Why does man need a code of values?

[Dragonfly]

Which means there are no analytic truths because to be true, a statement must correspond to reality. Or, stated another way, if we are constrained to use deduction only, then it is impossible to establish a true statement of any kind whatsoever.

The volume of a 6-dimensional sphere with radius R embedded in a 7-dimensional Euclidean space equals pi^3*R^6/6. This is an analytical truth. To what in reality does this statement correspond?

[Dragonfly]

why not at least take a peak at Sylvan Tomkins in the work of Steven Shmurak right here on OL

What peak do you take...?

[Rodney]

The volume of a 6-dimensional sphere with radius R embedded in a 7-dimensional Euclidean space equals pi^3*R^6/6. [...] To what in reality does this statement correspond?

I actually know the answer to that question. See my signature.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

why not at least take a peak at Sylvan Tomkins in the work of Steven Shmurak right here on OL

What peak do you take...?

Good God!

Once again, folk. This time with feeling!

Why not at least take a peek at Sylvan Tomkins in the work of Steven Shmurak right here on OL?

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

Which means there are no analytic truths because to be true, a statement must correspond to reality. Or, stated another way, if we are constrained to use deduction only, then it is impossible to establish a true statement of any kind whatsoever.

The volume of a 6-dimensional sphere with radius R embedded in a 7-dimensional Euclidean space equals pi^3*R^6/6. This is an analytical truth. To what in reality does this statement correspond?

My guess is, nothing.

--Brant

[Darrell Hougen]

Which means there are no analytic truths because to be true, a statement must correspond to reality. Or, stated another way, if we are constrained to use deduction only, then it is impossible to establish a true statement of any kind whatsoever.

The volume of a 6-dimensional sphere with radius R embedded in a 7-dimensional Euclidean space equals pi^3*R^6/6. This is an analytical truth. To what in reality does this statement correspond?

What is a 6-dimensional sphere?

Darrell

[Laure]

Which means there are no analytic truths because to be true, a statement must correspond to reality. Or, stated another way, if we are constrained to use deduction only, then it is impossible to establish a true statement of any kind whatsoever.

The volume of a 6-dimensional sphere with radius R embedded in a 7-dimensional Euclidean space equals pi^3*R^6/6. This is an analytical truth. To what in reality does this statement correspond?

What is a 6-dimensional sphere?

Darrell

Darrell, check out Wikipedia's Hypersphere article; or think of pattern classification. If we only have two different measurements on an object, like height and weight, we can plot the heights/weights on a 2 dimensional graph, and draw circles around clusters of points. If we have three different measurements (height, weight, shoe size) we can draw it on a 3 dimensional graph and draw a sphere around a cluster of points. ... If we have 6 measurements ... 6 dimensional graph ... 6 dimensional sphere. Hard to draw on the blackboard, but nevertheless you can "picture it" in a way. I'm not sure about the "embedded in a 7-dimensional Euclidean space" part. I know that a 3 dimensional sphere is referred to as a 2-sphere; maybe he means a "6-sphere" in 7-D space, or maybe there's a concept I'm missing.

[Dragonfly]

What is a 6-dimensional sphere?

The set of points x(1), x(2),...x(7) in a 7-dimensional vectorspace that is defined by R^2 = sumx(i)^2, where R is the radius of the sphere.

[Darrell Hougen]

Michael,

Some of what you are saying makes sense and is in agreement with what I am saying. I'm not exactly sure where you are coming from. However, it appears, based on some of your comments here and that you have made on other posts, that you somehow believe that facts are not simply facts of reality but are dependent upon our method of interpreting them. This, in my view is a dangerous position --- a position that leads down a path to subjectivism.

Previously, you stated:

Derived from your reasoning, you actually can extend your continuum to the extremes: on one end you have purely mental operations and no contact with any other reality except mental operations. Then you start adding reality and processing it and adding more and more reality until you get to the middle where there is equal parts input from external reality and mental operations. Then mental operations start start becoming less and input from external reality becoming more until you arrive at sensory input without any integration at all on the other end. Obviously the midsection of this continuum is where most mental operations sit.

