Myth of the Tyranny of the Majority

[SoAMadDeathWish]

Socrates was a victim of "direct democracy" try again.

Aristotle got out of town before "direct democracy" got him.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Your point is as irrelevant now as it was the first two times you've said this exact same thing.

Food for thought: The USA, a representative republic, literally enslaved millions of people for a whole century. And it didn't even restore their rights through legal procedures, but rather had to have a whole bloody and costly civil war to do it.

[SoAMadDeathWish]

The OP does not advocate for the state power to tax, it merely accepts that power as an unfortunate reality. That's a very important distinction that I've had to make repeatedly, but you keep ignoring it for some reason.

thNazi to the Jewish person being shot in the back of the head..."You understand that ve do not advocate for e state power to have me shoot you in the back of the head."

Ah, ok, fire away.

Umm no, I'm pretty sure that they advocated state power quite explicitly.

[Selene]

The OP does not advocate for the state power to tax, it merely accepts that power as an unfortunate reality. That's a very important distinction that I've had to make repeatedly, but you keep ignoring it for some reason.

thNazi to the Jewish person being shot in the back of the head..."You understand that ve do not advocate for e state power to have me shoot you in the back of the head."

Ah, ok, fire away.

Umm no, I'm pretty sure that they advocated state power quite explicitly.

I'm pretty sure that you are still clueless in Berwyn...

So now we are both pretty sure...

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I love this manner of argument.

A: I have all the answers. We defend freedom with state enslavement of the individual. Except we make it three individuals and give them choices of enslavement. Then we discover that they are not enslaved at all and voila! We defend freedom.

B: Er... That's not freedom.

A: That's totally irrelevant. I'm not talking about freedom.

B: Yes you are. You just said so.

A: You didn't understand me.

B: You said freedom.

A: Don't be stupid.

And so it goes...

Michael

[Frediano]

The idea of a "tyranny of the majority" is an old one, going back at least as far as Plato. Many libertarian and Objectivist thinkers simply accept that a government by majority rule would necessarily lead to the expropriation of the productive people in society. As far as I know, no formal argument has been presented to justify the idea.

I propose that direct democracy is (theoretically, at least) the best possible defender of individual rights.

Suppose that we have three people, A, B, and C. Each year, someone proposes a tax rate, all of them vote on it, and everyone gets an equal share of the revenue generated. Additionally, we suppose that A is a "producer". What this means is that he can allocate his time between labor and leisure. Specifically, he can choose a level of leisure l between 0 and 1. Therefore he contributes (1 - l) units of effort towards economic activity. The tax rate is r, and so government revenue R is given by R = r(1 - l). A's retained level of income given a tax rate r is thus, y = (1 - r)(1 - l). Each player's utility function is V(l, y) = l^(1/2) + y^(1/2), where l is the level of leisure and y is the amount of income for that year. Basically, it means that players like leisure and cash about equally, and the more they have of any of the two, the happier they are, though the more they already have, the lower the marginal benefit for each additional unit of that good. It should be noted that B and C always produce 1 unit of leisure and never do any work. We also assume that A's leisure level depends only on the tax rate, l = l( r ).

With this information, we can calculate the revenue maximizing tax rate. Plugging y into A's utility function and taking the derivative with respect to l with a given tax rate r, and finding the maximum, we get A's optimal choice of leisure for a given tax rate which is given by l* = 1/(2-r). From here, we can plug A's optimal leisure choice for a given tax rate into the government revenue equation, take the derivative with respect to r, and then find the revenue maximizing tax rate which is about 58.6% (ouch).

The logic here is simple. When the tax rate is 0%, A spends l* = 1/(2-0) = 1/2 his time on leisure and the other half working. When the tax rate is 100%, A spends l* = 1/(2-1) = 1/1 = 1 (i.e. all) of his time on leisure, since working doesn't do him any good because it all gets taxed away anyway. In between these two extremes is the tax rate at which the government gets the most out of A, that is, they tax him as much as they can without forcing him to become unproductive. At a tax rate of 58.6%, A spends l* = 1/(2-0.586) = 70.7% of his time on leisure and 29.3% working.

