My comments on capital punishment, in Cato Unbound

[George H. Smith]

http://www.cato-unbo...tal-punishment/

This article by me on capital punishment was just published in Cato Unbound. I was responding, more or less, to the lead article ("Learning What We Can From DNA) by Professor Brandon Garrett, which can be found here:

http://www.cato-unbo...e-can-from-dna/

I didn't have much to say about DNA testing, but I was specifically asked by the editor to broaden the discussion, so that's what I did.

OLers may be interested in my comments because I discuss Nathaniel Branden's views on capital punishment, as expressed in an early issue of the Objectivist Newsletter.

Commnents by readers are encouraged, but this will not be possible until later, after the initial writers are finished with their exchanges.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

George,

I agree with you that a moral case can be made against capital punishment.

I have always been uncomfortable with a zero-sum game kind of mentality as regards crime and punishment--even when NB said it. Incidentally, Rand did, too. I'm not sure about her written works--I don't recall seeing it, but I never looked with capital punishment specifically in mind.

I heard Rand say this in the Q&A to her 1971 Ford Hall Forum that I was fortunate enough to be at (Robert Campbell transcribed it here).

I understood this to mean if the courts make a mistake and execute an innocent person, the damage is permanent and you can't undo it. So on a common sense level (in addition to Rand's epistemological level), this is a good argument against capital punishment.

But I am uncomfortable with the idea of the government executing anyone. If it kills a person in a fight (like war or law enforcement activities, etc.), OK. Weirdly enough, I am also comfortable with the government assassinating a well-known enemy like it did with Bin Laden.

But staging a formal execution and making a theater presentation out of it (even if the only audience is the participants) leaves me with a creepy feeling. I don't see the moral logic in calling this retribution, but then I don't see an eye-for-an-eye as a good moral principle. It makes living in a society a zero-sum game for the individuals within it on a metaphysical level--and nothing I can think of in society is a true zero-sum metaphysical game.

We get more far benefits than we provide, and when disaster strikes, we usually get more damage than we deserve (based on our actions). That's certainly not zero-sum. As to good guys and bad guys, I would like society to work according to poetic justice, but there are too many cases of the good guy suffering and the bad guy making out well for me to believe in it--even as a possibility. Human nature just doesn't work according to a zero-sum criterion.

I think eye-for-an-eye is a good rule of thumb, however, for short-term cases that need immediate solution. But as the highest expression of a code of values, as a moral principle (especially when such a principle is taken to the social level), I don't see any individual value in it--unless revenge can be considered as a moral value. I know there's a lot of hairsplitting between retribution, revenge, and closure for the victim's loved ones as values, but in practical matters, no one gains anything from capital punishment except the government, which legitimizes its power to kill citizens with each legal execution.

On strict libertarian grounds, you have to twist a lot of logic to make an execution an example of retaliatory use of force.

The fact is, in reality, I don't believe there is any government punishment that can replace--even symbolically--the damage done by a homicide. Rand's word "irreplaceable" (with respect to a murdered person) has rung in my mind for decades since sitting in Ford Hall back in the 70's.

Forfeiture of the murderer's freedom, maybe at hard labor to help pay for his room and board in prison, is about the best moral alternative I can think of. What is gained? The only thing that can be gained. Civil peace by removing the criminal from society so he doesn't commit more of the same. And the government also gets to treat the murderer as a slave (and kick him around) if it so chooses for the rest of his life--although no one ever says that. But that's what it is de facto.

Notice that civil peace is gained by both execution and life imprisonment. So from just that standpoint, one is as good as the other.

I rambled a bit here, but I wanted to leave something on record to come back to later. I have not finished my thinking on this topic.

btw - I, also, agree with you that DNA testing is not a primary issue for a moral argument.

Michael

[George H. Smith]

George,

I agree with you that a moral case can be made against capital punishment.

I have always been uncomfortable with a zero-sum game kind of mentality as regards crime and punishment--even when NB said it. Incidentally, Rand did, too. I'm not sure about her written works--I don't recall seeing it, but I never looked with capital punishment specifically in mind.

I heard Rand say this in the Q&A to her 1971 Ford Hall Forum that I was fortunate enough to be at (Robert Campbell transcribed it here).

I understood this to mean if the courts make a mistake and execute an innocent person, the damage is permanent and you can't undo it. So on a common sense level (in addition to Rand's epistemological level), this is a good argument against capital punishment.

