just Mathematics</a>

<a href="#m" name="" target="">The True Nature Of Concepts</a>

<a href="#n" name="" target="">Observation, Identification, and Deduction</a>

<a href="#o" name="" target="">Deduction From Observation, Not Generalization</a>

<a href="#p" name="" target="">Scientific Method</a>

<a href="#q" name="" target="">Heading Off Possible Criticisms</a>

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I have been looking forward with some anticipation to finally reading the long-promised book on induction from ARI (Ayn Rand Institute) for some time. The book has been in the works for over 10 years and has finally been published as The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics. David Harriman is named as the author of the book, but it is clearly a collaboration between Harriman and Leonard Peikoff.

[Note: The is not a review of the book. If it were I would have good things to say about it, especially about the well presented and very interesting examples from the history of science. In this article I only address the essential arguments for the thesis of the book.]

There is a widely held view that the validity of science, in some way, depends on the validity of induction, and this book presents arguments which are supposed to be a defense of the inductive method in science. It is those arguments I am primarily interested in.

The entire argument is based on three concepts, "cause," "generalization," (by induction), and "mathematics." The book proceeds by means of illustrations of its premises with many good examples from the history of science. While those examples are excellent illustrations of the validity of scientific methods, they totally fail to demonstrate that induction is the basis of those methods.

My intention here is to explain why the concepts the book defends are either invalid or incorrectly understood. I'll first explain what Harriman seems to mean by the three main concepts. I will follow that by my criticism which includes the correct basis for the validity and objectivity of science.

[All quotes and page numbers refer to Harriman's The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics.]

<div align="center" style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:13pt;">Harriman's Thesis</div>

<a name="a">Cause</a>

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I intend to present these concepts without bias or criticism as closely as I can to the meaning intended by Harriman.

Concerning cause, he writes, "The only justification for inferring the future from the actions of the past is the fact that the past actions occurred not arbitrarily or miraculously, but for a reason, a reason inherent in the nature of the acting entities themselves: i.e., the justification is that the past actions were effects of causes—and thus if the same cause is operative tomorrow, it will result in the same effect." [Page 21.]

This meaning of cause seems very much like the meaning Hume intended, when he described cause as a "... necessary connexion ... which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other." [An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding]

I point this out to make it clear that though Harriman admires Aristotle and credits his philosophy as the most important philosophical influence on the development of science, his meaning of cause is obviously not that of Aristotle.

Aristotle identified four "types" or "aspects" of cause:

1. Material cause: The substance of which a thing consists.

2. Formal cause: The "design" or "form" of a thing.

3. Efficient cause: The agent that brings a thing into existence.

4. Final cause: Reason or purpose of a thing.

Cause, as Harriman uses the term would only pertain to number 3, the "efficient cause," and the "agent" for Harriman would be whatever thing, event or attribute was responsible for that which is caused, that is, the effect. But Aristotle was thinking on much broader terms, and by "cause" he meant what Harriman meant when he wrote: "... actions occurred not arbitrarily or miraculously, but for a reason ...." [Page 21.] Aristotle is addressing "cause" as the "reason" for things, not just their "physical" cause.

Harriman's meaning of cause separates a "cause" from an "effect" as though they were two independent metaphysical existents with "cause" as the only connection between them.

"In seeking cause and effect, we are relating objects/attributes that are subsumed under different concepts. We are attempting to discover the effects of one type of existent on another, for example, to identify the effect of temperature on the pressure of a gas, or the effect of length on the period of a pendulum, or the effect of distance on the gravitational force between bodies." [Page 229.]

But, though he confuses them, there is another meaning for cause suggested by Harriman. It is included in the quote above, "actions occurred not arbitrarily or miraculously, but for a reason, a reason inherent in the nature of the acting entities themselves," and stated explicitly here:

"Let us start by noting that all generalizations—first-level and higher—are statements of causal connection. All assert (or imply) that an entity of a certain kind necessarily acts in a certain way under a given set of circumstances, which is the essence of the law of causality." [Page 21.]

Let me make the difference clear: the first meaning of cause is a description of the relationship between two different existents, the one being the cause of the behavior of the other; the second meaning of cause states that which "causes" an existent's behavior as its own nature. Harriman obviously believes these two descriptions of cause agree, perhaps even that they reinforce each other.

<a name="b">Origin of the Concept Cause</a>

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Harriman regards causality as a "corollary" of the axiom of identity implicit in the perception of action in the same way identity is implicit in the perception of entities.

"Knowledge of the law of causality is first gained by a child in implicit form, in the early, preconceptual stage of cognition; it is grasped as a corollary—a self-evident implication—of the law of identity, one of the fundamental axioms of philosophy. The law of identity states that to be is to be something in particular, i.e., to have a nature; causality is the application of identity to the realm of action, i.e. it states that an entity must act in accordance with its nature."  [Page 22.]

One "possible" way a child gains knowledge of "cause," Harriman explains, is through the experience of causing things himself. He provides an example and explanation:

"A toddler, say, pushes a ball and it rolls away." ... the content of that concept [cause] is already present in the ... "rolling" an object. To roll an object is to cause it to roll by a certain means. The experience of rolling a ball, therefore, is the experience of causing something to happen. It is a pure experience of causation, without which the concept of "cause" could never be reached. The experience is directly perceptual. ... And if such rolling is an object of direct experience, as it clearly is, then causing, too, is an object of direct experience."

He then explains that this direct perception of cause is the basis of the child's first-level generalization (induction).

"He [the child] experiences the connection between what he does and what it makes happen. This is the basis of a child's first-level generalizations—and it gives him the explicit knowledge of "cause" necessary for further progress." [Page 22.]

According to Harriman, our knowledge of "cause" begins with direct perception.

"Armed with an explicit concept of 'cause' (of one thing 'making' another happen,) he [the child] is ready to perceive, all around him further instances of it. ... 'The wind makes the leaves flutter,' 'The fire makes the paper turn into ashes,' 'The rain makes the ground wet.' In all such cases, the causal connection is grasped from a single instance, because we directly perceive the causation as it is occurring." [Page 23.]

"In regard to first-level generalizations, however, direct perception of cause and effect is essential—and sufficient." [Page 24.]

<a name="c">Induction Is Generalization</a>

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Harriman's own definition of induction is the following:

"Induction is the process of inferring generalizations from particular instances." [Page 6.]

