New Developments re Harriman Induction book

[kiaer.ts]

I have to agree with Robert's statements on the non-reviews by Gotthelf and Binswanger. And to pretend that these two non-reviews would appear by coincidence is the height of naivete.

[Robert Campbell]

[…] I think your Conspiracy Theorist talents are wasted in so small a world as O'ist-land. You could have gotten big bucks with popular-appeal conspiracy theorizing.

This could mean that Dan Brown would be getting his lunch eaten if I decided to compete with him.

Or it could just mean that Ms. Stuttle has gotten so sore she can't keep being clever.

Were the first interpretation the right one, I'd be a fool to hang around here instead of cleaning up while I can.

Alas, the second seems much more probable.

Robert Campbell

[Philip Coates]

> So since we don't have tools to directly perceive motives, then we should never infer them? Is that your actual position? [shayne]

No.

> The position you appear to be adopting is that inferences about another person's unstated motives are always improper. [Robert]

No.

[Ellen Stuttle]

I think that to the extent there is a hint of Binswanger's being concerned about someone's or someones' opinion, Robert and others are misjudging whose.

Ellen

[9thdoctor]

Neil Parille's piece on the McCaskey schism, which I have just finished reading, is excellent:

http://objectiblog.b...key-schism.html

Great piece, he ought to post it here in it’s own thread. This made me laugh out loud:

In Peikoff’s 2006 DIM lecturers Peikoff said he had never heard of Richard Feynman

I know Neil doesn’t make stuff up, but seriously, never heard of him? And he’d been collaborating on a book on physics for years? Unbelievable. I take it this was in a question period? Reminds me of the Woody Allen character that poses as a musician, but when asked about Mozart he "couldn't place the name".

9 minutes in

[Robert Campbell]

I think that to the extent there is a hint of Binswanger's being concerned about someone's or someones' opinion, Robert and others are misjudging whose.

Hmm, so now maybe Gotthelf and Binswanger did post perfunctory, kiss-ass reviews on amazon—but it isn't Leonard Peikoff they felt obliged to please.

Even though Peikoff has pontifical status, virtually collaborated on Harriman's book, controls the Estate of Ayn Rand, has excommunicated critics in the past, and still likes to throw his weight around.

Well, if Ms. Stuttle identifies the person or persons she believes Harry Binswanger is in fact eager to please, we may find out in due time whether she is right.

Whereas if she refuses to identify him, her, or them, there will no way for anyone else to know whether her prediction was right, was wrong—was ever made at all.

Robert Campbell

[Robert Campbell]

> So since we don't have tools to directly perceive motives, then we should never infer them? Is that your actual position? [shayne]

No.

> The position you appear to be adopting is that inferences about another person's unstated motives are always improper. [Robert]

No.

Phil,

If you have an actual view on the subject of drawing inferences about other people's motives, please elaborate.

The ouija-board style of communication seems better suited to Ms. Stuttle.

Robert Campbell

[Philip Coates]

> If you have an actual view on the subject of drawing inferences about other people's motives, please elaborate. [Robert]

I have a whole detailed theory on when that is and is not appropriate. And how to do it.

This sleazy place -- in which my good posts are ignored or ridiculed -- is probably the last place I would offer it.

In fact, I'm pretty much bailing out of regular posting here:

--Don't care for the people; don't care for the threads. Don't care for the constant in fighting.

[sjw]

> If you have an actual view on the subject of drawing inferences about other people's motives, please elaborate. [Robert]

I have a whole detailed theory on when that is and is not appropriate. And how to do it.

This sleazy place -- in which my good posts are ignored or ridiculed -- is probably the last place I would offer it.

In fact, I'm pretty much bailing out of regular posting here:

--Don't care for the people; don't care for the threads. Don't care for the constant in fighting.

You should have waited to bail in a context where you were actually being treated unfairly. And leaving on a note of blanket attacks on everyone who stays, that kind of lack of class has a fitting irony given who it's coming from, don't you think?

Shayne

[9thdoctor]

In fact, I'm pretty much bailing out of regular posting here:

--Don't care for the people; don't care for the threads. Don't care for the constant in fighting.

Not again!

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=7808&view=findpost&p=83096

[Philip Coates]

Up yours, asshole.

[George H. Smith]

Up yours, asshole.

Ah, the voice of pure reason.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Up yours, asshole.

You can take the dude out of SLOP, but you can't take SLOP out of the dude.

People of all stripes seem to love a good schism...

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

I'd miss Phil if he used the quote function.

--Brant

[Ellen Stuttle]

I think that to the extent there is a hint of Binswanger's being concerned about someone's or someones' opinion, Robert and others are misjudging whose.

Hmm, so now maybe Gotthelf and Binswanger did post perfunctory, kiss-ass reviews on amazon—but it isn't Leonard Peikoff they felt obliged to please.

I haven't a clue re Gotthelf re Peikoff and expressed no opinion re Gotthelf's Amazon review. Only that Binswanger is genuinely enthused by Peikoff's proposed solution to the problem of induction and thinks it does the job.

