Proactive Behaviour and Causality

[John Dailey]

Test

J:D

P.S: DAMN! This got through, but the 20-min one I did previously didn't. Maybe I should 'Test' and then edit with my real post.

Edited November 27, 2006 by John Dailey

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

John,

I have opened a ticket for technical support. This is not just happening with you. IPB is usually quick to respond, so hopefully this problem will go away soon.

Michael

[Wolf DeVoon]

Human minds, bodies and brains are embedded in a far greater universe. Individual conscious representations are perspectival. That is, the precise manner in which entities, events and processes are translated into experiences depends on the location in space and time of a given observer, and the exact mix of perceptual, cognitive, affective, social, cultural and historical influences which enter into the "construction" of a given experience. In this sense, each conscious construction is private, subjective, and unique.

The question is efficacy of proactive behavior. Whether the individual human will is limited by a cultural time and place, it remains that no one volunteers to be created and born in a particular place or time; and the unchosen genetic roll of dice resulting in our individuality is both random and inescapable. I think it is evident and persuasive that infancy, naivete, ambition, error, dilemmas, and consequent soul-searching demonstrate our hope to attempt a better life than we can actualize. To be born an idiot is a metaphysical prison, no matter what the idiot dreams of being or doing in pursuit of his betterment.

I am painfully aware of apparent individuality and diversity, six billion unique lifestyles and hairstyles and nicknames. That's not the problem. The problem is that no one truly wishes to be who they are. I had hoped for a life like David Lean or Stanley Kubrick. In a pinch, I would have settled for Fred Zinneman. What I got instead was Wolf DeVoon -- an isolated beatnik with a second-class brain, whose idea of a good time is a newspaper and a cup of coffee at Denny's. (from Individualism)

W.

Edited January 7, 2007 by Wolf DeVoon

[Paul Mawdsley]

Human minds, bodies and brains are embedded in a far greater universe. Individual conscious representations are perspectival. That is, the precise manner in which entities, events and processes are translated into experiences depends on the location in space and time of a given observer, and the exact mix of perceptual, cognitive, affective, social, cultural and historical influences which enter into the "construction" of a given experience. In this sense, each conscious construction is private, subjective, and unique.

The question is efficacy of proactive behavior. Whether the individual human will is limited by a cultural time and place, it remains that no one volunteers to be created and born in a particular place or time; and the unchosen genetic roll of dice resulting in our individuality is both random and inescapable. I think it is evident and persuasive that infancy, naivete, ambition, error, dilemmas, and consequent soul-searching demonstrate our hope to attempt a better life than we can actualize. To be born an idiot is a metaphysical prison, no matter what the idiot dreams of being or doing in pursuit of his betterment.

I am painfully aware of apparent individuality and diversity, six billion unique lifestyles and hairstyles and nicknames. That's not the problem. The problem is that no one truly wishes to be who they are. I had hoped for a life like David Lean or Stanley Kubrick. In a pinch, I would have settled for Fred Zinneman. What I got instead was Wolf DeVoon -- an isolated beatnik with a second-class brain, whose idea of a good time is a newspaper and a cup of coffee at Denny's. (from Individualism)

W.

My question was whether or not we can make sense of proactive behaviour in principle. Can we produce an intuitive understanding and physics of proactive behaviour without calling it illusory and describing it in action-reaction terms?

As to the efficacy of proactive behaviour in our own lives, we will all draw on our own experiences using our personal orientations to existence, our own interpretive frameworks, and our own motivational biases. In my life, I have found I started with some decent genetic tools but my environment was not the most nurturing nor stimulating. It is the efficacy of my proactive behaviour that has gone a long way to correcting many of the negative influences of my environment and has helped push the structures of my genetic heritage to new levels of complexity. That our consciousness occupies a specific psychological, philosophical, spatial-temporal, location in the universe, and is affected by local/linear, as well as, non-local/non-linear forces, is a fact of existence to be identified and accepted. In any moment who, what, when, where, and why I am is my starting point. Part of the equation of this starting point is the fact that I am capable of initiating the actions of my consciousness: I can choose to be a proactive being. The vision of existence I create and the choices I make shape my being and my actions. I am more than what my genetic design and my environmental forces conspired to make me. Proactive behaviour is the difference. I have earned the me I am. And I would choose to be no-one else.

