Concepts Vs Theories

[tjohnson]

Once again, you have not presented the actual Objectivist position, Thomas. If you are able, would you please do so?

I don't believe there is any such thing, Theodore. I have not seen all the Objectivists here to agree on it, if it does exist. But this is not uncommon, in every movement (including general semantics) there are passionate people who embrace it and argue incessantly for years. I have experienced this elsewhere and I see it here. The thing about general semantics is it is supposed to enable agreement and it is extremely ironic when you see general semanticists arguing about what general semantics "is" etc. I am not surprised to see it here, however, since Objectivism, in its quest for certainty, is perfectly positioned for this sort of behaviour, in fact, encourages it. Think Objectivist rage.

[kiaer.ts]

Do you prefer Tom?

Originally, you said:

You can't point to "a furniture", there is no such thing. 'Furniture' refers to a generalization, abstraction, class, etc. that exists only in our brain.

In your last response to my request that you present your understanding of the Objectivist position of the nature of abstractions, you said:

Once again, you have not presented the actual Objectivist position, Thomas. If you are able, would you please do so?

I don't believe there is any such thing, Theodore. I have not seen all the Objectivists here to agree on it, if it does exist. But this is not uncommon, in every movement (including general semantics) there are passionate people who embrace it and argue incessantly for years. I have experienced this elsewhere and I see it here. The thing about general semantics is it is supposed to enable agreement and it is extremely ironic when you see general semanticists arguing about what general semantics "is" etc. I am not surprised to see it here, however, since Objectivism, in its quest for certainty, is perfectly positioned for this sort of behaviour, in fact, encourages it. Think Objectivist rage.

Okay. I did not ask you to provide your understanding of the beliefs of various posters here. That you choose to end with an ad hominem is also odd. I asked you to express your understanding of it in your own words. Such a position does exist. It is expressed explicitly in ItOE, and in Kelley's Evidence of the Senses. You can find clues here, http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/objectivity.html, and here:

See also AXIOMATIC CONCEPTS; AXIOMS; CONCEPTS; DEFINITIONS; EPISTEMOLOGY;IDENTITY; KANT, IMMANUEL; KNOWLEDGE; LOGIC; METAPHYSICS; PRIMACY of EXISTENCE vs. PRIMACY of CONSCIOUSNESS;PROOF; REASON; SUBJECTIVISM; TRUTH.

If you are going to argue against the Objectivist position on a supposedly Objectivist website I would think you would want to be able to state at its strongest the argument you want to refute.

[Daniel Barnes]

Clearly organisms can be seen in one sense. Visit a zoo and you will see plenty of them. So what Peikoff was trying to say is not clear. Guessing like you, he meant some of the similarities or CCDs aren't readily visible or even visible at all in a strict sense -- for example, metabolism and homeostasis. Also, the visible similarities between an amoeba and a human being are minimal.

There is only a small ambiguity in the passage ("...these latter..") and this is almost certainly resolved by Peikoff's unequivocal following line:

"...there are no such things as 'organisms' to be seen - there are only men, dogs, roses." (OPAR p91)

Not to mention that this is naturally entailed by the whole process of abstracting from abstractions itself, with its ever-greater distance from the perceptual level. (see also OPAR p91-2). So I am not quite sure it is all that unclear, or all that much of a guess. But at any rate, I've just parked a longer digression on the above in favour of honing in on the following:

I wrote:

Let's try a little thought experiment.

Say Rand and I, as a gauche new entrant to The Collective, are discussing the concept "selfishness". To define the (purely mental) concept that I choose to label "selfishness", I point to a man who buys shoes for himself instead of food for his child and say "that's what I mean by 'selfishness'". Rand, on the other hand, points to a man looking adoringly at his wife and says "that's what I mean by 'selfishness'"

Now, would Rand accept that my purely-mental-concept-that-I-choose-to-label-"selfishness" is just as "true" or "valid" or "proper" as hers given that, via the magical power of pointing, I have now grounded it resoundingly in reality by a method fully approved by herself? Would she agree that she is merely in possession of a different, yet equally grounded, purely-mental-concept-that-she-chooses-to-label "selfishness"? (whew!) And, that being the case, if we were to discuss the morality of a father who buys shoes rather than feed his child (and not the morality of being an uxorious husband), would she be just as happy to use the word "selfishness" to refer to such a concept as I have in mind, given that the concept is grounded in reality and the word is just a label after all? (and naturally I vice versa, with the caveat that her use of the term is more likely to be somewhat confusing to other people, given that my version is closer to the typical sense of the term).

