Free Market Anarchism: A Justification

[dan2100]

Without a government the strong would eat the weak alive.

Generally, the way the strong eat the weak alive is via government. Modern nation states have made this even better as they tend to indoctrinate people (via government schooling, court intellectuals, and controlled media) to believe, that without their special form of parasitism, life will be unbearable.

[Brant Gaede]

How the hell can you discover morality?? I can understand how you discover gold, but not morality.

Just a minuute. You were saying, about gold ...?

--Brant

[dan2100]

I'm not sure the Iceland, Harappan, and other historical examples aren't also practice. One reason, however, some might be skeptical of private security in the modern world is, some might argue, these work within the realm of current nation states -- states that already provide a matrix of social order for the firms to operate within.

I'm not saying I completely agree with this logic, but it does appeal to some, no?

Historical examples lose their power as the square of the distance. We live in a post-industrial, global world. It is better to solve today's problems. I have, indeed, looked to examples from "first peoples" (Cheyenne and Visigoth both among them) when researching community justice and other alternatives to incarceration. Still, here and now carries more weight and rightfully so.

As for the second point, if an atheist says that he is moral, the religionist can counter than atheism's morality is only a secular version of religion's morality. Largely, that is true, but obviously, Objectivism would contradict that. So, too, for the statist to claim that private security only exists within the context of national government is to ignore the objective derivation from first principles. Also, as you note, "historical" examples do exist as demonstrations and evidences, but I prefer to look closer to home.

I understand your view here about "distance" in time. I also understand how some will argue, as you hint, that "that worked then, but it won't work in today's much more complicated world." (Of course, that argument is never used to explain why governments, too, existed alongside the usual historical examples of anarchy. E.g., during Icelands anarchic period, Norway was under a feudal monarchy. I doubt anyone's made a good case that Norwegian was somehow more complex or advanced than Iceland's and, therefore, needed a government.)

But I still bring up the various historical examples. And I cited Bruce Benson's The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State. He uses similar examples to yours -- though his book now twenty years old. My guess is some people will be persuaded by "fresh" examples, others by wider ranging examples from history, and still others by a plethora of examples.

I still believe, too, some people will dismiss some current examples -- the ones you and Benson use -- as existing within or under current governments. This is no different than how some people will argue competing legal authorities, such as private mediators, work today because people can still appeal to a legal authority of last resort (the state) and because the latter makes for an overall social order in which such competition can take place and not be socially destructive. No reason here not to, when such arguments are raised, bring in the more pure examples from the Old West, First Peoples, Iceland, Harrapa, etc., no?

[George H. Smith]

Your position, as I understand it, is that if a government is morally legitimate, then the question "Who decides?" is irrelevant. But what does this mean, if not that the key issue of delegation is irrelevant to the moral legitimacy of a government? And if that is your position, then it flatly contradicts Rand's.

You don't understand it. Men do not determine what is moral, they discover it. For that reason, it is nonsense to ask "who decides what is moral." Likewise the morality of a government. A government is moral when those who form and sustain it enact moral laws and enforce them with moral procedures. In stating my position I have used the word "legitimacy" strictly in the moral context. You are using it in a legal context while implying that they are one and the same.

I said nothing about "Who decides what is moral?" That is your own fabrication.

Natural rights give individuals the moral power of choice. If I have a right to do X, this doesn't mean that I must do X. It means that I may or may not do X, and that other people do not have the right to use force (or the threat of force) in an attempt to influence my decision.

One of the most fundamental individual rights is the right of self-defense. Whether or not I delegate this right, in whole or in part, to an agency (be it the government or some private agency) is a matter for me to decide. Neither you nor anyone else has the right to say: I think my ideal government is moral, so I am going to compel you to delegate your right of self-defense to that government. You have no choice in the matter. Your own judgment is irrelevant. I have "discovered" the morality of this government, and that's all that matters. Case closed. So either obey my government or face the consequences.

I agree that we can ascertain just laws and legal procedures via reason. (This is a major theme in my "Justice Entrepreneurship" article.) Indeed, this is a major point against a monopolistic government. If the principles of justice are knowable through a rational process, then we don't need a monopolistic government to tell us what they are. If such principles are knowable to individuals who call themselves a "government," then they are equally knowable to everyone else. And if a person is competent to know these principles, then he is competent to decide which agency best embodies those principles, and to delegate his right of self-defense accordingly.

This is the "Who decides?" aspect of a legitimate government. A government may operate by just laws and procedures, but the same may be true of other agencies. And if I would rather delegate my right of self-defense to one of these competing agencies, then, so long as those agencies are just, that is my right. You have no rightful say in the matter. You have no right to compel me to accept your choice at the expense of my own judgment. So long as I don't violate anyone's rights, my business is my business.

Ghs: As for the Constitution, that document has moral authority only if it is based on consent, i.e., only if citizens have delegated the rights and powers that are specified in that document. The Constitution invests the right to tax in the federal government. I have never delegated such a right. Have you?

Mike: Citizens can give a government authority by delegating powers to it, but it will be moral authority only if those powers derive from moral laws and procedures objectively defined and proven for the protection of valid rights.

Exactly! Hence if I don't delegate my rightful powers to a government, it has no "authority" over me. I couldn't have put it better myself.

The right to tax you is not wrong because you did not consent to it, it is wrong because the threat of force required to collect it is not moral.

You apparently don't know much if anything about the social contract tradition. The idea behind the Constitution was that, having been ratified by "the people," it became the equivalent of a legally binding contract. Taxes were thus seen as "voluntary" (a fiction that still persists in some circles) in the sense that if you voluntarily enter into a private contract and agree to pay for a service, then you are legally obligated to pay that money, so long as the other party abides by the terms of the contract.

