Thoughts on rights (children and human nature)

[John Dailey]

Addendum:

~ That I am ('IS') a rational being, with self-perceived needs of existing, not only as a 'being', but also as well, existing as a 'rational being', implies that I have needs ('OUGHTS'), self-perceived or not, to continue existing...as such.

~ I see neither the perplexity in this view re the relations, nor the 'need' of some to harp on such as being incoherent.

LLAP

J:D

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

John,

If you want a bit of a logical pretzel, how about this?

We know that volition entails an "if" by definition. Things that do not have volition do not have an "if." In fact, if you really understand volition, you see that every use of volition entails the pursuit of some value (regardless of how important), which means an "if." (If you want or need X, you will do Y, or if you want or need to avoid A, you will do B.)

So by the very nature of the "is" of volition itself, when using it one ought to make all choices conditional (based on "if"). Except in this case, there really is no "ought" because the "is" of volition works that way whether you want it to or not.

Trying to remove the "if" from the equation is like trying to remove "value" from choice.

I do admit that there is one instance in reality where "ought" can be deducted from "is" and that is where no volition is involved. But then again, without volition, there is no ought.

(Rand succumbed to an excess of rhetoric in the famous passage, that's all. Since her words are not Holy Scripture and written by a perfect God, it's OK to notice when this happens.)

Michael

[John Dailey]

Michael:

:faceless:

~ Clearly, you've chosen to challenge my stated views (why, I'm not sure.)

~ Point-by-point, your statement-by-statement, I'll re-challenge.

~ ..."Ah'll be bahck."

LLAP

J:D

PS: Interesting that you had nothing to specifically argue against re my example about *me* being a rational being and merely segued into an associatable tangent on the subject of 'is'/'ought', a-n-d, that you re-raise your view of Rand and 'holy scripture' which I see as having nothing to do with what I actually said. If you have a prob with my points/arguments, let's stick to what I actually argued, ok?

PPS: My D-S kid IS in 'need' of an Accu-Check for his Diabetes, and I IS in 'need' of sleep, hence I OUGHT (recheck my args re parent-obligations) to care-take both, and, now will. As I said, though,

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

John,

I am not challenging. Just horsing around.

Seriously speaking, the whole issue stems from the fact that the people supporting Hume are using one system of logic only (deductive). Rand stated that she had solved a problem that they said was unsolvable. But she was not clear in that statement that she had solved it by expanding the scope of logic to include a conditional "if" (wedded, of course, to identifying in the nature of things where they harm/benefit the agent).

So she was right in that she made a connection. But they were right that she did not use deductive logic alone. She only used deductive logic to identify the nature of things where they harm/benefit the agent. That is a standard for gaging an "ought," but it is not an "ought" in itself. (Basically, two meanings for "ought" are being used here—Rand used one and Hume used another.)

The controversy is the following:

1. Those against Rand wish to show that she was full of crap by saying this and they try to use this as a means of invalidating the rest of her statements about values and volition, and

2. Those who support Rand at all costs wish to show that she actually did use deductive logic only, but they get into all kinds of logical pretzels, circular reasoning (reasoning disconnected from all reality but itself), and swapping double and triple meanings all over the place by doing so.

I see nothing wrong with accepting Rand's meaning in practically all other places in her work as her real meaning and simply discounting this phrase as an excess of rhetoric.

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

I said above that I'd re-quote the paragraph giving rise to these is/ought disputes.

Here again, in all its non sequitur glories, is what she wrote:

[pg. 7-8, The Virtue of Selfishness ,

The New American Library hardcover,

1961 given as the copyright date of the

article]

In answer to those philosophers who claim that no relation can be established between ultimate ends or values and the facts of reality, let me stress that the fact that living entities exist and function necessitates the existence of values and of an ultimate value which for any given living entity is its own life. Thus the validation of value judgments is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality. The fact that a living entity is, [sic, re the comma] determines what it ought to do. So much for the issue of the relation between "is" and "ought."

There just is no way you can twist that into a logically sound argument which counteracts the non-derivability of an "is" from an "ought."

Ellen

___

(I think she put that comma in there as a way of emphasis by making the reader pause on "is.")

There seems to be not an insignificant amount of determinism in Rand.

One can argue that the "ultimate value for any given entity" is reproduction. Both statements are false, though.

I think we can see here why John Hospers got the boot. This kind of philosophical writing doesn't stand up to basic analysis and she must have suddenly realized in that presentation of his that he certainly wasn't going to be a polemical ally. He must have been a major threat. Or, she was just waiting for an excuse to come along for breaking with him. I wonder if their private, philosophical discussions had started to wear on her.

