Leif Martyn

well thanks for the lecture, Michael! Leif

... I just cut the quote back to cut to the chase, as it were... this is what I referred to earlier as "the quiet part" - and Michelle Fram-Cohen alluded to it. I certainly appreciate your focus on this aspect, rather than the "parenting" aspect, because this is the problem that needs to be worked out. The only thing that made me stop was your ranking of volition in "the conceptual hierarchy of living things" lower than "species?" Aren't these different in kind? So I don't see a comparative measurement? The most I've seen so far which relates these two concepts - volition and reproduction - is Harry Binswanger's discussion in Ch. 9 of his Biological Basis of Teleological Concepts. There was an MDOP-related group working through the book (several essays hosted at Carolyn Ray's "Enlightenment") but... stopped at Chapter 8? From the material I introduced above, I think "foresight" is the least recognized, but that's the ability that leads to (??) the recognition you make. Harking back to December 1962, and the Intellectual Ammunition Dept., we see that the emphasis is on the here and now, or at least such a "now" as to include raising a child to adulthood. The injunction "take what you want, and pay for it" is echoed here, but there is no appeal to species interest. Again, I think the different angles/appeals work together to get past the "so what?" The strongest point, I think, is the recognition of the child as an end-in-itself.

The problem with this approach, Michael, is that I think it leads to that non sequitur I mentioned: "I am mortal, therefore I'll reproduce." It might be construed as an enthymeme of sorts, but I can't figure out the middle terms. And if procreation is an "optional value" because it doesn't directly contribute to the survival of the individual, then (and you've probably heard this more often than I !) the response to the reality of mortality is "so what?" That's the problem I'm trying to get around. I think the key is appreciating/valuing the child in itself.

Thanks for digging out George H. Smith's letter! It certainly bears on parenting, which is part & parcel of the "procreation" question. I hope he would find my observations to be in accord with his, although he's looking at it for a different point of view, that of "rights." I regret that George is not around to carry this discussion forward himself, but... that's mortality?! I stayed away from rights-language, for the most part (except, I suppose, the "corollary" about the woman's commitment to the act and process of procreation) because I wanted to focus on the individual finding value in procreation. Rights-language, even if it is grounded in the biological reality of parents and infants in this context, is a conceptual construct, with logical argument and law at its heart. This is inherently abstract, and tends to become dessicated - how much do we want to get into "nurturing" as a contractual relationship?

Y'know, Peter, I don't really think so. I don't think the question is settled, but I'm more inclined to think that the value of bequeathing life to future generations resides in the gift to that particular child that is the subject of my set of assumptions and "towards." Think of it like this: you (the procreator) get to bequeath to one generation - the next one - and that's about all you can do. Biologically.

