Toward an Egoist Pronatalism

[Leif Martyn]

But First - These Words!
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natalism
https://americanmind.org/salvo/today-wokeness-tomorrow-antinatalism/

 

Following from the earlier posts in this study, I'll start where Michelle Fram-Cohen began:
"... why undertake an eighteen-year obligation to raise and support a completely dependent human being?
 "Why assume the legal and moral responsibility for the conduct of someone else?
 "Why would any rational, independent, self-respecting individual want to do that?"

Let's consolidate the three questions, thus:
Why would any rational, independent, self-respecting individual want to undertake an eighteen-year obligation to raise and support a completely dependent human being, and assume the legal and moral responsibility for the conduct of someone else?

This is a long, hard way of asking: why parent?
The question that precedes this is: why have children at all?
From a rational egoist perspective, a short set of assumptions are required.

First, the assumption of a benevolent view of the universe: NOT that the universe is "benevolent," but that the individual considering the choice to undertake the action of procreation, and the consequent parenting, holds such a view.
Nathaniel Branden notes, in "The obligations of parents and children" :

By virtue of their unique biological relationship, parents and child are normally predisposed to feel benevolence toward each other. Parents expect to feel love for their creation.

It's not reading too closely to see a normal predisposition and the expectation of feeling love for their creation as indications of a benevolent view of the  universe.

Leonard Peikoff articulated the "benevolent view" in Lecture 8 of his "Philosophy of Objectivism" (1976):

Although accidents and failures are possible, they are not, according to Objectivism, the essence of human life. On the contrary, the achievement of values is the norm — speaking now for the moral man, moral by the Objectivist definition. Success and happiness are the metaphysically to-be-expected. In other words, Objectivism rejects the view that human fulfillment is impossible, that man is doomed to misery, that the universe is malevolent. We advocate the “benevolent universe” premise.

The “benevolent universe” does not mean that the universe feels kindly to man or that it is out to help him achieve his goals. No, the universe is neutral; it simply is; it is indifferent to you. You must care about and adapt to it, not the other way around. But reality is “benevolent” in the sense that if you do adapt to it — i.e., if you do think, value, and act rationally, then you can (and barring accidents you will) achieve your values. You will, because those values are based on reality.

I'm not spending any time here critiquing "anti-natalism" but reading those arguments with one eye open it's easy to see a "malevolent universe" premise at work.
A "benevolent universe" premise is necessary, but not sufficient, to underly a decision to procreate.

The next assumption is an understanding, and acceptance, of the integration of the biological and the conceptual. For biological, read: "animal."

Animal characteristics of man are aspects of his nature, and they are integrated with conceptual aspects in human nature.
By conceptual aspects I mean those that reflect the exercise of the capacity for volitional conceptual consciousness.
These aspects are emphasized in Ayn Rand's writings, from epistemology to art and politics, while the animal aspects are rarely addressed, and tangentially at best.

Is there a bias against examination of animal aspects? To steal a postmodern phrase, the conceptual aspects are "privileged" or "valorized" over the animal ones: is reproduction considered a mere animal function, in contrast to the highly conceptualized value of "productiveness?"

It may be an unintended consequence of this assumption: since man's mind is his sole, and supreme, means of survival, the works of the mind are considered more important than the works of the body. If unintended, it is ironic, since this ignores the context: the mind and body are integrated in human nature.

Carolyn Ray's brief account of animal nature at least has the merit of bluntness:

[From "Intellectual Arguments Against Having Children":]    Reproduction is a natural human activity, so human happiness requires reproduction.

[C. Ray:] It is true that the nature of human beings is such that they can make babies. But it is a natural human act in virtue of the fact that humans are animals, and it is animal nature to make babies. It is amazing and wonderful, surely, but as a human function, it carries no special force, certainly not the force of necessity.

    The nature of human beings, as animals, is also that they can overpower other human beings and take their possessions or kill them. The mere fact that such action is possible to us does not mean that we must act this way, or even that we must act this way in order to be happy. There are many natural human functions which should be curbed. The random production of children without genuine interest in them is one of them.

And from "Of Living Death" (1968), this declaration:

It is only animals that have to adapt themselves to their physical background and to the biological functions of their bodies. Man adapts his physical background and the use of his biological faculties to himself — to his own needs and values. /That/ is his distinction from all other living species.

I only show these as examples of accounts of the animal aspect(s) of human nature, and a typical rhetoric.

I suggest that Reggie Firehammer (banned but not forgotten!) has also, in a blunt way, spoken against the spirit of Carolyn's dismissal (from 2018):

The Ayn Rand Institute’s Ari Armstrong article, “Have Sex for Pleasure this Valentine’s Day,” (2012) <https://www.theobjectivestandard.com/2012/02/ignore-santorums-depraved-prescription-have-sex-for-pleasure/> identifies everything that is wrong with the modern Objectivist view of sex: “the primary purpose of sex is not procreation (an optional value) but pleasure (a requirement of human life), which corresponds to the fact that the latter purpose is far more widely embraced.” Let me emphasize the point Armstrong is making: The primary purpose of sex is pleasure.

How is the purpose of any human attribute or faculty determined? Why do human beings have genitals? To say the primary purpose of sex is not procreation is the equivalent of saying the primary purpose of the lungs is not breathing. If human beings reproduced in some other way, asexually for example, there would be no genitals. To deny the reason human beings have genitals is for reproduction flies in the face of both fact and reason.

Like every other human attribute and faculty, when used as their nature dictates, that proper use is pleasurable. Pleasure is our nature’s way of rewarding us for right action, for using any of our faculties as their nature requires them to be used.

The nature of the human genitals dictates how they ought to be used. Male and female are naturally physically compatible to fulfill their function of reproduction. They are, among human attributes, the only ones requiring another human being to fulfill, the means not only of reproduction but of completing each other, and uniting each other in a physical act that perfectly reflects their love.

Understanding that the animal and conceptual aspects of human nature are integrated suggests a corollary.
Recall that in Rand's interview with Alvin Toffler for Playboy (1964):

Toffler: Do you believe that women as well as men should organize their lives around work – and if so, what kind of work?

Rand: Of course. I believe that women are human beings. What is proper for a man is proper for a woman. The basic principles are the same. I would not attempt to prescribe what kind of work a man should do, and I would not attempt it in regard to women. There is no particular work, which is specifically feminine. Women can choose their work according to their own purpose and premises in the same manner as men do.

The "particular work" of course is childbearing. This is not the context in which Rand intends to discuss productive activity - a conceptual context.

Nonetheless, in a sexually dimorphic species, the male is involved; the female is committed. The preparation, time and energy expended, and risk assumed, are all on the female side. Therefore the conscious, voluntary decision to reproduce is essentially a female decision, which affords the authority to continue or end the pregnancy.

The corollary only sharpens the point: an understanding, and acceptance, of the integration of the animal and conceptual aspects of human nature, and the sexually dimorphic condition, is necessary - but again, not sufficient - to underly a decision to procreate.

The third assumption which I believe undergirds the decision to procreate is the perception of time: its passage and duration.

In Objectivist-related literature, I have not found any discussions, extended or not, of "time perspective" or "future time view" or any cognate terms.
Considered to be a psychological concept, especially as "future time perspective," it does not appear to have received much, if any, consideration in discussions of human life as an activity bounded by a beginning and an end.

