Anarcho-Capitalism: A Branden ‘Blast from the Past’

[rhartford]

The concept “owner” and the concept “property” used in posts on this thread often appeal to usage of those terms by individualist, libertarian, or Objectivist philosophers. But, to understand the meaning of a concept, it is necessary to appeal to the facts of reality that gave rise to the concept; appeal to statements by others provides information but does not directly lead to understanding.

Suppose an isolated individual, A, is pursuing goals that will benefit A’s life. A will create values that A will use for his or her benefit and A will dispose of those values as A sees fit. Only if A is performing those identical actions in a social context is it epistemologically important to have terms to distinguish, identify, and associate the cause of the value created, A, and the effect of A’s action, the value created.

It is in this social context, where it is possible that control of the use and disposal of a created value can be transferred to another, that it is important to form a concept for identifying the cause and effect relationship, and the two parts of that relationship. The concepts of owner, property, and ownership arise to identify the value creator, the created value, and the relationship between them.

Values that one achieves in the building of one’s own character and personality are not transferrable and the concepts of ownership, owner, and property can only be applied to them in a metaphorical sense, maybe nice aesthetically, but dangerous epistemologically.

[George H. Smith]

The concept “owner” and the concept “property” used in posts on this thread often appeal to usage of those terms by individualist, libertarian, or Objectivist philosophers. But, to understand the meaning of a concept, it is necessary to appeal to the facts of reality that gave rise to the concept; appeal to statements by others provides information but does not directly lead to understanding. Suppose an isolated individual, A, is pursuing goals that will benefit A’s life. A will create values that A will use for his or her benefit and A will dispose of those values as A sees fit. Only if A is performing those identical actions in a social context is it epistemologically important to have terms to distinguish, identify, and associate the cause of the value created, A, and the effect of A’s action, the value created. It is in this social context, where it is possible that control of the use and disposal of a created value can be transferred to another, that it is important to form a concept for identifying the cause and effect relationship, and the two parts of that relationship. The concepts of owner, property, and ownership arise to identify the value creator, the created value, and the relationship between them. Values that one achieves in the building of one’s own character and personality are not transferrable and the concepts of ownership, owner, and property can only be applied to them in a metaphorical sense, maybe nice aesthetically, but dangerous epistemologically.

You are mistaken. The notion of inalienable property has been around for centuries; indeed, it was essential to the idea of inalienable rights. Thus, according to Madison and many, many others, "property in one's conscience" is inalienable, because one cannot transfer one's moral agency to someone else, even in theory.

You are free to use terms as you deem best, but you should be aware of other usages.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

Axiom: "An established rule, principle, or law." (American Heritage Dictionary)

This is how Rothbard used "axiom." The NIOF principle, having been established (i.e., justified) by moral reasoning, becomes the basic principle of the political theory known as "libertarianism."

Political movements are defined in terms of the principles that members of a given movement agree upon. You don't have to be an atheist to be a libertarian; you can be a Christian, Muslim, or Jew. Nor do you have to accept Rand's theory of rights. You might be a utilitarian instead, as we find with David Friedman. So long as you accept the NIOF principle, for whatever reason, you are a libertarian.

It astonishes me to find how many O'ists don't even know the elementary rules of conceptual classification. Perhaps a Venn Diagram would help, given how concrete-bound some of these people are. Or maybe this folksy parable will do the trick.

Two guys are at an old-fashioned well, the type with a bucket attached to a rope. Both are thirsty, and both agree that they must get to the bottom of the well somehow in order to slake their thirst. So one guy lowers the bucket into the water, pulls it up, and takes a drink. He offers a drink to his friend, but the guy refuses. Instead, the second guy declares that he must get to the bottom of the well every time he wants a drink. He then jumps in.

Lesson: You don't need to dive to the bottom of the conceptual well each and every time you want to talk about freedom. Once you have the water, you can move on to other things.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

I cannot go along with this libertarian "axiom" stuff. If politics were all that was about philosophy then there'd have to be an axiom in there somewhere. But philosophy is much more than politics and politics must be part of philosophy so there's no axiom there. This is the central and basic fallacy of libertarianism and explains why it, commonly understood, has been on an intellectual down-slope since Rothbard and Hospers peaked it in the early 1970s. Objectivism has too, but for different reasons.