Or would she in fact fix me with a basilisk-glare and inform me sternly that words have meanings...

This point, I think, is really what the issue turns on.

You replied:

Your examples are insufficient for me to discern what the people's motivation are. Why do they call their motives selfish? Regardless, they are instances of their concepts of selfish to which they can call attention.

The point is not what you or I would say, but what we think Rand, as the author of Objectivism, would say. Now, this is not as speculative as it would appear, as it really boils down to two options. The first is basically the Critical Rationalist approach, treating the word merely as a convenient label we can attach to this or that problem under discussion. Ellen is attempting to argue, I think, that the first is Rand's position; so if she's correct then Rand, like Popper recommended, would happily accept that the word "selfishness" was a convenient label for either situation (the "definition" merely being the description of the situation we want to discuss, which can be either verbal or ostensive). The second option is to instead take the subject of the definition of the word very seriously; in fact, as a vital preliminary that unless successfully completed, and the "valid" or "true" version of the two different definitions of "selfishness" is fundamentally established, will mean further discussion is pointless, as it must supposed proceed from a solid base, rather than simply an agreed one.. I would argue that this second is far more likely to be Rand's position. It seems to me this is consistent with both her logic, such as it is, (ie her Aristotelian method) and her rhetoric. Such a preliminary is, in Rand's view, certainly not merely a case of the analysis of terms for mutual benefit and enlightenment, or any such sugar-coated academic politesse either. It's to find any bad-apple identifications that might be rotting your whole conceptual barrel.

Would you agree? If so, then how does the discussion then proceed in the second option? This is where it gets problematic.

Edited September 3, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[kiaer.ts]

Peikoff's general point is valid but the "organism" example is a bad one. If we discover life on another planet we will be able to identify it as alive before we will be able to specify that it is a Terileptil, Trinoc, Sandtrout, or Regulan Bloodworm. A friend of mine referred to squirrels, but not birds, as "doggies" when she was child. You could say she had the concept "beast." Children do not form abstract concepts like vetebrate before they form concepts like horse. Interestingly it is not the most abstract terms, like animal or living creature which we form last. It is the classificatorily mid-level concepts such as monocot and teleost which are the most derived epistemologically.

[Daniel Barnes]

Peikoff's general point is valid but the "organism" example is a bad one. If we discover life on another planet we will be able to identify it as alive before we will be able to specify that it is a Terileptil, Trinoc, Sandtrout, or Regulan Bloodworm. A friend of mine referred to squirrels, but not birds, as "doggies" when she was child. You could say she had the concept "beast." Children do not form abstract concepts like vetebrate before they form concepts like horse. Interestingly it is not the most abstract terms, like animal or living creature which we form last. It is the classificatorily mid-level concepts such as monocot and teleost which are the most derived epistemologically.

It seems that everyone here knows how Objectivism is supposed to work better than its originators. For instance: When criticised for its underlying confusion, Rand's example of "sacrifice" gets excused as poor example. When criticised likewise, Peikoff's example of an abstract concept is also sheeted down to simply being a "bad one". But if that's the case where are all the good ones?

If Objectivist theories are so unclear that the leading practitioners - not to mention their editors and proofreaders - can't really tell bad examples from good ones, then this doesn't say much for said theories.

Edited September 3, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[kiaer.ts]

Peikoff's general point is valid but the "organism" example is a bad one. If we discover life on another planet we will be able to identify it as alive before we will be able to specify that it is a Terileptil, Trinoc, Sandtrout, or Regulan Bloodworm. A friend of mine referred to squirrels, but not birds, as "doggies" when she was child. You could say she had the concept "beast." Children do not form abstract concepts like vetebrate before they form concepts like horse. Interestingly it is not the most abstract terms, like animal or living creature which we form last. It is the classificatorily mid-level concepts such as monocot and teleost which are the most derived epistemologically.

It seems that everyone here knows how Objectivism is supposed to work better than its originators. For instance: When criticised for its underlying confusion, Rand's example of "sacrifice" gets excused as poor example. When criticised likewise, Peikoff's example of an abstract concept is also sheeted down to simply being a "bad one". But if that's the case where are all the good ones?

If Objectivist theories are so unclear that the leading practitioners - not to mention their editors and proofreaders - can't really tell bad examples from good ones, then this doesn't say much for said theories.

