New Developments re Harriman Induction book

[sjw]

First, to call attention to a possible source of bias is not an ad hominem argument.

True.

Second, where does Harriman claim to offer "Final Truth"?

When someone says they "solved the problem of induction," I take that to mean they assert that they solved it.

Third, we should judge Harriman's book by the same criteria that we employ when assessing other histories of science. Anything else would amount to an irrational and unjust double-standard. The fact that Harriman is an orthodox Objectivist is irrelevant -- just as the fact that some excellent historians of science -- such as Herbert Butterfield, author of the classic The Origins of Modern Science -- have been Christians is irrelevant.

In short, we are not talking about Objectivism. We are talking about a history of science that was written by an Objectivist, from an Objectivist perspective. It should come as no surprise to anyone familiar with historical works in any field to hear that all historians work from some philosophical perspective. It is to Harriman's credit that he expressly states and explains what his perspective is. I wish more historians were this honest; too often the reader is left to figure out on his own what the particular prejudices and presuppositions of a given historian happen to be.

Ghs

Your position means, does it not, that no one who is not an expert on the history of science is in a position to judge Harriman's book?

I neither know, nor want to know, all of the possible variations of falsehoods that have ever existed in the history of mankind. I judge his book relative to truth, not relative to what others said. I suppose that is out of bounds for you. But I do think that Harriman would accept my standard more than yours, I think he thinks he's proffering the truth, and that his book should be judged in reference to it.

Shayne

[Peter]

Robert Campbell wrote:

I'm not an Objectivist.

End quote

Then you are the next best thing.

Rejection of the doctrine of the arbitrary assertion, the notion that philosophy speaks to science while science may never speak to philosophy, (I think it should be a verifiable feed-back loop) the doctrine of contextual certainty (George H. Smith’s version is more objective,) objectivist psychology, (lacks in science, and is too rigid for humans) etc., makes you an Independent Objectivist, if you so choose to be.

Face it Robert, except for the few religious zealots at the ARI, you are most welcome in ALL Objectivist circles.

After nearly forty years of excommunication no one in their right mind still considers Barbara or Nathaniel Branden anything less than Objectivists.

Others who claim to be determinists or soft-determinists like Bill Dwyer and Roger Bissell, are more problematic, but still strong fans of Rand, and I would not exclude them from any Objectivist circle.

Peter Taylor

[George H. Smith]

I think that Harriman's approach could have been defended in a less dogmatic way, e.g., by maintaining that there is an implicit logic in the process of discovery that generally operates independently of what the beliefs of particular scientists may be. (Harriman's contention that certain explicit concepts were necessary preconditions of key scientific discoveries is untenable in some instances. As I recall, this was one of McCaskey's criticisms.)

George,

Harriman would have benefited by formulating his approach—not merely defending it—in terms of a logic implicit in the process of discovery.

I agree.

But then he would no longer have been a Peikovian, and it would be debatable whether he would still have been an Objectivist of any sort.

"The Implicit" gave Ayn Rand fits. She had a healthy appreciation of its importance, but excluded it almost entirely from her formal efforts at epistemology. The works in which she gave it the most attention (her lectures on writing) have been bowdlerized by junior Peikovians. Even through Boeckmann and Mayhew's rewrites, we can see a whole host of expressions in scare-quotes, such as 'instinct' and 'just knowing.'

During the early 1970s, when many O'ist types who would later become well-known (e.g., Eric Mack and Doug Rasmussen) were contributing to the quasi-O'ist zine Invictus, there was considerable discussion of Michael Polanyi's theory of "tacit knowledge" as presented in The Tacit Dimension and Personal Knowledge. This is when I started reading Polanyi, and I still believe some of his major insights are compatible with Rand's epistemology. As I recall, Rand speaks of the remarkable integrative powers of the subconscious mind, but, as you point out, this promising aspect has not been pursued. (I recall that NB favorably reviewed Koestler's The Ghost in the Machine for Academic Associates during the early 1970s, and there was considerable interest among O'ists in some of Koestler's ideas about the subconscious.)

My honest opinion is that some of the flak by O'ist types over Harriman's book is owing to the fact that it is essentially a Peikovian interpretation, and that negative reactions are owing largely to an anti-Peikoff bias. I am not a fan of Peikoff, by any means, but I try not to let my personal bias (i.e., my dislike of Peikoff) affect my objectivity in assessing a book.

I'm not an Objectivist.

More to the point, I've criticized Harriman's book on account of its incorporation of bad ideas that Leonard Peikoff has championed, such as the doctrine of the arbitrary assertion; the notion that philosophy speaks to science while science may never speak to philosophy; and the doctrine of contextual certainty.

And the struggles with the implicit were Rand's, not Peikoff's. As was the incomplete rejection of cosmology, which Rand applied (with less than complete consistency) to physics, but never to psychology.

Robert Campbell

Note that my comment referred to "some of the flak...." I was thinking especially of blanket dismissals of Harriman's book by O'ist types, such as Ellen Stuttle's statement that it is "crackpot."

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

Aren't we--all and sundry--mixing up validation with discovery? Or at least not properly noting the essential difference? The problem of induction cannot be the problem of creative thinking. And I wonder how it affects critical thinking on the other hand. Is some deficiency apropos to anything practical being addressed?

--Brant

Edited October 18, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[George H. Smith]

Second, where does Harriman claim to offer "Final Truth"?

When someone says they "solved the problem of induction," I take that to mean they assert that they solved it.

Perhaps I missed something (I've only read the book once), but I don't recall that Harriman himself ever makes this claim. On the contrary, on page 8, he writes:

The problem is to identify the method of induction, not to seek its "justification." One cannot ask for a justification of induction, any more than for a justification of deduction. Inducing and deducing are man's means of justifying anything. Their validity as cognitive processes, therefore, is an unchallengeable given.

I don't agree with this statement in regard to induction, but Harriman's historical accounts are intended to illustrate the role of induction in science, not to "solve the problem of induction." And I think his illustrative examples are, for the most part, appropriate.

Btw, in the Introduction (p. xi), Peikoff writes: "Ayn Rand regarded the problem of how we prove inductive generalizations as the only unsolved problem in philosophy." No citation is given for this remarkable claim, and I seriously doubt whether Rand believed any such thing. For one thing, she treated (correctly) concept formation as an inductive process, so Peikoff's claim would cut the ground from under Rand's epistemology, as she understood it. My guess is that Peikoff wanted to present himself as a pioneer, and he misrepresented Rand in the process.

Third, we should judge Harriman's book by the same criteria that we employ when assessing other histories of science. Anything else would amount to an irrational and unjust double-standard. The fact that Harriman is an orthodox Objectivist is irrelevant -- just as the fact that some excellent historians of science -- such as Herbert Butterfield, author of the classic The Origins of Modern Science -- have been Christians is irrelevant.

In short, we are not talking about Objectivism. We are talking about a history of science that was written by an Objectivist, from an Objectivist perspective. It should come as no surprise to anyone familiar with historical works in any field to hear that all historians work from some philosophical perspective. It is to Harriman's credit that he expressly states and explains what his perspective is. I wish more historians were this honest; too often the reader is left to figure out on his own what the particular prejudices and presuppositions of a given historian happen to be.

Your position means, does it not, that no one who is not an expert on the history of science is in a position to judge Harriman's book?

Some knowledge of the history of science is obviously required to assess Harriman's historical accounts, but one needn't be an expert to assess its overall credibility. Some of Harriman's accounts are quite standard and uncontroversial. Consider this passage (p. 83) by Harriman:

At the beginning, the Greeks had based their mathematical astronomy on physical ideas....Before long, however, the observed movements of the sun, moon, and planets forced departure from these principles. Rather than searching for new principles, the Greeks gave up the goal of understanding the heavens and instead settled for "describing the appearances." The result was Ptolemy's theory, which employed mathematical devices (eccentric distances, epicycles, and equant points) that were inherently devoid of any reference to physical causes. Thus mathematics broke loose from its moorings on physics....

Compare this to the excellent account in The Fabric of the Heavens: The Development of Astronomy and Dynamics (1961), by Stephen Toulmin and June Goodfield (p. 139):

Whenever two constructions yielded equivalent mathematical results, there was, in Ptolemy's view, no astronomical difference between them. Given planetary observations displaying two independent kinds of irregularity, we are at liberty to account for the one anomaly in terms of "eccentrics" and the other in terms of "epicycles" -- whichever way round we please. So far as Ptolemy is concerned, the question of the physical reality or unreality of these motions is beside the point....The theory of the Heavens (he believed) was not a matter for physicists, but one for mathematicians.

Many similar examples could be given.

I neither know, nor want to know, all of the possible variations of falsehoods that have ever existed in the history of mankind. I judge his book relative to truth, not relative to what others said. I suppose that is out of bounds for you. But I do think that Harriman would accept my standard more than yours, I think he thinks he's proffering the truth, and that his book should be judged in reference to it.

Harriman's book is primarily historical in character; and when judged by historical standards, it is quite good for a popular treatment.

Ghs

[sjw]

Second, where does Harriman claim to offer "Final Truth"?

When someone says they "solved the problem of induction," I take that to mean they assert that they solved it.

Perhaps I missed something (I've only read the book once), but I don't recall that Harriman himself ever makes this claim. On the contrary, on page 8, he writes:

At Amazon the product review (which usually is approved of by the author or his representatives) says "A groundbreaking solution to the problem of induction, based on Ayn Rand's theory of concepts. Inspired by and expanding on a series of lectures presented by Leonard Peikoff, David Harriman presents a fascinating answer to the problem of induction-the epistemological question of how we can know the truth of inductive generalizations."

