What is Consciousness For?

[Dragonfly]

I.e., if one person ignores feedback indicating error and another person doesn't, in each case the person did what the person had to do. But then how can either person tell which of these circumstances is applicable? If some people are "just too dumb" to realize that they're ignoring feedback indicating error, whereas other people just aren't too dumb, how can anyone tell which of these two categories he or she is in?

By observing whether it works. There are probably prewired mechanisms in our brain that cause us to prefer methods that enable us to thrive (if behavior A produced some nice food, repeat A, if it caused pain and disabled us, avoid A). This is what you'd expect from an evolutionary point of view, organisms that effectively can use regularities in the behavior of the world around them to survive will automatically be selected over organisms that behave in a random manner. So a manner of reasoning that gives useful results (a theory that can make successful predictions, that enhance our chances of survival) will be favored and will be called a "correct manner of reasoning", it is a Good Trick. And then there is the historical record and the accumulation of knowledge. No need to try sacrificing goats to get some desired result, we know that the use of science and technology is a better method to achieve them, without having to find it out everyone for himself by trial and error.

[Dragonfly]

"Following my definition of determinism it only means that the description of a certain state at that level gives insufficient information to DETERMINE the state at a later time," are you meaning there "predict" by "determine"? If yes, then all you're meaning in saying the intentional level is undetermined is that it's unpredictable, not that it isn't deterministic.

It is in fact quite simple. You shouldn't confuse a model of reality with reality itself. The description at the intentional level of our consciousness is a (non-deterministic) model of reality. It is a useful, but incomplete model. That the model is non-deterministic does not imply that a more accurate model (a description at the physiological level of the brain) of reality is not deterministic. So for the sake of convenience we may treat the system as non-deterministic (as if more than one choice is possible, as if there exists "free will"), but we should keep in mind that a more detailed model is probably deterministic (in fact only one choice is possible). The states in the intentional model are underdetermined: for any state in that model there exist a huge number of different states in a more detailed model at the physiological level. These different states in the deterministic model give rise to different states at a later time. When we translate this to the intentional level, we see that one state at a certain moment may give rise to several different states at a later moment (that is why we call that model non-deterministic). But we know that in reality one single state at the intentional level may correspond to many different physiological states, so in reality it is the particular physiological state that corresponds to a given state at the intentional level of some person at a given time that determines the single possible outcome. The model of the description at the intentional level may be non-deterministic, but that model is not the last word about reality, it is a huge simplification of the more detailed deterministic model at the physiological level. That the simple model doesn't give us unique results at the intentional level does not mean that there are in reality not unique results at that level.

[BaalChatzaf]

.

The model of the description at the intentional level may be non-deterministic, but that model is not the last word about reality, it is a huge simplification of the more detailed deterministic model at the physiological level. That the simple model doesn't give us unique results at the intentional level does not mean that there are in reality not unique results at that level.

We are fifteen orders of magnitude removed from Planck Length, and this with our fanciest and most expensive instruments. You cannot have the last word until we get to Rock Bottom, assuming Rock Bottom exists. In the mean time we have our models (we call them theories and hypotheses) and we have the dial readings and computer displays from our instruments from which we -infer- (as opposed to perceive) what is going on Out There and Down There (at the sub, sub, sub microscopic level). Think of us as wanderers in the fog wondering what the world might be like when the fog clears, if it clears.

Even if we do get to Rock Bottom (don't hold your breath) it is not clear whether we primates with our three pound brains can correctly decode what data we gather. That remains to be seen.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[merjet]

I'm not following the above. It looks like you first said there is more than one possible state at time t2 and then said there isn't.

Dragonfly, you didn't reply to this. At least Ellen and I are interested in your answer.

But we know that in reality one single state at the intentional level may correspond to many different physiological states, so in reality it is the particular physiological state that corresponds to a given state at the intentional level of some person at a given time that determines the single possible outcome.

This isn't very clear to me. Regardless, how do you know this conclusion? You seem to say any other physiological states are irrelevant. So if at a restaurant I pick a turkey sandwich from the menu, the other items on the menu or what I may have eaten recently or what I expect to eat a little later are completely irrelevant to my decision? Or is my decision an illusion (all I really do is order)? Are my imagining eating any items on the menu other than a turkey sandwich mere illusions, but my imagining eating a turkey sandwich is not an illusion?

The following from Hayek's The Sensory Order are not just for Dragonfly, but are relevant to the topic.

4.18 The essential characteristic of the order of sensory qualities is that, within that order, each stimulus or group of stimuli does not possess a unique significance represented by the particular response, but that they are given different significance if they occur in combination with, or are evaluated in the light of, an infinite variety of other stimuli which may originate from the external world or from the organism itself.