This makes it sound as though you believe that facts are an additive combination of sensory data and innate operations. What does it mean to say that, "you start adding reality and processing it and adding more and more reality until you get to the middle where there is equal parts input from external reality and mental operations?" Every fact that you discover is 100% a result of your mental processes and 100% dependent upon reality. The two things are not of the same kind. You always use your mental processes and they always process information that is either directly or indirectly related to reality (at least insofar as you are considering facts, rather than fantasies).

It is completely beyond my capacity to imagine that the basic mathematical method of using numbers all humans share is merely a coincidence and that the development of another method has not happened also merely because of coincidence. That would be is a total invalidation of induction ("all similarities we observe are nothing but coincidence"). Our mind organizes its identifications and runs its processes in certain ways and we have no choice about the nature of them.

It is no coincidence that all humans use numbers. We all live in the same reality so it is natural that we all form the same or similar concepts, at least near the perceptual level. But consider the fact that other bases than base 10 have been used by peoples in the past and are sometimes used in specialized applications in the present. For example, computer programmers sometimes use binary, octal or hexidecimal numbers. Ancient Sumerians and Babylonians used a sexagesimal number system.

The fact that we observe similarities is a result of the fact that similarities exist in reality. Some things are objectively more similar to each other than other things are. A bush is more similar to another bush than it is to a car. So, we group bushes together and cars together as separate classes of items.

Darrell

Edited April 3, 2007 by Darrell Hougen

[Darrell Hougen]

Darrell, check out Wikipedia's Hypersphere article; or think of pattern classification. If we only have two different measurements on an object, like height and weight, we can plot the heights/weights on a 2 dimensional graph, and draw circles around clusters of points. If we have three different measurements (height, weight, shoe size) we can draw it on a 3 dimensional graph and draw a sphere around a cluster of points. ... If we have 6 measurements ... 6 dimensional graph ... 6 dimensional sphere. Hard to draw on the blackboard, but nevertheless you can "picture it" in a way. I'm not sure about the "embedded in a 7-dimensional Euclidean space" part. I know that a 3 dimensional sphere is referred to as a 2-sphere; maybe he means a "6-sphere" in 7-D space, or maybe there's a concept I'm missing.

Hi Laure,

I know what a 6-dimensional sphere is mathematically. The question is, what is it in reality? You can argue that it is an abstraction for a set of measurements performed on a set of data and that is fine. But Dragonfly is trying to avoid the appearance that there is any correspondence between analytical truths and reality. In other words, he is trying to claim that there are true statements that are purely analytical in nature. In my view, that is a misuse of the word, "true." If a statement has no meaning, i.e., refers to no perceptual facts, either directly or indirectly, in what sense is it true?

Darrell

[Darrell Hougen]

What is a 6-dimensional sphere?

The set of points x(1), x(2),...x(7) in a 7-dimensional vectorspace that is defined by R^2 = sumx(i)^2, where R is the radius of the sphere.

That's a nice symbolic statement, but what does it mean, if anything?

Darrell

[Dragonfly]

That's a nice symbolic statement, but what does it mean, if anything?

You think mathematical statements have no meaning? Is the formula for the volume of the 6-sphere not a true statement?

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

However, it appears, based on some of your comments here and that you have made on other posts, that you somehow believe that facts are not simply facts of reality but are dependent upon our method of interpreting them. This, in my view is a dangerous position --- a position that leads down a path to subjectivism.

Darrell,

Nope. You can try, but I don't fit into a subjectivist mold. Simply stated, my position is that we have mental equipment and we have facts we can use it with. This leads to 5 metaphysical facts.

1. Our mental equipment has a nature of its own with processes of its own that are contingent on our biology. The processes (the different mental processes like cognition, volition, emotions, daydreaming, sleep, etc.) function both with sensory input and as standalone in the absence of sensory input.

2. Our mental equipment will develop up to maturity with growth, regardless of volition and experience.

3. There is a reality that is external to us that is absolute. In this sense, our own nature, as a fact of reality separate from our awareness of it, is absolute.

4. Our identification of reality is always subject to our perspective and context, and it is selective by nature, so it is always only a partial identification of reality. We are not omniscient.