His meaning of generalization is this:

"A generalization is a proposition that ascribes a characteristic to every member of an unlimited class, wherever it is positioned in space or time. In formal terms, it states: All S is P. This kind of claim, on any subject, goes beyond all possible observations." [Page 7.]

The following are examples of what he means by generalization:

"But all of this requires that men first have the concept of 'shadow'—which depends on our ability to distinguish the dark areas behind lighted objects from the objects themselves. And how did we learn this distinction? From a wealth of earlier data, such as 'The dark areas in contrast to the objects they abut, have no tactile properties' (a generalization) and 'The dark areas appear or vanish with changes in the light source, while the objects remain constant' (a generalization). From these (along with other such generalizations), we conclude that the dark areas are not objects, but rather an effect produce when an object blocks light (a generalization)—which gives us the concept 'shadow.'" [Pages 17&18.]

Harriman bases his justification for this kind of generalization on what he calls, "first-level," inductions, which I suppose means the same as a child's "first-level generalizations," described above under the, "Origin of the Concept Cause."

"Similarly, a toddler sees a particular ball, but his identification of it is simply 'ball.' At this early stage, the child does not and cannot know any wider integration or narrower subtypes .... The same applies to the child's experience of himself as the particular pushing agent. His identification must be of 'pushing' as such .... Inherent in forming and applying a concept is the understanding that what counts cognitively is only the identity of its referents ... because the concept of an existent subsumes all instances everywhere, past, present, and future.

"Because of his simple, first-level conceptual structure, our inducer, in the very act of naming what he perceives, automatically drops the measurement of the perceived cause and effect and thereby gains knowledge transcending the given concrete. This is how he is able to grasp that the cause pertains to pushing as such, and the effect to balls as such, no matter where or when the ball is pushed." [Page 27.]

Remember, according to Harriman, all generalizations are concepts of cause:

"Let us start by noting that all generalizations&mdashfirst-level and higher—are statements of causal connection."[Page 21.]

Harriman nevertheless asserts that first-level inductions (generalizations) become concepts the moment a "word" is used to identify a "cause and effect," and this is automatic and self-evident.

"When the first-level inducer identifies his concrete experience of cause and effect in terms of words, his perceptual grasp of the causal relationship becomes thereby a conceptual grasp of it, i.e., a generalization. And since the application of first-level concepts is automatic and self-evident, the two aspects of a first-level generalization—the perceptual and the conceptual—are each, to a human mind, self-evident." [Page 28.]

Harriman makes this automatic self-evident concept of cause the basis for all knowledge of cause.

"How do you know that pushing a ball makes it roll? There is no answer, not even by Newton or Einstein, except this: Look and see. One cannot 'prove' such a generalization by deriving it from any abstract laws of motion. On the contrary, without a fund of such generalizations established at the outset, one could not discover or prove any laws of motion. The laws are valid only if their first-level antecedents are valid, not the other way around." [Page 18.]

[Note: On page 28, Harriman explains that a child's experience of "cause" becomes a concept when the experience is assigned a "word." On page 27, the only word Harriman gives as an example is "ball," and possibly by implication, thought not explicitly, the word "push." Harriman never gives an example of the child assigning a word to the supposed concept of cause.]

<a name="d">Mathematics, The Basis of Everything</a>

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Harriman reduces all universal knowledge to mathematics, basing both the nature of the metaphysical and the epistemological on it, including the nature of the human mind. It is mathematics he says, that is the means by which cause is understood.

Mathematics is, "the science of relating quantities to one another, quantities that are ultimately related to perceivable objects. ... it is by means of relating quantities that scientists grasp and express causal relationships." [Page 84.]

For Harriman, "mathematics is the language of physical science." [Page 225.]

"What knowledge of astronomy is possible without mathematics?" he asks. [Page 109.]

Harriman insists that mathematics is not a mere product of the mind without reference to the perceivable world. He comments on the wrong view of mathematics as "detached from the world, ... its source ... placed entirely within consciousness ...:"

"Such views about the nature of mathematical concepts led Einstein to pose the unanswerable question: 'How is it possible that mathematics, a product of human thought that is independent of experience, fits so excellently the objects of physical reality?' An answer to this question is possible only when we reject the premise that mathematics is independent of experience. Like every other science, mathematics applies to reality because it is derived from our observations of reality. It is a conceptualization of facts, which are ultimately reducible to observed similarities and differences." [Page 226.]

Continuing to emphasize that objectivity of mathematics, and after providing a somewhat fantastic explanation of how that method, which we call counting, was developed (as if anyone actually knows), he goes on to assert that "number concepts are integrations of similar concretes." and, "They refer to facts, as processed by our conceptual faculty; i.e., they are objective." [Page 227.]

He further states in this regard:

"Reduction to perceptual data is more complex for higher-level mathematical concepts.... If the concepts of higher mathematics are not derived from experience, however, then ... they are invalid." [Page 227.]

Having asserted the objectivity of mathematics, he then asks the question:

"Taking for granted the objectivity of mathematics, our question is: Why is it only by means of mathematics that we can gain scientific knowledge of the physical world?" [Page 228.]

The answer, according to, Harriman is because all our knowledge is based on the principles of mathematics, and that answer as based on Ayn Rand's "measurement omission" theory of concepts.

"Rand identified that the similar concretes united by a concept differed from one another only quantitatively. We form a concept by noticing that two or more existent have the same characteristic(s), but that these characteristics vary along a quantitative continuum of more or less. By omitting the implicit, approximate measurements of the characteristics, we can integrate the existent and treat them as interchangeable instances of a single concept." [Page 228.]

Since it is by means of measurements (or rather, ignoring them) all concepts are formed, Harriman can say "Concepts are the means by which we identify the nature of existents, and they are based on our grasp of quantitative relations among their referents. In performing such an integration, our minds grasp that the various instances we perceive are commensurable, i.e., reducible to the same unit&mdahsh;and therefore that the instances are the same except for their varying measurements. ... Thus when we say 'I know what something is,' we mean 'I know what it is through a quantitative operation my mind performs,' i.e., through grasping the quantitative connection of instances to some concrete taken as the unit—and then dropping the measurements." [Page 228.]

