An axiomatic paradox?

[BaalChatzaf]

Is this absolutely the case? Sorry Paul, I am just busting your chops a bit. Kindly forgive.

Ba'al Chatzaf

This represents an illegitimate totality. You cannot use the current statement as an argument for itself as this leads to a vicious circle which Baal has demonstrated.

I have not demonstrated a thing. I was fooling around.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[tjohnson]

I have not demonstrated a thing. I was fooling around.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Glad to hear it. I was worried that others might take it seriously.

[Paul Mawdsley]

--though absolute knowledge of reality is a limit we can never reach--

Paul

Is this absolutely the case? Sorry Paul, I am just busting your chops a bit. Kindly forgive.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Your just living up to your title.

Edited September 20, 2008 by Paul Mawdsley

[Paul Mawdsley]

--though absolute knowledge of reality is a limit we can never reach--

Paul

Is this absolutely the case? Sorry Paul, I am just busting your chops a bit. Kindly forgive.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Addendum: "Is this absolutely the case?" Taking the question seriously, I don't absolutely know if it is absolutely the case. I am contextually certain it is the case because it fits my understanding of human nature and the nature of existence, and I have not yet found it to have been falsified. In my mind I am certain given the subjective context of my understanding and the assumptions that underlie my understanding. Of course there may be evidence I have not considered or assumptions I hold that I have not identified, or that are mistaken, in shaping my understanding of human nature and the nature of existence.

Science works so well because it does a good job of establishing controls for the influence of our subjective context. Metaphysics has no such controls built in. An objective metaphysics (not to be confused with Objectivist metaphysics) requires the exploration and identification of our underlying assumptions and understanding. The poor job done on this exploration and identification of our subjective context has been the weakness of metaphysics to date.

However, there are metaphysical assumptions at the root of science-- e.g.: the nature of causality-- that bring an element of subjective context into science regardless of the controls. This is why a deeper exploration of the nature of causation, as a foundation of our subjective context and an element of metaphysics in science, is so important. It changes how we interpret the evidence and the mathematical language we use to describe it, in the same way our own subjective context determines how we interpret the meaning of other people's words. Our assumptions and understanding, whether consciously explored and identified or not, shape how we interpret our world. My general point is that we need to pay more attention to exploring and identifying the assumptions and understanding of our subjective context if we are to more reliably bring our perspective closer to the truth.

Paul

Edited September 20, 2008 by Paul Mawdsley

[tjohnson]

However, there are metaphysical assumptions at the root of science-- e.g.: the nature of causality-- that bring an element of subjective context into science regardless of the controls. This is why a deeper exploration of the nature of causation, as a foundation of our subjective context and an element of metaphysics in science, is so important. It changes how we interpret the evidence and the mathematical language we use to describe it, in the same way our own subjective context determines how we interpret the meaning of other people's words. Our assumptions and understanding, whether consciously explored and identified or not, shape how we interpret our world. My general point is that we need to pay more attention to exploring and identifying the assumptions and understanding of our subjective context if we are to more reliably bring our perspective closer to the truth.

I think there is a lot of truth in the proposition that constantly noticing a process, event, etc. over a period of time leads one to assume a causal connection between events. Also it when this sequence ceases to be true that we are compelled to look more closely. Invariably we find another level of "reality" with new events and we have a new feeling of causality.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

GS,

How about the causality of the process of observation itself?

Is that absolute or just absolutely taken for granted in the absolute claim that nothing is absolute?

Michael

[tjohnson]

GS,

How about the causality of the process of observation itself?

Is that absolute or just absolutely taken for granted in the absolute claim that nothing is absolute?

Michael

Cool, the word 'absolute' appeared 4 times in that sentence! B)

[Paul Mawdsley]

I think there is a lot of truth in the proposition that constantly noticing a process, event, etc. over a period of time leads one to assume a causal connection between events. Also it when this sequence ceases to be true that we are compelled to look more closely. Invariably we find another level of "reality" with new events and we have a new feeling of causality.

This is exactly what Rand's concepts of identity and causality, as epistemic principles, are. The statement, "What a thing is determines what it does," describes a model of "another level of 'reality.'"