Paul

[Wolf DeVoon]

I have earned the me I am. And I would choose to be no-one else.

I enjoy reading your posts, Paul. And you're quite right: a being of self-made soul. Roark was my inspiration since 1972. Amazing how much work there is, exploring the Unknown. Rod Nibbe has a cool motto: Beaten paths are for beaten men.

W.

[Paul Mawdsley]

Thanks Wolf. Your posts make me think. I look forward to discovering what the universe looks like from your place in it.

Paul

[Darrell Hougen]

Hi Paul,

I have given this topic a bit of thought, so let me give it a try. This will be brief as I don't have time to write a proper response. Also, I have not read every single entry in its entirety (though I did skim the entire list).

Simply put, randomness (non-determinism) is a fact of existence and it is a requirement of free will (proactive behavior).

To begin, non-determinism is consistent with classical physics. There are some classical physical systems that have non-deterministic solutions. Some physical systems have equations with infinitely many solutions at some point. (Such equations often have a square root, for example).

I had a physics professor (Alfred Hubler) that actually created a non-deterministic device. In it, a ball rolled down a slope of a particular shape in a bath of castor oil. Roughly, there was a downward sloping hill that leveled out at a single point and then sloped downward again. Watching the ball roll down the hill was amusing because it would stop at the level point for an indeterminant amount of time before proceeding down the hill. It sometimes rested for less than a second and sometimes for several seconds.

Now, someone might object that, being an experimental setup, it couldn't perfectly implement the equation which was supposed to govern its behavior so it might actually be deterministic. However, the problem is much deeper than that.

The fact is that any physical system can represent only a finite amount of information at any moment in time and the amount of information it can represent depends upon the "size" of the phase space region through which its trajectories pass. Therefore, if the trajectories of a system pass through a very small region of phase space, information must be lost. But, the trajectories must re-emerge on the other side of the singularity (or near singularity) and must go somewhere. Therefore, information must be added to the system to describe the system parameters. I will assert, for the time being, that the source of the information is randomness.

All physical systems are random to some degree.

Therefore, all physical systems are proactive to some degree --- ever wonder where the wind comes from?

Randomness does not require the injection of energy into the system and, therefore, proactive systems are consistent with the laws of physics such as the conservation of energy.

Living things and humans in particular have evolved to control and make use of this randomness.

As an aside, statisticians have learned that some randomized algorithms are more effective than deterministic algorithms at solving complex problems.

Darrell

[Paul Mawdsley]

Hi Darrell. Welcome to OL. I'm sorry I didn't get a chance to do more than skim your post tonight. I'll try to get back to you tomorrow.

Paul

[Paul Mawdsley]

Simply put, randomness (non-determinism) is a fact of existence and it is a requirement of free will (proactive behavior).

Darrell,

Everything you wrote hinges on this one statement. With the meanings I give the terms "randomness," "free will," and "proactive behaviour," I cannot agree with this statement. The concept of randomness can be conceived as a metaphysical term or an epistemological term. I think of epistemological randomness as causal but for which the causes are not known. The outcome of a roll of the dice is epistemologically random. Metaphysical randomness is acausal, meaning an effect without a cause. Quantum events are said to be metaphysically random.

My problem with the concept of metaphysical randomness is that its context is framed in action-to-action causation. What action-to-action causation means is that the impulse to initiate an entities action must come from outside the entity that acts. The fundamental principle of behaviour for action-to-action causation is: what a thing does is determined by the actions of other things. Metaphysical randomness, then, is an action that is not determined by the actions of other things. This is essentially what is assumed to happen in quantum events.