My copy of the book is on loan to a friend so I can't look up what he says at the moment.

I don't agree with this statement in regard to induction, but Harriman's historical accounts are intended to illustrate the role of induction in science, not to "solve the problem of induction." And I think his illustrative examples are, for the most part, appropriate.

...

Harriman's book is primarily historical in character; and when judged by historical standards, it is quite good for a popular treatment.

Ghs

To be sure there were historical references, but I took the book as primarily epistemological in character. I suppose that might account for why I gave it 2 stars and you'd give it 4. I didn't purchase or read the book just to get analysis of history, I saw the historic examples as being used to further Harriman/Peikoff's account on how one ought to think, i.e., I saw the history as subordinate to the purposes of conveying a new epistemological theory, a theory which I thought was awful, ergo the 2 stars.

I mean, if I bought a book telling me how to repair a car, and it was very well written but would screw up my car, I'd give the book 1 star. This is a book that I take to be telling me how to use my mind, and I think if I followed the advice it'd screw up my mind, so it gets 2 stars (it'd get 1 star if I thought that anyone actually taking the epistemological advice wouldn't deserve what they would get, which accounts for the difference between how I'd rate a bad car manual vs. a bad book on epistemology).

Shayne

Edited October 18, 2010 by sjw

[sjw]

I mean, if I bought a book telling me how to repair a car, and it was very well written but would screw up my car, I'd give the book 1 star. This is a book that I take to be telling me how to use my mind, and I think if I followed the advice it'd screw up my mind, so it gets 2 stars (it'd get 1 star if I thought that anyone actually taking the epistemological advice wouldn't deserve what they would get, which accounts for the difference between how I'd rate a bad car manual vs. a bad book on epistemology).

By way of contrast, I have been reading David Hume's "An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding." I would rate that book a 4 or 5 stars because it is so brilliantly written, and even in its errors highlights issues of importance. It would get 5 stars if I were to ignore the crucial error, it would get 4 if I wanted to take that into account.

Harriman's book is way below David Hume's in provoking thought -- my main reaction was disgust. I listed two items I found disgusting in my review. The first was the implied notion that we adults need to consult children to know what we know. The other was Harriman's analysis of the Galileo pendulum equation, construed by Harriman as exemplifying induction, but which was really a knowing approximation, not an induction.

Shayne

Edited October 18, 2010 by sjw

[George H. Smith]

At Amazon the product review (which usually is approved of by the author or his representatives) says "A groundbreaking solution to the problem of induction, based on Ayn Rand's theory of concepts. Inspired by and expanding on a series of lectures presented by Leonard Peikoff, David Harriman presents a fascinating answer to the problem of induction-the epistemological question of how we can know the truth of inductive generalizations."

My copy of the book is on loan to a friend so I can't look up what he says at the moment.

I don't hold an author responsible for what a reviewer says about his book. Harriman does deal with the problem of how we can justify particular inductive generalizations, but this is not the traditional "problem of induction," as raised by Hume and other skeptics. The latter is not a problem for Harriman because, as he puts it (p. 9), "I take for granted the law of causality...and the validity of sense perception." With these presuppositions, there is no serious "problem of induction" in a general sense.

To be sure there were historical references, but I took the book as primarily epistemological in character. I suppose that might account for why I gave it 2 stars and you'd give it 4. I didn't purchase or read the book just to get analysis of history, I saw the historic examples as being used to further Harriman/Peikoff's account on how one ought to think, i.e., I saw the history as subordinate to the purposes of conveying a new epistemological theory, a theory which I thought was awful, ergo the 2 stars.

I mean, if I bought a book telling me how to repair a car, and it was very well written but would screw up my car, I'd give the book 1 star. This is a book that I take to be telling me how to use my mind, and I think if I followed the advice it'd screw up my mind, so it gets 2 stars (it'd get 1 star if I thought that anyone actually taking the epistemological advice wouldn't deserve what they would get, which accounts for the difference between how I'd rate a bad car manual vs. a bad book on epistemology).

Harriman states that his book is an application of Rand's theory of concepts to inductive reasoning in the history of science. This is a perfectly legitimate procedure.

In my opinion, you are reading way too much into the book. Yes, I would probably give it four stars. It is not the pathbreaking work that some O'ists have claimed. It is not a great book, but it is a good book -- one that I would not hesitate to recommend. And I say this despite some substantial disagreements with Harriman.

Ghs

[Peter]

Shayne wrote:

This is a book that I take to be telling me how to use my mind, and I think if I followed the advice it'd screw up my mind, so it gets 2 stars (it'd get 1 star if I thought that anyone actually taking the epistemological advice wouldn't deserve what they would get, which accounts for the difference between how I'd rate a bad car manual vs. a bad book on epistemology) . . . I listed two items I found disgusting in my review. The first was the implied notion that we adults need to consult children to know what we know. The other was Harriman's analysis of the Galileo pendulum equation, construed by Harriman as exemplifying induction, but which was really a knowing approximation, not an induction.

end quotes

A “knowing approximation?” Well said, but I would not be so hard on fans of Objectivist Epistemology. I don’t think they deserve to suffer ill affects for trying to utilize the newest versions of Rand’s epistemology. If anyone deserves better, they do. All fans of Rand deserve our benevolence.

Robert Campbell wrote:

And the struggles with the implicit were Rand's, not Peikoff's. As was the incomplete rejection of cosmology, which Rand applied (with less than complete consistency) to physics, but never to psychology.

Ghs responded:

Note that my comment referred to "some of the flak...." I was thinking especially of blanket dismissals of Harriman's book by O'ist types, such as Ellen Stuttle's statement that it is "crackpot."

end quote

Crackpot? I referenced a podcast a few days ago from Leonard, that would suggest, in spite of all the controversies, past, present, and future, that Leonard, is also not a crackpot. I am against demonizing anyone, other than the mythical Beelzebub himself. As Richard Nixon said, “I ain't a crackpot.”

All involved in the controversy are Objectivists. Forgive me if I already posted the following. Some of the Ghs quote seems eerily deja vu. I had it up on my computer as an unsaved Word document, and it seems relevant.

Roger Bissell once noted:

In one of his “Navigator’ articles, David Kelley characterized any supporter of the Enlightenment as an Objectivist. He wrote that an Enlightenment person is one who "just loves happiness and freedom and thinking things through for himself . . . And since we are the ones who understand, most fully, what the essence of the Enlightenment outlook is, I suggest we name it after that essence: Call it Objectivism."

And Nathan wrote on the defunct website Atlantis, which was populated by some talented Objectivists:

From: Nathaniel Branden <brandenn@pacbell.net>

Reply-To: brandenn@pacbell.net

To: atlantis@wetheliving.com

Subject: ATL: for the record

Date: Sat, 01 Dec 2001 09:28:01 -0800

For the record, I am not suggesting that anyone who challenges some premise of Objectivism should be off this list. If this list is understood to be a site where people who share some or all or few of the premises [of] Objectivism wish to exchange ideas about Objectivism and its implications and its possible problems, there's nothing wrong with that.

What I said was that if one does not agree with one or some of the most fundamental premises of Objectivism, then it is misleading to call oneself an Objectivist.

I often call myself a "neo-Objectivist" and explain that I agree with the broad fundamentals but have significant points of disagreement, above all in the sphere of psychology and to some extent in ethics. Although more and more I dislike labeling myself at all, because there is always the need for a long explanation.

What I also claim is that I know a good deal about what Objectivism is and is not.

Nathaniel Branden

George H. Smith, ten years ago, quoted and then commented:

Chris Sciabarra wrote:

"We've got enough enemies on this planet not to make more enemies among ourselves. Work out your differences, if you can, and start pointing your venom toward your real exploiters and oppressors."

George responded:

"Alas, this has been typical of ideological movements. They often consume themselves and engage in a kind of intellectual cannibalism. In this regard, the sectarianism in the Objectivist-libertarian universe mirrors what one sees on the left... so maybe it is in the nature of things. I really don't know. What I do know is this: When it was time to make revolutions, the left learned to get along---long enough to topple the powers that be---before axing one another. We don't have to follow the same route to revolution, and given our own adherence to the non-aggression principle, there's no reason why we should."

As I discussed in *Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies,* heretics have always been more hated by an "in-group" than infidels -- and I think this is indeed "in the nature of things." The classic rationale for this is that heretics, since they profess agreement with a good deal of a given philosophy or theology, while dissenting from some particulars, should know better than those infidels (i.e., nonbelievers) who lie outside of a belief-system altogether. Infidels, in other words, can be excused on account of ignorance, whereas this is not true of heretics.

The issue of heresy only arises when a belief-system is presented as an all or nothing affair. Heresy stands opposed to orthodoxy ("right thinking"), and in Christianity heretics have been portrayed as people who knowingly and willingly rebel against God's word. The same attitude is found among those Objectivists who substitute "reason" for "God," and who then accuse those who disagree with some aspect of Objectivism of

deliberate irrationality or evasion.

This is one reason that I have always characterized myself as a "freethinker," first and foremost. This label, which became popular in the early 18th century, denotes someone who upholds the moral right to question, criticize and demand evidence for any and all beliefs. Early freethinkers challenged the conventional Christian view that we are morally obligated to believe certain things, even when they have not been demonstrated to our satisfaction. The "free" in "freethinker" thus pertains to the *moral* freedom to doubt, and this perspective is as necessary today as it was several centuries ago.

Every ideological movement in history (at least those I know anything about) has experienced a good deal of in-fighting, but I wouldn't characterize this as "cannibalism." Indeed, I think this internal dialogue, however intense, is a very healthy sign. It's when an ideological movement loses this inner fire that it becomes stale and moribund, and unable to attract young, energetic, and innovative minds.

