New Developments re Harriman Induction book


9thdoctor

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A few more comments about "sacrifice":

(1) We are told that when one sacrifices a queen in chess, one is giving up a lesser value (the queen) to attain a higher value (winning the game) -- and that this is what "sacrifice" really means. Thus if you pay $5 at a swap meet for an antique valued at $5000, you have engaged in a sacrificial act. You have sacrificed the lesser value of $5 for the greater value of $5000. Only a dogmatic psychological egoist could say this with a straight face.

The wrong premise in your reasoning here is: 'Every trade is a sacrifice'.

While every sacrifice is a trade, the opposite is not the case.

(2)Consider another chess scenario. I am playing a young chess player who has become dispirited because he has never won a game of chess, and I decide to boost his confidence by deliberately sacrificing my queen so he can win our game. According to the logic of the argument we are here considering, in this case I am also giving up a lesser value for a higher value, because I subjectively value his winning the more than I subjectively value my winning the game.

This is in fact a perfect example of a sacrifice! For in that case, you sacrifice your wish to win the game in order to attain what you subjectively regard as the higher value, given the sitation: giving the young player the feeling that he can win the game.

(3) In the first case I gave up my queen with the intention of winning the game, whereas in the second case I gave up my queen with the intention of losing the game. My intentions were exactly opposite, yet we are told that in both cases my "sacrifice" consisted in giving up a lesser value for a greater value.

There is no contradiction involved. For in both cases, sacrificing the queen is in step with the sacrificer's goal of obtaining (what he assesses to be, given the circumstances at the moment of choice, after personally evaluating the situation) the higher value. Simple as that.

This operating principle can be applied, without exception, to EVERY choices humans make. There is no exception. If you think there is, feel free to post your counter-examples here for examination.

I was never a Catholic -- though I do regard Thomistic Catholicism as the most reasonable of all the variants of traditional Christianity.

Were you born into a religion? If yes, what religion? For I ask myself now why I came to connect you with Catholicism. (?)

As for Aquinas offering the "most reasonable" variant - we'd better continue this discussion on a more suitable thread. For if we add discussing Aquinas here too, this would be 'running off topic within already running off topic' on this thread ...

Edited by Xray
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George H. Smith wrote: "A book that I like a great deal is Paul Taylor's Normative Discourse (Prentice Hall, 1961). I first read this book during the late 1960s, while taking a graduate seminar on ethics, and I cited it briefly in ATCAG."

Thanks for the tip. I will add it to my why-haven't-you-read-me-yet? list.

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I haven't read the discussion on values very carefully, but it seems to me that one of the combatants is equating objective value with intrinsic value, failing to use his Xray vision. It's true enough that valuation is relational; values aren't "out there" independent of any process of valuing or interaction (and contra the red greens who babble of of the "intrinsic" value of unspoiled verdure, needs of human beings be damned).

Edited by Starbuckle
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. (One of the items he said had an effect was a tape I lent him of Peikoff and Ridpath debating socialists in Canada--not because of the subject matter but mostly I think because of Peikoff's forceful thinking-on-his-feet logic, showing a different potential than my brother was seeing in the Bible studies. Irony.)

That is a great tape, isn't it?

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I was never a Catholic -- though I do regard Thomistic Catholicism as the most reasonable of all the variants of traditional Christianity.

Ghs

I was a priorist bullsh*t. Invoking such balderdash and calling it reason gives reason a bad name.

If it ain't empirical, it is nonsense or abstract hot air.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Aquinas was an empiricist -- one of the most influential in the history of western thought.

Ghs

As far as I can tell, Objectivism is about two thirds Thomistic scholasticism, minus the God and revelation bits. Seems to have come through Isabel Paterson. Read Cardinal Mercier's Manual of Scholastic Philosophy. He advocates a hylomorphic metaphysics, a laissez faire politics, and an egoist view of salvaltion.

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Aquinas was an empiricist -- one of the most influential in the history of western thought.