I think this view of causality is mistaken. Metaphysical randomness is an illusion created by applying a mistaken concept of causality as an epistemological principle. Applying the action-to-action view of causation as a guiding epistemological principle for constructing a worldview, necessarily leads to the conclusion that metaphysical randomness exists. If we cannot observe or measure in any way the nature of an entity that causes a quantum effect, then it only makes sense to conclude, as Bohr did, that we can know nothing about such an entity and it is wrong to even assume its existence. There is no information in the observable universe that can indicate even that anything exists below the quantum limit. As such, we must accept metaphysical randomness in quantum events if we accept action-to-action causation.

If the concept of metaphysical randomness is dependent on action-to-action causation and the principle of action-to-action causation states that "what a thing does is determined by the action of other things," then randomness cannot be a requirement of free will and proactive behaviour. The concepts of proactive behaviour (as I have discussed it in this thread) and free will require that what a thing does be determined by the thing itself. Free will is chosen---i.e.: causal---action not necessitated by antecedent events. This is not acausal randomness. It is self-initiated causal action. This is what I mean by proactive. The energy for action resides within the thing that acts. Action is a fundamental property of an entity and is an expression of its identity. It is not something that is transferred from one thing to another.

Metaphysical randomness is not an issue for proactive causation because an entity's actions are intrinsic to their identity. Since the energy for action cannot be separated from the thing that acts, there can be no effect without a cause. If there can be no effect without a cause, there can be no metaphysical randomness. Therefore, we are compelled to look for causation in quantum events. And we can find information about the underlying nature of quantum events in the identity of observable and measurable entities because there is a necessary connection between what a thing is and what it does. Quantum actions, then, tell us something about the underlying nature of the things that act.

Paul

PS--I am so tired at the point of finishing this that I have no clue if it makes any sense even to me. See what you think. I'll be back in a couple of days.

[Dragonfly]

In classical (Newtonian) mechanics there is in terms of the fundamental theory no randomness, only determinism. There is theoretically no limit to the accuracy with which we can measure positions and momenta, which would mean that we in theory could increase the accuracy enough to predict the evolution of a highly chaotic system for any given period. The practice is of course quite different. Given the fact that even the gravitational influence of a small displacement of a rock at the distance of Sirius could change the parameters of the molecules in a gas enough to change the microscopic configuration completely, it's clear that in practice predictability of chaotic systems is impossible. Therefore in real life we may say that even Newtonian systems can for all practical purposes have random behavior, even if it is not a fundamental randomness as in QM, but a pseudo-randomness, or in Paul's words "epistemological randomness".

Randomness, "metaphysical" or "epistemological", is not a requirement of "free will", however. A mind driven by random events is still a mind determined by something else, out of its control. Now this all has been already extensively discussed on this forum, so perhaps it might be useful to read the old posts before we start to rehash the whole discussion again.

[Darrell Hougen]

In classical (Newtonian) mechanics there is in terms of the fundamental theory no randomness, only determinism. There is theoretically no limit to the accuracy with which we can measure positions and momenta, which would mean that we in theory could increase the accuracy enough to predict the evolution of a highly chaotic system for any given period.

Actually, it turns out that there are some systems that are governed by non-deterministic sets of equations. There are infinitely many solutions at a single point so that it doesn't matter whether infinite accuracy is possible or not. The solution at the singularity cannot be resolved.

In my post, I sort of glided from that observation into an information theoretic argument which is, in some sense, an argument of modern rather than classical physics. However, I would argue that the notion that particles exist with mathematically exact parameters (location, momentum, etc.) and that have perfectly deterministic trajectories violates the law of identity. If we view a particle or system of particles as a system possessing a certain amount of information about its state, then, because it would require an infinite amount of information to give the particles mathematically precise locations and trajectories, the system would be required to possess an infinite amount of some quantity (namely, information) which violates the law of identity.

