Why does man need a code of values?

[Greybird]

I'll second Laure and send a thank-you to George Smith, in this venue — he's received it from me when I was on Atlantis (I) and Atlantis II — for all his books, but especially for the mind-wrenching benefits coming from A:TCAG.

Thank you also for your wholly pleasant memoir of being in and near the L.A. branch of that libertarian milieu. I'd often heard the late Samuel Edward Konkin III describe the Long Beach branch as an "AnarchoVillage," but it was great to hear more about doings further north.

George said above, regarding Victor: "I am thus more dumbfounded and saddened than I am angry or offended." That happens to precisely express how I see all this.

Yet it says something of far greater importance. Those in the current lynch party should note that this reaction comes from one of the actual, outside-the-forum authors whom Victor has wronged. They might take something beneficial, and certainly far more dignified, from George's example.

... On second thought, I'll backtrack from that locution of "lynch party." Victor was already strung up, or had strung himself up, or — to utterly mix metaphors — was hoist on the petard of his own plagiarism. His career as a participant in this forum, depending on your viewpoint, either suicided or was justly euthanized.

What's happening now, more accurately, is the stabbing of a corpse. It's entirely superfluous, does nothing except to vent anger, and creates an even greater mess to clean up afterwards.

[Jonathan]

Do you know what would be amazing to see in the online O'world?

Genuine contrition.

When confronted with overwhelming evidence of multiple misdeeds, I think it would be almost exhilarating to see a perpetrator penitent, confessing to his transgressions and taking every opportunity to apologize and atone for them. Instead of digging himself into a deeper hole and trying his damnedest to drag others down with him -- by, say, accusing his accuser of the same crimes, with evidence to come later, or threatening to make public a victim's private correspondence, in apparent retaliation for that victim's not having been quite gracious enough of a victim -- wouldn't it seem almost heroic if he were to take people up on their eagerness to forgive him by behaving as if he were remorseful?

J

Edited June 30, 2007 by Jonathan

[Brant Gaede]

Do you know what would be amazing to see in the online O'world?

Genuine contrition.

When confronted with overwhelming evidence of multiple misdeeds, I think it would be almost exhilarating to see a perpetrator penitent, confessing to his transgressions and taking every opportunity to apologize and atone for them. Instead of digging himself into a deeper hole and trying his damnedest to drag others down with him -- by, say, accusing his accuser of the same crimes, with evidence to come later, or threatening to make public a victim's private correspondence, in apparent retaliation for that victim's not having been quite gracious enough of a victim -- wouldn't it seem almost heroic if he were to take people up on their eagerness to forgive him by behaving as if he were remorseful?

J

What Victor did was so bad he's gone. If there were a Victor there to do what we'd like to see Victor do he wouldn't have done what he did in the first place. But I may be wrong and he'll pull himself out of hell by confessing his sins and asking for slack while he gets his act together. I'd grant him that. I'd offer him a hand up. I'd offer him two hands up. I can't retrieve a corpse, but I can retrieve or help retrieve a living, breathing human being who wants to live even if he's cut his own throat.

--Brant

[BaalChatzaf]

In thinking about it some more, it comes back to Rand's original question: do we need morality at all, and if so, why? So, for Dragonfly and others who believe morality only has to do with our relationship to other people: Why do you care, then? Why even worry about "being good" if it isn't "good for you" to be good? Do you fear God's punishment? If not, why should I give a damn about trying to treat other people properly? Why is it important?

On a desert island occupied by one human there is no need for morality. Morality is about how one behaves with respect to other people. So what does one need on a desert island. Working senses, a working brain and a decision to keep on living. None of these are moral. They are existential matters.

One can never wrong himself in the moral sense. One can make mistakes, one can misidentify and one can even evade considering facts. But these are all actions and do not constitute moral wrongs against oneself. One has no moral obligations to himself. Staying alive is a choice, not a duty.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[George H. Smith]

Ba'al Chatzaf wrote:

"On a desert island occupied by one human there is no need for morality. Morality is about how one behaves with respect to other people."

Although this view is fairly common in modern moral philosophy (see, for example, Kurt Baier's The Moral Point of View), I've never found it convincing. For one thing, it would arbitrarily exclude large chuncks of traditional ethical reasoning -- as found in the Aristotelian tradition, for instance -- from the province of moral theory. Many ethicists have regarded moral principles as an indispensable means to self-realization and happiness, and this is as much of a problem for Crusoe on his desert island as it is for people living in society.

