The function of language

[tjohnson]

If we look at humans from physiological point of view what would say is the main function of language? We all have hearts that function as pumps but it turns out many of us abuse them by our lifestyles and actually impede their ability to function. Similarly we all have nervous systems that can produce and respond to language so is it possible we can impede our nervous system by improper use of language?

The old dictum that we ‘are’ animals leaves us hopeless, but if we merely copy animals in our

nervous responses, we can stop it, and the hopeless becomes very hopeful, provided we can

discover a physiological difference in these reactions. Thus we are provided with a definite and

promising program for an investigation.

Such an investigation is undertaken in the present volume.

The result of this enquiry turned out to be a non-aristotelian system, the first to be formulated,

as far as I know, and the first to express the very scientific tendency of our epoch, which produced

the non-euclidean and non-newtonian (Einstein’s and the newer quantum theories ) systems. It

seems that these three, the non-aristotelian, non-euclidean and non-newtonian systems are as much

interwoven and interdependent as were the corresponding older systems. The aristotelian and the

non-aristotelian systems are the more general, the others being only special and technical consequences

arising from them.

Both the aristotelian and the non-aristotelian systems affect our lives deeply, because of

psycho-logical factors and the immediacy of their application. Each is the expression of the

psycho-logical tendencies of its period. Each in its period must produce in the younger generations

a psycho-logical background which makes the understanding of its appropriate disciplines

‘natural’ and simple. In an aristotelian human world the euclidean and newtonian systems are

‘natural’, while the youth educated in the non-aristotelian habits will find the non-euclidean and

non-newtonian systems simpler, more ‘natural’, and the older systems ‘unthinkable’.

The functioning of the human nervous system is a more generalized affair than that of the

animal, with more possibilities. The latter is a special case of the former, but not vice versa. John

Smith, through ignorance of the mechanism, may use his nervous system as a Fido; but Fido

cannot copy Smith. Hence, the danger for Smith, but not for Fido. Fido has many of his own

difficulties for survival, but, at least, he has no self-imposed conditions, mostly silly and harmful,

such as Smith has ignorantly imposed on himself and others. The field covered by this enquiry is

very wide and involves unexpectedly special suggestive contributions in diverse branches of

science.

[Barbara Branden]

Surely one of the functions of language is to make clarity of communication possible. I read the whole of the excerpt you posted, but I must say that it is one of the least clear, most confusing, and almost unintelliglble pieces of writing I can recall encountering.

Example, from only the first paragraph, which reads: "The old dictum that we ‘are’ animals leaves us hopeless, but if we merely copy animals in our nervous responses, we can stop it, and the hopeless becomes very hopeful, provided we can

discover a physiological difference in these reactions. Thus we are provided with a definite and

promising program for an investigation."

Why does the dictum leave us hopeless? And is it the dictum or the presumed fact the dictum points to that leaves us hopeless? How in the world can we "copy animals in our nervous responses?" Does this mean we have a choice of nervous respones? -- whatever "nervous responses" may mean. In the statement, "we can stop it," it's unclear what "it" refers to. In the statement, "provided we can discover a physiological difference in these reactions" -- what reactions is he referring to? The "thus" in the final sentence reads like a joke: I cannot imagine what in the paragraph leads to any conclusion at all.

Barbara

[tjohnson]

Maybe if I posted the preceding paragraph it would be clearer.

In the present volume I undertake the investigation of the mechanism of time-binding. The

results are quite unexpected. We discover that there is a sharp difference between the nervous

reactions of animal and man, and that judging by this criterion, nearly all of us, even now, copy*

animals in our nervous responses, which copying leads to the general state of un-sanity reflected

in our private and public lives, institutions and systems. By this discovery the whole situation is

radically changed. If we copy animals in our nervous responses through the lack of knowledge of

what the appropriate responses of the human nervous system should be, we can stop doing so,

both individually and collectively, and we are thus led to the formulation of a first positive theory

of sanity.

The salient point is that humans have much more evolved nervous systems and language abilities but if we don't use them properly we basically act like (copy) animals in our nervous responses.

[BaalChatzaf]

The salient point is that humans have much more evolved nervous systems and language abilities but if we don't use them properly we basically act like (copy) animals in our nervous responses.

So far member of our species have used their "animal like nervous responses" to produce mathematics and scienc.

Evriste Galois, the night before he dueled to his death, produced the theory of symmetry based on group theory. Go figure. Dueling to the death is the human version of butting heads and locking horns.