Perhaps this is because the research is in psychology, and just as the "animal aspects" are studied in biology, the distinction between philosophical and scientific areas of concern has been observed. I think the science can inform the philosophy.
Lawrence Frank is cited as the originator (1938) of the notion of "time perspective" but more currently the study is associated with Philip Zimbardo.

As it happens, there's also a new book bringing a synonym to bear which should be immediately applicable: foresight.

Future Time Perspective (foresight) is conceptual; as an aspect of self-awareness, one can imagine personal (animal) mortality, and time beyond death.
As such, FTP evaluates a finite amount of time (one's lifespan) and inspires imaginative projection into the future.
The concept of mortality matters as link between conceptual consciousness (self-awareness) and the animal aspect of human nature.

Self awareness, with a sense of time and biological mortality, can easily be misappropriated as a non sequitur:
 "I am mortal, therefore I'll procreate."

Foresight informs the rational egoist's decision to procreate, since this action has long-range consequences, especially for the child.

These assumptions: a benevolent universe premise, an understanding of the integration of the animal and the conceptual, and the need for a future time perspective, further inform several ideas in ethics which underlay the decision to procreate. Foremost among these is a consideration of the nature of the child.

“Introducing Objectivism,” The Objectivist Newsletter, Aug. 1962, 35.
... My philosophy, Objectivism, holds that:
[in ethics] "Man — every man — is an end in himself, not the means to the ends of others. He must exist for his own sake, neither sacrificing himself to others nor sacrificing others to himself. The pursuit of his own rational self-interest and of his own happiness is the highest moral purpose of his life.

As a human, then, every child is an end in itself.
In procreation a unique individual is created, who requires nurturing, both animal and conceptual (i.e. parenting).

 

Secondly, procreation is an "optional" value indicative of flourishing.

In "Of Living Death", Ayn Rand identifies procreation as an "optional value":

The capacity to procreate is merely a potential which man is not obligated to actualize. The choice to have children or not is morally optional. Nature endows man with a variety of potentials — and it is his /mind/ that must decide which capacities he chooses to exercise, according to his own hierarchy of rational goals and values...

In Viable Values (2000), Tara Smith explores the relationship of "optional values" to the concept of flourishing.
Lester Hunt has written a succinct review of Smith's book which will reward the reader unfamiliar with her work.
This is followed as well by The Virtuous Egoist (2006), reviewed here.

Disconcertingly, but perhaps unsurprisingly, Smith does not discuss procreation or parenting in her work (to date...).
As Rand would have it, procreation is optional because it is not required for the (immediate?) survival of individual.

However, recalling two of the assumptions noted above, to flourish, one ought to hold the benevolent universe premise and one ought to apply foresight.
That is, one ought to begin with the conviction that "if you do think, value, and act rationally, then you can (and barring accidents you will) achieve your values. You will, because those values are based on reality." Furthermore, one ought to look ahead as far as possible in order to anticipate what actions will be required to achieve those values.

Procreation is by no means ruled out as an "optional value." Furthermore, flourishing is not conceived in exclusively conceptual terms: it includes animal aspects (consider the efforts of a bodybuilder!).

As with the non sequitur noted in connection with foresight, however, procreation is not necessarily evidence of flourishing.
Too many children are in fact unwanted.

But finally, procreation can be considered a unique, philosophically objective value.

A rationally selfish attitude should always consider as broad a context of action as possible.
This context includes the dimension of time: personally, one's lifespan, but with foresight, one may look beyond.

I hope that what follows is not an unwarranted interpolation:
(From “What Is Capitalism?” in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, pp. 24, 26.)

   It is in regard to a free market that the distinction between an intrinsic, subjective, and objective view of values is particularly important to understand. The market value of a product is not an intrinsic value, not a “value in itself” hanging in a vacuum. A free market never loses sight of the question: Of value to whom? And, within the broad field of objectivity, the market value of a product does not reflect its philosophically objective value, but only its socially objective value.

    By “philosophically objective,” I mean a value estimated from the standpoint of the best possible to man, i.e., by the criterion of the most rational mind possessing the greatest knowledge, in a given category, in a given period, and in a defined context (nothing can be estimated in an undefined context)....

    Just as the number of its adherents is not a proof of an idea’s truth or falsehood, of an art work’s merit or demerit, of a product’s efficacy or inefficacy—so the free-market value of goods or services does not necessarily represent their philosophically objective value, but only their socially objective value, i.e., the sum of the individual judgments of all the men involved in trade at a given time, the sum of what they valued, each in the context of his own life....

    The “philosophically objective” value of a new product serves as the teacher for those who are willing to exercise their rational faculty, each to the extent of his ability. Those who are unwilling remain unrewarded—as well as those who aspire to more than their ability produces ....

I think this distinction can be applied more broadly, beyond the market of material values, by applying the criteria for “philosophically objective value” and "socially objective value" to the evaluation of human choices.

How is the creation of a new human being, an end-in-itself and not a means to an end, valued from the standpoint of the best possible to man? The fact that it is a unique, incommensurable action gives it a special status. I think that the "given period" involved in such a standpoint is the longest term possible, especially since this given period is measured against the individual lifespan and the imaginative projection beyond that.

By contrast, even if optional values are ranked, they are essentially socially objective values, chosen in the context of the individual life.
The establishment of a charitable foundation, as an optional value, is comparable to procreation - except for the absence of the animal aspect.

So as an instance of flourishing, procreation is a unique activity AND has a long-range context.
Procreation, properly considered (i.e. in the context of parenting), has a greater “philosophically objective” value than socially objective values of lifespan flourishing.

Procreation, considered as a selfish act, is rewarding in both animal and conceptual aspects of human nature.
Ethically, it is optional, and to the extent that it is freely chosen, it is good.
May every child be a wanted child.

========================================
A note on the merits of Foresight (a future time perspective):
This can be very helpful in forestalling a common misapprehension of the consequences of procreation, i.e. the requirements of parenting.
several extracts from John Galt's Speech illustrate the operation of a hierarchy of values:

“Sacrifice” does not mean the rejection of the worthless, but of the precious. “Sacrifice” does not mean the rejection of the evil for the sake of the good, but of the good for the sake of the evil. “Sacrifice” is the surrender of that which you value in favor of that which you don’t....
"... If you own a bottle of milk and give it to your starving child, it is not a sacrifice; if you give it to your neighbor’s child and let your own die, it is.
"... If a mother buys food for her hungry child rather than a hat for herself, it is not a sacrifice: she values the child higher than the hat; but it is a sacrifice to the kind of mother whose higher value is the hat, who would prefer her child to starve and feeds him only from a sense of duty...."

Implied here is the mother's foresight: her efforts are required to help the child survive, and hopefully flourish.
More broadly, or with a longer time perspective - and presuming the choices are not as stark or immediate as those invoked by Galt - what is so often decried as "sacrifice" can be better described as deferred gratification. But "all investing is subject to risk including possible loss" - and this is an intimate example.