--Brant

Edited April 17, 2007 by Brant Gaede

[Brant Gaede]

Well, I'll reread that essay ["Causality Versus Duty'] when I have time. I don't think philosophy is about proving anything, but only demonstrating what seem to be best conclusions from available data. I couldn't understand why I suddenly seemed to be on different tracks with Dragonfly. "Logic is the art of non-contradictory identification" means different, additional data might equal a different identification later on. The trick of logic is to use it and to avoid logical fallacies. This is reason. I think we know enough to justify a theory of natural human rights even if that theory is hard to apply in all circumstances. The anarchists are Utopian; they want perfection in human societies. I don't see how we can avoid having some government or how that government can avoid violating some rights. I suggest that the idea of perfection--in knowledge, human beings, human societies is basically nuts.

--Brant

Brant,

Not for the first time, I don't understand what you mean by your reply in relationship to the subject under dispute. Hume claimed, though not in terms of modern logic procedures, that one can't deduce an "ought" statement from an "is" statement. Rand appears in one paragraph * of "The Objectivist Ethics" to say, yes, you can. The paragraph is fuzzy as to interpretation because of her use of "determines," which might mean merely something like "sets the parameters of." But if that's all she meant, then why did she say "In answer to those philosophers [....]"? Ignorance of the context she was speaking to? Or what?

You keep bringing up the issue of "rights," but I think you're not understanding what the basic philosophic dispute is about. I have no quarrel with you -- and I'm sure that neither does Dragonfly -- that a society in which the principle of "rights" is accepted as the base line for legal procedures is a society wherein benefits that a lot of people would want would have a better chance of occurring. I have no quarrel that the flourishing of rational minds has a much better chance in a society where "rights" as Rand understood those are the law of the land. But this is not a deductive argument. It requires the introduction of factual speculations, conditionals, and preferences. Kenghis Khan wouldn't have liked your preferred society. SHOULD he have? Why, on the basis of deductive logic? Can you demonstrate, in the same way you can demonstrate that if all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, Socrates is mortal, he SHOULD have adopted your moral code?

Ellen

* Sorry; it's late and I don't have the paragraph immediately to hand. Probably someone else does and can reference it; or I'll post it again tomorrow -- it's been posted several times.

___

Even my rationale for rights, which isn't Objectivist, isn't "objective." I use is to get ought, but my ought is conditional--that is, based on what I know this is the best I can come up with. Can you (someone else) come up with an objective argument for violating rights as a basic principle for society? All I can claim is a better argument, not an absolute ought or should. Is from ought or ought from is contradicts volition, I think, and is necessary component of determinism. It is using human consciousness as some kind of stolen concept first by denying it its role then by affirming it with logic.

--Brant

[Ellen Stuttle]

The controversy is the following:

1. Those against Rand wish to show that she was full of crap by saying this and they try to use this as a means of invalidating the rest of her statements about values and volition, and

2. Those who support Rand at all costs wish to show that she actually did use deductive logic only, but they get into all kinds of logical pretzels, circular reasoning (reasoning disconnected from all reality but itself), and swapping double and triple meanings all over the place by doing so.

Are you proposing those categories as exhaustive? (Obviously I do not fit in category 2, but then neither do I fit in your indicated category 1.)

I see nothing wrong with accepting Rand's meaning in practically all other places in her work as her real meaning and simply discounting this phrase as an excess of rhetoric.

Neither do I. I've been saying so all along.

Ellen

___

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Are you proposing those categories as exhaustive? (Obviously I do not fit in category 2, but then neither do I fit in your indicated category 1.)

I see nothing wrong with accepting Rand's meaning in practically all other places in her work as her real meaning and simply discounting this phrase as an excess of rhetoric.

Neither do I. I've been saying so all along.

Ellen,

To answer you question, I should have stated that those two alternatives were the end points of a continuum. From what I have encountered so far, when there is a heated controversy (with emphasis on the word "controversy") with lots of inflamed arguments and one person completely ignoring what the other said and not even interested in understanding, those end points do seem pretty exhaustive.

As an issue for discussion, however, of course it isn't. The third possibility (for which you quoted from me, but for which I did not give a number) is another category. Also, there is the rest of the continuum. And then there is the final category of people who simply do not understand the issue at all, but do have a an opinion on what it appears to be.

From what I have read of you, we are very much aligned on the same conclusion, albeit you are probably better read on the issue than I am at this time.