Now, it could be argued that I am mixing the epistemological with the metaphysical because information content is not really a property of a physical system. However, I would disagree with that assessment. As we know, living in the modern, computer age, physical systems can be used to store and transmit information, e.g., disk drives and communications links. Slightly more broadly, any physical system can be used to store information. Indeed, every physical system stores information about its state.

Some systems store a lot of information about their past states, but are very hard to predict. Other systems are easy to predict, but store little information about their past states. Still other systems are somewhere in between. That is part of Chaos theory. But, in the end, the amount of information that a system is capable of storing is finite. That is a physical fact which is predictable from the law of identity.

On this view then, the classical notion of metaphysical determinism is inconsistent with the law of identity.

Randomness, "metaphysical" or "epistemological", is not a requirement of "free will", however. A mind driven by random events is still a mind determined by something else, out of its control. Now this all has been already extensively discussed on this forum, so perhaps it might be useful to read the old posts before we start to rehash the whole discussion again.

I do not believe that living things, and humans in particular, have some quality that is unexplainable in terms of the fundamental constituent parts of which they are composed. I do believe that this leads to some type of metaphysical dualism. I do not, at this point, have a good explanation of free will, but I do not see how to get there without the use of some notion of metaphysical randomness.

A system is random if there is no strictly mechanistic explanation possible for its behavior.

Darrell

Edited January 24, 2007 by Darrell Hougen

[Darrell Hougen]

My problem with the concept of metaphysical randomness is that its context is framed in action-to-action causation. What action-to-action causation means is that the impulse to initiate an entities action must come from outside the entity that acts. The fundamental principle of behaviour for action-to-action causation is: what a thing does is determined by the actions of other things. Metaphysical randomness, then, is an action that is not determined by the actions of other things. This is essentially what is assumed to happen in quantum events.

I'm not sure I understand this. It appears that you are saying that action-to-action causation is necessary for metaphysical randomness but yet that randomness is not caused by the actions of other things. How is that possible? It appears that you are contradicting yourself.

In my view, metaphysical randomness is more fully consistent with an entity-to-action view of causality exactly because a random behavior is a behavior that cannot be predicted from knowledge of the behavior of the other entities with which an object interacts. The behavior comes from the entity itself.

This naturally leads to a question about how such behavior can be consistent with the laws of physics such as conservation of energy, conservation of momentum, etc. But this can be handled if we assume that a particle, for example, transfers some of its momentum and energy to another particle when it changes course.

For example, in the thin slit experiment in which electrons are beamed at a target on the other side of a grating, the electrons can be assumed to transfer some momentum to the grating as they pass through, thereby conserving momentum within the system.

Darrell

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Darrell,

You are touching on some issues that have been bouncing around in my own mind. I keep coming back to reductionism and, while I see some the breathtaking results with this approach, I do not see constructive principles that explain how whole entities are formed or why they spring into being. I see how the parts work within the entity (including subatomic ones), and how the same part works the same way other entities, but I do not see any convincing reason for why Entity A or Entity B sprang up into existence with those particular sets of attributes and actions.

With reductionism, you take what exists—entities—and break them down into their parts. After you do that, you can recreate entities and even form new ones. This is a "smaller level" or "bottom up" approach to identifying the nature of entities. Science is based on it.

The following thought is vague, but I can't get rid of it. What if there were some principles that governed the middle (or higher) level, ones that governed the formation of entities at the initial level? Principles that determine from the top down which of the smaller parts will belong to an entity because the form it takes requires them?

This is where I can see randomness enter—not in determining the parts, but in the emergence (or existence itself) of the final form—and even in the behavior of that form when life is involved.

Just my 2 cents so far in pondering the mysteries of the universe...