Hume brought the idea, that we can know the nature of causality just by observing it, to an end. Therefore, the assumed necessary connection of contiguous events is a theory. According to what I have read on OL, Popper shows that induction is an invalid epistemic method (please correct me if I am mistaken) which should be replaced with the epistemic method of observation, theory generation, and error elimination through critical testing and exposure to falsification. Observations that support quantum theory and observations of self-generated motion (the entity that moves causing the initiation of action-- e.g.: will), found in animate motion and consciousness, show that our action-to-action view of causation, which is assumed by science, is falsified. Rand built a new theory of the nature of causality that views the necessary connection to be between what a thing is and what it does-- between its identity and its behaviour. Rand built metaphysical models of existence based on this new theory of causality. And she made the claim that knowledge is contextual, which seems to mean, it is right if we can't detect where its wrong (again, tell me if I am mistaken). But this is not good enough to satisfy Poppers requirement of generating predictions and exposure to falsification.

We can only be certain that our theory of causality is true to the extent that we have identified and evaluated the underlying assumptions, the theory is internally consistent, it produces measurable predictions that are consistent with observations (integrates the whole class of observations it was meant to explain without contradiction with those observations), and it is systematically tested through exposure of its predictions to falsification. This requires the objectifying of metaphysics by building models from metaphysical principles, generating testable predictions, and exposure to falsification. If the entire class of phenomena a theory is intended to explain--in the case of causality, all of existence-- is integrated without internal contradiction, makes predictions which are not contradicted by any observation, while systematically exposing it to possible falsification, we will then be justified in our assumption of contextual certainty. But, to emphasize, this requires the generation of testable predictions and systematic exposure to falsification. This has not been a strength of metaphysical models of existence in general, nor Rand's in particular. This is a requirement for an objective metaphysics. To be fair to Rand, her strengths were the identification and evaluation of the underlying assumptions and the internal consistency of her models. She just needed more reality testing in her philosophy and her personal life.

An objective metaphysics would not be different in substance, or in the principles of method, from science. It is just working from a different context, or perspective, using different mental processes in a different order. An objective metaphysics works from observations, to general principles, to generating a holistic model of existence, to fitting the particulars into the model, to generating predictions, to testing those predictions with observations. Science works from observations, to generating general principles, to piecing together the particulars, to generating predictions, to testing those predictions with observations, to building a theory of everything with well tested theories. Ultimately each, using the same standard of truth, should reach the same conclusions. Where they produce disagreement, judgement and new theories are required.

Paul

[Paul Mawdsley]

You might be right, Paul, about the spirit in which DF's quip was intended. Coming in the context in which it appears, however, it seemed to me to be indicating censure for GS's treatment here.

DF can clarify how he meant the remark, if he wants to.

Meanwhile, it occurred to me that rather than "trolling," an accurate description for GS's participation here is "intellectual loitering" -- "standing around," as it were, throwing in various remarks and questions but never showing a willingness to crack open some books -- not even ITOE -- and do some study of the basics of the philosophy around which this list is organized. When he continues to ask, after a year and 2 months of posting here, what O'ists mean by various terms, this is past the time for concluding that he isn't serious about participating. He reminds me of those students -- whose number keeps increasing -- who think that they should receive a decent grade simply in return for showing up for class.

Ellen,

GS is a loiterer. I'll buy that. I have to admit I wouldn't be able to participate here without reading at least Atlas, even if he skips Galt's speech. I think you get the best of Rand and Objectivism from her fiction. It better communicates the benevolent spirit.

Hey GS, you're not just any loiterer, you're the jazz musician playing in the subway at Union Station. You are not really there to assist the transit company or the passengers. I guess the estimate of your value depends on whether or not a person likes jazz.