Ghs

'zatso? Then how come he believed in the existence of God? There is not an iota of evidence for it.

How did he come to believe in the existence of an ultimate Good? There is not an iota of evidence for it.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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Aquinas was an empiricist -- one of the most influential in the history of western thought.

Ghs

'zatso? Then how come he believed in the existence of God? There is not an iota of evidence for it.

Thomas Aquinas's "Five Ways" -- i.e., five proofs for the existence of God -- are all empirical in nature. (A good summary can be found here. ) Aquinas rejected so-called a priori proofs, most notably Anselm's Ontological Argument. And he was the most important medieval figure, through his synthesis of Aristotelianism and Christianity, in ending the dominance of Neo-Platonic and Augustinian thinking in western thought.

Keep in mind that that Newton was also an empiricist, yet that didn't stop him from writing lots of zany stuff on biblical prophecy. In Observations Upon the Prophecies of Daniel and the Apocalypse of St. John (published in 1733, six years after his death), Newton wrote:

This prophecy is called the Revelation, with respect to the Scripture of Truth, which Daniel was commanded to shut up and seal, till the time of the end. Daniel sealed it until the time of the end, and until that time comes, the Lamb is opening the seals: and afterward the two Witnesses prophesy out of it a long time in sackcloth, before they ascend up to heaven in a cloud. All of which is as much as to say, that the prophecies of Daniel and John should not be understood till the time of the end: but that some should prophesy out of it in an afflicted and mournful state for a long time, and that but darkly, so as to convert but few. But in the very end, the Prophecy should be so far interpreted so as to convince many. Then saith Daniel, many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased.

For the Gospel must first be preached in all nations before the great tribulation, and end of the world. The palm-bearing multitude, which came out of this great tribulation, cannot be innumerable out of all nations unless they be made so by the preaching of the Gospel before it comes. There must be a stone cut of the mountain without hands, before it can fall on the toes of the Image, and become a great mountain and fill the earth. An Angel must fly through the midst of heaven with the everlasting Gospel to preach to all nations, before Babylon falls, and the Son of man reaps his harvest. The two prophets must ascend up to heaven in a cloud, before the kingdoms of this world become the kingdoms of Christ.

'Tis therefore a part of this Prophecy, that it should not be understood before the last age of the world; and therefore it makes for the credit of the Prophecy, that it is not yet understood. But if the last age, the age of opening these things, be now approaching, as by the great success of late Interpreters it seems to be, we have more encouragement that ever to look into these things.

If the general preaching of the Gospel be approaching, it is for us and our posterity that these words mainly belong: In the time of the end the wise shall understand, but none of the wicked shall understand. Blessed is he that readeth, and they that hear the words of this Prophecy, and keep those things that are written therein

(Daniel XII 4,10, Apoc. i 3).

In other words, the end of times is not far off. The prophecy by Daniel was the key to the "Great Instauration" (Bacon's term), as understood by many 17th and 18th century Protestants. The spread of knowledge, as brought about by printing, advances in science, and other factors, was widely regarded as a definitive sign of the second coming of Jesus. (This is a major reason why so many Puritans were pro-science.)

Aquinas, who did not take biblical prophecies as literally as Newton did (metaphorical interpretations were common among Catholic theologians), never preached anything like this.

The history of empiricism, like the history of all major ideas, is not a tidy affair.

Ghs

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JR wrote: "Might it be your stupidity? Just a thought."

Any such "thought" automatically redounds to the self-descriptive detriment of its author.

I have to grin because it looks like JR is still harbors a grudge against because I once asked him to please support with concrete text examples from Rand his assertion that she was such a great writer. Still waiting for him to provide those examples and demonstrate ... :D

JR, if you would please be so kind as to enlighten the dark chamber of my ignorance regarding Ghs's religious past: what religion was George born into then?

Xray is wrong again. She quoted Peikoff, not Ayn Rand.