Michael

[sjw]

I do not believe that living things, and humans in particular, have some quality that is unexplainable in terms of the fundamental constituent parts of which they are composed. I do believe that this leads to some type of metaphysical dualism. I do not, at this point, have a good explanation of free will, but I do not see how to get there without the use of some notion of metaphysical randomness.

The point is, what you are proposing is just a variant of determinism--it doesn't explain free-will, it makes free-will an impossibility, since to be determined by random atoms or some such is to be determined. I don't see the answer either, but I do know that a contradiction in terms is not an explanation.

[Paul Mawdsley]

The following thought is vague, but I can't get rid of it. What if there were some principles that governed the middle (or higher) level, ones that governed the formation of entities at the initial level? Principles that determine from the top down which of the smaller parts will belong to an entity because the form it takes requires them?

This is where I can see randomness enter—not in determining the parts, but in the emergence (or existence itself) of the final form—and even in the behavior of that form when life is involved.

Randomness-- No. Complexity-- Yes.

Jenna and I were having one of those intuitive flow dialogues before the "hack-attack" that touches on the type of principles you might be referring to. Here is something I wrote:

One image I have played with a lot...is the image of the vortex. When I picture the reciprocal relationship between wholes and parts, I think of the relation between the particles in a vortex and the form of the whole structure. The action of the parts give the whole vortex its form and motion. The form and motion of the vortex as a whole shapes the actions of the individual particles of which it is composed. Furthermore, I picture networks as webs of relationships who's lines cross at and act through nodes that are themselves vortices. The network can be pictured as an interconnected field of vortices– the actions of one vortex affecting the actions of the others in the field and the actions of the field affecting the actions of a given vortex. This can be seen as a vortex of vortices. The layering of networks can be visualized as layers of vortex fields. Ultimately, one single vortex can affect, or be effected by, multiple layers of vortices. Or the vortex can just move around and bump into other vortices in a fairly mechanical way. This is why we study quantum fields and the mechanical universe: both are an expression of a deeper reality. This why we study consciousness and biological psychology: both are an expression of a deeper reality. This is why we study individual behaviour and social dynamics: both are an expression of a deeper reality.

[Paul Mawdsley]

Darrell, you wrote,

...I would argue that the notion that particles exist with mathematically exact parameters (location, momentum, etc.) and that have perfectly deterministic trajectories violates the law of identity. If we view a particle or system of particles as a system possessing a certain amount of information about its state, then, because it would require an infinite amount of information to give the particles mathematically precise locations and trajectories, the system would be required to possess an infinite amount of some quantity (namely, information) which violates the law of identity.

You are viewing existence through a particulate lens. Consider the fact that physics has had to accept the reality of wave particle dualism. Now, I'm not a fan of how physicists have come to conceive of the relationship between the particle and wave natures of phenomena but we have to consider the implications of the wave nature of existence. We have to look at the universe through a wave lens also. Waves can possess and transmit an infinite amount of information without violating the law of identity.

(Warning: Here comes a tangent!)

This makes me think of Zeno's paradoxes. My basic answer to these paradoxes is that the universe is not merely atomic or digital. Motion is a fundamental property of atomic entities. Therefore, there is a fundamental non-digital, or analogue, aspect to existence. A lot of entities in motion will interact and produce a medium for the production and transmission of information via waves. To break existence down, to reduce it to its basic elements, necessitates the loss of information about existence because waves are a fundamental part of existence and are irreducibly holistic.

Since waves are a fundamental part of existence in which information can be produced and transmitted, a particle can also act as a node in a web of information and relationships; an aspect of the nodes identity and its behaviour is partly shaped by the information contained in the web. This is the nature of the relationship between an individual consciousness and the layers of social/cultural/physical context in which that individual exists. The non-linear and non-local information contained in these layers of context shape aspects of the individual's identity and behaviour.( This makes me think of Chris Sciabarra's ideas, but that's a tangent I choose not to follow right now.)