Thus, for Harriman, all knowledge, at least all scientific knowledge, is reduced to quantity, even to the working of the human mind.

"Human consciousness is inherently a quantitative mechanism. It grasps reality&mdashi.e., the attributes of entities and their causal relationships to one another—only through grasping quantitative data. In this sense, quantity has epistemological primacy over quality." [Page 231.]

Harriman does emphasize that the arithmetic nature of consciousness is epistemological.

"It is crucial to recognize that this point is epistemological, not metaphysical. Pythagoras was wrong to claim that quantity is the substance of reality; it is not true that "all things are numbers." Quantity is always quantity of something, i.e. of some entity or attribute. But quantity is the key to the nature of human knowledge. We can grasp and identify the qualities of things only through grasping quantity—and we can grasp causal relations between entities and actions only through grasping quantitative relations between them." [Page 231.]

<a name="e">Summary</a>

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Harriman considers induction the "compliment" of deduction, a kind of "converse" operation—induction is reasoning from the particular to the general; deduction is reasoning from the general to the particular.

"Induction is the process of inferring generalizations from particular instances. The complementary process of applying generalizations to new instances is deduction." [Page 6.]

The basis for the validity of induction, for Harriman, is the concept of cause, which is a fundamental concept of action in the same way identity is a fundamental concept of entities. Just as identity is implied by the perception of entities, cause is implied by the perception of action. Every action happens for a reason which is its cause.

The formation of the concept cause, "is automatic and self-evident," in the child, and is the basis of all future generalizations from particular instances, since "all generalizations ... are statements of causal connection."

These causal connections can be and are expressed in mathematical terms, because "it is by means of relating quantities that scientists grasp and express causal relationships."

Ultimately, mathematics, which is our means of comprehending quantity and quantitative relationships is the basis of all knowledge, because, "quantity is the key to the nature of human knowledge. We can grasp and identify the qualities of things only through grasping quantity—and we can grasp causal relations between entities and actions only through grasping quantitative relations between them."

[Note: This summary only addresses the concepts I am critical of. I am in total agreement or at least approving of many of the concepts in this book, specially the emphasis placed on the hierarchical nature of knowledge, that fact that new knowledge is always acquired in the context of current knowledge (which is frequently prerequisite for that new knowledge), and the non-contradictory nature of true knowledge.]

<div align="center" style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:13pt;">Critique and True Nature of Science</div>

<a name="f">Beginning With Cause</a>

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Though the stated purpose of The Logical Leap is to defend the validity of induction, I begin my criticism with Harriman's concept of cause, because he says, "all generalizations ... are statements of causal connection." We are not going to know what induction induces if we do not know what cause is.

Harriman states, "the same cause ... will result in the same effect." He also states, "In seeking cause and effect, we are relating objects/attributes that are subsumed under different concepts. We are attempting to discover the effects of one type of existent on another, for example, to identify the effect of temperature on the pressure of a gas, or the effect of length on the period of a pendulum, or the effect of distance on the gravitational force between bodies."

The key word in the second explanation of cause is "relating." It is obvious what Harriman means by "cause" here, is a particular kind of relationship, one in which an attribute, state, or behavior corresponds in some identifiable way to some other attribute, state, or behavior.

These kinds of relationships certainly exist, can be identified, and are identified; but why should they be called "cause?" The fact that a gas will have a higher pressure if its temperature is higher is simply a description of the relationship between two properties of a gas, not a description of a "cause." This is a good example because temperature and pressure in gasses are mutually determined. An increase in pressure produces an increase in temperature, and vice versa (so long as the volume remains constant). Which is the cause, and which is the effect?

The fact is, none of these are examples of one thing "causing" another. The correct explanation is given by Harriman, himself, "an entity of a certain kind necessarily acts in a certain way under a given set of circumstances ..." It is not, however, as he says, the essence of the law of causality," because an existent behaves the way it behaves because it is what it is and has the nature it has. Nothing "causes" it to behave the way it does.

The principle ought to be written, "the same entity in the same context always behaves the same way." An entity's context is its state and its relationships to all other things.

An entity is whatever all its qualities are. (By qualities I mean all of an entity's attributes, properties, characteristics, and states.) It is its own qualities that determine how it will behave in any context.

Now consider the examples of "cause" given by Harriman:

The temperature and pressure of a gas are attributes of the gas, an entity, and its behavior is determined by its own nature. It is not "caused" by something else. The fact that the attributes of pressure and temperature in a confined gas have a specific relationship is itself an attribute of gas. It does not exist in liquids, for example.

The length of a pendulum is a property of the pendulum. It behaves the way it does (has a specific period) because of its own attribute, length. It is not "caused" by something else.

Two bodies, relative to each other may be considered a system, an entity, and its behavior will be determined by its attributes, which of course includes what it consists of and the properties of those components. Otherwise each body might be considered part of the context of the other, but how each behaves in that case is determined by each body's own nature, that is, its own attributes.

<a name="g">More Than a Semantic Difference</a>

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There is nothing wrong with the concept "cause" meaning, as it does in common usage, the reason or explanation for a thing, usually for events, like the cause of an automobile accident or the cause of the power outage. In that sense it only means that things do not just happen, willy-nilly, but that everything happens as a consequence of some preceding conditions or events. Even though it is applied in some technical situations (looking for the cause of a circuit board failure, for example) it is not a technical term. The basis of the validity of the concept, however, is philosophical. It based on the understanding that the physical world has an objective nature, that it is what it is independent of anyone individual's knowledge or consciousness of it, and that it's nature and behavior are determined by inviolable principles.

It is the purpose of the sciences to discover what those principles are. While those principles are the basis for the common concept of cause, the word "cause" is inappropriate as an explanation of those principles.

This is much more than a semantic issue. In both philosophy and science, the word cause usually has a much narrower meaning than that of its common use, and that narrower meaning is both incorrect and misleading.

Consider again Harriman statement that, "the same cause ... will result in the same effect."

If by cause is meant the reason for any particular event, in the entire history of the world there have probably never been two identical "causes." Since events are only the behavior of entities, and since an entity's behavior is determined by its own response to its entire context, including all its relationships, identical "causes" would require identical entities in identical contexts, which is probably impossible. In the entire history of there world, there have probably never been two identical causes.