Nevertheless, I agree in substance with your remark, especially since it logically leads to the conclusion that the U.S. Constitution is, as Lysander Spooner put it, "a Constitution of no authority."

Mike: Here is Rand's statement:

The source of the government’s authority is “the consent of the governed.” This means that the government is not the ruler, but the servant or agent of the citizens; it means that the government as such has no rights except the rights delegated to it by the citizens for a specific purpose.

"The Nature of Government" VOS, 110

Note that this means only that the government has no authority that the governed do not give it. It neither says nor implies anything about that consent giving the government moral legitimacy.

Nowhere (that I know of) does Rand draw the distinction between "authority" and "legitimacy" that you do, and I seriously doubt if she would regard any government that lacks moral authority as morally legitimate nonetheless.

If all you wish to say is that a government that employs just laws and procedure is legitimate qua institution, even if no on consents to it, then I have no problem with your claim. But, again, the same can be said of private agencies. A private agency is also legitimate if it employs just laws and procedures, even if no one consents to it.

As for "authority" (as you use the term) the same reasoning applies in both cases. Neither a government nor private agencies may claim authority over individuals without their consent. A government can claim no special privileges in this regard. The relevant point is what laws and procedures are employed, not who employs them.

Such laws and procedures, as you correctly pointed out, are knowable to reason, so a government cannot claim to possess a special knowledge of them. If a government can determine what they are, then so can private agencies. There is no such thing as a monopoly on reason.

Mike: It also does not say or imply that the consent of the governed need be unanimous. When a majority of a population gains control of a government and rewrites its constitution and laws to be moral, it does not need the consent of the rest of the populace and visitors who will be governed. Moral laws do not need consent to be morally legitimate.

Well, that's quite a mouthful. Using your terminology, even if a government does not need consent to be "legitimate," it does require consent to have "authority." But somehow, through a mysterious process you have not explained, the consent required for "authority" need not be the consent of every individual; a majority approval will suffice.

Would you now care to explain how a majority has the right to decide which institution shall have "authority" over me or anyone else?

Mike: To the degree those in control drift from moral law and enact laws that are not moral, the government will be tyrannical. But again, enforcing immoral laws against you is not wrong because you did not give your consent, but rather because the laws are immoral.

Your point has nothing to do with anything I wrote.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

The question "Which is preferable -- anarchy or tyranny?" has been discussed many times in the history of political thought. It is a question fraught with important theoretical consequences. Just because you don't want to answer it, owing to its awkward implications for your position, doesn't make it a loaded question.

Loaded Question – a question that carries an assumption, and is worded in such a way so that the respondent who answers the question directly admits to accepting that assumption.

All philosophical questions carry assumptions. But that doesn't necessarily make them "loaded." A question asked in a philosophical vacuum would have no point.

The assumption on your part is that there is in principle enough difference between a tyranny and anarchy that I could have a preference. There isn't and I don't. I cannot name either one without confirming your erroneous assumption.

That wasn't my assumption at all. You might not see a dime's worth of difference between the two alternatives, after all.

Meanwhile, while explaining for the umpteenth time why you won't answer my question, you have in fact answered it. You have indicated that you don't have a preference one way or the other. Now that wasn't so painful, was it?

Ghs

[dan2100]

If I understand Mike correctly I believe he is saying that an objectivist government is a more desirable goal than no government?

Quick reply. I don't think he means exactly "objectivist government" as "objective law."

I mean a government consistent with the politics of Ayn Rand that monopolizes force in a specific jurisdiction. That obviously means that the laws shall be objectively defined and explicitly demonstrated to be valid.

Okay. I believe George has already replied to much of this. I'll just add what I hope are a few points of my own -- maybe not originally mine, but ones I hope haven't been mentioned already here.

I think there are two problems here. One is that a government -- a monopolist of legitimate force in a territory -- might not be able to deliver objective law -- for reasons similar to why socialism doesn't work. The other is that even if it could deliver, it might not be efficient at delivering it -- for reasons similar to why competition works better than coercively monopolized markets. (On the latter, if you're following Rand here, then I presume you're going to outlaw anyone else entering the market for security and justice here.)

Pertinent to the difference between that government and anarchy, however, is that there may be only one set of principles, procedures, and enforcement practices in its jurisdiction, and knowledge of them must be readily available and easily understandable to all who live or visit there.

Why would this not be possible under anarchy? I bet you know of examples of people converging on standards in other areas without there being a monopolist in place, such as in the shape and size of credit cards, the rules of language, how money arose, how scientific communities vet theories and data, and even social customs like hours and days of business (where these were not enforced or mandated by law). Aside from the theoretical case that objective law could arise under anarchy, there is also the historical case of objective laws and objective legal standards arising under competitive legal orders, such as the Law Merchants and Common Law during the Middle Ages. (These examples are telling because government legal systems adopted them in many cases. For instance, much of the core of commercial law came from governments adopting private commercial law.)

In fact, I would argue the opposite: that it's almost only by accident or because of non-governmental factors that government law even approximates objective law. Why? With no competitors and little restraint, government legal authorities only have to worry about either their consciences (which, of course, do not fail at every turn; while governments might not be people by angels, they are certainly not peopled only by monsters) or the remote chances of open rebellion, social collapse, or foreign competition. (The last has become less and less a problem, especially as the world has become basically unipolar and seems stuck in unipolarity for the moment.)