This does not change the fact that individuals also have a particulate aspect to their identity and behaviour. It is this aspect that is emphasized by Objectivism. An individual's behaviour is also determined by his fundamental motion: the principle of action to maintain and increase integration. This proactive principle of motion operates within the layers of social/cultural/physical context while interacting locally and linearly with particular physical and/or conscious entities.

Randomness, "metaphysical" or "epistemological", is not a requirement of "free will", however. A mind driven by random events is still a mind determined by something else, out of its control. Now this all has been already extensively discussed on this forum, so perhaps it might be useful to read the old posts before we start to rehash the whole discussion again.

I do not believe that living things, and humans in particular, have some quality that is unexplainable in terms of the fundamental constituent parts of which they are composed.

I do. Catch the wave.

I do believe that this leads to some type of metaphysical dualism.

I agree. But this is because we are starting with causal and substance dualism.

I do not, at this point, have a good explanation of free will

I do, but I am racking my brain to find a way to communicate it.

... but I do not see how to get there without the use of some notion of metaphysical randomness.

Metaphysical randomness won't get you there. Stepping outside of the action-to-action causal paradigm is the first step. Seeing that Aristotle's, "The principle of motion lies within," applies to the unifying centre of consciousness (NB), according to the principle of integration--- i.e.:"the cardinal principle of life" and "the cardinal principle of the mind" (NB again, The Art of Living Consciously.), all in the context of Rand's entity-to-action causation---i.e.: what a thing is determines it does, is the next step. This is where to begin to explain free will.

Paul

Edited January 25, 2007 by Paul Mawdsley

[sjw]

Waves can possess and transmit an infinite amount of information without violating the law of identity.

It's a mistake to take an epistemological concept like information and project it onto reality as such. And I don't see how pointing out that reality is analog helps explain free will. I mean, it helps explain why reality is a whole lot different than a mere computer simulation (and why AI is doomed). But I don't see the leap from "analog" to "free will".

While we're on esoteric metaphysics: Isn't it fascinating how the whole universe is implied by a single atom? I mean, if you blast it into its constituent units, then just by multiplying them and rearranging them, you can in principle recreate all of existence. In that sense, all principles and knowledge are in some sense implied by the existence of a single atom. The potential for volition is in there somewhere too.

[Paul Mawdsley]

Waves can possess and transmit an infinite amount of information without violating the law of identity.

It's a mistake to take an epistemological concept like information and project it onto reality as such.

I don't think the concept of information should be restricted to epistemology. In fact, I think of epistemological information as a subcategory of a broader concept of information. I consider information to be the patterns that are created in some media as the result of the expression of a given entity's identity which are transmitted by this media, contribute to the overall form of this media, and affect the context in which other entities act. As such, the existence and transmission of information does not require the existence of consciousness. It is in this way that the information contained in the quantum field as a whole affects the actions of a quantum particle. The information contained in the quantum field as a whole affects the context in which the quantum particle acts. The field affects the degrees of freedom of the particle, which affects how the (proactive?) energy of that particle will be expressed.

And I don't see how pointing out that reality is analog helps explain free will. I mean, it helps explain why reality is a whole lot different than a mere computer simulation (and why AI is doomed). But I don't see the leap from "analog" to "free will".

I initially referred to "analog" because it helped me to explain how there can be infinite amounts of information in a physical system. I didn't think I leaped from "analog" to "free will." I thought I gently strolled.

While we're on esoteric metaphysics: Isn't it fascinating how the whole universe is implied by a single atom? I mean, if you blast it into its constituent units, then just by multiplying them and rearranging them, you can in principle recreate all of existence. In that sense, all principles and knowledge are in some sense implied by the existence of a single atom. The potential for volition is in there somewhere too.