But First - These Words! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natalism https://americanmind.org/salvo/today-wokeness-tomorrow-antinatalism/ Following from the earlier posts in this study, I'll start where Michelle Fram-Cohen began: "... why undertake an eighteen-year obligation to raise and support a completely dependent human being? "Why assume the legal and moral responsibility for the conduct of someone else? "Why would any rational, independent, self-respecting individual want to do that?" Let's consolidate the three questions, thus: Why would any rational, independent, self-respecting individual want to undertake an eighteen-year obligation to raise and support a completely dependent human being, and assume the legal and moral responsibility for the conduct of someone else? This is a long, hard way of asking: why parent? The question that precedes this is: why have children at all? From a rational egoist perspective, a short set of assumptions are required. First, the assumption of a benevolent view of the universe: NOT that the universe is "benevolent," but that the individual considering the choice to undertake the action of procreation, and the consequent parenting, holds such a view. Nathaniel Branden notes, in "The obligations of parents and children" : By virtue of their unique biological relationship, parents and child are normally predisposed to feel benevolence toward each other. Parents expect to feel love for their creation. It's not reading too closely to see a normal predisposition and the expectation of feeling love for their creation as indications of a benevolent view of the universe. Leonard Peikoff articulated the "benevolent view" in Lecture 8 of his "Philosophy of Objectivism" (1976): Although accidents and failures are possible, they are not, according to Objectivism, the essence of human life. On the contrary, the achievement of values is the norm — speaking now for the moral man, moral by the Objectivist definition. Success and happiness are the metaphysically to-be-expected. In other words, Objectivism rejects the view that human fulfillment is impossible, that man is doomed to misery, that the universe is malevolent. We advocate the “benevolent universe” premise. The “benevolent universe” does not mean that the universe feels kindly to man or that it is out to help him achieve his goals. No, the universe is neutral; it simply is; it is indifferent to you. You must care about and adapt to it, not the other way around. But reality is “benevolent” in the sense that if you do adapt to it — i.e., if you do think, value, and act rationally, then you can (and barring accidents you will) achieve your values. You will, because those values are based on reality. I'm not spending any time here critiquing "anti-natalism" but reading those arguments with one eye open it's easy to see a "malevolent universe" premise at work. A "benevolent universe" premise is necessary, but not sufficient, to underly a decision to procreate. The next assumption is an understanding, and acceptance, of the integration of the biological and the conceptual. For biological, read: "animal." Animal characteristics of man are aspects of his nature, and they are integrated with conceptual aspects in human nature. By conceptual aspects I mean those that reflect the exercise of the capacity for volitional conceptual consciousness. These aspects are emphasized in Ayn Rand's writings, from epistemology to art and politics, while the animal aspects are rarely addressed, and tangentially at best. Is there a bias against examination of animal aspects? To steal a postmodern phrase, the conceptual aspects are "privileged" or "valorized" over the animal ones: is reproduction considered a mere animal function, in contrast to the highly conceptualized value of "productiveness?" It may be an unintended consequence of this assumption: since man's mind is his sole, and supreme, means of survival, the works of the mind are considered more important than the works of the body. If unintended, it is ironic, since this ignores the context: the mind and body are integrated in human nature. Carolyn Ray's brief account of animal nature at least has the merit of bluntness: [From "Intellectual Arguments Against Having Children":] Reproduction is a natural human activity, so human happiness requires reproduction. [C. Ray:] It is true that the nature of human beings is such that they can make babies. But it is a natural human act in virtue of the fact that humans are animals, and it is animal nature to make babies. It is amazing and wonderful, surely, but as a human function, it carries no special force, certainly not the force of necessity. The nature of human beings, as animals, is also that they can overpower other human beings and take their possessions or kill them. The mere fact that such action is possible to us does not mean that we must act this way, or even that we must act this way in order to be happy. There are many natural human functions which should be curbed. The random production of children without genuine interest in them is one of them. And from "Of Living Death" (1968), this declaration: It is only animals that have to adapt themselves to their physical background and to the biological functions of their bodies. Man adapts his physical background and the use of his biological faculties to himself — to his own needs and values. /That/ is his distinction from all other living species. I only show these as examples of accounts of the animal aspect(s) of human nature, and a typical rhetoric. I suggest that Reggie Firehammer (banned but not forgotten!) has also, in a blunt way, spoken against the spirit of Carolyn's dismissal (from 2018): The Ayn Rand Institute’s Ari Armstrong article, “Have Sex for Pleasure this Valentine’s Day,” (2012) <https://www.theobjectivestandard.com/2012/02/ignore-santorums-depraved-prescription-have-sex-for-pleasure/> identifies everything that is wrong with the modern Objectivist view of sex: “the primary purpose of sex is not procreation (an optional value) but pleasure (a requirement of human life), which corresponds to the fact that the latter purpose is far more widely embraced.” Let me emphasize the point Armstrong is making: The primary purpose of sex is pleasure. How is the purpose of any human attribute or faculty determined? Why do human beings have genitals? To say the primary purpose of sex is not procreation is the equivalent of saying the primary purpose of the lungs is not breathing. If human beings reproduced in some other way, asexually for example, there would be no genitals. To deny the reason human beings have genitals is for reproduction flies in the face of both fact and reason. Like every other human attribute and faculty, when used as their nature dictates, that proper use is pleasurable. Pleasure is our nature’s way of rewarding us for right action, for using any of our faculties as their nature requires them to be used. The nature of the human genitals dictates how they ought to be used. Male and female are naturally physically compatible to fulfill their function of reproduction. They are, among human attributes, the only ones requiring another human being to fulfill, the means not only of reproduction but of completing each other, and uniting each other in a physical act that perfectly reflects their love. Understanding that the animal and conceptual aspects of human nature are integrated suggests a corollary. Recall that in Rand's interview with Alvin Toffler for Playboy (1964): Toffler: Do you believe that women as well as men should organize their lives around work – and if so, what kind of work? Rand: Of course. I believe that women are human beings. What is proper for a man is proper for a woman. The basic principles are the same. I would not attempt to prescribe what kind of work a man should do, and I would not attempt it in regard to women. There is no particular work, which is specifically feminine. Women can choose their work according to their own purpose and premises in the same manner as men do. The "particular work" of course is childbearing. This is not the context in which Rand intends to discuss productive activity - a conceptual context. Nonetheless, in a sexually dimorphic species, the male is involved; the female is committed. The preparation, time and energy expended, and risk assumed, are all on the female side. Therefore the conscious, voluntary decision to reproduce is essentially a female decision, which affords the authority to continue or end the pregnancy. The corollary only sharpens the point: an understanding, and acceptance, of the integration of the animal and conceptual aspects of human nature, and the sexually dimorphic condition, is necessary - but again, not sufficient - to underly a decision to procreate. The third assumption which I believe undergirds the decision to procreate is the perception of time: its passage and duration. In Objectivist-related literature, I have not found any discussions, extended or not, of "time perspective" or "future time view" or any cognate terms. Considered to be a psychological concept, especially as "future time perspective," it does not appear to have received much, if any, consideration in discussions of human life as an