Art and Subobjectivity

[Victor Pross]

Michael,

Could you restrain your own rhetoric please by referring to my alleged bombast and Jeff’s age to make a case for your arguments? Let the argument stand, such as they are.

My arguments are very clear regarding your own definition [and following statmenets] of 'art.' In short, it is a rehash of the “institutional definition.”

-Victor

Edited January 8, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Victor,

"Riddled with pitfalls," "brazen subjectivism," "defective for its own non-essentialist approach" are examples of bombastic rhetoric. This is not alleged bombastic rhetoric. This is actual bombastic rhetoric.

Please address the form and content idea as cognitive and normative if you want to define things.

Also, which definitions of "art" of mine are you referring to? I have mentioned three (and there are actually even more), yet you keep saying "your definition" as if there were only one.

Michael

[Danneskjold]

I believe he is referring to the one you gave back on page six or so. The thing created by and for humans solely for the purpose of contemplation.

I am still trying to hash out your argument. The thing I'm trying to figure out is why this part is true.

If you are going to talk about a person as a generic category (the cognitive concept), you would not refer to specific types of ideas or nationalities. (Stolen concept again.) You would refer to their generic categorization. The correct analogy would be to say that Osama Bin Laden is anti-human being.

I'm not making an argument, I'm trying to figure out why a nationality is not a cognitive concept.

[Victor Pross]

Michael,

I saw your definition as:

"…an object or performance made by and for human beings solely for the purpose of contemplation."

I said:

"Though it had the merit of brevity, it contains the absurd notion that something—anything—becomes art by having the status “conferred” upon it. More over, the term “object” is rather open-ended. What objects? Cell phones and joy buzzers? And you do not help matters when you say “It is clear to me that ‘art’ can be defined cognitively to include all art” when a rational definition of “art” is still wanting."

Your position was summed up thusly:

“Art (painting for the time being so as to stay simple and consistent with the previous posts) is exhibited in special display spaces like galleries, museums, halls, etc. People go there to contemplate it. So long as people produce it and consume it like that, it is cognitively ‘art.’”

Yes, I went on to say:

"Your approach is riddled with all the pitfalls that are characteristic in modern philosophy—especially in epistemology. Your definition [and explanations] of art preserve the same fundamentally circular thrust: virtually anything is art if a reputed artist or other purported expert says its art--if that is the intention, then cognitively—it is art. Therefore, 'art' does not have an identity."

This is the institutional definition of art, and as such, it fails to stand. Do you want to know why?

-Victor

[Danneskjold]

I think everyone has made it quite clear that we want to know why.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I'm trying to figure out why a nationality is not a cognitive concept.

Jeff,

Whoever said that? Of course it is a cognitive concept in its broadest meaning. It can be used as a normative concept, too.

I repeat, the normative concept includes the cognitive one when the same word is used.

Michael

This is the institutional definition of art, and as such, it fails to stand.

Victor,

Stand where?

Michael

Edit: Here. You want to see circular reasoning? "Art is a selective re-creation of reality according to an artist's metaphysical value-judgments." (Rand, The Romantic Manifesto, "The Psycho-Epistemology of Art.") So what is an artist? He obviously is someone who creates or performs art. Heh.

[Ellen Stuttle]

Michael, re your post #144, I'm sorry but I still think that you aren't understanding how RAND thought of this issue of "non-art" or "anti-art." I agree with you that in her writings on esthetics she intermingled cognitive statements and normative judgments, but I don't think that this is the same issue as whether there are items which some people would call "art works" which Rand would have said don't properly belong in the category.

You made reference to her idea of "anti-concept." That's the perfect comparison example, and I think you misinterpreted her in what you wrote, which was:

Rand coined a term once for a concept that tries to obliterate another concept, "anti-concept." The present use of the term "art" is such a case, and it is especially tricky because the same word is used for two different concepts. Also, the constant shift between the cognitive and normative, treating both as if they were the same, is a perfect example of using the "stolen concept."

Pause on the first sentence there, "Rand coined a term once for a concept that tries to obliterate another concept, 'anti-concept.'" The inclusion of "for a concept" is incorrect. She wasn't saying that an "anti-concept" is a type of "concept."

Here exactly is what she did say:

(Rand)

An anti-concept is an unnecessary and rationally unusable term designed to replace and obliterate some legitimate concept [my emphasis]."