4.56 ... But even more important than the question why the organism will behave differently in different environments is the question why it will at different times behave differently in the same environment.

5.58 The representation or model of the environment will thus constantly tend to run ahead of the actual situation. This representation of the possible results following from the existing position will, of course, be constantly checked and corrected by the newly arriving signals which record the actual development in the environment. The newly arriving impulses, on the other hand, in turn will always be evaluated against the background of the expectations set up by the previously existing pattern of impulses.

5.59 The representations of the external environment which will guide behavior will thus be not only representations of the actually external environment; but also representations of the changes to be expected in that environment. We must therefore conceive of the model as constantly trying out possible developments and determining action in the light of the consequences which from the representations of such actions would appear to follow from it.

Edited November 7, 2007 by Merlin Jetton

[Dragonfly]

I'm not following the above. It looks like you first said there is more than one possible state at time t2 and then said there isn't.

Dragonfly, you didn't reply to this. At least Ellen and I are interested in your answer.

I answered that in post #27. The more than one possible state at t2 refers to the non-deterministic intentional model (in which the states are described in terms of conscious thoughts). This model has a limited accuracy however, as it ignores all the different physiological states that may correspond to a single conscious thought. A more accurate (but completely impractical) model would take these into account, resulting in a single possible state at t2. As a more accurate model gives in principle a better description of reality (although it wouldn't work in practice due to the enormous complexity of the system), we may conclude that although the non-deterministic model is far more useful, its conclusion that more than one outcome is possible is incorrect.

This isn't very clear to me. Regardless, how do you know this conclusion? You seem to say any other physiological states are irrelevant.

If we look at a particular case there is at any time t only one physiological state, so other physiological states are in that case indeed irrelevant.

So if at a restaurant I pick a turkey sandwich from the menu, the other items on the menu or what I may have eaten recently or what I expect to eat a little later are completely irrelevant to my decision?

No, but what you have eaten and what you have read on the menu are represented as memories in your brain, as are your expectations of what you will eat a little later, so the fysiological structure does contain that information. So far I have ignored for the sake of simplicity the continuous stream of input data from the environment, which of course also contributes to future states, by concentrating on a momentaneous decision, during a time interval in which the external input does not play a significant role. A complete description would include also new input data, making it even more impossible to use in practice than it already is, but it doesn't change the essence of the argument. The contents of the menu and the knowledge and feeling of what you have recently eaten and what you expect to eat a little later are already part of your brain, so it can use this knowledge to make a choice. Whatever you consciously think in choosing the turkey sandwich is also reflected in the fysiology of your brain, so where is the problem?

The following from Hayek's The Sensory Order are not just for Dragonfly, but are relevant to the topic.

4.18 The essential characteristic of the order of sensory qualities is that, within that order, each stimulus or group of stimuli does not possess a unique significance represented by the particular response, but that they are given different significance if they occur in combination with, or are evaluated in the light of, an infinite variety of other stimuli which may originate from the external world or from the organism itself.

That doesn't contradict what I'm saying.

4.56 ... But even more important than the question why the organism will behave differently in different environments is the question why it will at different times behave differently in the same environment.

That is while it has a different history, resulting in different brain states (which of course will often be also different at a conscious level, though not necessarily so).

[Ellen Stuttle]

This is the first I've had time to check OL goings-on since my last post Tuesday about 8:00 pm est.

Things are getting too close to the T-Seminar wire for me even to be reading proceedings here, let alone engaging in detailed replies now. Thus the only 3 posts I've read are those DF has posted since my last check-in.

DF, sorry, but I still have to say that your replies sidestep the epistemic problem.

E.g., you write (post #26) in answer to my asking how anyone can tell whether he/she is in the "just too dumb" category or not:

"By observing whether it works."

But HOW one has any basis for doing that is the question.

The epistemic problem with determinism is how do you demonstrate the validity of a theory which gives you no means of assessing validity? "Observing"? How do you go about doing that?

And then we have your long discussion in post #27, which you start by telling me:

"You shouldn't confuse a model of reality with reality itself."

And how do you claim to know what reality is, on the basis of your own theories? (Do you suppose Deep Blue knows what reality is, e.g.?)

Your further answer to Merlin again asserts knowledge which there's no way you could have -- for instance:

"This model has a limited accuracy however, as it ignores all the different physiological states that may correspond to a single conscious thought. A more accurate (but completely impractical) model would take these into account, resulting in a single possible state at t2."

Where do you get this? Where has it been demonstrated what the correspondence is between physiological states and "a single conscious thought"? You've made an enormous factual assumption there. And, again, returning to the epistemic problem, you're providing no means of assessing the accuracy of your assumption.

I think I'll have to leave off there until 2+ weeks from now. Sorry, but there are only 24 hours in a day.

Happy Thanksgiving, U.S. posters.