<a name="h">Principles, not Cause</a>

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It is obvious that Harriman is convinced the validity of science, and perhaps all knowledge, rests on the validity of the concept, cause.

The concept "cause," in this case, is the philosophical one, which historically has always been mistaken. Aristotle's version was really about how things came into being and are what they are, and was quite unlike what Harriman thinks cause means. I've already mentioned that Harriman's explanation of cause most resembles Hume's.

In fact, I think philosophers like Harriman have been fooled by Hume. Hume defined cause in a way that is easily refuted implying that since our knowledge of scientific principles rested on the concept of cause, there is no certain basis for science. The big lie that Hume subtly put over was that the validity of science rested on some philosophical notion of cause, particularly the absurdity he himself put forth.

Harriman is fully convinced by that lie. For example he writes, concerning Kepler's laws:

"He thought of his laws in the following way: First, the sun exerts a force on each planet that causes it to move in an elliptical orbit (with the sun located at a focus); second, the solar force causes each planet to move so that the line from the sun to the planet sweeps out equal areas in equal time; third, the solar force diminishes with distance in a way that causes the cube of the mean distance from the sun divided by the square of the orbital period to be constant for all planets. Clearly, these are causal statements—as they must be in order to qualify as laws." [Page 104.] [Emphasis mine.]

Each of the statements in Harriman's description of Kepler's laws containing the word "causes" is incorrect. For example, the force the sun exerts on a planet does not "cause" it to move in an elliptical orbit. In fact, the sun's force does not "cause" it to move at all. The reason the planets move is their own inertia—they were already in motion and if there is a "cause" for that it would have to be their own entire history. In response to the force the sun exerts on a planet, it accelerates toward the sun and the resulting change in the direction of its own motion results in that motion conforming to an elliptical path.

In attempting to illustrate that Kepler's laws are examples of, "causation," Harriman misses the true basis for scientific laws, which is the metaphysical fact that every existent has a specific nature that determines how it behaves in every context. The behavior of the planets in the context of the suns gravitational field is not "caused" by the sun or the force it exerts, it is determined by the planets own nature (it accelerates toward other masses) and state (it is in motion at a certain velocity).

The validity of science does not rest on the notion of cause. The concept of cause, even if it could be made "scientific", is too simple. The validity of science rests on the fact physical existence consists only of physical existents, that every existent has a specific nature that determines its behavior, and its relationship to all other existents. The whole objective of science is to discover the nature of all existents and their behavior and relationships. The nature of existents, their behavior and there relationships are absolute, the discovery and identification of those existents, their behavior and their relationships constitute the inviolable "laws" of science.

Science, then, consists of to two aspects: 1. the process and methods by which the laws of science are discovered and 2. the body of established laws expressed as principles by which the nature of existents, their behavior, and relationships are understood—that is, the body of established scientific knowledge.

<a name="i">First-level Concepts</a>

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The reason Harriman emphasizes cause as a first-level concept, derived by direct perception (ostensively), is because his whole argument for the validity of induction as generalizations from even single incidents, depends on regarding all generalizations as notions of cause, and cause as an axiomatic (or at least corollary) concept inherent in all concepts of physical relationships.

"Knowledge of the law of causality is first gained by a child in implicit form, in the early, preconceptual stage of cognition; it is grasped as a corollary—a self-evident implication—of the law of identity, one of the fundamental axioms of philosophy. ... causality is the application of identity to the realm of action, i.e. it states that an entity must act in accordance with its nature," he writes.

There is a mistake here that is identical in nature to the mistake the idea of cause always introduces. It is a kind of false dichotomy. Just as the idea of "cause and effect" separate attributes of an entity, as thought they were independent existences, Harriman separates an entity's nature from its behavior.

An entity does no act "in accordance with its nature," as though its nature were one thing and its action another; an entity's action is an aspect of its nature. But Harriman must maintain this separation to insist that what a child perceives when perceiving events is "cause".

When he says a toddler, "pushes a ball and it rolls away," is "a pure experience of causation," he assumes the pushing the ball and the ball's rolling are somehow separated in the toddler's consciousness, else one thing being the cause of another could not be experienced. Of course no one can say exactly what the child's conscious experience is, but from everything we know about how we perceive things, it is much more likely a child would perceive his pushing the ball and the ball rolling as one single contiguous event, not two events, one being the cause, the other the effect.

The same false dichotomy shows up in all of Harriman's examples. It is unlikely a child perceives 'the wind makes the leaves flutter,' and if he makes any connection at all between wind and leaves, the fluttering leaves would probably be perceived as the wind; and I'm certain the child does not perceive 'the fire makes the paper turn into ashes,' but, which is much nearer to the truth, that fire is the paper turning into ashes.

None of these are examples of cause in any case, but are good examples of the principle that a thing's behavior or even state, are aspects of its own nature—leaves flutter in the wind, but rocks do not because of the difference in their nature; paper turns to ashes when it burns but alcohol does not because of the differences in their natures; and the ground becomes wet when it rains but the lake doesn't because of the differences in their natures.

There is, in fact, no perceivable axiomatic concept of cause as described by Harriman. What is perceivable is things as they are, and the fact that they are different, which implies differences in their attributes, though the nature of those differences may not be directly perceived. It is the job of science to identify those differences, conceptually, which will explain the differences in their behavior and their relationships to each other.

<a name="j">Identification, Not Generalization</a>

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There is a widely held misconception clearly stated by Harriman:

"Induction is the process of inferring generalizations from particular instances. The complementary process of applying generalizations to new instances is deduction." [Page 6.]

The principles of correct reasoning first identified by Aristotle, is called logic. The process of using those principles, that is, thinking logically, is called deduction. There is no other kind of correct reasoning.

The principles of deductive reasoning have been formalized and are called "formal logic." Formal logic describes the principles of correct reasoning by means of strict rules and structure. It does not describe how we usually do our thinking, even when our thinking is correct, but all correct thinking can be put into the structure of formal logic, else it is not correct thinking.

All reasoning in formal logic is in the form of syllogisms, which all consist of three statements, call propositions. Those three propositions are called a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion. A proposition is a sentence that asserts something about something else. The following is an example of a syllogism:

All birds have feathers. (Major premise)

Penguins are birds. (Minor premise)

Therefore, penguins have feathers. (Conclusion)

The conclusion of a syllogistic argument contains the "inference." In this case the inference is that penguins have feathers based on the two premises, that is, since penguins are birds (minor premise) and all birds have feathers, (major premise) penguins therefore have feathers. If either of the premises were not true, the inference or conclusions could not be known from the argument to be true.