Also, there is the discovery problem governments will face. It's one thing if all objective laws, procedures, and standards are already known and in place. Even then, competing legal authorities would probably do better than a monopolist. But what about the discovery of new objective laws, procedures, and standards? In a competitive market for these, they will likely arise via the rivalrous process -- and, similarly, spread as successful laws, procedures, and standards are adopted by others, by society as a whole. Under monopoly, however, there's little incentive to discover anything new and the likely result will be laws, procedures, and standards that are outmoded or hold to a lower standard that need to be periodically reformed. So, instead, what will likely be seen -- and this seems to be the case -- is periods of stasis and rapid reform -- with the reforms coming too late and merely setting the stage for the next long period of legal stasis.

(By "new" here, I don't mean that somehow that objective law is fluid, but merely that its principles and applications are not foreknown. They must be discovered and such discovery is no more automatic than the discovery of, say, the principles of nutrition or healthy living.)

These are the necessary prerequisites to preventing the arbitrary exercise of force that diminishes liberty. Arbitrary force diminishes liberty by undermining everyone's justifiable expectations not only that it exists, but how it will be sustained in the entire range of possible circumstances one could face as one walks out the door each day to interact with the rest of the society.

I don't think you'll find any libertarian market anarchist disagreeing with you on this. The major desire for objective law is or should be to bring the use of legitimate force under objective control. (Illegitimate force, of course, is another story.) But that doesn't tell one how to achieve this control. I believe George, Murray Rothbard, and many others (myself included) have shown why this is either possible under anarchy or impossible under government.

In fact, were he correct, we should expect objectivity in every field to only be possible were there's a monopoly and all competitors are kept out.

And there is the error again — the one I pointed out at the end of my previous comment. You are trying to treat defensive force as a commodity that would become better and more abundant if created and distributed by a competitive market and would be harmed by a force wielding monopoly.

Actually, whatever the good (or service; let's, following Mises, use "good" here as a stand in for both goods and services) is here, it's amount and quality depends on supply and demand. Having a monopolist doesn't change this. In this case, though, there's reason to suspect that the amount and quality of the good produced on a free market would be more coordinated than under monopoly for the same reasons that any other good. The belief that the quantity would somehow increase is just an unfounded fear. (The problem for the monopolist, even the well intentioned one, is figuring out what to supply and at what price. Lacking a competitive market, the monopolist, even the monopolist in security and law, faces the same problem that the well intentioned central planner faces.)

Let me elaborate too. That something is competitively provided does not mean there will be more of it provided. Beforehand, one can't tell whether a competitive market will provide more or less of some good. One can only know that it will be better, for the most part, at coordinating supply and demand. Why? The incentives are better aligned for coordination and the information is better available for doing so (including market prices).

But were I to hazard a guess, I bet under anarchy the supply of security would be lower but of higher quality. Why? Because under the current monopoly system, people who are net users of the system actually have the costs spread over the total population. This creates a net positive feedback to use the system. Under anarchy, net users would incur net costs, creating a negative feedback loop. (A better way of people this is people who have higher security wants will have to pay for it or persuade others to pay for it; people who have lower security wants will, all else being equal, pay less. As no one has an infinite ability to pay (under anarchy or governemnt), people will limit their use of security seeking the best value, but under anarchy they won't have the ability to pass these costs on to others. Does this mean those who can't afford security won't buy it? Not necessarily, but I imagine many will simply change their lives in other ways -- e.g., moving out of a crime-ridden neighborhood rather than asking for more policing.)

To repeat the point: there cannot be a competitive market in force. A competitive market can only exist after an effective institution monopolizing defensive force is already a fait accompli.

This is mere blind assertion. There's no reason why security or law, which are goods like any other, can't be provided competitively.

If the institution in charge of exercising defensive force and/or verifying that its sub-agencies, subcontractors, private security forces, or individuals acting in self-defense are complying with that single objectified set of standards is not a monopoly in its jurisdiction, then no market there can be fully free or competitive, because it would be subject to arbitrary acts of force by whatever extraneous agencies of force were being tolerated in addition to it.

Your argument simply does not follow. Users of arbitrary force will always exist -- government or no. Under anarchy, there's no reason competing legal authorities or security firms couldn't use legitimate force objectively and the drive toward objectifying laws, procedures, and standards has been theoretically demonstrated by George, Roderick Long, and others. This drive has empirical backing, too, from historical examples of anarchy and near anarchy, such as the Old West. This doesn't mean anarchy would be perfect -- that there'd never be an authority or firm that wouldn't use arbitrary force.

However, the same holds for government, but the problem is much more difficult to deal with because the would be arbitrary user of force only has to either take over the government (as all real world governments, without exception, appear to be -- i.e., users of arbitrary force -- today and have forever been; and George would seem to argue are always likely to be) or come to an accomodation with it (as organized crime does today).

Let me put this another way. If I told you you could live in two societies. In one society, one firm had all the power over legitimate force and its word was law. In the other, there was no such single firm and there was free entry into using legitimate force. In neither society did you know whether they were using objective law. (Try to put aside, for the moment, your belief that the latter could never ever ever have objective laws.) Do you seriously believe that you could persuade the former -- the monopolist -- to use objective law? Do you seriously believe that, supposing you had some above average powers of persuasion, it'd be impossible to persuade firms in the latter to start using objective law? (I believe this links directly into George's question -- the one you feel is loaded.)

[George H. Smith]

The question "Which is preferable -- anarchy or tyranny?" has been discussed many times in the history of political thought. It is a question fraught with important theoretical consequences.