"So what does one need on a desert island. Working senses, a working brain and a decision to keep on living. None of these are moral. They are existential matters."

This presumes that morality does not, and should not, concern itself with "existential matters." I see no reason accept this assertion.

"One can never wrong himself in the moral sense."

Yes, but only if one defines "wrong in the moral sense" as pertaning to other people or moral agents. And this simply begs the question."

"One can make mistakes, one can misidentify and one can even evade considering facts. But these are all actions and do not constitute moral wrongs against oneself. One has no moral obligations to himself. Staying alive is a choice, not a duty."

Again, all this depends on one's conceptions of "moral wrongs," "moral obligations," and "duty."

Ba'al seems to regard "moral obligation" as synonymous with "duty," but the meanings of these terms have often been distinguished. Natural-right philosophers, for example, have often regarded duties as "perfect," or enforceable, obligations -- and in this sense one can have "imperfect" moral obligations to oneself, but not duties. (Moral obligation, in this tradition, has typically been viewed as a species of rational obligation.)

Ba'al's position, as I noted previously, is quite common in modern moral philosophy, but it cuts against the grain of more traditional views of ethics. The notion that ethics is necessarily other-regarding. and therefore applies only in social contexts, is the standard foundation for the argument that egoism is not really a moral (as opposed to nonmoral) doctrine at all, but is merely a prudential one. But I'm afraid that more is required to dispense with egoim than the tactic of exclusion be definition.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

My apologies for the numerous typos in my last post. I really shouldn't post anything before that first cup of coffee in the morning, but I trust that my intended meanings were clear enough.

Also, I'm a little rusty with this kind of posting format. If I prefer the email format (such as that used by Atlantis II), this is largely because it permits me to use a spellchecker before sending off a post, and this enables me to catch missing words, obvious misspellings, etc., before they announce my carelessness to the world.

Hence my question: Is there a spellchecker with the current system? Of course, I could paste the text into an email, run the spellchecker, and then paste it back again, but this method is so cumbersome that I rarely use it. I was hoping for something more simple.

Ghs

[BaalChatzaf]

Although this view is fairly common in modern moral philosophy (see, for example, Kurt Baier's The Moral Point of View), I've never found it convincing. For one thing, it would arbitrarily exclude large chuncks of traditional ethical reasoning -- as found in the Aristotelian tradition, for instance -- from the province of moral

Ba'al's position, as I noted previously, is quite common in modern moral philosophy, but it cuts against the grain of more traditional views of ethics. The notion that ethics is necessarily other-regarding. and therefore applies only in social contexts, is the standard foundation for the argument that egoism is not really a moral (as opposed to nonmoral) doctrine at all, but is merely a prudential one. But I'm afraid that more is required to dispense with egoim than the tactic of exclusion be definition.

Ghs

Egoism is the only philosophy one needs on a desert Island. Who else is there around?

And what is wrong with being prudential? Those who are prudential live longer than those who are not. Ultimately, all strategies are prudential. Those that promote one's well being are used and those which do not are discarded.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[George H. Smith]

Ba'al Chatzaf wrote:

"Egoism is the only philosophy one needs on a desert Island. Who else is there around?"

I'm afraid I don't understand the relevance of your remark. The issue under consideratiion is whether morality applies only in a social context. To say that one has no choice on a desert island except to adopt egoism has nothing to do with this problem. If (as I would contend) egoism is a type or species of moral philosophy, then your asserton would imply that morality does indeed apply to Crusoe scenarios. (A case can be made that Defoe wished to make this very point in his novel; at the very least, many commentataors have noted the Lockean undercurrents in Robinson Crusoe.)

"And what is wrong with being prudential?"

I never said there was anything wrong with being prudential -- but, again, this isn't on point. The problem had to do with the proper conception and application of ethical theory.

"Those who are prudential live longer than those who are not. Ultimately, all strategies are prudential. Those that promote one's well being are used and those which do not are discarded."