5. In addition to the sensory input processed by the brain, there is much sensory input that is not processed by the brain and even more sensory material that is not even absorbed.

If that sounds like subjectivism to you, well, so be it. But it isn't. And I don't see how the tabula rasa concept can be applied to this, except in the manner I gave ("virgin" in sensory input outside the womb). This is simply a point where Rand's scope exceeded her observation.

Now see if the following statement is clearer to you:

Previously, you stated:

Derived from your reasoning, you actually can extend your continuum to the extremes: on one end you have purely mental operations and no contact with any other reality except mental operations. Then you start adding reality and processing it and adding more and more reality until you get to the middle where there is equal parts input from external reality and mental operations. Then mental operations start start becoming less and input from external reality becoming more until you arrive at sensory input without any integration at all on the other end. Obviously the midsection of this continuum is where most mental operations sit.

But to be clear, here is your observation.

This makes it sound as though you believe that facts are an additive combination of sensory data and innate operations. What does it mean to say that, "you start adding reality and processing it and adding more and more reality until you get to the middle where there is equal parts input from external reality and mental operations?" Every fact that you discover is 100% a result of your mental processes and 100% dependent upon reality. The two things are not of the same kind. You always use your mental processes and they always process information that is either directly or indirectly related to reality (at least insofar as you are considering facts, rather than fantasies).

There is one case where this gets a bit confusing and possibly you did not understand what I was saying above. That is when the mental operations are operating with themselves only, without sensory input. Then they are both fact and method. Once again, the mind is not a blank at birth that magically springs a method out of nowhere and starts working with sensory input. It comes with a whole lot of facts and knowledge of its own that it can observe and identify as it develops. So in this sense, in addition to being 100% mental processes housed in a biological support, it itself is also 100% fact of reality.

It is no coincidence that all humans use numbers. We all live in the same reality so it is natural that we all form the same or similar concepts, at least near the perceptual level. But consider the fact that other bases than base 10 have been used by peoples in the past and are sometimes used in specialized applications in the present. For example, computer programmers sometimes use binary, octal or hexidecimal numbers. Ancient Sumerians and Babylonians used a sexagesimal number system.

I have no problem with different numerical bases being developed. In fact, I think they cannot be innate. What is innate is the ability to formulate numbers and a numerical base, and once again, this develops automatically with growth. Which base is used derives from experience and education.

To be frank, I think we are basically on the same page. I think it is a shame that Rand only took growth into account so selectively that she exceeded scope for some of her concepts. Her flat-out denial of instinct doesn't help, either. Obviously infants run more on instinct than anything else (especially affects). As they develop volition and learning, instinct starts taking second place and gradually loses ground until it becomes a very minor aspect of behavior.

Just one final comment on Rand's scope problems. Late stage embryos, before being whacked on the behind or becoming self-aware, already show mental activity and are already integrating some very primary sensory experiences from their movements in the womb. If the tabula rasa concept were taken literally, the fact of this knowledge would be denied despite scientific proof to the contrary.

Michael

[Darrell Hougen]

So, I think that if your point is to show that some knowledge is innate (point 1 above) I think you are mistaken. The mind is very much tabula raza. Even if the mind were preprogrammed with some ability to perform mathematical operations, that would not constitute knowledge. Knowledge is the subject of thought, not the process of thought.

Yeah, right... Knowledge about the process is somehow not knowledge.

Tabula rasa is another one of Rand's ideas that has only one defense, as I see you're leaning to already, and that's to define knowledge and character traits as by definition uninheritable - ie only and all that is not inherited. There are so many examples of heritable knowledge/character/personality in both man and animals that the only refuge the Rand defender can take is to say "but that's not knowledge" and committing the begging the question fallacy.

I didn't say that, "Knowledge about the process is ... not knowledge." I stated that the process itself is not knowledge. Are you born with knowledge of how your mind works? Try asking a small child how his mind works.

