New Developments re Harriman Induction book

[sjw]

I am saying that I would not find it surprising to find top scientists using something akin to pragmatic or dialectical methods in addition to empirical or analytical methods in developing theories as well as a wide variety of image or pattern modalities. As long as a given formulation can be validated, it does not matter what method was used in conceiving it.

Jim

Jim, what is your purpose in wondering what top scientists do? Is it because you want to be one, or emulate them, or what?

Here is what I think top scientists will do when studying previous scientists: They ask themselves how they could themselves have figured out what the top scientist did. They don't necessarily care whether the other top scientist used imagery or words or whatever. All that matters is that they understand how they themselves could come to learn some truth for the first time.

Shayne

[James Heaps-Nelson]

I am saying that I would not find it surprising to find top scientists using something akin to pragmatic or dialectical methods in addition to empirical or analytical methods in developing theories as well as a wide variety of image or pattern modalities. As long as a given formulation can be validated, it does not matter what method was used in conceiving it.

Jim

Jim, what is your purpose in wondering what top scientists do? Is it because you want to be one, or emulate them, or what?

Here is what I think top scientists will do when studying previous scientists: They ask themselves how they could themselves have figured out what the top scientist did. They don't necessarily care whether the other top scientist used imagery or words or whatever. All that matters is that they understand how they themselves could come to learn some truth for the first time.

Shayne

My purpose is to confirm my strong suspicion that scientific induction is a method of validation, not a method of discovery. Scientists don't say: Gee, I'd like to induce a brilliant new theory today, I will follow steps 1-4.

Of course each scientist has to create a conceptual edifice for themselves. There's a choice quote from Richard Feynman in his Lectures on Computation where he talks about how he went about problem solving, that he never wanted to look at someone else's solution until he had come up with his own.

Jim

[BaalChatzaf]

Why do I care what John Baez thinks? Whoops, asked another "why"....

Shayne

Because John Baez the physicist is ten times smarter than you are.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[sjw]

Why do I care what John Baez thinks? Whoops, asked another "why"....

Shayne

Because John Baez the physicist is ten times smarter than you are.

Ba'al Chatzaf

"Smart" is evidently not all it's cracked up to be: It doesn't seem to stop him from spewing nonsense such that seeking to know "why" is a sign of being a crackpot. On the contrary, to say "why" doesn't matter is proof of a crackpot. Which means that John Baez, for all his smartness, is a crackpot.

Shayne

[sjw]

My purpose is to confirm my strong suspicion that scientific induction is a method of validation, not a method of discovery. Scientists don't say: Gee, I'd like to induce a brilliant new theory today, I will follow steps 1-4.

Of course each scientist has to create a conceptual edifice for themselves. There's a choice quote from Richard Feynman in his Lectures on Computation where he talks about how he went about problem solving, that he never wanted to look at someone else's solution until he had come up with his own.

Jim

What exactly do you mean by "scientific induction"? How would you say it differs from "non-scientific induction"?

Feynman was doing essentially what I said a top-scientist should do: don't (first) ask how someone else figured it out, figure it out for yourself. (If you can't figure it out for yourself then of course you might want to resort to seeing how they did it).

Shayne

[James Heaps-Nelson]

My purpose is to confirm my strong suspicion that scientific induction is a method of validation, not a method of discovery. Scientists don't say: Gee, I'd like to induce a brilliant new theory today, I will follow steps 1-4.

Of course each scientist has to create a conceptual edifice for themselves. There's a choice quote from Richard Feynman in his Lectures on Computation where he talks about how he went about problem solving, that he never wanted to look at someone else's solution until he had come up with his own.

Jim

What exactly do you mean by "scientific induction"? How would you say it differs from "non-scientific induction"?

Feynman was doing essentially what I said a top-scientist should do: don't (first) ask how someone else figured it out, figure it out for yourself. (If you can't figure it out for yourself then of course you might want to resort to seeing how they did it).

Shayne

Shayne,

I'm assuming scientific induction means that you look at empirical data, use some method to integrate it so that it fits (equations etc.) and then verify it.

Jim

Edited October 18, 2010 by James Heaps-Nelson

[sjw]

My purpose is to confirm my strong suspicion that scientific induction is a method of validation, not a method of discovery. Scientists don't say: Gee, I'd like to induce a brilliant new theory today, I will follow steps 1-4.

Of course each scientist has to create a conceptual edifice for themselves. There's a choice quote from Richard Feynman in his Lectures on Computation where he talks about how he went about problem solving, that he never wanted to look at someone else's solution until he had come up with his own.

Jim

What exactly do you mean by "scientific induction"? How would you say it differs from "non-scientific induction"?

Feynman was doing essentially what I said a top-scientist should do: don't (first) ask how someone else figured it out, figure it out for yourself. (If you can't figure it out for yourself then of course you might want to resort to seeing how they did it).

Shayne

Shayne,

I'm assuming scientific induction means that you look at empirical data, use some method to integrate it so that it fits (equations etc.) and then verify it.

Jim

And it differs from ordinary human induction how?

Shayne

[BaalChatzaf]

And it differs from ordinary human induction how?

Shayne

The folks who become top-notch physicists have a better grasp and feel for how the world works. Look, I am sure millions of people have seen fruit fall from trees. How many would hypothesize that the same thing that makes the fruit fall from the tree also makes the Moon revolve around the Earth, or the Earth revolve around the Sun? The Moon is falling around the Earth. That is what makes Newton, Newton. Making the connection. Seeing two seemingly different things as being the same thing underneath. It is that ability to see through the obvious and get to the truth that makes the difference.

All the physicists knew prior to 1904 that the Laws of Mechanics as stated by Newton and his successors were at odds with the laws of Electrodynamics. Very few, Einstein among them, thought about changing the laws of mechanics to fit the laws of Electrodynamics. Just about everyone else was working it the other way, trying to make Electrodynamics fit with the laws of Mechanics. Likewise, how many physicists would conceive of the gravitational interaction between masses a matter of temporal-spatial geometry? Only Einstein. All the physicists had the same facts available to them. Only Einstein came up with a covariant geometric theory to account for gravity.

