Proactive Behaviour and Causality

[Darrell Hougen]

The point is, what you are proposing is just a variant of determinism--it doesn't explain free-will, it makes free-will an impossibility, since to be determined by random atoms or some such is to be determined. I don't see the answer either, but I do know that a contradiction in terms is not an explanation.

That would true only if an ensemble of particles behaved as a collection of independent particles. If the joint probability distribution were non-trivial, some sort of epiphenomenal behavior might arise.

Darrell

[Darrell Hougen]

Waves can possess and transmit an infinite amount of information without violating the law of identity.

How? In common usage they certainly cannot. The electromagnetic waves transmitting information to my television set don't transmit an infinite amount of information and I don't think it is fundamentally possible for them to do so.

I do not, at this point, have a good explanation of free will

I do, but I am racking my brain to find a way to communicate it.

Well, as you can see, I'm very interested in this topic so I'd love to hear your explanation.

... but I do not see how to get there without the use of some notion of metaphysical randomness.

Metaphysical randomness won't get you there. Stepping outside of the action-to-action causal paradigm is the first step.

I guess I don't see myself as stuck in that paradigm. Maybe you can help me see why you think I am.

Darrell

[sjw]

That would true only if an ensemble of particles behaved as a collection of independent particles. If the joint probability distribution were non-trivial, some sort of epiphenomenal behavior might arise.

If all your theory requires in order to get volition off of the ground is complexity, then why do you introduce randomness at all? Just say that if we have enough complexity, then some sort of volition might arise. Which is in fact the truth, since that's exactly what happens. Of course, then you've said nothing at all that any non-religious layman doesn't already know, you just said it in fancier words.

[Dragonfly]

So, Dragonfly, I would like to know what you think the difference is between predictability and determinism. Is a system, in your view, unpredictable simply because it is impossible to measure the initial conditions with perfect accuracy? Or is there a deeper dichotomy?

There are several levels of unpredictability. One example is a version of QM with hidden variables (the prospects are not good for such theories, but they are not a priori impossible). Such a theory may be deterministic in its hidden variables, but as they are hidden and we only can observe statistical results, we can't use them for exact predictions (one may wonder whether hidden variables that can't be used in practice have any real meaning, but that's a different question).

Another example is a computer, which functions as a discrete, deterministic machine. An initial state (program) will evolve in discrete steps. If the shortest way to determine the state in step n is by running the program itself, you can't speak of predicting the outcome. Of course you may use another computer to do the calculation and then use the result to predict the outcome on the first computer, but that's merely shifting the burden to the second computer. If the program interacts with the environment the number of possible pathways may increase so fast by the combinatorial explosion that any prediction becomes impossible. In general, if a system is complex enough (and certainly such an enormously complex system as the human brain), the number of possibilities quickly becomes many, many times larger than the total number of elementary particles in the universe. If you need a computer much larger than the whole universe and a time much longer than the time since the Big Bang to make a prediction of something that will happen let's say in an hour, you can hardly call that a "prediction". And of course non-linear dynamics make predictions of even small deterministic systems quickly impossible, even if you suppose that there is no limit to the accuracy with which you can determine the initial state, the resources in time and material you'd need might soon exhaust the entire universe. In such cases by far the most efficient "prediction" is done by the system itself (by letting it evolve), but then it's of course no longer a prediction.

[Paul Mawdsley]

...a version of QM with hidden variables... they are not a priori impossible).

This is a fact we can both agree on. I think we also agree on what we class as evidence.

...the prospects are not good for such theories

This is where we don't agree. This is a judgement that depends on the contextual lens through which one views the evidence. Your lens is in alignment with that of the establishment of modern physics. Yours is well documented and well supported. The contextual lens through which you and most physicists view the evidence is shaped by the action-to-action concept of causality. This conceptual lens determines how the evidence is shaped into an integrated vision of existence and thus, determines how we judge such theories.

My conceptual lens is in alignment with...well...no one else. Though well developed, I am still in the process of creating it and learning how to put words to the dynamic images I have created. My conceptual lens is shaped by an epistemological principle I have called proactive identity-to-action causation: What a thing does is determined by the informed proactions of its physical components in the context of other things. (The principle of causality contains the principle of identity: What a thing is is determined by the informed proactions of its physical components in the context of other things.) This lens tells me hidden variable theories are not only possible, they are necessary. This is why I view a discussion of the nature of causality (and the nature of identity that is included in this concept) to be of primary importance. Causality is the metaphysical law and epistemological principle that we must discover/construct, which shapes our models of existence and shapes the contextual lens through which we view evidence and evaluate concepts.