activity bounded by a beginning and an end. Perhaps this is because the research is in psychology, and just as the "animal aspects" are studied in biology, the distinction between philosophical and scientific areas of concern has been observed. I think the science can inform the philosophy. Lawrence Frank is cited as the originator (1938) of the notion of "time perspective" but more currently the study is associated with Philip Zimbardo. As it happens, there's also a new book bringing a synonym to bear which should be immediately applicable: foresight. Future Time Perspective (foresight) is conceptual; as an aspect of self-awareness, one can imagine personal (animal) mortality, and time beyond death. As such, FTP evaluates a finite amount of time (one's lifespan) and inspires imaginative projection into the future. The concept of mortality matters as link between conceptual consciousness (self-awareness) and the animal aspect of human nature. Self awareness, with a sense of time and biological mortality, can easily be misappropriated as a non sequitur: "I am mortal, therefore I'll procreate." Foresight informs the rational egoist's decision to procreate, since this action has long-range consequences, especially for the child. These assumptions: a benevolent universe premise, an understanding of the integration of the animal and the conceptual, and the need for a future time perspective, further inform several ideas in ethics which underlay the decision to procreate. Foremost among these is a consideration of the nature of the child. “Introducing Objectivism,” The Objectivist Newsletter, Aug. 1962, 35. ... My philosophy, Objectivism, holds that: [in ethics] "Man — every man — is an end in himself, not the means to the ends of others. He must exist for his own sake, neither sacrificing himself to others nor sacrificing others to himself. The pursuit of his own rational self-interest and of his own happiness is the highest moral purpose of his life. As a human, then, every child is an end in itself. In procreation a unique individual is created, who requires nurturing, both animal and conceptual (i.e. parenting). Secondly, procreation is an "optional" value indicative of flourishing. In "Of Living Death", Ayn Rand identifies procreation as an "optional value": The capacity to procreate is merely a potential which man is not obligated to actualize. The choice to have children or not is morally optional. Nature endows man with a variety of potentials — and it is his /mind/ that must decide which capacities he chooses to exercise, according to his own hierarchy of rational goals and values... In Viable Values (2000), Tara Smith explores the relationship of "optional values" to the concept of flourishing. Lester Hunt has written a succinct review of Smith's book which will reward the reader unfamiliar with her work. This is followed as well by The Virtuous Egoist (2006), reviewed here. Disconcertingly, but perhaps unsurprisingly, Smith does not discuss procreation or parenting in her work (to date...). As Rand would have it, procreation is optional because it is not required for the (immediate?) survival of individual. However, recalling two of the assumptions noted above, to flourish, one ought to hold the benevolent universe premise and one ought to apply foresight. That is, one ought to begin with the conviction that "if you do think, value, and act rationally, then you can (and barring accidents you will) achieve your values. You will, because those values are based on reality." Furthermore, one ought to look ahead as far as possible in order to anticipate what actions will be required to achieve those values. Procreation is by no means ruled out as an "optional value." Furthermore, flourishing is not conceived in exclusively conceptual terms: it includes animal aspects (consider the efforts of a bodybuilder!). As with the non sequitur noted in connection with foresight, however, procreation is not necessarily evidence of flourishing. Too many children are in fact unwanted. But finally, procreation can be considered a unique, philosophically objective value. A rationally selfish attitude should always consider as broad a context of action as possible. This context includes the dimension of time: personally, one's lifespan, but with foresight, one may look beyond. I hope that what follows is not an unwarranted interpolation: (From “What Is Capitalism?” in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, pp. 24, 26.) It is in regard to a free market that the distinction between an intrinsic, subjective, and objective view of values is particularly important to understand. The market value of a product is not an intrinsic value, not a “value in itself” hanging in a vacuum. A free market never loses sight of the question: Of value to whom? And, within the broad field of objectivity, the market value of a product does not reflect its philosophically objective value, but only its socially objective value. By “philosophically objective,” I mean a value estimated from the standpoint of the best possible to man, i.e., by the criterion of the most rational mind possessing the greatest knowledge, in a given category, in a given period, and in a defined context (nothing can be estimated in an undefined context).... Just as the number of its adherents is not a proof of an idea’s truth or falsehood, of an art work’s merit or demerit, of a product’s efficacy or inefficacy—so the free-market value of goods or services does not necessarily represent their philosophically objective value, but only their socially objective value, i.e., the sum of the individual judgments of all the men involved in trade at a given time, the sum of what they valued, each in the context of his own life.... The “philosophically objective” value of a new product serves as the teacher for those who are willing to exercise their rational faculty, each to the extent of his ability. Those who are unwilling remain unrewarded—as well as those who aspire to more than their ability produces .... I think this distinction can be applied more broadly, beyond the market of material values, by applying the criteria for “philosophically objective value” and "socially objective value" to the evaluation of human choices. How is the creation of a new human being, an end-in-itself and not a means to an end, valued from the standpoint of the best possible to man? The fact that it is a unique, incommensurable action gives it a special status. I think that the "given period" involved in such a standpoint is the longest term possible, especially since this given period is measured against the individual lifespan and the imaginative projection beyond that. By contrast, even if optional values are ranked, they are essentially socially objective values, chosen in the context of the individual life. The establishment of a charitable foundation, as an optional value, is comparable to procreation - except for the absence of the animal aspect. So as an instance of flourishing, procreation is a unique activity AND has a long-range context. Procreation, properly considered (i.e. in the context of parenting), has a greater “philosophically objective” value than socially objective values of lifespan flourishing. Procreation, considered as a selfish act, is rewarding in both animal and conceptual aspects of human nature. Ethically, it is optional, and to the extent that it is freely chosen, it is good. May every child be a wanted child. ======================================== A note on the merits of Foresight (a future time perspective): This can be very helpful in forestalling a common misapprehension of the consequences of procreation, i.e. the requirements of parenting. several extracts from John Galt's Speech illustrate the operation of a hierarchy of values: “Sacrifice” does not mean the rejection of the worthless, but of the precious. “Sacrifice” does not mean the rejection of the evil for the sake of the good, but of the good for the sake of the evil. “Sacrifice” is the surrender of that which you value in favor of that which you don’t.... "... If you own a bottle of milk and give it to your starving child, it is not a sacrifice; if you give it to your neighbor’s child and let your own die, it is. "... If a mother buys food for her hungry child rather than a hat for herself, it is not a sacrifice: she values the child higher than the hat; but it is a sacrifice to the kind of mother whose higher value is the hat, who would prefer her child to starve and feeds him only from a sense of duty...." Implied here is the mother's foresight: her efforts are required to help the child survive, and hopefully flourish. More broadly, or with a longer time perspective - and presuming the choices are not as stark or immediate as those invoked by Galt - what is so often decried as "sacrifice" can be better described as deferred gratification. But "all investing is subject to risk including possible loss" - and this is an intimate example. If the effort attendant on procreation, i.e. parenting, is judged to be a "sacrifice" then obviously one ought not choose this as a value to pursue. If that effort is seen, in the long run, as an investment, then it is an element of assuming the challenge. "take what you want, and pay for it"