If you can justify this claim without recourse to circular reasoning, I would like to see your reasoning. I suspect, however, that -- as with psychological egoism (according to which all decisions and actions are self-interested) and similiar doctrines -- your claim will boil down to a trivial assertion, e.g., an obvious point about the the relationship between ends and means in purposeful action.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

Although this view is fairly common in modern moral philosophy (see, for example, Kurt Baier's The Moral Point of View), I've never found it convincing. For one thing, it would arbitrarily exclude large chuncks of traditional ethical reasoning -- as found in the Aristotelian tradition, for instance -- from the province of moral

Ba'al's position, as I noted previously, is quite common in modern moral philosophy, but it cuts against the grain of more traditional views of ethics. The notion that ethics is necessarily other-regarding. and therefore applies only in social contexts, is the standard foundation for the argument that egoism is not really a moral (as opposed to nonmoral) doctrine at all, but is merely a prudential one. But I'm afraid that more is required to dispense with egoim than the tactic of exclusion be definition.

Ghs

Egoism is the only philosophy one needs on a desert Island. Who else is there around?

And what is wrong with being prudential? Those who are prudential live longer than those who are not. Ultimately, all strategies are prudential. Those that promote one's well being are used and those which do not are discarded.

Ba'al Chatzaf

"Prudential" is only a sub-category of verifying philosophy, not philosophy as such. It is thus also a sub-category of ethics including egoism. Keeping your head down so you won't get shot is only one part of living in any society. Making a society so one can be big and keep one's head up (generally) requires more than avoiding walls to run into. It is a fair question, though, to ask if egoism works, assuming we really understand what egoism is.

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

I read some of the earlier posts on this thread and noticed references to David Hume, the Is-Ought dichotomy, and related subjects. During my forty years of reading and writing in the field of intellectual history, I have tended to focus on philosophy in general and ethics/political theory in particular.

Within these vast intellectual landscapes there is no area that has interested me more, or from which I continue to learn as much to this day, as the moral and political philosophy of the 17th and 18th centuries. This is especially true of figures in the natural law/natural rights tradition (e.g., Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf), and of the so-called School of Britiish Moralists, whose leading figures include Francis Hutcheson, Samuel Butler, David Hume, and Adam Smith -- the latter for his Theory of Moral Sentiments,, which in my judgment ranks alongside the Wealth of Nations in quality and significance.

An overlapping school would include leading members of the Scottish Enlightenment, and here my favorites extend beyond the realm of moral and political theory to encompass economists (most notably Adam Smith) and historians (e.g., William Robertson, John Millar, and David Hume -- who was perhaps better known in his day for his multi-volume History of Enland than for his philosophic works.) The work of these historians was often characterized as "philosophic history" (or "conjectural history"), and as such it was so intensely interdisciplinary as to defy classification. We see this in Essay on the History of Civil Society, a seminal book by Adam Ferguson that contains as much of what now call social theory and historical sociology as it does history pre se.

It is not my intention to name-drop, there is actually a point here -- or to be precise, a lot of points. Here I will confine myself to one or two things, and I will expand on them later, should anyone be interested.

Perhaps the best place to begin is with a personal story, one that I suspect some of you will relate to.

As my interest in philosophy took off during the late 1960s, thanks largely to the enthusiasm that was instilled in me by reading Ayn Rand and listening to NBI lectures and courses, my first impressions of certain philosophers was heavily influenced by the negative evaluations of Rand and her followers. Certain philosophers in particular, such as Kant and Hume, became paradigmatic villains who were deemed guilty of crimes like attackiing man's conceptual level of consciousness.

In some cases, the net result of these early impressions was to leave me so biased against these "anti-mind, anti-life philosophers" (or AMALPs, as I used to call them) that it took me years before I could study their ideas with even a modicum of objectivity and thereby appreciate what they had to offer. Permit me to be blunt, even though this remark will doubtless piss a few readers off.

If I were to select my least favorite essay by Rand, it would probably be "For the New Intellectual." This is not to deny the merits of that piece, which are considerable, but we find there what I regard as the most detrimental intellectual feature in all of Rand's writing, namely, a misleading characterization -- caricature might be a better word in some instances -- of certain philosophic trends and figures. There and elsewhere the moral condemnations of some philosophers can get so intense as to thoroughly mislead those young admirers of Rand who, not having read much in philosophy on their own steam, take Rand's assessments at face value and thereby risk losing the benefits they might otherwise gain from a sympathetic reading of her philosopher-villains.

A great deal more obviously needs to be said about this, but this post is already too long. so I will develop some of my thoughts in subsequent posts, as I get the time. I will end for now with one general point. With a few exceptions, such as Aristotle, Aquinas, and Locke, western philosophers in Rand's account wear black hats. In my view, however, the classic philosophers who wear black hats are far outnumbered by those who sport white hats.