(one may wonder whether hidden variables that can't be used in practice have any real meaning, but that's a different question).

Hidden variables have no practical use for making predictions in physics. The practical use of hidden variables is philosophical. The concepts of identity and causality that go into creating hidden variable views of the universe also shape our worldview and affect our judgements and behaviour. The concepts of identity and causality that can shape a worldview without internal or external contradictions, and without excluding any of the available evidence, will be the concepts of identity and causality that will be judged to be representative of reality and the right epistemological principles. Identifying the nature of hidden variables in QM is a means to this end. The worldview from the proactive identity-to-action concept of causality includes free will, volition, causal necessity, and QM hidden variables while excluding gods, ghosts, magic, determinism, and acausal events, without internal or external contradictions (no dualism) and without excluding any of the evidence (volition is not an illusion). This is why I am committed to it even though I am having great difficulties communicating it.

Paul

PS---I just finished reading the sections in ITOE for my response to Shayne's questions in another thread. Thanks Shayne, for the kick in the ass. My judgement of Rand's non-fiction work was based on my contextual lens of a relatively naive 21 year old. It is immensely interesting and valuable to revisit her perspective 20 years later with a more evolved context. She has an incredibly brilliant and lucid mind. It is great to take it in again. I still think she made some errors, and there are things she did not identify, but what she did is brilliant and unsurpassed. I'm out of town again, (visiting Shauna's family) but I hope to respond over the weekend.

PPS---I will respond to other comments directed to me on this thread as soon as I can. Dragonfly's comments sparked a line of thought I didn't want to put down.

Edited January 26, 2007 by Paul Mawdsley

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I am intrigued by this term "hidden variables."

Where do those little suckers hide?

The only place I can think of is in reality, but outside human sense perception, even when sense perception is amplified or otherwise provided with enhanced detection by instruments.

Right?

Michael

[Paul Mawdsley]

I am intrigued by this term "hidden variables."

Where do those little suckers hide?

The only place I can think of is in reality, but outside human sense perception, even when sense perception is amplified or otherwise provided with enhanced detection by instruments.

Right?

That's the theory.

Heisenberg's uncertainty principle tells us that we cannot measure position and momentum of a particle beyond a certain mathematical limit. This is a fact of existence that must be accepted. Therefore, we have no way of perceiving beyond this limit. The question is: What exists and what happens beyond that limit, if anything? Physics can't go there for obvious reasons. Physics can't work with what it can't measure. Only the imagination and philosophy can go there. It would seem that Rand and N. Branden might say "little stuff" is a hidden variable there. I have reached the same conclusion and have played with the theoretical nature of these hidden variables, seeing how we can account for QM, for Newton's laws of motion, for Einstein's two relativity theories, the nature of electromagnetism, life, consciousness, etc. by following the complex evolution of intrinsically dynamic "little stuff." I have created some interesting pictures.

[Martin Radwin]

Hi Paul,

I have given this topic a bit of thought, so let me give it a try. This will be brief as I don't have time to write a proper response. Also, I have not read every single entry in its entirety (though I did skim the entire list).

Simply put, randomness (non-determinism) is a fact of existence and it is a requirement of free will (proactive behavior).

To begin, non-determinism is consistent with classical physics. There are some classical physical systems that have non-deterministic solutions. Some physical systems have equations with infinitely many solutions at some point. (Such equations often have a square root, for example).

I had a physics professor (Alfred Hubler) that actually created a non-deterministic device. In it, a ball rolled down a slope of a particular shape in a bath of castor oil. Roughly, there was a downward sloping hill that leveled out at a single point and then sloped downward again. Watching the ball roll down the hill was amusing because it would stop at the level point for an indeterminant amount of time before proceeding down the hill. It sometimes rested for less than a second and sometimes for several seconds.

Now, someone might object that, being an experimental setup, it couldn't perfectly implement the equation which was supposed to govern its behavior so it might actually be deterministic. However, the problem is much deeper than that.

The fact is that any physical system can represent only a finite amount of information at any moment in time and the amount of information it can represent depends upon the "size" of the phase space region through which its trajectories pass. Therefore, if the trajectories of a system pass through a very small region of phase space, information must be lost. But, the trajectories must re-emerge on the other side of the singularity (or near singularity) and must go somewhere. Therefore, information must be added to the system to describe the system parameters. I will assert, for the time being, that the source of the information is randomness.

All physical systems are random to some degree.

Therefore, all physical systems are proactive to some degree --- ever wonder where the wind comes from?

Randomness does not require the injection of energy into the system and, therefore, proactive systems are consistent with the laws of physics such as the conservation of energy.