Try to keep up, Brant. I've explained all this. Dennis doesn't know what he is talking about. If he sees the the word "axiom," he salivates like a Palovian dog, with no more awareness of what is going on.

Here is a parallel: Ayn Rand defended "selfishness." Selfish people don't care about other people. Therefore, Rand did not care about other people.

See: http://www.objectivi...ndpost&p=161173

Ghs

I just keep returning to my roots, George.

--Brant

defaulting constantly to clarity

[Brant Gaede]

The notion of inalienable property has been around for centuries; indeed, it was essential to the idea of inalienable rights. Thus, according to Madison and many, many others, "property in one's conscience" is inalienable, because one cannot transfer one's moral agency to someone else, even in theory.

Ghs

That's a gem. Something like this makes this whole thread worthwhile.

--Brant

things not taught in school though they ought to, especially in America

[Brant Gaede]

Axiom: "An established rule, principle, or law." (American Heritage Dictionary)

This is how Rothbard used "axiom." The NIOF principle, having been established (i.e., justified) by moral reasoning, becomes the basic principle of the political theory known as "libertarianism."

Political movements are defined in terms of the principles that members of a given movement agree upon. You don't have to be an atheist to be a libertarian; you can be a Christian, Muslim, or Jew. Nor do you have to accept Rand's theory of rights. You might be a utilitarian instead, as we find with David Friedman. So long as you accept the NIOF principle, for whatever reason, you are a libertarian.

It astonishes me to find how many O'ists don't even know the elementary rules of conceptual classification. Perhaps a Venn Diagram would help, given how concrete-bound some of these people are. Or maybe this folksy parable will do the trick.

Two guys are at an old-fashioned well, the type with a bucket attached to a rope. Both are thirsty, and both agree that they must get to the bottom of the well somehow in order to slake their thirst. So one guy lowers the bucket into the water, pulls it up, and takes a drink. He offers a drink to his friend, but the guy refuses. Instead, the second guy declares that he must get to the bottom of the well every time he wants a drink. He then jumps in.

Lesson: You don't need to dive to the bottom of the conceptual well each and every time you want to talk about freedom. Once you have the water, you can move on to other things.

Ghs

All very well and (a) good (well). But we have to keep our language and premises straight or these discussions digress in unfortunate and confusing ways. For the record, Rand never used "axiom" the way Rothbard did. The whole idea culturally of Objectivism is that the libertarianism of the founders was deficient--that more was needed. Hospers didn't reject that, I think Rothbard did, but am willing to be corrected.

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

But we have to keep our language and premises straight or these discussions digress in unfortunate and confusing ways. For the record, Rand never used "axiom" the way Rothbard did. The whole idea culturally of Objectivism is that the libertarianism of the founders was deficient--that more was needed. Hospers didn't reject that, I think Rothbard did, but am willing to be corrected. --Brant

Rand used the term "selfish" with a different meaning than most people use. But if we wish to understand what Rand was talking about, we need to pay her the courtesy of understanding what she was getting at. Her ideas, not her choice of words here and there, are the important thing.

It doesn't look like Dennis is willing to extend the same courtesy to Rothbard. If Dennis declares that "axiom" must signify a self-evident truth, and if Rothbard used the term "axiom," then Rothbard must have also been referring to a self-evident truth, regardless of the facts.

There is no excuse for this juvenile game, especially since Dennis knows zilch about Rothbard's ideas. I spent dozens upon dozens of hours talking with Murray about these matters, especially late at night during summer conferences, and I have read all his books. I'm not about to let some concrete-bound ignoramus violate the most rudimentary standards of intellectual ethics, while screaming: He said "axiom"'! He said "axiom"! I googled it. I know he said "axiom"!

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Two guys are at an old-fashioned well, the type with a bucket attached to a rope. Both are thirsty, and both agree that they must get to the bottom of the well somehow in order to slake their thirst. So one guy lowers the bucket into the water, pulls it up, and takes a drink. He offers a drink to his friend, but the guy refuses. Instead, the second guy declares that he must get to the bottom of the well every time he wants a drink. He then jumps in.