Knowledge, character, and personality are not synonyms for the same thing. Character traits and personality may very well be inherited, to some extent. If a person is quick to anger, that may be inherited, though people can learn to modify their behavior. But knowledge is not inherited. Again, knowledge is the subject of thought, not the process of thought. Simply because the ability to learn to perform certain tasks such as speaking is inherited does not mean that knowledge of any word or the meaning of any word or any sentence or its meaning is inherited. Knowledge is knowledge of reality.

If you think that knowledge is inherited, give an example. I won't object so long as you can show that your example is knowledge of reality and that it is the subject of thought and not the process. Because, that is the meaning of the word knowledge. Using a word appropriately is not begging the question.

Darrell

[bmacwilliam]

So, I think that if your point is to show that some knowledge is innate (point 1 above) I think you are mistaken. The mind is very much tabula raza. Even if the mind were preprogrammed with some ability to perform mathematical operations, that would not constitute knowledge. Knowledge is the subject of thought, not the process of thought.

Yeah, right... Knowledge about the process is somehow not knowledge.

Tabula rasa is another one of Rand's ideas that has only one defense, as I see you're leaning to already, and that's to define knowledge and character traits as by definition uninheritable - ie only and all that is not inherited. There are so many examples of heritable knowledge/character/personality in both man and animals that the only refuge the Rand defender can take is to say "but that's not knowledge" and committing the begging the question fallacy.

I didn't say that, "Knowledge about the process is ... not knowledge." I stated that the process itself is not knowledge. Are you born with knowledge of how your mind works? Try asking a small child how his mind works.

Knowledge, character, and personality are not synonyms for the same thing. Character traits and personality may very well be inherited, to some extent. If a person is quick to anger, that may be inherited, though people can learn to modify their behavior. But knowledge is not inherited. Again, knowledge is the subject of thought, not the process of thought. Simply because the ability to learn to perform certain tasks such as speaking is inherited does not mean that knowledge of any word or the meaning of any word or any sentence or its meaning is inherited. Knowledge is knowledge of reality.

If you think that knowledge is inherited, give an example. I won't object so long as you can show that your example is knowledge of reality and that it is the subject of thought and not the process. Because, that is the meaning of the word knowledge. Using a word appropriately is not begging the question.

Darrell

Well,

Here's a clear example in a 'lower' animal.

"Bird migration is among the most fascinating natural wonders. Large

numbers of even small migratory birds, not heavier than a normal letter, are

every year travelling enormous distances from breeding areas in Europe to

wintering quarters in e.g. Africa. In geese and storks the route is learned

from experienced conspecifics, but in many other species the young birds

are travelling these distances alone, without any guidance from parents or

other experienced conspecifics. A well known example showing that the

migratory orientation programme is inherited is the cuckoo Cuculus

canorus, in which the parents leave the nest long before the chick is able to

fly."

So, inherited knowledge is clearly possible in animals. They KNOW which way to fly. But somehow magically impossible in humans?

Now, shall I progress to humans or should I stop now?

Bob

Edited April 4, 2007 by Bob_Mac

[Darrell Hougen]

Here's a clear example in a 'lower' animal.

"Bird migration is among the most fascinating natural wonders. Large

numbers of even small migratory birds, not heavier than a normal letter, are

every year travelling enormous distances from breeding areas in Europe to

wintering quarters in e.g. Africa. In geese and storks the route is learned

from experienced conspecifics, but in many other species the young birds

are travelling these distances alone, without any guidance from parents or

other experienced conspecifics. A well known example showing that the

migratory orientation programme is inherited is the cuckoo Cuculus

canorus, in which the parents leave the nest long before the chick is able to

fly."

So, inherited knowledge is clearly possible in animals. They KNOW which way to fly. But somehow magically impossible in humans?

Now, shall I progress to humans or should I stop now?

Well, your example doesn't make your case. An automatic behavior is not knowledge. It is the process of thought, not the subject, so it doesn't pass the test. That is, insofar as cuckoos can think at all, their migratory path is not the subject of thought. It is a preprogrammed behavior.

Let me give a counterexample. When I was living in a rental house some years ago, I noticed a tiny fly (similar to a gnat) hovering around the garbage receptacle in my kitchen. The paths travelled by the flies appeared to be almost random. However, it was clear that their average trajectory was towards the garbage as that is where the highest concentration of flies appeared.