We ARE animals. We happen to be very smart animals who like to talk and exchange tall tales.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Brant Gaede]

The salient point is that humans have much more evolved nervous systems and language abilities but if we don't use them properly we basically act like (copy) animals in our nervous responses.

So far member of our species have used their "animal like nervous responses" to produce mathematics and scienc.

Evriste Galois, the night before he dueled to his death, produced the theory of symmetry based on group theory. Go figure. Dueling to the death is the human version of butting heads and locking horns.

We ARE animals. We happen to be very smart animals who like to talk and exchange tall tales.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Yeah, push a button and blow up a billion! That's one!

--Brant

[Ellen Stuttle]

Evriste Galois, the night before he dueled to his death, produced the theory of symmetry based on group theory. Go figure. Dueling to the death is the human version of butting heads and locking horns.

I've heard tell from a mathematically informed friend who researched the story that it's been mythologized. The story appears in Infeld's Whom the Gods Love. I don't know if he originated the story. But from what my friend reports, Galois just added some further details the night before the duel; he'd already previously done the major work.

Ellen

___

[BaalChatzaf]

Evriste Galois, the night before he dueled to his death, produced the theory of symmetry based on group theory. Go figure. Dueling to the death is the human version of butting heads and locking horns.

I've heard tell from a mathematically informed friend who researched the story that it's been mythologized. The story appears in Infeld's Whom the Gods Love. I don't know if he originated the story. But from what my friend reports, Galois just added some further details the night before the duel; he'd already previously done the major work.

Ellen

___

Quite so.

The point is that Galois, a genius in abstract mathematics engaged in head butting and horn locking, just like some other kinds of animals. And, what is "worse", he engaged in subject-predicate logic and even used the verb "is" (or its French equivalent).

Which gets us right to the point. Humans ARE animals. We just like to gab a lot. Man is the smartest, baddest Ape in The Monkey House.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Ellen Stuttle]

Maybe if I posted the preceding paragraph it would be clearer.

In the present volume I undertake the investigation of the mechanism of time-binding. The

results are quite unexpected. We discover that there is a sharp difference between the nervous

reactions of animal and man, and that judging by this criterion, nearly all of us, even now, copy*

animals in our nervous responses, which copying leads to the general state of un-sanity reflected

in our private and public lives, institutions and systems. By this discovery the whole situation is

radically changed. If we copy animals in our nervous responses through the lack of knowledge of

what the appropriate responses of the human nervous system should be, we can stop doing so,

both individually and collectively, and we are thus led to the formulation of a first positive theory

of sanity.

The salient point is that humans have much more evolved nervous systems and language abilities but if we don't use them properly we basically act like (copy) animals in our nervous responses.

I certainly don't find Korzybski's writing clear; nor do I see, in excerpts posted thus far, what he claims as evidential basis for his conclusions.

Nevertheless I see strong similarity to statements of a certain philosopher, such as the idea of humans failing to be human -- by choice -- functioning on the "perceptual level"...yada dada. AR provided no support for her pronouncements either -- and in her case, since I've read all her published work, I'm aware that she never does provide something remotely like a scientific foundation.

Ellen

___

[tjohnson]

So far member of our species have used their "animal like nervous responses" to produce mathematics and scienc.

Evriste Galois, the night before he dueled to his death, produced the theory of symmetry based on group theory. Go figure. Dueling to the death is the human version of butting heads and locking horns.

We ARE animals. We happen to be very smart animals who like to talk and exchange tall tales.

Ba'al Chatzaf

This is precisely what Korzybski was talking about - if we ARE animals then it's hopeless, we will can never expect a civilization beyond what animals are capable of. All out scientific and technical progress is due to people who DIDN'T act like animals, at least while they were doing their work.

[BaalChatzaf]

This is precisely what Korzybski was talking about - if we ARE animals then it's hopeless, we will can never expect a civilization beyond what animals are capable of. All out scientific and technical progress is due to people who DIDN'T act like animals, at least while they were doing their work.

Every scientist who ever lived made ka ka. We cannot, I repeat, cannot separate our total selves from our animal nature. It is impossible. There is no separation. Our curiosity derives directly from our mobile animal nature.

We will get the civilization that smart talkative animals can achieve.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[tjohnson]

I certainly don't find Korzybski's writing clear; nor do I see, in excerpts posted thus far, what he claims as evidential basis for his conclusions.

Nevertheless I see strong similarity to statements of a certain philosopher, such as the idea of humans failing to be human -- by choice -- functioning on the "perceptual level"...yada dada. AR provided no support for her pronouncements either -- and in her case, since I've read all her published work, I'm aware that she never does provide something remotely like a scientific foundation.