F.A. Hayek once explored the question of why socialism attracted more young intellectuals in the early 20th Century than did classical liberalism, which was far better theoretically. Socialism presented itself as an ideology in progress, one that needed original thinkers to drive it "onward and upward" (as our beloved Jason Alexander would say). Liberalism, in contrast, presented itself as fully developed, with no additional creativity and innovation needed, so the only role available to young intellectuals was to perform as movement gofers, in effect, whose only task was to disseminate ideas that were already fully finished.

I have some problems with Hayek's analysis, so I would give a different somewhat different explanation, but his is interesting nonetheless.

End quote

The end.

Peter

[George H. Smith]

By way of contrast, I have been reading David Hume's "An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding." I would rate that book a 4 or 5 stars because it is so brilliantly written, and even in its errors highlights issues of importance. It would get 5 stars if I were to ignore the crucial error, it would get 4 if I wanted to take that into account.

Hume's Enquiry is a very mixed bag. The epistemology is extremely crude. Hume has no theory of abstraction to speak of -- he regards ideas (or concepts) as the faint impressions (faded mental copies, in effect) of sensory data -- and his approach is a disastrous retrogression from the promising empiricist epistemology of John Locke, who had a sophisticated theory of abstraction that resembles Rand's in some respects.

In contrast, Hume's social theory, which ignores or contradicts virtually everything he said about epistemology, is remarkably good.

Ghs

[sjw]

By way of contrast, I have been reading David Hume's "An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding." I would rate that book a 4 or 5 stars because it is so brilliantly written, and even in its errors highlights issues of importance. It would get 5 stars if I were to ignore the crucial error, it would get 4 if I wanted to take that into account.

Hume's Enquiry is a very mixed bag. The epistemology is extremely crude. Hume has no theory of abstraction to speak of -- he regards ideas (or concepts) as the faint impressions (mental copies, in effect) of sensory data -- and his approach is a disastrous retrogression from the promising empiricist epistemology of John Locke, who had a sophisticated theory of abstraction that resembles Rand's in some respects.

I don't suggest that one actually adhere to Hume's epistemology, but the way he took a premise and ran with it is illuminating. Sort of like when doctors study what happens when part of the human brain is destroyed -- it can be highly insightful to subtract out useful parts in order to isolate their function. Hume did this like an expert surgeon.

Shayne

[George H. Smith]

Hume's Enquiry is a very mixed bag. The epistemology is extremely crude. Hume has no theory of abstraction to speak of -- he regards ideas (or concepts) as the faint impressions (mental copies, in effect) of sensory data -- and his approach is a disastrous retrogression from the promising empiricist epistemology of John Locke, who had a sophisticated theory of abstraction that resembles Rand's in some respects.

I don't suggest that one actually adhere to Hume's epistemology, but the way he took a premise and ran with it is illuminating. Sort of like when doctors study what happens when part of the human brain is destroyed -- it can be highly insightful to subtract out useful parts in order to isolate their function. Hume did this like an expert surgeon.

Harriman also took a premise and ran with it, and his premise, unlike Hume's, is actually credible -- but I don't see you cutting him much slack.

If, like Hume, you treat ideas as faint copies of primitive sense impressions and then demand that we identify the sense impression that corresponds to our idea of causation -- then of course we won't find what we are looking for, since there is no tangible entity called "causation." And if, like Hume, you reduce all perception to discrete sensory impressions, then you also won't be able to explain how the thing you perceive during one instant is the same thing that you perceive one second later.

Such premises leave only one place to run, namely, into a futile and self-defeating epistemological skepticism. Hume was too enamored with Greek skepticism, and some of his key arguments were little more than expanded versions of arguments originated by those ancient skeptics. Hume's epistemology, far more than Kant's, had a disastrous influence on the subsequent course of philosophy. It was effectively the death-knell of a reasonable empiricism, leading instead to the constipated form of empiricism known as positivism.

Ghs

[sjw]

Harriman also took a premise and ran with it, and his premise, unlike Hume's, is actually credible -- but I don't see you cutting him much slack.

I said the way Hume did it was illuminating. Harriman's way wasn't, at least not for me. I found the epistemological treatment silly, and where it wasn't silly, intellectually and/or morally offensive, and the historical treatment redundant relative to a college education in science and engineering.

If, like Hume, you treat ideas as faint copies of primitive sense impressions and then demand that we identify the sense impression that corresponds to our idea of causation -- then of course we won't find what we are looking for, since there is no tangible entity called "causation." And if, like Hume, you reduce all perception to discrete sensory impressions, then you also won't be able to explain how the thing you perceive during one instant is the same thing that you perceive one second later.

And the issues Hume raises here are interesting philosophical issues. He underscores very well that (contra Harriman/Peikoff!) one can't "see" causation or even entities, that something beyond what he covers very well is required. (Did Harriman/Peikoff isolate this? No, they just assume it. They see causation because they say they do and that's that).

Such premises leave only one place to run, namely, into a futile and self-defeating epistemological skepticism. Hume was too enamored with Greek skepticism, and some of his key arguments were little more than expanded versions of arguments originated by those ancient skeptics. Hume's epistemology, far more than Kant's, had a disastrous influence on the subsequent course of philosophy. It was effectively the death-knell of a reasonable empiricism, leading instead to the constipated form of empiricism known as positivism.

Ghs

After reading Hume I'm not sure his empiricism necessarily leads anywhere in particular. He explicitly assents to the fact that his empiricism logically means, if that was only what one followed, the end of human life. He says we have to add something more to what we see than is there in order to give human life meaning and purpose. Probably the main value one can get from Hume is the isolating what comes via sense perception and what does not. (Since Peikoff/Harriman are rationalists, they claim to perceive via sense perception that which they in fact do not).

Edit: I should qualify that I subscribe to Rand's "stolen concept" criticism of Hume -- if we can't know reality then we can't even have a concept of "know" in the first place. But I think we can perhaps go further than this terse rejection.

Shayne

Edited October 18, 2010 by sjw

[George H. Smith]

After reading Hume I'm not sure his empiricism necessarily leads anywhere in particular. He explicitly assents to the fact that his empiricism logically means, if that was only what one followed, the end of human life. He says we have to add something more to what we see than is there in order to give human life meaning and purpose. Probably the main value one can get from Hume is the isolating what comes via sense perception and what does not. (Since Peikoff/Harriman are rationalists, they claim to perceive via sense perception that which they in fact do not).

Hume was clear about where his epistemology leads. In his first book, A Treatise of Human Nature-- a more extensive treatment of Hume's ideas than we find in the later Enquiry, which is essentially a condensed and more popularized version of the the Treatise-- Hume writes:

For I have already shewn, that the understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its most general principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or in common life.

Hume understood that his skeptical theories "subvert entirely the human understanding," and that this conclusion would logically put him in the "most deplorable condition imaginable" -- a condition of "philosophical melancholy and delirium." Fortunately, however, "nature" provides a cure, obliterating "all these chimeras" by showing us that technical philosophical arguments have no relevance whatsoever to everyday life.

I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hour's amusement, I wou'd return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain'd, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther.

Here then I find myself absolutely and necessarily determin'd to live, and talk, and act like other people in the common affairs of life.

It it interesting that Hume, who would qualify as what today is known as a "soft determinist" even though he adamantly denied any rational basis for belief in causation, can speak so casually of being "absolutely and necessarily determin'd" to do certain things. Such flagrant contradictions are rife throughout his writings.

Hume's basic point here is that reason and human nature are in irremediable conflict. If we cannot really believe in skepticism, this is because it would be far too inconvenient to do so. As Hume puts it: "If we believe, that fire warms, or water refreshes, 'tis only because it costs us too much pains to think otherwise." (All the preceding quotations are from Book I, Section VII, of the Treatise.)

Now, does any reasonable person really think that our beliefs that fire warms and water refreshes have no rational foundation whatsoever, not even some level of probability, and that we believe such things only because it would prove too inconvenient to believe otherwise?

Hume is an extremely engaging writer -- one of the finest essayists in the English language -- but his literary skills should not detract from the obvious, namely, how truly absurd he could be at times. Hume was an authentic genius, but this merely shows that even geniuses, whether in philosophy or science, can say silly things.

I am reluctant to dub beliefs per se "evil," but if I were so inclined, Hume's artificial opposition between reason and human well-being would definitely qualify.

Ghs

[sjw]

Now, does any reasonable person really think that our beliefs that fire warms and water refreshes have no rational foundation whatsoever, not even some level of probability, and that we believe such things only because it would prove too inconvenient to believe otherwise?

Hume is an extremely engaging writer -- one of the finest essayists in the English language -- but his literary skills should not detract from the obvious, namely, how truly absurd he could be at times. Hume was an authentic genius, but this merely proves that even geniuses, whether in philosophy or science, can say silly things.

I am reluctant to dub beliefs per se "evil," but if I were so inclined, Hume's artificial opposition between reason and human well-being would definitely qualify.

Ghs

Because I am at complete liberty to take what I want from Hume and leave the rest the word "evil" does not come to my mind. When I read him it seems he is clearly demarcating between something he arbitrarily and wrongly defines as "reason" and something else which he only vaguely refers to as human values or some such.

But if I were to assign "evil" to his works, the worst thing I think he did was to create an opening for the religious to shove their faith in. And I have seen literal religious tracts which do this, perhaps even because they were so encouraged by Hume.