I suppose expecting you to read past the first sentences fails to take into account your nature. I gave two good examples, with links and an explanation. Look in the mirror. Contrarian is a another good example. So is crank.

[merjet]

There is only a small ambiguity in the passage ("...these latter..") and this is almost certainly resolved by Peikoff's unequivocal following line:

"...there are no such things as 'organisms' to be seen - there are only men, dogs, roses." (OPAR p91)

What's your point? "These latter" refers unequivocally to CCDs.

The first is basically the Critical Rationalist approach, treating the word merely as a convenient label we can attach to this or that problem under discussion. Ellen is attempting to argue, I think, that the first is Rand's position; so if she's correct then Rand, like Popper recommended, would happily accept that the word "selfishness" was a convenient label for either situation (the "definition" merely being the description of the situation we want to discuss, which can be either verbal or ostensive).

Do you mean the same Critical Rationalist who holds that definitions -- what words mean or refer to -- are of little use?

The second option is to instead take the subject of the definition of the word very seriously; in fact, as a vital preliminary that unless successfully completed, and the "valid" or "true" version of the two different definitions of "selfishness" is fundamentally established, will mean further discussion is pointless, as it must supposed proceed from a solid base, rather than simply an agreed one.. I would argue that this second is far more likely to be Rand's position. It seems to me this is consistent with both her logic, such as it is, (ie her Aristotelian method) and her rhetoric. Such a preliminary is, in Rand's view, certainly not merely a case of the analysis of terms for mutual benefit and enlightenment, or any such sugar-coated academic politesse either. It's to find any bad-apple identifications that might be rotting your whole conceptual barrel.

Would you agree? If so, then how does the discussion then proceed in the second option? I say: it must break down, unproductively.

If the case were about the meaning of "selfishness" and the two people were Rand and you, then I'm confident that you would make sure it would break down, unproductively. Otherwise, please tell us why it must break down in any case. Have you never seen a disagreement about the meaning a word be resolved? You also began on the wrong foot -- your regular straw man that Rand held a word can only have one true meaning.

So, no, I don't agree. Also, it is not necessary for two people to agree to use the same meaning or definition for the same word for a productive dialog. Each only needs to understand what the other means by the word.

Edited September 4, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[kiaer.ts]

If the case were about the meaning of "selfishness" and the two people were Rand and you, then I'm confident that you would make sure it would break down, unproductively. Otherwise, please tell us why it must break down in any case. Have you never seen a disagreement about the meaning a word be resolved? You also began on the wrong foot -- your regular straw man that Rand held a word can only have one true meaning.

As an aside, I have not once, since May of 1985, found the need to use the word selfish in a pejorative sense. The words "greedy" (taking what belongs to others, or more than one's share) and "inconsiderate" (failing to respect the rights or value of another) cover all cases. People who use the term selfish are all too often complaining that you aren't letting them be as greedy and inconsiderate with your property, time and life as they wish. They want the senses blurred. Rand was absolutely right to insist on the proper use of the word.

[Daniel Barnes]

I suppose expecting you to read past the first sentences fails to take into account your nature. I gave two good examples, with links and an explanation. Look in the mirror. Contrarian is a another good example. So is crank.

Where do Peikoff and/or Rand give "monocot" and "teleost" as examples of their theories? I just had a look in the index of OPAR at least and couldn't see any reference to them. Cite please.

[Daniel Barnes]

Otherwise, please tell us why it must break down in any case. Have you never seen a disagreement about the meaning a word be resolved?

But again, how do you think Rand would have proposed to resolve it? This is precisely what I'm wondering. There seem to be two choices, which I have outlined. I have difficulty imaging her taking the Critical Rationalist approach, but perhaps that is a failure of imagination on my part.

You also began on the wrong foot -- your regular straw man that Rand held a word can only have one true meaning.

I don't think this is a straw man. In fact it seems very close to what Rand is claiming here for example:

"The meaning ascribed in popular usage to the word “selfishness” is not merely wrong: it represents a devastating intellectual “package-deal,” which is responsible, more than any other single factor, for the arrested moral development of mankind."

[kiaer.ts]

I suppose expecting you to read past the first sentences fails to take into account your nature. I gave two good examples, with links and an explanation. Look in the mirror. Contrarian is a another good example. So is crank.