According to Harriman, our knowledge that "all birds have feathers" would be a generalization from particular instances; of birds, I presume. In reality our knowledge that "all birds have feathers," is based solely on our concept of birds, which like all other universal concepts, identifies a specific category of existents in terms of their attributes—which in the case of birds includes the attribute "feathered."

We do not first form our concept of birds from the observation of birds, and afterwards discover they have feathers— we form our concept of birds because we discover creatures that have feathers and choose to name our identification of them "birds."

Harriman's description of generalization ignores the nature of concept formation:

"A generalization is a proposition that ascribes a characteristic to every member of an unlimited class, wherever it is positioned in space or time. In formal terms, it states: All S is P. This kind of claim, on any subject, goes beyond all possible observations," Harriman wrote.

Well, of course, if I observe a feathered animal, even if only one, and name it a bird, because it is feathered, every animal I discover after that which is feathered is a bird.

The process is not generalization, it is identification, the identification of a thing's attributes, and the identification of entities in terms of those attributes.

This is exactly how concept formation of universal concepts works. It is the identification of existents in terms of their attributes that make them the kind of existent they are. [Please see "The True Nature Of Concepts" below.]

So to say "all birds have feathers" is not based on a generalization, but a definition—"a bird is a feathered animal." If after seeing a bird fly, I say "all birds fly," that is a generalization, and of course it is wrong. (The penguin and ostrich do not fly.) An equally bad generalization would be that all flying animal's have feathers from observing flying birds, which do have feathers. (Bats and flying insects do not have feathers.)

Now consider Harriman's description of the concept of "shadow."

"And how did we learn this distinction? From a wealth of earlier data, such as 'The dark areas in contrast to the objects they abut, have no tactile properties' (a generalization) and 'The dark areas appear or vanish with changes in the light source, while the objects remain constant' (a generalization). From these (along with other such generalizations), we conclude that the dark areas are not objects, but rather an effect produce when an object blocks light (a generalization)—which gives us the concept 'shadow.'"

In each case where Harriman writes, "a generalization," it is actually, "an identification," specifically of an attribute, and what we mean by a "shadow" is something with all those attributes.

There is an oddity in this example of his idea of generalization as well. Remember, he wrote, "... all generalizations ... are statements of causal connection." Perhaps he would consider "the dark areas appear or vanish with changes in the light source," an example of a, "causal connection," but how can, "the dark areas in contrast to the objects they abut, have no tactile properties," be construed as causal?

No such thing as induction, in the sense of generalizing from some limited number of instances, can possibly be valid. The source for universal concepts is observation and identification of existents in terms of the qualities (attributes and properties) that are their nature. Conceptualization of an existent, even if only one has ever been observed, is as valid as it would be if an indefinitely large number had been observed.

This process is not inductive, not a complimentary process of deduction, but in fact a deductive process. (This will be more fully explained in terms of "The True Nature Of Concepts.")

<a name="k">Mathematics is Only a Method</a>

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While I believe Harriman's view of mathematics is badly mistaken, almost mystical, I do agree that mathematics is firmly rooted in objective reality, derived from observation and not some kind of disconnected abstraction of the mind. Beyond that, there is not much agreement between Harriman's view of mathematics and my own.

Before I discuss my view, however, I want to emphasize the fact that I fully agree that the use of mathematics in science is an invaluable and totally valid tool that has made it possible to discover the true nature of many things and relationships between them that would have been impossible without mathematics.

I've already provided what I think is a fair description of Harriman's understanding of mathematics. I do not intend to burden the reader with a description of my entire view of mathematics, but to understand my criticism of Harriman's view and use of mathematics, an understanding of what I regard as the limits of mathematics will make it easier to understand. The following is adapted from another work in progress.

<a name="l">Limits of Mathematics</a></a>

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There is in many people, maybe even most, an overwhelming desire for some one single ultimate answer or explanation for everything. That desire is born of an irrational fear of the unknown. For some, the ultimate answer for everything is God, for others it is the illusive Grand Unified Theory (GUT) of physics. All such ultimate answers, however, are really a kind of mysticism, and those who accept some supposed ultimate answer, whether God, or GUT, or something else, embrace it with religious fervor.

Perhaps the most fervent of "true believers," are those who embrace what I call the Pythagorean fallacy or superstition. It is the belief that number or mathematics is, in some profound way, the ultimate answer or explanation for everything.

Pythagoras said, "all things are numbers." Modern Pythagoreans do not say all things are numbers, but do believe everything can ultimately be understood in terms of numbers or explained by mathematics. When the ancient Pythagoreans discovered incommensurables, some of them committed suicide, because that discover showed that all they believed, the very basis of meaning in their lives, was wrong. I hope the modern Pythagoreans will not react to what I have to say with similar despair.

Objective Base of a Method

Mathematics, like conceptualization and language, is a method, a human invention with the purpose of dealing with certain specific attributes of the perceived physical world.

All of what is called mathematics begins with the concept of numbers. At some level, the field of mathematics merges with geometry and some aspects of logic as well, but the strictly mathematical part of even the advance mathematical fields of trigonometry and the calculus, for example, depend on the concept of numbers.

The objective attribute of the world which numbers pertain to is multiplicity—that is, the fact existence consists of multiple discrete entities. That is the objective foundation of all mathematics.

Numbers are the conceptual tool of counting. Before men learned how to count, or even today where primitive tribes do not have that skill, there is no certain way to determine the quantity of things, such as how many cattle one has, or how many people there are in the village.

We do not know who the genius was who discovered that using a set of different symbols, always recited or recorded in the same order, assigning a different symbol to each item in a collection, the last symbol used would indicated the total number of items in that collection. The symbols that were assigned to each item are what we now call numbers or numerals. The process of assigning the names to items, we call counting. That discovery, wherever it has been passed on, has transformed the world, and nothing in the civilized world would be possible without it.

All of mathematics is an extension of that basic method of determining the number of things by counting. Addition and subtraction are just shortcuts for counting and "counting backwards." Multiplication and division are shortcuts of addition and subtraction. Fractions and decimals are shortcuts of division and methods of notation.