I myself see this opening as merely his failure to address a certain aspect of reason, precisely because he wrongly designated it "not reason", but I find value in seeing the aspect he was focussed on thrown into sharp relief. I also appreciate his lucid writing, he is indeed engaging.

I don't think that Hume meant to be taken in the way you're taking him, I think he's saying what he said from a poor but strictly adhered to definition of "reason."

Shayne

[George H. Smith]

I don't think that Hume meant to be taken in the way you're taking him, I think he's saying what he said from a poor but strictly adhered to definition of "reason."

Having studied Hume for over 40 years, I can assure you that my interpretation is the standard one. I simply take Hume at his word rather than reading into him what I wish he would have said.

Locke, Hume, and other early empiricists often used the generic term "understanding" instead of "reason" -- sometimes using the latter term in a more specialized sense, e.g., as the faculty that deals with the relationship between ideas and is therefore able to arrive at necessary truths. But what O'ists and many other philosophers call "reason" today corresponds to what they called "understanding."

Ghs

[sjw]

I suppose the main difference between Hume and I (and presumably Rand) would be that he was quite satisfied in coming to the answer he did, but if I were to reason myself into a corner like that I'd not want to rest until I'd figured out where I went wrong. Why would I assume I went wrong? Because the only reason I would engage in philosophy would be to rationally comprehend the world in order to more effectively deal with it, and Hume's answer represents total failure. I think his answer is akin to suicide, as the purpose of life is to live and the purpose of a mind is to know.

Shayne

[sjw]

Having studied Hume for over 40 years, I can assure you that my interpretation is the standard one. I simply take Hume at his word rather than reading into him what I wish he would have said.

You're far better at philosophy than you are at psychiatry.

Shayne

[Peter]

Doing a search on “induction,” I found these few letters clumped together, in my files.

Is anyone else here a fan of “Bones?” Well these letters are just for “squints.” If you are, or if you are not a squint, you need not feel any compulsion to read these. But damn, they are good, and provide a historical note to the current debate.

Peter

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2000 23:39:36 +0000

From: dpotts@ameritech.net

Subject: OWL: Re: Death to Contextual Certainty

Marsha Enright, in a very interesting post [7/6/00], connects the

Objectivist doctrine of contextual certainty with what is in my opinion a quite different doctrine, held by many Objectivists, concerning induction.

This doctrine holds that scientific theories and factual claims, if properly validated, are never falsified, only _assimilated_ into newer theories and discoveries. In Marsha's example, Newtonian mechanics was not falsified by Einstein's theory but rather was incorporated into Einstein's theory as a limiting case, such that we still today employ Newton's formulas in preference to the more cumbersome Einsteinian ones wherever the limiting conditions are satisfied (which, actually, is most of the cases of interest to human engineering). In this way properly grounded knowledge is shown to only grow, and we need never fear that our theories will turn out false.

Which would be the connection Marsha is pointing to between this view of induction and contextual certainty. That is, I believe she wishes to interpret contextual certainty as saying, not that a certainty can turn out false, which is embarrassing, but that certainties are in fact never falsified, which is good, since that is what being a certainty would seem to require.

But now, I just want to point out that we may be jumping from pan to fire if we try to save certainty by switching from the strange claim that a certainty could turn out false to the positively bizarre claim that in fact we are never wrong (about properly justified claims)! For surely such a claim is unsustainable (except possibly for senior military officers and full university professors).

Newton _was_ wrong. (a) His theory makes predictions, such as that mass remains constant as velocity increases, and that the mass of any given system is a constant value ("conservation of mass"), which are false to observation. (B) The "ontology" of his theory - including such claims as that space is Euclidean, that space is an absolute, independently existing container, that mass and energy are not convertible, and that velocity can reach any arbitrary magnitude (in particular, faster than the speed of light) - is quite different from what is now believed.

It is the second point (B) that is the more important of the two. What it means is that, even where the two theories might agree in their predictions (such as at slow velocities and imprecise measurement conditions), what they say about _how_ nature works to make those predictions come true is quite different and mutually contradictory. Therefore they are not both true.

To see this more clearly, take a different example. When Copernican astronomy replaced Ptolemaic, the Copernican predictions about the motions of the heavenly bodies were not superior to the Ptolemaic. The fact is that the Ptolemaic system did a fair job of predicting many astronomical phenomena. And I imagine that, if we suitably restricted the measurement conditions, certain predictions of the two theories would be equivalent.

Nevertheless, the two theories would not be the same, and the Ptolemaic is not properly regarded as being incorporated into the Copernican, because their ontological claims - i.e., what they say about how the solar system is organized - are different and mutually contradictory. The Copernican says that the sun is at the center, the planets (of which the earth is one) go around the sun, and the stars are fixed, and the Ptolemaic says that the earth (which is not a planet) is at the center and that the sun, planets, and stars all go around it in concentric circles (not to mention epicycles and other machinery).

You can't have both these conceptions be true. And exactly the same point holds for Einsteinian and Newtonian mechanics - it's just not as visually arresting.

So far I have been talking about theories. What about facts? Say, that the earth is flat. Were we not wrong about that? Or should we try to claim that, within a certain restricted scope, it is still true? What about the outcome of a criminal court case, in which all of the evidence shows it to be quite certain that the defendant is guilty? If additional evidence twenty years later shows the defendant to have been innocent, will it be any consolation to the poor schmoo, who has languished in prison for twenty years, or rather a slap in the face, if we say, "After all, within a certain restricted scope, you _were_ guilty!"?

The trouble in all the above cases is the same. All empirical judgments, including even simple perceptual judgments such as "there's a thorn tree in the garden," imply claims that go beyond what the evidence can certify. Newtonian mechanics implies that there is no limit to how fast you can go. The earth being flat implies that no matter how far you travel in the same direction, you will not return to your starting point. A thorn tree being in the garden implies that the "tree" is a living thing, rooted in the ground, with rings, etc., not a cleverly contrived fake. In every case, from Newtonian mechanics to the thorn tree, you can restrict the scope of your claims and try to insist that, properly understood within the context of their evidence, your claims remain true and nothing has been falsified. But it will be evident to the neutral observer that in fact you have _altered_ your claims post hoc in the face of falsifying evidence.

There is nothing wrong with adjusting your beliefs in the face of new evidence. Obviously, it's just what we should do. What is wrong is to try to claim that the parts of your beliefs you were forced to change were not falsified, or that your beliefs remain the same as what they were before.

-David Potts

Brookfield, IL

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2000 15:10:29 +0000

From: wdwyer@california.net

Subject: OWL: Re: Death to Contextual Certainty

David Potts wrote: "Almost nothing that really matters in life – maybe nothing at all - is a certainty, which is a fact that we as human beings must conform to every day of our lives."

I've always thought of certainty as synonymous with knowledge. "I am 'certain' that capitalism is superior to socialism" means "I *know* that capitalism is superior to socialism". On this view, if we cannot have certainty of anything that really matters in life, then we cannot have *knowledge* of anything that really matters. Is this correct? I don't think so.

For example, I *know* that I have certain needs that my happiness and well-being depend on; I *know* that if I abuse my health I risk illness -- that if I'm non-productive or a spendthrift, I risk penury and want; I *know* that it's moral to pursue my own happiness, that people have individual rights, that God doesn't exist, etc. And I'm *certain* of these things as well.

In his original post on this subject, David wrote, "If true certainty means you can't be wrong, it will be rare indeed. None of our ordinary empirical beliefs, including all the theories and findings of science, will be certain."

I'd like to ask David if he is certain of this, or if he could be wrong about it? And if he could be wrong about it, then how can he claim it as true? Isn't it a contradiction to say, "X is true, but it might be false"?

In fact, I'd say that David IS wrong about it. Let's take Newton's (weak-field) law of gravitation as an example. Here we have a well-established theory and finding of science. Could we be wrong about it? I don't think so. If he says that we could, then he will have to back up that assertion with evidence. Where's the evidence that we could be wrong about Newton's law of gravitation as applied to a weak-field context?

Don't say, "Well, we were wrong about its application beyond that

context, as Einstein discovered." That won't do. The fact that we were wrong about its application *beyond* its weak-field context does not mean that we could be wrong about its application *within* that context -- a context in which Newton's theory is simply a special case of Einstein's.

I'd say that in the absence of any evidence that we could be wrong, we're entitled to claim knowledge and therefore certainty. Now if we subsequently discover that we were wrong or even just some reason to believe we could be, then we can no longer claim that our belief constitutes (or constituted) knowledge. But short of that, I think that we can.

How does this relate to Objectivism's theory of "contextual certainty"? Well, the latter would say that Einstein's theory of gravitation did not contradict Newton's theory as originally formulated, but merely added to it. According to Objectivism, Newton's original theory as properly understood simply said that "within the context of the circumstances so far known", the law of gravitation is valid. Hence, his theory was not inconsistent with Einstein's.

But Newton did not regard the law of gravitation as confined to a limited context; he viewed it as having a *universal* application. And in that respect, he was indeed mistaken, as Einstein demonstrated.

To say that Newton's conception of gravity as a universal law was "contextually certain" doesn't make any sense, unless its universality is regarded as the context, in which case, his conception of that law could not have been "contextually certain", because it was false.

It may be replied that Newton should not have formulated his law as universally applicable. But how else could he have formulated it? A law, by definition, covers *all* cases of a certain kind. In order for Newton to limit his law to those cases consistent with Einstein's discovery, he would have had to know what Einstein knew, which of course he didn't.