Succeeding at physics is not only knowing the facts, but having a different way of seeing how the facts fit together. It takes talent and a wee bit of luck. That is why we do not have an algorithm that transforms a large collection of facts into an explanatory theory. It takes talent to do that. It is like music. Millions can play or sing the scales or toot on a horn, but very few can compose music that will last throughout the ages.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited October 18, 2010 by BaalChatzaf

[James Heaps-Nelson]

My purpose is to confirm my strong suspicion that scientific induction is a method of validation, not a method of discovery. Scientists don't say: Gee, I'd like to induce a brilliant new theory today, I will follow steps 1-4.

Of course each scientist has to create a conceptual edifice for themselves. There's a choice quote from Richard Feynman in his Lectures on Computation where he talks about how he went about problem solving, that he never wanted to look at someone else's solution until he had come up with his own.

Jim

What exactly do you mean by "scientific induction"? How would you say it differs from "non-scientific induction"?

Feynman was doing essentially what I said a top-scientist should do: don't (first) ask how someone else figured it out, figure it out for yourself. (If you can't figure it out for yourself then of course you might want to resort to seeing how they did it).

Shayne

Shayne,

I'm assuming scientific induction means that you look at empirical data, use some method to integrate it so that it fits (equations etc.) and then verify it.

Jim

And it differs from ordinary human induction how?

Shayne

I didn't say it did. I'm not quite sure where this leading. Scientists develop a repertoire of concepts and images that they combine in different ways to get a result when they are making a discovery. Some of it is pattern recognition, diagnosis, recombination etc. Very little induction in the sense of taking empirical data and putting it together step by step in some organized procedure.

Jim

Edited October 18, 2010 by James Heaps-Nelson

[mfgreaves]

Interests: gazing into the abyss, fighting monsters from the id

Dr. Morbius,

I figure they could use your help over at ARI around about now;

their "monsters from the id" are getting seriously out-of-hand...

("The Forbidden Planet" is one of my old favorites too.

Watch out for that "brain boost"! It's a doozy!)

Mike

[sjw]

I didn't say it did. I'm not quite sure where this leading. Scientists develop a repertoire of concepts and images that they combine in different ways to get a result when they are making a discovery. Some of it is pattern recognition, diagnosis, recombination etc. Very little induction in the sense of taking empirical data and putting it together step by step in some organized procedure.

Jim

You were the one who used the phrase "scientific induction", which implies that it is a special kind of induction. I was just wondering what you meant by it, and if you thought it was a separate concept, what you thought normal induction was, and what you thought the boundary between the two types was.

So if you think "scientific induction" is just plain human induction, then why call it "scientific"?

Shayne

[dsaum]

Interests: gazing into the abyss, fighting monsters from the id

Dr. Morbius,

I figure they could use your help over at ARI around about now;

their "monsters from the id" are getting seriously out-of-hand...

("The Forbidden Planet" is one of my old favorites too.

Watch out for that "brain boost"! It's a doozy!)

Mike

I just got a blu-ray player and I have ordered the Netflix blu-ray version "Forbidden Planet".

Be still my heart!

[James Heaps-Nelson]

I didn't say it did. I'm not quite sure where this leading. Scientists develop a repertoire of concepts and images that they combine in different ways to get a result when they are making a discovery. Some of it is pattern recognition, diagnosis, recombination etc. Very little induction in the sense of taking empirical data and putting it together step by step in some organized procedure.

Jim

You were the one who used the phrase "scientific induction", which implies that it is a special kind of induction. I was just wondering what you meant by it, and if you thought it was a separate concept, what you thought normal induction was, and what you thought the boundary between the two types was.

So if you think "scientific induction" is just plain human induction, then why call it "scientific"?

Shayne

Shayne

Sure. Induction is induction.

Jim

[Selene]

The folks who become top-notch physicists have a better grasp and feel for how the world works. Look, I am sure millions of people have seen fruit fall from trees. How many would hypothesize that the same thing that makes the fruit fall from the tree also makes the Moon revolve around the Earth, or the Earth revolve around the Sun? The Moon is falling around the Earth. That is what makes Newton, Newton. Making the connection. Seeing two seemingly different things as being the same thing underneath. It is that ability to see through the obvious and get to the truth that makes the difference.

All the physicists knew prior to 1904 that the Laws of Mechanics as stated by Newton and his successors were at odds with the laws of Electrodynamics. Very few, Einstein among them, thought about changing the laws of mechanics to fit the laws of Electrodynamics. Just about everyone else was working it the other way, trying to make Electrodynamics fit with the laws of Mechanics. Likewise, how many physicists would conceive of the gravitational interaction between masses a matter of temporal-spatial geometry? Only Einstein. All the physicists had the same facts available to them. Only Einstein came up with a covariant geometric theory to account for gravity.

Succeeding at physics is not only knowing the facts, but having a different way of seeing how the facts fit together. It takes talent and a wee bit of luck. That is why we do not have an algorithm that transforms a large collection of facts into an explanatory theory. It takes talent to do that. It is like music. Millions can play or sing the scales or toot on a horn, but very few can compose music that will last throughout the ages.

Very well put. It is that spark or mental leap that makes greatness. And, as you astutely note, a wee bit of luck on occasion!

Edited October 18, 2010 by Selene

[Robert Campbell]

I haven't read Harriman's book yet, but Valliant's is a glaringly sectarian screed that is painful to read more than four and a half words of at a time. From everything I've seen pro and con Harriman, his book is not in that category. Obviously The Logical Leap will get the most immediate attention from Objectivist circles, as is true of other books of most apparent interest to various ideological camps. But if Harriman's book survives, whether its arguments are right or wrong or mixed, it can have a long-term influence whether or not it is reviewed in journals, and perhaps even end up referenced in the works of philosophers of science. Would a non-Ob student writing a paper on induction never stumble across references to Harriman's book?