Stephen, thanks for the reference to Ron Merrill's essay, "Objectivist Ethics: a Biological Critique," as well as his subsequent exchange with Phil Coates, and Marsha Familaro Enright's comments - and your own editorial notes. I read these at the time (1997) no doubt, and hoped that more would follow on the topic, but as you know, it's been sparse. Hope springing eternal, I still look forward to Greg Salmieri's remarks as they are released. And in the meantime, I expect to make my own comments, which may not be too redundant (standing on the shoulders of... the crowd?)

So, is there more to this idea? Yes, I found your name over on Objectivism Online.

... kind of lame to reply to my own post, but in lieu of editing it (translation: I can't figure how, if at at all, I can do that...), I wanted to add "more sources!" If nothing else, this set of posts ought to function as a sort of Vade Mecum for the topic (why have kids?). I'm still staying away from the "how to parrent successfully" material because this question is rich enough.... Anyway, over in Barrytown they've chewed on this, several times & several ways, over several years: an extensive discussion between 2005 - 2008; a shorter exchange in 2007; another in 2008, and one in 2010. I don't know if any of that informed the discussion here (2011 - 2015), but it comes & goes...

“Why Have Children? - A Sequel to “The Shame of Not Having Children” Michelle Fram-Cohen Forum: Enlightenment [Inspired by Carolyn Ray's "The Shame of Not Wanting Children"] [original source: <http://enlightenment.supersaturated.com/essays/text/michelleframcohen/whychildren.html> - reposted at: <http://www.theatlasphere.com/columns/040616_cohen_children.php> ; dated 16 June 2004; retrieved 19 Oct. 2022. I mentioned in Part I that after Fram-Cohen's 'sequel' in 2001, reposted in 2004, there has been a marked dearth of discussion of this topic. I amend that after re-reading my own notes, and recognizing that Right Here In River City, between 2011 and 2015, there was an exchange among a number of participants, innocuously titled "Objectivism and Children." To the participants, my thanks for keeping the topic warm! Even if it did end with a sigh... I leave it as an exercise for the reader to sift the nuggets of insight from amongst the detritus of linkrot and thread drift (not that much drifting, actually)! By noting as many sources as I have been able to find, I am intending to leave a collection describing where we came from, and where we need to go. So, here's Michelle Fram-Cohen's take, with comments. I also admit that I was less impressed with her essay after examining it, in what I hope is a spirit of charity, but it has had the great merit of helping me frame my own thoughts, some of which are interleaved: .................................................................... Today, with almost fool-proof birth control, legal abortions and the future prospects of self-cloning, the question "Why Have Children?" sounds rather appropriate. Indeed, why undertake an eighteen-year obligation to raise and support a completely dependent human being? Why assume the legal and moral responsibility for the conduct of someone else? Why would any rational, independent, self-respecting individual want to do that? My response to this question is a sequel to Carolyn Ray's essay "The Shame of Not Wanting Children", in which she refuted irrational arguments for having children. In my essay, I would like to provide some rational arguments for having children. I would have been very happy with explicit answers to her opening questions. Notice that she's bound the question of "why have children" to the problem of parenting. The discursive format doesn't lend itself well to "Why? Because..." however. ... For many people parenting means sacrificing what they really want to do, therefore they should not have children. But what about the ones who want to have children? This starts off on the wrong foot: it is a response to Carolyn Ray's Intellectual Argument about self-sacrifice, but at this point denying the premise might be better. What is the case for parenting NOT being "sacrifice?" A common rationale for having children among Objectivists is that this is their selfish wish: they enjoy nurturing a human being. But can this selfish wish be justified philosophically? Nurturing is not an Objectivist virtue.... Rand did not provide a major model of parenting in her novels. This picks up on Carolyn's Intellectual Argument about "nurture." However, it needs unpacking, as well as mentioning on the side that the absence of "a major model of parenting" speaks more to the author's decisions about what to emphasize and what to leave out. In Ayn Rand's non-fiction, as illustrated in earlier posts, she at least implicitly addressed philosophical justifications for procreation, especially the level of conceptual effort required. At this point, I'll introduce a dictionary definition of "nurture": (verb) "the process of caring for and encouraging the growth or development of someone or something." (noun) "care for and encourage the growth or development of [someone or something]." Nurturing, then has two aspects, at least in the context of human children: a physical (or "animal") and a conceptual. The "common rationale... the selfish wish," requires engagement with both aspects. In her “Playboy” interview in 1962 Rand said that women who choose to be mothers should approach it as a career, not an emotional indulgence. She focused on the intellectual aspect of raising a rational human being. According to this approach, parents are not different from teachers, except that their hours are longer. At this point I reiterate this puzzling, almost offhand dismissal: Toffler: Do you believe that women as well as men should organize their lives around work – and if so, what kind of work? Rand: Of course. I believe that women are human beings. What is proper for a man is proper for a woman. The basic principles are the same. I would not attempt to prescribe what kind of work a man should do, and I would not attempt it in regard to women. There is no particular work, which is specifically feminine. Women can choose their work according to their own purpose and premises in the same manner as men do. The simple fact is that there is particular work, specifically feminine: specifically female. This is quite central to an argument for an egoist natalism, and is important for the recognition of the integration of the physical and the conceptual. Rand did not write about the bonding between parent and child, an aspect of their relationship that is not intellectual but emotional. Nevertheless, bonding is a physiological, as well as a psychological, corollary of parenting. Several points: first, the experience of bonding follows the act of procreation, and bonding is an act of parenting; second, and more importantly for the integration of the physical and the conceptual, the experience begins as physiological (physical? animal?), and continues, as "bonding," conceptually as the child matures (and the parent's relationship with the child matures). Having a child in order to raise a rational human being can be a noble endeavor, but it does not have to be the main reason. The simple selfish enjoyment of having a child around is sufficient. In this context, parenting can be a very enjoyable emotional indulgence. ... which is, as it happens, in direct opposition to Rand's assertion in the Playboy interview (following her observations about "women's work", above). The problem here is a lack of connection between the commitment to "a noble endeavor" and the emotional reward, decribed here as an indulgence. The implication is that "the simple selfish enjoyment" is self-evident, which it is not. This opens up a line of thinking about "flourishing," and that concept might be better used here. Fram-Cohen makes a further series of arguments, attempting to compare procreation (more properly speaking, parenting) with other adult activities: Objectivism strives to provide men and women with a philosophy that can fit their nature and does not require any sacrifice. In this context, one reason for having children is that parenting is a part of human nature, just like a romantic relationship. If a person were to say that he or she decided to never have a romantic relationship because it will take away from his or her time pursuing a career, it would be considered odd. Then why isn't it considered odd when the same claim is made against parenting? Granted there are people who are not cut out for romantic relationships, there are also people who are not cut out for parenting. But having a romantic relationship is a significant experience within one's life and so is parenthood. In this respect, the commitment to raise a child is not different from the commitment to stay in a life-long monogamous relationship, "for better or worse." Bad marriages do not prove that long-range monogamous relationships are against human nature, so bad parents do not prove that having children is against human nature. If "parenting is a part of human nature" then so is procreation, and this identification has led to apparent distress with "animal" aspects of human nature. Carolyn Ray makes a similar point about bad parenting in her (failed) argument about virtue and virtuous procreators, but the real problem is that procreation is a unique activity, and does not compare with adult activities such as careers, romantic relationships, and contractual undertakings. This uniqueness needs to be described; again, it is central to an egoist natalism. Fram-Cohen continues to compare parenting and adult activities, but she also opens the discussion to a consideration of the child: ... One of the great innovations of Objectivism is its positive view of work as a purposeful, enjoyable task and the proper function of man.... ... Parenting requires some concessions, but so do work and marriage. Career minded individuals are willing to put up with the demands and conduct of superiors and co-employees at work, for longer hours than they would ever spend with their kids. Married people are willing to work out their differences in order to preserve their marriage. When a child is brought up rationally, he or she is not likely to be the screaming brat many people dread. Children are not necessarily the worst irrational whim worshippers one must deal with. In many cases, they are the only uncorrupted, reasonable human beings around. She leaves open the question of how parenting can be described as "productive work" - the topic, it seems, might be better phrased, "Why Parent Children?" which is not the same thing as the necessarily prior action. Almost offhand, Fram-Cohen notes the value of a rational "nurturing," but leaves many ideas to be unpacked, such as corruption and behavioral consequences of a poorly planned procreation. This is, however, the first time "the child" comes to the center of the discussion. In her final argument, Michelle Fram-Cohen says the quiet part out loud. A major aspect of having children that is rarely addressed by Objectivists is that children are the future: they will be here when we are gone. They will carry on our genetic makeup, and possibly, our values as well. They will inherit what we created.... In her introduction to the 25th anniversary of The Fountainhead, referring to the fact that her novels have been read by several generations of readers, Rand paraphrased Victor Hugo as saying: “If I only write for my own time, I might as well throw my pen in the trash.” Wouldn't it be sad indeed if Rand's generation was the last generation of Homo Sapiens on earth and we were not around to read her novels? ©2001, Michelle Fram-Cohen In spite of the immediate rejoinder that the child is not a means, but an end in itself, we can read this a little more charitably and recognize that humans are mortal. The fact that the recognition of one's own mortality is a conceptual effort is also rarely addressed. The extent to which this bears on an egoist natalism is not clear. That Victor Hugo reference? "Many people have asked me how I feel about the fact that The Fountainhead has been in print for twenty-five years. I cannot say that I feel anything in particular, except a kind of quiet satisfaction. In this respect, my attitude toward my writing is best expressed by a statement of Victor Hugo: "If a writer wrote merely for his time, I would have to break my pen and throw it away."

It behooves me, I guess, to get that "Part II" up, looking at Michelle Fram-Cohen's 'sequel' to Carolyn Ray's defense(s) of 'ward-free' life. It's messy, like this, since Carolyn didn't start out to justify procreation - pretty much the opposite, actually, and as I noted somewhat redundant (no-child is the default position) - and Michelle didn't intend to extensively critique her arguments. But anything I say now is a sort of spoiler, and it does get funnier. Well, I make it more complicated, anyway. ASAP.