Ellen

Well perhaps you should hold off on your judgment of Korzybski until you have read all of his work as well.

[BaalChatzaf]

Well perhaps you should hold off on your judgment of Korzybski until you have read all of his work as well.

Most of what The Count wrote about human neurological function is either just plain wrong or has been rendered totally obsolete by modern neurophysiology and related epistemological matters. We have learned more about how the human brain and nervous system functions in the last fifty years (thanks mostly to modern technology) than was know in the previous three thousand years. Virtually all of the New Stuff was developed after the Count either stopped writing or died. So The Count is no authority on the nuts and bolts of the human neurological system. Nowhere near. Most of what The Count wrote was not even wrong.

By the way all of the advances in neurological science was done by people who use subject-predicate language and who even use various conjugations of the verb infinitive "to be". Imagine that!

Ba'al Chatzaf

[tjohnson]

Most of what The Count wrote about human neurological function is either just plain wrong or has been rendered totally obsolete by modern neurophysiology and related epistemological matters. We have learned more about how the human brain and nervous system functions in the last fifty years (thanks mostly to modern technology) than was know in the previous three thousand years. Virtually all of the New Stuff was developed after the Count either stopped writing or died. So The Count is no authority on the nuts and bolts of the human neurological system. Nowhere near. Most of what The Count wrote was not even wrong.

By the way all of the advances in neurological science was done by people who use subject-predicate language and who even use various conjugations of the verb infinitive "to be". Imagine that!

Ba'al Chatzaf

I'd like to see you substantiate this.

[tjohnson]

We are not animals - we call ourselves 'animals' and there is a huge difference. Also using certain language has an effect on us and effects the way react and refering to ourselves as 'animals' promotes us acting like animals. There is a multitude of evidence concerning 'self-fulfilling prophecy' and the power of positive thinking. There is a big difference in referring to ourselves as humans who have been trained to act like animals instead of animals with a rational faculty. If the average person on the street thought he's been essentially brainwashed by the "system" he might react totally different than if thinks he's just an animal.

[BaalChatzaf]

Most of what The Count wrote about human neurological function is either just plain wrong or has been rendered totally obsolete by modern neurophysiology and related epistemological matters. We have learned more about how the human brain and nervous system functions in the last fifty years (thanks mostly to modern technology) than was know in the previous three thousand years. Virtually all of the New Stuff was developed after the Count either stopped writing or died. So The Count is no authority on the nuts and bolts of the human neurological system. Nowhere near. Most of what The Count wrote was not even wrong.

By the way all of the advances in neurological science was done by people who use subject-predicate language and who even use various conjugations of the verb infinitive "to be". Imagine that!

Ba'al Chatzaf

I'd like to see you substantiate this.

Consult the bibliographies of the following books:

Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain by Patricia Smith Churchland

The Engine of Reas, the Seat of the Soul by Paul Churchland.

The Churchlands (husband and wife) have both made important contributions to the field of neurophysiology and the epistemology of the neurological sciences.

In the bibliographies, each several hundred items long you will not see a single reference to The Count nor and only a few are dated prior to 1950, which is when The Count died. In short The Count has contributed nothing important to the current neurological sciences. Most of the contributions are done by folks more recently, who use subject-predicate language and who even (gasp!) use various conjugations of the verb infinitive "to be" (the horror! the horror!).

If you want to see some interesting new work on the role of linguistics in human thought read just about anything by Stephen Pinker.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[tjohnson]

Consult the bibliographies of the following books:

Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain by Patricia Smith Churchland

The Engine of Reas, the Seat of the Soul by Paul Churchland.

The Churchlands (husband and wife) have both made important contributions to the field of neurophysiology and the epistemology of the neurological sciences.

In the bibliographies, each several hundred items long you will not see a single reference to The Count nor and only a few are dated prior to 1950, which is when The Count died. In short The Count has contributed nothing important to the current neurological sciences. Most of the contributions are done by folks more recently, who use subject-predicate language and who even (gasp!) use various conjugations of the verb infinitive "to be" (the horror! the horror!).

If you want to see some interesting new work on the role of linguistics in human thought read just about anything by Stephen Pinker.

Ba'al Chatzaf

First of all, Korzybski wasn't a neurophysiologist or a linguist and never proclaimed to be either, he started a field called general semantics, a theory of sanity, and AFAIK there has not been another one produced since 1933. Perhaps you know of another? I would be very interested to read it.