To make things easier for the rest of the analysis, we assume that A can always produce some fraction of $1,000,000 depending on how much of his time he spends working. That is, he produces (1 - l) * $1,000,000. So, at 0%, A produces and keeps $500,000. At 100%, A produces nothing and the government gets nothing. And at the revenue maximizing rate of 58.6%, A produces $293,000 a year, the government gets $171,698 and A gets just $121,302.

Now suppose that B proposes to C that they implement this plan. Under it, B and C would get $57,233 each, while A gets $178,536. This is clearly a better option for B and C, since it's clearly superior to a 0% tax rate where they each get nothing.

At first glance, it certainly seems as if direct democracy rewards the unproductive majority, but let's dig a little deeper.

Suppose that, after B proposes his plan to C, A goes to C and says, "C, if you vote against this bill, I will give you $57,234". This is better for C than B's proposal, since he gets an extra dollar, but it is also a better deal for A, since he then gets $442,766. Almost 4 times as much. B, realizing that he's about to be left with $0, goes to A and says, "All right, look. I'll vote against this bill regardless of C's vote, if you give me just $57, 233." This is good for B, since $57,233 is more than $0, but it's also good for A, since he saves an extra dollar. But now C, realizing he's the one whose about to get screwed, goes to A and offers just $57,232 for a vote against the bill. And on and on it goes, until either B or C drop the price for their vote to just $1. At that point, there's no point in going any lower. The bill fails, the tax rate is 0%, A gets $499,999 while either B or C get only $1.

However, there is a clever way for A to save the last dollar. Suppose that he makes the following offer to B and C: "If a tax bill is proposed, I will offer $1 more than what you can expect to gain from the bill to whoever didn't propose it to vote against it." Since both B and C would prefer for the other guy to propose the bill, neither of them ever proposes the bill. And even if one of them does, the bill fails anyway.

Thus, we see that under a system of direct democracy, a politically strategic producer can never be exploited by the unproductive majority.

and everyone gets an equal share of the revenue generated.

Generated from what? An imagined risk free exertion of effort in this universe? Or equally as absurd, of the tax 'revenue' generated by a tax on an imagined risk free exertion of effort in this universe?

Risk free: guaranteed to not only break even, but net more value than expended in the effort to create new value.

We also assume that A's leisure level depends only on the tax rate, l = l( r ).

And, what does the universe say about your assumption?

There is only leisure level at all after creating that required for basic sustenance.

So in this risk free model, let's see:

A works first shift. His efforts are guaranteed risk free by a tax on B.

B works 2nd shift. His efforts are guaranteed risk free by a tax on C.

C works 3rd shift. His efforts are guaranteed risk free by a tax on A.

Any questions? See, it is nonsense just like this that ends up with all of them trying to work by borrowing an unlimited amount from unborn children, who have yet to show up and create anything in these economies of risk free wonder.

It looks like math. Sure it does. Really, really, really flawed math.

Fail.

[SoAMadDeathWish]

and everyone gets an equal share of the revenue generated.

Generated from what? An imagined risk free exertion of effort in this universe? Or equally as absurd, of the tax 'revenue' generated by a tax on an imagined risk free exertion of effort in this universe?

Risk free: guaranteed to not only break even, but net more value than expended in the effort to create new value.

We also assume that A's leisure level depends only on the tax rate, l = l( r ).

And, what does the universe say about your assumption?

There is only leisure level at all after creating that required for basic sustenance.

It's called an abstraction. You leave out irrelevant details so you can focus on the core of the problem.

That A produces something is all we have to know. If you think additional details will have a significant effect on the conclusion of the argument, then tell us what those details are and give us your reasoning that shows how they change the conclusion.