The Shame of Not Wanting Children : The Social Stigma of Leading a Ward-Free Life by Carolyn Ray Date: 11 Jul 98 (draft) Copyright: Carolyn Ray After discovering Michelle Fram-Cohen's brief essay, entitled “Why Have Children? - A Sequel to “The Shame of Not Having Children”, I realized I could not give it the context it requires without looking at Carolyn Ray's 1998 piece. As far as I can tell, Fram-Cohen responds pretty directly to three of of the arguments in "Shame" and includes her own ideas. This sequel is examined in "Part II." So first, some notes on the seminal work (1998), followed by more detail on the sequel (2001). The dates underline the scarcity of attention paid to the main topic, i.e. Michelle Fram-Cohen's question "Why Have Children?" Between "Of Living Death" (1968) and this pair of essays on Carolyn Ray's "Enlightenment" website, I did not find any discussion in (publicly-accessible) Objectivist-oriented online resources. I did find Ayn Rand's "Causality Versus Duty" (Objectivist, July 1970) useful, as below. However, since Fram-Cohen's re-posted essay in 2004 (on the "Atlasphere") I have not found any further discussions. I'm only focusing on discussions of my central question, to which I hope the eventual release of Greg Salmieri's notes at OCON 2022 will add substance, and not the discussions of parenting and childrearing. But these all begin with the implicit(?) premise, "since you've decided to have kids..." - and are, at best, workings-out of Rand's ideas on Causality Versus Duty. And there are good and articulate discussions to be had. My overall opinion of Carolyn Ray's "The Shame of Not Wanting Children" is that it presumes a default attitude of child-free adulthood, since her intended audience is one looking for defensible reasons and a critique of common arguments intended to make a shaming judgement: "If you wish to remain child-free, I hope that this discussion will help you develop the strength of your convictions. If you have or want children, I hope that the discussion will help you to feel more comfortable with others' decisions to live a ward-free life." And with this attitude, I notice that the burden of proof is placed where it belongs: on the pro-creator side, and that such an assertion of the onus of proof reminds me of arguments about theism. In "Of Living Death", Ayn Rand identifies procreation as an "optional value": "The capacity to procreate is merely a potential which man is not obligated to actualize. The choice to have children or not is morally optional. Nature endows man with a variety of potentials — and it is his /mind/ that must decide which capacities he chooses to exercise, according to his own hierarchy of rational goals and values...." Thus, the "ward-free" position is the default. Likewise, the theist assumes the burden of proof. So how necessary, or convincing, are arguments for "a ward-free life?" Out of Carolyn Ray's set of arguments, Michelle Fram-Cohen expressly addresses three: from the "Intellectual Arguments" she examines the idea of nurture and the idea of self-sacrifice, and from the "Moral Arguments" she examines the idea of selfishness. I found three additional arguments noteworthy: in the "Intellectual Arguments" Ray addresses the "value" of children, and discusses the animal nature of man; in the "Moral Arguments" she discusses the relationship between a virtuous act and a virtuous individual. Some comments on selected "INTELLECTUAL ARGUMENTS FOR HAVING CHILDREN" People throughout history have chosen to have children, so there must be some value in it. Otherwise, they wouldn't do it. Are you saying that these people are all wrong, that you know something they don't? This argument is actually rather silly and trivial in the best cases (e.g., where the cases cited are cases in which parents actually adore children); naturally, people who want children see some value in creating and living with them. It is incorrect in the worst cases (e.g., where people gave in to social pressures); in these cases, there was something at work other than a genuine valuing of children... It was the "silly and trivial" that caught my attention, so I considered, what would happen if I made a substitution on the second sentence: instead of "they wouldn't do it" I said "you wouldn't be here"? I don't find that altogether silly and trivial. But it is natural to want to nurture something! Look at how you take care of your plants and pets — don't you think you're trying to make up for not having children? I nurture the plants in my garden, my pets, and the wild visitors to my property. I lavish attention on my friends. But my urge to nurture is not context-free. When I acquire plants and animals, it is not because I am filling a need to nurture something. I acquire them because I want my life to be full of plants and animals, and my response to their presence and their needs is to nurture them. The mere fact that a child is something which requires nurturing does not make them similar enough to plants and animals to make me want one. Not much of a definition of nurture, except to compare it to "lavishing attention" on friends. The discussion of "nurture" is reserved, then, for Michelle Fram-Cohen's comments. Reproduction is a natural human activity, so human happiness requires reproduction. It is true that the nature of human beings is such that they can make babies. But it is a natural human act in virtue of the fact that humans are animals, and it is animal nature to make babies. It is amazing and wonderful, surely, but as a human function, it carries no special force, certainly not the force of necessity. The nature of human beings, as animals, is also that they can overpower other human beings and take their possessions or kill them. The mere fact that such action is possible to us does not mean that we must act this way, or even that we must act this way in order to be happy. There are many natural human functions which should be curbed. The random production of children without genuine interest in them is one of them. Is this about the "force of necessity" (or simply jumping to conclusions?) or is it about the animal aspect of human nature? If I were looking for justification of a "ward-free" life, I would not be inclined to start here. But the evocation of "animal nature" has come up before, in "Of Living Death." "It is only animals that have to adapt themselves to their physical background and to the biological functions of their bodies. Man adapts his physical background and the use of his biological faculties to himself — to his own needs and values. /That/ is his distinction from all other living species." All human beings need to give selflessly to someone else; children give us the opportunity to exercise selflessness. It is commonly believed that human beings need, whether they feel it or not, to give selflessly of themselves in order to be truly fulfilled, to feel fully human, etc. Children are seen as the recipients of character-building self-sacrifice, and people who don't want children are objectionably selfish, self-centered, uncharitable by nature, egostical, childish. This restatement of a common argument is noteworthy principally for its omission of an examination of why it is assumed to be "self-sacrifice." Likewise, any exploration of "true fulfillment" of feeling "fully human" is omitted. But this also goes somewhat past my concern (why have a child at all?) and into the parenting aspect of procreation. Some comments on selected "MORAL ARGUMENTS FOR CREATING CHILDREN" That's an awfully selfish attitude, isn't it? In an episode of the television sitcom Mad About You, Jaimie is trying to hide her pregnancy from her mother so that she can surprise her; she tries to throw her off track by suggesting that she is not even sure she wants children. Her mother is appalled. She replies, "That's an awfully selfish attitude, isn't it?" Forgetting for the moment any special moral interpretations of the word 'selfish,' several questions arise. First, 'selfish' in the vernacular implies that someone is hurt by the selfish decision; if this is a selfish decision, whose welfare is hurt by a woman's decision not to have children? Is it Jaimie's? Obviously not. Ordinary people wouldn't call an act "selfish" if the only the actor got hurt. In order for the claim to be meaningful, we must suppose that there is a party other than the actor who is hurt by the decision. The most logical answer is that it is the potential father; perhaps he wants children, but his cruel wife refuses to give him one. But if the husband is not making this accusation, why would the mother? I don't intend to forget "any special moral interpretations of the word 'selfish' " - in fact, that's exactly where the argument should be joined. Why wouldn't it be 'selfish' to want to have children? It seems to me that the 'vernacular' or sitcom-informed use of the term is fit only for pathological dissection, which Ray could do - but doesn't. In her sequel, Michelle Fram-Cohen takes up the issue of self-sacrifice and selfishness, so my further comments will be reserved for that. It is a virtue to have children. People don't make this claim explicitly. It is implied. Mothers often get more respect from people than they got when they were childless. Children are expected to respect their parents, simply because they are in the general vicinity of the child. "Family man" and "Mother" are both terms that engender respect. Certainly, carrying a child can be difficult and giving birth is painful; and there are many things a sincere woman can do to make sure that her fetus gets superior nutrition and protection. But one cannot tell just by knowing that a woman is pregnant or a mother, whether this special effort has been made. In most cases the fetus is carried and born automatically as long as no one interferes. So the implication is that people are virtuous if they do not interfere with reproduction. But consider: If having children required a virtuous character, a lot fewer people would have them! Conception is one of the easiest things in the world to do for most people; it takes no thought, no energy, no insight, no good works, no virtue at all. Many vicious, despicable people make babies and then torture them once they arrive. You just need the animal parts in good working order and they will happen automatically. I don't know of any version of morality that considers that a virtue. Apparently, people confuse two types of behavior and treat them as one. On the one hand, there's making the baby, bringing it into existence. On the other, there's taking care of the child and doing it well. If someone does a great job of raising a child, he or she is worthy of praise. But there are plenty of people who make babies, keep them, and don't take care of them properly; these people should be condemned for mistreating a helpless and innocent human being. I can't make the jump from "the implication is that people are virtuous if they do not interfere with reproduction" to "If having children required a virtuous character..." Furthermore, if there is an implication in this statement, it is that the animal nature is not worthy of moral consideration: "it will happen automatically." For those interested in her demolition of several other arguments intended to shame someone electing to remain (default!) "ward-free," I don't think you'll find anything surprising. I noted the selected arguments principally for the aspects that bear on the pro-creator position, and as Michelle Fram-Cohen presents her ideas, I will expand on several.