[BaalChatzaf]

First of all, Korzybski wasn't a neurophysiologist or a linguist and never proclaimed to be either, he started a field called general semantics, a theory of sanity, and AFAIK there has not been another one produced since 1933. Perhaps you know of another? I would be very interested to read it.

Define "sanity" in neurological terms. You may as well be talking about the Sacraments, if you cannot. And I did read The Count (when I was a kid) and I do recall him making specific statements about brain functions. I am not about to re-read this nonsense, but I remember what I remember.

And I bet I can beat you at the "go silent game". I can do a half hour wordless in my head. What can you do?

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Brant Gaede]

We are not animals - we call ourselves 'animals' and there is a huge difference. Also using certain language has an effect on us and effects the way react and refering to ourselves as 'animals' promotes us acting like animals. There is a multitude of evidence concerning 'self-fulfilling prophecy' and the power of positive thinking. There is a big difference in referring to ourselves as humans who have been trained to act like animals instead of animals with a rational faculty. If the average person on the street thought he's been essentially brainwashed by the "system" he might react totally different than if thinks he's just an animal.

If we were animals what would we call ourselves?

--Brant

[Ellen Stuttle]

I certainly don't find Korzybski's writing clear; nor do I see, in excerpts posted thus far, what he claims as evidential basis for his conclusions.

Nevertheless I see strong similarity to statements of a certain philosopher, such as the idea of humans failing to be human -- by choice -- functioning on the "perceptual level"...yada dada. AR provided no support for her pronouncements either -- and in her case, since I've read all her published work, I'm aware that she never does provide something remotely like a scientific foundation.

Ellen

Well perhaps you should hold off on your judgment of Korzybski until you have read all of his work as well.

I doubt that I'll be reading all of his work, GS. I have a great deal to read which I expect to be of value. From the material you post and the hints of what Korzybski says on neurological functioning, it's clear enough to me that Bob is right: The Count "is either just plain wrong or has been rendered totally obsolete by modern neurophysiology and related epistemological matters." Plus, sorry, but I find your own harping on subject-predicate language and the use of forms of the verb "to be" comical, doubly so since you give the lie to your own pronouncements with your own use of subject-predicate language and forms of the verb "to be." I'm not saying I'd find nothing of value in Korzybski; to the contrary aspects of what you've posted (and of what I've heard of his views elsewhere) I find interesting -- but not sufficiently interesting I'm likely to read an outdated theorist on mind/brain when I have stacks of up-to-date material to keep me occupied.

Ellen

___

[tjohnson]

I doubt that I'll be reading all of his work, GS. I have a great deal to read which I expect to be of value. From the material you post and the hints of what Korzybski says on neurological functioning, it's clear enough to me that Bob is right: The Count "is either just plain wrong or has been rendered totally obsolete by modern neurophysiology and related epistemological matters." Plus, sorry, but I find your own harping on subject-predicate language and the use of forms of the verb "to be" comical, doubly so since you give the lie to your own pronouncements with your own use of subject-predicate language and forms of the verb "to be." I'm not saying I'd find nothing of value in Korzybski; to the contrary aspects of what you've posted (and of what I've heard of his views elsewhere) I find interesting -- but not sufficiently interesting I'm likely to read an outdated theorist on mind/brain when I have stacks of up-to-date material to keep me occupied.

That's fine, I only suggested you not judge it before reading it, if you don't want to read it fine. I just gave an example of not using subject-predicate form when I changed "we are animals" to "we call ourselves 'animals'". It's not so easy to communicate to people who habitually use the form and have them understand - old habits die hard.

[tjohnson]

First of all, Korzybski wasn't a neurophysiologist or a linguist and never proclaimed to be either, he started a field called general semantics, a theory of sanity, and AFAIK there has not been another one produced since 1933. Perhaps you know of another? I would be very interested to read it.

Define "sanity" in neurological terms. You may as well be talking about the Sacraments, if you cannot. And I did read The Count (when I was a kid) and I do recall him making specific statements about brain functions. I am not about to re-read this nonsense, but I remember what I remember.

And I bet I can beat you at the "go silent game". I can do a half hour wordless in my head. What can you do?

Ba'al Chatzaf

I can't define sanity in neurological terms, I can only do so in general semantic terms - it's not neurology.

[Ellen Stuttle]

[....] I just gave an example of not using subject-predicate form when I changed "we are animals" to "we call ourselves 'animals'". It's not so easy to communicate to people who habitually use the form and have them understand - old habits die hard.

GS, "we call ourselves 'animals'" is not an example of not using subject-predicate form.