Ellen

___

[Dragonfly]

The epistemic problem with determinism is how do you demonstrate the validity of a theory which gives you no means of assessing validity? "Observing"? How do you go about doing that?

I'm not going to spell out the obvious.

And then we have your long discussion in post #27, which you start by telling me:

"You shouldn't confuse a model of reality with reality itself."

And how do you claim to know what reality is, on the basis of your own theories? (Do you suppose Deep Blue knows what reality is, e.g.?)

Then you should have read further, as I never claimed that I knew what reality is; I pointed out that we have more accurate models of reality.

"This model has a limited accuracy however, as it ignores all the different physiological states that may correspond to a single conscious thought. A more accurate (but completely impractical) model would take these into account, resulting in a single possible state at t2."

Where do you get this? Where has it been demonstrated what the correspondence is between physiological states and "a single conscious thought"? You've made an enormous factual assumption there. And, again, returning to the epistemic problem, you're providing no means of assessing the accuracy of your assumption.

I nowhere said what the correspondence between a certain thought and the fysiological states of the brain was, we still know far too little to know all the details. But I think no brain scientist will doubt that thoughts do correspond with fysiological states of the brain, only mystics think otherwise. This is also confirmed by everything we know about neurophysiology.

I think I'll have to leave off there until 2+ weeks from now. Sorry, but there are only 24 hours in a day.

Ha ha! Yeah, sure...

[merjet]

If we look at a particular case there is at any time t only one physiological state, so other physiological states are in that case indeed irrelevant.

At any time 't' what you call only one state might be a set of contenders (alternatives). For example, a few milliseconds before deciding on a turkey sandwich, three or four items on the menu are in strong contention. So are the contending items other than the turkey sandwich irrelevant?

Or is my decision an illusion (all I really do is order)? Are my imagining eating any items on the menu other than a turkey sandwich mere illusions, but my imagining eating a turkey sandwich is not an illusion?

Whatever you consciously think in choosing the turkey sandwich is also reflected in the fysiology of your brain, so where is the problem?

You indirectly answered my first question -- my decision is not an illusion. What about my second question? The problem is you say that I make a decision, then act upon it, yet you've said "free will" is an illusion. Doesn't compute in my book.

[Dragonfly]

At any time 't' what you call only one state might be a set of contenders (alternatives). For example, a few milliseconds before deciding on a turkey sandwich, three or four items on the menu are in strong contention. So are the contending items other than the turkey sandwich irrelevant?

No. Am I saying that?

You indirectly answered my first question -- my decision is not an illusion. What about my second question? The problem is you say that I make a decision, then act upon it, yet you've said "free will" is an illusion. Doesn't compute in my book.

As I said in a previous post: when I say that "free will" is an illusion, I mean that the notion that there are really different outcomes physically possible (that is what the proponents always claim) is incorrect, that it is merely the unpredictability of your own thoughts that creates that illusion. That does not imply that you cannot make a choice, only that this choice is not as free as it might seem to you. In fact, what does "free" really mean in this context? Who or what makes that final decision? You might argue that it is the result of weighing all the factors pro and contra and basing the decision on the overall score, but that is in itself a deterministic process, so it's hardly an argument against the possibility of a deterministic substrate. You may try to probe further, but at a certain point you'll get no further explanation, a thought or a decision just seems to happen ("Der Mensch kann wohl tun, was er will, aber er kann nicht wollen, was er will", said Schopenhauer) . The usual cop-out is to call this a "first cause", which in fact is merely a label that doesn't tell us anything, it has the same explanatory power as the statement "God did it", namely none at all. You just "happen" to have that thought. Is having such random thoughts really being more free than having thoughts as the result of a deterministic process in your brain? I don't think so.

[merjet]

As I said in a previous post: when I say that "free will" is an illusion, I mean that the notion that there are really different outcomes physically possible (that is what the proponents always claim) is incorrect, that it is merely the unpredictability of your own thoughts that creates that illusion.

I don't know whom "proponents" refers to. But I'll try to explain how the claim can be coherent. Suppose at time t1 you ponder mutually exclusive alternatives A1, A2, A3 pertaining to what you will do at time t2 (t2 > t1). At t1 A1, A2, A3 are all physically possible (not actual). At t2, however, only one of them is physically possible (actual). If a proponent's claim is merely the first, then it is coherent. It's imaginary, but pondering any future state or event involves imagination. You could imagine throwing an egg against the wall and the egg breaking, but I wouldn't call your imagining this an illusion. You could imagine rolling a die and getting a 6, but I wouldn't call your imagining this an illusion, even though the outcome is unpredictable.

The usual cop-out is to call this a "first cause", which in fact is merely a label that doesn't tell us anything, it has the same explanatory power as the statement "God did it", namely none at all.