In short, I regard western philosophy as the crowning jewel of western culture; indeed, in earlier centures philosophy was a leading influence on the development of individual freedom. With Rand, on the other hand, one can easily go away with the opposite impression.

My earlier laundry list was given for a reason: it presents David Hume, among others, in a number of capacities. Athough I am not a fan of Hume in some areas (especially his epistemology) a forthcoming post will allow me to explain why the tendency of some Objectivists summarily to dismiss Hume as a "subjectivist" brings about not only a distorted view of Hume; it can also cut off those selfsame Objectivists from an extraordinarily valuable body of philosophic, historical, and social ideas and theores -- ideas and theories that can be pressed into the sevice of Objectivism as well.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

The reference to "Samuel Butler" in my last post was an error. I was thinking of Joseph Butler (1692-1752) --widely known as "Bishop Butler" -- whose systematic refutation of psychologial egoism has never been equaled. In addiition, Butler's discussion and defense of "cool self-love" is a classic.

Ghs

[Roger Bissell]

Perhaps the best place to begin is with a personal story, one that I suspect some of you will relate to.

As my interest in philosophy took off during the late 1960s, thanks largely to the enthusiasm that was instilled in me by reading Ayn Rand and listening to NBI lectures and courses, my first impressions of certain philosophers was heavily influenced by the negative evaluations of Rand and her followers. Certain philosophers in particular, such as Kant and Hume, became paradigmatic villains who were deemed guilty of crimes like attackiing man's conceptual level of consciousness.

In some cases, the net result of these early impressions was to leave me so biased against these "anti-mind, anti-life philosophers" (or AMALPs, as I used to call them) that it took me years before I could study their ideas with even a modicum of objectivity and thereby appreciate what they had to offer. Permit me to be blunt, even though this remark will doubtless piss a few readers off.

If I were to select my least favorite essay by Rand, it would probably be "For the New Intellectual." This is not to deny the merits of that piece, which are considerable, but we find there what I regard as the most detrimental intellectual feature in all of Rand's writing, namely, a misleading characterization -- caricature might be a better word in some instances -- of certain philosophic trends and figures. There and elsewhere the moral condemnations of some philosophers can get so intense as to thoroughly mislead those young admirers of Rand who, not having read much in philosophy on their own steam, take Rand's assessments at face value and thereby risk losing the benefits they might otherwise gain from a sympathetic reading of her philosopher-villains.

A great deal more obviously needs to be said about this, but this post is already too long. so I will develop some of my thoughts in subsequent posts, as I get the time. I will end for now with one general point. With a few exceptions, such as Aristotle, Aquinas, and Locke, western philosophers in Rand's account wear black hats. In my view, however, the classic philosophers who wear black hats are far outnumbered by those who sport white hats.

In short, I regard western philosophy as the crowning jewel of western culture; indeed, in earlier centures philosophy was a leading influence on the development of individual freedom. With Rand, on the other hand, one can easily go away with the opposite impression.

My earlier laundry list was given for a reason: it presents David Hume, among others, in a number of capacities. Athough I am not a fan of Hume in some areas (especially his epistemology) a forthcoming post will allow me to explain why the tendency of some Objectivists summarily to dismiss Hume as a "subjectivist" brings about not only a distorted view of Hume; it can also cut off those selfsame Objectivists from an extraordinarily valuable body of philosophic, historical, and social ideas and theores -- ideas and theories that can be pressed into the sevice of Objectivism as well.

Ghs

Hear, hear! I second all of the above, and George, thank you so much for this post! I look forward to your subsequent comments on Hume et al.

REB

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Hence my question: Is there a spellchecker with the current system?

George,

There is an item you can install in your browser called a "Google Toolbar" that you can get on any Google page. But see here for convenience. It comes with a spell checker for most all places you will go on the web.

You can enable rich text mode in your settings which adds a spell checker, but we do not recommend using it since it opens the door to invasion and I am a bit paranoid after the hacker attack.

Once you use the Google one, however, I am sure you will want no other. You can use it everywhere, which means you only need to learn it once.

Hear, hear! I second all of the above, and George, thank you so much for this post! I look forward to your subsequent comments on Hume et al.

Roger,

Ditto.