Now, one possible interpretation of their behavior is that the flies were born knowing where my garbage receptacle was located. However, given the obviously limited number of neurons in a creature of that size, it seems unlikely to me that the flies knew anything at all. Moreover, my garbage receptacle wasn't located in the same place for a long period of time, making genetic learning of its location almost impossible. My best guess is that their seemingly random paths allowed them to sample the concentration gradient of some odor to which they were attracted and adjust their flight paths accordingly.

Now, returning to the example of the cuckoo, don't you think that some simpler explanation of their behavior is much more likely? Isn't it likely that the cuckoo is following some sort of concentration gradient that it is preprogrammed to follow? And, if programming passes for knowledge, shouldn't we conclude that a spreadsheet program knows how to add numbers? It seems unlikely to me that the cuckoo actually knows where it is going. The existence of a behavior is not, in itself, evidence for the existence of knowledge.

Darrell

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

So, inherited knowledge is clearly possible in animals. They KNOW which way to fly. But somehow magically impossible in humans?

Bob,

You have hit on one of the contradictions by definition that needs to be corrected in Objectivism. This deals with the nature of man. Let's use Rand's own words and standards. I doubt that she would argue with your observation about lower animals. Here is a quote about lower animals from her essay, "The Objectivist Ethics." Notice the term "automatic knowledge." (Rand was using this in a more immediate sense of the animal knowing what is beneficial or harmful right in front of it, but the idea is still valid for reproduction and migratory flight or migration in general.)

An animal is guided, not merely by immediate sensations, but by percepts. Its actions are not single, discrete responses to single, separate stimuli, but are directed by an integrated awareness of the perceptual reality confronting it. It is able to grasp the perceptual concretes immediately present and it is able to form automatic perceptual associations, but it can go no further. It is able to learn certain skills to deal with specific situations, such as hunting or hiding, which the parents of the higher animals teach their young. But an animal has no choice in the knowledge and the skills that it acquires; it can only repeat them generation after generation. And an animal has no choice in the standard of value directing its actions: its senses provide it with an automatic code of values, an automatic knowledge of what is good for it or evil, what benefits or endangers its life. An animal has no power to extend its knowledge or to evade it.

In Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. "Definitions," Rand defined man.

In the definition of man ("A rational animal"), "rational" is the differentia, "animal" is the genus.

In the ITOE workshops, Rand even cautioned one of those present against forgetting that "animal" was part of the definition of man. The quote is from ITOE, 2nd edition, "Appendix—Abstraction as Measurement-Omission," "Overview of the Process," p. 138:

There is one thing that I want to correct you on, unless it was just foreshortening. You said that "manness" consists of rationality. Don't ever forget the full definition is "rational animal." Otherwise you may give the impression that rationality is the equivalent of the concept "man."

But going back to "The Objectivist Ethics," in discussing man, Rand lopped off the "animal" part and put man in an entirely different category—some kind of unstated genus.

Man has no automatic code of survival. He has no automatic course of action, no automatic set of values. His senses do not tell him automatically what is good for him or evil, what will benefit his life or endanger it, what goals he should pursue and what means will achieve them, what values his life depends on, what course of action it requires. His own consciousness has to discover the answers to all these questions-but his consciousness will not function automatically. Man, the highest living species on this earth—the being whose consciousness has a limitless capacity for gaining knowledge—man is the only living entity born without any guarantee of remaining conscious at all. Man's particular distinction from all other living species is the fact that his consciousness is volitional.

Just as the automatic values directing the functions of a plant's body are sufficient for its survival, but are not sufficient for an animal's—so the automatic values provided by the sensory-perceptual mechanism of its consciousness are sufficient to guide an animal, but are not sufficient for man. Man's actions and survival require the guidance of conceptual values derived from conceptual knowledge. But conceptual knowledge cannot be acquired automatically.

This statement is true up to a point, then it becomes false. This is because of scope, not because the entire statement is false. Before I get into that, though, here is the contradiction.