If the effort attendant on procreation, i.e. parenting, is judged to be a "sacrifice" then obviously one ought not choose this as a value to pursue.
If that effort is seen, in the long run, as an investment, then it is an element of assuming the challenge.
"take what you want, and pay for it"

[Peter]

Excellent letter and quote. Do we owe ourselves the right to bequeath future generations, “bearing the entire human species through the oceans of space and time”? Our place in the Cosmos, co-written by Carl Sagan

With every century
Our eyes on the universe have been opened anew
We are witness
To the very brink of time and space

We must ask ourselves
We who are so proud of our accomplishments
What is our place in the cosmic perspective of life?

The exploration of the cosmos
Is a voyage of self discovery
As long as there have been humans
We have searched for our place in the cosmos

Are there things about the universe
That will be forever beyond our grasp?
Are there things about the universe that are
Ungraspable?

One of the great revelations of space exploration
Is the image of the earth, finite and lonely
Bearing the entire human species
Through the oceans of space and time

Matter flows from place to place
And momentarily comes together to be you
Some people find that thought disturbing
I find the reality thrilling

As the ancient mythmakers knew
We're children equally of the earth and the sky
In our tenure on this planet, we've accumulated
Dangerous evolutionary baggage

We've also acquired compassion for others,
Love for our children,
And a great soaring passionate intelligence
The clear tools for our continued survival

We could be in the middle
Of an inter-galactic conversation
And we wouldn't even know

We've begun at last
To wonder about our origins
Star stuff contemplating the stars
Tracing that long path

Our obligation to survive and flourish
Is owed not just to ourselves
But also to that cosmos
Ancient and vast, from which we spring

[Peter]

I started looking for letters concerning families and found this old nugget. Peter

From: "J. Gregory Wharton" To: <family@wetheliving.com> Subject: FAM: RE: Dividing Labor in the Household Date: Sun, 5 Aug 2001 17:48:15 -0700. Luke Setzer brings up an interesting question in two parts. In the first part, he notes that the legally "collectivized" nature of the family structure is contrary to the important principle of the unity of authority and responsibility in individual action.  To a certain extent, I see his point.  At the same time, I also perceive something of a category error here.

Families are not political organizations, but rather social ones.  That being said, the family as a social unit provides the core building block of most political systems.  For most of human history, political systems have been grappling with families and how best to treat them.

This may sound a note of dissonance with objectivist notions of individualism in politics, but it acknowledges an inescapable historical fact: where family units are undermined by the political structure, societal order weakens in proportion.  The family is the smallest and most stable element of any self-organizing socio-political order.

It is interesting to note that the more tyrannical a political system is, the more strenuously it works to undermine familial structures and relationships.  The Nazis and the Soviets both strove to break the bonds by which members of families hold themselves together.

This is primarily because the family, as a self-generated, self-organizing social order, represents a direct threat to the loyalty and obeisance any family member might feel toward the state.  Given the choice, people will nearly always put family before king and country.

To go off on another relevant historical tangent, one of the reasons that the Roman republic and empire lasted as long as it did was due to the Roman recognition of the importance of family, and the extent to which this was institutionalized in their society.

The Romans believed that families were not simply defined by consanquinity (blood ties), though this was certainly a part of any family structure. Family, to the Romans, was a group of people who bound themselves together in such a way as to directly pledge each other to serving common interests. It was quite common for outsiders to become part of a family unit by being adopted, even though the adoptee might be in middle age and have a family of his or her own.  The head of the family unit, the Paterfamilias (father of the families), literally had the dictatorial power of life and death in his own household (though this power was rarely used).  The Imperial state, even at the height of its power, dared not trespass against the prerogatives of the Roman familial order. [1]

Because the family is the most fundamental self-organizing unit of social order, there are as many ways in which families are organized as there are families.  We can easily argue that the power of a Paterfamilias to deny life at his word violates fundamental individual rights.  Physical abuse or other overt acts of violence would also be proscribed on moral grounds. However, beyond simple issues of fundamental individual right, there is no justification for political interference in the order of the family unit, whether to dictate behavior or structure.

In the United States at present, the nuclear family is recognized as deserving of special legal protections and privileges.  The ways in which this is put into practice vary widely.  In Washington State, where I and my family live, the legal presumption is of unity.  In other words, the law considers my wife and myself to be the same person for nearly all legal purposes.  Everything I own (with some minor exceptions) is presumed to be hers and vice versa.  Either one of us may act on behalf of the other without express permission.  The law considers the marriage agreement to effectively be a binding, mutual, unlimited power of attorney for both parties.

There are some good reasons for this, but the main one has to do with the legal recognition of the family as the basic unit of social order.  Now, in our society, that recognition is strictly limited to the nuclear family (as embodied by the marriage agreement between one man and one woman), and we could argue whether or not this is just (I argue that it is not--but we'll have to save that for another day)

This obviously opens to door for the potential abuse of that relationship. I could easily enter into agreements which would obligate my wife to responsibilities of which she did not want any part and vice versa.  To a certain extent, what the law is saying is this:  How we work that out is our own affair and not the concern of the State (this is over-simplified, but it gets the point across).

This is reasonable.  The internal organization of our family is none of the State's business.  We choose to act as a social unit in a formal way, and our political system recognizes that choice to the extent that nobody's rights are abrogated.

So, that leaves the second part of Luke's question: how do we actually go about organizing ourselves as a family?

My wife occasionally finds herself in conversation with one of the minions of Political Correctness, who inquires as to her "partner" (hoping to avoid such incendiary phrases as "husband" or "lover").  This raises the question: is our relationship really a partnership?  (Kate jokes that it's more of Limited Liability Company than a true partnership).

The answer, I think, is "sort of."

Do we share in everything we do in equal parts as befitting an equal partnership in all things?  The answer most emphatically is no.  We do not.

Do we combine our strengths to offset each others' weaknesses?  Do we pool our talents to act more effectively?  Do we divide our labor to act more efficiently toward our common goals and purposes?  Definitely yes on all counts.

And, of course, we love each other dearly and deeply enjoy each others' company.  We also put up with each others' idiosyncrasies and overlook each others' occasional failings thereby.

Our children fit into this relationship as best they can according to what they can do.  We don't insist that they do chores in order to tally up work points in a partnership agreement.  We do insist that, so long as they are a part of the family, they respect, cherish and help out family members as they can.

We all love each other, and usually act toward common goals.  That, in itself, pretty much defines what family is all about.

~g

J. Gregory Wharton, AIA

-----------------------

Architect | Philosopher

Seattle, Washington USA

[NOTE 1]  As an even further ranging aside, it occurred to me long ago that if we members of the objectivist diaspora were really serious about fomenting the rise of a new spontaneous order in our society, the best way to go about doing it would be to create a large extended family.

When I was a teenager at summer camp, we used to play this game called (strangely enough) "family."  It would start about a week into the four-week session with a few boy-girl pairs who had formed amorous relationships. Their friends would jokingly tease them, and at some point the couples would respond to the teasing with a further joke about their friends being their "children" or some such.  Pretty soon, the whole camp full of kids had mapped out a giant, convoluted tree of fictitious family relationships. This little girl might be a cousin, that little boy might be my uncle.  A tent-mate of mine (who was 13 years old) wound up calling a 9-year-old girl "Grandma."  It brought us all closer together and built bridges.  It also put us in a frame of mind to automatically assume that we had something in common with these complete strangers.  It's funny, but I still remember many of those children, according to those fake family trees, two and a half decades after those summer sessions.