Lesson: You don't need to dive to the bottom of the conceptual well each and every time you want to talk about freedom. Once you have the water, you can move on to other things.

George,

The problem with this analogy isn't the depth of the well. It's the claim that only this particular bucket gets water from the well.

Conceptual foundations are important if you are going to deduct and develop a political system from them. A false premise leads to disaster--and it does so completely by reasoned steps, for example communism. This is obvious, no?

That. to me, is why Rand constantly said, "Good premises" to her friends, and spent a long time delving into them in her works. I disagree with you when you insinuate that checking premises is a stupid exercise.

As I mentioned earlier, here are the Kelley and Sciabarra quotes that Dennis provided (my bold):

Many libertarians, indeed, regard a principal banning coercion as a kind of axiom from which all principles assigning rights can be derived. In effect, the fundamental right is the right not to be coerced, and specific rights can be established by identifying specific forms of coercion....

David Kelley, "Life, Liberty and Property"

Human Rights, Paul, Miller, Paul, p. 111

Rand’s approach, however, differs from the rights doctrines of classical liberalism because it is self-consciously derived from a broader theory of ethics. Whereas some libertarian thinkers, such as Rothbard, begin their defense of rights with an axiom of nonaggression, Rands theory is the culmination of a full-bodied system of thought...

Chris Sciabarra, Ayn Rand, The Russian Radical

p. 274-275

You gave the following explanation:

Murray sometimes spoke of the "axiom" of nonaggression, but he didn't mean what you mean by "axiom." He meant what Francis Bacon called a "middle axiom." The is a mid-level principle, justified by reason, that is employed as the fundamental principle of a specific cognitive discipline.

If you say so. I need to read Rothbard to come to my own conclusion on this.

I do know that, from the context and history of both Kelley and Sciabarra, I seriously doubt they were talking about this kind of "middle axiom" as what they meant by axiom. (Maybe Kelley did mean this when he said "kind of axiom," meaning something that looks like an axiom but is not really one--and in that case, I believe his meaning of axiom all by itself would have been the Randian one. But since he talked about deriving all other rights from it, it's reasonable to imagine he was talking about something fundamental without exceptions.)

If they were not, and they actually were basing their arguments on the ideas of Bacon (or similar), may I suggest correcting them? I'm not being flip here. The idea that an axiom is more than a general principle is widespread in our neck of the woods, on all sides.

You keep acting surprised that people say libertarians call NIOF an axiom--in the sense of not admitting exceptions for validity--but there is a vast amount of discussions online from libertarians (and Objectivists) where they twist rationalizations around all kinds of situations in order to call them a response to an initiation of force.

Usually they get mad as hell when someone even asks a question or speculates about initiating force (some even threaten to shoot the person discussing dead) and they yell to the top of their lungs that there are no valid cases of initiating force.

(Incidentally, that's a fundamental characteristic of an axiom in my sense--the "no valid cases" of the contrary part, not the yelling.)

Now you say this is not what libertarian thinkers (except Block) really mean, that they mean something else instead.

OK. Let's do an acid test.

Do general principles sometimes admit exceptions? Yes, of course.

Since you claim that NIOF is a "middle axiom" as presented by Rothbard, and you agree that a middle axiom is a general principle and a general principle admits exceptions, here's some acid to drip on it to see if it burns a hole.

Do you think Rothbard would have admitted that there are times when the government can legitimately initiate force against another human being?

If so, when?

Of if not a government and, instead, one of the competing force commodity agencies that are discussed a lot, do you think Rothbard would have admitted that there are times when such an agency can legitimately initiate force against another human being?

Or maybe he actually said it somewhere? I haven't read much of him, but I have read a lot of people who attempt to refute him, so I am pretty sure a comment like that would have come up and been trumpeted about. So I doubt it, but it is still worth asking to make sure. Did Rothbard ever claim there were exceptions where someone or some group could legitimately initiate force against other human beings?

I ask this in good faith, not as gotcha.

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

The axiom business is not important. Rand meant one thing and Rothbard another. Big deal. Dennis can see that or trivialize himself. Self ownership and the inalienablity of rights in the historical context and in Rand's is another matter.