Paul

[tjohnson]

Hume brought the idea, that we can know the nature of causality just by observing it, to an end. Therefore, the assumed necessary connection of contiguous events is a theory. According to what I have read on OL, Popper shows that induction is an invalid epistemic method (please correct me if I am mistaken) which should be replaced with the epistemic method of observation, theory generation, and error elimination through critical testing and exposure to falsification. Observations that support quantum theory and observations of self-generated motion (the entity that moves causing the initiation of action-- e.g.: will), found in animate motion and consciousness, show that our action-to-action view of causation, which is assumed by science, is falsified. Rand built a new theory of the nature of causality that views the necessary connection to be between what a thing is and what it does-- between its identity and its behaviour. Rand built metaphysical models of existence based on this new theory of causality. And she made the claim that knowledge is contextual, which seems to mean, it is right if we can't detect where its wrong (again, tell me if I am mistaken). But this is not good enough to satisfy Poppers requirement of generating predictions and exposure to falsification.

As Bob said;

Hume made a relevant point. He said that some of our metaphysical convictions are based on habit and custom. We believe in causes because we habitually or repetitively observe conjoined events in our experience. Which gets us back to the habit of induction. It seems humans cannot shake this habit.

and;

Furthermore I have pointed out, on several occasions, that physical science is primarily -abductive- (in the sense of Peirce) rather than -inductive- (in the sense of Francis Bacon). The inference of causes from the constant conjunction of event types is a nifty example of -abduction-, not induction. Just to keep the terminology straight, abduction is hypothesizing to causes. From the effect, derive the cause. Basic Hume. Pure Peirce.

I believe we are speaking the same language.

[tjohnson]

Hey GS, you're not just any loiterer, you're the jazz musician playing in the subway at Union Station. You are not really there to assist the transit company or the passengers. I guess the estimate of your value depends on whether or not a person likes jazz.

Paul

If you make it James Taylor I will agree. (or possibly Paul Simon)

[Paul Mawdsley]

Hey GS, you're not just any loiterer, you're the jazz musician playing in the subway at Union Station. You are not really there to assist the transit company or the passengers. I guess the estimate of your value depends on whether or not a person likes jazz.

Paul

If you make it James Taylor I will agree. (or possibly Paul Simon)

If I had guessed, I would have said you were in the folk to classic rock end of the music spectrum. It fits your laid back style and what little I know about you. Jazz made for a better metaphor because it requires a deeper musical understanding to be appreciated and people often strongly like or dislike it. There is evidence that some have a strong dislike for what you contribute on OL, I would say, because they don't understand where you are coming from well enough to appreciate it. How many people do you know who have a strong dislike for or misunderstand where James Taylor or Paul Simon are coming from?

Paul

Edited September 21, 2008 by Paul Mawdsley

[Ellen Stuttle]

There is evidence that some have a strong dislike for what you [GS] contribute on OL, I would say, because they don't understand where you are coming from well enough to appreciate it.

Do you allow for the possibility of understanding where he's coming from and therefore disliking it?

Paul, what you did with that very comment is (part of) what Mindy objects to: You invalidate criticisms of what GS says by attributing the criticisms to a lack in the people making them.

It isn't that such things don't happen, that there aren't cases of people not appreciating something because of not understanding it. But by doing what you did in that comment, you put anyone who finds substantive flaws in GS's posts in the situation of being psychologically accused.

I, btw, don't have any strong dislike for GS's posting here. His laziness irritates me, but only in a mild degree.

There are a number of aspects of the substance of his views, however, which I consider badly wrong and part of the picture of the post-modern threat to science. I think that I see those issues clearly, whereas you do not. But if I were to discuss those issues with you, I'd discuss the issues not imply that you're prevented from being able to understand them because of a "lens" through which you're looking. Do you see the difference?

Ellen

PS: It will take me an hour at least to address your post #283, and I don't have the hour to spare right now. Maybe this week.

___

Edited September 22, 2008 by Ellen Stuttle

[Paul Mawdsley]

There is evidence that some have a strong dislike for what you [GS] contribute on OL, I would say, because they don't understand where you are coming from well enough to appreciate it.

Do you allow for the possibility of understanding where he's coming from and therefore disliking it?

Paul, what you did with that very comment is (part of) what Mindy objects to: You invalidate criticisms of what GS says by attributing the criticisms to a lack in the people making them.

I do "allow for the possibility of understanding where he's coming from and therefore disliking it." But, having experienced being very misinterpreted, and having witnessed MSK (for example) being quite misinterpreted on various threads, the evidence leads me to conclude otherwise in this specific situation.