Starbuckle,

Sure, Harriman's book is written better than Valliant's.

The vast preponderance of books published by native speakers of English are written better than Valliant's.

However, both the marketing strategy for The Logical Leap and much of the rhetoric within it presuppose an audience limited to committed Randians.

And it is a book that draws primarily on physics for its examples, claims to appreciate the importance of mathematics for physics, yet contains just 4 equations.

Robert Campbell

[Robert Campbell]

On the other hand:

(From http://blog.dianahsi...skey-facts.html)

Shayne,

I don't think David Harriman's book reads like the production of a crank physicist. I grant that this may be because the book devotes very few of its pages to 20th century physical science.

On the other hand, Harriman's email to Paul Hsieh (now reproduced for the second time on this thread) does make him appear to be a crank. For what other sort of thinker could imagine that wrapping himself in a mantle of Peikovian authority is a sufficient rejoinder to detailed historical or epistemological criticisms?

Robert Campbell

[kiaer.ts]

I am not exactly sure what you mean by saying that whether scientists use one method over another needs to be demonstrated. Surely they use every one they find convenient. The important thing is that the underlying reality is the same.

Any given equation can be graphed, and any equation can be stated explicitly in the form of words alone. For example, the classic "If one train leaves Boston southbound at 11am going 50 mph and another leaves New York at noon going north at 60 miles an hour, at what time will they pass if the track is 150 miles long?" can be expressed in words, as a set of equations, or as a graph, each convertible into the other. Obviously the question is more easily solved using symbolic equations and the answer is directly apprehensible visually as the intersection of two sloping lines on a graph of time versus distance. Rand was apparently being tutored on such a level of math when she died. I think we both may be dismayed by the fact that there is no evidence Objectivist muckity mucks think in such terms. Indeed, is there any canonical Objectivist work that features diagrams?

I am saying that I would not find it surprising to find top scientists using something akin to pragmatic or dialectical methods in addition to empirical or analytical methods in developing theories as well as a wide variety of image or pattern modalities. As long as a given formulation can be validated, it does not matter what method was used in conceiving it.

If the issue is actual method, I doubt pragmatism or dialectical method or any explicit school of methodology matters so much as their advocates might think. What I expect happens is hypothesizing followed by testing. Hypothesizing is the product more of the subconscious chewing on an idea - I.e., brainstorming and sleeping on it - while testing might be anything from actual experiments or thought experiments to seek out contradictions in or implications of one's ideas. My charitable understanding of the good parts of Harriman is that he is offering a description of the process after the fact more than a set of rules to follow.

Harriman's criticisms of Einstein strike me as silly and ex post facto. Harriman misunderstands relativity, and so seeks for grounds on which to declare it invalid before he even understands it. Einstein seems to have accepted the recent concepts of Maxwell, etc., and to have, by analysis of the concepts, seen what the implications were. That is a perfectly valid method and will reach valid results if the concepts he starts with are valid. The proof of the validity of the ideas and his analysis lay in the predictions Einstein made, which were mathematically coherent and empirically verified. Harriman's complaint seems to be that Einstein didn't start with experiments - but the necessary experiments had already been done - they were just waiting analyisis.

[James Heaps-Nelson]

I am not exactly sure what you mean by saying that whether scientists use one method over another needs to be demonstrated. Surely they use every one they find convenient. The important thing is that the underlying reality is the same.

Any given equation can be graphed, and any equation can be stated explicitly in the form of words alone. For example, the classic "If one train leaves Boston southbound at 11am going 50 mph and another leaves New York at noon going north at 60 miles an hour, at what time will they pass if the track is 150 miles long?" can be expressed in words, as a set of equations, or as a graph, each convertible into the other. Obviously the question is more easily solved using symbolic equations and the answer is directly apprehensible visually as the intersection of two sloping lines on a graph of time versus distance. Rand was apparently being tutored on such a level of math when she died. I think we both may be dismayed by the fact that there is no evidence Objectivist muckity mucks think in such terms. Indeed, is there any canonical Objectivist work that features diagrams?

I am saying that I would not find it surprising to find top scientists using something akin to pragmatic or dialectical methods in addition to empirical or analytical methods in developing theories as well as a wide variety of image or pattern modalities. As long as a given formulation can be validated, it does not matter what method was used in conceiving it.

If the issue is actual method, I doubt pragmatism or dialectical method or any explicit school of methodology matters so much as their advocates might think. What I expect happens is hypothesizing followed by testing. Hypothesizing is the product more of the subconscious chewing on an idea - I.e., brainstorming and sleeping on it - while testing might be anything from actual experiments or thought experiments to seek out contradictions in or implications of one's ideas. My charitable understanding of the good parts of Harriman is that he is offering a description of the process after the fact more than a set of rules to follow.

Harriman's criticisms of Einstein strike me as silly and ex post facto. Harriman misunderstands relativity, and so seeks for grounds on which to declare it invalid before he even understands it. Einstein seems to have accepted the recent concepts of Maxwell, etc., and to have, by analysis of the concepts, seen what the implications were. That is a perfectly valid method and will reach valid results if the concepts he starts with are valid. The proof of the validity of the ideas and his analysis lay in the predictions Einstein made, which were mathematically coherent and empirically verified. Harriman's complaint seems to be that Einstein didn't start with experiments - but the necessary experiments had already been done - they were just waiting analyisis.

Ted,

Perfect summary! I would also venture to say method in thinking is more a matter of personal cognitive style than an issue of philosophical training. That's why I think that a distinction has to be made between a philosophical system that holds together and has a sound method and thinking styles that involve certain operations on information or questions on premises. If you're troubleshooting a car, do you isolate each component one at a time or do you tackle everything at once etc.

Jim

[George H. Smith]

We might well be seeing more detailed and critical science journal reviews by non-Randians in the year ahead. Even if the reviews tend to be highly critical of Objectivism, the additional exposure for Objectivist epistemology has to be a positive thing.