To say, as Objectivism does, that a scientific law contains the (implicit) proviso "within the context of the circumstances so far

known" adds nothing to the law's specificity. What are thecircumstances so far known? Whatever circumstances are not contradicted by future discoveries? How does this proviso enable one to formulate a law that is "contextually certain"? The answer is, it doesn't. As originally formulated, Newton's law of gravitation was "contextually" *false*.

So, unlike David Potts, I believe that there are many important respects in which we *can* be certain. But I do not believe that Objectivism's concept of "contextual certainty" is legitimate.

Bill Dwyer

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Date: Fri, 10 Nov 2000 12:33:05 +0000

From: eyal@cloud9.net

Subject: OWL: Re: Contextual Certainty

In the recent discussion of contextual certainty, I think there is

a very important distinction that is being overlooked: the distinction between general claims and claims about specific entities. Peikoff, in writing OPAR, failed to make this distinction because of his injection of Hegelian ideas into Objectivism; and that has been confusing this issue ever since. The idea, that conclusions reached by a valid method cannot be invalidated by later discoveries, is true *only* for general claims.

Marsha Enright uses the standard Objectivist example of Newton and Einstein. I agree that this is a valid example; Einstein did not refute Newton, but rather discovered more about the limits of the context in which Newton's theory applies.

As Bill Dwyer points out correctly, "A law, by definition, covers *all* cases of a certain kind." The crucial point is that future discoveries can provide more knowledge about the limits of this "certain kind"; in the example of Newton's laws, we now know that it covers only cases in which velocities are below a certain limit. So Bill misses the point when he goes on to say: "In order for Newton to limit his law to those cases consistent with Einstein's discovery, he would have had to know what Einstein knew, which of course he didn't."

Newton didn't need to know all the limits of which cases his law applies to; what he needed was to recognize that future discoveries are possible about the limits within which his law applies. This is what *any* scientist formulating a general theory should recognize. If a scientist recognizes this, and otherwise uses the scientific method validly, then indeed his theories cannot be invalidated by future discoveries.

In objecting to this, David Potts brings up the examples of Ptolemaic astronomy - which is a claim about specific entities, namely the earth and the sun - and the example of an innocent defendant convicted of a crime. David is correct about these examples, precisely because these examples involve claims about specific entities. Saying that the man, who in fact did not commit the crime, "is guilty within a certain scope", or that the sun does revolve around the earth "within a certain scope", makes no sense at all, and clearly violates the law of the excluded middle.

Eyal Mozes

Edited October 18, 2010 by Peter Taylor

[James Heaps-Nelson]

Doing a search on “induction,” I found these few letters clumped together, in my files.

Is anyone else here a fan of “Bones?” Well these letters are just for “squints.” If you are, or if you are not a squint, you need not feel any compulsion to read these. But damn, they are good, and provide a historical note to the current debate.

Peter

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2000 23:39:36 +0000

From: dpotts@ameritech.net

Subject: OWL: Re: Death to Contextual Certainty

Marsha Enright, in a very interesting post [7/6/00], connects the

Objectivist doctrine of contextual certainty with what is in my opinion a quite different doctrine, held by many Objectivists, concerning induction.

This doctrine holds that scientific theories and factual claims, if properly validated, are never falsified, only _assimilated_ into newer theories and discoveries. In Marsha's example, Newtonian mechanics was not falsified by Einstein's theory but rather was incorporated into Einstein's theory as a limiting case, such that we still today employ Newton's formulas in preference to the more cumbersome Einsteinian ones wherever the limiting conditions are satisfied (which, actually, is most of the cases of interest to human engineering). In this way properly grounded knowledge is shown to only grow, and we need never fear that our theories will turn out false.

Which would be the connection Marsha is pointing to between this view of induction and contextual certainty. That is, I believe she wishes to interpret contextual certainty as saying, not that a certainty can turn out false, which is embarrassing, but that certainties are in fact never falsified, which is good, since that is what being a certainty would seem to require.

But now, I just want to point out that we may be jumping from pan to fire if we try to save certainty by switching from the strange claim that a certainty could turn out false to the positively bizarre claim that in fact we are never wrong (about properly justified claims)! For surely such a claim is unsustainable (except possibly for senior military officers and full university professors).

Newton _was_ wrong. (a) His theory makes predictions, such as that mass remains constant as velocity increases, and that the mass of any given system is a constant value ("conservation of mass"), which are false to observation. (B) The "ontology" of his theory - including such claims as that space is Euclidean, that space is an absolute, independently existing container, that mass and energy are not convertible, and that velocity can reach any arbitrary magnitude (in particular, faster than the speed of light) - is quite different from what is now believed.

It is the second point (B) that is the more important of the two. What it means is that, even where the two theories might agree in their predictions (such as at slow velocities and imprecise measurement conditions), what they say about _how_ nature works to make those predictions come true is quite different and mutually contradictory. Therefore they are not both true.

To see this more clearly, take a different example. When Copernican astronomy replaced Ptolemaic, the Copernican predictions about the motions of the heavenly bodies were not superior to the Ptolemaic. The fact is that the Ptolemaic system did a fair job of predicting many astronomical phenomena. And I imagine that, if we suitably restricted the measurement conditions, certain predictions of the two theories would be equivalent.

Nevertheless, the two theories would not be the same, and the Ptolemaic is not properly regarded as being incorporated into the Copernican, because their ontological claims - i.e., what they say about how the solar system is organized - are different and mutually contradictory. The Copernican says that the sun is at the center, the planets (of which the earth is one) go around the sun, and the stars are fixed, and the Ptolemaic says that the earth (which is not a planet) is at the center and that the sun, planets, and stars all go around it in concentric circles (not to mention epicycles and other machinery).

You can't have both these conceptions be true. And exactly the same point holds for Einsteinian and Newtonian mechanics - it's just not as visually arresting.

So far I have been talking about theories. What about facts? Say, that the earth is flat. Were we not wrong about that? Or should we try to claim that, within a certain restricted scope, it is still true? What about the outcome of a criminal court case, in which all of the evidence shows it to be quite certain that the defendant is guilty? If additional evidence twenty years later shows the defendant to have been innocent, will it be any consolation to the poor schmoo, who has languished in prison for twenty years, or rather a slap in the face, if we say, "After all, within a certain restricted scope, you _were_ guilty!"?

The trouble in all the above cases is the same. All empirical judgments, including even simple perceptual judgments such as "there's a thorn tree in the garden," imply claims that go beyond what the evidence can certify. Newtonian mechanics implies that there is no limit to how fast you can go. The earth being flat implies that no matter how far you travel in the same direction, you will not return to your starting point. A thorn tree being in the garden implies that the "tree" is a living thing, rooted in the ground, with rings, etc., not a cleverly contrived fake. In every case, from Newtonian mechanics to the thorn tree, you can restrict the scope of your claims and try to insist that, properly understood within the context of their evidence, your claims remain true and nothing has been falsified. But it will be evident to the neutral observer that in fact you have _altered_ your claims post hoc in the face of falsifying evidence.

There is nothing wrong with adjusting your beliefs in the face of new evidence. Obviously, it's just what we should do. What is wrong is to try to claim that the parts of your beliefs you were forced to change were not falsified, or that your beliefs remain the same as what they were before.

-David Potts

Brookfield, IL

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2000 15:10:29 +0000

From: wdwyer@california.net

Subject: OWL: Re: Death to Contextual Certainty

David Potts wrote: "Almost nothing that really matters in life – maybe nothing at all - is a certainty, which is a fact that we as human beings must conform to every day of our lives."

I've always thought of certainty as synonymous with knowledge. "I am 'certain' that capitalism is superior to socialism" means "I *know* that capitalism is superior to socialism". On this view, if we cannot have certainty of anything that really matters in life, then we cannot have *knowledge* of anything that really matters. Is this correct? I don't think so.

For example, I *know* that I have certain needs that my happiness and well-being depend on; I *know* that if I abuse my health I risk illness -- that if I'm non-productive or a spendthrift, I risk penury and want; I *know* that it's moral to pursue my own happiness, that people have individual rights, that God doesn't exist, etc. And I'm *certain* of these things as well.

In his original post on this subject, David wrote, "If true certainty means you can't be wrong, it will be rare indeed. None of our ordinary empirical beliefs, including all the theories and findings of science, will be certain."

I'd like to ask David if he is certain of this, or if he could be wrong about it? And if he could be wrong about it, then how can he claim it as true? Isn't it a contradiction to say, "X is true, but it might be false"?

In fact, I'd say that David IS wrong about it. Let's take Newton's (weak-field) law of gravitation as an example. Here we have a well-established theory and finding of science. Could we be wrong about it? I don't think so. If he says that we could, then he will have to back up that assertion with evidence. Where's the evidence that we could be wrong about Newton's law of gravitation as applied to a weak-field context?

Don't say, "Well, we were wrong about its application beyond that

context, as Einstein discovered." That won't do. The fact that we were wrong about its application *beyond* its weak-field context does not mean that we could be wrong about its application *within* that context -- a context in which Newton's theory is simply a special case of Einstein's.

I'd say that in the absence of any evidence that we could be wrong, we're entitled to claim knowledge and therefore certainty. Now if we subsequently discover that we were wrong or even just some reason to believe we could be, then we can no longer claim that our belief constitutes (or constituted) knowledge. But short of that, I think that we can.

How does this relate to Objectivism's theory of "contextual certainty"? Well, the latter would say that Einstein's theory of gravitation did not contradict Newton's theory as originally formulated, but merely added to it. According to Objectivism, Newton's original theory as properly understood simply said that "within the context of the circumstances so far known", the law of gravitation is valid. Hence, his theory was not inconsistent with Einstein's.

But Newton did not regard the law of gravitation as confined to a limited context; he viewed it as having a *universal* application. And in that respect, he was indeed mistaken, as Einstein demonstrated.