Where do Peikoff and/or Rand give "monocot" and "teleost" as examples of their theories? I just had a look in the index of OPAR at least and couldn't see any reference to them. Cite please.

I said that I gave two examples, not that P & R did. They are both woefully ignorant of biology, unfortunately. I did link the terms to their wikipedia articles if you are unfamiliar with them. They are concepts that cannot be acquired prior to the acquisition of lower level concepts. To acquire the concept monocot one has to be familiar with such flowering plants as grass, lily, pineapple, palm, orchid, and banana and so forth as opposed to oaks, roses, daisies, and so forth. One also has to have the concept plant and flowering plant, which are broader classes than monocots and dicots in classification. And one has to know a bit about leaf, flower, and seedling morphology. No child or uneducated layman is going to walk down the street pointing out monocots.

[Daniel Barnes]

I suppose expecting you to read past the first sentences fails to take into account your nature. I gave two good examples, with links and an explanation. Look in the mirror. Contrarian is a another good example. So is crank.

Where do Peikoff and/or Rand give "monocot" and "teleost" as examples of their theories? I just had a look in the index of OPAR at least and couldn't see any reference to them. Cite please.

I said that I gave two examples, not that P & R did. They are both woefully ignorant of biology, unfortunately. I did link the terms to their wikipedia articles if you are unfamiliar with them. They are concepts that cannot be acquired prior to the acquisition of lower level concepts. To acquire the concept monocot one has to be familiar with such flowering plants as grass, lily, pineapple, palm, orchid, and banana and so forth as opposed to oaks, roses, daisies, and so forth. One also has to have the concept plant and flowering plant, which are broader classes than monocots and dicots in classification. And one has to know a bit about leaf, flower, and seedling morphology. No child or uneducated layman is going to walk down the street pointing out monocots.

I didn't think so. As I say, everyone else understands their theories so much better than they!

[kiaer.ts]

I suppose expecting you to read past the first sentences fails to take into account your nature. I gave two good examples, with links and an explanation. Look in the mirror. Contrarian is a another good example. So is crank.

Where do Peikoff and/or Rand give "monocot" and "teleost" as examples of their theories? I just had a look in the index of OPAR at least and couldn't see any reference to them. Cite please.

I said that I gave two examples, not that P & R did. They are both woefully ignorant of biology, unfortunately. I did link the terms to their wikipedia articles if you are unfamiliar with them. They are concepts that cannot be acquired prior to the acquisition of lower level concepts. To acquire the concept monocot one has to be familiar with such flowering plants as grass, lily, pineapple, palm, orchid, and banana and so forth as opposed to oaks, roses, daisies, and so forth. One also has to have the concept plant and flowering plant, which are broader classes than monocots and dicots in classification. And one has to know a bit about leaf, flower, and seedling morphology. No child or uneducated layman is going to walk down the street pointing out monocots.

I didn't think so. As I say, everyone else understands their theories so much better than they!

You are being fatuous. If I said Peikoff's example was correct, you would say I was a fundy fan of the infallible Peikoff. And a poor example doesn't invalidate a theory. You need to stop trying so hard not to understand.

[Daniel Barnes]

You are being fatuous. If I said Peikoff's example was correct, you would say I was a fundy fan of the infallible Peikoff. And a poor example doesn't invalidate a theory. You need to stop trying so hard not to understand.

Not at all. If Peikoff's examples had been yours it would have made me think his theory's a bit more credible. There seems to be a lot of retro-fitting going on.

Edited September 4, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[kiaer.ts]

You are being fatuous. If I said Peikoff's example was correct, you would say I was a fundy fan of the infallible Peikoff. And a poor example doesn't invalidate a theory. You need to stop trying so hard not to understand.

Not at all. If Peikoff's examples had been yours it would have made me think his theory's a bit more credible. There seems to be a lot of retro-fitting going on.

What are you actually interested in, understanding the theory, or imagining yourself smarter than Peikoff? Why would you need my help for the latter?

I am old enough to have understood Objectivism from the books published during Rand's lifetime.

Who do you think Peikoff is, St Peter, loosing and binding?

[Ellen Stuttle]

You also began on the wrong foot -- your regular straw man that Rand held a word can only have one true meaning.

I don't think this is a straw man. In fact it seems very close to what Rand is claiming here for example:

"The meaning ascribed in popular usage to the word “selfishness” is not merely wrong: it represents a devastating intellectual “package-deal,” which is responsible, more than any other single factor, for the arrested moral development of mankind."