Living things and humans in particular have evolved to control and make use of this randomness.

As an aside, statisticians have learned that some randomized algorithms are more effective than deterministic algorithms at solving complex problems.

Darrell

Darrell,

I'm rather surprised by your statement that non-determinism is consistent with classical physics, and that there are classical physical systems that have non-deterministic solutions. Are you certain of this? I noticed that Dragonfly did not address this statement and continued to argue that classical physical systems are deterministic, randomness occuring only at the quantum level. It was also my belief that classical systems are entirely deterministic. If you have a classical ensemble of particles, the position and momentum of each particle determine the Hamiltonian function, which is a deterministic description of both the past and future of the system. That's what I thought, anyway. I am not familiar with classical systems which have more than one solution and are, therefore, indeterministic at that point. As far as the device created by your professor, I don't think that any device could actually demonstrate indeterminism, even if indeterminism were indeed a real feature of some classical systems. I think that such indeterminism could only be demonstrated mathematically, such as by showing, as you suggested above, that a system has multiple different solutions at a certain point.

Martin

[James Heaps-Nelson]

I thought I'd chime in for a few brief comments.

1. Quantum perturbation can lead to upper level complexity that is unpredictable, although it's unlikely that that is happening in the brain because quantum-level uncertainty is several orders of magnitude smaller than the dimensions of the neural structures that carry neural dark current activity in the brain.

2. For a fascinating although math-intensive tour of large-scale nondeterministic systems based on quantum perturbation see Ilya Prigogine's The End of Certainty.

3. Many chaotic systems yield behavior that is deterministic, yet unpredictable i.e. they have closed form mathematical expressions that have time as a variable and can only be solved by stepping through iterative steps for which even with a perfect description of initial conditions you are unable to predict the outcome past a given time interval e.g. differential equations with Lyapunov instability.

Jim

Edited January 29, 2007 by James Heaps-Nelson

[Darrell Hougen]

I'm rather surprised by your statement that non-determinism is consistent with classical physics, and that there are classical physical systems that have non-deterministic solutions.

Hi Martin, here is a link to a paper that describes a non-deterministic physical system:

http://www.citebase.org/fulltext?format=ap...o-dyn%2F9402004

Of course, the equations only describe a model of the system. It may be that a more refined model would not be non-deterministic in the classical sense. However, I think it is instructive to examine what the paper actually says:

a. Non-deterministic dynamics The standard approach to classical dynamics assumes a Laplacian point of view, i.e., that the time evolution of a system is uniquely determined by it’s initial conditions [1]. This view of determinism results from the Existence and Uniqueness Theorem of differential equations [2], which requires that the equations of motion everywhere satisfy the Lipschitz condition. It has long been tacitly assumed that nature (in the classical realm) is deterministic, and that correspondingly, the equations of motion describing physical systems are Lipschitz.

However, there is no a priori reason to believe that nature is Lipschitzian. For instance, it has been shown [3] that in the case of a whip snapping, the physical solutions correspond to equations of motion that violate the Lipschitz condition. A similar effect is seen when seismic waves approach the surface of the earth [4]. In this paper, we are concerned with a particular implication of non-Lipschitz equations of motion, namely, the possibility of non-unique solutions. If a dynamical system is non-Lipschitz at a singular point, it is possible that several solutions will intersect at this point [5,6]. Since this singularity is a common point among many trajectories, the dynamics of the system after the singular point is intersected is not in any way determined by the dynamics before, hence the term non-deterministic dynamics...

Of consequence to us in this paper is in possibility of non-deterministic chaos. For a non-deterministic system, it is entirely possible (if not likely), that as the various solutions move away from the singularity they will evolve very differently, and tend to diverge. Several solutions coincide at the non-Lipschitz singularity, and therefore when-ever a phase space trajectory comes near this point any arbitrarily small perturbation may push the trajectory onto a completely different solution. As “noise” is intrinsic to any physical system, we expect the time evolution of a non-deterministic dynamical system to consist of a series of transient trajectories, with a new one being chosen randomly whenever the solution (in the presence of noise) nears the non-Lipschitz point. We term such behavior non-deterministic chaos.

First, it should be noted that, according to the paper, the time evolution of a system is not completely determined in the classical sense if the differential equations describing the system fail to satisfy the Lipschitz condition.

Second, although the behavior may only be indeterminant if the system actually passes through the singular point, it will be nearly indeterminant near the singular point. Classically, that may not amount to indeterminism, but it would appear to be a route for quantum randomness to affect the behavior of a macroscopic system rather directly.

As a side note, I will try to address everyone's responses to my earlier posts as I have time.