Similarly, anti-art as she thought of that would be something which isn't art but is displayed as if it were, displacing real art.

You wrote:

"Anti-art" in cognitive terms is a category of art. Notice even that the word "art" is used? Rand is obviously referring to items or performances that are exhibited or take place where people exhibit and consume art.

No, "anti-art" in cognitive terms, as Rand uses it, is a category of "item," not of "art." As to her reference, if the third sentence were changed to "items or performances that are exhibited or take place where people exhibit and consume what they call art," it would be accurate, the point being that just because some item is exhibited and consumed in such places doesn't make it art. Something MORE is needed, according to her, for it properly to BE art. (That something more is a certain type of expressiveness.)

In a further post, #146, to Jeff, you wrote:

Thus, "modern art is not art" is a normative statement. Cognitively it makes no sense. How can art not be art? That is a contradiction. This statement only makes sense if the word "art" in "modern art" means one thing and the word "art" in "not art" means another. In the first, it is a cognitive concept. In the second, it is a normative concept (or at least qualified to exclusion by something not stated). The two uses of the word "art" mean two different concepts.

The sentence you use, "modern art is not art," you're correct, doesn't make sense just as written. But it would make sense with the appropriate change in wording or punctuation. If it were written instead "modern so-called art is not art" or "modern 'art' is not art," then it would be cognitively respectable, since the first usage of "art" would be singled out as referring to something which isn't really art.

I don't know if Rand did or did not consistently use scare quotes (or alternately "so-called") when she talked about modern art. But I think that what she thought was that at least much of what's generally called "modern art" by the art world isn't properly art.

Returning to your post #144, you wrote:

Form is cognitive.

Content is normative.

Form is the physical existent. Content is what is valuable (or judged as not valuable) in the form. Therefore, art as a form of human activity is a cognitive concept, the content of such activity is a normative one.

I agree with you, and Rand would have as well, but there's a problem here which I think you're overlooking, which is that she wouldn't have considered, e.g., a Kandinsky to have the form which is needed to qualify as being "art."

Going again to your post #146, you wrote:

"technically speaking," a painting on a canvas made by an artist hanging in a museum is art, regardless of what forms and colors are on that canvas. But in a view of art that restricts what subjects (content) may be included as valid according to a standard (value), is it not art (normative).

On another point, you cannot define art in generic terms (cognitively) by the content—only by the form. In this sense, Kandisky does what all painters do. He creates forms and colors on a canvas with paint to make an entity for exhibition. He made artworks.

There is probably the key issue over which mutual misunderstanding is arising between you on the one hand and Victor (and Jeff) on the other. Rand would not have agreed that "technically speaking" anything on a canvas made by (someone calling him- or herself) an artist and hanging in a museum is art. You're defining the "form" simply on the basis of the type of object, whereas in Rand's esthetics the "form" is a particular type of expression, a type which she would have considered -- I could just about swear though I don't know if she's on record as saying this -- to NOT be present in Kandinsky's work.

Now since I don't share her views as to what the requisite form is, I do consider Kandinsky's work legitimately art. However there are items which these days are put in art museums and called "art" which I would say aren't "art" and don't belong there. In other words, I don't agree with you that just being put in an art museum, or just being something or other on a canvas, is adequate "form" for classifying the item as "art." I think a certain type of symbolic intent is required. And that leads to, What is art?, What's a good definition?, i.e., back where this started.

Ellen

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Edited January 8, 2007 by Ellen Stuttle

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen,

According to Rand's stated views, I agree with you (in the most). However we judge what a person says and what a person does. So let us see what Rand does (going on the premise that if she did it, she knew what she was doing). We will see that what she does is a bit different than what she says.

Here are a few quotes from her using the term "art." Please remember that Rand, to my knowledge, never applied the cognitive/normative distinction to the word "art."

The following passage from "Art and Cognition," p 74-75, shows that she was well aware that there were different definitions for the term "art." In this case, she talks about "the decorative arts." Notice the qualification "esthetic-philosophical meaning of the term."

A similar type of confusion exists in regard to the decorative arts. The task of the decorative arts is to ornament utilitarian objects, such as rugs, textiles, lighting fixtures, etc. This is a valuable task, often performed by talented artists, but it is not an art in the esthetic-philosophical meaning of the term.