I want to expand on this remark a bit. Although the aspect of this question that I will focus on here is not directly relevant to the ongoing discussion, it is interesting in its own right.

"Which is preferable -- anarchy or tyranny?" One reason this question (or questions like it) was so important for political philosophers, especially during the 17th and 18 centuries, was because its relationship to the right of revolution.

According to 17th century defenders of absolute government, most notably Sir Robert Filmer (John Locke's major target in his Two Treatises) and Thomas Hobbes, the violent overthrow of a government is never justified, no matter how tyrannical that government may be. (Absolutists sometimes made an exception in the case of "usurpers," i.e., monarchs who had no legitimate title to rule in the first place.)

Absolutists employed a number of arguments to support this claim -- including moral arguments and, in the case of Filmer, an appeal to the divine right of kings. But one of the more interesting arguments had to do with the state of anarchy that ensues during or after a revolution. If this interim condition of anarchy would be so devastating and horrible -- if it would bring about, as Hobbes believed, a perpetual "war of every man against every man" -- then revolutions, however supposedly just they may be, will bring about a social condition that is far worse than even the worst tyranny. Indeed, as Hobbes claimed, a revolution might destroy an entire society by throwing it into maelstrom of conflict and chaos from it could never recover. Better, then, to endure even the worst tyranny than to hurl society into a nightmarish condition that is even worse.

This argument against the right of revolution is one of the major reasons why Locke and others in his tradition maintained that a state of nature (a society without government) could maintain a high degree of social order, even if that order is attended with certain "inconveniences" and is therefore not optimal. The point here was that society could maintain itself during the anarchist interlude created by a revolution.

Perhaps the most forceful presentation of this position was that by Thomas Paine in Part Two of Rights of Man . Here is a typical passage:

Thomas Paine

So far is it from being true, as has been pretended, that the abolition of any formal government is the dissolution of society, that it acts by a contrary impulse, and brings the latter the closer together. All that part of its organisation which it had committed to its government, devolves again upon itself, and acts through its medium. When men, as well from natural instinct as from reciprocal benefits, have habituated themselves to social and civilised life, there is always enough of its principles in practice to carry them through any changes they may find necessary or convenient to make in their government. In short, man is so naturally a creature of society that it is almost impossible to put him out of it.

Formal government makes but a small part of civilised life; and when even the best that human wisdom can devise is established, it is a thing more in name and idea than in fact. It is to the great and fundamental principles of society and civilisation — to the common usage universally consented to, and mutually and reciprocally maintained- to the unceasing circulation of interest, which, passing through its million channels, invigorates the whole mass of civilised man- it is to these things, infinitely more than to anything which even the best instituted government can perform, that the safety and prosperity of the individual and of the whole depends.

The more perfect civilisation is, the less occasion has it for government, because the more does it regulate its own affairs, and govern itself; but so contrary is the practice of old governments to the reason of the case, that the expenses of them increase in the proportion they ought to diminish. It is but few general laws that civilised life requires, and those of such common usefulness, that whether they are enforced by the forms of government or not, the effect will be nearly the same. If we consider what the principles are that first condense men into society, and what are the motives that regulate their mutual intercourse afterwards, we shall find, by the time we arrive at what is called government, that nearly the whole of the business is performed by the natural operation of the parts upon each other.

Man, with respect to all those matters, is more a creature of consistency than he is aware, or than governments would wish him to believe. All the great laws of society are laws of nature. Those of trade and commerce, whether with respect to the intercourse of individuals or of nations, are laws of mutual and reciprocal interest. They are followed and obeyed, because it is the interest of the parties so to do, and not on account of any formal laws their governments may impose or interpose.

But how often is the natural propensity to society disturbed or destroyed by the operations of government! When the latter, instead of being ingrafted on the principles of the former, assumes to exist for itself, and acts by partialities of favour and oppression, it becomes the cause of the mischiefs it ought to prevent.

Ghs

[mcm]

Pertinent to the difference between that government and anarchy, however, is that there may be only one set of principles, procedures, and enforcement practices in its jurisdiction, and knowledge of them must be readily available and easily understandable to all who live or visit there.

Why would this not be possible under anarchy?

Because, by definition, there could be as many different sets of standards for using force as there are agencies up to as many as there are inhabitants. There would also be no obligation by the exercisers of force to make those standards known to the populace at large. Consequently, law and its enforcement would not be objectified. That does not mean that some or all of the standards would not be objectively defined, but rather that they cannot be objectively known to the populace. Additionally, even if one could discover all of the standards in effect and where they are at any given point in time, one would not know if or when new agencies or inhabitants would begin implementing other sets of standards.

To repeat the point: there cannot be a competitive market in force. A competitive market can only exist after an effective institution monopolizing defensive force is already a fait accompli.

This is mere blind assertion. There's no reason why security or law, which are goods like any other, can't be provided competitively.

You do not yet understand the point I am making. It has nothing to do with providing security competitively or not. We have private agencies providing security who compete in the market today. In the government Rand envisioned, all defensive force could be provided by private agencies and contractors if subject to one set of standards. But anarchists advocate that a free, competitive market should provide not only all defensive force but the principles, laws, definitions of rights and procedures as well. My point is that the position relies on a logical fallacy, namely a stolen concept.

A "market" is a place where values are exchanged voluntarily. A "free market" is a market where there is no interference at all from other parties in those exchanges. "Competition" is the struggle among parties exchanging values in a market to entice the most favorable result from the other parties. Where there is coercion by physical force or the threat of force to alter the terms of any value exchange, there cannot be a market nor a free market nor competition.