Notice that in Rand's jump from plants to animals, she does not claim that an animal stops having "automatic values directing the functions" of the body, just like a plant does, because a perceptual faculty is added. She builds on the body's automatic functions because having such functions is a fundamental characteristic of "living being," which is the genus uniting plant and animal. But when she comes to man, she alters the fundamental characteristics of the genus. Just because man gets a volitional faculty added to his perceptual faculty, she simply declares that the characteristics that define animal (having "an automatic code of values, an automatic knowledge of what is good for it or evil," etc.) do not exist for man, or as you state, they become "somehow magically impossible in humans."

Thus man becomes a rational animal without being an animal at all. That's the contradiction in Rand's own terms. The fact is that you cannot be a rational animal and not be an animal at the same time.

I mentioned breathing earlier as a good example of a process where volition is involved. It serves perfectly for how the conceptual faculty works. It is an automatic process where volition can control it when so desired. Otherwise, it runs by itself. That is how our conceptual faculty works.

Rand's statement, "But conceptual knowledge cannot be acquired automatically" is false. It most definitely can be acquired non-volitionally. Rand even admits this in other places and rants and rails against it. Here is a quote from The Ayn Rand Letter, Vol. III, No. 7, December 31, 1973, "Philosophy: Who Needs It" (later used in the book by the same name).

Now ask yourself: if you are not interested in abstract ideas, why do you (and all men) feel compelled to use them? The fact is that abstract ideas are conceptual integrations which subsume an incalculable number of concretes—and that without abstract ideas you would not be able to deal with concrete, particular, real-life problems. You would be in the position of a newborn infant, to whom every object is a unique, unprecedented phenomenon. The difference between his mental state and yours lies in the number of conceptual integrations your mind has performed.

You have no choice about the necessity to integrate your observations, your experiences, your knowledge into abstract ideas, i.e., into principles. Your only choice is whether these principles are true or false, whether they represent your conscious, rational convictions—or a grab-bag of notions snatched at random, whose sources, validity, context and consequences you do not know, notions which, more often than not, you would drop like a hot potato if you knew.

But the principles you accept (consciously or subconsciously) may clash with or contradict one another; they, too, have to be integrated. What integrates them? Philosophy. A philosophic system is an integrated view of existence. As a human being, you have no choice about the fact that you need a philosophy. Your only choice is whether you define your philosophy by a conscious, rational, disciplined process of thought and scrupulously logical deliberation—or let your subconscious accumulate a junk heap of unwarranted conclusions, false generalizations, undefined contradictions, undigested slogans, unidentified wishes, doubts and fears, thrown together by chance, but integrated by your subconscious into a kind of mongrel philosophy and fused into a single, solid weight: self-doubt, like a ball and chain in the place where your mind's wings should have grown.

In essence, Rand is stating that if you do not acquire concepts volitionally, they will be integrated automatically in a haphazard manner. She mostly talks about "ideas" and "principles," but notice above that she clearly states that "abstract ideas are conceptual integrations." How can you "let your subconscious accumulate a junk heap" of bad ideas (concepts) if that is not an automatic process?

A more exact statement would be something like "Conceptual knowledge is acquired both automatically and by volition, but knowledge acquired by volition can be mentally checked for contradictions and corrected, and it can be systematically increased. In other words, conceptual knowledge acquired by volition is reliable whereas conceptual knowledge acquired automatically can be reliable or not."

This does not invalidate Rand's ideas, but it does restrict their scope on this issue. I firmly believe that this is the correct manner to deal with such contradictions when they appear in Rand's writings. Instead of tossing out the entire thing, you filter out the bad part, but keep the really deep and profound insights (of which there are many).

Michael

[Darrell Hougen]

Michael,

Although I agree with much of what you are saying, I'm still not sure we are in 100% agreement.

This makes it sound as though you believe that facts are an additive combination of sensory data and innate operations. What does it mean to say that, "you start adding reality and processing it and adding more and more reality until you get to the middle where there is equal parts input from external reality and mental operations?" Every fact that you discover is 100% a result of your mental processes and 100% dependent upon reality. The two things are not of the same kind. You always use your mental processes and they always process information that is either directly or indirectly related to reality (at least insofar as you are considering facts, rather than fantasies).