Michael

[Jonathan]

I'll second Laure and send a thank-you to George Smith, in this venue — he's received it from me when I was on Atlantis (I) and Atlantis II — for all his books, but especially for the mind-wrenching benefits coming from A:TCAG.

Thank you also for your wholly pleasant memoir of being in and near the L.A. branch of that libertarian milieu. I'd often heard the late Samuel Edward Konkin III describe the Long Beach branch as an "AnarchoVillage," but it was great to hear more about doings further north.

George said above, regarding Victor: "I am thus more dumbfounded and saddened than I am angry or offended." That happens to precisely express how I see all this.

Yet it says something of far greater importance. Those in the current lynch party should note that this reaction comes from one of the actual, outside-the-forum authors whom Victor has wronged. They might take something beneficial, and certainly far more dignified, from George's example.

... On second thought, I'll backtrack from that locution of "lynch party." Victor was already strung up, or had strung himself up, or — to utterly mix metaphors — was hoist on the petard of his own plagiarism. His career as a participant in this forum, depending on your viewpoint, either suicided or was justly euthanized.

What's happening now, more accurately, is the stabbing of a corpse. It's entirely superfluous, does nothing except to vent anger, and creates an even greater mess to clean up afterwards.

This is still sticking in my craw, so I might as well get it out.

I usually have a lot of respect for Steve, but I'm wondering if he thinks that his gripes about "schadenfreude" and "lynching" are based on a principle that he applies consistently to other transgressors. If a burglar who had been caught in the act of stealing money and electronics had been duly convicted and sentenced to a prison term, would Steve complain if people investigated further and discovered that the thief had committed multiple other thefts? If, with each of the thief's previously undetected robberies that was freshly uncovered, people continued to express disgust or derision, would Steve scold them for picking on the poor thief because he had already been convicted and sentenced for the crime of theft?

Basically, Steve, I'm wondering what was going through your mind that inspired you to scold people for reacting passionately to a type of theft committed by a repeat offender.

Have you read Victor's "taking responsibility" posts on the Meetup site? I think they contain many indications that there's still a lot that Victor is not facing up to, and that there's much that he needs to work on, but at least he appears to be taking some preliminary steps in the right direction, or at least away from the wrong direction (of mostly attacking or blaming others). I'm wondering what you think of his posts and the influence that your words might have had on them. Are you buying the victim of addiction stuff? Do you think that his full, genuine acceptance of his behavior, and all of its consequences, has been impeded because your scolding of others has encouraged him to continue seeing himself as a victim?

J

Edited July 4, 2007 by Jonathan

[BaalChatzaf]

In thinking about it some more, it comes back to Rand's original question: do we need morality at all, and if so, why? So, for Dragonfly and others who believe morality only has to do with our relationship to other people: Why do you care, then? Why even worry about "being good" if it isn't "good for you" to be good? Do you fear God's punishment? If not, why should I give a damn about trying to treat other people properly? Why is it important?

It is not good to be at war with one's neighbors. Unless one is ready to live alone and isolated he must conform his behavior to the group in which he wishes to dwell.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[BAMF]

From Victor Pross himself:

Both normative and descriptive sciences are centered chiefly on facts. The fact that ‘action results from identity’ is universally accepted and used in the fields of physics, chemistry, and the other realms of science. Both normative and descriptive sciences are concerned with facts and both are capable of verification---as both are subject to such judgments as “valid” or “invalid” or “true” or “false.”

(Post #233)

From Atheism: The Case Against God by George H. Smith (p. 281-2).

[George H. Smith]

From Victor Pross himself:

Both normative and descriptive sciences are centered chiefly on facts. The fact that ‘action results from identity’ is universally accepted and used in the fields of physics, chemistry, and the other realms of science. Both normative and descriptive sciences are concerned with facts and both are capable of verification---as both are subject to such judgments as “valid” or “invalid” or “true” or “false.”

(Post #233)

From Atheism: The Case Against God by George H. Smith (p. 281-2).

I wouldn't call this an instance of plagiarism. Rather, it is a legitimate paraphrase (or perhaps summary) of something I wrote in ATCAG.

Granted, the line between paraphrasing and plagiarizing can be a fine one at times, but this doesn't come close to crossing it, IMHO.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Kori,

Victor Pross is banned. Please do not channel messages from him. I will delete any further posts like that. (You may cite the instances of plagiarism if you like.)

