My Interview With Adam Smith

[Selene]

Let me pose another question: Suppose a thug robs you at gunpoint. We agree that this is an immoral act. But is it immoral primarily because the thug is not acting in his own rational self-interest? Or is it immoral primarily because of the effect it has on you, i.e., because the thug has violated your rights?

Ghs

Now that is a quite skillful question. Eliminating both and neither, I would select door number two (2), since the right resides in me not the thug.

Edited September 26, 2011 by Selene

[Xray]

[Replying to poster WhYNot]:

As for egoism and rights, please explain why it is always in one's self-interest to respect the rights of others. (I am not speaking of emergency situations here.) If, late at night, you see a drunk passed out who has a lot of money hanging out of his pocket, and if you are certain you will not get caught, then why wouldn't it be in your self-interest to steal the money and take off? No one will ever know, except you.

I ask this old question because I have grown tired of assuming the burden of proof in this exchange. I would therefore like more conventional O'ists to do more than cite Rand in a general way. I would like to see some specific arguments that explain how Rand's egoism provides the necessary foundation for rights.

Yes, it serves your interests to have your rights respected by other people, but why it is always in your interest to respect the rights of other people? Why not violate the rights of others when you will suffer no adverse consequences?

I'm am not attempting to be cute here. On the contrary, I addressed this very issue (including the example of a passed out drunk with money) in a 1971 issue of Invictus, in response to a quasi-Stirnerite article titled "Every Man For Himself." (This was one of my first published articles) Thus I can answer my own question, but my answer is not part of the Randian canon. I would therefore like to see how others would deal with this problem. This will give us something specific to deal with, rather than considering vague generalizations about how Rand's egoism supposedly justifies rights.

Ghs

If I were an Objectivist, I would argue that taking the money from the drunk's pocket would be violating the property rights of another individual and therefore be immoral. Since it is claimed in Objectivism that an immoral person cannot act in his/her ['rational'] self-interest, it follows that not stealing the money is in a person's [rational] self-interest.

I'm am not attempting to be cute here. On the contrary, I addressed this very issue (including the example of a passed out drunk with money) in a 1971 issue of Invictus, in response to a quasi-Stirnerite article titled "Every Man For Himself."

Did Lou Rollins write that article? Edited September 26, 2011 by Xray

[George H. Smith]

I'm am not attempting to be cute here. On the contrary, I addressed this very issue (including the example of a passed out drunk with money) in a 1971 issue of Invictus, in response to a quasi-Stirnerite article titled "Every Man For Himself."

Did Lou Rollins write that article?

No, at the time Lou was pretty much an O'ist. I think my subsequent Invictus articles on "Ayn Rand and the Right to Life: A Critical Evaluation" had a lot to do with his later rejection of natural rights, which is why he quoted me several times in The Myth of Natural Rights.

I never intended for my critique of Rand to be construed as a rejection of natural rights. Rather, I planned to write a third part in which I would explain how some tweaking here and there of Rand's theory would resolve the objections that I gave in the first two parts. But when the Nash contract to write ATCAG came along, that plan never materialized, and the negative stuff was all that was ever published.

This was just as well, since Roy Childs convinced me that my critique was based on a misunderstanding of Rand's approach. He said that I had missed the forest for the trees,and he was right.

Ghs

[anthony]

Yes, it serves your interests to have your rights respected by other people, but why it is always in your interest to respect the rights of other people? Why not violate the rights of others when you will suffer no adverse consequences? I'm am not attempting to be cute here. Ghs

Reality, basically. Whether they know it or not, or accept it or not, other people are egoists, also. It is the nature of Man I am talking about, and that I can't refuse some, or confer on others. To presume special licence as only one man in many, would be an affront to my sense of reality (and justice, secondly.). Once that moral identification is made, individual rights seem an easy step. Tony

I basically agree with your analysis, though I would question your statement that "other people are egoists." They may or they may not be, but even if they are altruists (in the sense that they place a high value on helping others), they still have a right to pursue happiness in their own way. Altruists (again, in this limited sense, not in the Randian sense) value helping others; and they need freedom to pursue this value as much as egoists need freedom to pursue their values. Let me pose another question: Suppose a thug robs you at gunpoint. We agree that this is an immoral act. But is it immoral primarily because the thug is not acting in his own rational self-interest? Or is it immoral primarily because of the effect it has on you, i.e., because the thug has violated your rights? Ghs

With the thug - I am on uncertain ground here - but I'd doubt violating my rights is in itself immoral. To say, the thug is immoral, his action is immoral, but is 'infringement of rights' immoral, too. Or simply illegal?

?

But to go on, regular, conventional, morality would dictate the robber to be wrong or evil by consequence - one person gains and one loses from the robbery.

Leaving aside for now the force required, taking something that was not his, would condemn him as 'selfish egoist', therefore primarily immoral because the property came from another person, and so an 'other'-, or, victim-based', act.