So in this risk free model, let's see:

A works first shift. His efforts are guaranteed risk free by a tax on B.

B works 2nd shift. His efforts are guaranteed risk free by a tax on C.

C works 3rd shift. His efforts are guaranteed risk free by a tax on A.

Any questions? See, it is nonsense just like this that ends up with all of them trying to work by borrowing an unlimited amount from unborn children, who have yet to show up and create anything in these economies of risk free wonder.

It looks like math. Sure it does. Really, really, really flawed math.

Fail.

[anthony]

The OP does not advocate for the state power to tax, it merely accepts that power as an unfortunate reality. That's a very important distinction that I've had to make repeatedly, but you keep ignoring it for some reason.

Nazi to the Jewish person being shot in the back of the head..."You understand that ve do not advocate for the state power to have me shoot you in the back of the head."

Ah, ok, fire away.

You have the nub of it, Adam. Any time anyone - even a sweet young woman, bright as a pin - says "unfortunate reality" to you, head for the exit. Reality is gonna get unfortunate, alright, for you, real soon. (Knew a woman like that once. She'd have scared even you...;)

[Brant Gaede]

deleted

Edited April 13, 2014 by Brant Gaede

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Brant,

Why did you delete that?

I agree that this thread has very little (to none) intellectual value and it is basically a stubborn person lecturing everyone else on something she doesn't really understand very well.

There is no give and take of ideas, no learning, no correcting, no seeing new perspectives, most of all no growth occurring here.

It's just one person doubling down on some fundamental errors and not making much sense as she lectures everyone else on how she is right and they are wrong.

I'm going to let it stay here for a while to see if it gets better, but frankly, this is Garbage Pile material.

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

It was too easy and obvious. I went back and reread the OP and it was so bad I didn't think it was worth further comment. The mechanistic reduction of human beings dressed out in pseudo or worthless mathematical symbology and even less than bathtub economics mixed up with no understanding of human rights--ask her about "freedom"--was ignorant-stupid. Add to that the presumption of lecturing--even Ba'al aces her--her betters. She seems to be an elitest determinist, not personally determined, of course.

--Brant.

[SoAMadDeathWish]

I'm not here to lecture anyone. It might seem that that's my only goal here, but I think that that's only because I've spent a very long time preparing my defense and anticipating your responses. Does anyone really think I'm quick enough to just come up with all this stuff right on the spot?

I just wanted feedback on ideas that I think are really important and interesting and that I'd spent a lot of time and effort researching and working on from a community of intelligent people.

If you want me to stop defending them, that's fine. I will. I don't care if anyone agrees with me or not.

But I won't share any deeper analyses that I've come up with, because they would be nearly incomprehensible to anyone who isn't familiar with the overall context and the preliminary ideas. It would just take too much effort to try to explain it all in one go.

Especially if it's all just going to be ignored and tossed aside anyway.

[BaalChatzaf]

The idea of a "tyranny of the majority" is an old one, going back at least as far as Plato. Many libertarian and Objectivist thinkers simply accept that a government by majority rule would necessarily lead to the expropriation of the productive people in society. As far as I know, no formal argument has been presented to justify the idea.

I propose that direct democracy is (theoretically, at least) the best possible defender of individual rights.

Suppose that we have three people, A, B, and C. Each year, someone proposes a tax rate, all of them vote on it, and everyone gets an equal share of the revenue generated. Additionally, we suppose that A is a "producer". What this means is that he can allocate his time between labor and leisure. Specifically, he can choose a level of leisure l between 0 and 1. Therefore he contributes (1 - l) units of effort towards economic activity. The tax rate is r, and so government revenue R is given by R = r(1 - l). A's retained level of income given a tax rate r is thus, y = (1 - r)(1 - l). Each player's utility function is V(l, y) = l^(1/2) + y^(1/2), where l is the level of leisure and y is the amount of income for that year. Basically, it means that players like leisure and cash about equally, and the more they have of any of the two, the happier they are, though the more they already have, the lower the marginal benefit for each additional unit of that good. It should be noted that B and C always produce 1 unit of leisure and never do any work. We also assume that A's leisure level depends only on the tax rate, l = l( r ).