That was just a long-ago game, but I can't help wonder if it would really work to build our ideal society from the ground up as an extended family. I've observed, and heard this observation from many others: that objectivists have a hard time coming together.  We get so caught up in our individualism that we forget the importance of cooperation among individuals.  Families provide a built-in and powerful structure for bringing people together in a cooperative way which also recognizes their inherent individuality.  We should embrace that, rather than be puzzled by it.

[Peter]

And another well thought out letter about guardianship, and I will stop for now. Peter

From: "George H. Smith" To: "*Atlantis" <atlantis@wetheliving.com> Subject: ATL: Re:  Sound science - philosophical conclusions Date: Sun, 25 Mar 2001 23:43:38 -0600. Bill Dwyer wrote: "If we accept Rand's concept of rights, then the only "obligation" that rights imply is to abstain from violating them.  So if the mother of a child has a right to raise him, then the only obligation that right would imply is that ~others~ are obligated to abstain from interfering with it.  It would not, by itself, imply that she is obligated to care for the child (i.e., not to neglect its welfare)."

The guardian-ward relationship is unique, something quite unlike ownership claims. If the guardian has a right to raise an infant -- i.e., to make crucial decisions on behalf of that infant, while excluding other people from doing likewise -- then what is the basis of this guardianship right? It is not a right of ownership, but rather the right the decide (relative to third parties) what is in the *best interests* of the infant. This is necessarily so, because the infant (i.e., a child before the "age of reason") is unable to make decisions in its own interests, so these decisions must be made for it by an adult.

In thus claiming a guardianship right over an infant, the adult is saying, in effect, "I accept the responsibility for taking care of this infant; and as a corollary of my right to make these decisions, others are obligated not to interfere." The right of guardianship vis-a-vis the infant is therefore the voluntary assumption of a positive obligation to care for the infant, and this obligation is reflected in the corresponding right of the infant to receive this care.

There are thus two set of rights and obligations at work here: (1) the relationship between the infant-ward and the parent-guardian, and (2) the relationship between the guardian and interested third parties, who are barred from interfering with the guardian's decisions, so long as she exercises minimal care in providing for the needs of the infant.

Bill wrote: "What I don't understand is how this right of control over the child ~by itself~ implies that the mother is legally obligated to take proper care of him, since it is not normally the case that having the right of exclusive control over something implies a legal obligation to take proper care of it.  For example, I have exclusive control over my car, but that doesn't mean that I have no right to neglect its care and maintenance."

Guardianship is not a species of ownership, so Bill's reference to his car is irrelevant. Bill owns his car, and this right of ownership imposes no obligations on him relative to his car. He may dispose of it in any manner he pleases, because a piece of property does not have "rights." But an infant, in my view, has the same (negative) rights as every other person. The problem is that an infant (by definition) cannot care for itself and so must be cared for by an adult, who is willing to assume this obligation voluntarily. And since the *needs* of the infant generate guardianship rights in the first place (a right that precludes third parties from interfering), a right of guardianship cannot exist -- indeed, it makes no sense -- unless the guardian has voluntarily assumed the obligation to care for the infant-ward.

Thus to speak of an adult as a "guardian" means: (1) this adult has voluntarily taken upon herself the obligation to care for the infant, which creates a corresponding right in the infant to such care (so long as this relationship continues to exist); and (2) this adult, in virtue of assuming this obligation to the infant, can exclude third parties from overriding her decisions, so long as she fulfills the minimal conditions of guardianship.

Bill wrote: "In order to claim that the mother is obligated to care for the child, unless someone else is willing and able to do so, it seems that one must first show that the child has a right to be taken care of by her. But how does one demonstrate such a right, short of arguing that the child's needs as such confer a claim on the mother (which is a difficult proposition to defend)?"

The obligations of guardianship, as I have said, must be accepted voluntarily. Although the needs of the infant, coupled with the inability of the infant to care for itself, create the *potential* for a guardian-ward relationship to exist, these needs alone cannot generate that relationship per se. This latter requires the consent of an adult, who then assumes responsibility for the infant voluntarily. I do not believe in unchosen "positive" obligations, but I do believe that positive obligations can be created voluntarily (as is the case, for example, with contracts).

Bill wrote: "Besides, if a newborn's needs confer a claim on the mother not to neglect them until she can find another guardian, then why don't the needs of a fetus confer a claim on the mother not to neglect them until she can find another guardian (i.e., until she gives birth to the baby and can put it up for adoption)?  Why, in other words, isn't an expectant mother obligated to refrain from taking drugs or from otherwise engaging in actions that harm the fetus?"

An infant has rights, whereas a fetus -- which, as a part of the mother's body, falls within the jurisdiction of her self-ownership -- does not have rights. That is the difference. If Bill wants to uphold the rights of the fetus on other grounds, then that raises a different set of issues --but my treatment of guardian-ward relationship proceeds from the premise that an infant has the same negative rights as everyone else.

As I have explained, the "positive" rights of the infant vis-a-vis its guardian arise because of the obligations which the guardian has *voluntarily* taken upon herself -- and it is from this assumption of responsibility to care for the infant that the guardian acquires a right vis-a-vis third parties that obligates them not to forcibly interfere with her decisions, so long as she fulfills the terms of her guardianship.

I wrote: "Thus the mother may not leave a child to die of starvation in its crib, when she could easily locate others who would be willing to receive her transfer of the right of guardianship."

And Barbara Branden replied: "According to your own theory, why may she not allow her child to die? -- if she does voluntarily accept the position of guardian and therefore need not abide by a guardian's rules, and since, you say: <<Although a newborn infant has the same negative rights as every other person -- i.e., the right not to be aggressed upon or physically assaulted -- the infant cannot claim any special natural rights, such as the positive right to be cared for, that others lack.>>"

A guardian cannot do this because it violates the fundamental conditions that generated her right of guardianship in the first place, i.e., her voluntary commitment to preserve the life of the infant.

To put it another way: Suppose a mother accepts the obligation of guardianship over her child. This then creates a right vis-a-vis third parties (who might otherwise be willing to care for the infant) to exclude them from interfering in her decisions as to what constitutes the best interests of the infant-ward. This right to exclude third parties is operative only so long as the mother continues to sustain the life of the infant. Thus, if the mother puts the infant in a location (such as a crib) that is inaccessible to third parties, she cannot suddenly opt of her responsibilities without making a reasonable effort to find another guardian. Why? Because she accepted responsibility for the infant with the understanding that she had the obligation to preserve its life. And to allow the infant to starve in its crib would be a manifest violation of this obligation.

This has to do with the manner in which voluntary obligations can be reasonably severed. A pilot who contracts with passengers to fly them from LA to New York accepts this obligation voluntarily. But this does not mean that he can opt out of this obligation midway through the flight, and bail out, while leaving the passengers to crash.

When you voluntarily assume the responsibility for the life of a helpless infant, and thereby exclude third parties who might also be willing to care for the infant, you cannot then leave the infant to starve in an inaccessible location where there is no chance that others will take responsibility for it. Deliberately to allow the infant to die while in your guardianship violates the most fundamental condition of that guardianship. For what else can it possibly mean to assume the responsibilities of a guardian, if not to take reasonable actions to promote the best interests of your ward? To claim otherwise, to claim that a guardian could willy-nilly allow the helpless ward to perish, would be to strip the term "guardian" of any meaning.