Therefore, a viable system providing defensive force to one set of standards must already be operative before a free, competitive market can exist. Advocating that the free market should provide us with defense agencies and their various standards begs the question of what institution of defense will provide the free market itself in which the those agencies would compete.

Presently our government provides an imperfectly free market in which private security firms compete. Its imperfection is not a product of its monopoly on the standards by which force may be used, but rather of the philosophy of the overwhelming majority of the governed who authorize it to be what it is.

[George H. Smith]

In the government Rand envisioned, all defensive force could be provided by private agencies and contractors if subject to one set of standards. But anarchists advocate that a free, competitive market should provide not only all defensive force but the principles, laws, definitions of rights and procedures as well.

This characterization is absurd beyond belief. No major market anarchist -- Murray Rothbard, Roy Childs, Randy Barnett, etc. -- has ever advocated such a thing. You should address what anarchists have actually said, instead of rebutting positions that exist nowhere except in your own imagination or that you picked up from the fraudulent representations of the ARI crowd.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

There would also be no obligation by the exercisers of force to make those standards known to the populace at large. Consequently, law and its enforcement would not be objectified. That does not mean that some or all of the standards would not be objectively defined, but rather that they cannot be objectively known to the populace.

Can you give a persuasive argument as to why a government is obligated to make its legal standards "known to the populace at large"? If so, then what prevents you from applying that same argument to private justice agencies?

There can be legitimate and illegitimate justice agencies, just as there can be legitimate and illegitimate governments. The same requirements pertaining to the rule of law and related matters apply to both types of institutions.

You object to "loaded" questions, but you appear to have no problem with loaded comparisons. You like to compare an ideally legitimate government with a welter of private agencies, some of which are illegitimate. This would be like my comparing one ideal justice agency with all the governments in the world, some of which are illegitimate, and then concluding that only a private agency can provide objective justice, since there are no uniform standards among governments.

As a starting point in the minarchism/anarchism debate, the only fair comparison would be to compare one legitimate government with one legitimate competing agency, i.e., an agency that employs the same "objective" legal standards as your legitimate government.

This hypothetical ceteris paribus condition enables us to focus on some key questions, namely: Would the government have any moral justification for prohibiting the existence of this competing agency? On what moral grounds could your government forcibly prevent people from choosing to deal with the private agency, when that agency operates by the same principles (both substantive and procedural) as your government does? (One reason for choosing the private agency might be that it is more efficient and therefore cheaper.)

In short, what is the justification for a government threatening to initiate force against an agency that has not violated or threatened to violate anyone's rights, indeed, an agency that meets all of your own standards for objective justice?

Would there exist illegitimate agencies in an anarchist society? Yes, probably, just as there exist illegitimate governments today. But how to deal with these illegitimate agencies and governments is a different issue.

Ghs

[dan2100]

There would also be no obligation by the exercisers of force to make those standards known to the populace at large. Consequently, law and its enforcement would not be objectified. That does not mean that some or all of the standards would not be objectively defined, but rather that they cannot be objectively known to the populace.

The above is not a quote from me.

[dan2100]

Pertinent to the difference between that government and anarchy, however, is that there may be only one set of principles, procedures, and enforcement practices in its jurisdiction, and knowledge of them must be readily available and easily understandable to all who live or visit there.

Why would this not be possible under anarchy?

Because, by definition, there could be as many different sets of standards for using force as there are agencies up to as many as there are inhabitants. There would also be no obligation by the exercisers of force to make those standards known to the populace at large. Consequently, law and its enforcement would not be objectified. That does not mean that some or all of the standards would not be objectively defined, but rather that they cannot be objectively known to the populace. Additionally, even if one could discover all of the standards in effect and where they are at any given point in time, one would not know if or when new agencies or inhabitants would begin implementing other sets of standards.

There is a big reason for any legal authority to make its standards known and have them acepted by "populace at large" -- to have its standards and efforts respected. This applies to both a monopolist and a competitive market. Otherwise what happens would be that such authority would have to use force more often, which is costly, and would also face retaliation and even intervention from third parties. This is why all sorts of open legal contests seems to have evolved in the first place. And any legal authority (or any legal standard or procedure or law) that becomes widely accepted and not often contested will, all else remaining the same, have much lower enforcement costs.

There's also a good reason why people who have variant views on this would want to make them known: to reduce their enforcement costs (thereby, making acceptance easier and avoiding conflict). This is no different than posting the rules of an establishment on the door, in a sense.

George covers this in his essay on justice entrepreneurship -- which I'm sure you're unfamiliar with. It's online at:

https://www.mises.org/journals/jls/3_4/3_4_4.pdf

I think he provided sound reasoning there on why competing legal authorities would want open, transparent procedures. In many ways, this meshes with why, on a totally free market, healthy, sound firms would not hide financial information: they would want to display their vigor for all to see and those firms that didn't do so would be suspected by investors, customers, partners, and other third parties of having something to hide. This would increase things like borrowing costs for the latter. Would you loan to a firm that didn't want to tell you anything about its finances?

In much the same way, on a free market in justice and security, firms that didn't want open procedures would have a harder time getting investors, clients, and partners. Were you in the market for justice or security, would you hire or invest in a firm whose standards, procedures, and operations were secret or that you knew weren't likely to be widely accepted?

[George H. Smith]

There would also be no obligation by the exercisers of force to make those standards known to the populace at large. Consequently, law and its enforcement would not be objectified. That does not mean that some or all of the standards would not be objectively defined, but rather that they cannot be objectively known to the populace.