Daniel, it seems to be that particular example which gives you the idea that Rand thought a word can only have one true meaning. What you leave out is that she did think *in some cases* that a word is naming an invalid concept, or a "package-deal." I grant that she said "wrong" there, which is confusing. But the whole thrust of her ideas is so much a correcting of *ethical packing* which people accept so that unearned guilt is inculcated and ethics becomes an enemy working against the person's own well-being and happiness. That standard meaning of "selfishness" is especially loaded in producing this problem. It's used as a weapon to keep other people in line: "You're being selfish." I.e., you're being bad. The "package-deal" of "self-interest" with "bad" is what's she's objecting to, what she's trying to pry apart. I think you make a mistake of interpretation by focusing so much on that example, as if it were the center piece of her theory of concepts whereas actually it's a special case where she was fighting against the ethical baggage of the typical meaning.

As I've said before, I think she made a tactical error in calling a book The Virtue of Selfishness. This invited her being misunderstood. Nonetheless the point she was making concerned the weapon uses to which the usual meaning of "selfish" lends itself -- not an issue in her formal epistemology. She hadn't even written the epistemology yet, so you're taking as a test case of a work not yet written a statement which in retrospect can be seen to have contradicted the later work. I don't think you'd be so uncharitable in not letting Popper off the hook for some earlier statement which is contradicted by a later one.

Ellen

[kiaer.ts]

You also began on the wrong foot -- your regular straw man that Rand held a word can only have one true meaning.

I don't think this is a straw man. In fact it seems very close to what Rand is claiming here for example:

"The meaning ascribed in popular usage to the word "selfishness" is not merely wrong: it represents a devastating intellectual "package-deal," which is responsible, more than any other single factor, for the arrested moral development of mankind."

Daniel, it seems to be that particular example which gives you the idea that Rand thought a word can only have one true meaning. What you leave out is that she did think *in some cases* that a word is naming an invalid concept, or a "package-deal." I grant that she said "wrong" there, which is confusing. But the whole thrust of her ideas is so much a correcting of *ethical packing* which people accept so that unearned guilt is inculcated and ethics becomes an enemy working against the person's own well-being and happiness. That standard meaning of "selfishness" is especially loaded in producing this problem. It's used as a weapon to keep other people in line: "You're being selfish." I.e., you're being bad. The "package-deal" of "self-interest" with "bad" is what's she's objecting to, what she's trying to pry apart. I think you make a mistake of interpretation by focusing so much on that example, as if it were the center piece of her theory of concepts whereas actually it's a special case where she was fighting against the ethical baggage of the typical meaning.

As I've said before, I think she made a tactical error in calling a book The Virtue of Selfishness. This invited her being misunderstood. Nonetheless the point she was making concerned the weapon uses to which the usual meaning of "selfish" lends itself -- not an issue in her formal epistemology. She hadn't even written the epistemology yet, so you're taking as a test case of a work not yet written a statement which in retrospect can be seen to have contradicted the later work. I don't think you'd be so uncharitable in not letting Popper off the hook for some earlier statement which is contradicted by a later one.

Ellen

The title was a stroke of genius. (Not that she lacked for them.) Thank God she named it that. I laughed aloud when I saw it. Had she chosen something conventional I might never have read it and might still not know who she was til this day.

[Daniel Barnes]

double post

Edited September 4, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Daniel Barnes]

Daniel, it seems to be that particular example which gives you the idea that Rand thought a word can only have one true meaning. What you leave out is that she did think *in some cases* that a word is naming an invalid concept, or a "package-deal." I grant that she said "wrong" there, which is confusing.

Thank you. This is not the only example, BTW - there is "sacrifice" as another obvious example, where she tells you what the word does, and does not mean. And I would include the entire Ayn Rand Lexicon as massive example of the general thrust of this basically mistaken direction.

But I am trying to get to why she "said 'wrong'" in the first place. I don't see a single, unforced error. I see a pattern in both her work, and that of her followers. Rather, I think she was operating under a mistaken methodology with which this and the other errors are consistent. It helps also that this seems to be a widespread pattern in philosophy, just particularly strong due to Aristotle's particularly direct influence on Rand.