As I have said before, the guardian-ward relationship is unique in moral theory. The infant-ward will literally perish without the continuous assistance of a parent-guardian, and it is this threat of imminent death that generates the need for the guardian-ward relationship to begin with. To assume the responsibilities of a guardian is literally to render the life of a helpless infant dependent on your decisions and actions. And deliberately to allow that infant to die is to default on the most elementary aspect of that guardianship, the responsibilities of which one has voluntarily assumed. Remember, this assumption of an obligation to preserve the life of an infant creates a corresponding *right* on the part of the infant to reasonable care, until and unless the guardian decides to sever this relationship IN A MANNER THAT DOES NOT VIOLATE THAT RIGHT.

I should mention that my guardian-ward model is an effort to deal with problems relating to the rights of infants and parents in a manner that is consistent with a libertarian theory of individual rights – which states, among other things, that there can be no unchosen (or "natural") positive obligations. My model is a blending of ideas put forward by previous libertarian theorists (such as Locke, Bentham, and Spencer), along with a few original twists of my own. I am not dogmatically wedded to this model, nor do I claim that it is without problems, nor do I think it is incapable of improvement. But I do think it has a comparative advantage over competing theories, or at least those I am familiar with -- and I have read most everything written by classical liberals and libertarians on the topic of children's rights.

In short, the issue is not so much whether this guardian-ward model may have some problems --for I don't deny this, and I hope such problems can be resolved. Rather, the issue is whether we have a *better* theoretical model to put in its place, one that would be at least as consistent with the libertarian (and Objectivist) theory of individual rights. Ghs

[Leif Martyn]

On 11/25/2022 at 12:25 AM, Peter said:

Excellent letter and quote. Do we owe ourselves the right to bequeath future generations, “bearing the entire human species through the oceans of space and time”? 

Y'know, Peter, I don't really think so. I don't think the question is settled, but I'm more inclined to think that the value of bequeathing life to future generations resides in the gift to that particular child that is the subject of my set of assumptions and "towards." Think of it like this: you (the procreator) get to bequeath to one generation - the next one - and that's about all you can do. Biologically.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

How about Law of Identity?

There are always individual exceptions to general categories in Nature.

But when the general category is dissolved, the identity of the thing dissolves with it.

Either a new shared identity takes its place, or the life form it goes extinct.

Without reproduction, all life forms go extinct.

That's reality, not choice,

Michael

[Leif Martyn]

On 11/25/2022 at 12:49 AM, Peter said:

And another well thought out letter about guardianship, and I will stop for now. Peter

From: "George H. Smith" To: "*Atlantis" <atlantis@wetheliving.com> Subject: ATL: Re:  Sound science - philosophical conclusions Date: Sun, 25 Mar 2001 23:43:38 -0600. Bill Dwyer wrote: "If we accept Rand's concept of rights, then the only "obligation" that rights imply is to abstain from violating them.  So if the mother of a child has a right to raise him, then the only obligation that right would imply is that ~others~ are obligated to abstain from interfering with it.  It would not, by itself, imply that she is obligated to care for the child (i.e., not to neglect its welfare)."

The guardian-ward relationship is unique, something quite unlike ownership claims. If the guardian has a right to raise an infant -- i.e., to make crucial decisions on behalf of that infant, while excluding other people from doing likewise -- then what is the basis of this guardianship right? It is not a right of ownership, but rather the right the decide (relative to third parties) what is in the *best interests* of the infant. This is necessarily so, because the infant (i.e., a child before the "age of reason") is unable to make decisions in its own interests, so these decisions must be made for it by an adult.

In thus claiming a guardianship right over an infant, the adult is saying, in effect, "I accept the responsibility for taking care of this infant; and as a corollary of my right to make these decisions, others are obligated not to interfere." The right of guardianship vis-a-vis the infant is therefore the voluntary assumption of a positive obligation to care for the infant, and this obligation is reflected in the corresponding right of the infant to receive this care.

...

The obligations of guardianship, as I have said, must be accepted voluntarily. Although the needs of the infant, coupled with the inability of the infant to care for itself, create the *potential* for a guardian-ward relationship to exist, these needs alone cannot generate that relationship per se. This latter requires the consent of an adult, who then assumes responsibility for the infant voluntarily. I do not believe in unchosen "positive" obligations, but I do believe that positive obligations can be created voluntarily (as is the case, for example, with contracts).

...

Thanks for digging out George H. Smith's letter! It certainly bears on parenting, which is part & parcel of the "procreation" question. I hope he would find my observations to be in accord with his, although he's looking at it for a different point of view, that of "rights."  I regret that George is not around to carry this discussion forward himself, but... that's mortality?!

I stayed away from rights-language, for the most part (except, I suppose, the "corollary" about the woman's commitment to the act and process of procreation) because I wanted to focus on the individual finding value in procreation. Rights-language, even if it is grounded in the biological reality of parents and infants in this context, is a conceptual construct, with logical argument and law at its heart. This is inherently abstract, and tends to become dessicated  - how much do we want to get into "nurturing" as a contractual relationship?

[Leif Martyn]

8 minutes ago, Michael Stuart Kelly said:

How about Law of Identity?

There are always individual exceptions to general categories in Nature.

But when the general category is dissolved, the identity of the thing dissolves with it.

Either a new shared identity takes its place, or the life form it goes extinct.

Without reproduction, all life forms go extinct.

That's reality, not choice,

Michael

The problem with this approach, Michael, is that I think it leads to that non sequitur I mentioned: "I am mortal, therefore I'll reproduce."

It might be construed as an enthymeme of sorts, but I can't figure out the middle terms. And if procreation is an "optional value" because it doesn't directly contribute to the survival of the individual, then (and you've probably heard this more often than I !) the response to the reality of mortality is "so what?" That's the problem I'm trying to get around. I think the key is appreciating/valuing the child in itself.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

1 hour ago, Leif Martyn said:

The problem with this approach, Michael, is that I think it leads to that non sequitur I mentioned: "I am mortal, therefore I'll reproduce."

L,

No it doesn't.

I have no idea how you derived that syllogistic statement from the Law of Identity about the nature of life.

I suspect you are trying to deduce reality from principles or syllogisms rather than observing reality to discern what exists, then coming up with the logic to work with it. But I'm not sure.

That's a big problem in our neck of the woods. People do syllogisms in order to leave out essential characteristics.

And that leads to very little that is useful for anything.

 

To be clearer, the condition that a species, to not go extinct, must have enough individuals who reproduce does not erase volition from human nature.

It's not either-or.

Human beings are living creatures in nature. Not syllogisms to be squeezed into one rationalization or another while obliterating essential characteristics.

Formal logic does not trump nature. Nature is bigger than it is.

 

To say it differently, reproduction does not obliterate volition. But when volition (which is lower in the conceptual hierarchy of living things than species is) has obliterated reproduction in the past, like with the Shakers, such culture has become extinct. Technically, that could happen to mankind as a species if people become convinced to stop reproducing or incapable of it, but I doubt this will ever happen.

Still, my doubt doesn't invert the hierarchy in conceptual conditions.

With no species, there are no individuals. With no reproduction, the species dies off. In other words, no more individuals.