With this information, we can calculate the revenue maximizing tax rate. Plugging y into A's utility function and taking the derivative with respect to l with a given tax rate r, and finding the maximum, we get A's optimal choice of leisure for a given tax rate which is given by l* = 1/(2-r). From here, we can plug A's optimal leisure choice for a given tax rate into the government revenue equation, take the derivative with respect to r, and then find the revenue maximizing tax rate which is about 58.6% (ouch).

The logic here is simple. When the tax rate is 0%, A spends l* = 1/(2-0) = 1/2 his time on leisure and the other half working. When the tax rate is 100%, A spends l* = 1/(2-1) = 1/1 = 1 (i.e. all) of his time on leisure, since working doesn't do him any good because it all gets taxed away anyway. In between these two extremes is the tax rate at which the government gets the most out of A, that is, they tax him as much as they can without forcing him to become unproductive. At a tax rate of 58.6%, A spends l* = 1/(2-0.586) = 70.7% of his time on leisure and 29.3% working.

To make things easier for the rest of the analysis, we assume that A can always produce some fraction of $1,000,000 depending on how much of his time he spends working. That is, he produces (1 - l) * $1,000,000. So, at 0%, A produces and keeps $500,000. At 100%, A produces nothing and the government gets nothing. And at the revenue maximizing rate of 58.6%, A produces $293,000 a year, the government gets $171,698 and A gets just $121,302.

Now suppose that B proposes to C that they implement this plan. Under it, B and C would get $57,233 each, while A gets $178,536. This is clearly a better option for B and C, since it's clearly superior to a 0% tax rate where they each get nothing.

At first glance, it certainly seems as if direct democracy rewards the unproductive majority, but let's dig a little deeper.

Suppose that, after B proposes his plan to C, A goes to C and says, "C, if you vote against this bill, I will give you $57,234". This is better for C than B's proposal, since he gets an extra dollar, but it is also a better deal for A, since he then gets $442,766. Almost 4 times as much. B, realizing that he's about to be left with $0, goes to A and says, "All right, look. I'll vote against this bill regardless of C's vote, if you give me just $57, 233." This is good for B, since $57,233 is more than $0, but it's also good for A, since he saves an extra dollar. But now C, realizing he's the one whose about to get screwed, goes to A and offers just $57,232 for a vote against the bill. And on and on it goes, until either B or C drop the price for their vote to just $1. At that point, there's no point in going any lower. The bill fails, the tax rate is 0%, A gets $499,999 while either B or C get only $1.

However, there is a clever way for A to save the last dollar. Suppose that he makes the following offer to B and C: "If a tax bill is proposed, I will offer $1 more than what you can expect to gain from the bill to whoever didn't propose it to vote against it." Since both B and C would prefer for the other guy to propose the bill, neither of them ever proposes the bill. And even if one of them does, the bill fails anyway.

Thus, we see that under a system of direct democracy, a politically strategic producer can never be exploited by the unproductive majority.

I hope you are aware there is no empirical corroboration of Utility Functions. No economic theory has survived empirical falsification. If you lined up every economist who ever lived in a straight line head to toe, you would not reach a highly probably conclusion. Economics is a pseudo science.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Brant Gaede]

I'm not here to lecture anyone. It might seem that that's my only goal here, but I think that that's only because I've spent a very long time preparing my defense and anticipating your responses. Does anyone really think I'm quick enough to just come up with all this stuff right on the spot?

I just wanted feedback on ideas that I think are really important and interesting and that I'd spent a lot of time and effort researching and working on from a community of intelligent people.