I am seeing misinterpretation as a pattern that needs to be explained. I am looking for an explanation. I am seeing patterns of misinterpretation all over the place, not just on OL and not just with me as a participant, that strike me as pointing to a specific causal dynamic or identifiable phenomena. And I am seeing how much interpretive lenses, or subjective contexts, or the ways we frame our understanding, affects what we conclude. Not that this necessarily makes our perspectives relative because we have the ability to generate a perspective of perspectives, an interpretation of interpretations, a metacontext of contexts, which can allow us to evaluate the degree of relativeness of our own perspectives (e.g.: the amount we have put effort into understanding the assumptions and principles that have shaped ours and someone else's perspective as opposed to just categorizing perspectives) and make it less relative (or closer to the truth). We can all ask ourselves if we have taken the time to understand how someone else arrived at their point of view. Is the only problem here that someone else (me) is asking this question?

Let me try to illustrate. I was watching my wife talking to my son (he's 8) the other morning about a book he was supposed to read for which he was to write a summary for school. He had brought the book home this weekend complaining that he had to read over a hundred pages and complete this summary by Monday. Upon a little investigation Shauna discovered he had been given the book 3 weeks ago and was given class time to read it which he used to do other work.

Shauna could have taken two approaches: the first would be to take the contrary position, as an adversary to his position, and point out the weakness of his position; the second was to take a position that understood how he reached this point but explored, as collaborators, how he could think about a plan for doing things differently next time. Knowing the first approach would only produce resistance, defensiveness, and a clash of wills, Shauna opted for the second.

Now here's my point. No matter how much she tried to get Lucas to shift perspectives into the role of collaborators, he was in a mood of resistance and defense that would not let him break out of an adversarial framework. His body language and intonation showed his resistance and defensiveness. He saw it only as a clash of wills. Communication broke down because he, in this moment, could not shift perspectives from that of adversaries occupying opposite poles in a disagreement to that of collaborators working together to create solutions to a problem. It ended with Lucas' adversarial framework being reinforced because his inability to shift frameworks frustrated Shauna's efforts and caused her to shift into an adversarial framework.

Viewing social dynamics though an adversarial lens creates a self-fulfilling prophecy. Shauna was not agitated by Lucas not taking care of his homework responsibilities. She was agitated by his resistance to shift out of an adversarial framework. Lucas did not interpret it as Shauna being agitated at his adversarial stance. He interpreted it as her being agitated at him not taking care of his homework responsibilities. Bottom line: communication broke down, despite best efforts, all because contexts would not align.

If you want to understand my perspective in this thread, or anywhere, start by assuming I am always looking to create a shared context of collaborators. If I refer to someone's not shifting contexts to deepen understanding, it is an attempt to explain a pattern I have noticed, not an accusation. I am not saying the essence of someone is to be locked in some perspective. I am saying that people can process information in a way that can lock them in some perspective and this might (read hypothesis to be tested) be the cause of a breakdown in communication. The only time I break from looking for a shared context of collaborators is when I judge someone to be disrespecting my perspective and dignity(think of my reaction to Nick Otani). I have not judged anyone in this thread to be disrespecting my perspective and dignity so I have continued to try to form a common context of collaborators (although I think Mindy might have come close with her "As for understanding Paul's perspective, I think we all do," comment).

It isn't that such things don't happen, that there aren't cases of people not appreciating something because of not understanding it. But by doing what you did in that comment, you put anyone who finds substantive flaws in GS's posts in the situation of being psychologically accused.

No I'm not. It puts the onus on those finding "substantive flaws" to understand his context first. It's not enough to just categorize and label him from outside the context in which he operates. It's not just whether he has flaws from an objectivist perspective, from a Popperian perspective, from a Brantian perspective, or from an Ellenian perspective. It's not just whether he is being logical from Dragonfly's perspective. What is GS's perspective, what are the principles it is built upon, and does it make sense. Who has inquired into how GS has arrived at his conclusions to the point where they can point out mistakes in his thinking from within the context he operates? Without this, any perceived flaws amount to he's wrong because what he says does not fit with how I think about things.