I just looked it up, thanks for pointing out the error: It was Peikoff, in the article he wrote in ITOE. But unless you can make your case in demonstrating that what Peikoff said is not in sync with Objectivist epistemology, I'll rephrase the sentence:

You forgot to take into account what I also quoted in # 722, namely that it is stated in ITOE, p. 97 (Leonard Peikoff):

"To form a concept, one mentally isolates a group of concretes (of distinct perceptual units)"(LP)

If you think that what Peikoff said is not in sync with Objectivist epistomology, please demostrate why.

I also found this from Rand in TVOS where she says on p. 21:

"A concept is a mental integration of two or more perceptual concretes." (Rand)

Here it is again: perceptual concretes.

How can elves, gods etc. be perceptual concretes?

My philosophical position on the value question is a radical one and its radicalness is based on the epistemological conclusion that there exists no ought from is.

All this means is that one cannot, via a deductive syllogism, arrive at a normative ("ought") conclusion from purely descriptive ("is") premises. So what? No defender of objective values that I can think of, including Rand, ever claimed otherwise.

Rand did claim otherwise. Have you forgotten her key statement in TVOS, p. 18?

"The fact that a living entity is, determines what ought to do. So much for the issue of the relation betwen "is" and "ought". (Rand)

Edited by Xray
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My philosophical position on the value question is a radical one and its radicalness is based on the epistemological conclusion that there exists no ought from is.

All this means is that one cannot, via a deductive syllogism, arrive at a normative ("ought") conclusion from purely descriptive ("is") premises. So what? No defender of objective values that I can think of, including Rand, ever claimed otherwise.

Rand did claim otherwise. Have you forgotten her key statement in TVOS, p. 18?

"The fact that a living entity is, determines what ought to do. So much for the issue of the relation between "is" and "ought". (Rand)

You don't know what the hell you are talking about. The statement you quoted has nothing to do with a deductive syllogism. As Rand wrote in "Causality Versus Duty":

Life or death is man's only fundamental alternative. To live is his basic act of choice. If he chooses to live, a rational ethics will tell him what principles of action are required to implement his choice. If he does not choose to live, nature will take its course.

Reality confronts man with a great many "musts," but all of them are conditional; the formula of realistic necessity is: "You must, if—" and the "if" stands for man's choice: "- if you want to achieve a certain goal." You must eat, if you want to survive. You must work, if you want to eat. You must think, if you want to work. You must look at reality, if you want to think- if you want to know what to do- if you want to know what goals to choose—if you want to know how to achieve them....In a rational ethics, it is causality- not "duty"—that serves as the guiding principle in considering, evaluating and choosing one's actions, particularly those necessary to achieve a long-range goal.

A short time ago you mentioned our earlier exchange regarding the "Is-Ought Problem." You complained that I had only shown how conditional oughts can be grounded in facts. Get the picture now? Doh!

You are now free to point out that Rand speaks of "must," not "ought" -- even though the entire article from which this passage is taken is a criticism of Kant's categorical imperative, and Rand is clearly positing conditional imperatives -- or what Kant called "hypothetical imperatives" -- as the rational way to look at ethical prescriptions. But given the intellectual dishonesty you have repeatedly displayed in discussions like this, I don't expect facts to stand in your way.

Ghs

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Xray,

Man - the rational animal - can only survive by thinking, so he must.

He is volitional, so he has to determine his own life.

He can hold virtues, so he should.

He is autonomous, so he must be egoistical.

Whatever he is, and is capable of, so he ought to do.

(A simplistic take on it.)

George, I'm puzzled by your last statement as quoted by Xray - could you explain please?

Tony

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My philosophical position on the value question is a radical one and its radicalness is based on the epistemological conclusion that there exists no ought from is.

All this means is that one cannot, via a deductive syllogism, arrive at a normative ("ought") conclusion from purely descriptive ("is") premises. So what? No defender of objective values that I can think of, including Rand, ever claimed otherwise.

Ghs

This one confused me. It seemed to contradict the resolution of the 'dichotomy'.