I strongly disagree. That book's being reviewed in science publications would serve to confirm the prevailing opinion amongst scientists that Objectivism is a crackpot cult.

How many of these scientists have actually read Rand for themselves? Relatively few, I would wager.

The notion that Objectivism is a "crackpot cult" -- not only the Peikovian branch but Objectivism in general -- has been around ever since Rand became popular. Moral philosophers have said that about her ethical theory, political philosophers about her political philosophy, and so forth, so your "scientists" -- who are probably far more ignorant about philosophy than most Objectivists are about science -- are scarcely unique.

Legitimate criticisms can be made of Harriman's book, but it is not the work of a "crackpot."

Ghs

George,

The criticisms that you would get from most scientists would likely be more strident than the terrifically cogent criticisms John McCaskey and Travis Norsen have offered. The reason is that their experience of the process of scientific discovery is likely largely different than what is described by Harriman. If I wanted to write a book on scientific discovery and how it occurs, I would interview top living scientists themselves across a range of fields and look for patterns in how they do science. Other approaches seem second best.

Jim

I doubt if more than a relative handful of practicing scientists have given much thought to the history of science. And among the most esteemed historians of science, one will find a broad range of interpretations about what the "scientific method" is (or even if there is one) and how it has been employed by various scientific greats throughout history. These interpretations range from the fairly rationalistic accounts of historians like I. Bernard Cohen (Harriman cites his excellent book The Birth of a New Physics on at least one occasion) to what might be described as the "lucky guess approach," or methodological anarchism, of Paul Feyerabend. Somewhere in between these extremes fall the "Conjectures and Refutations" of Karl Popper, the "Sleepwalkers" of Arthur Koestler (whom Harriman cites on numerous occasions), the "paradigm shifts" of Thomas Kuhn, the anti-Kuhnian evolutionary approach of Stephen Toulmin (my favorite historian of science overall), and the "research programs" of Imre Lakatos.

My point here is that Harriman's approach does not fall outside this broad spectrum of respectable interpretations. Rather, it falls on the rationalistic wing, which was the more-or-less standard approach before Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions took the historical world by storm in 1962.

I think that Harriman's approach could have been defended in a less dogmatic way, e.g., by maintaining that there is an implicit logic in the process of discovery that generally operates independently of what the beliefs of particular scientists may be. (Harriman's contention that certain explicit concepts were necessary preconditions of key scientific discoveries is untenable in some instances. As I recall, this was one of McCaskey's criticisms.) In any case, a major theme of Harriman's book -- one that I think deserves serious consideration -- is the rejection of the common claim that the process of discovery is irrelevant to the logic of validation. (See p. 8.)I have never been entirely happy with this dichotomy, which goes back to the 19th century; it is far too simplistic for my tastes. But it is precisely this distinction that has led Karl Popper and other historians of science to reject induction (which they regard as a process of discovery, not validation) as irrelevant to the scientific method per se. I think Harriman presents a credible, if not totally compelling, case that induction cannot be dismissed in such a cavalier manner.

My honest opinion is that some of the flak by O'ist types over Harriman's book is owing to the fact that it is essentially a Peikovian interpretation, and that negative reactions are owing largely to an anti-Peikoff bias. I am not a fan of Peikoff, by any means, but I try not to let my personal bias (i.e., my dislike of Peikoff) affect my objectivity in assessing a book.

Ghs

[sjw]

My honest opinion is that some of the flak by O'ist types over Harriman's book is owing to the fact that it is essentially a Peikovian interpretation, and that negative reactions are owing largely to an anti-Peikoff bias. I am not a fan of Peikoff, by any means, but I try not to let my personal bias (i.e., my dislike of Peikoff) affect my objectivity in assessing a book.

Ghs

Ad hominem.

I'm sure you are more "balanced" because you've got a wide and deep knowledge of all the wrong-headed things people have come up with in history, and you are holding Harriman to a historical standard. On those terms I'll trust you that the book is OK. But this is Objectivism we're talking about, and people who think they have the Truth. This isn't just one independent person's creation here, this is Harriman pretending to stand on Rand's theory of concepts and offer Final Truth. That is the standard I measure the book by, which is fair because that's his own standard, and by that standard it's awful.

Shayne

[James Heaps-Nelson]

We might well be seeing more detailed and critical science journal reviews by non-Randians in the year ahead. Even if the reviews tend to be highly critical of Objectivism, the additional exposure for Objectivist epistemology has to be a positive thing.

I strongly disagree. That book's being reviewed in science publications would serve to confirm the prevailing opinion amongst scientists that Objectivism is a crackpot cult.

How many of these scientists have actually read Rand for themselves? Relatively few, I would wager.

The notion that Objectivism is a "crackpot cult" -- not only the Peikovian branch but Objectivism in general -- has been around ever since Rand became popular. Moral philosophers have said that about her ethical theory, political philosophers about her political philosophy, and so forth, so your "scientists" -- who are probably far more ignorant about philosophy than most Objectivists are about science -- are scarcely unique.

Legitimate criticisms can be made of Harriman's book, but it is not the work of a "crackpot."

Ghs

George,

The criticisms that you would get from most scientists would likely be more strident than the terrifically cogent criticisms John McCaskey and Travis Norsen have offered. The reason is that their experience of the process of scientific discovery is likely largely different than what is described by Harriman. If I wanted to write a book on scientific discovery and how it occurs, I would interview top living scientists themselves across a range of fields and look for patterns in how they do science. Other approaches seem second best.

Jim

I doubt if more than a relative handful of practicing scientists have given much thought to the history of science. And among the most esteemed historians of science, one will find a broad range of interpretations about what the "scientific method" is (or even if there is one) and how it has been employed by various scientific greats throughout history. These interpretations range from the fairly rationalistic accounts of historians like I. Bernard Cohen (Harriman cites his excellent book The Birth of a New Physics on at least one occasion) to what might be described as the "lucky guess approach," or methodological anarchism, of Paul Feyerabend. Somewhere in between these extremes fall the "Conjectures and Refutations" of Karl Popper, the "Sleepwalkers" of Arthur Koestler (whom Harriman cites on numerous occasions), the "paradigm shifts" of Thomas Kuhn, the anti-Kuhnian evolutionary approach of Stephen Toulmin (my favorite historian of science overall), and the "research programs" of Imre Lakatos.