--Brant

[Brant Gaede]

Michael. This is not a defense of the military draft. This jejune back-door effort to support what George and I see as unsupportable in the context of libertarianism, Objectivism, freedom and individualism won't work. An ethics of emergencies is in the context of individual rights, not state rights, which do not exist. The right to life is inalienable.

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

I need to read Rothbard to come to my own conclusion on this.

Yes, please do. I am much more pleasant when discussing issues with people who actually know what they are talking about.

You may wish to begin with Rothbard's The Ethics of Liberty. The first four chapter titles alone will tell you that Murray did not pull the nonaggresson principle out of thin air and treat it as a self-evident truth:

1. Natural Law and Reason

2. Natural Law as "Science"

3. Natural Law versus Positive Law

4. Natural Law and Natural Rights

If you don't know what "natural law" means in this context, it is the traditional term for what Rand called "objective ethics," i.e., moral principles knowable to reason.

As Murray explains in Chapter 5: "The intention [of this book] is to set forth a social ethic of liberty, i.e., to elaborate that subset of the natural law that develops the concepts of natural rights, and that deals with the proper sphere of "politics," i.e., with violence and non-violence as modes of interpersonal relations. In short, to set forth a political philosophy of liberty." (My italics.)

A little later, Murray writes:

In order to advocate public policy, therefore, a system of social or political ethics must be constructed. In former centuries this was the crucial task of political philosophy. But, in the contemporary world, political theory, in the name of a spurious "science," has cast out ethical philosophy, and has itself become barren as a guide to the inquiring citizen. The same course has been taken in each of the disciplines of the social sciences and of philosophy by abandoning the procedures of natural law. Let us then cast out the hobgoblins of Wertfreiheit, of positivism, of scientism. Ignoring the imperious demands of an arbitrary status quo, let us hammer out...a natural law and natural rights standard to which the wise and honest may repair. (My emphasis.)

Why the hell should I have to waste my time typing this stuff out? Anyone who knows anything about Rothbard's ideas already knows this stuff. It is Rothbard 101.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

George,

My question still stands.

Does Rothbard admit the possibility of cases where it is legitimate to initiate force against another human being?

Michae;

[George H. Smith]

George, My question still stands. Does Rothbard admit the possibility of cases where it is legitimate to initiate force against another human being? Michae;

No.

So I guess I wasted my time setting you straight on the "axiom" question. Right? Are you still going to believe secondary sources over Rothbard's own words?

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

George,

My question still stands.

Does Rothbard admit the possibility of cases where it is legitimate to initiate force against another human being?

Michae;

For my criticism of some of Murray's views in this area, see the first part of my essay "Thinking About War."

http://www.ozarkia.net/bill/anarchism/library/ThinkingAboutWar.html

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Does Rothbard admit the possibility of cases where it is legitimate to initiate force against another human being? Michae;

No.

So I guess I wasted my time setting you straight on the "axiom" question. Right? Are you still going to believe secondary sources over Rothbard's own words?

George,

You do a hell of a lot better when you do your thinking and don't do mine for me.

My issue isn't a personality game of proving this person or that right or wrong. It's to get at clear ideas.

I just can't understand how something can have exceptions and not have exceptions at the same time. Not on fundamentals. Philosophy to me isn't a game of "eeny, meeny, miny, moe".

I think if NIOF is a "middle axiom" as you say, but no exceptions are admitted, that's a hell of a poor premise to build anything on. It's a contradiction.

If the premise is an axiom, meaning something without exceptions, and you don't like the word "axiom," hell, let's call it a goose pond or even a middle goose pond. I don't care. Just so long as the meaning is clear.

And then we can move on to application, derivation, validity and the other ideas, but we will be talking about the same thing when we refer to the foundational concept.

Regardless, that kind of concept (a principle without exceptions) looks an awful lot like what other people in other places call an axiom.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

George,

My question still stands.

Does Rothbard admit the possibility of cases where it is legitimate to initiate force against another human being?

Michae;

For my criticism of some of Murray's views in this area, see the first part of my essay "Thinking About War."

http://www.ozarkia.n...ngAboutWar.html

George,

Give me some time to read this with attention. I'll get back later today on it.

Your essay looks interesting for a secondary source on Rothbard.