The above is not a quote from me.

Shit, sorry about that, Dan. The quote is obviously from one of Mike's posts. I messed up when I adjusted the HTML code. I just corrected my post.

Ghs

[tjohnson]

The idea of having a choice of which "justice provider" to use is novel to me but it sort of sounds like binding arbitration? But would this work for capital crimes like murder, etc.? Maybe I'm not getting it.

[dan2100]

The idea of having a choice of which "justice provider" to use is novel to me but it sort of sounds like binding arbitration? But would this work for capital crimes like murder, etc.? Maybe I'm not getting it.

I don't see any special problem with these, but I'm not sure what you're getting at. Did you have a specific example in mind?

[dan2100]

The above is not a quote from me.

Shit, sorry about that, Dan. The quote is obviously from one of Mike's posts. I messed up when I adjusted the HTML code. I just corrected my post.

Ghs

Thanks.

[tjohnson]

The idea of having a choice of which "justice provider" to use is novel to me but it sort of sounds like binding arbitration? But would this work for capital crimes like murder, etc.? Maybe I'm not getting it.

I don't see any special problem with these, but I'm not sure what you're getting at. Did you have a specific example in mind?

Well, suppose I come home and find my wife murdered, do I look in the yellow pages to hire a detective to investigate? If he finds a suspect do we hire a police agency to apprehend him? Then what? An arbitrator to decide if he's guilty? I'm confused.

[dan2100]

The idea of having a choice of which "justice provider" to use is novel to me but it sort of sounds like binding arbitration? But would this work for capital crimes like murder, etc.? Maybe I'm not getting it.

I don't see any special problem with these, but I'm not sure what you're getting at. Did you have a specific example in mind?

Well, suppose I come home and find my wife murdered, do I look in the yellow pages to hire a detective to investigate? If he finds a suspect do we hire a police agency to apprehend him? Then what? An arbitrator to decide if he's guilty? I'm confused.

That's a clear example and I understand some of your confusion -- simply because the idea is probably new and a straightforward application might seem a bit tricky. Let's look at what would happen now. I presume, living in Canada, you'd call the police and they do the investigation, perhaps find a suspect, and, if they had enough evidence or testimony, turn the case over to a public prosecutor to try him in a public court. Let's say he's convicted and found guilty. The court would then decide how to punish him.

Under free market anarchy, all aspects of this would be private and payment for the various legitimate services here would be voluntary. (In other words, everyone else in Canada wouldn't be taxed to fund security, policing, detection, arbitration, and other services you use. Still, they might contribute -- just as people voluntarily donate or pool resources even now under statism.) There are many ways this example might play out and some of the particulars would, no doubt, be radically different than what exists now or what one could imagine, but I think the likely cases are:

1) you try to self-help -- do all the work yourself (very unlikely unless you have the resources, ability, and will to do so)

2) you might get help from others

The latter case might involve an already existing relationship, such as you already deal with others for security and law services, or a new relationship, as in you start dealing with others for this specific case (or maybe going forward -- as in people who buy theft insurance after being robbed).

The existing relationship would likely be the easier of these two options for the second case. It might turn out to be much like reporting the incident to the police now. You call up, for instance, the firm you hired long ago for security. It might be a one stop shop thing -- as in the model offered up of insurance companies being the likely candidates for security firms under free market anarchy. In other words, you'd have insurance and part of the policy would cover things like personal protection, including crimes against person like murder. When something like that happens, the insurance company would either have its in house detectives, enforcement, and possibly judges/courts.

Or it might work with other firms -- maybe one that specializes in detection, forensics, and the like, another that deals with apprehension of suspects, and still another that deals with courtroom and other legal proceedings. (And to forestall Mike, the last would likely want its proceedings to be respected, so there'd be a strong incentive to have open proceedings and transparent standards and rulings.)

The same sort of thing might apply where you hire a firm after the incident. Now a problem that immediately comes to mind in this last instance is price. After all, if you have an insurance policy, the cost is likely to be low because, hopefully, murder and other crimes against person are rare. But if you come to an insurance or other firm with an instance of an actual murder, then you're no longer paying for a low probability event but for the actual occurence -- kind of like buying collision insurance for an accident that just happened.

[dan2100]

In an effort to spark more discussion on just how a market anarchist society might look in practice, here's an example culled from something I wrote a few years back on another forum that I think might concretize some aspects of the problem:

Imagine two people, Kristin and Erlend, in a society have a dispute over some land. Obviously, they might just resolve the dispute on amiable terms -- which happens often enough, but is not very interesting when considering political theory. What happens when they can't resolve it? One possibility is that either or both might use force to get their way -- and, sure enough, that happens quite often. However, using force has costs associated with it. One cost is that of losing. Perhaps Erlend's attempt to seize the land from Kristin will backfire and he might be injured or even killed in the process. Another cost is the cost of retaliation. Perhaps Erlend will successfully seize the land, but Kristin will burn down his house a few months later in retaliation. Yet another cost is the cost of third party intervention. Perhaps Erlend will successfully seize the land, but other parties who think Erlend doesn't have a just claim might intervene -- or he won't be successful because third parties come to Kirstin's aid. (At the margin, too, others might see Erlend and Kristin both weakened by using force and intervene to take some or all of the land or other stuff.)

I grant that in certain societies (and certainly with certain people in any society), these costs might be seen as low and that happens often enough. This applies to states too. If the cost of taking property or violating this or that other right is seen as low under a state, that doesn't bode well for the advocate of government. The advocate of government would have to show that the government will always or mostly be responsive to victims and against such violations -- and not merely state loudly that the government will protect individual rights.