My point here is that Harriman's approach does not fall outside this broad spectrum of respectable interpretations. Rather, it falls on the rationalistic wing, which was the more-or-less standard approach before Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions took the historical world by storm in 1962.

I think that Harriman's approach could have been defended in a less dogmatic way, e.g., by maintaining that there is an implicit logic in the process of discovery that generally operates independently of what the beliefs of particular scientists may be. (Harriman's contention that certain explicit concepts were necessary preconditions of key scientific discoveries is untenable in some instances. As I recall, this was one of McCaskey's criticisms.) In any case, a major theme of Harriman's book -- one that I think deserves serious consideration -- is the rejection of the common claim that the process of discovery is irrelevant to the logic of validation. (See p. 8.)I have never been entirely happy with this dichotomy, which goes back to the 19th century; it is far too simplistic for my tastes. But it is precisely this distinction that has led Karl Popper and other historians of science to reject induction (which they regard as a process of discovery, not validation) as irrelevant to the scientific method per se. I think Harriman presents a credible, if not totally compelling, case that induction cannot be dismissed in such a cavalier manner.

My honest opinion is that some of the flak by O'ist types over Harriman's book is owing to the fact that it is essentially a Peikovian interpretation, and that negative reactions are owing largely to an anti-Peikoff bias. I am not a fan of Peikoff, by any means, but I try not to let my personal bias (i.e., my dislike of Peikoff) affect my objectivity in assessing a book.

Ghs

George,

I agree with you that there can be a strong link between discovery and validation. Scientists/mathematicians frequently spend a majority of their time steeped in preexisting theory's mathematical framework before being able to come up with something new. However, the clue is often experimental in physics which can cause a whole new framework to be drawn up. So in some ways, induction in physics takes on a different character than say philosophy, because scientists today look at different experimental data than scientists of yesteryear, whereas a philosopher in ethics today has the same data that a philosopher 2000 years ago had.

Einstein's theory of gravity is completely different than Newton's and more precisely fits today's available data. However, questions of egoism vs. altruism are the same today as 2000 years ago. A philosopher can come up with a new system, but it is a system based on much the same data set as existed before. A philosophical inquiry is much more likely to yield gradual and incremental change based on the same premises, but a physics theory can be completely revised or overturned based on new data.

Jim

[George H. Smith]

My honest opinion is that some of the flak by O'ist types over Harriman's book is owing to the fact that it is essentially a Peikovian interpretation, and that negative reactions are owing largely to an anti-Peikoff bias. I am not a fan of Peikoff, by any means, but I try not to let my personal bias (i.e., my dislike of Peikoff) affect my objectivity in assessing a book.

Ghs

Ad hominem.

I'm sure you are more "balanced" because you've got a wide and deep knowledge of all the wrong-headed things people have come up with in history, and you are holding Harriman to a historical standard. On those terms I'll trust you that the book is OK. But this is Objectivism we're talking about, and people who think they have the Truth. This isn't just one independent person's creation here, this is Harriman pretending to stand on Rand's theory of concepts and offer Final Truth. That is the standard I measure the book by, which is fair because that's his own standard, and by that standard it's awful.

Shayne

First, to call attention to a possible source of bias is not an ad hominem argument.

Second, where does Harriman claim to offer "Final Truth"?

Third, we should judge Harriman's book by the same criteria that we employ when assessing other histories of science. Anything else would amount to an irrational and unjust double-standard. The fact that Harriman is an orthodox Objectivist is irrelevant -- just as the fact that some excellent historians of science -- such as Herbert Butterfield, author of the classic The Origins of Modern Science -- have been Christians is irrelevant.

In short, we are not talking about Objectivism. We are talking about a history of science that was written by an Objectivist, from an Objectivist perspective. It should come as no surprise to anyone familiar with historical works in any field to hear that all historians work from some philosophical perspective. It is to Harriman's credit that he expressly states and explains what his perspective is. I wish more historians were this honest; too often the reader is left to figure out on his own what the particular prejudices and presuppositions of a given historian happen to be.

Ghs

[kiaer.ts]

I am not exactly sure what you mean by saying that whether scientists use one method over another needs to be demonstrated. Surely they use every one they find convenient. The important thing is that the underlying reality is the same.

Any given equation can be graphed, and any equation can be stated explicitly in the form of words alone. For example, the classic "If one train leaves Boston southbound at 11am going 50 mph and another leaves New York at noon going north at 60 miles an hour, at what time will they pass if the track is 150 miles long?" can be expressed in words, as a set of equations, or as a graph, each convertible into the other. Obviously the question is more easily solved using symbolic equations and the answer is directly apprehensible visually as the intersection of two sloping lines on a graph of time versus distance. Rand was apparently being tutored on such a level of math when she died. I think we both may be dismayed by the fact that there is no evidence Objectivist muckity mucks think in such terms. Indeed, is there any canonical Objectivist work that features diagrams?

I am saying that I would not find it surprising to find top scientists using something akin to pragmatic or dialectical methods in addition to empirical or analytical methods in developing theories as well as a wide variety of image or pattern modalities. As long as a given formulation can be validated, it does not matter what method was used in conceiving it.

If the issue is actual method, I doubt pragmatism or dialectical method or any explicit school of methodology matters so much as their advocates might think. What I expect happens is hypothesizing followed by testing. Hypothesizing is the product more of the subconscious chewing on an idea - I.e., brainstorming and sleeping on it - while testing might be anything from actual experiments or thought experiments to seek out contradictions in or implications of one's ideas. My charitable understanding of the good parts of Harriman is that he is offering a description of the process after the fact more than a set of rules to follow.