Michael

[Mike Hardy]

circular reasoning (reasoning disconnected from all reality but itself)

I hope you're not proposing that that's a definition of "circular reasoning".

Circular reasoning is this: "Since A is true, we can deduce that B must

be true. Since B is true, C must be true. Since C is true, D must follow.

Since D is true, it follows that A must be true. Thus we have proved A."

-- Mike Hardy

[Mike Hardy]

There just is no way you can twist that into a logically sound argument which counteracts the non-derivability of an "is" from an "ought."

Um .... did you mean "ought" from "is"? -- Mike Hardy

[Ellen Stuttle]

There just is no way you can twist that into a logically sound argument which counteracts the non-derivability of an "is" from an "ought."

Um .... did you mean "ought" from "is"? -- Mike Hardy

Um .... yeah. (I changed it.)

E-

___

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

circular reasoning (reasoning disconnected from all reality but itself)

I hope you're not proposing that that's a definition of "circular reasoning".

Circular reasoning is this: "Since A is true, we can deduce that B must

be true. Since B is true, C must be true. Since C is true, D must follow.

Since D is true, it follows that A must be true. Thus we have proved A."

-- Mike Hardy

Mike,

I stated that poorly and incompletely, but you gave a perfect example of what I meant. I wanted to highlight that the only standard of truth in circular reasoning is the logical system itself and nothing is confirmed by any relation to outside facts. (I am aware that this observation could inadvertently apply to mathematics as a complaint, but I left out the circle in my description of circular reasoning and I just fessed up, so please don't shoot me. )

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

There just is no way you can twist that into a logically sound argument which counteracts the non-derivability of an "is" from an "ought."

Um .... did you mean "ought" from "is"? -- Mike Hardy

Um .... yeah. (I changed it.)

E-

___

Heck, and I thought that was an interesting way to look at it. :cry: Some kind of running a program backwards seeking to demonstrate some kind of validity to something--or nothing. :sick:

--Brant

[John Dailey]

~ Well, here I am...'bahk'...and, reading all since my last comment, uh...sheesh.

~ I'm not sure if we're all really 'focused' on any particular point anymore, other than each arguing either the 'circular reasoning' of the other, or on the nature of 'circular reasoning' itself. Interesting abstruse subject, but...what was the original concern (at least where I left off)? Oh, Rand and the subject of 'oughts/shoulds' implied connection to 'is' was it, right?

~ My view is that the very term of 'ought' applies only to volitional beings; that scratches rocks, flowers and insects for the 'Domain of Discourse' (for most of us, anyways.) I'm keeping in mind a 'context' here, where we're presumably distinguishing between 'ought-to-do' with 'ought-to-be-expected-to-happen', ok? The latter applies to avalances and nuclear physics; the former to human decisions.

2Bcont

LLAP

J:D

Edited April 21, 2007 by John Dailey

[John Dailey]

~ A volitional being 'ought' to use the capability they have of such (given that they 'is' one) in-order-to continue to survive and flourish, IF they find the latter worth a value; if not, then they should not (would that Cho had thought of this 1st rather than last.) --- To stress: any and all 'oughts' are conditional...in action, but not, in implication, for life forms oriented at continuance.

~ This does not 'imply', however, that whatever a volitional being happens to feel like 'choosing' to do is what they ought to do. No 'feeling' or desire, per se, 'implies' any ought. This type of 'thinking/analysis' is myopically (as so many "O-ists" do re the term 'rational') narrowing the meaning of 'ought' to an irrationally narrow framework.

2Bcont

LLAP

J:D

[John Dailey]

~ "Is" implies "ought" does not imply that "Is-capable-of" implies "Ought-to-do." This is a near-purposefully-skewed myopic interpretation of a summarizing re capabilities. One's 'teacher/counselor' tells a student "Don't 'let it go'; strive for the best of your capability in what you don't know, but especially in what you do know how to" and the student says "I'm really good at opening safe-locks" and one's going to argue that the counselor is really implying this? Think twice on such 'analysis.' Puh-leeze.

~ Rand's view of "is" and "ought" needs a bit more pithy and substantive attention than so far given; such seems equivalent to what 'rational' so far has meant to "O-ists": knowing inside-and-out the analysis and use of the 'formal rules of logic' of Aristotle (if not also Russell-and-Whitehead). --- 'Rational' means more than this (quoting her noted def is beside my point; such described IS, ntl, the myopic view of too many); the 'is/ought' conundrum is just as too myopically 'analyzed.'