If one starts with the assumption that they are dealing with a person of an intelligence roughly equal to their own (until proven otherwise), then one starts with the idea that one should not assume someone is wrong, or has substantial flaws, or is illogical until one has attempted to generate a context that could rationally and consistently arrive at the same conclusions. Not knowing how someone arrives at some conclusion is not the same as knowing he is mistaken. To emphasize, categorizing is not understanding. Generating a model of processes is understanding. Until you generate a model of someone's processes, you don't have a falsifiable theory of their flaws. All you have is an accusation.

(Interesting, I have been accused of accusation when I was presenting a model of someone's processes that can be falsified. And those accusing me have been categorizing my behaviour, not generating a model of my processes that can be falsified. I know Popper talks somewhere about the difference between science and pseudo-science. I wonder if this is related?)

I, btw, don't have any strong dislike for GS's posting here. His laziness irritates me, but only in a mild degree.

If I understand him, it's not laziness. I didn't read a book cover to cover until I was 18 (if you don't count comic books). It wasn't laziness. It was resistance to letting someone else's ideas shape my thinking. I learned by going out and exploring my world first hand and building my own theories. This is the essence of my early anti-academic stance (btw--I've been working on another post to respond to previous posts). I was able to make it through grade school by having my theory development keep pace with what was being taught (this was especially evident in math). I began to stumble later in high school which lead me to accept the need to read more. By my second year at university I had learned to devour books that could guide the development of my own theories.

If I am right, GS doesn't see reading Rand's books as the right course to take to expand his theories of his existence, so he is not motivated to read them. But I'm sure he reads other books and he hones his ideas here on OL.

There are a number of aspects of the substance of his views, however, which I consider badly wrong and part of the picture of the post-modern threat to science. I think that I see those issues clearly, whereas you do not. But if I were to discuss those issues with you, I'd discuss the issues not imply that you're prevented from being able to understand them because of a "lens" through which you're looking. Do you see the difference?

I do see the difference. I am not implying an inability due to some static lens that may be genetically programed. I am implying that we have the ability to dynamically shift lenses and we sometime use a lens that creates distortion and stops communication. I am trying to raise the idea of shifting lenses as a matter for discussion and a theory to be tested, not as a trump card to make myself right.

The idea of lenses that can be created and we can shift between explains and predicts certain behaviours. One thing it explains and predicts is people of good will, who are intent on communicating and, in fact, like each other, can misinterpret each others meaning, motives and intentions because they cannot align their thoughts within a shared context. The objectivity of science generally helps to prevent this because there is an "out there" that assists with the alignment. But as science approaches the boundaries of metaphysics, as with the issue of causality in quantum interpretations, even great people such as Einstein and Bohr, who genuinely liked and respected each other, were unable to create a common context and ended up taking adversarial positions. The key to resolving this is being able to understand the processes that generate someone else's context so you can generate a context of contexts and find resolution. If both parties can gain a shared context of contexts, they can work together as collaborators to create resolution between disparate conclusions. It's unfortunate that a winner had to be decided, instead of a shared context formed, between Einstein and Bohr.

Question: do you see any value in post-modernism? I have to be honest, I am not overly familiar with it because its relativistic principles make me role my eyes an turn the other way. However, I did find a great little nugget: the view of causality it espouses. It views entities as nodes in a web of relationships who's actions are shaped by the web as a whole. This is whole-to-part causation whereas Objectivism presents part-to-whole causation-- i.e.: what a thing is determines what it does. Unifying these two views produces a much more powerful concept of causation that can be used to explore the objective metaphysics that underlies quantum reality, social dynamics, the dynamics of the psyche, and more.

Post-modernism will collapse under its own unsupported weight when the principles it heralds are integrated into a more objective metaphysics. Right now it is only supported by the fact that it resonates with some people's experience of existence who can't find this connection in a more objective metaphysics. It is not a threat. Not understanding how to integrate its more attractive principles into a more objective metaphysics is the threat. What GS is saying, and as far as I can tell I agree, does not so much support a post-modern perspective as point in the direction in which an objective metaphysics must explore. GS is inviting us to destroy the "post-modern threat to science."