But I am uncomfortable with the idea of the government executing anyone. If it kills a person in a fight (like war or law enforcement activities, etc.), OK. Weirdly enough, I am also comfortable with the government assassinating a well-known enemy like it did with Bin Laden.

But staging a formal execution and making a theater presentation out of it (even if the only audience is the participants) leaves me with a creepy feeling. I don't see the moral logic in calling this retribution, but then I don't see an eye-for-an-eye as a good moral principle. It makes living in a society a zero-sum game for the individuals within it on a metaphysical level--and nothing I can think of in society is a true zero-sum metaphysical game.

We get more far benefits than we provide, and when disaster strikes, we usually get more damage than we deserve (based on our actions). That's certainly not zero-sum. As to good guys and bad guys, I would like society to work according to poetic justice, but there are too many cases of the good guy suffering and the bad guy making out well for me to believe in it--even as a possibility. Human nature just doesn't work according to a zero-sum criterion.

I think eye-for-an-eye is a good rule of thumb, however, for short-term cases that need immediate solution. But as the highest expression of a code of values, as a moral principle (especially when such a principle is taken to the social level), I don't see any individual value in it--unless revenge can be considered as a moral value. I know there's a lot of hairsplitting between retribution, revenge, and closure for the victim's loved ones as values, but in practical matters, no one gains anything from capital punishment except the government, which legitimizes its power to kill citizens with each legal execution.

On strict libertarian grounds, you have to twist a lot of logic to make an execution an example of retaliatory use of force.

The fact is, in reality, I don't believe there is any government punishment that can replace--even symbolically--the damage done by a homicide. Rand's word "irreplaceable" (with respect to a murdered person) has rung in my mind for decades since sitting in Ford Hall back in the 70's.

Forfeiture of the murderer's freedom, maybe at hard labor to help pay for his room and board in prison, is about the best moral alternative I can think of. What is gained? The only thing that can be gained. Civil peace by removing the criminal from society so he doesn't commit more of the same. And the government also gets to treat the murderer as a slave (and kick him around) if it so chooses for the rest of his life--although no one ever says that. But that's what it is de facto.

Notice that civil peace is gained by both execution and life imprisonment. So from just that standpoint, one is as good as the other.

I rambled a bit here, but I wanted to leave something on record to come back to later. I have not finished my thinking on this topic.

btw - I, also, agree with you that DNA testing is not a primary issue for a moral argument.

Michael

I published a major critique of capital punishment in Liberty Magazine, November 1996 (Vol 10, No. 2). It is titled "A Killer's Right to LIfe" -- which was Bradford's title, not mine.

The issue can be downloaded in a PDF file in the Liberty Magazine archives, though this takes a while. My article begins on page 46.

http://www.libertyunbound.com/node/362

(Neither the article nor my name is listed in the details on this page, but this is the right issue.)

Two critiques of my article were published in the May 1997 issue, beginning on p. 47. The one by Goodman is reasonable, but Virkkala was being his usual dipshit self.

http://www.libertyunbound.com/node/343

I responded to my critics in the July 1997 issue, beginning on page 51. This article deals with the subject of inalienable rights in more detail.

http://www.libertyunbound.com/node/171

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

Without referring to George's articles, which I am sure I read at the time, I have two basic criticisms of capital punishment: Execution of innocents and self-execution of the executioners. Instead of explicating now, I'll just wait to see how this is considered.

--Brant

will reread George

[Dennis Hardin]

George,

In your article in Liberty magazine, you state:

“I believe that every person—including a wanton, brutal killer—has certain inalienable rights in common with the rest of humankind, rights that cannot be transferred, abandoned, or forfeited. I further maintain that the death penalty is a clear violation of that inalienable right known as self-sovereignty.

If that’s your position, then nothing that anyone does could ever result in the loss of any right. Consequently, killers should be able to kill wantonly, with no consequences. Arresting a killer and putting him in jail would also be a violation of his "inalienable" rights, because the rule itself is unconditional.

The Objectivist position is that no person can reasonably make a claim to rights when he has denied that right to another person, because rights depend on a certain standard. It is the Law of Noncontradiction applied to politics. The conceptual context of rights creates a requirement for logical consistency.The word "inalienable" does not erase that context. It is a brazen contradiction for a person to say he has an inalienable right based on his nature as a rational being, but another person—another rational being--does not. That’s why forfeiture of one’s life is a logical consequence of denying life to someone else. Therefore, if you kill another human being, you thereby forfeit the right to your own life.