Anyhow, the problem for Erlend and for Kristin is enforcing their claim -- and doing so with a low enough cost so that it's worth it. (Let's assume, for the moment, people won't waste all their wealth and their lives for the claim. If they will, then, even under a state, dispute resolution won't matter. Why? These are people who don't care, so the state would have to have to use brute force.) Why would they, under market anarchism, consider going to security firms (let's bundle courts, police, and the like together in one firm to simplify things) that abided by objective laws -- as opposed to firms that were unequivocally biased. For one thing, such firms are less likely to have to use force in the first place, since they don't piss off more people by routinely violating rights. For another, they have to worry less about retaliation, since fewer people are likely to fight what most think is a just decision. For still another, they don't draw in third parties to their disputes. (They carry this out by having clear, open procedures that most people would agree with or not strongly disagree with.)

Now, let's say Erlend is pigheaded and monomaniacal about this. He wants those hectares from Kristin's side of the valley and anyone who disagrees with him be damned. Let's say, further, too, that Kristin has already gone to a reputable firm and gotten her claim enforced. Let's say she really has the just claim here. The firm she's hired did the research on her claim and made all of this public because they found out she was, in fact, right. The firm has a strong incentive -- for future profits, to maintain reputation, and so forth -- to make public its findings -- and its rivals have a strong incentive to scrutinize it, especially if it tries to hide anything or use procedures that are shady.

Erlend is pissed and he wants to hire a firm that will help him get his unjust claim enforced. (The typical critic of market anarchism seems to believe, at this point, that people will be lining up to join Erlend's cause, since they only care about the quick buck to be made.) The problem for Erlend, however, is that few will respect his claim and any reputable firm knows trying to enforce his claim will result in higher costs, including injury to reputation. The higher costs will include that it might face retaliation from many sides, as firms that know it's taking the wrong side will see profit in weeding it out. (Why? It will not be able to call on allies.) In short, Erlend has to find a firm that doesn't care and is willing to take on the high costs. Such a firm is no better than the criminal gangs in today's societies. Now, of course, even this might not stop Erlend and his firm, but this sort of approach is likely to be rare anyhow... But should Erlend hire such a gang, he and his firm are still left with defending against retaliation and third party intervention. Erlend will likely also have to pay a much higher cost -- just as anyone who tries to use the mob today to enforce, say, a vendetta, faces a high cost: punishment by others and high charges from the mob. (And such extreme cases do happen, but the problem for any society is how often do they happen and with what severity. If they happen too often for any society -- one with or without a state -- then the society has big problems anyway and will end in civil war.)

[tjohnson]

I think the biggest issue in all this is getting people to recognize authority, whether it's private or public. This is part and parcel of "law and order". Even in public run systems if enough people disobey laws then they can't be enforced because it would use up too many resources. This whole thing hinges on people being "reasonable" (sane) and I think this is the ultimate goal of mankind. The question is can you get people to become reasonable by immersing them in a totally free system or do they have to be reasonable first before it will work?

[Brant Gaede]

I think the biggest issue in all this is getting people to recognize authority, whether it's private or public. This is part and parcel of "law and order". Even in public run systems if enough people disobey laws then they can't be enforced because it would use up too many resources. This whole thing hinges on people being "reasonable" (sane) and I think this is the ultimate goal of mankind. The question is can you get people to become reasonable by immersing them in a totally free system or do they have to be reasonable first before it will work?

"Recognize" or submit to?

--Brant

let's not mince words

[dan2100]

I think the biggest issue in all this is getting people to recognize authority, whether it's private or public. This is part and parcel of "law and order". Even in public run systems if enough people disobey laws then they can't be enforced because it would use up too many resources.

Yes, even Rand recognized this issue. That's a general problem that I believe all societies face. I believe anarchists ones have a leg up since any authority is respected (or, following Brant, submitted to) mostly consensually because individual consent can be removed at any time by everyone. (Of course, in some situations, you might point out, this doesn't matter -- say, when a particular individual is being coerced by a widely respected authority -- but it's at the margin where individuals have more power.)

This whole thing hinges on people being "reasonable" (sane) and I think this is the ultimate goal of mankind. The question is can you get people to become reasonable by immersing them in a totally free system or do they have to be reasonable first before it will work?

I don't think one needs any more reasonability or sanity than is normally seen. In other words, I don't think some sort of general reform of humanity is necessary to get along without government. There will still be social conflicts and problems of all sorts, but there will just be one less problem: that of statism.

Also, the argument you're using is similar, unintentionally I'm sure, than arguments against setting slaves free. I've read somewhere that some believed the slaves shouldn't be freed immediately or, for some, ever -- that giving them freedom without adequate preparation or some radical change in the slaves' natures would lead to social chaos or, at least, personal failure as slaves unaccustomed to choosely freely wouldn't know what to do.

[anonrobt]

I think the biggest issue in all this is getting people to recognize authority, whether it's private or public. This is part and parcel of "law and order". Even in public run systems if enough people disobey laws then they can't be enforced because it would use up too many resources.

Yes, even Rand recognized this issue. That's a general problem that I believe all societies face. I believe anarchists ones have a leg up since any authority is respected (or, following Brant, submitted to) mostly consensually because individual consent can be removed at any time by everyone. (Of course, in some situations, you might point out, this doesn't matter -- say, when a particular individual is being coerced by a widely respected authority -- but it's at the margin where individuals have more power.)