From one angle, an individual faculty of volition cannot exist at all without reproduction. It had to come into existence somehow. It was reproduced from parents.

Michael

[Leif Martyn]

3 hours ago, Michael Stuart Kelly said:

To say it differently, reproduction does not obliterate volition. But when volition (which is lower in the conceptual hierarchy of living things than species is) has obliterated reproduction in the past, like with the Shakers, such culture has become extinct. Technically, that could happen to mankind as a species if people become convinced to stop reproducing or incapable of it, but I doubt this will ever happen.

Still, my doubt doesn't invert the hierarchy in conceptual conditions.

With no species, there are no individuals. With no reproduction, the species dies off. In other words, no more individuals.

From one angle, an individual faculty of volition cannot exist at all without reproduction. It had to come into existence somehow. It was reproduced from parents.

Michael

... I just cut the quote back to cut to the chase, as it were...  this is what I referred to earlier as "the quiet part" - and Michelle Fram-Cohen alluded to it.

I certainly appreciate your focus on this aspect, rather than the "parenting" aspect, because this is the problem that needs to be worked out.

The only thing that made me stop was your ranking of volition in "the conceptual hierarchy of living things" lower than "species?" Aren't these different in kind? So I don't see a comparative measurement?

The most I've seen so far which relates these two concepts - volition and reproduction - is Harry Binswanger's discussion in Ch. 9 of his Biological Basis of Teleological Concepts. There was an MDOP-related group working through the book (several essays hosted at Carolyn Ray's "Enlightenment") but... stopped at Chapter 8? From the material I introduced above, I think "foresight" is the least recognized, but that's the ability that leads to (??) the recognition you make.

Harking back to December 1962, and the Intellectual Ammunition Dept., we see that the emphasis is on the here and now, or at least such a "now" as to include raising a child to adulthood. The injunction "take what you want, and pay for it" is echoed here, but there is no appeal to species interest.

  Again, I think the different angles/appeals work together to get past the "so what?" The strongest point, I think, is the recognition of the child as an end-in-itself.

 

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

11 hours ago, Leif Martyn said:

Aren't these different in kind?

L,

You mean species is for Martians and volition is for humans?

 

Or do you mean a floating species and a floating volition, neither connected to real living life forms?

 

Do you understand Rand's idea of "entity thinking"? If not, look it up.

I remember her saying once the world would be a far better place if people used entity thinking.

 

Here is a hint:

11 hours ago, Leif Martyn said:

The most I've seen so far which relates these two concepts - volition and reproduction - is Harry Binswanger's discussion in Ch. 9 of his Biological Basis of Teleological Concepts.

Ah, man, whatcha wanna go and do that for?

I had to go downstairs and find my friggin' copy.

 

So I checked and I can say with certainty:

Wrong.

 

I don't want to get into a deep discussion of Binswanger's metaphysics, mostly because I merely skimmed (medium-level skimming) that chapter just now. But I did not see him use the word "species." I saw him use "group" a lot.

Well, a human species is a group, but so is the collection of things within a room where a person is at. And among those things are chairs, windows, and so on. The person belongs to that group of things when talking about what is in the room. I made that last overly exaggerated to make a point. "Group" is not a contextless state. There are different kinds of groups. 

Likewise, I did not see Binswanger make the connection that without the human group (that is species in this context) there is no individual.

That--to me--jumps out as "Woah thar, Hoss!" when reading someone who is writing about evolution and biological teleology. 

What's more, Binswanger does something I dislike in general. He anthropomorphizes concepts like "selection," wondering what its goals are. If I wanted to get to pain-in-the-ass level, I could go further and ask who or what is doing the selecting. He would probably reply "nature." And I would facepalm. There goes that anthropomorphizing again.  

As long as I am griping, I hate contextless discussions of which is the most important of two equally fundamental things, like what is more important, survival or reproduction?  Sound familiar? Yup. That's Chapter 9 to a tee. And that's Harry for ya'.  

On a metaphorical level, I like the example of what is more important to the human body, the heart or the lungs? Sorry, Charlie. Without one of 'em, no matter which one, you gonna die...

 

Anyway, back to point.

One thing relates the two concepts (volition and reproduction). A human being. Both concepts refer to two fundamental features of the same human being.

That relates them just fine.

Human beings (normal human beings) do not come without volition and they do not come without reproductive organs.

When I talk about species being more fundamental than volition, I was talking within the context of the human being. But it works for any living being that has volition. An individual living being cannot have volition if it does not belong to a species because, if it does not belong to a species, it does not exist as an individual. Hell, it does not exist, period.

And if individual members of a species do not reproduce, brrrzap. No more species after a while. Thus no more volition.

One must exist to be able to think and choose.

 

As I suspected, I am right to suggest you look at your foundations (or, to quote a great lady, check your premises): Get your theory from concepts based on observed reality rather than try to tease out reality by starting with theory first. Later you can tease out reality once the theory aligns with reality. Later you can even start with theory because you have done the hard part of identifying it with reality correctly.

Think "entity" in the beginning as your lens. Not just the rules of logic. That helps a lot.

Once you do that, you will see that volition does not and cannot exist without having reproduction as one of the fundamental components--reality components, not simply items in a syllogism. Don't forget that a syllogism, to be correct, does not need to connect to reality.

All rattle snakes are mortal.

Socrates is a rattle snake.

Therefore Socrates is mortal.

 

A concept in Randian terms has to connect to reality for it to be knowledge.

 

btw - I appreciate you not getting offended with my comments. I tend to be blunt. But that comes from trying to be clear. Unless I am openly hostile (and people who know me know I get real ugly when I get that way), I never intend hostility. Frankly, I love to banter. And I have seen nothing in your posts to make be be anything but happy so far, even when we disagree.

 

 

Apropos of nothing, I saw a video the other day of some dude or other discussing Hemingway's writing advice. The video covered 4 points. Maybe there are more out there, I don't know. But I resonated so much with those 4, I didn't need to memorize them. They are part of me after one hearing.

1. Write short sentences.

2. Write short paragraphs.

3. Use vigorous language instead of bland language.

4. Frame ideas in a positive--not negative--light as much as possible. 

(Believe me, you can only get this right when you revise and revise and revise.)

 

My love of banter comes from trying to be positive as much as possible in life. So that item number 4 above clinched a huge jump in my respect for Hemingway. But I can go waaaaaay deeper. For example, it seems like Hemingway was telling people how to write for the internet. (That includes standards like eye-tracking studies I could point to.) And there was no Internet in his time.  

I know that I do all 4 things OK, but I practice, too. And I know for a fact I am not perfect. Sometimes I come back the next day, see what I have written, and wonder what in hell made me write that mess.

But I write. I love it.

And I choose.

And I have reproductive organs, but let's not go there...

 

Michael

[Leif Martyn]

well thanks for the lecture, Michael!

Leif

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

L,

Just a nitpick.

OL is a discussion forum, not a lecture forum.

I was discussing.

 

Michael

[william.scherk]

On 11/26/2022 at 9:28 PM, Michael Stuart Kelly said:

Do you understand Rand's idea of "entity thinking"? If not, look it up.

I remember her saying once the world would be a far better place if people used entity thinking

I made the mistake of taking the quote "entity thinking" too literally, looking for an instance where Rand recorded the phrase in published text, letter, or speech.