But I missed your last post, and "categorical" versus "conditional" imperatives, gives me a part answer.

Like much you write, new to me...

Tony

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My philosophical position on the value question is a radical one and its radicalness is based on the epistemological conclusion that there exists no ought from is.

All this means is that one cannot, via a deductive syllogism, arrive at a normative ("ought") conclusion from purely descriptive ("is") premises. So what? No defender of objective values that I can think of, including Rand, ever claimed otherwise.

Rand did claim otherwise. Have you forgotten her key statement in TVOS, p. 18?

"The fact that a living entity is, determines what ought to do. So much for the issue of the relation between "is" and "ought". (Rand)

You don't know what the hell you are talking about. The statement you quoted has nothing to do with a deductive syllogism.

Don't you get the implication of the Rand quote? That of course she believed that an ought can be derived from an is! That she did not formally express this belief in the form of an invaldid syllogism is only of secondary interest in that context.

"No ought from is" is a radical philosophical position reaching far deeper than pointing out the formal fallacy of deductive syllogisms related to the issue.

For it undercuts every claim of "objective" morality, and how on earth is an advocate of objective morality going to make his case if he has to concede that no ought can be derived from is?

I'll adress your other points in a separate post later.

Edited by Xray
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I have to grin because it looks like JR is [sic] still harbors a grudge against [sic] because I once asked him to please support with concrete text examples from Rand his assertion that she was such a great writer. Still waiting for him to provide those examples and demonstrate ... :D

No, Xray, I harbor no grudge against you. I merely haven't the time and inclination to provide you with a free course on writing. And I know that's what it would take, because I know that you understand nothing at all about what makes good writing good and therefore could not comprehend a briefer demonstration or explanation. Also, I know that your only purpose in even asking for such a demonstration is so you can read it and then dance around like an imbecile, crowing that "The values JR assumes are to be achieved by what he calls 'good writing' aren't objective at all! He chose them; they're just subjective!" Then you'd start running victory laps with the wind whistling through your empty head. No, Xray, I hold no grudge against you. I just think you're stupid. Not that you're alone in this. Starbuckle seems pretty stupid, too. And there are others.

JR, if you would please be so kind as to enlighten the dark chamber of my ignorance regarding Ghs's religious past: what religion was George born into then?

Why should I bother to answer such a question?

JR

Edited by Jeff Riggenbach
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Don't you get the implication of the Rand quote? That of course she believed that an ought can be derived from an is!

No, I don't, since I am not a word Nazi like you. Your word Nazi act this time is declaring that when Rand said "relation" she meant "deduction". It is clear she did not.

Edited by Merlin Jetton
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My philosophical position on the value question is a radical one and its radicalness is based on the epistemological conclusion that there exists no ought from is.

All this means is that one cannot, via a deductive syllogism, arrive at a normative ("ought") conclusion from purely descriptive ("is") premises. So what? No defender of objective values that I can think of, including Rand, ever claimed otherwise.

Rand did claim otherwise. Have you forgotten her key statement in TVOS, p. 18?

"The fact that a living entity is, determines what ought to do. So much for the issue of the relation between "is" and "ought". (Rand)

You don't know what the hell you are talking about. The statement you quoted has nothing to do with a deductive syllogism.

Don't you get the implication of the Rand quote? That of course she believed that an ought can be derived from an is! That she did not formally express this belief in the form of an invaldid syllogism is only of secondary interest in that context.

"No ought from is" is a radical philosophical position reaching far deeper than pointing out the formal fallacy of deductive syllogisms related to the issue.

For it undercuts every claim of "objective" morality, and how on earth is an advocate of objective morality going to make his case if he has to concede that no ought can be derived from is?

I'll adress your other points in a separate post later.

Yet another muddled post from you.

Rand didn't consider it necessary to "derive" values from facts because, for her, values signify a kind of fact, namely, the beneficial or harmful relationship of some aspect of reality to a living organism.