Well, if Ms. Stuttle identifies the person or persons she believes Harry Binswanger is in fact eager to please, we may find out in due time whether she is right.

Nor did I say anything about "eager to please."

With your conspiracy antennae, you should be able to connect the dots.

Ellen

[George H. Smith]

I haven't a clue re Gotthelf re Peikoff and expressed no opinion re Gotthelf's Amazon review. Only that Binswanger is genuinely enthused by Peikoff's proposed solution to the problem of induction and thinks it does the job.

This question isn't addressed to Ellen specifically, but I would like someone to tell me: What exactly is Harriman's solution to the problem of induction? On p. 8, Harriman, echoing Peikoff, writes:

The problem is to identify the method of induction, not to seek it's "justification." One cannot ask for a justification of induction, any more than for a justification of deduction. Their validity as cognitive processes, therefore, is an unchallengeable given.

This approach is similar in some ways to that presented by P.F. Strawson in An Introduction to Logical Theory (1952), who writes of the "absurdity of a demand that induction in general shall be justified." And though I am a staunch defender of inductive reasoning, I am left dumbfounded by HarriPei's claim that the validity of induction is an "unchallengeable given."

This certainly doesn't sound like a revolutionary solution to me.

To be fair, I should note that HarriPei does go on to give a fairly standard justification of induction, despite this earlier disclaimer. And I agree with his approach overall. But how Gotthelf (on Amazon) can say that HarriPei has developed "a fundamentally new approach to the nature of inductive reasoning," or how Binswanger can say that "this book actually solves the age-old problem of induction," with the actually serving to suggest that the problem was never solved before, boggles the mind.

I think Robert's Kiss-Ass theory is the most plausible explanation.

Ghs

[Ellen Stuttle]

To be fair, I should note that HarriPei does go on to give a fairly standard justification of induction, despite this earlier disclaimer. And I agree with his approach overall. But how Gotthelf (on Amazon) can say that HarriPei has developed "a fundamentally new approach to the nature of inductive reasoning," or how Binswanger can say that "this book actually solves the age-old problem of induction," with the actually serving to suggest that the problem was never solved before, boggles the mind.

George,

I asked you once before what you think the problem is. Although you replied, I didn't see any statement of the problem in your reply. Maybe something you said further in the thread (I've forgotten which thread) clarified. Justifying induction, in the sense of saying it's legitimate that inductions are made and are taken as a basis in living one's life, isn't the same as solving how do you know when you have enough evidence to conclude that a generalization will hold in all cases? Do you really think that that problem has ever been solved?

Ellen

Edited September 21, 2010 by Ellen Stuttle

[George H. Smith]

To be fair, I should note that HarriPei does go on to give a fairly standard justification of induction, despite this earlier disclaimer. And I agree with his approach overall. But how Gotthelf (on Amazon) can say that HarriPei has developed "a fundamentally new approach to the nature of inductive reasoning," or how Binswanger can say that "this book actually solves the age-old problem of induction," with the actually serving to suggest that the problem was never solved before, boggles the mind.

George,

I asked you once before what you think the problem is. Although you replied, I didn't see any statement of the problem in your reply. Maybe something you said further in the thread (I've forgotten which thread) clarified. Justifying induction, in the sense of saying it's legitimate that inductions are made and are taken as a basis in living one's life, isn't the same as solving how do you know when you have enough evidence to conclude that a generalization will hold in all cases? Do you really think that that problem has ever been solved?

Ellen

My earlier response addressed Hume's problem of induction specifically. This is a pseudo-problem, one based on Hume's denial of identity and causation.

Even non-Humeans, however, have recognized the problem of how we can generalize from a limited number of experiences. The standard answer, even long before Hume, has been that similar things will behave in similar ways in similar circumstances.

The real problem, as I have stated many times before, is not with the reasoning per se, but with the empirical matter of determining when we are dealing with things and circumstances that are relevantly similar. This often isn't a problem in everyday life -- no one really doubts, for instance, the empirical generalization that a blowtorch pointed at your bare hand for five minutes from five inches away will cause a burn -- but matters are rarely this simply in science. Hence the need for controlled experiments.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

William Whewell (pronounced Hu-al), an English philosopher and historian of science, wrote a number of pathbreaking works on induction. The two best known and most important are History of the Inductive Sciences, 1837, volumes One and Two , and Three ; and The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, founded upon their History, volumes One and Two (1840).