I wonder, Ellen, who sees these issues more clearly? You may be underestimating me. I'm not particularly well read but, if I can break issues down into my images, I can think with anyone.

Paul

PS-- After the length of this post I'm scared to put up another post.

PPS-- Ellen, I wouldn't want you to misinterpret my last comment. I have no doubt that you have access to much more information than I regarding the effects of post-modernism on science. The question of clarity I reflect back to you is on the theoretical understanding of the relationship between GS's perspective and the post-modern threat to science.

Edited September 22, 2008 by Paul Mawdsley

[Mindy Newton]

So it's not just me picking this up that Rand thinks this dichotomy is false. And if Rand is leading a "revolt against the dualism" as Sciabarra claims, then why stop at the king of them all, the mind/brain dualism?

Mind you, her "revolt against the dualism" seems to also get interpreted as a "revolt against monism", so it's deuces wild AFAICS...;-)

It's far from just you. I've had debates with staunch O'ists who think she held no form of mind/brain dualism, but I think her theory of volition at minimum has to imply property dualism. Plus she railed against both materialism and idealism. Possibly a case could be made for dual-aspect monism. But how does one limit dual-aspect monism only to humans? And how does one get her theory of volition from dual-aspect monism? Also, she more than a few times spoke of "man" as being "an integration of mind and body," but how can one have an "integration" of only one something?

I haven't time for digging up cites now, but I think quite a bit can be found which casts doubt on her having been a monist. Thus my evaluation is that she was at minimum an undeclared property dualist. And despite her negative remarks about Descartes' views, I've long thought that her "model" is a close look-alike to his: He described other animals as being automata and believed that the soul activated the human body through the pineal gland as the point of contact. She likewise drew a sharp contrast between humans and other animals (ascribing to humans alone a "level" of consciousness which needs to be volitionally activated), and she made "the choice to think or not to think" the prime determinant of human behavior. She didn't anywhere I know of say how she thought the prime choice results in action, but somehow it has to be doing this according to her theory.

Ellen

Edit: I originally wrote, being tired and muggy-headed at the time, "process dualist." I meant the term "property dualist." For a quick synopsis of the meaning of "property dualism," see.

___

This is an interesting topic. I'm wondering why you find a need to limit dual-aspect theory to humans. Dual-aspect admits of degrees of IQ and related capacities. It is adequate IQ that doesn't pertain to lesser animals. No?

= Mindy

Edited September 22, 2008 by Mindy

[Ellen Stuttle]

[....] I've had debates with staunch O'ists who think she held no form of mind/brain dualism, but I think her theory of volition at minimum has to imply property dualism. Plus she railed against both materialism and idealism. Possibly a case could be made for dual-aspect monism. But how does one limit dual-aspect monism only to humans? And how does one get her theory of volition from dual-aspect monism? Also, she more than a few times spoke of "man" as being "an integration of mind and body," but how can one have an "integration" of only one something?

This is an interesting topic. I'm wondering why you find a need to limit dual-aspect theory to humans. Dual-aspect admits of degrees of IQ and related capacities. It is adequate IQ that doesn't pertain to lesser animals. No?

Mindy, my point re dual-aspect monism is that, given Rand's ideas on the sharp disjunct between human and other-animal consciousness, I think that she would have had to limit dual-aspect monism to humans if dual-aspect monism was the theory-type she held. I'm just pointing out that if she was dual-aspect monist in her views, I think that she had consistency problems. (I doubt that she ever gave much thought to the intricacies of mind-body issues; I'm just posing the possibilities as to how her theory of human consciousness might be categorized.)

Ellen

___

[Ellen Stuttle]

Paul,

I read through your post #289. I'm going to speak frankly now while I'm feeling this strongly:

In all the time I've known you in listland, you've never before angered me. I'm angered now, and I'm feeling, oh, hell, never mind; just forget it and drop it.

Ellen

___

[Mindy Newton]

Mindy, my point re dual-aspect monism is that, given Rand's ideas on the sharp disjunct between human and other-animal consciousness, I think that she would have had to limit dual-aspect monism to humans if dual-aspect monism was the theory-type she held. I'm just pointing out that if she was dual-aspect monist in her views, I think that she had consistency problems. (I doubt that she ever gave much thought to the intricacies of mind-body issues; I'm just posing the possibilities as to how her theory of human consciousness might be categorized.)