Darrell

[Darrell Hougen]

It's a mistake to take an epistemological concept like information and project it onto reality as such. And I don't see how pointing out that reality is analog helps explain free will. I mean, it helps explain why reality is a whole lot different than a mere computer simulation (and why AI is doomed). But I don't see the leap from "analog" to "free will".

While we're on esoteric metaphysics: Isn't it fascinating how the whole universe is implied by a single atom? I mean, if you blast it into its constituent units, then just by multiplying them and rearranging them, you can in principle recreate all of existence. In that sense, all principles and knowledge are in some sense implied by the existence of a single atom. The potential for volition is in there somewhere too.

I liked Paul's response to your first point, but let me answer it another way. Information, in the mathematical sense, can be stored in a physical system. It is in that sense that every physical system can be said to possess information about its past states and, in a closed system, information about its future states.

There was a mind bender going around at the time I was in college that stated that all of the information in the Library of Congress could be stored in a single block of aluminum. Simply convert all of the words in all of the books into numbers, string them out to create a single large number and put a decimal point in front of that number. Then, cut the block of aluminum to that length in inches. To recover the information, simply measure the block.

Now, clearly that is not possible, for any number of reasons. But, fundamentally, there is a limit to the amount of information that can be stored in any device because no physical system can possess an infinite amount of information about its state.

As far as analog versus digital goes, the argument is a red herring that has been refuted long ago. A digital system can approximate an analog system to any desired degree of accuracy and in light of the above argument, there is a limit to the number of digital bits required to represent all of the information contained in an analog system. Besides, who says AI is impossible?

As to your second paragraph, are you saying that all of the elementary particles can be created by repeatedly blasting an atom? Of course, blasting the atom requires energy at the very least and one could say that all of existence is present in a sufficient amount of energy. I view particles as being stable energy states (in some sense). Matter and energy are interchangeable.

Of course, the reality that emerged from another big bang might be very different from the current one, especially if one believes in fundamental randomness.

Darrell

[heusdens]

Where, in causality, does proactive behaviour fit in?

If you leave your home and take a windshield with you, because the meteorlogists yesterday predicted that a rain will show up the next day, you act consciously proactive, based on known information.

Proactive behaviour is simply a feature of consciousness who understands the world and anticipates it's behaviour. It is existent throughout the natural world. Animals can proactively behave before a thunderstorm or earthquake emerges. Many natural phenomena are detected by animals before they happen, which in earlier epochs has been used by man to predict weather phenomena and such.

Of course this means that some signs have arrived in consciousness that relates to the upcoming event to which one proactively acts. There must be a causal relationship and explenation for this.

I think if one explores this further one can find many examples in the material world. Volcano's and earthquakes and weather phenomena are just examples of such phenomena, that before the major event happens, can already be detected.

Edited March 2, 2007 by heusdens

[BaalChatzaf]

Dragonfly,

Going back to the very beginning of life with the first microorganism, could you say conclusively that the sun was the energy that caused the birth-growth-death cycle? I'm only mulling...

Paul,

You mentioned causal dualism. That would only happen with existential dualism - and frankly there are two kinds of entities: inanimate and living. I don't see any problem at all with the causation for living things including the same causation as for inanimate ones, but having an added metaphysical attribute. Life is a specific form of existence, so why cannot there be some laws that are specific to it?

When you go quantum, this is one hell of a premise to check.

Michael

The difference between the living and the non-living is that living things consist of molecular structure that replicate themselves (possibly with errors). Things that do not replicate their structure are not living. There maybe a twilight zone insofar as there are quasi-living replicators, certain virus like structures that can assimilate chemicals from their environment and replicate using those.

As the late Carl Sagan said -- We are all made of stuhr-stuff from billyuns and billyuns of stuhrs. Every last atom of stuff on earth other than hydrogen and helium was cooked up in the belly of a nova or supernova. Since we are all made of the same stuff the same laws of physics should apply, or so it would seem. Any "magic" of living things derives from their molecular structure.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[BaalChatzaf]

Isn't i (the square root of -1) an unextended entitiy?

David

The square root of -1 the root of the polynomial x^2 + 1 = 0.

Just as square root of 2 is the root of the polynomial

x^2 - 2 = 0.

Both are abstractions and have no physical existence. There are the epiphenomena of neural discharges taking place somewhere between your ears and somewhere between the front of your head and the back of your head.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[BaalChatzaf]

So, Dragonfly, I would like to know what you think the difference is between predictability and determinism. Is a system, in your view, unpredictable simply because it is impossible to measure the initial conditions with perfect accuracy? Or is there a deeper dichotomy?