I seriously doubt she was talking about Kant's philosophy or aesthetics. She was talking about the Objectivist version. She used to proclaim that she was first and foremost a moralist. I have no doubt that she would regard the adoption of reason as a normative decision (since it is a cardinal value), thus Objectivist philosophy is normative at the root. You are right that she would say something like "what others call art" for abstract art, and in this case, her use of the word "art" would be cognitive if you broke it down to essentials.

Here is a perfect example of double meaning—first, her normative pronouncement of putting shapes and patterns into the category of decoration and outside the category of art ("Art and Cognition," p 75):

As a re-creation of reality, a work of art has to be representational; its freedom of stylization is limited by the requirement of intelligibility; if it does not present an intelligible subject, it ceases to be art.

...

It [color symphony] could conceivably produce an appropriate decorative effect at a carnival or in a night club on New Year's Eve, but it has no relation to art.

This section is full of pronouncements of this type. That sounds pretty cognitive, right? Then without batting an eye, she writes immediately thereafter:

This brings us to the subject of modern art.

Woah there! The subject of modern "what"?

Is she talking about a concept that has some kind of meaning, like paintings and stuff, or does this expression refer to nothing in reality? Here's another beauty of a statement (right after):

It is highly doubtful that the practitioners and admirers of modern art have the intellectual capacity to understand its philosophical meaning; all they need to do is indulge the worst of their subconscious premises.

Woah there double again! The practitioners and admirers of modern "what"? And this has "philosophical meaning" that can be understood? Isn't "philosophical meaning" a prerequisite of art according to her own view?

Ellen, it gets "worser and worser" when you see what Rand says and what she does on using this term "art." She bounces back and forth between the cognitive and normative as suits her rhetoric. How about a real normative statement with a blatant use of the cognitive? (From the same section:)

I do not know which is worse: to practice modern art as a colossal fraud or to do it sincerely.

Say what? "Practice" modern what? What does she mean by "practice" if not practice art in the cognitive sense—like paint pictures, make sculptures, etc.?

I could go on with oodles of quotations from fiction and nonfiction alike where Rand used the word "art" to mean what I do in my cognitive definition, especially when she used terms like "modern art." But hopefully you can see what I mean now. What she said art was is one thing. How she used the word "art" shows clearly that she did not restrict it to her own definition and often meant what is traditionally meant.

If she used it that way as often as she did, doesn't that mean that she agreed to that definition as one possible definition, at least by implication?

I understand that Rand's view of "art according to Objectivist philosophy" (what I call the normative definition) excludes certain content (and such exclusion was often very bombastic). But she had no qualms whatsoever about using the word "art" to refer to objects she called "anti-art" etc., in other places when she meant abstract paintings, sculptures, etc. (the cognitive definition). Try reading her works looking for this. This double use of the meaning jumps out at you all over the place in her writing.

I object to this unclear use of the language as it provokes much confusion. It also leads people to judge what they do not properly identify first—and that's a big problem many people I have engaged display in adopting Objectivism (an awful, terrible, irritating bad habit, actually).

Michael

[Victor Pross]

Michael,

Okay, you are a devotee of this dance between cognitive and normative…we got that. We can’t say “modern art” without you jumping in and saying “see, you said the word ‘art’—so there!” We got that. Loud and clear. Place a rock on a toilet and put a price tag on it in a gallery--art. Gotcha'!

New approach now:

Question one: Michael, in your view, what purpose and role does art fulfill in human life? Is it similar to what Rand’s is? If so, capsulate what that is, please. Why do we need art? What does it do for us as human beings from any other man-made objects?

Question two: How would you distinguish art--as it has been for 25 hundreds years--from “modern art”? [Keep in mind—that the designation of referring to it as “modern art” is there for a reason]. Why the designation and how is it distinguished from academic art?

Victor

Edited January 9, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Danneskjold]

You'll have to forgive Rand for not taking the time to coin a new term for modern art, relay it to the reader, and type it in instead of using the normal definition.

Forgive me for saying this if you have already cleared this up, but why is it that Rand's definition of art is normative and not cognitive? She is essentially saying this is what is required for something to be art. It has nothing to do with talent.

Similarly, if we were to define humans specifically as bipeds, and something came along that was extremely similar to being a human but was a quadraped, would this be human? In the same way Rand is saying the cognitive definition of art requires that it be a selective recreation of reality. If something is not a selective recreation of reality, how is saying that it is not art normative?