Thanks to you both for your comments - as I read through "Of Living Death" these questions about the completeness of the handy definition of Life (self-generated, self-sustaining action) occurred to me and left me thinking that something was missing, and from a very early period, and this was the puzzle we were left to clean up. I've got another "source" to review coming up: the dialogue (one pass each side) between Carolyn Ray and Michelle Fram-Cohen on this topic, after which I'll take a deep breath and see if any of these puzzle pieces fit without a lot of forcing.

Ayn Rand, Of Living Death. This essay was first published in the September – November 1968 issues of /The Objectivist/ and also delivered in lecture form in December 1968 at Boston’s Ford Hall Forum. It was later anthologized in /The Voice of Reason: Essays in Objectivist Thought/ (1989). The full text was retrieved from the Ayn Rand Institute website <https://courses.aynrand.org/works/of-living-death/>. The use of slashes (/ /) for emphasis was supplied by editors at the Institute, and I'll take them as they are, without reviewing the printed texts. Compared to her remarks in the Objectivist Newsletter (Dec 1962) and in the Playboy interview (1964), this is the most extended discussion by Ayn Rand of her ideas about sex and reproduction. It is, however, a reactive piece, written after the issuing of the Papal encyclical "Humanae Vitae." As such, it is a critique, and I attribute the angry rhetoric to the fact that Rand found herself reacting, and not creating a positive vision of sex and reproduction. Compare this with her response, in the Playboy interview, to a question about politics, "I never describe my position in terms of negatives." Her anger is evident from the outset: "Dealing with the subject of birth control, the encyclical prohibits all forms of contraception (except the so-called “rhythm method”). The prohibition is total, rigid, unequivocal. It is enunciated as a moral absolute. "Bear in mind what this subject entails. Try to hold an image of horror spread across space and time — across the entire globe and through all the centuries — the image of parents chained, like beasts of burden, to the physical needs of a growing brood of children — young parents aging prematurely while fighting a losing battle against starvation — the skeletal hordes of unwanted children born without a chance to live — the unwed mothers slaughtered in the unsanitary dens of incompetent abortionists — the silent terror hanging, for every couple, over every moment of love. If one holds this image while hearing that this nightmare is not to be stopped, the first question one will ask is: /Why/? In the name of humanity, one will assume that some inconceivable, but crucially important reason must motivate any human being who would seek to let that carnage go on uncontested." "... In the darker corners of that labyrinth, one finds some snatches of argument, in alleged support of the mystic axiom, but these arguments are embarrassingly transparent equivocations. For instance: . . . to make use of the gift of conjugal love while respecting the laws of the generative process means to acknowledge oneself not to be the arbiter of the sources of human life, but rather the minister of the design established by the Creator. In fact, just as man does not have unlimited dominion over his body in general, so also, with particular reason, he has no such dominion over his creative faculties as such, because of their intrinsic ordination toward raising up life, of which God is the principle. [Humanae Vitae 13] "What is meant here by the words “man does not have unlimited dominion over his body in general?” The obvious meaning is that man cannot change the /metaphysical/ nature of his body; which is true. But man has the power of choice in regard to the /actions/ of his body — specifically, in regard to “his creative faculties,” and the responsibility for the use of these particular faculties is most crucially his. “To acknowledge oneself not to be the arbiter of the sources of human life” is to evade and to default on that responsibility. Here again, the same equivocation or package deal is involved. Does man have the power to determine the nature of his procreative faculty? No. But granted that nature, is he the arbiter of bringing a new human life into existence? He most certainly is, and he (with his mate) is the /sole/ arbiter of that decision — and the consequences of that decision affect and determine the entire course of his life. "... The passive obedience and helpless surrender to the physical functions of one’s body, the necessity to let procreation be the inevitable result of the sexual act, is the natural fate of /animals/, not of men. In spite of its concern with man’s higher aspirations, with his soul, with the sanctity of married love — it is to the level of animals that the encyclical seeks to reduce man’s sex life, in fact, in reality, on earth. What does this indicate about the encyclical’s view of sex?" The heart of Rand's critique of the encyclical is succinct, and not rhetorically infused: "The motive of the church’s doctrine on this issue is, philosophically, much deeper than that and much worse; the goal is not metaphysical or political or biological, but psychological: if man is forbidden to regard sexual enjoyment as an end in itself, he will not regard love or his own happiness as an end in itself; if so, then he will not regard his own life as an end in itself; if so, then he will not attain self-esteem." After which she articulates her positive vision of the role of sex: "It is not against the gross, animal, physicalistic theories or uses of sex that the encyclical is directed, but against the /spiritual/ meaning of sex in man’s life. (By “spiritual” I mean pertaining to man’s consciousness.) It is not directed against casual, mindless promiscuity, but against romantic love. "To make this clear, let me indicate, in brief essentials, a rational view of the role of sex in man’s existence. "Sex is a physical capacity, but its exercise is determined by man’s mind — by his choice of values, held consciously or subconsciously. To a rational man, sex is an expression of self-esteem — /a celebration of himself and of existence/. To the man who lacks self-esteem, sex is an attempt to fake it, to acquire its momentary illusion. "Romantic love, in the full sense of the term, is an emotion possible only to the man (or woman) of unbreached self-esteem: it is his response to his own highest values in the person of another — an integrated response of mind and body, of love and sexual desire. Such a man (or woman) is incapable of experiencing a sexual desire divorced from spiritual values. "... In comparison to the moral and psychological importance of sexual happiness, the issue of procreation is insignificant and irrelevant, except as a deadly threat — and God bless the inventors of the Pill! In her brief discussion of procreation, she comes nearest to my question: a motive for bringing children into the world, but this is not addressed explicitly - not surprising, since that is not the intent of the critique of "Humanae Vitae." It is, however, a restatement and underlining of the ideas she articulated in the Objectivist Newsletter brief essay and in her interview with Alvin Toffler for Playboy. "The capacity to procreate is merely a potential which man is not obligated to actualize. The choice to have children or not is morally optional. Nature endows man with a variety of potentials — and it is his /mind/ that must decide which capacities he chooses to exercise, according to his own hierarchy of rational goals and values. The mere fact that man has the capacity to kill does not mean that it is his duty to become a murderer; in the same way, the mere fact that man has the capacity to procreate does not mean that it is his duty to commit spiritual suicide by making procreation his primary goal and turning himself into a stud-farm animal. "It is only animals that have to adapt themselves to their physical background and to the biological functions of their bodies. Man adapts his physical background and the use of his biological faculties to himself — to his own needs and values. /That/ is his distinction from all other living species. "To an animal, the rearing of its young is a matter of temporary cycles. To man, it is a lifelong responsibility — a grave responsibility that must not be undertaken causelessly, thoughtlessly, or accidentally. "In regard to the moral aspects of birth control, the primary right involved is not the “right” of an unborn child, or of the family, or of society, or of God. The primary right is one which — in today’s public clamor on the subject — few, if any, voices have had the courage to uphold: /the right of man and woman to their own life and happiness/ — the right not to be regarded as the means to any end. "Man is an end in himself. Romantic love — the profound, exalted, lifelong /passion/ that unites his mind and body in the sexual act — is the living testimony to that principle." These comments may appear to be rather selective, but that's on purpose: while /Of Living Death/ is a monumental diatribe, as public as Ayn Rand could make it, I am on the lookout for ideas of a different, more positive kind. They are more implied than explicit.