Michael

[George H. Smith]

Does Rothbard admit the possibility of cases where it is legitimate to initiate force against another human being? Michae;

No.

So I guess I wasted my time setting you straight on the "axiom" question. Right? Are you still going to believe secondary sources over Rothbard's own words?

George,

You do a hell of a lot better when you do your thinking and don't do mine for me.

My issue isn't a personality game of proving this person or that right or wrong. It's to get at clear ideas.

I just can't understand how something can have exceptions and not have exceptions at the same time. Not on fundamentals. Philosophy to me isn't a game of "eeny, meeny, miny, moe".

I think if NIOF is a "middle axiom" as you say, but no exceptions are admitted, that's a hell of a poor premise to build anything on. It's a contradiction.

If the premise is an axiom, meaning something without exceptions, and you don't like the word "axiom," hell, let's call it a goose pond or even a middle goose pond. I don't care. Just so long as the meaning is clear.

And then we can move on to application, derivation, validity and the other ideas, but we will be talking about the same thing when we refer to the foundational concept.

Regardless, that kind of concept (a principle without exceptions) looks an awful lot like what other people in other places call an axiom.

Michael

The issue I addressed was what Rothbard meant by "axiom." I don't care if you agree with him or not. That's not the point.

Lots of people think that Rand was a Nazi. I guess I had better read AS again so I can make an informed judgment.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

An excerpt from Rothbard's The Ethics of Liberty.

Let us consider Crusoe, who has landed on his island, and, to simplify matters, has contracted amnesia. What inescapable facts does Crusoe confront? He finds, for one thing, himself, with the primordial fact of his own consciousness and his own body. He finds, second, the natural world around him, the nature-given habitat and resources which economists sum up in the term “land.”He finds also that, in seeming contrast with animals, he does not possess any innate instinctual knowledge impelling him into the proper paths for the satisfaction of his needs and desires. In fact, he begins his life in this world by knowing literally nothing; all knowledge must be learned by him. He comes to learn that he has numerous ends, purposes which he desires to achieve, many of which he must achieve to sustain his life: food, shelter, clothing, etc. After the basic needs are satisfied, he finds more “advanced” wants for which to aim. To satisfy any or all of these wants which he evaluates in accordance with their respective importance to him, Crusoe must also learn how to achieve them; he must, in short, acquire “technological knowledge,” or “recipes.”

Crusoe, then, has manifold wants which he tries to satisfy, ends that he strives to attain. Some of these ends may be attained with minimal effort on his part; if the island is so structured, he may be able to pick edible berries off nearby bushes. In such cases, his “consumption” of a good or service may be obtained quickly and almost instantaneously. But for almost all of his wants, Crusoe finds that the natural world about him does not satisfy them immediately and instantaneously; he is not, in short, in a Garden of Eden. To achieve his ends, he must, as quickly and productively as he can, take the nature-given resources and transform them into useful objects, shapes, and places most useful to him—so that he can satisfy his wants.

In short, he must (a) choose his goals; (b) learn how to achieve them by using nature-given resources; and then © exert his labor energy to transform these resources into more useful shapes and places: i.e., into “capital goods,” and finally into “consumer goods” that he can directly consume. Thus, Crusoe may build himself, out of the given natural raw materials, an axe (capital good) with which to chop down trees, in order to construct a cabin (consumer good). Or he may build a net (capital good) with which to catch fish (consumer good). In each case, he employs his learned technological knowledge to exert his labor effort in transforming land into capital goods and eventually into consumer goods. This process of transformation of land resources constitutes his “production.” In short, Crusoe must produce before he can consume, and so that he may consume. And by this process of production, of transformation, man shapes and alters his nature-given environment to his own ends, instead of, animal-like, being simply determined by that environment.

And so man, not having innate, instinctive, automatically acquired knowledge of his proper ends, or of the means by which they can be achieved, must learn them, and to learn them he must exercise his powers of observation, abstraction, thought: in short, his reason. Reason is man’s instrument of knowledge and of his very survival; the use and of his mind, the acquisition of knowledge about what is best for him and how he can achieve it, is the uniquely human method of existence and of achievement. And this is uniquely man’s nature; man, as Aristotle pointed out, is the rational animal, or to be more precise, the rational being. Through his reason, the individual man observes both the facts and ways of the external world, and the facts of his own consciousness, including his emotions: in short, he employs both extraspection and introspection.