To say that Newton's conception of gravity as a universal law was "contextually certain" doesn't make any sense, unless its universality is regarded as the context, in which case, his conception of that law could not have been "contextually certain", because it was false.

It may be replied that Newton should not have formulated his law as universally applicable. But how else could he have formulated it? A law, by definition, covers *all* cases of a certain kind. In order for Newton to limit his law to those cases consistent with Einstein's discovery, he would have had to know what Einstein knew, which of course he didn't.

To say, as Objectivism does, that a scientific law contains the (implicit) proviso "within the context of the circumstances so far

known" adds nothing to the law's specificity. What are thecircumstances so far known? Whatever circumstances are not contradicted by future discoveries? How does this proviso enable one to formulate a law that is "contextually certain"? The answer is, it doesn't. As originally formulated, Newton's law of gravitation was "contextually" *false*.

So, unlike David Potts, I believe that there are many important respects in which we *can* be certain. But I do not believe that Objectivism's concept of "contextual certainty" is legitimate.

Bill Dwyer

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Date: Fri, 10 Nov 2000 12:33:05 +0000

From: eyal@cloud9.net

Subject: OWL: Re: Contextual Certainty

In the recent discussion of contextual certainty, I think there is

a very important distinction that is being overlooked: the distinction between general claims and claims about specific entities. Peikoff, in writing OPAR, failed to make this distinction because of his injection of Hegelian ideas into Objectivism; and that has been confusing this issue ever since. The idea, that conclusions reached by a valid method cannot be invalidated by later discoveries, is true *only* for general claims.

Marsha Enright uses the standard Objectivist example of Newton and Einstein. I agree that this is a valid example; Einstein did not refute Newton, but rather discovered more about the limits of the context in which Newton's theory applies.

As Bill Dwyer points out correctly, "A law, by definition, covers *all* cases of a certain kind." The crucial point is that future discoveries can provide more knowledge about the limits of this "certain kind"; in the example of Newton's laws, we now know that it covers only cases in which velocities are below a certain limit. So Bill misses the point when he goes on to say: "In order for Newton to limit his law to those cases consistent with Einstein's discovery, he would have had to know what Einstein knew, which of course he didn't."

Newton didn't need to know all the limits of which cases his law applies to; what he needed was to recognize that future discoveries are possible about the limits within which his law applies. This is what *any* scientist formulating a general theory should recognize. If a scientist recognizes this, and otherwise uses the scientific method validly, then indeed his theories cannot be invalidated by future discoveries.

In objecting to this, David Potts brings up the examples of Ptolemaic astronomy - which is a claim about specific entities, namely the earth and the sun - and the example of an innocent defendant convicted of a crime. David is correct about these examples, precisely because these examples involve claims about specific entities. Saying that the man, who in fact did not commit the crime, "is guilty within a certain scope", or that the sun does revolve around the earth "within a certain scope", makes no sense at all, and clearly violates the law of the excluded middle.

Eyal Mozes

Peter,

It is true that Newton's second law of motion F=ma is a limiting case of the more general case of Einstein's Theory of Special Relativity. It is Einstein's General Theory of Relativity which encompasses his conception of gravity which is completely divorced from Newton's law of gravitation. It is outgrowth of Maxwell's Theories of Electrodynamics and is encompassed by several field equations which represent gravitation in terms of tensorial mathematics.

Jim

[James Heaps-Nelson]

As an aside, Einsteinian regimes aren't the only limiting factors to Newton's theory of gravitation. This wasn't known until sometime in the 1970's, but there even limits with respect to being able to use Newtonian mechanics as an orbital body passes through an L1 Lagrange point. The fact is that we cannot predict the behavior of such an orbital body.

Jim

[kiaer.ts]

As an aside, Einsteinian regimes aren't the only limiting factors to Newton's theory of gravitation. This wasn't known until sometime in the 1970's, but there even limits with respect to being able to use Newtonian mechanics as an orbital body passes through an L1 Lagrange point. The fact is that we cannot predict the behavior of such an orbital body.

Jim

Let me guess, chaos?

[James Heaps-Nelson]

As an aside, Einsteinian regimes aren't the only limiting factors to Newton's theory of gravitation. This wasn't known until sometime in the 1970's, but there even limits with respect to being able to use Newtonian mechanics as an orbital body passes through an L1 Lagrange point. The fact is that we cannot predict the behavior of such an orbital body.

Jim

Let me guess, chaos?

Yep.

[9thdoctor]

This isn't much, but there is a new review of the Harriman book on the National Science Teachers Association website. The only other review from outside of Rand-land, that I've seen, is the Audible.com one I linked to upthread.

http://www.nsta.org/recommends/ViewProductPrint.aspx?ProductID=20204

It has been well said that an author who expects results from a first novel is in a position similar to that of a man who drops a rose petal down the Grand Canyon of Arizona, and listens for the echo.

P.G. Wodehouse, Cocktail Time

[Peter]

James Heaps-Nelson responded to the question, “. . . chaos?”

With, “Yep.”

Lions, and tigers, and bears-

Induction, and Popper, and Hume

For serious “squints” only, here are some more moldy but recently found documents from Ram Tobolski. It is a wonder to behold his mind at work, as it is to behold our own James’ Celtic thunder.

Peter

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Date: Sat, 16 Dec 2000 13:42:51 +0000

From: rtb_il@yahoo.com

Subject: OWL: Induction(1)- Dykes on Popper

Since Popper was recently discussed on OWL, I think it is fitting to give some serious attention to the problem of induction (henceforth POI). As you may recall, the POI was Popper's point of departure. Popper accepted Hume's argument, that induction has no rational basis, in full, and suggested his own idea of conjectures and refutations as a replacement to induction.

During the discussion on Popper I followed Nicholas Dykes' suggestion and read his article "Debunking Popper", a very thorough (even though itself is an abbreviation of a larger work) criticism of Popper. One thing troubled me, though, and it was what Dykes believed to be the _right_ approach to the POI. In the remaining part of this post, I will be quoting the section from Dykes' article (with his permission) in which he deals with the POI. In my next post I intend to criticize the apparent solution to the POI that figures in that section. Then I intend to suggest my own solution.

As you will see, Dykes' preferred solution (attributed to H.W.B. Joseph) relies on the "law of identity" and on the supposed place of causality in identity. This approach matches very well Rand's "axiomatic" view of identity. Rand, as far as I know, did not bother to engage Hume's problem, but promptly considered identity (over-time, including causal powers) to be axiomatic.

Logically, however, that won't do. Hume denied this kind of identity, and it cannot be proved unless the validity of induction be proved _first_. I therefore believe that an appropriate solution to the problem of induction deserves to be placed at the basis of an objectivist epistemology, as a fundamental requisite to the validity of concepts and judgments.

---------------------------------------------

From Nicholas Dykes' "Debunking Popper"

---------------------------------------------

2. THE FIRST PREMISE OF CR [Critical Rationalism]

Popper built his philosophy on foundations borrowed from Hume and Kant. His first premise was wholehearted acceptance of Hume’s attack on induction. The second, to be addressed in the next section, was agreement with Kant’s view that it is our ideas which give form to reality, not reality which gives form to our ideas.

Hume, whom Popper called “one of the most rational minds of all ages” [PKP2 1019], is renowned for elaborating the ‘problem of induction’ - a supposedly logical proof that generalisations from observation are invalid. Most later philosophers have accepted Hume’s arguments, and libraries have been filled with attempts to solve his ‘problem.’ Popper thought he had the answer. “I believed I had solved the problem of induction by the simple discovery that induction by repetition did not exist” [uNQ 52; cf OKN 1ff & PKP2 1115]. What really took place, according to Popper, was CR, knowledge advancing by means of conjecture and refutation: “... in my view here is no such thing as induction” [LSCD 40]; “what characterises the empirical method is its manner of exposing to falsification, in every conceivable way, the system to be tested” [LSCD 42].

Hume, said Popper, had shown that: “there is no argument of reason which permits an inference from one case to another... and I completely agree” [OKN 96]. Elsewhere he referred to induction as “a myth” which had been “exploded” by Hume [uNQ 80]. He further asserted that “There is no rule of inductive inference - inference leading to theories or universal laws - ever proposed which can be taken seriously even for a minute” [uNQ 146-7; see also RASC 31].

THE PROBLEM WITH 'THE PROBLEM'

Popper’s solution was certainly correct in one respect. The problem of induction would indeed vanish if there were no such thing as induction. However, the issue would be resolved much more positively were it to turn out that Hume had been wrong, and that there never had been any problem with induction in the first place. And, in point of fact, this is the case. Despite his great skill as a thinker and writer, Hume missed the point. Induction does not depend for its validity on observation, but on the Law of Identity.

Hume stated, in essence, that since all ideas are derived from experience we cannot have any valid ideas about future events - which have yet to be experienced. He therefore denied that the past can give us any information about the future. He further denied that there is any necessary connection between cause and effect. We experience only repeated instances, we cannot experience any “power” that actually causes events to take place. Events are entirely “loose and separate.... conjoined but never connected.”

According to Hume, then, one has no guarantee that the hawthorn in an English hedge will not bear grapes next autumn, nor that the thistles in a nearby field won’t produce figs. The expectation that the thorn will produce red berries, and the thistles purple flowers, is merely the result of “regular conjunction” which induces an “inference of the understanding.” In Hume’s view, there is no such thing as objective identity, there is only subjective “custom” or “habit.”