Measurement

Another unknown genius of ancient history discovered that numbers could also be used to identify other characteristics of things, such as length, weight, or speed, as well as relationships between things, such as distance. The technique is called measurement.

Obviously this discovery has been just as important to the development of the civilized world as counting itself. Unfortunately, it also led to one of the first great mistakes in philosophy of which philosophy has never thoroughly rid itself.

Measurement uses the method of counting to determine a "measurable" attribute. All measurement requires "a unit of measure" commensurate with the attribute to be measured. If the attribute to be measured is length, for example, the unit of measure must be some length that is chosen as a "standard" length. If the attribute to be measured is weight, the unit of measure must be some standard weight.

The method of measurement is counting, and what is counted is the number of "units of measure" that equal the measure of whatever characteristic is to be determined. If we use length as an example, one way to measure it would be to take a small stick, as the unit of measure. The stick could be laid out on the length to be measured, starting at one end, then placing it next where it last ended, repeating this process, counting each time the stick is laid down until the end of the length being measured is reached. If the stick is laid down 10 times, the measured length is "10 'sticks' long."

While a stick is a metaphysical existent, and has length as an attribute, and its own length is a metaphysical fact, and it's length is being used as the "unit of measure" to measure something else, it is an arbitrary unit. As a concept for a "unit of measure" it is only a concept, there is no metaphysical existent, "stick-length."

When counting entities, counting is absolute. If there are thirty seven entities, counting will tell you exactly how many there are, that is, 37—and there are 37, absolutely.

When measuring something, the number of "units of measure" that are "counted" may, or may not be the exact measure of a thing, and in fact will almost never be perfectly exact.

The main reason for this is because units of measure are discrete; they are concepts and all concepts are discrete. But concepts have no physical existence, only mental or conceptual existence. There are no metaphysical inches, pounds, or minutes, there are only length, weight, and time, and they are all analog.

For any discrete unit of length conceived, there may be existents it can exactly measure, but there are, potentially, an infinite number of existents it cannot exactly measure. This is true of all units of measure. To suppose that everything can ultimately be known in terms of mathematics forgets that mathematics is only a method, a method of determining the numbers of things adapted as a method for dealing with measurable attributes of existents and their relationships. Measurement is only the application of the method of counting to that which cannot truly be counted, but with the invention of, "units of measure," some of the attributes of the physical can be treated as though they had "parts" that can be counted, which metaphysically, they do not.

Pythagoras' Devastating Discovery

The disillusionment of the ancient Pythagoreans followed directly from Pythagoras' greatest discovery that, where a and b are the legs (sides next to the right angle) of a right triangle, and c is the hypotenuse, (side opposite the right angle), a2 + b2 = c2. This led immediately to the discovery that in an isosceles right triangle, where a = b, there is no commensurate unit of measure that can measure both a leg of an isosceles right triangle and the hypotenuse.

Today many such "irrational" (no ratio) relationships are known, and very close approximations, such a pi, are used in calculations where such relationship need to be measured. It is difficult not to have the impression that irrationals, like pi, actually do have a value if one could just carry it out far enough. The ancient way of describing these irrational relationships is much clearer in demonstrating there is no such value.

Suppose the sides of an isosceles right triangle are one inch long. Let the length of the hypotenuse be represented by m/n. Since a2 + b2 = c2, substituting 1 for both a and b, and m/n for c, yields m2/n2 = 2. Divide out any common factor in m/n, now either m or n must be odd (because if both are even there is still the common factor 2).

Multiply both sides of the equation, m2/n2 = 2, by n2 to get m2 = 2n2. Therefore, m2 is even; therefore m is even. Suppose m = 2p (if m is even it must be 2 times something). Substituting 2p for m in the equation, m2 = 2n2, yields 4p2 = 2n2. Dividing both sides by 2 yields n2 = 2p2, therefore n is even.

If there were a unit of measure that could measure both a leg and hypotenuse of an isosceles right triangle, the length of the hypotenuse could be represented as m/n units, and either m or n, reduced to lowest terms, would have to be odd. Since both m and n can be demonstrated logically (or mathematically) to be even, there can be no unit of measure that can measure both a leg and hypotenuse of an isosceles right triangle.

This discovery was enough to demonstrate to the ancient Pythagoreans that not only is, "all things are numbers," not true, all things cannot even be described by numbers. It is even worse than that, however, for the modern Pythagoreans.

Mathematically Unknowable

There is a class of physical events described by a set of concepts called "chaos" or "fractals" or "Lorenz attractors." The peculiar thing about such events is that they are determined, not randomly as chaos might imply, but by strictly in terms mathematical functions, though the actual mathematical function for any real chaotic event or process can never be discovered, and the actual behavior of chaotic events and processes are impossible to predict (which is the real reason they are called "chaos").

True natural "chaos" events and phenomena are analog, not discrete, in nature, but scientists can simulate such events with digital computers using what are called iterative functions. The technology is too complex to describe here.

There are many aspects of the real world, however, that are examples of "chaos" theory. The human heart beat, for example, is never absolutely even, because the electronic nature of the heart behaves, apparently, like a Lorenz attractor. It is a feedback mechanism (like taking the output of one equation and using it as the input of the next). In fact, if the heartbeat were perfectly symmetrical, it would race uncontrollably, a condition which does happen called fibrillation.

The almost endless patterns of snow flakes are examples of fractals. Each is completely different, because the physics that forms them, though identical, begins with a different value for each snow flake (because the particles of dust all snow flakes form on are slightly different).

Ferns are another an example. While ferns all look very similar, they are never identical. Broccoli exhibits the same fractal characteristics. There are, in fact, chaotic characteristics in all life. The venous and arterial systems in a human kidney, flowers, and trees are all examples, and DNA clusters form shapes that resemble Julia sets. Non-living examples include clouds, frost and ice formations, lightning, galaxies, and ocean currents.

Perhaps the most interesting

Dennis Hardin · October 31, 2010

This is not a criticism of David Harriman's thesis. It is a criticism of Ayn Rand's thesis.

Since David Harriman’s book is specifically intended to represent an application of Ayn Rand’s Objectivist epistemology to the problem of induction, and since this writer not only rejects Objectivist epistemology but has no clue about what Objectivist epistemology says, the whole premise of this critique is absurd and the article itself a waste of time.