In your Cato article, you came very close to equating Branden’s position with that of Kant. In fact however, only their conclusions are similar. They get to that conclusion through fundamentally different arguments.

Here’s how you ended that article:

For now, suffice it to say that I think a compelling moral case can be made against capital punishment, so I do not accept the retributive theory of punishment defended by Kant and many other philosophers.

As I understand Kant, practical universality serves a crucial role in his argument for rights, and he pays scant attention to any conception of human nature. He considered a state of political freedom as a kind of social/political categorical imperative. "There is only one innate right," says Kant, "Freedom (independence from being constrained by another's choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law."

As I understand it, this puts quite a bit of theoretical distance between him and many other natural rights theorists (e.g., Hobbes, Locke, Jefferson), including Branden. The fact that Kant and Branden reached a common conclusion, a point you seemed to emphasize, is of no real significance..

Since the whole basis of Kant’s arguments for retributive justice rests on the ideal of social equanimity rather than the objective requirements of human life, his arguments for the consequences of violating the freedoms of others would have to be pretty flimsy. When you accept his deontological approach to ethics, you buy into his whole rule-based viewpoint.

“All humankind must be free”—Kant’s argument--is a rule, and creates a duty to let everyone be free regardless of their actions. A violation of a rule does not warrant additional violations of the same rule. You can violate the rule with impunity because the rule remains a rule.

“A man is free because his rational nature requires freedom” is a standard-based argument, and any person’s claim to rights (so derived) depends on his willingness to apply that same standard to everyone who shares that nature. If he does not apply that same standard to others, he cannot claim it for himself.

[George H. Smith]

George,

In your article in Liberty magazine, you state:

“I believe that every person—including a wanton, brutal killer—has certain inalienable rights in common with the rest of humankind, rights that cannot be transferred, abandoned, or forfeited. I further maintain that the death penalty is a clear violation of that inalienable right known as self-sovereignty.

If that’s your position, then nothing that anyone does could ever result in the loss of any right. Consequently, killers should be able to kill wantonly, with no consequences. Arresting a killer and putting him in jail would also be a violation of his "inalienable" rights, because the rule itself is unconditional.

The Objectivist position is that no person can reasonably make a claim to rights when he has denied that right to another person, because rights depend on a certain standard. It is the Law of Noncontradiction applied to politics. The conceptual context of rights creates a requirement for logical consistency.The word "inalienable" does not erase that context. It is a brazen contradiction for a person to say he has an inalienable right based on his nature as a rational being, but another person—another rational being--does not. That’s why forfeiture of one’s life is a logical consequence of denying life to someone else. Therefore, if you kill another human being, you thereby forfeit the right to your own life.

In your Cato article, you came very close to equating Branden’s position with that of Kant. In fact however, only their conclusions are similar. They get to that conclusion through fundamentally different arguments.

Here’s how you ended that article:

For now, suffice it to say that I think a compelling moral case can be made against capital punishment, so I do not accept the retributive theory of punishment defended by Kant and many other philosophers.

As I understand Kant, practical universality serves a crucial role in his argument for rights, and he pays scant attention to any conception of human nature. He considered a state of political freedom as a kind of social/political categorical imperative. "There is only one innate right," says Kant, "Freedom (independence from being constrained by another's choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law."

As I understand it, this puts quite a bit of theoretical distance between him and many other natural rights theorists (e.g., Hobbes, Locke, Jefferson), including Branden. The fact that Kant and Branden reached a common conclusion, a point you seemed to emphasize, is of no real significance..

Since the whole basis of Kant’s arguments for retributive justice rests on the ideal of social equanimity rather than the objective requirements of human life, his arguments for the consequences of violating the freedoms of others would have to be pretty flimsy. When you accept his deontological approach to ethics, you buy into his whole rule-based viewpoint.

“All humankind must be free”—Kant’s argument--is a rule, and creates a duty to let everyone be free regardless of their actions. A violation of a rule does not warrant additional violations of the same rule. You can violate the rule with impunity because the rule remains a rule.

“A man is free because his rational nature requires freedom” is a standard-based argument, and any person’s claim to rights (so derived) depends on his willingness to apply that same standard to everyone who shares that nature. If he does not apply that same standard to others, he cannot claim it for himself.