On 11/26/2022 at 9:28 PM, Michael Stuart Kelly said:

As I suspected, I am right to suggest you look at your foundations (or, to quote a great lady, check your premises): Get your theory from concepts based on observed reality rather than try to tease out reality by starting with theory first. Later you can tease out reality once the theory aligns with reality. Later you can even start with theory because you have done the hard part of identifying it with reality correctly.

Think "entity" in the beginning as your lens. Not just the rules of logic. That helps a lot.

Can we have another search hint or  pointer for "look it up," please?

On 11/26/2022 at 9:28 PM, Michael Stuart Kelly said:

Once you do that, you will see that volition does not and cannot exist without having reproduction as one of the fundamental components--realit

1. Write short sentences.

2. Write short paragraphs.

3. Use vigorous language instead of bland language.

4. Frame ideas in a positive--not negative--light as much as possible. 

(Believe me, you can only get this right when you revise and revise and revise

I believe. The entity that is me thinks "vigorous language" is fun to compose, if not always as effective as hoped in communication. It may depend on the Randian notion of precision. 

 

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

8 minutes ago, william.scherk said:

I made the mistake of taking the quote "entity thinking" too literally, looking for an instance where Rand recorded the phrase in published text, letter, or speech.

William,

You did not take the quote too literally and Rand did use that exact phrase several times.

I'll have to dig to find it, but it's out there.

In fact, Rand herself is where I got the phrase from.

 

Before insinuating something is false, you might want to ask yourself if you dug deep enough.

But who knows?

Maybe your shovel is different than mine and makes you hurt when you dig, poor thing.

   

 

I'll look for where Rand said this phrase (exact phrase) and post it when I find it, but don't expect me to drop everything to satisfy your itch for gotcha. I recall one context--when she was talking about ITOE. Maybe in the Q&A. She was talking about how Aristotle did entity thinking and the world doesn't do that practice much anymore and it would be good if the world returned to it.

That's all I've got off the top of my head, so I'll have to look. But be aware that this is not my top priority in life.

Until I find it, I suggest you think I am a doofus who doesn't know his ass from a hole in the ground.

That may not be accurate, but it will be emotionally satisfying until the source appears.

   

Michael

[william.scherk]

On 12/5/2022 at 2:43 PM, Michael Stuart Kelly said:

On 12/5/2022 at 2:22 PM, william.scherk said:

On 11/26/2022 at 9:28 PM, Michael Stuart Kelly said:

Do you understand Rand's idea of "entity thinking"? If not, look it up.

I remember her saying once the world would be a far better place if people used entity thinking

I made the mistake of taking the quote "entity thinking" too literally, looking for an instance where Rand recorded the phrase in published text, letter, or speech.

You did not take the quote too literally and Rand did use that exact phrase several times.

I'll have to dig to find it, but it's out there.

Cool. I discovered some material so far that helps me figure out what Rand meant by "entity," and that opened up a research niche as well. 

As you say, not a priority. Perhaps I'll ask in another forum of Objectivist wonks. Sometimes it's just a matter of keeping notes for followup later. 

I would like to see what she has to say on either side of the quote "entity thinking." When priorities allow, I'll dig in ITOE.

"Do you understand Rand's idea of "entity thinking"? 

Not yet! 

Edited December 9, 2022 by william.scherk
Tidied up quotes

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

William,

Good luck on your search. Seek and ye shall find.

 

Apropos:

On 12/5/2022 at 4:43 PM, Michael Stuart Kelly said:

Until I find it, I suggest you think I am a doofus who doesn't know his ass from a hole in the ground.

That may not be accurate, but it will be emotionally satisfying until the source appears.

 

1 hour ago, william.scherk said:

Cool.

Did I get that right?

   

Michael

[Peter]

5 hours ago, william.scherk said:

Cool. I discovered some material so far that helps me figure out what Rand meant by "entity," and that opened up a research niche as well. 

Entity thinking? I could not find a match in any old documents I saved. I have never thought about it but when you search for the word “entity,” you also find the word “identity.” I found a couple of old letters that may hold some interest and the phrase, “entity-action.” Peter

From: Ram Tobolski To: OWL Subject: OWL: Re: Mind in Objectivism [This is a reply to Diana Mertz Hsieh's post from 1/13. I sent it to Diana off-list a few days ago] Hi Diana, Following your post at OWL, I've read your essay, and I was much impressed by the scholarly work that you did. This is truly a model example for an "objectivist scholarship".

Here are some various comments, related to difficulties that I had with understanding. I hope some of them may be helpful:

1. The term "Humean" causation which you have used several times is strange for me. For example, you wrote: "Efron also warns that adopting a Humean view of causality with respect to the mind (such that "the cause of any event is the occurrence of a preceding physical event")". Hume, as much as I know him, did not hold that view. Such a view could be related to Descartes or to Newton, but Hume's position was that causes (in the sense of "efficient" causes, where one thing has an influence on another thing) do not exist at all. That there are only regularities (which are, more of less, Aristotelian "formal" causes).

2. I did not understand how consciousness can be regarded as an _action_. What could be the related concept of action, the definition of action?

3. A stylistic preference of mine: I feel uneasy with the term 'argues', as in "He argues that the entity-action relationship is different when applied to consciousness than to the physical world". When I encounter the term 'argues' I automatically expect an _argument_; but in fact, what we often get is merely an assertion, without an argument, or only some bits of an argument.

4. Regarding "self-evidence", you wrote: "[Binswanger's] basic approach to the subject, in which fundamental, self-evident facts about consciousness are used to ground an ontology of mind, is a fruitful one". Now I agree that it could be fruitful, heuristically, but I wouldn't want to see any reliance on "self-evidence" in a finished philosophy. In a fundamental philosophy, as I take objectivism to be, nothing is self-evident, in the sense that it doesn't require proof.

5. I didn't really understand your opposition to Binswanger's kind of dualism, as in "Binswanger's advocacy of dualism is strange and startling not just because it stands in opposition to all other Objectivist commentary on philosophy of mind, but also because it destroys the foundation of the mind-body integration so central to the Objectivist epistemology, ethics, and politics". What is that mind-body integration that you take to be central to objectivism, and which is excluded by Binswanger's kind of dualism? Do you think, for example, that consciousness is not a mystery? To me it seems a great, great mystery. I don't understand how anyone can "return to Aristotle" in such a way as if modern science did not happen. How can anyone naively accept Aristotle account on the relation between mind and matter, when his theory of matter was so thoroughly refuted, in a way that made him a symbol of what the scientific revolution was against? I hope I am not read as rude, or offensive, or reproaching, because that is not my intention. Best, Ram

From: Rafael Eilon To: OWL CC: Diana M Hsieh  Subject: Re: OWL: Mind in Objectivism Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2003 04:05:55 -0800 (PST) Hi all, I congratulate Diana M. Hsieh on her survey of Objectivist writings on the philosophy of mind, which is generally well-written, and faithfully represents (with mostly well-based criticism) the views of the various sources. However, I think the picture conveyed by this survey is incomplete: one important position, which is held, so I believe, by many Objectivists, is not well-represented. I mean the position which I would call "physicalist/compatibilist/analytic" (in short: "p/c/a").