Xray · October 31, 2010

This is not a criticism of David Harriman's thesis. It is a criticism of Ayn Rand's thesis.
Since David Harriman’s book is specifically intended to represent an application of Ayn Rand’s Objectivist epistemology to the problem of induction, and since this writer not only rejects Objectivist epistemology but has no clue about what Objectivist epistemology says, the whole premise of this critique is absurd and the article itself a waste of time.

I think the writer has an astute grasp of Objectivist epistemology and does a great job in focusing on Harriman's application of it.

Regi: There is in many people, maybe even most, an overwhelming desire for some one single ultimate answer or explanation for everything. That desire is born of an irrational fear of the unknown. For some, the ultimate answer for everything is God, for others it is the illusive Grand Unified Theory (GUT) of physics. All such ultimate answers, however, are really a kind of mysticism, and those who accept some supposed ultimate answer, whether God, or GUT, or something else, embrace it with religious fervor.

I disagree about the desire for an GUT in physics being labeled as mysticism. For the notion of mysticism implies transcendence, and the idea of transcendence is not neeeded for a GUT.

BaalChatzaf · October 31, 2010

Regi Writes:

There is in many people, maybe even most, an overwhelming desire for some one single ultimate answer or explanation for everything. That desire is born of an irrational fear of the unknown. For some, the ultimate answer for everything is God, for others it is the illusive Grand Unified Theory (GUT) of physics. All such ultimate answers, however, are really a kind of mysticism, and those who accept some supposed ultimate answer, whether God, or GUT, or something else, embrace it with religious fervor.

I respond:

Not so. There is only one cosmos and having two disjoint theories to account for its physics (the Standard Model to handle all forces except gravitation and the General Theory of Relativity to handle gravitation) is down right annoying. The two theories are incompatible with each other but both together explain virtually all known phenomenon. The desire to have a single theory handle all is quite natural and is not the least bit mystical. If there is only one world, why shouldn't there be only one theory? It is a matter of neatness and efficiency.

Ba'al Chatzaf

regi · November 1, 2010

There is only one cosmos and having two disjoint theories to account for its physics (the Standard Model to handle all forces except gravitation and the General Theory of Relativity to handle gravitation) is down right annoying. The two theories are incompatible with each other but both together explain virtually all known phenomenon. The desire to have a single theory handle all is quite natural and is not the least bit mystical. ...

I disagree about the desire for an GUT in physics being labeled as mysticism. For the notion of mysticism implies transcendence, and the idea of transcendence is not neeeded for a GUT.

I agree with you both. I did not mean the very genuine scientific enquirey into a unifying theory in physics was mysticism, but there are some who think a GUT will be the answer to everything, not just physics, though they are not themselves physicists. They are the same types that attempt to use "quantum uncertainty" as the explanation of, "volition," though they have no understanding whatsoever of quantum mechanics.

The confusion is entirely my fault, because I let myself indulge in a little rhetorical license. It's probably the most non-essential statement in the entire article. It was not meant to repudiate GUT, but those who look to it as a kind of ultimate answer for everything.

Regi

Ellen Stuttle · November 1, 2010

This is not a criticism of David Harriman's thesis. It is a criticism of Ayn Rand's thesis.
Since David Harriman’s book is specifically intended to represent an application of Ayn Rand’s Objectivist epistemology to the problem of induction, and since this writer not only rejects Objectivist epistemology but has no clue about what Objectivist epistemology says, the whole premise of this critique is absurd and the article itself a waste of time.

I haven't had time to look through, let alone read, Regi's long discussion -- just glancing at it, it seems to me to hold promise of being a good critique of the Harriman, but that's only a cursory first impression.

Meanwhile, I noticed Dennis' post and want to say something about the intent of the Harriman book being to apply AR's epistemology to the problem of induction. I agree that this is the intent of the book. However, I think that the book is NOT such an application. (I hope to spell out why not later this year, but I probably won't have time until after Thanksgiving.) The book's not being as advertised is a strong reason why I think it's so potentially damaging.

One, suppose professional scientists see The Logical Leap and notice the advertising of the thesis as an extension of AR's epistemology, they could reasonably conclude, by a sort of "modus tollens" assumption, that, the book being bad, so is the epistemology on which it's (supposedly) based. Not being familiar with ITOE, they wouldn't have a basis for concluding that the book isn't a proper extension thereof. The advertising says it's certified as such by the (supposed) leading interpreter of Rand.

Two, I think the book's going to cause a whole lot of trouble for Objectivists to sort out, since, given Peikoff's endorsement -- indeed, given that Peikoff's are the primary arguments claiming that the thesis represents an extension of AR's theory of concepts -- they're likely also to believe that it does represent a proper extension.

Ellen

kiaer.ts · November 1, 2010

This is not a criticism of David Harriman's thesis. It is a criticism of Ayn Rand's thesis.
Since David Harriman's book is specifically intended to represent an application of Ayn Rand's Objectivist epistemology to the problem of induction, and since this writer not only rejects Objectivist epistemology but has no clue about what Objectivist epistemology says, the whole premise of this critique is absurd and the article itself a waste of time.

Thanks, I'm inclined to take your word for this.

regi · November 1, 2010

This is not a criticism of David Harriman's thesis. It is a criticism of Ayn Rand's thesis.
Since David Harriman’s book is specifically intended to represent an application of Ayn Rand’s Objectivist epistemology to the problem of induction, and since this writer not only rejects Objectivist epistemology but has no clue about what Objectivist epistemology says, the whole premise of this critique is absurd and the article itself a waste of time.
I haven't had time to look through, let alone read, Regi's long discussion -- just glancing at it, it seems to me to hold promise of being a good critique of the Harriman, but that's only a cursory first impression.
Meanwhile, I noticed Dennis' post and want to say something about the intent of the Harriman book being to apply AR's epistemology to the problem of induction. I agree that this is the intent of the book. However, I think that the book is NOT such an application. (I hope to spell out why not later this year, but I probably won't have time until after Thanksgiving.) The book's not being as advertised is a strong reason why I think it's so potentially damaging.
...
Ellen

Hi Ellen,

I wish your critique were going to be sooner rather than later, because I agree with you that Harriman's thesis does not agree with Rand's epistemology as presented in ITOE. I'd love to see someone present the argument from that point of view.