If you want me to stop defending them, that's fine. I will. I don't care if anyone agrees with me or not.

But I won't share any deeper analyses that I've come up with, because they would be nearly incomprehensible to anyone who isn't familiar with the overall context and the preliminary ideas. It would just take too much effort to try to explain it all in one go.

Especially if it's all just going to be ignored and tossed aside anyway.

"Deeper analyses" you've "come up with." Analyses of what? Words?

--Brant

where are the real people doing real things?

while I understand narcissism I don't have the slightest idea how one becomes a narcissist: "fell in love with one's own image" needs "deeper analyses" likely "nearly incomprehensible" to me

[Francisco Ferrer]

In the original post you wrote, "I propose that direct democracy is (theoretically, at least) the best possible defender of individual rights." Yet you cannot defend rights while accepting the violation of rights "as an unfortunate reality," any more than you can defend self-ownership while accepting slavery "as an unfortunate reality."

Your so-called "defense" amounts to a confession of helplessness.

I am not accepting the violation of rights as an unfortunate reality. I am accepting the existence of the power that the government has to violate rights as an unfortunate reality.

There is no reason to accept either property rights violation or the legal power to violate property rights as a necessary fact of man's existence. In the 1850's slavery was an institution firmly established in American law and custom. A decade later it was was gone. It disappeared in large part as a result of people who refused to accept it as an "unfortunate reality."

The state does not create the wealth it appropriates in order to perform certain civil functions. That wealth exists independently of the state and thus would be available to finance the same functions provided that the owners of that wealth voluntarily spent it for that purpose. Therefore, it is only a question of the willingness of citizens to provide for their own defense, of which there is little doubt, given that the overwhelming majority of Americans are not philosophical pacifists.

One way is to enforce laws against extortion equally and universally. If the Mafia can be prosecuted for threatening a business owner with ruin unless he pays a "protection" fee, then the same rule should be applied to members of a certain government agency who regularly engage in a similar practice.

And who would enforce that rule?

Those who pool their resources to reduce or eliminate the initiation of force within a community.

But if this group has sufficient military might to defeat anybody who might try to initiate force, then who could stop them should they decide to loot the community?

The community itself. Mutual defense based on the premise that the initiation of force is evil would require a widespread respect for and cherishing of property rights. This would, of course, necessitate much prior educational-intellectual groundwork. (Ayn Rand repeatedly reminded us that the philosophical battle must precede the political battle.) But ultimately we might end up with something quite similar to what the Founding Fathers had in mind, not a standing army, but a well-armed citizenry.

So either, there must be severe negative consequences for not paying the bribe, else there must be a tax. You can pick your poison, but I'd much rather go with the scenario whereby there are severe negative consequences for not paying a bribe I never have to actually pay, to a situation whereby I do have to actually pay a tax, and where there are severe negative consequences for not paying it.

I see only two choices under your proposal:

1. You pay the tax under threat of heavy fines and prison term, in which case you are being forced to surrender what is rightfully yours to essentially an armed gunman.

2. You pay a bribe to a fellow citizen in exchange for his promise not to increase the loot collected by the state, in which case you are still being forced to surrender what is rightfully yours to someone else, even though a third party is holding the gun for him.

Both are acts of coercion. Neither is a defense of rights.

If there is a third alternative you've offered, I don't see it.

Since all of this depends on the uphill battle of removing the secret ballot from U.S. elections, I would much rather work on the uphill battle of reducing taxation by first putting low spenders in office and later by making all government financing voluntary.

The difference between extortion by the Mafia and the proposed system is that the "donor" never donates anything and nothing bad happens to him.

Great! Then there is a third choice. Contrary to your statement that "If there were no negative consequences to the producer for not paying the bribe, then his promise to pay would not be credible," Citizen A would be allowed to refuse to pay the bribe and Citizen B would not collude with the state to raise taxes.