The "oughts" come into play when value judgments are applied to purposeful actions. Hence Rand's insistence that all "oughts" are conditional -- e.g., if you want to live a good life, then you should do X, etc. There is nothing mysterious about this kind of "practical syllogism," as it has been called since the time of Aristotle. (I discuss this issue in far greater detail in ATCAG, pp. 279-89.)

The key question is whether value judgments can be rationally justified. They can, e.g.: poison will kill you; therefore, if you want to live, you should not eat poison. Rationally justifiable value propositions are called "objective," in contrast to "subjective" value judgments, such as a preference for a flavor of ice cream, that express nothing more than the personal feelings and preferences of a given individual. There is no rational basis on which to argue about subjective values, but this is not the case with objective values.

This is what the objective/subjective controversy has been about throughout many centuries of philosophy. Live and learn, Toots.

Ghs

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My philosophical position on the value question is a radical one and its radicalness is based on the epistemological conclusion that there exists no ought from is.

All this means is that one cannot, via a deductive syllogism, arrive at a normative ("ought") conclusion from purely descriptive ("is") premises. So what? No defender of objective values that I can think of, including Rand, ever claimed otherwise.

Rand did claim otherwise. Have you forgotten her key statement in TVOS, p. 18?

"The fact that a living entity is, determines what ought to do. So much for the issue of the relation between "is" and "ought". (Rand)

You don't know what the hell you are talking about. The statement you quoted has nothing to do with a deductive syllogism.

Don't you get the implication of the Rand quote? That of course she believed that an ought can be derived from an is! That she did not formally express this belief in the form of an invaldid syllogism is only of secondary interest in that context.

"No ought from is" is a radical philosophical position reaching far deeper than pointing out the formal fallacy of deductive syllogisms related to the issue.

For it undercuts every claim of "objective" morality, and how on earth is an advocate of objective morality going to make his case if he has to concede that no ought can be derived from is?

I'll adress your other points in a separate post later.

Yet another muddled post from you.

Rand didn't consider it necessary to "derive" values from facts because, for her, values signify a kind of fact, namely, the beneficial or harmful relationship of some aspect of reality to a living organism.

The "oughts" come into play when value judgments are applied to purposeful actions. Hence Rand's insistence that all "oughts" are conditional -- e.g., if you want to live a good life, then you should do X, etc. There is nothing mysterious about this kind of "practical syllogism," as it has been called since the time of Aristotle. (I discuss this issue in far greater detail in ATCAG, pp. 279-89.)

The key question is whether value judgments can be rationally justified. They can, e.g.: poison will kill you; therefore, if you want to live, you should not eat poison. Rationally justifiable value propositions are called "objective," in contrast to "subjective" value judgments, such as a preference for a flavor of ice cream, that express nothing more than the personal feelings and preferences of a given individual. There is no rational basis on which to argue about subjective values, but this is not the case with objective values.

This is what the objective/subjective controversy has been about throughout many centuries of philosophy. Live and learn, Toots.

Ghs

Ellen Moore may no longer be with us, but her spirit lives on.

Nice job, George. The quintessential rational animal strikes again. :-)

REB

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No, Xray, I harbor no grudge against you. I merely haven't the time and inclination to provide you with a free course on writing.

JR, you can spare yourself this effort indeed here, since my studies in linguistics and literature have provided me with sufficient exercise in learning the ropes in that field.

Strange that Ayn Rand, who you believe to be such a great writer, never figured with her fiction in any list of world literature novels we had to to study ...

And I know that's what it would take, because I know that you understand nothing at all about what makes good writing good and therefore could not comprehend a briefer demonstration or explanation.

Sure, everyone who does not agree with your opinion understands nothing at all. :D

In her book, Jennifer Burns mentions the "the nearly universal consensus among literary critics that she [AR] was a bad writer" (JB, Goddess of the Market, p. 2)

So in your opinion, all these literary critics understand "nothing at all" about 'good' writing?