Something relating to a reality may be better or worse than something not relating to reality. Personally I do not have the taste for it, but others seem to. So, holding that true, if something that was completely abstract was a better painting than something that was completely based in reality, we wouuld consider it art if our definition was normative. This is not true, we would put it on a higher tier of something different.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

You'll have to forgive Rand for not taking the time to coin a new term for modern art, relay it to the reader, and type it in instead of using the normal definition.

Forgive me for saying this if you have already cleared this up, but why is it that Rand's definition of art is normative and not cognitive? She is essentially saying this is what is required for something to be art.

Jeff,

I don't have to forgive Rand for that. I merely have to note what definitions are used for my own mental clarity. And Rand certainly did use the "normal definition" as one definition of art. Not just with modern art either. I also mentioned "decorative art." Rand was quite aware of dictionaries, too, where the practice of a word having more than one definition is very common.

As to your question, it is a matter of context. If Rand's view of art is taken with the qualification "under Objectivism," it is easily the cognitive concept of what Objectivist art is—or, more clearly, what art under Objectivism is. When applied to all art under all systems of thought, Rand's view of art—say, her proclamation that visual art must be representational—is either false because the definition is different, or it is normative because the definition uses good-evil values for judging the content of the art practiced under other theories.

For example, a mystic revelation portrayed in art might not be representational. If it is judged using Objectivist standards, it is not art. Why? Because it presents disintegration (or whatever) where integration and volition should be presented. The content is considered part of the form. Thus it is not only not art. The message is evil for presenting the irrational as "what could and should be." That is about as normative as you can get.

I think the best way to describe what I am saying, just so you don't get the impression that I am trying to undermine Rand, is that Rand's view of what art is, and how it is used, exists and it is valid. But her view is not the only valid view of art, nor the only valid use. The world happily keeps turning. (As with other cases where I disagree with Rand, the problem is when her insights are applied to all cases. When that is done, they is false. When they is applied to some cases, they are very valuable.)

It is awfully hard to discover what the other views are when you deny their very existence. And denying the existence of anything in the face of vast evidence to the contrary is not my way of dealing with reality.

Now why would I want to discover what the other views are? To judge them, of course. How can I judge what I do not know? And how will I ever know anything if I close my eyes to what is plainly seen right in front of my face?

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

I understand that Rand's view of "art according to Objectivist philosophy" (what I call the normative definition) excludes certain content (and such exclusion was often very bombastic). But she had no qualms whatsoever about using the word "art" to refer to objects she called "anti-art" etc., in other places when she meant abstract paintings, sculptures, etc. (the cognitive definition). Try reading her works looking for this. This double use of the meaning jumps out at you all over the place in her writing.

Oops, pause there. What you're calling "normative" isn't, then, what I thought you meant by "normative" -- and what I meant by it when I said at the start of my previous post that, yes, Rand often intermingles cognitive and normative uses. "Art according to Objectivist philosophy" is her cognitive definition. Whether particular works within that definition are good or bad art is one type of normative judgment. Another type, which she engages in and shouldn't have engaged in, is to argue that the specific type of "art according to Objectivist philosophy" which she likes is better art as a category.

You've demonstrated that she did frequently use "modern art" instead of "modern so-called art" or "modern 'art,'" either of the latter two of which would have been consistent usage with her assessment of "modern art." So, yes, she is confusing on that. Nevertheless, I think she fairly clearly indicated that she didn't think of the category "modern art" as properly belonging under the umbrella of her cognitive definition.

And, Michael, I don't want to get into an argument with you in which I'm cast as defending Rand's esthetics. To repeat, although I think her esthetics is in a generally right ballpark, there's a fair amount of it I find wanting, and I've never liked her definition -- and numerous of her specific opinions I don't agree with at all. So I'm not desirous of being cast as Rand's defender here. But I think it's important, if you're going to be talking about "cognitive" and "normative," to get clear Rand's actual meaning and which is which in her theory as she formed it.

Ellen

___

[Danneskjold]

I agree with you completely which is why I'm arguing with you. (Wrap your mind around THAT one. No but I'm sure you've figured out that I was referring to different things) My arguing with you is the best way to figure out if an idea holds water.

I'm not sure about other definitions of art. I think that what is referred to as Modern Art is a different concept completely than art. My reason for believing that is if you broaden the definition of art enough to include modern art you end up broadening it enough so that there are very few things that are not art.