Harriman's criticisms of Einstein strike me as silly and ex post facto. Harriman misunderstands relativity, and so seeks for grounds on which to declare it invalid before he even understands it. Einstein seems to have accepted the recent concepts of Maxwell, etc., and to have, by analysis of the concepts, seen what the implications were. That is a perfectly valid method and will reach valid results if the concepts he starts with are valid. The proof of the validity of the ideas and his analysis lay in the predictions Einstein made, which were mathematically coherent and empirically verified. Harriman's complaint seems to be that Einstein didn't start with experiments - but the necessary experiments had already been done - they were just waiting analyisis.

Ted,

Perfect summary! I would also venture to say method in thinking is more a matter of personal cognitive style than an issue of philosophical training. That's why I think that a distinction has to be made between a philosophical system that holds together and has a sound method and thinking styles that involve certain operations on information or questions on premises. If you're troubleshooting a car, do you isolate each component one at a time or do you tackle everything at once etc.

Jim

My experience in studying comparative linguistics has been that those who are most concerned (or perhaps I should say obsessed) with methodology are those who wish to provide both post hoc and a priori reasons why plausible new ideas which step on a specialists toes should not be adopted.

I remember reading the works of popular linguists like Mario Pei (a classic liberal and the Isaac Asimov of language) who described in detail the genetic classification of Europe, the Mid East, and greater Indo-China, but who left the languages of Africa, New Guinea, and the Americas either randomly or totally unclassified. Joseph Greenberg found this situation untolerable, and set about to once and for all classify all the worlds languages, beginning with Africa. The method at the time was to base classifications on race and typology. For example, the great Afro-Asiatic family, which includes Semitic, Ancient Egyptian, and Berber, as well as Chadic (e.g., Hausa), Cushitic (e. g., Somali) and some other less familiar languages was called Hamito-Semitic, with Hamitic being defined as those languages spoken by negros, who, presumably, borrowed their culture from the more advanced, Causcasian, Semites.

Other than race, typological questions were used to classify languages, whether they had complex morphologies like Latin, or a lack of declensions and conjugations, like Chinese. Whether they were polysyllabic like Finnish or tended toward short, dry, hard words, like our tongue.

But the problem is that comparison of typology is like comparison of the external physiology of animals. The sword fish, the great white, the Ichtyosaur, and the Dolphin all have a similar outline but each has closer relatives that belie their close association.

Greenberg looked at language families which had been classified successfully and saw that shared basic vocabulary items (what Rand would call first level concepts) due to their common use (and hence the rarity of their being lost and replaced due to disuse) were a strong indicator of actual relation between languages. For instance, the Irish and the Iranians use the same words for such things as me, thee, mother, father, name, sun, salt, one through ten, etc. Greenberg accumulated vast basic vocabulary lists of all the documentd languages or families of Africa and deteremined that the vocabularies fell into four classes: Hamito-Semitic (which he renamed Afro-Asiatic) across North Africa, Niger-Congo along the slave coast and across sub-Saharan africa, Nilo-Saharan in relic areas of the border between those two prior families, and Khoi-San among the Bushmen and Hottentots and a few other relics in the far south. He showed the previously recognized Bantu family to be a sub-branch of a sub-branch of a sub-branch of Niger Congo. His system was denounced by the specialists, especially of the polysyllabic Bantu, who denied it was related to the often monosyllabic Niger Congo languages. But the myriad correspondences of the details of vocabulary words showed that any assumption that such correspondences were due to random chance was untenable.

Greenberg's 1950's classification of Africa was largely accepted by the 1970's. It is still considered valid over all and presciently accurate in its details.

So, Greenberg moved on to NewGuinea, where he found one vast phylum which includes all the non Malayo-Polynesian languages of that Island in one vast, old group, and to the Americas, where he classified all the indigenous languages into just three groups: Eskimo-Aleut, Dene-Athabaskan (which includes Navajo) and Amerind, the name he gave the third, and most vast of families, which includes all the rest of the indigenous languages from the Algonquin familiy in the East, to the Salish family in the west, all the way south to the southern tip of South America.

American linguists, who had been working on the problem for over a century, were outraged. Greenberg may have guessed right in Africa, they asserted. But his method was invalid here. The fact that every middle-level linguistic stock in the Americas shows evidence of a ni- / mi- pattern for its me and thee pronouns was dismissed as due to random chance, or unidentified psychological factors. Some of Greenberg's word lists had errors - rendering his entire thesis suspect. He hadn't first waited for the specialists to compare each set of two languages one at a time to see if they were related first, like waiting to find out if the Ostrich and the robin or perhaps the flying fox were related first, before going on to such controversial large groups as the birds or the bats. Methodologies showing that any two particular word correspondences might be due to chance sprang up. The mere fact that it is possible for words to be borrowed was offered as obvious disproof of any suggestion that two words were genetically related, as if the mere possibility, without any evidence offered, spoke for itself, while the assumption of relatedness (which must be the default assumption, since all language changes and diverges over time) was treated as if it need conclusive, de novo proof in every case. Bizarre new methods of "statistical" analysis were offered to show why manipulating the data according to all sorts of subjective criteria were developed.

Of course, Greenberg's American classification was just as valid as his African one. While Eskimo-Aleut and Dene-Athabaskan have both been found to be most closely related to The Chukchi-Kamchatkan and Yeniseian language families of Siberia, respectively, no Amerind language has been shown to be more closely related to any external branch. The response has ranged from silence to the creation of arbitrary new methodological requirements (such as the idea that you have to reconstruct a language family's proto-form—essentially its missing link— before you can classify its individual members—as if you could reconstruct the proto-form of a family that hasn't yet been identified) to calls for him simply to be shouted down.

All the meantime, Greenberg repeatedly described his methodology as nothing mysterious, and nothing other than the same broad side-by side inspection that allowed the identification of classical language groups like Indo-European, Finno-Ugric, and Sino-Tibetan. Yet methodologies which depend on the statistical torture hand-picked data while resulting in statistically insignificant results are praised because they make no specific predictions and step on no one's toes.