There is one case where this gets a bit confusing and possibly you did not understand what I was saying above. That is when the mental operations are operating with themselves only, without sensory input. Then they are both fact and method. Once again, the mind is not a blank at birth that magically springs a method out of nowhere and starts working with sensory input. It comes with a whole lot of facts and knowledge of its own that it can observe and identify as it develops. So in this sense, in addition to being 100% mental processes housed in a biological support, it itself is also 100% fact of reality.

I don't know when, "mental operations are operating with themselves only, without sensory input." For example, it appears to be impossible to introspect and determine how your visual system functions. How are percepts formed? It also appears to be impossible to determine how you speak, purely through introspection. So, you can introspect and examine the content of your thought but not your method of thought. Yet, you are equating method with knowledge. The truth is that no one knows exactly how people think. Your method of thought is inherited, but no knowledge of any fact is inherited.

It is no coincidence that all humans use numbers. We all live in the same reality so it is natural that we all form the same or similar concepts, at least near the perceptual level. But consider the fact that other bases than base 10 have been used by peoples in the past and are sometimes used in specialized applications in the present. For example, computer programmers sometimes use binary, octal or hexidecimal numbers. Ancient Sumerians and Babylonians used a sexagesimal number system.

I have no problem with different numerical bases being developed. In fact, I think they cannot be innate. What is innate is the ability to formulate numbers and a numerical base, and once again, this develops automatically with growth. Which base is used derives from experience and education.

I do not agree that the ability to formulate numbers and a numerical base are inherited. The ability to think is inherited and that includes an ability to classify objects. Once objects have been classified, a person will notice the existence of multiple instances of the same kind of object. However, I do not believe that a person, left to himself, will necessarily develop an ability to count them, much less perform higher mathematical operations on them. The simplest way of counting objects is through the use of tick marks. It takes another conceptual leap to create a number system with a base.

Let's take a similar example. Most children, if they are normal, have ten toes. During their development they will eventually discover the fact that they have ten toes. Does that mean that they are born with the innate knowledge that they have ten toes? Or does it even imply that they are born with the innate ability to count their toes? Or, the specific ability to learn that they have ten toes? I don't think so. They are born with a general ability to think which includes the ability to classify objects (such as their toes). If they also learn to count, they will discover that they have ten toes as that is an almost unavoidable fact of their existence, though it is still possible to imagine that some person may have never bothered to count his toes and therefore would not know how many he had.

Darrell

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Yet, you are equating method with knowledge.

Darrell,

Not at all. Just because you can have knowledge about a method of thinking does not mean that the method does not exist as a fact or it is something the equivalent of that knowledge (somehow merged with it). I have not claimed that anywhere. What is it that I said that leads you to this conclusion since my words are so different?

A method of thinking is a fact just like any other fact in reality. Do you deny that? Using a method and saying that it cannot be identified except by reference to facts outside of it is an arbitrary condition that is not placed on anything else. Why do that?

I will agree that the mental method of integrating sensory data cannot be identified without the existence of sensory data. But there are so many other mental operations in addition to this that can be noticed and identified (with all due concept formation) and they do not depend on sensory input.

I do not agree that the ability to formulate numbers and a numerical base are inherited. The ability to think is inherited and that includes an ability to classify objects. Once objects have been classified, a person will notice the existence of multiple instances of the same kind of object. However, I do not believe that a person, left to himself, will necessarily develop an ability to count them, much less perform higher mathematical operations on them.

We will have to agree to disagree here. However, by your rationale, man would have never learned to count in the first place. Even Rand noticed this innate ability. ITOE is shot through and through with references to mathematics and concept formation as being different (albeit overlapping) processes.

The ability to classify in itself does not lead to mathematics (or even measurement, which is Rand's definition of mathematics), just as it does not lead to making music. There are specific innate mental capacities that allow these different things to develop alongside each other. We have a minimum of 5 senses (more if we include gravity and some other goodies), not just one. So why does our mind have to have a single innate capacity to deal with all of them? Just because someone said so?