There are several levels of unpredictability. One example is a version of QM with hidden variables (the prospects are not good for such theories, but they are not a priori impossible). Such a theory may be deterministic in its hidden variables, but as they are hidden and we only can observe statistical results, we can't use them for exact predictions (one may wonder whether hidden variables that can't be used in practice have any real meaning, but that's a different question).

Hidden variable are not a priori impossible (i.e. the assumption that such exist do not lead to a logical contradiction). However the experiments testing out Bell's inequality show the failure of this inequality to hold and that the inequality is the consequence of the assumption of hidden variables and locality of action. So the prospect for hidden variables does not appear to be good. Quantum physics is consistent with the outcome of these experiments.

See:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell%27s_Inequality

particularly section 6.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

The difference between the living and the non-living is that living things consist of molecular structure that replicate themselves (possibly with errors).

Bob,

Do you mean that is the only difference or merely one difference? How about death, for instance, where replication ceases?

AAAAAAAAAAND... Does not that special property of the molecular structures of living entities you mentioned result in certain causal principles specific to that state?

Michael

[BaalChatzaf]

...a version of QM with hidden variables... they are not a priori impossible).

This is a fact we can both agree on. I think we also agree on what we class as evidence.

...the prospects are not good for such theories

This is where we don't agree. This is a judgement that depends on the contextual lens through which one views the evidence. Your lens is in alignment with that of the establishment of modern physics. Yours is well documented and well supported. The contextual lens through which you and most physicists view the evidence is shaped by the action-to-action concept of causality. This conceptual lens determines how the evidence is shaped into an integrated vision of existence and thus, determines how we judge such theories.

Quantum physics is a-causal and there is no action to action production of events. That is because time and energy are conjugate variables. The actions cannot be fixed exactly. Quantum physics calculates the odds, not the outcomes.

You have said something equivalent to: the physicists have loaded the dice.

I disagree. If what you said were the case then no experimental outcome could be trusted. What shall we use in the place of experiments? Philosophical insights? We have been there, done that and got the T-shirt. That is what Aristotle did in dealing with matters of motion (matter -in- motion). He was mostly wrong. It took nearly two thousand years to correct the errors derived by Aristotle's followers from Aristotle's basic incorrect works on how physical nature works.

If a metaphysical principle collides with a sound, vetted and replicated experiment, woe unto the metaphysical principle. Nature does not care one bit about our philosophical principles because nature cannot care. Nature just is. Experiments are one of the ways we found out what Nature is.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Paul Mawdsley]

I'm sorry I do not have time to engage in discussions now or in the near future. I am still subscribed to some of the threads and occasionally receive emails on forum activity. I am in the process of launching a new company and it, and my networking activities, are taking all my time outside of family time.

If a metaphysical principle collides with a sound, vetted and replicated experiment, woe unto the metaphysical principle. Nature does not care one bit about our philosophical principles because nature cannot care. Nature just is. Experiments are one of the ways we found out what Nature is.

Ba'al Chatzaf

A quick note on this argument: this is exactly my point. If the metaphysical principle collides with the objectively measured facts, change the principle. This does not necessarily mean throw out causality. I read it to mean: change our conception of the nature of causality. Can we create a concept of causality that is consistent with the facts all the way down to and, theoretically, beyond the quantum limit? Likewise, can we create a concept of causality that consistently connects the facts of consciousness, free will and material reality? Or do we have to conclude causality is what we intuitively believe it to be without further examination?

I say: the facts are the facts, lets question our concept of causality. What emerges when we step outside of the intuitive causal box is a new way of connecting the facts; a new way of thinking about causality. With a new way of connecting the facts comes a new vision of the nature of reality that can connect the facts all the way down to the quantum limit and beyond. Along the way, it also brings some of our theoretical views on physics and cosmology into question because the integrating principle is different.

Paul

(Michael, I do miss this place.)

Edited April 17, 2007 by Paul Mawdsley

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

(Michael, I do miss this place.)

Paul,

I do miss you too and I am sure I am not the only one. But I have no doubt you will find time once in a while to show up, so I don't hear a goodbye at all.

I wish you all happiness and success.

Michael

[Matus1976]

Where, in causality, does proactive behaviour fit in?

Paul, it seems in your description you are talking about the same thing I am in this post.