Incidentally, I also would agree that there are places where she says otherwise, but they tend not to be front-and-centre like "selfishness." Perhaps at some level she realised there was a problem, which might explain the sudden outbreak of Popperian nominalism such referring to words as "labels". Yet just prior to her trivialising them as "labels", she's making them the triumphant final step in the process of concept formation. This is another possible source of confusion. Humans can be very inconsistent creatures...;-)

But the whole thrust of her ideas is so much a correcting of *ethical packing* which people accept so that unearned guilt is inculcated and ethics becomes an enemy working against the person's own well-being and happiness. That standard meaning of "selfishness" is especially loaded in producing this problem. It's used as a weapon to keep other people in line: "You're being selfish." I.e., you're being bad. The "package-deal" of "self-interest" with "bad" is what's she's objecting to, what she's trying to pry apart. I think you make a mistake of interpretation by focusing so much on that example, as if it were the center piece of her theory of concepts whereas actually it's a special case where she was fighting against the ethical baggage of the typical meaning.

I agree that this is what she probably aimed at doing. I also agree this is to some extent admirable - I've mentioned to you previously how useful Rand has been for people trying to free themselves from, say, oppressive religious beliefs. What I'm trying to say is that the antique sights on her rifle, if you like, are on examination fundamentally miscalibrated, and this explains the misfires - which are by no means limited to "selfishness" - better than simple human error.

As I've said before, I think she made a tactical error in calling a book The Virtue of Selfishness. This invited her being misunderstood. Nonetheless the point she was making concerned the weapon uses to which the usual meaning of "selfish" lends itself -- not an issue in her formal epistemology. She hadn't even written the epistemology yet, so you're taking as a test case of a work not yet written a statement which in retrospect can be seen to have contradicted the later work. I don't think you'd be so uncharitable in not letting Popper off the hook for some earlier statement which is contradicted by a later one.

I see what you mean by calling it a tactical error, but I am not fully convinced. As well as erroneous methodology, some of it could be sheeted down to a desire to shock, to say outrageous things to get attention. This is common enough. The debatable point is how much was intended as mere shock value, to be watered down in the body of the text, and how much was to be taken straight.

Edited September 4, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[kiaer.ts]

Do you prefer Tom?

Originally, you said:

You can't point to "a furniture", there is no such thing. 'Furniture' refers to a generalization, abstraction, class, etc. that exists only in our brain.

In your last response to my request that you present your understanding of the Objectivist position of the nature of abstractions, you said:

Once again, you have not presented the actual Objectivist position, Thomas. If you are able, would you please do so?

I don't believe there is any such thing, Theodore. I have not seen all the Objectivists here to agree on it, if it does exist. But this is not uncommon, in every movement (including general semantics) there are passionate people who embrace it and argue incessantly for years. I have experienced this elsewhere and I see it here. The thing about general semantics is it is supposed to enable agreement and it is extremely ironic when you see general semanticists arguing about what general semantics "is" etc. I am not surprised to see it here, however, since Objectivism, in its quest for certainty, is perfectly positioned for this sort of behaviour, in fact, encourages it. Think Objectivist rage.

Okay. I did not ask you to provide your understanding of the beliefs of various posters here. That you choose to end with an ad hominem is also odd. I asked you to express your understanding of it in your own words. Such a position does exist. It is expressed explicitly in ItOE, and in Kelley's Evidence of the Senses. You can find clues here, http://aynrandlexico...bjectivity.html, and here:

See also AXIOMATIC CONCEPTS; AXIOMS; CONCEPTS; DEFINITIONS; EPISTEMOLOGY;IDENTITY; KANT, IMMANUEL; KNOWLEDGE; LOGIC; METAPHYSICS; PRIMACY of EXISTENCE vs. PRIMACY of CONSCIOUSNESS;PROOF; REASON; SUBJECTIVISM; TRUTH.

If you are going to argue against the Objectivist position on a supposedly Objectivist website I would think you would want to be able to state at its strongest the argument you want to refute.

I won't repeat the request that you articulate Rand's position on the metaphysical status of abstractions again, which, if you wish to refute, you should be able to state in your own words. Given the lack of evidence to the contrary, Tom, I will simply take it as given that you cannot articulate it because you do not understand it.

[Daniel Barnes]

Further to this post to Ellen, I submit the following example:

The Miracle Worker by William Gibson . . . tells the story of how Annie Sullivan brought Helen Keller to grasp the nature of language. . . .

I suggest that you read The Miracle Worker and study its implications. . . . this particular play is an invaluable lesson in the fundamentals of a rational epistemology.