In an 1844 article published in Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society (reprinted in William Whewell's Theory of Scientific Method, ed. Robert Butts, 1968, pp. 54-75), Whewell discusses induction in a manner quite similar to the HarriPei approach. Although Whewell doesn't discuss concept formation per se, he clearly understands that our mental classifications are formed via an inductive process. Whewell (p. 67) writes:

The objects which we find in the world, for instance, minerals and plants, are of different kinds; and according to their kinds, they are called by various names, by means of which we know what we mean when we speak of them. The discrimination of these kinds of objects, according to their different forms and other properties, is the business of chemistry and botany. And this business of discrimination, and of consequent classification, has been carried on from the first periods of the development of the human mind by an industrious and comprehensive series of observations and experiments; the only way in which any portion of the task could have been effected. But as the foundation of all this labour, and as a necessary assumption during every part of its progress, there has been in men's minds the principle, that objects are so distinguishable by resemblances and differences, that they may be named, and known by their names. The principle is involved in the idea of Name; and without it no progress could have been made. The principle may be briefly stated thus: -- Intelligible names of kinds are possible. If we suppose this not to be so, language can no longer exist, nor could the business of human life go on. If instead of having certain definite kinds of minerals, gold, iron, copper, and the like, of which the external forms and characters are constantly connected with the same properties and qualities, there were no connexion between the appearance and the properties of the object; -- if what seemed externally iron might turn out to resemble lead in its hardness; and what seemed to be gold during many trials, might at the next trial be found to be like copper, not only all the uses of these minerals would fail, but they would not be distinguishable kinds of things, and the names would be unmeaning. And if this entire uncertainty as to kind and properties prevailed for all objects, the world would no longer be a world to which language was applicable. To man, thus unable to distinguish objects into kinds, and call them by names, all knowledge would be impossible, and all definite apprehension of external objects would fade away into an inconceivable confusion.

It mystifies me why Harriman's book on the history of induction in science doesn't give so much as a passing nod to Whewell, who was one of the great pioneers in this field.

Ghs

[merjet]

This certainly doesn't sound like a revolutionary solution to me.

To be fair, I should note that [Harriman-Piekoff] does go on to give a fairly standard justification of induction, despite this earlier disclaimer. And I agree with his approach overall. But how Gotthelf (on Amazon) can say that [Harriman-Piekoff] has developed "a fundamentally new approach to the nature of inductive reasoning," or how Binswanger can say that "this book actually solves the age-old problem of induction," with the actually serving to suggest that the problem was never solved before, boggles the mind.

I just finished reading the book. One might say it's new because it is based on Ayn Rand's theory of concepts. Other than that, it seems what's new about it is the emphasis on integration. Integration involves coherence testing a hypothesis with controlled experiments.

I am working on a review of the book, which I will probably post here soon and on Amazon later.

Edited September 21, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[Neil Parille]

George,

You write:

It mystifies me why Harriman's book on the history of induction in science doesn't give so much as a passing nod to Whewell, who was one of the great pioneers in this field.

Could it be because Whewell was an Anglican priest?

I note that McCaskey mentions Whewell a lot in his writings, or so it appeared when I skimed his website.

-Neil Parille

Edited September 21, 2010 by Neil Parille

[George H. Smith]

George,

You write:

It mystifies me why Harriman's book on the history of induction in science doesn't give so much as a passing nod to Whewell, who was one of the great pioneers in this field.

Could it be because Whewell was an Anglican priest?

I note that McCaskey mentions Whewell a lot on his writings, or so it appeared when I skimed his website.

-Neil Parille

Yeah, that possibility occurred to me as well, but struck me as unlikely. It's possible that neither Peikoff nor Harriman are familiar with Whewell. It is also possible that they are familiar with him but didn't want to cite him because he was a fellow-traveler in some respects. Orthos are very reluctant to cite precedents; they can get in the way of claiming revolutionary originality for one's own views.

Ghs

[Guyau]

.

Delighted to see George’s notice of Whewell (#294). Why – a, b.

.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Re #299 below:

Merlin, I wouldn’t be surprised at some overlap. Certainly I exhibited the relation of Whewell’s consilience of inductions and Rand’s identity as the basis of induction in my essay “Induction on Identity” so long ago. My remarks in the links a and b were only in response to Ted’s review of Harriman’s book. I have not looked at the book, and I expect it will be at least another year before the time arrives for me to fold it into my work in view.

Edited September 21, 2010 by Stephen Boydstun

[merjet]

Stephen and George,

Do you think Whewell's "consilience of inductions" is similar to Harriman's "integration"?

I peeked at Whewell's Theory of Scientific Method on Google Books and it seems so. See page 18.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

And though I am a staunch defender of inductive reasoning, I am left dumbfounded by HarriPei's claim that the validity of induction is an "unchallengeable given."

George,

Sorry for this aside, but I keep chuckling. So I might as well get it out.

You used "HarriPei" several times to refer to Harriman and Peikoff, The poet in me kept hearing the tug of the "between the lines." Why does this seem so oddball and off, like a sour note in a song, but also seems related in a quirky manner? It's just an abbreviation made from joined elisions. And it looks like some kind of Oriental abbreviation, which has nothing to do with nothing.

Hmmmm...

Then I thought about the pronunciation. How do you pronounce that?

Oh...

Hairy pee.

Bingo.

I'll let the metaphors rest right there...

(Back to more serious stuff...)

Michael