following on, in historical sequence, from "The obligations of parents and children." (1962) a note on sources: The Playboy Interview, conducted by Alvin Toffler and published in the March 1964 issue, includes remarks by Ayn Rand illuminating her ideas about the individual's life purpose, creative work, and gender roles. The text of the interview is available in print, but at this point (2022) I have been able to find only one online source. This is located on a personal webpage and consists of a PDF copy of the original Playboy article, provided by the publisher (at the time it was downloaded). The page shows a link to the location of the article on the Playboy website, but this is now inaccessible. In 2004 Don Hauptman posted a note at the Atlas Society entitled The "Lost" Parts of Ayn Rand's Playboy Interview, describing an acquisition of material edited by Ayn Rand as she reviewed the interview text prior to publication. This note does not include the final copy as published, but does include an interesting passage cut in her edit. This is examined briefly below. Harry Binswanger's "Ayn Rand Lexicon" available online includes a number of quotes from the 1964 interview, but the Acknowledgements footer for each entry includes this 'boilerplate' statement: "Excerpts from Alvin Toffler’s interview with Ayn Rand, which first appeared in Playboy magazine. Copyright © 1964. Reprinted by permission of Alvin Toffler. All rights reserved including the right of reproduction in whole or in part in any form. Used by arrangement with Plume, a member of Penguin Group (USA), Inc." Enforcement of, or at least respect for, Toffler's copyright may be the main reason why the complete interview is hard to find, although Binswanger's quotations can be considered "fair use." The notes below are also "fair use" even though the source consulted (the PDF copy) exceeds that. Toffler: According to your philosophy, work and achievement are the highest goals of life. Do you regard as immoral those who find greater fulfillment in the warmth of friendship and family ties? Rand: If they place such things as friendship and family ties above their own productive work, yes, then they are immoral. Friendship, family life and human relationships are not primary in a man’s life. A man who places others first, above his own creative work, is an emotional parasite; whereas, if he places his work first, there is no conflict between his work and his enjoyment of human relationships. Toffler:Do you believe that women as well as men should organize their lives around work – and if so, what kind of work? Rand: Of course. I believe that women are human beings. What is proper for a man is proper for a woman. The basic principles are the same. I would not attempt to prescribe what kind of work a man should do, and I would not attempt it in regard to women. There is no particular work, which is specifically feminine. Women can choose their work according to their own purpose and premises in the same manner as men do. Toffler: In your opinion, is a woman immoral who chooses to devote herself to home and family instead of a career? Rand: Not immoral — I would say she is impractical, because a home cannot be a full-time occupation, except when her children are young. However, if she wants a family and wants to make that her career, at least for a while, it would be proper—if she approaches it as a career, that is, if she studies the subject, if she defines the rules and principles by which she wants to bring up her children, if she approaches her task in an intellectual manner. It is a very responsible task and a very important one, but only when treated as a science, not as a mere emotional indulgence. "There is no particular work, which is specifically feminine." This is simply not true: as regards specifically feminine work, the dismissal of childbearing is striking. The context, of course, is a discussion of the place of work, especially creative work, in the lives of productive men and women. In the third reply, she does imply that the decision to undertake a specifically feminine 'career' is primarily the woman's. Rand's description of the method for preparing for this specific career is often quoted, and is certainly consistent with her principled approach to living rationally. As with the Intellectual Ammunition offered to readers of the Objectivist Newsletter two years earlier, she does not address the logically prior question, "why have children at all?" Implying that such a question may be a "mere emotional indulgence" makes for a sharp rhetorical contrast with her description of the rigorous and systematic thinking required to bring up children, but the opportunity to address it is missed. The simplest reason may be to consider the context of the interview, and the mores of the time. Don Hauptmann, discussing the "Lost Parts" of the interview, adds: "After the Q&A on women's roles and careers, the following exchange occurred, which Rand chose to delete in the proof stage. She may have realized that she hadn't fully answered the question, and that to provide a complete explanation briefly would be difficult or impossible. PLAYBOY: In Atlas Shrugged, you wrote that "one neither asks nor grants the unearned." Did you mean this to include unearned love as well as unearned aid and material support? RAND: Yes. PLAYBOY: Well, then, why should a mother love her newborn infant who is still too young to have done anything to earn her love? RAND: You don't really mean this as a serious question. To begin with, if the mother is a responsible, rational human being, she does not have a baby by accident; she has him by choice. At first, a child has a value to her simply because it is a human being created—physically, at least—by her. The child's parents owe him support until the legal age of 21, which means until such time as he can support himself. This is a chosen obligation that rational parents accept when they decide to have a child. They have to accept the consequences of their own decision. But do they have to love the child? No, not necessarily. That will depend on their evaluation of his character, as he grows up. He has to earn their love—as they have to earn his. These last remarks recapitulate one of the main points of the Intellectual Ammunition brief essay. But the points about the mother's choice and the value of the child might be what prompted the deletion, as Hauptmann suggests.

So Tad, I think I know where you're going with this, but I'm not much at unpacking high-context stuff without some background. Have you been trying to figure this out elsewhere? If so, please include a reference. If this is new, please expand on the ideas of 'species-free riders' (species free-riders?) and the charge of moral culpability in this case.