I need to write some additional comments about capital punishment for Cato Unbound (I am working on one now), so I don't want to get distracted with detailed arguments here. I will therefore confine myself to a few points. After the initial contributors (two attorneys and myself) finish with our replies and counter-replies, the forum will open up to anyone who cares to contribute comments, questions, or arguments. It would be good if you reposted your comments, or some version of them, there.

1. If you read Goodman's critique of my Liberty article, you will see that he made the same objection that you did, namely, that my argument would forbid any kind of punishment, not merely capital punishment. In my reply I acknowledged that Goodman's point was well taken, but I didn't attempt to answer it in any detail. I may do that in the Cato Unbound forum, especially you if state the objection there.

For now, suffice it to say that I stressed inalienable rights, not all rights. Unlimited freedom of action is certainly not an inalienable right in all cases, especially when a criminal is confined for the purpose of providing restitution for the victim or his heirs.

Let me ask you a question: Suppose a wanton killer has been justly convicted and sentenced to death. I assume you would maintain that "we" have a right to kill the murderer. Fine, but since every right has a corresponding duty (i.e., moral obligation), I ask, Where is the duty in this case? If we have a right to kill the murderer, does this mean that he has the moral obligation to passively submit and permit himself to be killed? Has the murderer, in other words, completely surrendered or forfeited his right of self-defense in all cases whatsoever?

If my argument from inalienable rights appeared somewhat odd to you, the notion that a person -- any person -- has a moral obligation to permit himself to be killed by others seems very odd to me, especially if we are talking about a theory of egoism.

Moreover, as I discussed in my original article, if the killer literally becomes a rightless being, having forfeited even the basic right of self-defense, then, if we can kill her, why can't we also torture her unmercifully, or boil her in oil, or use her as a sex slave, after selling her to the highest bidder? If such acts are morally impermissible, then this can only be because the killer has retained at least some of her rights. Okay, so which rights has she retained, and why, in spite of being a brutal killer?

2. The fact that Kant and Rand (and Branden by implication) used different arguments to justify individual rights is irrelevant to the point I made. Kant and Branden both explicity defended capital punishment by claiming that a murderer deserves to die, and that this is the fundamental moral principle that should guide our moral judgment of capital punishment. Both were strict defenders, in other words, of a retributive theory of punishment.

3. It is highly misleading to say that Kant did not base his theory of rights on human nature. What Kant insisted upon, in opposition to many earlier defenders of natural rights, is that rights derive solely from man's rationality, and that any rational being would have the same rights. Unlike most earlier natural-rights philosophers, who used a quasi-utilitarian approach in justifying rights as essential to the "common good," and who therefore conceded that rights may be violated by a government when they don't further the common good, Kant was an absolutist in these matters.

We have a moral duty, according to Kant, to respect the moral autonomy of other persons (i.e., their rights), regardless of what we may think about the common good, and even in "emergency" situations where respecting the rights of others might lead to our own death. Although Rand would presumably agree with the first claim, she certainly disagreed with the second.

Ghs

[anthony]

As a moral issue it is about Life as value, isn't it?

Including that of the sub-human who has lost all right to his.

The objectivist answer of the remote possibility of wrongful execution, (which of course is too terrible

to contemplate) has always rung a little hollow or convenient for me.

It is incontrovertible that one should never 'pass the buck': that one should and must

consistently apply one's own morality, not that of those who have wronged you.

No matter how much they deserve it.

Execution by the State raises such a double standard, I think - and operating

as our Agency, it makes each of us a vengeful executioner, too. I'll take a pass, on that pleasure.

[syrakusos]

See my paper on Reintegrative Shaming and Restorative Justice here. The purpose of justice is to restore the victim to whatever extent is possible. If the victim is dead, some restorative justice is still owed to the perpetrator.

It is broadly true that Objectivists in particular, but conservatives in general as well, speak of "wanton" murderers and "vicious" killers and so on. You paint one of the victims in a color that lets you make them your target. When you generalize from metaphysical unrealities, you achieve nothing. The way to understand this is to begin with the cases.

There are rational killers. They are seldom caught: Only about 15% of homicides are truly premeditated and only about 15% of those result in arrests. Mostly, people kill each other in anger, which is rooted in hurt. So, sorting out the victims is not as easy as we like to think. Even a month later, it is not "premeditated" but only staying emotionally distraught for a month. Often, people have some history of escalating interpersonal violence from verbal through physical, playing out for years. At some tipping point, the legal system gets involved. By then, it is too late. Ideally, restorative justice begins even before the first assault. That it does not is a failure of the criminal justice system, which is to say, a failure of the philosophers.