This is wrong. The third choice is that the producer offers to pay half of the parasites more money than they can extract from him in taxes, excluding the parasite who proposed the tax bill, in exchange for their vote against the bill. Since every parasite would like to gain as much as possible, none of them wants to be the one to propose the tax bill, and so the tax bill is never proposed, and the producer never has to pay a single penny to anybody. You know, like I argued in the OP. An argument that you keep ignoring for some reason, and simply assert the opposite conclusion without ever justifying it.

This plan would work perfectly in any society where there are no altruists. However, in a diverse population it is not hard to imagine that there would be at least one self-sacrificing do-gooder who would propose the bill in order that his comrades gain a higher portion of the total amount of private wealth in the land, either through the payoff or the threat that backs up the bribe request.

Yes, for example, an automobile company could say "public opinion be damned" and manufacture millions of cars that consumers hate and refuse to buy. Any company could keep doing this year after year as long as it cared nothing about profits and had an unlimited bank account to draw on.

Or, they could say "public opinion, individual rights, and free markets be damned" and lobby congress to regulate the competition out of existence, or get them to declare extremely unpopular wars to protect foreign investments.

When that happens the corporation is no longer acting as a player in the free market but as a partner with and a part of the state.

By comparison consider this exchange:

X: Aren't you worried about the power that churches have?

Y: What power?

X: Well, churches could always take over the Congress and have a law passed to round up all the non-believers and make them convert or else be burned at the stake.

Y: I see what you mean. Churches are a real threat to freedom.

[Selene]

I'm not here to lecture anyone. It might seem that that's my only goal here, but I think that that's only because I've spent a very long time preparing my defense and anticipating your responses. Does anyone really think I'm quick enough to just come up with all this stuff right on the spot?

I just wanted feedback on ideas that I think are really important and interesting and that I'd spent a lot of time and effort researching and working on from a community of intelligent people.

If you want me to stop defending them, that's fine. I will. I don't care if anyone agrees with me or not.

But I won't share any deeper analyses that I've come up with, because they would be nearly incomprehensible to anyone who isn't familiar with the overall context and the preliminary ideas. It would just take too much effort to try to explain it all in one go.

Especially if it's all just going to be ignored and tossed aside anyway.

Not attending your pity party.

Your semantic is lecturing from the first words of your sentences which has been pointed out to you.

I've spent a very long time preparing my defense and anticipating your responses. Does anyone really think I'm quick enough to just come up with all this stuff right on the spot?

This is actually as astounding as it is revealing.

How much is "...a very long time..." in your very short timei in existence? And, is there some intrinsic value to a position based on the "very long time" you have spent coming up with that position?

The stuff you "come up with," basically ... hmm ... let's be kind here ... sucks...as to it's value and logic.

Carry on though, you seem impervious to constructive criticism.

A...

[dldelancey]

It's called an abstraction. You leave out irrelevant details so you can focus on the core of the problem.

The core of the problem of this thread is that everyone here disagrees with you on what the relevant details are. Regardless of how much time you have spent developing an argument, you are always going to be frustrated by your audience when they are offended by the fundamental premises on which you base that argument. Likewise, if you are unwilling to examine those fundamental premises, your audience is going to be frustrated by you. Further, when your unwillingness is laced with condescension, you're going to get labeled a snotty brat.

[Selene]

It's called an abstraction. You leave out irrelevant details so you can focus on the core of the problem.

The core of the problem of this thread is that everyone here disagrees with you on what the relevant details are. Regardless of how much time you have spent developing an argument, you are always going to be frustrated by your audience when they are offended by the fundamental premises on which you base that argument. Likewise, if you are unwilling to examine those fundamental premises, your audience is going to be frustrated by you. Further, when your unwillingness is laced with condescension, you're going to get labeled a snotty brat.

A shot from way beyond the 3 point line and it's good!