However, Hume also wrote: “When any opinion leads to absurdities, it is certainly false” and the idea that one might gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles is surely absurd enough to qualify. And false is what Hume’s opinions most certainly are. Left standing, they lead to what he himself called “the flattest of all contradictions, viz. that it is possible for the same thing both to be and not to be.” The crux of the case against Hume was stated in 1916 by H.W.B. Joseph in An Introduction to Logic: “A thing, to be at all, must be something, and can only be what it is. To assert a causal connexion between a and x implies that a acts as it does because it is what it is; because, in fact, it is a. So long therefore as it is a, it must act thus; and to assert that it may act otherwise on a subsequent occasion is to assert that what is a is something else than the a which it is declared to be.” Hume’s whole argument - persuasive though it may be - is, to borrow Joseph’s words, “in flat conflict with the Law of Identity.”

Existence implies identity. It is not possible to exist without being something, and a thing can only be what it is: A is A. Any actions of that thing form part of its identity: “the way in which it acts must be regarded as a partial expression of what it is.” Thus to deny any connection between a thing, its actions, and their consequences, is to assert that the thing is not what it is; it is to defy the Law of Identity.

It is not necessary to prolong this discussion. Entities exist. They possess identity. By careful observation - free from preconception - we are able to discover the identities of the entities we observe. Thereafter, we are fully entitled to assume that like entities will cause like events, the form of inference we call induction. And, because it rests on the axiom of the Law of Identity, correct induction - free from contradiction - is a valid route to knowledge. The first premise of CR is therefore false.

There is nonetheless a substantial grain of truth in Hume’s position, or few philosophers would have followed him. The grain lies in the precision of our knowledge of future events. Hume denied all knowledge of the future because we can have no experience of it. As we have seen, this is not true, it overlooks the Law of Identity. What is true, is that our prediction of events is limited by the unforeseeable. An ‘O’ ring may fail and destroy an otherwise reliable spacecraft; an icy road surface may cause a pristine Rolls-Royce to crash. For, no matter how sound our judgment or wide our experience, we cannot possibly have complete, certain and absolute knowledge of future events. We are not omniscient: all kinds of unforeseen happenings may intervene to spoil even the best laid of our plans, and of course new information about old subjects continuously comes to light. But, armed with the Law of Identity, there is no reason to allow the unforeseeable to turn us into sceptics. The universe is not a series of “loose and separate events” any more than time is a series of discrete, unrelated segments of duration.

It should also be noted that, in fact, all knowledge of entities, and all knowledge of language, is acquired inductively. A child’s knowledge of apples, for example, is based on a very limited sampling. A student’s knowledge of the word ‘inference’ is founded on a similarly narrow acquaintance. If it were true that induction is a myth, then all knowledge of external reality, all language, and all human thought - which depends on knowledge of reality and on language - would be myths as well, including, of course, CR.

---------------------------------------------

Ram Tobolski.

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2000 13:22:13 +0000

From: rtb_il@yahoo.com

Subject: OWL: Induction(2)- criticism of Joseph's solution

In my previous post, I quoted the section about the problem of induction (henceforth POI) from Nicholas Dykes' "Debunking Popper". In this post I intend to show why H.W.B. Joseph's solution, that was presented in that section, is not satisfactory. In my next post I intend to present my own solution to the POI. I also wish to remind my estimate, that a solution to the POI is needed to fill a lacuna in the objectivist epistemology.

Joseph's solution, as far as I can judge from Dykes' essay, misses the crux of the Hume's POI in two ways: 1. It misses Hume's valid insight, that induction is not deduction, i.e. that it is not a _logical_ implication.

2. It misses the ontological side of Hume's position, by relying on the existence of a certain kind of entities, whose existence cannot be proved without some version of induction.

1. INDUCTION VS. DEDUCTION

What is the crux of the POI? Using induction, we predict future events on the basis of past events. Using induction, we believe in general rules on the basis of particular phenomena.

The common ground, the problematic ground is this: an inductive conclusion always goes _beyond_ the premises. The conclusion is never _logically_ implied the premises. In other word, induction is not deduction.

As Dykes writes, describing Hume's position:

<We experience only repeated instances, we cannot experience any power” that actually causes events to take place. Events are entirely “loose and separate.... conjoined but never connected.

There's the point. There is no _logical_ implication between different events. Of course, we normally think of events as connected, notably by causal implication. Now Hume's point is this: (1) What we call a causal implication is never a logical implication. We can always conceive, and even imagine, the outcome to be different. We can imagine, e.g., cold fire, or fire without smoke. (2) And since there is no _logical_ implication between different events, there is no _rational_ procedure to derive the existence of one event from the existence of other events.

I believe that Hume was right in (1) but wrong in (2). I will elaborate on this in my next post.

But Joseph's solution, if it were true, would imply that induction is a kind of deduction, true by virtue of logic alone:

<To assert a causal connexion between a and x implies that a acts as it does because it is what it is; because, in fact, it is a. So long therefore as it is a, it must act thus; and to assert that it may act otherwise on a subsequent occasion is to assert that what is a is something else than the a which it is declared to be.

Put to use: when I predict that my computer will be not malfunction today, I cannot be wrong, because it is part of the _identity_ of my computer to function. Computer is computer... It _must_ function...

This amounts to say that we are infallible in empirical beliefs... unless we have wrongly identified our logical laws.

2. THE ONTOLOGICAL SIDE OF HUME'S CHALLENGE

Notice what kind of entity Joseph has in mind when he uses the word 'thing':

<A thing, to be at all, must be something, and can only be what it is. To assert a causal connexion between a and x implies that a acts as it does because it is what it is; because, in fact, it is a. So long therefore as it is a, it must act thus ...

A thing is an entity which endures through time ("So long ... as it is a"). A thing is an entity that "acts", that has causal relations with other entities. A thing may be, say, a chair, or a billiard ball.

But Joseph's reliance on the existence of "things" ignores the essential context of Hume, which flatly denies such existence: the existence of anything enduring, the existence of casual relations. As Dykes himself writes:

<He [Hume] further denied that there is any necessary connection between cause and effect. We experience only repeated instances, we cannot experience any “power” that actually causes events to take place. Events are entirely “loose and separate.... conjoined but never connected.

What kind of entities did Hume admit? The bare minimum, really, the only entities that he could not doubt: momentary sense impressions. Hume refused to admit any other kind of entities, not because he was just a hardheaded skeptic, but because he sincerely could not find any rational argument to justify their existence. Largely, because he could not find any rational argument to justify induction.

The move from momentary sense impressions to "things" requires induction. And Dykes also recognizes it, although he does not notice that this fact explodes Joseph's argument:

<It should also be noted that, in fact, all knowledge of entities, and all knowledge of language, is acquired inductively.

How can we know that we need some kind of induction in order to establish the existence of "things"? Because any way we put it, the assertion of such an existence requires a (non-) logical leap. It is logically possible that any consistent "thing" which I might consider (e.g. my computer) will act inconsistently in the next moment (e.g. change into a black swan).

3. INTERIM CONCLUSION

To solve Hume's POI, we need something very different from Joseph's solution. We have to show how an argument can be _rational_ without being _logical_. And we must not rely on ontological assumptions, except for the bare minimum that does not itself require induction. I will try to present such a solution in my next post.

Ram Tobolski

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2000 13:52:25 +0000

From: rtb_il@yahoo.com

Subject: OWL: Re: Induction(2)- criticism of Joseph's solution

I am grateful for Gayle Dean's criticism, because it enabled me to detect a genuine bug in my argument. The bug was not in my "infallible computer" example, but this unclarified example was both a symptom of the bug and an aid to hide it from myself.

The bug was this: I claimed that Joseph's solution has two faults- (1) That it take induction to be a kind of deduction, i.e. a logical implication. (2) That it begs the question by relying on the existence of things which endure in time and have causal relations, while the existence of this kind of things cannot be accomplished without induction. But now I see that what I can actually prove is that Joseph's solution has _either_ of these faults, but not necessarily both.

Let me try to make this clear. Joseph wrote:

<To assert a causal connexion between a and x implies that a acts as it does because it is what it is; because, in fact, it is a. So long therefore as it is a, it must act thus; and to assert that it may act otherwise on a subsequent occasion is to assert that what is a is something else than the a which it is declared to be.

Let's put Joseph's words in the exact context in which they appear in Nicholas Dykes' article. This is what Dykes writes before quoting Joseph:

<According to Hume, then, one has no guarantee that the hawthorn in an English hedge will not bear grapes next autumn, nor that the thistles in a nearby field won’t produce figs. The expectation that the thorn will produce red berries, and the thistles purple flowers, is merely the result of “regular conjunction” which induces an “inference of the understanding.”

Now let's instantiate Joseph's formula with this very example that Dykes meant it to be against:

<To assert a causal connexion between a thorn and red berries implies that the thorn acts as it does because it is what it is; because, in fact, it is a thorn. So long therefore as it is a thorn, it must act thus; and to assert that it may act otherwise on a subsequent occasion is to assert that what is a thorn is something else than the thorn which it is declared to be.

But why should this worry Hume? Hume would gladly agree that the thorn is something else than the thorn which it is declared to be. Because for Hume, there are neither thorns nor berries in existence. These apparent identities are just habitual illusions.

So this opens for me _two_ alternatives in how to interpret Joseph's intention. One alternative is simply that Joseph failed to realize that Hume denied the existence of such identities as thorns and berries.

The other alternative is that Joseph thought that such identities are undeniable. But to assert that identities are undeniable is equivalent to asserting that our identifications are infallible, which is false. Thorns _must_ produce berries. And because this is presented as a paradigm of induction, it would imply that _any_ inductive argument is equivalent to a deductive argument that relies on undeniable identities. So when I predict that my computer will function _today_, Joseph should say, according to that second interpretation, that the prediction rests on the identity of my computer, i.e. that it is its identity to function today, and it cannot do otherwise... I hope it is now clearer how did I get to my "infallible computer" example.