Origins of Volition, the Prime Mover, effecient cause, and computer programming

Recently I was having an interesting discussion on the origins of volitional consciousness with a fellow myspacer. This particular question has been a popular one in the circles of philosophy and science. What, exactly, is the origin of volition in a sentient being? It is easy to imagine what the origin is in a non-sentient being, such as a bacterium. In these creatures very particular stimulations of the environment trigger very specific reactions and combinations off different reactions. There is no origin of thought, there is only reaction and response, a well conditioned tiny machine. However, in a sentient being, an action is directly linked to a thought and is not always caused by an external stimuli. The source of the action can not be a loud noise or a bright light, it must be some internal mechanism. Thus the problem in philosophy arises, what is the source of this action? How can inanimate non-sentient matter combine in such a way as to be capable of animation and action caused by thought alone? To put it simpler, as one of my professors of religion described it, when you move you arm it moves because your nerves have sent a charge differential into the muscle, causing a cascading effect that is muscular contraction. Your brain sent the impulse to your nerves, but where and how exactly did the brain impulse originate? If we imagine the charged pulse going backward in time up the brain stem and into the brain, through tens of millions of neural connections, where does it stop, or rather start? What triggers that initial action? What is it's origin? Does a nerve, of it's own accord, suddenly activate? How do other nerves, which themselves require activation, cause the activation of other nerves?

In other philosophical circles this problem ends up being very similar to the Prime Mover, that is all actions and motion in the universe are caused by previous actions, the Earth orbits the sun because it coalesced out of a spinning dust disk, the consequence of a conglomeration of generations of dead star matter and heavy elements and the natural way that large sparse dynamic gravitational systems tend to imbalance and form pockets where more matter happens to collect. The clouds of dust were spread out and formed through previous generations of stars, going back to the big bang. What started this motion? Many theologians like to insist that god started the motion, that he is the prime mover, ignoring the fact that they are explaining a mystery by presenting an even larger one; what started god moving? If he started himself moving then it is simpler to presume the universe started itself as well, since if we are going to arbitrarily add entities to an explanation then we can arbitrarily add an infinite amount of them and never change the question and never have any more real information.

Given that and looking at bacteria and simple animals, it's clear that most of their actions could be considered to originate in the first cause as well, assuming there was one. If a bacterium swims toward the light, it does so because a photon hits a protien which unfolds and triggers a nerve which triggers a reflexive swimming response. But that photon originated in the sun, the sun originated in the formation of our galaxy, the galaxy originated in the formation of the universe, etc. etc. The point being mechanistic responsive behavior is irrelevant to the question of the origin of volitional behavior, unless one believes in a deterministic universe and that all volitional behavior only appears to be volitional and was actually writ in stone at the moment of the formation of the universe, just as this article must have been. So presuming the universe is not deterministic, and I feel it irrational to consider it to be, what is the origin of volitional behavior?

One of the most influential Christian philosophers of all time, Thomas Aquinas, originated this argument as the argument from efficient cause, though it had its roots in Aristotle. It is an argument that is often confused with that of the Prime Mover, and superficially they are very similar. However the argument from efficient cause, if you consider the universe non-deterministic, can be thought more of as billions of Prime Mover dilemmas that occur all the time. As a person that embraces a non-deterministic universe, this obviously presents a great dilemma. Hume's counter arguments to the efficient cause argument are mostly the same as a rational person would present against the prime mover as god argument. Immanuel Kant's counter arguments were much worse, and none these philosophers seem to recognize the role that efficient cause plays as a fundamental in a non-deterministic universe.

Thus we are back to our original problem. What is the trigger for action, for thought? Where does it originate? How can a nerve trigger it's own activation? There have been many studies with MRI's and PET and CAT scans which show us how some of the these origins of choices operate and what general regions of our brains are used, but we won't find our answer there yet; the scale is too large. It occurred to me today when contemplating the functioning of computer system that there is a problem which is identical to the efficient cause problem and might help, conceptually, to explain the origins of volition in sentient beings. To find our answer for now, we have to look to computer programming. Consider a computer program, or more specifically a computer program reading another program. How does a computer initially gain the ability to read programs? Or, essentially, how do you program a program to read programs? It's a catch 22, you can't program a computer unless the computer is able to read programs, but the computer can not read programs unless you program it. Just as a nerve can not initiate itself to fire, so a computer program can not tell a computer how to read it (I speak here in the most fundamental sense of a computer program, not a new file format which includes a module to convert it) In both cases we have a physical device which is operated by a change of a state, coincidently in both cases it is electrical charges. If this catch 22 is resolved in the physical operation of computers, it can clearly be solved inside the brain over billions of years of evolution. So how is it solved?