Again I don't know whom you refer to, but maybe they mean "final cause" per Aristotle. Does that have no explanatory power?

[Dragonfly]

I don't know whom "proponents" refers to. But I'll try to explain how the claim can be coherent. Suppose at time t1 you ponder mutually exclusive alternatives A1, A2, A3 pertaining to what you will do at time t2 (t2 > t1). At t1 A1, A2, A3 are all physically possible (not actual). At t2, however, only one of them is physically possible (actual). If a proponent's claim is merely the first, then it is coherent. It's imaginary, but pondering any future state or event involves imagination. You could imagine throwing an egg against the wall and the egg breaking, but I wouldn't call your imagining this an illusion.

Neither would I. Making predictions on the basis of a model which necessitates the use of statistical probabilities due to insufficient information is in itself not an illusion. As I said, the illusion is that there is really more than one alternative physically possible (as that would correspond to "real free will"). I gather that you don't object to calling that an illusion, but there are many Objectivists who would swear by their life and their love of it that it is true - and then run into problems with physics of course.

You could imagine rolling a die and getting a 6, but I wouldn't call your imagining this an illusion, even though the outcome is unpredictable.

The analogical illusion in the case of the die is that it is a random outcome.

The usual cop-out is to call this a "first cause", which in fact is merely a label that doesn't tell us anything, it has the same explanatory power as the statement "God did it", namely none at all.

Again I don't know whom you refer to, but maybe they mean "final cause" per Aristotle. Does that have no explanatory power?

It's from Peikoff: “By its nature, it is a first cause within a consciousness, not an effect produced by antecedent factors. It is not a product of parents or teachers, anatomy or conditioning, heredity or environment. . . . The choice to activate the conceptual level of awareness must precede any ideas. . . . In short, it is invalid to ask: why did a man choose to focus? There is no such ‘why’.” (Peikoff, OPAR, 59-60). (from one of your own posts on RoR).

[merjet]

The usual cop-out is to call this a "first cause", which in fact is merely a label that doesn't tell us anything, it has the same explanatory power as the statement "God did it", namely none at all.

Again I don't know whom you refer to, but maybe they mean "final cause" per Aristotle. Does that have no explanatory power?

It's from Peikoff: “By its nature, it is a first cause within a consciousness, not an effect produced by antecedent factors. It is not a product of parents or teachers, anatomy or conditioning, heredity or environment. . . . The choice to activate the conceptual level of awareness must precede any ideas. . . . In short, it is invalid to ask: why did a man choose to focus? There is no such ‘why’.” (Peikoff, OPAR, 59-60). (from one of your own posts on RoR).

I don't place much stock in Peikoff post 1981. Instead of saying "produced", he could have said "necessitated". (We can make the distinction between "influenced by" and "necessitated.") And obviously anatomy and heredity have something to do with man's nature. If you refer to this, anyone can note that I criticized the rest of that quote from Peikoff.

[BaalChatzaf]

I don't place much stock in Peikoff post 1981. Instead of saying "produced", he could have said "necessitated". (We can make the distinction between "influenced by" and "necessitated.") And obviously anatomy and heredity have something to do with man's nature. If you refer to this, anyone can note that I criticized the rest of that quote from Peikoff.

If one does not -have to - focus, the focusing the mind (which corresponds to a natural neurological process) is a natural fact that just happens to be the case. In short it is a natural (therefore metaphysical fact) that is not necessary. Focusing happens. And it just so happens.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Bob,

Focusing is done by volition. Some of it is automatic but there is a definite strong part that is chosen. If a tiger is charging at you, I suggest you focus real hard on what you have to do. You might even want to.

Michael

[BaalChatzaf]

Bob,

Focusing is done by volition. Some of it is automatic but there is a definite strong part that is chosen. If a tiger is charging at you, I suggest you focus real hard on what you have to do. You might even want to.

Michael

Then what "mental state" lead to the volitional focusing? And is the focusing of attention the epiphenomenon of a natural electro-chemical process. If so we have a so-called metaphysical fact as the result of a human decisions. Which leads one to question whether the distinction between a metaphysical fact (so-called) and a man-made fact is meaningful or not.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Bob,

I just watched some very interesting videos on You Tube talking about science and free will, etc. Check this out.

Michael

[UncleJim]

You say, "Our conscious reasoning is no less valid if it is based on a deterministic substrate." OK, fine, but won't you also have to endorse "Our conscious reasoning is no less invalid if it is based on a deterministic substrate"? After all, our conscious reasoning is not always valid.

Robert Campbell

See the highlight above: Isn't this a contradiction?

Is this an example of conscious reasoning? How is it possible for "conscious reasoning" to be other than what it is? Or for its product [a valid conclusion] to be other than what it is?

Edited February 22, 2008 by UncleJim