LLAP

J:D

[John Dailey]

Addendum:

~ Don't ask me what all I just posted has to do with the thread's title (anymore than why 'circular reasoning' got...whirlpooled into by others), but, the subject came up and...I talked enough about 'rights/children/etc' on other threads anyways.

LLAP

J:D

[BaalChatzaf]

leads to some pretty strange conclusions, like the one that prompted the initial discussion. Killing a newborn is called murder, not abortion. This is a universal concept. Only a person who had an incomplete or flawed view of human nature could make a mistake of that magnitude.

If by universal you mean at all times (eras) and all places, you are quite mistaken. The Spartans practiced infanticide by tossing ill formed or sickly newborns off a cliff. The purpose was to insure that only health sons and daughters would survive to populate the State. The business of Spartans was to be soldiers and only the healthy were permitted to survive into childhood. Of those, the youngsters were taken at age seven in inducted into a very rigorous training regimen and not all of these youngsters survived. The Spartans did not call it murder.

That Athenians practiced exposure of infants who were sickly or ill formed and children that the parents could not afford to feed. These were not killed outright. They were left to freeze to death a night. If a kind soul took an exposed child to nurture so be it. The Athenians did not call it murder.

The Romans also practiced infant exposure and the the father of the family had the power of life and death over his children. If the father killed a child for whatever reason, he was not held to account for it. The Romans did not call it murder.

The Aztecs also practiced exposure. We don't know what the Aztecs called it since the Spanish destroyed almost of of the codices.

Thus infanticide and even killing of the more grown up children occurred in some rather great civilizations.

In modern times we are more sentimental. Thus we carry the burden of keeping unhealthy, unfit, ill formed children alive, very often at public expense. Fortunately the very unfit often die early (but not always) and are sometimes not a long term burden on the public purse.

Refer to the following article on infanticide:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infanticide

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Bob,

Context. I was obviously talking about modern times. Still, in ancient times I doubt they called killing the young "abortion." I bet they called it something like, er... "killing the young."

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Here is a quote by Kelley and Thomas on rights that I found absolutely refreshing. It is from the beta version of The Logical Structure of Ojectivism, which can be downloaded here on the TAS site (download Chapter 7 "Freedom and Rights" and go to p. 249 for the quote). You can also get to the right place in the David Kelley Corner on OL here.

Notice that what “rights” refers to abstractly is a collection of principles, not innate features of man. A right is a principle that defines an aspect of human action over which a person should be free.[4] Freedom of speech and the right to pursue one’s happiness are examples of this, and as we will see it is true of rights as such. The point to note here is that the ability to take those actions is part of the person’s nature; the rights are not.

As principles, rights are not inherent in things or actions. Contrary to Thomas Jefferson, we are not naturally “endowed” with rights; rather, we recognize that rights properly apply to us in virtue of our natures, in the normal context of life. Thus, to say that a person “has rights” is just a manner of speaking. Similarly, it would be a loose figure of speech to say that an imprisoned criminal has “alienated” his rights; rather, those principles have different implications in the case of a criminal because of the way he has behaved. Nevertheless, rights are objective: they identify facts about how human beings should deal with each other in order to best promote their own individual lives. Rights are like basic principles of engineering for social organization.

[4] One might think of a right as identifying a range of actions rather than an aspect of human action. Freedom speech gives us a right to a way in which we act: communication. This is an aspect of the total variety of human action possible. It also subsumes a range of actions: talking to Joe, writing to Jane, etc. etc.

This is so much in line with my thinking it hurts. Sometimes, even with engineering principles, certain exceptions are made and sometimes one displaces another, depending on the value desired (the aspect of the building).

I have only skimmed short passages of this work, but now I will print it out and read it carefully. So far, I have not seen the question of newborns covered in it, but this might be due to only skimming it.

Michael

[John Dailey]

~ Well, so much for the is's and ought's.

~ Now that the subject has segued into the 2nd favorite philosophical subject (over-covered in so many different threads and forums elsewheres), the meaningful source of the term 'rights', let's remember, given that this is "Objectivist" Living, the 1st identification by the 1st 'Objectivist' re what 'rights' fundamentally, essentially, indeed, inherently metaphysically and most properly epistemologically identifiable as, are (supposedly acceptable): To wit...

"Rights are conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival."

~ Then, in a shifted context, "Rights are a moral concept..." and all thereafter said about 'rights' is argued about, including the 'bridge' to Politics, in terms of Ethics. But, they all start from the Metaphysical identification.

~ Methinks that too many are forgetting this.

LLAP

J:D

Edited May 4, 2007 by John Dailey