Isn't this the hallmark of altruist ethics?

However, Objectively, he is immoral in himself, first and foremost - secondarily arises his effect on other peoples' rights.

By this morality, the thug is anything but an egoist.

To deviate, briefly, I think Objectivists tie themselves in knots often when dealing with altruism-egoism.

If one focuses purely on the "for" aspect("for" others; "for" oneself), an important part of what I believe Rand implicitly meant by the two polar opposites is ignored and discarded.

i.e., the medical doctor who gives up a year to practise in Africa, is choosing to do this for other people, and is therefore altruistic, right?

No, not at all - he is most likely a rational egoist who places value in all life, by the standard of his own.

Which is why I think it is critical to expand the meanings to: "through, by, and for" - others (altruism), or - self (egoism).

So the robber lives 'by and through' his victims - he is an altruist(!) who is not acting in his own self interest.

By themselves, individual rights are no guarantee of a rational and moral, self-directing people - those who choose to "do [or don't do] without being commanded" theoretically have no need of those restrictions; they serve as the last line of defence against those who only desist from infringing acts for "fear of the law". (And of course, protection from our governments - but that's a partially different kettle of fish.)

-IMO

Tony

Edited September 27, 2011 by whYNOT

[Brant Gaede]

To get a good sense of where rights came from intellectually and historically read my grandfather's book The Bill of Rights, It's Origin and Meaning, Irving Brant, 1965. Great intellectual and moral heroes literally put their lives on the line for them. This same kind of heroism was present when all those same kind of men signed the Declaration of Independence in 1776. And what was the pursuit of happiness but an expression of egoism?

America is an idea less and less reflected in the reality of The United States, which is dying under the mantle of unpayable debt and statism. The country cannot be saved, but America--the idea of America--will never die, unless Earth gets hit by a comet or asteroid. This idea is inextricably locked into the individualist part of human nature usually in conflict or tension with man's social needs.

--Brant

Edited September 27, 2011 by Brant Gaede

[George H. Smith]

Before I write any more replies to specific posts, I want to review the troops.

This discussion about the moral foundations of capitalism (or a free society generally) began when I characterized this foundation as the right to pursue one's own values as one sees fit, so long as one respects the equal freedom of others to do the same.

Dennis Hardin disagreed with my statement, claiming instead that Randian egoism -- an ethics more fundamental than rights -- is the only proper moral foundation. Dennis wrote:

She also says that, in her egoistic system, man must be the beneficiary of his own moral actions. To the extent that [Adam]Smith regarded “self-regarding” behavior as something that has to be balanced with “other-regarding” behavior, he was wrong.

Thus this debate, as I understand it, reduces to this: Is it sufficient (as I claim) for a free society that individuals have the right to pursue their own interests, even if they think they have (voluntary) moral obligations to help others? Or is it necessary (as Dennis claims) that individuals be ethical egoists of the Randian variety, who believe that "man must be the beneficiary of his own moral actions"?

I have attempted to state the essentials of this debate fairly. If I have misrepresented Dennis's argument, then he will need to correct me.

In my next post I will make some general comments about this issue, before I return to writing replies.

Ghs.

[George H. Smith]

Okay, let me now see if I can summarize my position in a nontechnical way. For this purpose, I will refer to an unpublished manuscript that John Locke wrote, which is quoted by Maurice Cranston in John Locke: A Biography (1957; Oxford pb 1985, p. 123). I am citing Locke because his views are very similar to the 18th century philosophers that I have discussed on this thread.

Locke writes:

Thus, I think -- it is a man's proper business to seek happiness and avoid misery. Happiness consists in what delights and contents the mind, misery is what disturbs, decomposes, or torments it. I will therefore make it my business to seek satisfaction and delight and avoid uneasiness and disquiet and to have as much of the one and as little of the other as may be....

Question: Is this egoism? Answer: No, not as "egoism" has traditionally been understood. Rather, Locke embraces eudaemonism, according to which happiness is his ultimate value. The difference between egoism and eudaemonism can be illustrated by referring to Locke's list of fundamental goods that he regards as essential to his happiness. After discussing health, reputation, and knowledge, Locke moves to "Doing good," by which he means helping others. He writes:

Doing good. For I find the well-cooked meal I ate today does now no more delight me, nay that I am diseased after a full meal. The perfumes I smelt yesterday now no more affect me with any pleasure. But the good turn I did yesterday, a year, seven years since, continues still to please me, as often as I reflect on it.

Thus, for Locke, certain "good turns" contribute more to his happiness than do more transitory pleasures that are purely self-interested. So does this make Locke an "altruist"? Well, I will leave that question for others to ponder. My point is simply this:

Locke was no Randian egoist; this much is obvious. But if doing good turns contributed to his happiness, and if he recommends that other people do good turns as well, then how could this other-regarding aspect of Locke's personal code of ethics in any way make it impossible for him to be a consistent defender of individual rights and a free society?