For my part, I suspect it is a consequence of an active process in a volitional being. I think if you consider how to program 'volition' into a computer you might get some insight into this. Here is a vague description of my still vague idea of a possible concentpual answer to this question; I think the root is a series of neural loops which fire all the time, and thus are continually processing and responding. A volitional "decision" then is one in which a series of options are recalled, and the actual decisions (which is weighed against values, etc) is picked up from a continual. There is no 'prime cause' because as an active process the cause need not be pinpointed to a singuarly nueral event, but instead the combination of effects from various loops which are weighing values, perceptions, projections, etc. Maybe that helps, maybe it doesnt really answer the question at all, this is still a topic which perplexes me.

Regards,

Matus

[Paul Mawdsley]

Where, in causality, does proactive behaviour fit in?

Paul, it seems in your description you are talking about the same thing I am in this post.

For my part, I suspect it is a consequence of an active process in a volitional being. I think if you consider how to program 'volition' into a computer you might get some insight into this. Here is a vague description of my still vague idea of a possible concentpual answer to this question; I think the root is a series of neural loops which fire all the time, and thus are continually processing and responding. A volitional "decision" then is one in which a series of options are recalled, and the actual decisions (which is weighed against values, etc) is picked up from a continual. There is no 'prime cause' because as an active process the cause need not be pinpointed to a singuarly nueral event, but instead the combination of effects from various loops which are weighing values, perceptions, projections, etc. Maybe that helps, maybe it doesnt really answer the question at all, this is still a topic which perplexes me.

Matus,

I will find time later to read your longer quote. For now, it seems at first glance that what your describing is on a similar track to my own view.

To emphasize the fact that no external action is required, I call it a proactive process which initiates volitional action. My sense of proactive is not that something can choose to act as such. My sense of proactive is more fundamental than the ability to choose. It is more that action is inherent in a things nature. Volition evolves from a proactive---ie: intrinsically in motion--- physical reality.

I agree that reciprocal causation is a central element of awareness, creativity and volition. Action alternatives can be created via unique integrations from the continual flow of consciousness. An act of volition is the impulse that initiates an action from an action alternative (or choice). There is no prime cause because action is a fundamental property of being. What a thing does is a fundamental property of what it is; it is not a property that is transfered from other things. Energy for action is intrinsic to the thing that acts. A thing cannot be, without being in some motion.

I have come to imagine that the most fundamental things have a very simple motion. The fundamental particles I have come to imagine move in absolute straight lines, at the absolute speed of light, in an absolute space and an absolute absolute time dimension, that can only be measured by relative standards from our own relative positions.

A volitional decision is action according to a specific principle that exists in the very nature of living entities. The principle of integration is the strange attractor that draws action into a focus. A volitional decision is an action according to the principle of integration. We are driven to eat, sleep, have sex, work, learn, write, etc. because we are maximizing the integration of our organism, in our judgement. The choices we make are the initiation of actions according to some principle of integration that makes sense to us.

Paul

[Paul Mawdsley]

Matus,

I got a chance to read your longer article above. While I think we are both moved by the same disconnects between notions of causality and the evidence, I am most struck by how much the standard notions of causality are still embedded in your images, and how little they are in mine. Quite frankly, I'm weirder than you.

Think about the proverbial billiard ball. The standard notion states that when two billiard balls collide, energy is transfered between them: the energy from one determines the action of the other.

This flies in the face of how I have come to conceive causation. What if we think of the finite and intrinsic energy of its constituents as already being in the billiard ball, but as being primarily being expressed, due to the degrees of freedom available to it, in a circular motion. When it collides with another billiard ball, the internal degrees of freedom change and the energy balance between internal circular motion and the translational, rotational and/or vibrational motion of the ball as a whole change also. The result is the ball moving off in a new direction at a new speed.

The key point here is that no energy was transferred. One entity changed the degrees of freedom of another entities constituents. The change in degrees of freedom caused the entity's internal energy to be expressed in a different way.

An interesting side benefit of this approach is that it can explain why special relativity must be so. To increase a billiard ball's translational motion, its internal circular motion must be reduced because it's intrinsic energy is finite. If we imagine it to be made of finite fundamental particles that only move in straight lines at the speed of light (unless its degrees of freedom limit its action), then as the billiard ball approaches the speed of light, its internal motion (its clock) will slow down. The measure of its mass will be reduced because its slowed internal clock will make it react more slowly to the effects of a force--- ie: it will be less responsive to a change in the degrees of freedom. Finally, it will measure as being contracted along its length because, in the billiard ball's direction of motion, most of the intrinsic energy is being converted into translational motion. There is less energy in the direction of motion to maintain its length.

This line of thinking is all based on a different concept of causation from the standard view. We not only have to change our concept of causality to fit the facts of quantum physics and volition; we have to change our interpretation of the facts to fit the concept of causation that fits the facts of quantum physics and volition. Our entire worldview must shift for everything to come into alignment. When we make the shift, we see everything differently. The worldview that used to make sense, at least mostly, now flies in the face.