Maybe she can "hear" this from you because she sure does not hear it from others.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Notice that when people try to be nice to Naomi, she gets gratuitously snotty to them. This made me wonder if she's a fox and interprets friendliness as someone being patronizing with her. So she breaks bad first in a kind of "you can't fire me because I quit" mindset.

I once saw a documentary on foxes and I was impressed at how nastiness was just part of their way of being. First there was the male and female out hunting. The male went forth and killed some animal or other (I don't remember which right now) and the female went right up into his face, bared her teeth and started biting at him for real. It was like a dog fight. He backed off as the female took the carcass and carried it off.

She went to her brood where there were three little foxes (I think it was three). The oldest simply jumped in her face, snarled at her viciously and snapped at her as she dropped the carcass and backed off. Then he ate. After a while the mother fox went up to him, teeth bared, snarling and lashing out until he backed off. She picked up the remainder of the carcass and took it to another cute little foxy-woxy in the brood. That one attacked her like he was really pissed off and wanted to kill her until she dropped the carcass. And so it went until the last of the brood had eaten.

I thought to myself at the time, what an asshole of an animal.

But for the tenderhearted, here is a tame fox.

Ain't that something that the damn thing has to keep biting even as it gets petted and likes the petting?

I'm not saying for sure Naomi is a fox, but I won't be carrying her any carcasses anytime soon.

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

My carcass feels the relief.

--Brant

hooray for vegetarians!

[Selene]

That guy really knows his animal behavior...the minute that fox rolled over and displayed it's flanks to him it was over.

As I am sure you are aware, that is not "biting," no broken skin.

It is pretty much "play."

Excellent video.

A...

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Adam,

Sure it's play. But look how that "play" goes straight to the bite. It's instantaneous. Almost like breathing. Much faster than with a dog or cat playing.

Now... let that hand hold a carcass that it won't give up, playfully of course, and see how that play turns into a real bite.

Notice. also, in the handler's handling how he purposely lets the fox bite him. And how he eases out of the bite after allowing it for a while. Everything nice and calm. See what happens if he resists or makes any sudden movements.

(I'll just let that one sink in as a metaphor without further comment. )

Michael

[Selene]

Adam,

Sure it's play. But look how that "play" goes straight to the bite. It's instantaneous. Almost like breathing. Much faster than with a dog or cat playing.

Now... let that hand hold a carcass that it won't give up, playfully of course, and see how that play turns into a real bite.

Notice. also, in the handler's handling how he purposely lets the fox bite him. And how he eases out of the bite after allowing it for a while. Everything nice and calm. See what happens if he resists or makes any sudden movements.

(I'll just let that one sink in as a metaphor without further comment. )

Michael

Yep. A very instructive video.

[Brant Gaede]

He over-petted the fox.

He really shouldn't own a fox; they aren't domesticated animals.

--Brant

I prefer my wolf

[SoAMadDeathWish]

There is no reason to accept either property rights violation or the legal power to violate property rights as a necessary fact of man's existence. In the 1850's slavery was an institution firmly established in American law and custom. A decade later it was was gone. It disappeared in large part as a result of people who refused to accept it as an "unfortunate reality."

I think that there are a few good reasons to accept the power of states to tax and violate property rights as a necessary fact of man's existence. While there are many states throughout history that did not allow slavery, there are no states that did not have the power to tax and violate property rights. Now, this alone does not prove my point, but it is evidence for it when you consider why no state in history did not have such power.

A state requires people to support it if it is to continue to exist. People will not support a state if they think they can form a new state that gives them more benefits than the old one. If a state did not have the power to tax, and instead relied on voluntary donations, it would not be able to reward its supporters better than a state that did have the power to tax and violate property rights.

Hence, if at any point in history, some head of state relinquished his power to tax, immediately his supporters would turn from him and replace (and probably kill) him with a head of state that would tax and violate the property rights of the weak.