Thanks to both of you for your initial responses: as you can see, I posted my comments about the Objectivist Newsletter "Intellectual Ammunition" piece separately, and I intend to work through several other sources in separate posts. Since this is the start of my project, I won't make more than a few general comments here, largely in response to Michael's note: I am not especially a fan of Greg Salmieri, but I am aware of the work he's done (published), and it appears that he picks up where Allan Gotthelf left off. If I were to be a fan of anyone, it would be the work that's come out of the Ayn Rand Society (APA) so far. My "thing," as should be immediately apparent, is the literature: this is the scholarly record as far as it goes, and as far as it will have an impact going forward. I am also aware that Salmieri's lecture (to the extent that it was a lecture) at OCON will be "published" or released on a schedule that is not his own - I suspect copyright has a lot to do with it - so I was just hoping... To finish that idea, since he actually made a presentation on this topic area, in a recognized forum, I thought this would be a useful benchmark of where to go. I will extend some charity and assume that his ideas will not have the appearance of a mechanistic approach - but I stand prepared to be disabused of that conceit! Michael, I think your "bottom line" is where I ultimately intend to go, but only after reviewing what's been done - which isn't much, I think that too is apparent. If I were to put the conclusion before the premises, I would say that going forward Objectivism, as an organized body of thought, with a vision of the human, has the potential to offer a cogent argument for the value of procreating: I reserve the right to revise this formulation, but I'd like to see if an egoist position for natalism can be coherently stated, from Objectivist principles. Your point about the biological aspect of identity is also well-taken; I will add here that if you have looked at all at discussions of "future time perspective" then you may see some angles worth exploring. I really don't want to get into abortion as a topic here, since I think it has been done, and is a distraction from my main intention. I do expect, however, to look at "Of Living Death" to some extent, since Ayn Rand makes a number of comments there that reflect (not very well, IMHO) on the problem of deciding to have children. I also expect to mine the depths of the comments made over the past several years in the several forums where discussions have been held. Let's see what emerges!

Nathaniel Branden. I.A.D. (Intellectual Ammunition Department): The obligations of parents and children. Objectivist Newsletter 1(12), Dec 1962, p. 55. retrieved August 25, 2022 from http://www.proctors.com.au/mrhomepage.nsf/985f14ab922be306482577d5003a2040/2a9525c5206e5f324825789d00418dbd/$FILE/Objectivist Newsletter Vol 1 Nos 1 to 12 1962.pdf Since the complete article is currently available at the site noted above, my comments can be read in that context - and I'm thinking that a lot of newer readers of OL may have heard of this but have not had the chance to read it in its entirety. This is probably the oldest known explicit discussion of parenting issues in the Objectivist literature. If there were taped lectures from the period addressing these issues, maybe even in a question and answer format, I am not aware of them and in most cases these would be irretrievable and could not provide any foundation for further work (this is actually a general complaint I have about discussions originating in the Objectivist community, since audiovisual media do not make for a good searchable scholarly record, but I'll work with what I can get...). It is also worth pointing out that while Nathaniel Branden was instrumental in suggesting, launching, and managing the production of the Objectivist Newsletter, it is also well-known that as "co-editors" both Ayn Rand and Branden reviewed and no doubt edited all the material published therein. And it is also obvious that Rand's credibility was a principal asset of the Newsletter, so it is reasonable to assume that she approved of the general tenor of this article, as well as the specifics. The focus of this short essay is on the "respective obligations" so there are several assumptions that are, properly, not addressed: that is, we can assume that in the opinion of the editors they would distract from the intent to deliver "intellectual ammunition" on this particualr topic. Those assumptions are, nevertheless, worth identifying and examining. Consider this statement of principle, and the subsequent line of thought: "The key to understanding the nature of parental obligation lies in the moral principle that human beings must assume responsibility for the consequences of their actions. "A child is the responsibility of his parents, because (a) they brought him into existence, and (b) a child, by nature, cannot survive independently. (The fact that the parents might not have desired the child, in a given case, is irrelevant in this context; he is nevertheless the consequence of their chosen actions - a consequence that, as a possibility, was foreseeable.)" The assumption that I want to identify is the decision to bring a child into existence. In short, why would anyone decide to have children in the first place? In this passage, and in what follows, this decision is simply assumed. There is, however, an implied foundation, which we'll see later, below. Before that, however, I want to draw attention to what is probably the central point of the "intellectual ammunition" - that the effort expended in creating and raising a child is not a sacrifice, i.e., the exchange of a greater value for a lesser one. Concisely: "If parents forgo other purchases in order to provide for their child's necessities, their action is not a sacrifice, and they have no moral right to regard it as such. One of the cruelest injustices that parents can perpetrate is to reproach a child for being a financial burden or for requiring time and attention, as if the child's legitimate needs were an imposition on them - to complain to the child of the "sacrifices" made for his sake, as if he were to feel apologetic or guilty-to state or imply that the child's mere existence is an unfair strain, as if the child had any choice in the matter." The focus, again, is on the principle of accepting responsibility for the consequences of (freely chosen?) actions. One possible reason for deciding to procreate is implied, below; in fact, with the continual emphasis on benevolence, it may be the only good reason. "By virtue of their unique biological relationship, parents and child are normally predisposed to feel benevolence toward each other. Parents expect to feel love for their creation. A child wishes to feel love for his protectors. But this biological tie must never be "traded on" - that is, used as a moral blank check, as a substitute for personal value. Parents cannot demand love as a duty - "because we're your parents." A child cannot demand absolution of any irrationality - "because I'm your child." Emotions are not causeless. Love, respect, admiration have to be earned." "Parents expect to feel love for their creation." This stems, apparently, from the "unique biological relationship" between parent and child, but it may not be a necessary condition: consider the decision to adopt an infant. My basic point is that the passage also exemplifies the unstated assumptions. What is apparent, though, is that this relationship between parent and child proceeds from, at the least, a benevolent view of the universe, and so must precede the actual creation of the child; that is, such a benevolent view is suggested as a foundation for undertaking the long effort of raising a child. Without such an attitude, the disincentives - the sacrifices, the limitations on adult freedom of choice and action - overwhelm any notion of the value of having a child. We ought to notice as well the question left open as to how a child ought to earn love, respect, and admiration, when the child is born without any means of doing this. The concluding paragraph sketches out a path for this: "It is immensely valuable, from the point of view of the child's happiness and psychological development, that he find human beings whom he can love, respect and admire. One of the chief obligations of parents is to offer the child this opportunity. One of the chief obligations of the child - and of all human beings - is to recognize this opportunity if and when it exists." I think this essay was a good start: I think we need to follow up on the implications. If the key to deciding whether or not to have children in the first place is the possession of a benevolent view of existence, then this ought to be spelled out more completely - dare I say, rigorously?

Hello - I'd like to know if anyone attended Greg Salmieri's talk at OCON 2022 on this topic? If so, to what degree of detail did he discuss this? Here's the brief description from Objectivist Media: Reproduction and the Objectivist Ethics -- Objectivist Media: Conferences - Debates - Interviews OBJECTIVISTMEDIA.COM The Objectivist ethics is grounded in the nature of life. Spanning meta-ethics to politics, this talk surveys the implications for this ethics of an... I suppose this question / topic could just as well have been placed in "Ethics" but iit seems to me that this is a more focused area, and I have an intention to follow up with more specific questions and ideas on the subject. Anyone reading this will recognize that this is an under-explored area, so I hope we can make some progress here. In a subsequent post, I would like to look at one of the earliest discussions in the literature on this topic, which is Nathaniel Branden's brief essay on "The obligations of parents and children." Nathaniel Branden. I.A.D. (Intellectual Ammunition Department): Objectivist Newsletter 1(12), Dec 1962, p. 55.