Paul

Edited April 18, 2007 by Paul Mawdsley

[BaalChatzaf]

Isn't i (the square root of -1) an unextended entitiy?

David

Mathematical objects are abstractions. They live only in our heads. The integer 1 is no more real or imaginary than is the square root of -1. Neither have physical existence.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited August 26, 2007 by BaalChatzaf

[Kevin Haggerty]

Wow, I missed this discussion completely! And now some of my off-line reading has gotten me thinking about will in some new ways and with Bob's posting yesterday, the title of this old thread announced itself to me from the "today's active topics" page and I started reading it, etc.

(Michael, isn't it wonderful how broad and deep the world of O-L has become? How hard it is, I presume, for most of us to keep abreast of all the many fascinating developments? Quite an accomplishment! Thoroughly redundant congratulations to you and Kat!)

It's funny, me visiting this site and finding it of value, because, for the most part, I have no patience for philosophy. The constantly reductive discussions of philosophers bore me close to tears and rarely if ever express anything I'd want to take home with me. What does fascinate me is psychology. I am particularly interested in the place where psychology and philosophy meet. Not so much "what" people are thinking, but "why."

It's curious to me that Paul's NB quotes here have gotten exactly zero commentary, because they seem to me to be at the beating heart of whatever the heck we're talking about when we talk about "free will." Keeping it simple and letting reality be my guide, self-esteem seems to be the elephant in this room. Forget about where free will comes from, I want to know where self-esteem comes from!

In a deterministic universe, self-esteem must be pure delusion, sentimental attachment to an abstraction. Either that, or some bloodless equivalent to "Yay! The machine isn't broken!" Why would you congratulate or esteem something for simply working properly? I mean, how much excitement, how much passion can a mere mechanism generate? To quote Paul's post #22: "Without human will, thinking is automatic, art is automatic, love is automatic, existence is automatic, passion is dead!"

If indeed we have a self to be esteemed, then the self must generate something to account for it. If passion is a value, it cannot simply be a measure of a machine's struggle against brokenness.

On the other hand, Dragonfly's argument has an elegance to it. Just as ancient people thought the gods must be responsible for the natural phenomena they could not understand, so modern man deifies his own poorly understood motives with the magnificent notion that he is the unmoved mover of his own will. I suppose, then, self-esteem would, at best, be relegated to the level of a "necessary fiction."

Seems obvious to me that if self-esteem is a real value, then free will must be a real phenomenon. In psychotherapy we are confronted again and again by the praxis of free will, in contraversion to a life-time's worth of causation and addictions, coming forward out of the mysterious individual human being to say, "No, I am not simply the result of the many forces in my life. Today, this moment, I choose to unwrite the program and begin anew." No respectable therapist would ever claim agency for such a patient's shift. It's something in the individual, something unprecedented and transformative.

Put even more simply, I'm talking about creativity itself. Is creativity an illusion? Can a Dragonfly honestly say that the creation of great art that transforms consciousness and propels the race toward greater and greater levels of awareness is just an inevitable result of Newtonian principles? And if he can, then--and I mean this very seriously--why do we care about any of it?

-Kevin

[Paul Mawdsley]

Hi Kevin. This is one of the threads that is still set up to email me when there is activity. I read what you wrote and I can't help but be moved to think about it. For me it requires an act of will to stop myself from thinking about such things so I can pay attention to other priorities. I've not been following any other threads that you seem to be referring to but I would like to make a point that occurs to me regarding what you wrote here.

You wrote:

modern man deifies his own poorly understood motives with the magnificent notion that he is the unmoved mover of his own will

I believe this statement is based on a common and mistaken concept of the nature of entities and causation. The dynamics of free will does not require an unmoved mover. If we assume we have some sort of spiritual (but not supernatural) core to our being that experiences phenomena and responds to it, that creates and is asserted in our imaginations and the world, then could we not assume it is in perpetual motion over our lifespan? After all, do we not describe it as a flow of awareness? And could we not consider such motion to be guided by the principle of integration---the integration of the organism and/or the integration of the psyche? Making a choice is then a matter of delaying our impulse to act so we can weigh which of a set of action alternatives will maximize the integration of our being at that moment and releasing the impulse to act when we are satisfied with one of the alternatives. We would then be a moving mover.

The underlying nature of entities and causation lies at the heart of the free will vs determinism debates. It is also at the root of disagreements over quantum physics. It's about time we started to seriously question our intuitive understandings of the nature of entities and causation. I think it is mistakes in these intuitions that are causing the problems.

Paul