YES! I don't think we need to assume a separate kind of substance to explain consciousness or volition. When it comes to quantum physics, I'm a hidden variables guy. My view of causality requires it. I think the stuff of consciousness, volition and all of physical existence is in the hidden variables. It's one kind of stuff. Rand called it "little stuff." One more place I agree with her (and NB). One thing I would add: if the constituent units of atoms are fundamentally dynamic, they will arrange themselves into layer upon layer of complex systems, evolving all the way up to conscious beings. I just think consciousness and volition are the result of a special integration of layers between inert matter and dynamic "little stuff."

Paul

Edited January 25, 2007 by Paul Mawdsley

[sjw]

I don't think the concept of information should be restricted to epistemology. In fact, I think of epistemological information as a subcategory of a broader concept of information. I consider information to be the patterns that are created in some media as the result of the expression of a given entity's identity which are transmitted by this media, contribute to the overall form of this media, and affect the context in which other entities act.

It isn't information if there isn't a consciousness involved. All you're talking about here is simple cause and effect, not information. Redefining cause and effect as information doesn't create a new metaphysical thing. When a billiard ball hits another, that's not an information transfer, that's entities and forces. All you mean when you say "information" is that the system is set up in such and such a way. Well that's just identity--such and such elements of a given kind are at a given location with a given velocity etc. It's not a new thing, therefore using a new concept is just asking for confusion.

But this is a common mistake. See the latest Wired magazine. Ugh.

I initially referred to "analog" because it helped me to explain how there can be infinite amounts of information in a physical system. I didn't think I leaped from "analog" to "free will." I thought I gently strolled.

I didn't detect any motion at all myself. Maybe I missed it. What was the first step past the observation that reality is analog?

YES! I don't think we need to assume a separate kind of substance to explain consciousness or volition. When it comes to quantum physics, I'm a hidden variables guy. My view of causality requires it. I think the stuff of consciousness, volition and all of physical existence is in the hidden variables. It's one kind of stuff. Rand called it "little stuff." One more place I agree with her (and NB). One thing I would add: if the constituent units of atoms are fundamentally dynamic, they will arrange themselves into layer upon layer of complex systems, evolving all the way up to conscious beings. I just think consciousness and volition are the result of a special integration of layers between inert matter and dynamic "little stuff."

When it comes to QM, I have a lot of respect for Lewis Little's thinking outside the box, even if he's wrong. I don't know enough myself to say, but I don't buy the story that there's inherent weirdness down there. I think this is a thinking outside the box problem--just like all problems before it.

I think talking about volition happening at the scale you're saying is probably not right. I don't think snails have volition, and they're way above that level. Something really complicated has to happen, way above that scale, for volition to come into play. Obviously it's exploiting that scale like everything else in the universe. But just as, say, the existence of sound is not directly exploiting that scale--sound is not "in" the integration of "little stuff" layers--I doubt consciousness is either.

[Dragonfly]

In my post, I sort of glided from that observation into an information theoretic argument which is, in some sense, an argument of modern rather than classical physics. However, I would argue that the notion that particles exist with mathematically exact parameters (location, momentum, etc.) and that have perfectly deterministic trajectories violates the law of identity. If we view a particle or system of particles as a system possessing a certain amount of information about its state, then, because it would require an infinite amount of information to give the particles mathematically precise locations and trajectories, the system would be required to possess an infinite amount of some quantity (namely, information) which violates the law of identity.

Even if we'd need an infinite amount of information to determine the exact trajectory of a particle, this doesn't mean that such an exact trajectory can't exist. Well, at least in classical mechanics, QM is of course a different story. So your conclusion that exact trajectories can't exist is correct, but it doesn't follow from classical mechanics, which doesn't imply that exact measurements are possible.

I do not believe that living things, and humans in particular, have some quality that is unexplainable in terms of the fundamental constituent parts of which they are composed. I do believe that this leads to some type of metaphysical dualism.

I agree completely.

I do not, at this point, have a good explanation of free will, but I do not see how to get there without the use of some notion of metaphysical randomness.

A system is random if there is no strictly mechanistic explanation possible for its behavior.