The science I have read so far does not support this at all. What I have read in Rand's writings does not support it either. On the contrary, it resoundingly contradicts it.

Michael

[bmacwilliam]

A method of thinking is a fact just like any other fact in reality. Do you deny that? Using a method and saying that it cannot be identified except by reference to facts outside of it is an arbitrary condition that is not placed on anything else. Why do that?

Because tabula rasa and the dowstream arguments would be false or suspect.

In order for Darrell's concept of tabula rasa to work, knowledge MUST be defined as the subset of knowledge which cannot be inherited. This obviously creates a circular argument/begs the question and is dead in the water.

Bob

[bmacwilliam]

Well, your example doesn't make your case. An automatic behavior is not knowledge. It is the process of thought, not the subject, so it doesn't pass the test. That is, insofar as cuckoos can think at all, their migratory path is not the subject of thought. It is a preprogrammed behavior.

So, preprogrammed knowledge -oops - programming isn't good enough? A bird somehow flies (without learning as well) to a specific location (without learning) but doesn't pass some arbitrary 'knowledge test'. A bit absurd no?

Bob

[Darrell Hougen]

Well, your example doesn't make your case. An automatic behavior is not knowledge. It is the process of thought, not the subject, so it doesn't pass the test. That is, insofar as cuckoos can think at all, their migratory path is not the subject of thought. It is a preprogrammed behavior.

So, preprogrammed knowledge -oops - programming isn't good enough? A bird somehow flies (without learning as well) to a specific location (without learning) but doesn't pass some arbitrary 'knowledge test'. A bit absurd no?

Not at all. I don't think you're understanding what I'm saying. Do you know how to program a computer? Do you understand the distinction between a program and its data?

In the mean time, I found this little gem (http://www.caosclub.org/totalcaos/members/caosho12.html):

Irruptive There are irruptive migration patterns, when migrations are not as predictable. These flexible migrants are more like food specialists that travel where they need to depending upon the conditions of that particular year. In some years, red crossbills migrate south, but they do not do so every year. This lesson shows the black-billed cuckoo's migration pattern as irruptive.

So, unlike your characterization, at least some cuckoos do not follow the same migration pattern every year. Far from having some "knowledge" of a migration path, they are simply looking for food.

Darrell

[Darrell Hougen]

I will agree that the mental method of integrating sensory data cannot be identified without the existence of sensory data. But there are so many other mental operations in addition to this that can be noticed and identified (with all due concept formation) and they do not depend on sensory input.

But mental operations are not the subject of thought unless and until they are noticed, as you put it. To have inherited knowledge implies that a person somehow comes to know some fact without ever observing it or reading about it or hearing about it by any other means, whether introspective or not. It would be as if you woke up one day and said, "I have a second cousin, George, that no one in my immediate family knows about. I had a dream about him last night."

Of course people naturally become aware of some mental operations in the same sense as people become aware of their toes. But that doesn't mean that knowledge of their mental operations or knowledge of their toes is inherited.

Darrell

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

But mental operations are not the subject of thought unless and until they are noticed, as you put it. To have inherited knowledge implies that a person somehow comes to know some fact without ever observing it or reading about it or hearing about it by any other means, whether introspective or not.

Darrell,

We are talking past each other. I was discussing this in the context of you expressing doubt that mental operations without sensory input existed. It was specifically in answer to this:

I don't know when, "mental operations are operating with themselves only, without sensory input."

. . .

Yet, you are equating method with knowledge.

I was not trying to say anything at all about inherited knowledge in the quote you just presented.

Michael

[bmacwilliam]

To have inherited knowledge implies that a person somehow comes to know some fact without ever observing it or reading about it or hearing about it by any other means, whether introspective or not.

And there it is. Full circular argumentation - on cue, begging the question. You are clearly assuming that it is not possible, by your definition of "fact" to know a "fact" as you define it without observation. That is TEXTBOOK begging the question.

Your responses have been "that's not a fact", or "that's not data, that's programming", all the while defining implicitly or overtly "fact" and/or "knowledge" as that which MUST be observed - fallacious.

Bob