See:

http://classroom.jc-schools.net/la/activit...predicates.html

Note:

Every sentence contains two parts: a subject and a predicate. A subject is what or whom the sentence is about. The predicate is the part of the sentence that tells something about the subject.

In "we call ourselves 'animals,'" the subject is "we"; the predicate is the rest of the construction; the verb in the construction is "call."

In "we are animals," the subject is "we"; the predicate is the rest of the construction; the verb in the construction is "are."

Possibly you aren't aware that every sentence which is in noun-phrase/verb-phrase form (including simple subject/verb form, such as "I write") is in subject-predicate form. The verb's being a form of the verb "to be" is not what defines the form.

Once a grammarian always a grammarian,

Ellen

___

Edited November 4, 2007 by Ellen Stuttle

[tjohnson]

GS, "we call ourselves 'animals'" is not an example of not using subject-predicate form.

Ah, you bring up an excellent point, it seems there are different uses of 'subject-predicate', possibly due to convention since the early 1900's

. . . the subject-predicate habits of thought. . . had been impressed on the European

mind by the overemphasis on Aristotle’s logic during the long mediaeval period. In

reference to this twist of mind, probably Aristotle was not an Aristotelian. (578)A. N.

WHITEHEAD

The evil produced by the Aristotelian ‘primary substance’ is exactly this habit of

metaphysical emphasis upon the ‘subject-predicate’ form of proposition. (570)

A. N. WHITEHEAD

The belief or unconscious conviction that all propositions are of the subject-

predicate form—in other words, that every fact consists in some thing having some

quality—has rendered most philosophers incapable of giving any account of the

world of science and daily life. (453) BERTRAND RUSSELL

The alternative philosophic position must commence with denouncing the whole

idea of ‘Subject qualified by predicate’ as a trap set for philosophers by the syntax of

language. (574) A. N. WHITEHEAD

Another definition " what is predicated of the subject of a proposition; the second term in a proposition is predicated of the first term by means of the copula". So in other words to state or affirm as an attribute or quality of something. In my example the expression "we are animals' we state that animalism is a property of us, or something like that. In the expression "we call ourselves animals" we are simply describing an action we are doing.

[Ellen Stuttle]

GS,

OK, I see that you're using "subject-predicate form" with a different meaning than I'd understood. I still think you fall into the form you object to -- and can't help but do so, not because of any being "brainwashed" by language but because of far deeper, and universal, linguistic principles. You've every now and then referred to the Whorf-Sapir theory of language and culture. This theory has come in for strenuous criticism. You might, for instance, see works by Steven Pinker, also recommend by Bob K.

Something I think I should say to you, however, is that I'm not desirous of being in an adversarial relationship with you. You've said that you've found Korzybski's work a good living-your-life basis for (as I recall the figure) 32 years. I have no desire to try to "upset the applecart," or similar expression, of a view of existence with which you're happy. I haven't seen reason to think that I'd glean much of usefulness to my own life and intellectual concerns from Korzybski's writings, though I do find certain of his ideas, which I've heard from others as well, "interesting" in a metaphorical not a literal way.

I'm afraid that the biggest hurdle you'd face with attempts to convince me of the merit of his theories is that I've been steeped in evolutionary thought since I was of gradeschool age -- I started studying evolution when I was in 5th or 6th grade, fascinated by what I found about the evolution of the horse pictorially portrayed, and described, in one of my horse books. The exact sequence has subsequently been questioned; the general idea of evolution, however, I fell in love with then and remain in love with. A lot of my objections to Rand come from thinking she's not properly evolutionary, for all her claims to situate the human in a "biological" context. (I think her context is Aristotelian biology, not Darwinian.) Although you seem to think of describing the human as "an animal" a limiting view, even a pejorative view, I have no such emotional reaction. Do you think the human is a plant? A protozoan? You see, all the identification means to me is the correct biological classification. It carries no negative emotional weight, instead explanatory truth.

So...I think what it comes down to is that we'll remain in disagreement, whatever either of us might say countering the other's views. I don't mind being friendly with someone with whom I disagree.

Ellen

___

Edited November 5, 2007 by Ellen Stuttle

[BaalChatzaf]

So...I think what it comes down to is that we'll remain in disagreement, whatever either of us might say countering the other's views. I don't mind being friendly with someone with whom I disagree.

Ellen

___

Arrgghhh! Smarrrrt as paint ye arrrre! That is a very intelligent and reasonable way of looking at disagreements. It is possible to disagree without being disagreeable. Disagreement is not conflict.

Ba'al Chatzaf