Ellen

___

Oops, I didn't make myself clear. I do realize you were discussing Rand's implicit views. I was wondering about how you chose to describe Rand, implicitly, as dual-property versus dual-aspect. I subscribe to the dual-aspect view, myself. I think what that theory needs is an explanation as to why, and how the aspects come to be had.

I'm not sure a dual-property view gets you anywhere. Metaphysically, you still have to explain the duo, including interaction, don't you?

= Mindy

[Ellen Stuttle]

Mindy, my point re dual-aspect monism is that, given Rand's ideas on the sharp disjunct between human and other-animal consciousness, I think that she would have had to limit dual-aspect monism to humans if dual-aspect monism was the theory-type she held. I'm just pointing out that if she was dual-aspect monist in her views, I think that she had consistency problems. (I doubt that she ever gave much thought to the intricacies of mind-body issues; I'm just posing the possibilities as to how her theory of human consciousness might be categorized.)

Ellen

___

Oops, I didn't make myself clear. I do realize you were discussing Rand's implicit views. I was wondering about how you chose to describe Rand, implicitly, as dual-property versus dual-aspect. I subscribe to the dual-aspect view, myself. I think what that theory needs is an explanation as to why, and how the aspects come to be had.

I'm not sure a dual-property view gets you anywhere. Metaphysically, you still have to explain the duo, including interaction, don't you?

= Mindy

For one reason, because of the sharp disjunct she draws, instead of the idea of a gradation, between human and other-animal consciousness. For another because of her speaking of man as "an integration of mind and body" -- and how do you have an "integration" of only one something? Wouldn't the "integration" imply at least property dualism?

On the other hand, there are some hints of dual-aspect in some things Nathaniel has reported discussing with her. I don't have the cites immediately available and haven't time to search for them now. I think they're somewhere on this board.

A problem I see with dual-aspect is that, when pushed, it results in pan-psychism, everything having some degree of consciousness. As I recall, Chalmers a number of years ago "bit the bullet" and acceded to that implication. (It's been awhile since I've read anything about where he's gotten to, and I haven't had time to finish Damasio's Searching for Spinoza -- ? if that's the exact title -- though I did start it. I think he's trying for a dual-aspect theory.)

Ellen

Edit: I originally wrote "pan-consciousness." "Pan-psychism" is the term generally used; it means everything having some shred of sentience.

___

Edited September 22, 2008 by Ellen Stuttle

[Mindy Newton]

Ellen,

Your point about integration is undeniable. There is still epistemological integration in aspect-dualism. Doesn't property-dualism imply an overlying aspect-dualism? Anything that isn't eliminativist does, it seems to me.

I don't see how pan-psychism is implied, but I will do a little research on that.

= Mindy

[Brant Gaede]

Paul,

I read through your post #289. I'm going to speak frankly now while I'm feeling this strongly:

In all the time I've known you in listland, you've never before angered me. I'm angered now, and I'm feeling, oh, hell, never mind; just forget it and drop it.

You must understand him then. I don't; I stopped reading him, lacking interest in understanding his "context" or useless epistemological inquiries, if they be inquiries.

What Paul might do is talk about extant scientific methodology--method--and explain how he can improve it with his ideas, wherever they came from, whatever they are. That'd be real and important. Or, simply explain how they improve logic and reasoning.

--Brant

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Paul,

I read through your post #289. I'm going to speak frankly now while I'm feeling this strongly:

In all the time I've known you in listland, you've never before angered me. I'm angered now, and I'm feeling, oh, hell, never mind; just forget it and drop it.

Ellen

___

Dayaamm!

I had just skimmed post #289 because it was so long. This made me want to read it carefully, which I did.

Ellen's lovely when she gets miffed.

Paul outlines perfectly the process of what I call the cognitive part in judging a person, judging being the normative part. (I believe we have to correctly identify something before we can judge it correctly.) I didn't read Paul saying one should not judge a person. All I read him saying was that one should understand a person in order to correctly judge him.