I do not agree with all of Rand's epistemology, but do agree with much of it, especially those aspect having to do with the coginitive role of concepts, but not her definition of concepts, so my criticism of Harriman is partly based on the errors, as I see them, of the epistemology itself. Dennis Hardin's criticism that I did not present the argument you intend to present is true enough, not because I do not understand Rand's epistemology, but because I do, and disagree with it, which is the reason I was obliged to include a brief explanation of my view of concepts. I had no intention of repudiating Rand.

Looking forward to your review of The Logical Leap.

Regi

George H. Smith · November 2, 2010

Meanwhile, I noticed Dennis' post and want to say something about the intent of the Harriman book being to apply AR's epistemology to the problem of induction. I agree that this is the intent of the book. However, I think that the book is NOT such an application. (I hope to spell out why not later this year, but I probably won't have time until after Thanksgiving.) The book's not being as advertised is a strong reason why I think it's so potentially damaging.

Harriman does apply Rand's theory of concepts in a way, but not in a way that is essential. In other words, he could have made the same points about induction without that foundation, as others have before him.

Ghs

Ellen Stuttle · November 2, 2010

Harriman does apply Rand's theory of concepts in a way, but not in a way that is essential. In other words, he could have made the same points about induction without that foundation, as others have before him.

Quip I maybe could have resisted but didn't resist making:

Exactly who before Peikoff -- in the first chapter, taken "nearly verbatim" from Peikoff's lectures -- starts by throwing out the correspondence theory of truth?

I don't agree with your viewpoint, expressed on other threads, that the presentation is fairly standard, or that others have "solved" the problem -- or that the problem is solvable. But even if I thought it were solvable, I wouldn't set store on a foundation which takes as axiomatically universally true first-level generalizations to which even Peikoff provides counter instances.

Ellen

George H. Smith · November 2, 2010

Harriman does apply Rand's theory of concepts in a way, but not in a way that is essential. In other words, he could have made the same points about induction without that foundation, as others have before him.
Quip I maybe could have resisted but didn't resist making:
Exactly who before Peikoff -- in the first chapter, taken "nearly verbatim" from Peikoff's lectures -- starts by throwing out the correspondence theory of truth?

Where does Harriman, following Peikoff, throw out the correspondence theory of truth? The whole point of linking induction to concept formation, via tracing (or "reducing") the concepts used in induction to perceptual experiences, is to show how valid inductive generalizations must ultimately correspond to facts. This procedure, in general terms if not in every detail, has been the standard method of empiricism for centuries.

Some of Harriman's most important theoretical points about induction do not appear in the first chapter. See, for example, the sections "The Methods of Difference and Agreement" and "Induction as Inherent in Conceptualization" in Chapter Two, and "The Science of Philosophy" in the final chapter.

It is my understanding that you have not even read Harriman's book but are basing your comments solely on Peikoff's lectures, as summarized by Harriman in Chapter One. Perhaps Harriman's amplifications later in the book are also nothing more than paraphrases of Peikoff; I have not heard Peikoff's lectures, so I cannot say. But whatever the case may be, these later discussions provide a richer view of induction than you seem to have gotten from Peikoff alone. You should read the book.

I don't agree with your viewpoint, expressed on other threads, that the presentation is fairly standard, or that others have "solved" the problem -- or that the problem is solvable. But even if I thought it were solvable, I wouldn't set store on a foundation which takes as axiomatically universally true first-level generalizations to which even Peikoff provides counter instances.

Yes, we have discussed this issue before, and I still don't understand exactly what the "problem" is to which you refer.

Harriman applies the term "self-evident" to immediate perceptual experiences. ("The "perceptual is the self-evident," says HarriPei on p. 19.) In Chapter Two (p. 67), Harriman writes that "our first generalizations are based on causal connections that are directly perceived." He continues:

No deliberately applied method is required to grasp such first-level generalizations. The measurement-omission process is subconscious and automatic, and the causal connection is given in the perceptual data. The need for a method arises when we attempt to establish relationships that involve higher-level concepts.

Whether direct perceptual experiences should be called "self-evident" is problematic, especially when they involve some level of interpretation, but Harriman is far from alone among philosophers in using "self-evident" in this manner. It means that the experience itself is sufficient evidence for the conclusion drawn from it; no additional argument or evidence is needed. Does this imply that a first-level generalization cannot possibly be wrong or inadquate, as a matter of principle? No.

Ghs

regi · November 2, 2010

No deliberately applied method is required to grasp such first-level generalizations. The measurement-omission process is subconscious and automatic, and the causal connection is given in the perceptual data. ...
Ghs

George, I hope you don't mind if I ask a question about the quote above. The assertion that there are "automatic" processes in human consciousness has always seemed a kind of ratioalism in both Peikoff's and Rand's writings. Rand referred to an "automatic process" that integrated sense date into percepts of entities, which was expanded by Peikoff, and your quote refers to an automatic subconscious process of "grasping" first level generalizations, in this case "causal connection."

If a philosopher is going to assert there are automatic processes, isn't that philosopher obliged to explain what those automatic process are, how the automatic processes work, how he knows there are such automatic processes, and further, how he knows the product of such automatic process are valid and reliable?

The problem is the very same one Rand identified regarding Kant's view, and even Plato's view of perception. If something lies between our senses and our perception of the world, some process, automatic or otherwise, unless one can explain exactly how that process works demonstrating its validity in terms of the percepts it produces, or worse, the "first level concepts" it is responsible for, there is no basis for assuming either perception or first level concepts are valid.

Pleasse understand this is not a repudiation of the validity of perception, which I regard as both valid and contextually infallible, but that conviction is not based on any presumed automatic processes, but an understanding of the true nature of perception which requires no such automatic processes. As for first level concepts, they are valid only because what they identify are the entities of direct perception. There cannot be first level concepts for what can only be identified at the conceptual level, such as relationships, of which "cause" is one.

My question is, why do you accept that there are such "automoatic processes" that Objectivism posits? Can you explain how you know there are such processes, how such processes work, and how you know the product of such processes are valid?

By the way, I do not mean this as a challenge to your views. I am sincerely interested in your view of these things, but have no interest in changing your, or anyone else's views.

Regi

A Criticism of David Harriman's Thesis

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