George,

I wouldn't call this an instance of plagiarism. Rather, it is a legitimate paraphrase (or perhaps summary) of something I wrote in ATCAG.

Granted, the line between paraphrasing and plagiarizing can be a fine one at times, but this doesn't come close to crossing it, IMHO.

This is true for the first half of it. The second phrase appears to have been plagiarized. Here is the second phrase from Post 233 cited above.

Both normative and descriptive sciences are concerned with facts and both are capable of verification---as both are subject to such judgments as “valid” or “invalid” or “true” or “false.”

Now here is your version from Atheism: The Case Against God, p. 282:

Both normative and descriptive sciences are concerned with factual knowledge, both are capable of verification, and both are open to such judgments as “valid” or “invalid,” "correct" or "incorrect," “true” or “false.”

This fits my criteria for plagiary.

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

From Victor Pross himself:

Both normative and descriptive sciences are centered chiefly on facts. The fact that ‘action results from identity’ is universally accepted and used in the fields of physics, chemistry, and the other realms of science. Both normative and descriptive sciences are concerned with facts and both are capable of verification---as both are subject to such judgments as “valid” or “invalid” or “true” or “false.”

(Post #233)

From Atheism: The Case Against God by George H. Smith (p. 281-2).

I wouldn't call this an instance of plagiarism. Rather, it is a legitimate paraphrase (or perhaps summary) of something I wrote in ATCAG.

Granted, the line between paraphrasing and plagiarizing can be a fine one at times, but this doesn't come close to crossing it, IMHO.

Ghs

It isn't "a legitimate paraphrase (or perhaps summary)" if he didn't indicate where he got the material but instead passed it off as if it was his own thinking. When Objectivists utter Objectivist viewpoints which the audience can be expected to recognize came from Rand, this is legitimate without indicating the source. But was Victor crediting you with the points he was making or using your reasoning without acknowledging where he got it? (In some cases he copied near exactly from ATCAG without crediting the source.)

Ellen

___

[John Dailey]

~ Jeez!

~ After working through THIS thread, it seems like Movies and Entertainment is the ONLY sub-forum that isn't moaning mea culpas (or listing new stones) over V(u)P. Can't discussing him now stay in just one thread?

~ Good points GHS...including about Ob'ist-newbies' unchecked acceptance of Rand's evaluations of philosophers/philosophies.

Baal:

~ To complement GHS' critique of your view re Robinson Crusoe (before meeting Friday, that is), I gather that you don't agree with Rand's view (via Galt's speech) that morality, concern with 'right/wrong', STARTS with non-social ('prudential') concerns. I find the distinction of social/non-social concerns re the subject of 'right/wrong' actions/decisions as artificially unnecessary; why the distinction...other than its commonality?

LLAP

J:D

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

~ After working through THIS thread, it seems like Movies and Entertainment is the ONLY sub-forum that isn't moaning mea culpas (or listing new stones) over V(u)P. Can't discussing him now stay in just one thread?

John,

If you look at the dates on the posts, you will see that discussion has died down a lot on the plagiarism issue. I have also reduced the size of the signature line in Pross's posts and am now editing all new plagiarisms within the post of infraction. See here for a brief discussion of this and links to an example.

If you wish to follow the progress of my cleanup, you can go here. This post is a record of my efforts and changes as I edit. To date, there are 44 different plagiarisms identified and edited and the end is nowhere in sight. In answering you right now, I just saw that people do not have a record of new additions. They get lost since the list is in chronological order. So I might add a small mention of the recent plagiarisms being added.

The reason this issue got discussed on many threads is that this poster posted voluminously on them and was often quite snarky and mocking. That normally pisses people off, but when they discover that they were mocked with plagiarized material, they get much more pissed off because of the unfairness.

I am frankly impressed and proud of OL members for the restraint they have shown.

Michael

[John Dailey]

Mike:

~ Really, you didn't have to explain. I was just...surprised to find so much; not from Pross, but so many different threads still talking about his plagiarizing. Whew-w! You DO have a 'job' there.

~ I'm fairly well-read but, hadn't noticed his tendency 'till others started commenting...then you; I missed that con, man.

~ Re the notice you use now: quite appropriate 'signalling' to others, methinks. (Wonder if other forums will pick this method up?)

LLAP

J:D

PS: No response necessary (as I use to end my e-m's to CS)