In the long run, these alternative approaches to language classification will be forgotten. Greenberg's hypothesis fits the facts, even if the vagaries of academics and national boundaries make it the rare linguist who is familiar with enough languages to evaluate his thesis from a thorough insider's standpoint. The work of geneticists and anthropologists supports Greenberg, even if the conventional Americanists keep coming up with ad hoc objections. For some reason, their methodology doesn't serve to make new discoveries. It serves only to cast arbitrary doubt on old ones.

Edited October 18, 2010 by Ted Keer

[Peter]

To an advanced alien scientist, looking at us from space, humans driving cars might look the same as driver ants look to humans.

I want to thank the scientifically inclined for their input. It is rare to see so many gathered in one nest. I wonder how other Objectivist ideas will withstand a scientific peer review?

Semper cogitans fidele,

Peter Taylor

From the online, Ayn Rand Lexicon:

Induction and Deduction

The process of forming and applying concepts contains the essential pattern of two fundamental methods of cognition: induction and deduction.

The process of observing the facts of reality and of integrating them into concepts is, in essence, a process of induction. The process of subsuming new instances under a known concept is, in essence, a process of deduction.

Concept-Formation

According to Objectivism, concepts “represent classifications of observed existents according to their relationships to other observed existents.” (Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology; all further quotations in this section, unless otherwise identified, are from this work.) To form a concept, one mentally isolates a group of concretes (of distinct perceptual units), on the basis of observed similarities which distinguish them from all other known concretes (similarity is “the relationship between two or more existents which possess the same characteristic(s), but in different measure or degree”); then, by a process of omitting the particular measurements of these concretes, one integrates them into a single new mental unit: the concept, which subsumes all concretes of this kind (a potentially unlimited number). The integration is completed and retained by the selection of a perceptual symbol (a word) to designate it. “A concept is a mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted.”

Leonard Peikoff, “The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy,”

Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 97–98.

Bear firmly in mind that the term “measurements omitted” does not mean, in this context, that measurements are regarded as non-existent; it means that measurements exist, but are not specified. That measurements must exist is an essential part of the process. The principle is: the relevant measurements must exist in some quantity, but may exist in any quantity.

Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 12.

Let us now examine the process of forming the simplest concept, the concept of a single attribute (chronologically, this is not the first concept that a child would grasp; but it is the simplest one epistemologically)—for instance, the concept “length.” If a child considers a match, a pencil and a stick, he observes that length is the attribute they have in common, but their specific lengths differ. The difference is one of measurement. In order to form the concept “length,” the child’s mind retains the attribute and omits its particular measurements. Or, more precisely, if the process were identified in words, it would consist of the following: “Length must exist in some quantity, but may exist in any quantity. I shall identify as ‘length’ that attribute of any existent possessing it which can be quantitatively related to a unit of length, without specifying the quantity.”

The child does not think in such words (he has, as yet, no knowledge of words), but that is the nature of the process which his mind performs wordlessly. And that is the principle which his mind follows, when, having grasped the concept “length” by observing the three objects, he uses it to identify the attribute of length in a piece of string, a ribbon, a belt, a corridor or a street.

The same principle directs the process of forming concepts of entities—for instance, the concept “table.” The child’s mind isolates two or more tables from other objects, by focusing on their distinctive characteristic: their shape. He observes that their shapes vary, but have one characteristic in common: a flat, level surface and support(s). He forms the concept “table” by retaining that characteristic and omitting all particular measurements, not only the measurements of the shape, but of all the other characteristics of tables (many of which he is not aware of at the time).

Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 11–12.

Observe the multiple role of measurements in the process of concept-formation, in both of its two essential parts: differentiation and integration. Concepts cannot be formed at random. All concepts are formed by first differentiating two or more existents from other existents. All conceptual differentiations are made in terms of commensurable characteristics (i.e., characteristics possessing a common unit of measurement). No concept could be formed, for instance, by attempting to distinguish long objects from green objects. Incommensurable characteristics cannot be integrated into one unit.

Tables, for instance, are first differentiated from chairs, beds and other objects by means of the characteristic of shape, which is an attribute possessed by all the objects involved. Then, their particular kind of shape is set as the distinguishing characteristic of tables—i.e., a certain category of geometrical measurements of shape is specified. Then, within that category, the particular measurements of individual table-shapes are omitted.

Please note the fact that a given shape represents a certain category or set of geometrical measurements. Shape is an attribute; differences of shape—whether cubes, spheres, cones or any complex combinations—are a matter of differing measurements; any shape can be reduced to or expressed by a set of figures in terms of linear measurement. When, in the process of concept-formation, man observes that shape is a commensurable characteristic of certain objects, he does not have to measure all the shapes involved nor even to know how to measure them; he merely has to observe the element of similarity.

Similarity is grasped perceptually; in observing it, man is not and does not have to be aware of the fact that it involves a matter of measurement. It is the task of philosophy and of science to identify that fact.

Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 13–14.

A commensurable characteristic (such as shape in the case of tables, or hue in the case of colors) is an essential element in the process of concept-formation. I shall designate it as the “Conceptual Common Denominator” and define it as “The characteristic(s) reducible to a unit of measurement, by means of which man differentiates two or more existents from other existents possessing it.”

The distinguishing characteristic(s) of a concept represents a specified category of measurements within the “Conceptual Common Denominator” involved.

New concepts can be formed by integrating earlier-formed concepts into wider categories, or by subdividing them into narrower categories (a process which we shall discuss later). But all concepts are ultimately reducible to their base in perceptual entities, which are the base (the given) of man’s cognitive development.

Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 15.

When concepts are integrated into a wider one, the new concept includes all the characteristics of its constituent units; but their distinguishing characteristics are regarded as omitted measurements, and one of their common characteristics determines the distinguishing characteristic of the new concept: the one representing their “Conceptual Common Denominator” with the existents from which they are being differentiated.