The second alternative does seem to me more far fetched. The first alternative seems to me more probable: that Joseph failed to realize that it is futile to _rely_ on identities such as thorns and berries against Hume's position.

Thanks again! I shall welcome any further criticism and comments. By default, my next post will be about my own solution to the problem of induction.

Happy new year!

Ram Tobolski

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Date: Sat, 23 Dec 2000 14:13:03 +0000

From: rtb_il@yahoo.com

Subject: OWL: Induction(3)- my solution

My criticism of H.W.B. Joseph's solution to Hume's problem of induction was intended to help me (and others) to avoid typical mistakes when trying to answer Hume. First, not to ignore the fact that induction is not deduction, i.e. that it is not a purely logical implication. Second, more typical, not to beg the question by relying on premises which are themselves epistemologically based on induction. This is too easy because induction is so basic.

So, how can we refute Hume, and show that induction is rational? The apparent strength of Hume's position is its _minimalism_. Hume fortifies himself with minimum assertions about reality, and he refused to accept any other assertions about reality, claiming that they cannot be justified.

Minimalists seem to be so innocent, to be assuming so little. But this semblance is only apparent. They are typically found out to be assuming too much, right from the start.

Hume seems to be assuming very little about existence. But in fact, he is assuming too much. HUME IS ASSUMING THAT EVERYTHING HAT EXISTS IS PARTICULAR AND DIRECTLY PERCEPTIBLE.

Let's trace Hume's reasoning in his original text ("A Treatise of Human Nature"). Hume concluded, for example, that concepts ('ideas' in his language) are not only derived from sense impressions, but that they are actually _made_ of sense impressions! The alternative would be, that a concept be something that is not in itself perceptible, which was unthinkable for Hume.

<Now since all ideas are deriv'd from impressions, and are nothing but copies and representations of them, whatever is true of the one must be acknowledg'd concerning the other. Impressions and ideas differ only in their strength and vivacity. The foregoing conclusion is not founded on any particular degree of vivacity. It cannot therefore be affected by any variation in that particular. An idea is a weaker impression: and as a strong impression must necessarily have a determinate quantity and quality, the case must be the same with its copy or representative. [A Treatise of Human Nature, part 1, section VII: Of Abstract Ideas]

And this is what Hume says about the particularity of entities, and about that there can be no abstract ideas (concepts). Hume subsequently adopted the nominalist position, i.e. that only names are general, not concepts:

<Thirdly, 'tis a principle generally receiv'd in philosophy that everything in nature is individual, and that 'tis utterly absurd to suppose a triangle really existent, which has no precise proportion of sides and angles. If this therefore be absurd in fact and reality, it must also be absurd in idea; since nothing of which we can form a clear and distinct idea is absurd and impossible. But to form the idea of an object, and to form an idea simply, is the same thing; the reference of the idea to an object being an extraneous denomination, of which in itself it bears no mark or character. Now as 'tis impossible to form an idea of an object, that is possest of quantity and quality, and yet is possest of no precise degree of either; it follows that there is an equal impossibility of forming an idea, that is not limited and confin'd in both these particulars.

Abstract ideas are therefore in themselves individual, however they may become general in their representation. The image in the mind is only that of a particular object, tho' the application of it in our reasoning be the same, as if it were universal. [ibid]

Let's see how Hume's bias functions in the specific context of induction. Suppose that I perceive many (momentary) swans (I stress "momentary" to avoid appearing to be begging the question), and I notice that all the (momentary) swans were white. I expect, and predict, that the next (momentary) swan that I am going to see will be also white.

Hume denies the rationality of this prediction. What is the logic of his denial? He would say that the predicted perceptible event is not logically implied by the previous perceptible events:

<'Tis easy to observe, that in tracing this relation, the inference we draw from cause to effect, is not deriv'd merely from a survey of these particular objects, and from such a penetration into their essences as may discover the dependence of the one upon the other. There is no object, which implies the existence of any other if we consider these objects in themselves, and never look beyond the ideas which we form of them. [A Treatise of Human Nature, part 3, section VI: Of the Inference from the Impression to the Idea]

But why should the new event be logically implied by _them_ (the previous events)? This apparently innocent requirement is a result of Hume's unchecked premise about existence.

"The next swan will be white". This refers to a fact (if it will really obtain). To derive a fact logically, we can only derive it from other facts. From what facts did I derive it? Well, obviously not from particular facts like "This and this swan was white", but rather from a _general_ fact, such as "all swans are white"!

Hume couldn't conceive this, because for him, that cannot be, ultimately, general facts. General facts are neither particular nor perceptible! This is the metaphysical aspect of his fallacy.

But can a general fact have a rational basis? Does "all swans are white" have a rational basis? Not for Hume, even if he could momentarily accept the existence of general facts. For him, knowledge must be _certain_, based either on direct perception or on logical implication from previous knowledge. This is the epistemological aspect of his fallacy:

<There is no object, which implies the existence of any other if we consider these objects in themselves, and never look beyond the ideas which we form of them. Such an inference wou'd amount to knowledge, and wou'd imply the absolute contradiction and impossibility of conceiving any thing different. [ibid]

But in fact, a general fact can have a rational basis. A general fact is justified by _explaining_ particular facts. The general fact is then not logically implied by the particular facts - on the contrary - _it_ logically implies them. It is still rationally implied by the particular facts that it explains, in the sense that they logically _condition_ it (a limiting necessary condition). An explaining general fact is also logically conditioned from outside, so to speak, because it is required to be logically consistent with the rest of our knowledge, consistent with other particular and general facts.

"All swans are white" is not a particularly brilliant explanation, but it does serve to demonstrate the relevant logical relations which were missed by Hume, because of his unjustified premises. A more accurate account of the swan prediction will be that, seeing a consistent association like swan-white, I have come to realize that a general fact may explain this consistency. From that general fact (which is not yet known, and which is not the naive "all swans are white") I deduce that the next swan will be white.

The basic structure of an inductive argument is, then, not an implication from some particular facts to another particular fact. There are two different implications. First, from some particular facts to a general fact, by way of explanation. Second, from a general fact to a particular fact, by way of logical implication. Since the general fact is independently (and rationally) justified, we are entitled to derive new particular facts from it. That does not make it infallible, though, because explanations are not infallible.

That's it. Please, check my premises...

A happy new year,

Ram Tobolski

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Date: Tue, 26 Dec 2000 14:24:03 -0800

From: rtb_il@yahoo.com

Subject: OWL: RE: Induction(3)- my solution

I thank Robert Kolker for his "responses" (12/25) to my arguments concerning Hume's problem of induction. I would be happier, though, with actual counter-arguments rather than mere assertions. After all, from my point of view, Robert is just repeating Hume's mistake, asserting unjustified premises about existence.

I'll begin by briefly responding to Robert's responses. Then I'll say something more general about objectivism and the nature of existence.

1. I wrote:

<HUME IS ASSUMING THAT EVERYTHING THAT EXISTS IS PARTICULAR AND DIRECTLY PERCEPTIBLE.

And Robert responded:

<All that exists is particular. It might or might not be directly perceptible. In fact many entities are not directly perceptible, for example, electrons.

And I say: Why? I also believe that electrons exist. And I also believe that this quantified fact (that electrons exist) exists. Otherwise, what does the sentence "electrons exist" refer to?

2. I wrote:

<"The next swan will be white" ... [is not derived] from particular facts like "This and this swan was white", but rather from a _general_ fact, such as "all swans are white"!

And Robert responded:

<There are no * general * facts. There are only extants [existents?]. Universally quantifiable assertions require a volitional intelligence to formulate and if volitional conscious beings like us ceased to exist, so would universally quantified assertion.

In short there are no forests in Reality, only trees.

And I say: Why? Assertions, any assertion, require an intelligent mental act. But facts (to which assertions aim to refer), particular or general, just exist. I already gave an argument for the existence of general facts: they provide good explanations for consistent, repeating occurrences.

Trees are more basic than forests, but, of course, forests exist too. Otherwise, the word 'forest' would be devoid of meaning. And it isn't.

3. EXISTENCE: THE WRONG BATTLE-FIELD

Robert's assertions are not surprising, since they are deeply rooted in Ayn Rand's writings. But this is a weak point in Rand's argument and I'd to help to improve upon it.

The basic ethical insight of objectivism is the irreducibility of the individual. An individual cannot be subsumed under a collective, as an organ under an organism.

Rand believed she could ground this insight in this most basic attribute, existence. She believed that individuals exist, and that collectives do not exist. That is what enabled her to believe that the sentence "existence exists" expresses the core of her philosophy.

I am deeply sympathetic with individualism. But I believe that Rand was mistaken about existence. Collectives, even when they are random groups, exist. Otherwise, we could not talk about them, we could not refer to them. Words like 'state', 'society', 'forest' would not have meaning if states, societies, forests did not exist. But these words obviously have meaning.

Individuals have a lot to say for themselves, when opposed to collectives. But existence is not part of their advantage. "Existence" is not an honorary title. The assertion that only individuals "really exist" is putting a valid intuition in unfitting terms. An individual is a center of activity in a way that a collective cannot be. But collectives exist. Existence is not the difference.

I'll be glad to hear any arguments (please, no mere-assertions) to the contrary. My solution to the problem of induction is the central topic for me now, but this solution depends on an unbiased approach to "existence".

Ram Tobolski