The community itself. Mutual defense based on the premise that the initiation of force is evil would require a widespread respect for and cherishing of property rights. This would, of course, necessitate much prior educational-intellectual groundwork. (Ayn Rand repeatedly reminded us that the philosophical battle must precede the political battle.) But ultimately we might end up with something quite similar to what the Founding Fathers had in mind, not a standing army, but a well-armed citizenry.

A well-armed citizenry is not an army. They cannot devote all of their time to training, preparing, and, most importantly, organizing themselves for war.

An organized military force could easily overwhelm a well-armed citizenry by conquering them piecemeal. Unlike a unified and organized army, a well-armed citizenry faces a "Belling the Cat" problem when it comes to defending their allies. Each citizen can gain little from defending anybody who the army attacks, but faces enormous costs if he decides to help out, even if they win. Furthermore, they are all well aware of their conundrum, so any citizen that the army attacks usually cannot count on the support of other citizens, and simply surrenders. Thus, an army could conquer the citizens simply by threatening to do so.

Indeed, this "belling the cat" problem perfectly explains why popular revolutions against tyranny are so rare.

This plan would work perfectly in any society where there are no altruists. However, in a diverse population it is not hard to imagine that there would be at least one self-sacrificing do-gooder who would propose the bill in order that his comrades gain a higher portion of the total amount of private wealth in the land, either through the payoff or the threat that backs up the bribe request.

I am glad that we can agree that the plan would work perfectly in a society without any "do-gooders". However, I think that there is a way for the producer to win even when there are "do-gooders". All he has to do is make a slight modification to his offer..

Suppose that the producer make the following offer, "If a parasite proposes a tax bill, then I will give everyone an equal share of the money that would be taxed if the bill were to pass, but only if the bill fails. However, if a do-gooder proposes a tax bill, then I will give one dollar more than what they can expect to gain from the bill to any parasite that votes against the bill".

Suppose that a parasite proposes a tax bill. Then, all the do-gooders vote against it, because everyone would get even more than they could with the tax bill. The producer also votes against it, breaking the tie, and failing the bill. He also gives everyone an equal share of the money.

Suppose that a do-gooder proposes a tax bill. Then, all the parasites vote against it, because the producer has promised them more than they could get if the wealth was distributed over a greater number of people. The producer also votes against it, breaking the tie, and failing the bill. He gives to each parasite that voted against it the money he promised them.

Thus, the parasites can get nothing if they propose the bill, and a lot if the do-gooders do. So they never propose the bill. The do-gooders get a more equal distribution of wealth, but only if a parasite proposes the bill. So they never propose the bill either.

Once again, a tax bill is never proposed, and the producer gets to keep everything he produces.

I think this example illustrates my original point quite well. No matter what the parasites do, because the producer starts the game with more resources and can make credible commitments about his use of those resources, he is always able to out-maneuver the parasites.

When that happens the corporation is no longer acting as a player in the free market but as a partner with and a part of the state.

By comparison consider this exchange:

X: Aren't you worried about the power that churches have?

Y: What power?

X: Well, churches could always take over the Congress and have a law passed to round up all the non-believers and make them convert or else be burned at the stake.

Y: I see what you mean. Churches are a real threat to freedom.

Economic organizations, such as corporations, are never acting solely as ordinary participants in markets. They are always, almost as if by a law of nature, "a partner with and a part of the state." This is true for very similar reasons to the ones I used above to explain why states necessarily interfere with markets.

Additionally, your example is a really bad one because it describes a very plausible scenario. Churches could have an enormous hold over secular governments. Indeed, for centuries in Europe, they did exactly that. Indeed, to a quite significant extent, they still do today.

The only reason they don't have a greater say is because the corporate elite have pushed them off to the margins.

[Brant Gaede]

If you support the state you are a statist. If you do not fight the state the state becomes more statist. Supporting rational governance is another thing entirely. You primarily support that by fighting statism.

--Brant

if you aren't a freedom fighter you're either fighting someone else's freedom or are what Rand called "social ballast"