But your conclusion is wrong: why should no strictly mechanistic explanation be possible for behavior and free will? Determinism isn't the same as predictability. No doubt the human mind is far too complex for any exact prediction (which would also demand predictability of the outside world interacting with the mind), we can't predict our own thoughts, which creates the user illusion that our thoughts are sui generis and not something that is generated by a highly complex but mechanistic system. As I've shown in earlier posts, there are strong indications that in terms of it functional building blocks the brain is a classical and therefore deterministic system. This does not contradict the randomness at subatomic level, just as the computer as a deterministic system doesn't contradict that randomness. Arthur C. Clarke once said: any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic. The human brain is an example of such an advanced technology, even if not created by humans but by natural evolution, so it isn't surprising that its functioning with seemingly spontaneous thoughts and choices looks like magic, while we still aren't able to reproduce its workings. But there is no need to assume that mystical explanations, dualism or some "new physics" are necessary.

[Paul Mawdsley]

Dragonfly,

I like your last post. By implication, it nails the exact points of agreement and disagreement between our two points of view. This helps me focus. Thanks.

Paul

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Determinism isn't the same as predictability.

Dragonfly,

That's one hell of an interesting statement. It sounds a great deal like a relative of the fundamental axioms, especially the law of identity.

Michael

[Dragonfly]

That's one hell of an interesting statement. It sounds a great deal like a relative of the fundamental axioms, especially the law of identity.

Predictability implies determinism, but determinism doesn't imply predictability. This isn't an axiom, but follows from the definitions.

[Darrell Hougen]

So, Dragonfly, I would like to know what you think the difference is between predictability and determinism. Is a system, in your view, unpredictable simply because it is impossible to measure the initial conditions with perfect accuracy? Or is there a deeper dichotomy?

Darrell

[Darrell Hougen]

You are touching on some issues that have been bouncing around in my own mind. I keep coming back to reductionism and, while I see some the breathtaking results with this approach, I do not see constructive principles that explain how whole entities are formed or why they spring into being. I see how the parts work within the entity (including subatomic ones), and how the same part works the same way other entities, but I do not see any convincing reason for why Entity A or Entity B sprang up into existence with those particular sets of attributes and actions.

Michael, I'm not sure I understand the fundamental problem here. There is quite a bit of science dedicated to learning how constructive forces create macroscopic entities in certain cases. For example, astronomers seek to explain how the sun and stars were created from hydrogen atoms. Biologists seek to understand how trees grow and take the shapes that they do. There are many unexplained creation processes, and perhaps some philosophical issues that need to be resolved, but I'm not sure what you're driving at.

The following thought is vague, but I can't get rid of it. What if there were some principles that governed the middle (or higher) level, ones that governed the formation of entities at the initial level? Principles that determine from the top down which of the smaller parts will belong to an entity because the form it takes requires them?

The idea of top-down contruction seems backwards to me. However, I could imagine forces that only become apparent when an entity has reached a certain size or mass or level of complexity and that those forces could shape the final creation. For example, I'm pretty sure that gravity plays a role in shaping a developing person. At small scales, electronic forces are probably much stronger than the pull of gravity and the development of an embryo in the early stages is largely unaffected by it. However, the length of a person's legs, thickness of their bones and strength of their muscles is undoubted affected by gravity.

Gravity is an external effect, but one might imagine that the shapes of various parts are affected by fluid pressure which, again, is negligible at a small scale but becomes more pronounced as the organism grows. So, there could well be "forces' that shape mental development that only become apparent at later stages of development.

This is where I can see randomness enter—not in determining the parts, but in the emergence (or existence itself) of the final form—and even in the behavior of that form when life is involved.

In my opinion, for metaphysical randomness to be possible at the higher stages, it must be possible at the lower. I don't think I have contradicted what I said above because none of the forces that I mentioned above were non-existant at the microscopic level, they just didn't have a significant effect until the higher levels of development. Randomness, in my view, must be the same.

Darrell