I suggest that you consider Annie Sullivan’s titanic struggle to arouse a child’s conceptual faculty by means of a single sense, the sense of touch, then evaluate the meaning, motive and moral status of the notion that man’s conceptual faculty does not require any sensory experience.

I suggest that you consider what an enormous intellectual feat Helen Keller had to perform in order to develop a full conceptual range (including a college education, which required more in her day than it does now), then judge those normal people who learn their first, perceptual-level abstractions without any difficulty and freeze on that level, and keep the higher ranges of their conceptual development in a chaotic fog of swimming, indeterminate approximations, playing a game of signals without referents, as Helen Keller did at first, but without her excuse. Then check on whether you respect and how carefully you employ your priceless possession: language.

And, lastly, I suggest that you try to project what would have happened if, instead of Annie Sullivan, a sadist had taken charge of Helen Keller’s education. A sadist would spell “water” into Helen’s palm, while making her touch water, stones, flowers and dogs interchangeably; he would teach her that water is called “water” today, but “milk” tomorrow; he would endeavor to convey to her that there is no necessary connection between names and things, that the signals in her palm are a game of arbitrary conventions and that she’d better obey him without trying to understand [both emphases DB].

In short, Rand is asserting that only a sadist would consider that there is "no necessary connection between names and things", and that names are just "conventions"! This seems to me to be completely irreconcilable with a Popperian position, and entirely compatible with the position Popper criticises, and which I hold is the underlying tendency in Rand's thought. The term "necessary connection" seems decisive - it can hardly be applied to a mere label, and instead suggests there is at the very least some kind of irresistible epistemological connection between a word and a thing - and I would go further, and say between a word and a concept too. (There is also the reasonably common confusion, to which she regularly succumbs, between "arbitrary" and "artificial". Just because conventions are artificial does not mean they are arbitrary. This or that name may be chosen may be chosen for a number of different reasons.)

Edited September 9, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Ellen Stuttle]

In short, Rand is asserting that only a sadist would consider that there is "no necessary connection between names and things", and that names are just "conventions"! This seems to me to be completely irreconcilable with a Popperian position, and entirely compatible with the position Popper criticises, and which I hold is the underlying tendency in Rand's thought. The term "necessary connection" seems decisive - it can hardly be applied to a mere label, and instead suggests there is at the very least some kind of irresistible epistemological connection between a word and a thing - and I would go further, and say between a word and a concept too. (There is also the reasonably common confusion, to which she regularly succumbs, between "arbitrary" and "artificial". Just because conventions are artificial does not mean they are arbitrary. This or that name may be chosen may be chosen for a number of different reasons.)

The above might be -- I didn't read it carefully, just skimming before-sleep.

BUT: Popper was no "nominalist." Notice that even he says that even "methodological nominalism" -- "nominalism" with the qualifier -- was a mistake as a designation of his views.

Methinks that an attempt to get agreement on what a "nominalist" is would help.

Ellen

Editing: What I'm saying is that the above isn't irreconcilable with a Popperian position, since Popper wasn't a nominalist. He thought there was a real world with real regularities. Nominalists hold that it's just a matter of convention and convenience how you divvy things up, nothing in reality that your words need conform with.

Edited September 9, 2010 by Ellen Stuttle

[merjet]

In short, Rand is asserting that only a sadist would consider that there is "no necessary connection between names and things", and that names are just "conventions"! This seems to me to be completely irreconcilable with a Popperian position,

No, she did not say "only a sadist"; she said "A sadist", period. I believe what she attributed to the sadist is entirely reconcilable with a Popperian position -- there is no rational basis for induction.

[Daniel Barnes]

In short, Rand is asserting that only a sadist would consider that there is "no necessary connection between names and things", and that names are just "conventions"! This seems to me to be completely irreconcilable with a Popperian position,

No, she did not say "only a sadist"; she said "A sadist", period. I believe what she attributed to the sadist is entirely reconcilable with a Popperian position -- there is no rational basis for induction.

Then surely only a masochist would engage in such a debate...;-)

[Daniel Barnes]

Methinks that an attempt to get agreement on what a "nominalist" is would help.

Popper says somewhere in his OSE Chapter 11 that he's not a typical nominalist - only one of method. I've tried to avoid the term for those reasons, and tried to keep referring to "words-as-labels" as both Popper uses it and there is a precedent in Rand (though as I say I don't think it actually fits with the rest of her theory).