If people are interested in judging GS (and I am one who does judge him), the path most likely to lead to a correct evaluation is looking at him from different angles (or lenses or metacontexts or whatever one wants to call this). One fundamental angle is trying to look at the world through his eyes. If you leave that out, you run a serious risk of judging something that doesn't even exist, but attributing it to him.

(At this very moment I tried to see the world through GS's eyes and all I wanted to do is get high, but that's another issue. I had to give all that stuff up. )

In terms of the accusation leveled at Paul, I do not see him saying, "You folks do not understand GS because you won't or can't." I understand him to be saying, "I have seen no indication of people who are judging GS to see the issues from his angle. I believe they leave out important information. Since I have observed this information and speculated on it, I do not agree with their judgments."

Paul also stated quite well what happens when the cognitive part (identification) is done incorrectly: communication breaks down. The popular way to say this is that one person places words in the mouth of the other. The implied add-on at the end is "then judges the person."

As an artist, I find this subject interesting in its own right as a primary challenge. The only communication that breaks down with this process is conceptual language. But there are other forms of communication. The artist's job is to step outside conceptual language and still communicate a vision or idea. Sometimes a quip or an outburst, etc., does more to communicate this than a reasoned explanation because it cuts through prejudice and hits a person from another angle.

(Or lens... or metacontext... )

Michael

[Paul Mawdsley]

Paul,

I read through your post #289. I'm going to speak frankly now while I'm feeling this strongly:

In all the time I've known you in listland, you've never before angered me. I'm angered now, and I'm feeling, oh, hell, never mind; just forget it and drop it.

Ellen

___

I'm in awe.

Paul

[Paul Mawdsley]

Ellen,

I am trying to figure this out. What angered you? I am genuinely confused and want to understand. Michael seems to have a very different read on what I said that aligns much more with what I was trying to communicate. Why am I not able to get you to interpret it the same way? Is it how I'm saying it, how you are processing it, or a bit of both that is causing the breakdown? To the best of my judgement there is nothing in my intended message that should offend. Aside from its length and what has been called my use of jargon, why does it offend so?

Paul

Edited September 22, 2008 by Paul Mawdsley

[Ellen Stuttle]

Paul,

One of the things which angers me is precisely the length. Did you not see the PS to my post, in which I said it would take me at least an hour to respond to your #283 and that I didn't have the time (but might be able to manage it this week)? Plus you know (or at least you have been told several times) that e-list work is a physical ordeal for me at the best of times.

So then you respond with a hugely long post, which would take me at least a whole afternoon to answer in any detail.

That's starters.

In addition, it's the continued thrust of what you're saying.

Look, I don't care a damn about judging GS as a person. (Notice Michael's post; you seem to think he's reading you correctly. He gets a message pertaining to the issue of what one has to do to judge a person.) GS sometimes mildly irritates me because of his laconicly lackadaisical posting style and his continued refusal so much as to read ITOE, while he meanwhile repeats questions about what O'ists mean by certain terms. But GS, personally, isn't any concern of mine. Nor have I typically bothered to try to have any dialogue with him. (You could have found that latter out if you'd looked back through the history of his posting. You'd find that mostly I've ignored him.)

I think that his ideas are full of inconsistencies. I also think that inconsistency is no big deal to him, since amongst his ideas is that 2-value logic is outmoded, so what does an inconsistency matter? I don't think I'd get anywhere in a discussion with him. I have no desire to bother to try, except every now and then when I've prodded with a few questions.

I have no doubt he's sincere, that what he says makes sense to him. I don't care if it makes sense to him or not. I don't care about psyching into his perspective and empathisizing with where he's coming from. Specifics of what he says I very well recognize as being a dime a dozen in various academic venues. There I care about the specifics because I see what they lead to. But convincing GS of anything is not even remotely on my agenda.

The net result of this whole GS episode is that we keep getting farther from not closer to discussing any substance. And at this point I'm feeling devoid of the desire to try to refocus the discussion with you on substantive issues. Maybe I'll feel differently later.

Ellen

___

Edited September 23, 2008 by Ellen Stuttle