If they are all so 'stupid', why not use the opportunity to make the case here for your minority view and prove them all wrong? Just think of the field day you could have here, Jeff, if you accomplished that! If I were you and that convinced of my value criteria, nothing would be prevent me from proudly presenting my case here. C'mon Jeff, after all, isn't "pride" a virtue in Objectivism, why don't you take the plunge?

Also, I know that your only purpose in even asking for such a demonstration is so you can read it and then dance around like an imbecile, crowing that "The values JR assumes are to be achieved by what he calls 'good writing' aren't objective at all! He chose them; they're just subjective!"

Please let us stay precise. The choice of a value by an individual is always an objective act.

And why would it bother you what I think or how a debate opponent reacts? I have never been bothered when a discussion opponent takes a critical look at what I write. Your demonstration would be read by many interested others as well, and if you are convinced you can make your case, a dissenter could stomp his/her foot like Rumpelstiltzkin, and it wouldn't take one iota away from the validity and soundness of your argumentation, would it?

Then you'd start running victory laps with the wind whistling through your empty head. No, Xray, I hold no grudge against you. I just think you're stupid. Not that you're alone in this. Starbuckle seems pretty stupid, too. And there are others.

See above. It looks like all those who you label as "stupid" have one characteristic in common: they have disagreed with you. :o

Can't resist getting a little lyrical now, inspired by the exchange about literature:

The world is divided in stupid and bright,

By Jeff Riggenbach who thinks he's always right.

I hope you will understand the poetic license I took in converting "Riggenbach" (which is normaly pronounced in a dactylic rhythm (DA-da-da) into an anapaest (da-da-DA) for my little tetrameter. I needed the anapaest to keep up the dynamic flow, ending in a dramatic 'flourish' expressed by "right". :)

The world is divided in stupid and bright,

By Jeff Riggenbach who thinks he's always right

JR, if you would please be so kind as to enlighten the dark chamber of my ignorance regarding Ghs's religious past: what religion was George born into then?

Why should I bother to answer such a question?

JR

I didn't expect you to answer it. Actually I even thought of posting: "I'll bet my bottom euro that JR won't answer it."

That one could even get the idea that a question asked "ought to" be answered is another proof that from an "is" (in that case: a question being asked) an "ought to" (= a moral obligation to answer it) cannot be be derived.

Edited by Xray
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C'mon Jeff, after all, isn't "pride" a virtue in Objectivism, why don't you take the plunge?

When did I claim to be an Objectivist? (Though I suppose it would be no more preposterous than someone who writes run-on sentences claiming to be an authority on language and literature.)

JR

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Jeff will defer to those who know what they are talking about. This is my observation after reading him for at least a decade on multiple Internet forums.

Most people don't know what they are talking about. This is because they are either not expert or don't refer to personal experience. Underneath this surface are all kinds of crazed or immature psychologies.

I personally have little or no tolerance for school teachers and their electric drill approach to teaching, which they stupidly, if not innocently, confuse with the Socratic Method. It's all camouflage for knowledge--knowledge lacking, that is. Oh, they know something about somethings. Therefore they think they're educated.

Real education is the search for truth. Truth has nothing to do with plastic facts or moral relativism or the supremacy of the subjective to the objective. Truth is objective. That it is hard to find, hard to ID, doesn't mean that the quest is horseshit or the bastards at the gates of Vienna shouldn't be chopped down by a Hungarian army.

--Brant

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Real education is the search for truth. Truth has nothing to do with plastic facts or moral relativism or the supremacy of the subjective to the objective. Truth is objective. That it is hard to find, hard to ID, doesn't mean that the quest is horseshit or the bastards at the gates of Vienna shouldn't be chopped down by a Hungarian army.

--Brant

What about the truth of your internal states, particularly your emotional state? That is subjective.

One can be objective only concerning things going on outside of your consciousness.

The height of Mt. Everest is an objective matter. The height of your high dudgeon is subjective.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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