Etc., etc.

For the entire text, see: http://mises.org/rot.../ethics/six.asp

Notice how Murray doesn't try to build up a theory based on man's nature, as Rand does. Notice how he just blurts out "Nonagression is an axiom!" and leaves it at that.

More serioiusly, if some of this stuff reminds you of Rand, this is no accident. Rand had a big influence on Murray.

I don't what to hear any more of that bullshit about Rothbard having made no attempt to provide a philosophical foundation for his libertarianism. In some areas, he explored the foundations of freedom in far greater detail than Rand ever did.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

The issue I addressed was what Rothbard meant by "axiom." I don't care if you agree with him or not. That's not the point.

George,

It's not a matter of me agreeing with Rothbard. My thing is the ideas.

I don't understand the logic of how a premise can have exceptions and not have exceptions at the same time.

I know some people have no problem with this, but I don't understand it.

I can't call it reason until I do.

I'm sure I'm not the only one, so it isn't just me. It's a matter of being able to explain the logic to anyone.

Michael

[anthony]

M. Rothbard's allegory of Crusoe is a very solid expansion of Rand's enigmatic

"Alone on a desert island is when you will need it [rational morality] most."

[George H. Smith]

My thing is the ideas. I don't understand the logic of how a premise can have exceptions and not have exceptions at the same time. I know some people have no problem with this, but I don't understand it. I can't call it reason until I do. I'm sure I'm not the only one, so it isn't just me. It's a matter of being able to explain the logic to anyone. Michael

A "premise can have exceptions and not have exceptions at the same time"??? No libertarian that I know of has ever said this. Where did you come up with that silly notion? I've never even heard of it before.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I don't what to hear any more of that bullshit about Rothbard having made no attempt to provide a philosophical foundation for his libertarianism.

George,

You're fighting the Randian versus Rothbardian war here?

Hell and damnation.

I thought we were talking about philosophy.

The only reason I brought up Rothbard is that you asked several times which libertarian writers used NIOF as an axiom and preemptively claimed no one did except maybe Block. I mentioned that David Kelley and Chris Sciabarra said this and I remembered Rothbard being mentioned. Then you said when libertarian writers like Rothbard referred to NIOF as an axiom, they were referring to a general principle that can have exceptions, but there's no real need to talk about it.

Then I presented the quotes and to be clear, I asked if Rothbard would admit an exception. You said no.

So I don't understand how this logic works. His "axiom" can have an exception according to you, but can't have an exception according to you.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

A "premise can have exceptions and not have exceptions at the same time"??? No libertarian that I know of has ever said this. Where did you come up with that silly notion?

George,

You.

See my above post.

Michael

[George H. Smith]

I don't what to hear any more of that bullshit about Rothbard having made no attempt to provide a philosophical foundation for his libertarianism.

George, You're fighting the Randian versus Rothbardian war here? Hell and damnation. I thought we were talking about philosophy. The only reason I brought up Rothbard is that you asked several times which libertarian writers used NIOF as an axiom and preemptively claimed no one did except maybe Block. I mentioned that David Kelley and Chris Sciabarra said this and I remembered Rothbard being mentioned. Then you said when libertarian writers like Rothbard referred to NIOF as an axiom, they were referring to a general principle that can have exceptions, but there's no real need to talk about it. Then I presented the quotes and to be clear, I asked if Rothbard would admit an exception. You said no. So I don't understand how this logic works. His "axiom" can have an exception according to you, but can't have an exception according to you. Michael

Are you familiar with something called a "disagreement"?

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Are you familiar with something called a "disagreement"?

George,

Sure.

What does that got to do with my attempt to understand this logic or lack of logic?

I sincerely do not understand.

If someone says they hold NIOF as an axiom and there can be no exceptions, I can disagree. If I claim that reason has to be the foundation of a system of government and can trump NIOF in certain contexts, they can disagree.

What I don't understand is how NIOF can be a middle goose pond that admits exceptions and be a goose pond that doesn't admit exceptions at the same time.

Michael