One of the sources which Hsieh cites does represent this p/c/a position: Roger E. Bissell's essay, "A Dual-Aspect Approach to the Mind-Body Problem". I admire Bissell very much for coming up with such an advanced theory as early as 1974 (!). Unfortunately, Bissell's essay is the only source that Hsieh seriously misunderstands and misrepresents. The main point of Bissell's position is that mental processes are actually brain processes that can be perceived introspectively, which is the _aspect_ from which they are perceived as mental. Hsieh's misunderstanding consists mainly in thinking that Bissell uses the concept of introspection to define awareness; actually, he only uses it to observe how we become aware of awareness. In other words, Bissell does not say that consciousness _is_ introspection, only that it is _perceived by means_ of introspection; and thus he certainly does not mean that brain processes are the object of consciousness, but simply that certain brain processes _are_ consciousness (and, as such, they are the object of introspection). Misunderstanding this, Hsieh's charges that Bissell's position is circular, and claims that it "inverts the hierarchy of concepts"; but her misunderstanding makes her criticism completely beside the point.

(Note: I have written the above before I became aware of Bissell's earlier (1/17) response to Hsieh's survey. I have now read Bissell's response, but I find nothing essential that I want to change.)

I am here referencing Bissell's essay only with regard to this one important part of the p/c/a position: the relation between the mental and the physical. I haven't yet studied Bissell's application of the Dual-Aspect approach to the free will issue, and I think I have taken a different line from his in defending physicalism against the charge that it is a form of reductionism. I am also concerned whether the mental is sufficiently defined by calling it an "aspect"; if we ask what makes a certain brain process mental, is it just the fact that, for some unspecified reason, it is viewed (or can be viewed) introspectively as mental, or is it something about the process itself that makes it viewable from such an aspect (and then its being mental is not _just_ an aspect). But, anyhow, I find Bissell's central point at least an approximately valid formulation of one essential part of the p/c/a position, namely, that mental processes _are_ physical processes.

I have argued before for the p/c/a position on this forum around 1998, in a discussion with Michael Hardy (unfortunately, this data has been lost, at least to me). I shall now attempt a very concise outline of all three aspects of the p/c/a position, as a candidate for a comprehensive position on the philosophy of mind.

1) Standard materialism, or a mechanistic view, is not the same as the modern _physicalism_. The former position argues that only matter (including mechanical systems) exists, and thus the mind is an illusion (i.e., it is "eliminative"). Physicalism, on the other hand, argues that, ontologically, everything that exists (or happens) is physical, i.e., involves _only_ matter and energy; and that this description applies also to mental states and actions. In other words, in contrast to all those creeds that (explicitly or implicitly) regard the mind as either _non-physical_ or _non-existent_, physicalism regards the mind as _both_ physical _and_ existent. It thus explicitly regards any belief in non-physical entities as superstition, and states unambiguously that, ontologically, _nothing_ is non-physical. (This means, for example, that a brain state or process and the associated mental phenomenon are one and the same thing, ontologically; with the subjective quality of the mental only reflecting _the point of view_ of personal experience; Bissell's point). In the OWL discussion I mentioned above, I used a clarifying formulation and an illustration to make this point, as follows: all the actions of a physical system are physical; for example, if someone said that an automobile is a physical system but its motion down the road is non-physical, no one would take it seriously. Similarly, if we recognize that a human being is a physical system, then we must recognize that _all_ his/her actions--including mental actions--are physical. (At a risk of stating the obvious: here "physical" does not mean "of the muscles" but "of matter and energy").

2) The above does not negate free will; free will is _compatible_ with physicalism, _because_ many of the _physical_ causes of, say, a decision, are actually mental causes. However, since this is not a non-physical account of free will, such a concept of free will does _not_ involve an axiom of uncaused action; it is _compatible_ with overall physical determinism, as also discussed before on this forum (see, for example, my 26 Oct. 2001 post under the title "Questions for Hard Determinists (Spinoza)", which is outside the current archive, but was also posted on Starship Forum under the title "Freewill vs Determinism":

3) This is not reductionism. Saying something like "this chair is composed of nothing but atoms" is not the same as the reductionist claim, which goes something like: "This chair is only atoms, therefore there really is no chair, only atoms." The latter is evidently false. But the former represents the _analytic_ position, which holds that the chair is not _reducible_ to atoms (unless exploded or something), and yet it is _analyzable into_ atomic structures, and _also_ exists and has identity as a whole object; and that this identity derives not only from the atoms themselves but also from their inter-relations and overall structure, but does not imply that anything other than atoms and their combinations must exist to account for the existence of the chair. Similarly, a human being is made of _nothing but_ matter and energy, but has all those characteristics and capabilities that are typical of a human being by virtue of his/her overall structure as a complex system; _not_ because _anything but_ matter and energy goes "into the making" of a human being.

I think the p/c/a position on the philosophy of mind should have been adopted by Objectivism, explicitly, long ago. As it is, the Objectivist position is surrounded by a thick layer of mental fog. OK, mind and body are not separable, but how exactly are they "connected"? As Hsieh's survey shows, views aren't always clear, and differ widely. Most of Hsieh's sources hold that the mind is natural, but not physical; how is that possible? They don't explain, at least not satisfactorily. Hsieh's sources unanimously agree that the mind exists in nature, and that nature is causal; but with the exception of Bissell they all maintain that the mind is somehow capable of uncaused action. How? They don't explain.

These are the questions that Objectivism leaves essentially unanswered. They are questions that only a resolute physicalist position can answer. And they must be answered, if we are to achieve clarity. And clarity must be achieved, if Objectivism is to get anywhere.

I don't believe that polls are a way to establish truth; but I do believe that the fact that a number of people have independently, each by his/her honest effort, reached the same conclusion, carries a great deal of weight. I therefore encourage readers of this forum who agree with the p/c/a position on the philosophy of mind to state their agreement here. Needless to say, criticism is also welcome. Thank you for your attention, Rafael Eilon

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

In Chapter One of Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, Ayn Rand did not use the term "entity thinking," but she sure as hell described it to perfection.

If anyone can read the following and conclude Rand meant anything but entity thinking, they are not conceptual thinkers.

Quote

The (implicit) concept “existent” undergoes three stages of development in man’s mind. The first stage is a child’s awareness of objects, of things—which represents the (implicit) concept “entity.” The second and closely allied stage is the awareness of specific, particular things which he can recognize and distinguish from the rest of his perceptual field—which represents the (implicit) concept “identity.” The third stage consists of grasping relationships among these entities by grasping the similarities and differences of their identities. This requires the transformation of the (implicit) concept “entity” into the (implicit) concept “unit.” When a child observes that two objects (which he will later learn to designate as “tables”) resemble each other, but are different from four other objects (“chairs”), his mind is focusing on a particular attribute of the objects (their shape), then isolating them according to their differences, and integrating them as units into separate groups according to their similarities. This is the key, the entrance to the conceptual level of man’s consciousness. The ability to regard entities as units is man’s distinctive method of cognition, which other living species are unable to follow. 

So entity thinking means turning the mental representation of existents into units. But not just any existent. In this sense, an existent is something particular perceived at a child's level of abstraction. In other words, a thing, i.e., entity.

This is probably why she used the term "entity thinking" when she did.

I still have to remember and find where, but this is a pretty good start.

It gives the conceptual base of what that term meant to Rand.

Michael