(Also, just one point of many, the claim that knowing about an execution or actually watching one brings "closure" to the victim's family is malarky. All it does is pass along the violence to still more perpetrating victims.)

Consider shooting a burglar. Is that not pre-emptive self-defense? If someone would steal your property, are they not stealing the time of your life? Do you not have a right to defend your life? If someone would steal a minute of your life, what standard prevents them from taking an hour or a year or a decade? Do you not have a right to kill anyone who would deprive you of your life?

What if you marry someone who promises to take care you and the children you have in common and then you find them sleeping with some slut they met in a bar? Don't you have the right to kill them before they take any more of your life and deny the value of the future to your children?

I offer those cases as examples of the fact that the limits on homicide are much closer than any of the Platonists here have identified. These libertarian philosophers just spin wool without any referents to reality.

My point is that Justice is restorative by its nature. To be that, it must begin at the beginning. The fact is that so-called criminal justice only activates at some arbitrary point and then pretends that no antecedents existed. Thus, it is non-objective... as are most of the philosophical essays about justice...

[George H. Smith]

See my paper on Reintegrative Shaming and Restorative Justice here. The purpose of justice is to restore the victim to whatever extent is possible. If the victim is dead, some restorative justice is still owed to the perpetrator. It is broadly true that Objectivists in particular, but conservatives in general as well, speak of "wanton" murderers and "vicious" killers and so on. You paint one of the victims in a color that lets you make them your target. When you generalize from metaphysical unrealities, you achieve nothing. The way to understand this is to begin with the cases. There are rational killers. They are seldom caught: Only about 15% of homicides are truly premeditated and only about 15% of those result in arrests. Mostly, people kill each other in anger, which is rooted in hurt. So, sorting out the victims is not as easy as we like to think. Even a month later, it is not "premeditated" but only staying emotionally distraught for a month. Often, people have some history of escalating interpersonal violence from verbal through physical, playing out for years. At some tipping point, the legal system gets involved. By then, it is too late. Ideally, restorative justice begins even before the first assault. That it does not is a failure of the criminal justice system, which is to say, a failure of the philosophers. (Also, just one point of many, the claim that knowing about an execution or actually watching one brings "closure" to the victim's family is malarky. All it does is pass along the violence to still more perpetrating victims.)

What you call "restorative justice" is often called "restitution." An excellent and extended defense of the restitution model can be found in Randy Barnett's The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law (Oxford, 1998).

In his book, When the State Kills (Princeton 2001), Austin Sarat presents a persuasive argument that admission of victim impact statements in capital cases (i.e., the testimony of family and friends of the murder victim) has done nothing more than introduce a strong element of personal vengeance into the sentencing process. In general, I would argue that capital punishment is ultimately nothing more than a quest for vengeance. Some proponents of capital punishment see nothing wrong with this, however.

Ghs

[syrakusos]

... admission of victim impact statements in capital cases ... has done nothing more than introduce a strong element of personal vengeance into the sentencing process. ... Some proponents of capital punishment see nothing wrong with this, however. Ghs

Thanks for your reasoned and focused reply. I think that to get past Absolutism to true objectivism, we have to consider the cases in context. In my paper on Braithwaite's theory, I repeat some cases from community justice sources. Among the Visigoths, a woman who is raped can bring suit against her assaulter. If he is found guilty, she can flog him or have one of her relatives do it. Among the Inuit, there was a man who killed his wife. Well, it happens, you know... But then, he killed her brother... So, now we all have a problem. The men all went hunting. He did not come back. Among the Cheyenne, there was a boy who was wild. He took horses and did not return them. He was disrespectful. He ate without hunting. One day, the Dog Soldiers found him on the prairie and they beat him and took his clothes and his horse and his weapons and left him. He walked for days. A chief found him. The chief gave him clothes and a pony and tobacco. The chief sent word to the Dog Soldiers who came for the boy. He was ashamed to live among his own people so he lived with the people in the north where he was respectful. That boy was me. So, I say to you, respect your elders and return the horses you take.

Law by legislation is an absolutist error.

It just seems to me that we want the economic benefit of society without paying the sociological cost of community.

[Brant Gaede]

One problem with capital punishment is the spectacle of years and decades of public consideration of the ultimate fate of a convicted murderer. Criminals should be incarcerated to prevent continuing criminal behavior and to discourage would-be criminals from living that life. The broadest concern is the validity of eye-witness testimony and inaction of police to improve their witness interrogation techniques. I also find the idea of hard labor repulsive. It destroyed Oscar Wilde.