This whole thing hinges on people being "reasonable" (sane) and I think this is the ultimate goal of mankind. The question is can you get people to become reasonable by immersing them in a totally free system or do they have to be reasonable first before it will work?

I don't think one needs any more reasonability or sanity than is normally seen. In other words, I don't think some sort of general reform of humanity is necessary to get along without government. There will still be social conflicts and problems of all sorts, but there will just be one less problem: that of statism.

Also, the argument you're using is similar, unintentionally I'm sure, than arguments against setting slaves free. I've read somewhere that some believed the slaves shouldn't be freed immediately or, for some, ever -- that giving them freedom without adequate preparation or some radical change in the slaves' natures would lead to social chaos or, at least, personal failure as slaves unaccustomed to choosely freely wouldn't know what to do.

Besides, there is a difference between being rational and being reasonable...

[anonrobt]

I think the biggest issue in all this is getting people to recognize authority, whether it's private or public. This is part and parcel of "law and order". Even in public run systems if enough people disobey laws then they can't be enforced because it would use up too many resources.

Yes, even Rand recognized this issue. That's a general problem that I believe all societies face. I believe anarchists ones have a leg up since any authority is respected (or, following Brant, submitted to) mostly consensually because individual consent can be removed at any time by everyone. (Of course, in some situations, you might point out, this doesn't matter -- say, when a particular individual is being coerced by a widely respected authority -- but it's at the margin where individuals have more power.)

This whole thing hinges on people being "reasonable" (sane) and I think this is the ultimate goal of mankind. The question is can you get people to become reasonable by immersing them in a totally free system or do they have to be reasonable first before it will work?

I don't think one needs any more reasonability or sanity than is normally seen. In other words, I don't think some sort of general reform of humanity is necessary to get along without government. There will still be social conflicts and problems of all sorts, but there will just be one less problem: that of statism.

Also, the argument you're using is similar, unintentionally I'm sure, than arguments against setting slaves free. I've read somewhere that some believed the slaves shouldn't be freed immediately or, for some, ever -- that giving them freedom without adequate preparation or some radical change in the slaves' natures would lead to social chaos or, at least, personal failure as slaves unaccustomed to choosely freely wouldn't know what to do.

Besides, there is a difference between being rational and being reasonable... one can be rational and yet unreasonable [sane? or insane]

[mcm]

As a starting point in the minarchism/anarchism debate, the only fair comparison would be to compare one legitimate government with one legitimate competing agency, i.e., an agency that employs the same "objective" legal standards as your legitimate government.

This is not the starting point. Every government, legitimate or not, competes against other governments on the planet to be the defense agency of choice. The earth is a partial anarchy that has separate, exclusive, geographically defined jurisdictions for each agency, rather than the anarchy that has overlapping geographical jurisdictions and in which multiple agencies could legitimately operate in one location.

I am not arguing that there is any difference in the ability of any of these agencies to define and enforce a rational set of standards. My argument is that liberty requires that in any given region (=jurisdiction), only one constitution shall be enforced, and that no matter how many agencies or sub-jurisdictions there may be, ultimately there must be one body of oversight to certify compliance with that constitution.

That is what objectifies (enables to be a certainly known fact) the principles and standards that opt in that given region. It is what makes the laws and their enforcement known and therefore predictable to all subject to them. It does not guarantee that the laws will be rational, but only that they will be known. We are discussing the proper system to govern when the founders and sustainers of the government are rational. That those men can be irrational is not relevant.

Would there exist illegitimate agencies in an anarchist society? Yes, probably, just as there exist illegitimate governments today. But how to deal with these illegitimate agencies and governments is a different issue.

To the contrary, that is not a different issue. It is precisely the issue at hand. And it is over the very difference between bad agencies and bad governments. Bad governments come one to each particular geographic region. And one needs only one rational government to take hold in one single region to effect full liberty. And one needs to persuade only a majority of the citizens in that region to attain it.

Bad agencies, on the other hand, can multiply spontaneously, secretly and infinitely within one particular geographic region. For full liberty in a region under anarchy, all of the agencies would have to be as good as that one rational government in a crowd of bad governments. Or, the rational agencies would have to outnumber the irrational ones and act in league to subordinate them to rational law, which would make said league a third party institution with a monopoly on the standards for using force — a government.

Can you give a persuasive argument as to why a government is obligated to make its legal standards "known to the populace at large"? ...

Yes: Over half the value of liberty is in the justifiable expectation of it. So far, nothing you or other anarchists have said have dissuaded me from the notion that this sentence is the Achilles heel of anarchy. I discovered it while trying to answer your next question when someone else asked it awhile back. It is the only question any anarchist ever asked me to which the answer was not obvious on the face of it.

In short, what is the justification for a government threatening to initiate force against an agency that has not violated or threatened to violate anyone's rights, indeed, an agency that meets all of your own standards for objective justice?

Any institution or agency of defensive force that allows other agencies to exercise defensive force that is not subject to oversight to objectify their compliance with the standards (constitution) of that institution/agency, effectively enables the arbitrary use of force in its jurisdiction. The uncertainty and anxiety that results from living in a region subject to arbitrary force is as destructive of liberty as is initiated force. It cripples the ability to project one's actions into the future. It undermines thereby one's ability to be productive and to achieve contentment. It is, therefore, a contradiction to advocate the exercise of defensive force arbitrarily to protect or preserve the benefits of liberty.

It appears to be a paradox at first glance, but at the fundament it is clearly a contradiction. The specific contradiction is that "free market anarchism" demands a right to the arbitrary exercise of objective force — i.e., the irrational exercise of rational force.