When a concept is subdivided into narrower ones, its distinguishing characteristic is taken as their “Conceptual Common Denominator”—and is given a narrower range of specified measurements or is combined with an additional characteristic(s), to form the individual distinguishing characteristics of the new concepts.

Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 23–24.

The formation of introspective concepts follows the same principles as the formation of extrospective concepts. A concept pertaining to consciousness is a mental integration of two or more instances of a psychological process possessing the same distinguishing characteristics, with the particular contents and the measurements of the action’s intensity omitted—on the principle that these omitted measurements must exist in some quantity, but may exist in any quantity (i.e., a given psychological process must possess some content and some degree of intensity, but may possess any content or degree of the appropriate category).

Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 31–32.

Concepts are not and cannot be formed in a vacuum; they are formed in a context; the process of conceptualization consists of observing the differences and similarities of the existents within the field of one’s awareness (and organizing them into concepts accordingly). From a child’s grasp of the simplest concept integrating a group of perceptually given concretes, to a scientist’s grasp of the most complex abstractions integrating long conceptual chains—all conceptualization is a contextual process; the context is the entire field of a mind’s awareness or knowledge at any level of its cognitive development.

This does not mean that conceptualization is a subjective process or that the content of concepts depends on an individual’s subjective (i.e., arbitrary) choice. The only issue open to an individual’s choice in this matter is how much knowledge he will seek to acquire and, consequently, what conceptual complexity he will be able to reach. But so long as and to the extent that his mind deals with concepts (as distinguished from memorized sounds and floating abstractions), the content of his concepts is determined and dictated by the cognitive content of his mind, i.e., by his grasp of the facts of reality.

Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 55.

Objectivity begins with the realization that man (including his every attribute and faculty, including his consciousness) is an entity of a specific nature who must act accordingly; that there is no escape from the law of identity, neither in the universe with which he deals nor in the working of his own consciousness, and if he is to acquire knowledge of the first, he must discover the proper method of using the second; that there is no room for the arbitrary in any activity of man, least of all in his method of cognition—and just as he has learned to be guided by objective criteria in making his physical tools, so he must be guided by objective criteria in forming his tools of cognition: his concepts.

Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 42–43.

Just as man’s physical existence was liberated when he grasped the principle that “nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed,” so his consciousness will be liberated when he grasps that nature, to be apprehended, must be obeyed—that the rules of cognition must be derived from the nature of existence and the nature, the identity, of his cognitive faculty.

Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 87.

Man’s sense organs function automatically; man’s brain integrates his sense data into percepts automatically; but the process of integrating percepts into concepts—the process of abstraction and of concept-formation—is not automatic.

The process of concept-formation does not consist merely of grasping a few simple abstractions, such as “chair,” “table,” “hot,” “cold,” and of learning to speak. It consists of a method of using one’s consciousness, best designated by the term “conceptualizing.” It is not a passive state of registering random impressions. It is an actively sustained process of identifying one’s impressions in conceptual terms, of integrating every event and every observation into a conceptual context, of grasping relationships, differences, similarities in one’s perceptual material and of abstracting them into new concepts, of drawing inferences, of making deductions, of reaching conclusions, of asking new questions and discovering new answers and expanding one’s knowledge into an ever-growing sum. The faculty that directs this process, the faculty that works by means of concepts, is: reason. The process is thinking.

[Robert Campbell]

I think that Harriman's approach could have been defended in a less dogmatic way, e.g., by maintaining that there is an implicit logic in the process of discovery that generally operates independently of what the beliefs of particular scientists may be. (Harriman's contention that certain explicit concepts were necessary preconditions of key scientific discoveries is untenable in some instances. As I recall, this was one of McCaskey's criticisms.)

George,

Harriman would have benefited by formulating his approach—not merely defending it—in terms of a logic implicit in the process of discovery.

But then he would no longer have been a Peikovian, and it would be debatable whether he would still have been an Objectivist of any sort.

"The Implicit" gave Ayn Rand fits. She had a healthy appreciation of its importance, but excluded it almost entirely from her formal efforts at epistemology. The works in which she gave it the most attention (her lectures on writing) have been bowdlerized by junior Peikovians. Even through Boeckmann and Mayhew's rewrites, we can see a whole host of expressions in scare-quotes, such as 'instinct' and 'just knowing.'

As far as I can see, Peikoff largely gave up struggling with "the implicit." So, as Peikoff's trainee and protégé, Harriman had hardly anything to draw on.

In any case, a major theme of Harriman's book -- one that I think deserves serious consideration -- is the rejection of the common claim that the process of discovery is irrelevant to the logic of validation. (See p. 8.)I have never been entirely happy with this dichotomy, which goes back to the 19th century; it is far too simplistic for my tastes. But it is precisely this distinction that has led Karl Popper and other historians of science to reject induction (which they regard as a process of discovery, not validation) as irrelevant to the scientific method per se. I think Harriman presents a credible, if not totally compelling, case that induction cannot be dismissed in such a cavalier manner.

I agree.

However, Harriman would be a lot more credible if he didn't consign the developmental aspect of discovery to child psychology as revealed unto him by Rand and Peikoff.

My honest opinion is that some of the flak by O'ist types over Harriman's book is owing to the fact that it is essentially a Peikovian interpretation, and that negative reactions are owing largely to an anti-Peikoff bias. I am not a fan of Peikoff, by any means, but I try not to let my personal bias (i.e., my dislike of Peikoff) affect my objectivity in assessing a book.

I'm not an Objectivist.

More to the point, I've criticized Harriman's book on account of its incorporation of bad ideas that Leonard Peikoff has championed, such as the doctrine of the arbitrary assertion; the notion that philosophy speaks to science while science may never speak to philosophy; and the doctrine of contextual certainty.

And the struggles with the implicit were Rand's, not Peikoff's. As was the incomplete rejection of cosmology, which Rand applied (with less than complete consistency) to physics, but never to psychology.

Robert Campbell