[Ellen Stuttle]

Forgive me for saying this if you have already cleared this up, but why is it that Rand's definition of art is normative and not cognitive? She is essentially saying this is what is required for something to be art. It has nothing to do with talent.

See my post above. I disagree with Michael that Rand's definition is normative and not cognitive. I think it's cognitive, though a less than ideal definition.

Ellen

___

[Ellen Stuttle]

I agree with you completely which is why I'm arguing with you. (Wrap your mind around THAT one. No but I'm sure you've figured out that I was referring to different things) My arguing with you is the best way to figure out if an idea holds water.

I'm not sure about other definitions of art. I think that what is referred to as Modern Art is a different concept completely than art. My reason for believing that is if you broaden the definition of art enough to include modern art you end up broadening it enough so that there are very few things that are not art.

I'm not sure who the "you" is you mean there, me or Michael. If you mean me, yes, I understand what you're saying.

Ellen

___

[Danneskjold]

I meant it towards MSK. Sorry for not specifying. I figured from your posts that you agree that it is a cognitive definition.

I have seen far less desireable definitions than Rand's. The fact is that hers is quite well thought out if you do not want to let the definition of art run rampant.

w00t 300 posts.

Edited January 9, 2007 by Jeff Kremer

[Victor Pross]

Jeff wrote: I'm not sure about other definitions of art. I think that what is referred to as Modern Art is a different concept completely than art. My reason for believing that is if you broaden the definition of art enough to include modern art you end up broadening it enough so that there are very few things that are not art.

Bingo! Jeff, right on the money! Now ask this question: what purpose do definitions serve?

That's right, virtually anything is art if a reputed artist or other purported expert says its art--if that is the intention—it is art. This is modernism in its glory. This is the pure subjectivity of concepts, of which art has been cascaded. Modern philosophy and modern art, is it any wonder, go hand-in-hand.

Victor

Edited January 9, 2007 by Victor Pross

[reason.on]

Kandinsky on artists, art and values:...

Thank you Soze, for posting Kandinsky's thoughts; they are not what I'd have expected, and provide a certain new insight into the refrigerator magnets currently decorating my mustard colored cooling box.

RCR

[reason.on]

So, am I to understand correctly that Victor and Jeff would not consider the below image to fit into the concepual category of "art", because it does not represent some thing, in particular, in reality...

...while, they would consider this second piece to be "art", since it represents the form of a flower?

Finally, I have no idea where Victor and Jeff would place this one, since it does represent Saguaro forms, though not overtly or discretely....so, "art" or not?

RCR

[Danneskjold]

Those are very pleasant decorations. I like them very much. Art? Not by any definition that I am aware of that is not so broad that it encompasses everything to nearly everything. Unless of course you have one?

[Victor Pross]

...while, they would consider this second piece to be "art", since it represents the form of a flower?

A flower? Really? I don't see it.

[reason.on]

A flower? Really? I don't see it.

So--there we have it.

RCR

[Danneskjold]

I don't see the flower either really. And I have no clue about the third one because...well I have no clue what a Saguro is. So I will admit my ignorance there.

[Victor Pross]

The criterion of practical utility is crucial in determining the nature of an object. Decorative images—such as these--are crafts and are subordinated to a utilitarian purpose—even though they have embedded in them non-essential characteristics found in some art: creativity and beauty. This is a short answer. :turned:

edit: While I’m at it—architecture and photography is not art, either.

Edited January 9, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Jonathan]

RCR,

Thank you Soze, for posting Kandinsky's thoughts; they are not what I'd have expected, and provide a certain new insight into the refrigerator magnets currently decorating my mustard colored cooling box.

You're welcome. Is your fridge the color that they call "harvest gold"? I'm pretty sure that's precisely the hue that Kandinsky had in mind when he described a certain sickly shade of yellow as being what most people would associate with the pungency of urine or the staleness of old, faded newspaper. :-)

Btw, Victor is right about some of the views that drove the artists and theorists who came up with abstract art. Some of their belief systems were pretty loopy, and if you read more of Kandinsky you'll definitely run into it. But what I like about Kandinsky more than the others is that, despite some of his self-contradictions and spiritual views, he seemed to be very open, honest and almost scientific in experimenting and pondering possible solutions to the puzzle of why color, form and composition moved him so deeply.

J

Edited January 9, 2007 by Jonathan