--Brant

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Tony,

As an aside, I'm glad to see you got your technical issues resolved.

Michael

[George H. Smith]

http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/03/16/george-h-smith/comments-on-deterrence/

My first reply in the Cato Unbound discussion on capital punishment is now up. Much of it is devoted to a critique of Cass Sunstein.

Ghs

[anthony]

Tony, As an aside, I'm glad to see you got your technical issues resolved. Michael

Michael, thanks for your forbearance: your suggestion re the Rhino/ Hippo, whachamacallit installation, did the trick.

[Dennis Hardin]

George,

Thanks very much for your response.

Let me ask you a question: Suppose a wanton killer has been justly convicted and sentenced to death. I assume you would maintain that "we" have a right to kill the murderer. Fine, but since every right has a corresponding duty (i.e., moral obligation), I ask, Where is the duty in this case? If we have a right to kill the murderer, does this mean that he has the moral obligation to passively submit and permit himself to be killed? Has the murderer, in other words, completely surrendered or forfeited his right of self-defense in all cases whatsoever?

If my argument from inalienable rights appeared somewhat odd to you, the notion that a person -- any person -- has a moral obligation to permit himself to be killed by others seems very odd to me, especially if we are talking about a theory of egoism.

I would say that morality is no longer applicable to the killer, because the foundation of morality—the objective requirements of human life—is no longer applicable to him. He has forfeited his life. In that context, morality is meaningless.

Moreover, as I discussed in my original article, if the killer literally becomes a rightless being, having forfeited even the basic right of self-defense, then, if we can kill her, why can't we also torture her unmercifully, or boil her in oil, or use her as a sex slave, after selling her to the highest bidder? If such acts are morally impermissible, then this can only be because the killer has retained at least some of her rights. Okay, so which rights has she retained, and why, in spite of being a brutal killer?

Morality remains applicable to those imposing punishment. To engage in gratuitous acts of cruelty and viciousness toward someone who has no rights is immoral by the standard of human rationality. It would be immoral for the enforcers to do this to a convicted killer just as it is immoral for any human to engage in the senseless torture or abuse of animals, who also have no rights.

2. The fact that Kant and Rand (and Branden by implication) used different arguments to justify individual rights is irrelevant to the point I made. Kant and Branden both explicity defended capital punishment by claiming that a murderer deserves to die, and that this is the fundamental moral principle that should guide our moral judgment of capital punishment. Both were strict defenders, in other words, of a retributive theory of punishment.

I disagree that the fundamental moral principle is the conclusion that the killer deserves to die. The fundamental moral principle is the premise which justifies the execution, and the justification derives from the underlying argument. Branden has logical justification for such action. Kant might be correct in his conclusion, but his justification is severely lacking, just as it is for those who execute criminals purely on the basis of deterrence.

3. It is highly misleading to say that Kant did not base his theory of rights on human nature. What Kant insisted upon, in opposition to many earlier defenders of natural rights, is that rights derive solely from man's rationality, and that any rational being would have the same rights. Unlike most earlier natural-rights philosophers, who used a quasi-utilitarian approach in justifying rights as essential to the "common good," and who therefore conceded that rights may be violated by a government when they don't further the common good, Kant was an absolutist in these matters.

We have a moral duty, according to Kant, to respect the moral autonomy of other persons (i.e., their rights), regardless of what we may think about the common good, and even in "emergency" situations where respecting the rights of others might lead to our own death. Although Rand would presumably agree with the first claim, she certainly disagreed with the second.

Ghs

The fundamental difference between Kant and other views which base rights on a concept of human nature is that Kant’s view of maxims of human action-- indispensable 'regulative' principles-- derive from the phenomena of rationality and autonomy, not any metaphysical insight into human nature, since he denies the validity of metaphysical insight into anything. Any conclusions we draw about metaphysical human nature are a tissue of ungrounded assertions resulting from the inevitable tendency of human reason to carry our ideas to that which lies beyond the bounds of human sensibility..

Kant derives moral law and human rights from the concept of rationality itself.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

whachamacallit installation...

Tony,

Just for your edification, CCleaner used to be called "Crap Cleaner."

But the name offended too many folks and they got tired of the complaints. So they changed the name.

Seriously.

Computer geek names and acronyms often hide these gems.

Michael