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

Seems to me that Rand wanted to take over the entirety of rights' philosophy monopolizing it to Objectivism--and then didn't do all that much with it.

--Brant

[anthony]

Okay, let me now see if I can summarize my position in a nontechnical way.

Thus, for Locke, certain "good turns" contribute more to his happiness than do more transitory pleasures that are purely self-interested. So does this make Locke an "altruist"? Well, I will leave that question for others to ponder. My point is simply this: Locke was no Randian egoist; this much is obvious. But if doing good turns contributed to his happiness, and if he recommends that other people do good turns as well, then how could this other-regarding aspect of Locke's personal code of ethics in any way make it impossible for him to be a consistent defender of individual rights and a free society? Ghs

I'll take a shot.

"Self-regard" ( I cannot deny egoism) is the starting point of values.

One's "other-regard" would be empty and valueless if conducted 1. by coercion 2. by rote. 3. from lack of ego.

Rational egoism directly affects consciousness, an awareness of all life, which translates into genuinely wishing others well.

We have to ask ourselves by whom would we rather be the recipient of an extraordinary "good turn": a regularly self-sacrificing person, or one who is unashamedly self-regarding? Sure, the same consequence, but what's different?

(To repeat my earlier stated conviction, altruism is more significantly living BY, and THROUGH, others - than it is acting for them on occasion.

This is how I use it - though so far I've had no agreement from O'ists - but I'll stick to my guns.)

Was Locke seeking his own eudaemonism? Did he find pleasure in helping others - but apparently not as his only purpose? Did he recommend it to others, without coercion?

Then in the broad sense he was a rational egoist, living by, for, and through himself.

Tony

[George H. Smith]

Okay, let me now see if I can summarize my position in a nontechnical way. Thus, for Locke, certain "good turns" contribute more to his happiness than do more transitory pleasures that are purely self-interested. So does this make Locke an "altruist"? Well, I will leave that question for others to ponder. My point is simply this: Locke was no Randian egoist; this much is obvious. But if doing good turns contributed to his happiness, and if he recommends that other people do good turns as well, then how could this other-regarding aspect of Locke's personal code of ethics in any way make it impossible for him to be a consistent defender of individual rights and a free society? Ghs

I'll take a shot. "Self-regard" ( I cannot deny egoism) is the starting point of values. One's "other-regard" would be empty and valueless if conducted 1. by coercion 2. by rote. 3. from lack of ego. Rational egoism directly affects consciousness, an awareness of all life, which translates into genuinely wishing others well. We have to ask ourselves by whom would we rather be the recipient of an extraordinary "good turn": a regularly self-sacrificing person, or one who is unashamedly self-regarding? Sure, the same consequence, but what's different? (To repeat my earlier stated conviction, altruism is more significantly living BY, and THROUGH, others - than it is acting for them on occasion. This is how I use it - though so far I've had no agreement from O'ists - but I'll stick to my guns.) Was Locke seeking his own eudaemonism? Did he find pleasure in helping others - but apparently not as his only purpose? Did he recommend it to others, without coercion? Then in the broad sense he was a rational egoist, living by, for, and through himself. Tony

Locke made is very clear that happiness is "a man's proper business." As he put it later in the same manuscript: "I will faithfully pursue that happiness I propose to myself."

So what's the big deal if doing "good turns" now and then made Locke happier than eating a good meal? He is not talking about sacrificing his own happiness for the sake of others.

Locke is not a conventional egoist, however, because (like everyone else in his tradition) he thought that you must truly care about the people you choose to help and be motivated primarily by a concern for their welfare; otherwise, good turns will not make you happy. Your own happiness, in this way of thinking, is an indirect result of helping others, not a primary motivation.

In any case, I don't see why any of this would lead us to conclude that Locke's position is inconsistent with individual rights, capitalism, or whatever. As Locke saw the matter, individuals should be free to reach their own decisions, without coercion, in the matters I have discussed. He understood that people differ, and that what makes one person happy might not make another person happy.

Sounds good to me.

Ghs

[rhartford]

. . . I characterized [capitalism's moral] foundation as the right to pursue one's own values as one sees fit, so long as one respects the equal freedom of others to do the same. . . .

The above is not a full characterization because the meaning of "freedom" is not specified. Freedom, or more specifically "a political freedom," is conceptually prior to the concept of rights. A right is an abstract principle that summarizes and describes a set of political freedoms with common characteristics. When a conflict in choice of action occurs, and the conflict cannot be voluntarily resolved, one of the actions is a political freedom and the other action would violate that freedom.

"Because ethics is the discipline devoted to discovering principles for guiding all of an individual’s action, principles for resolving conflicting actions must be derived from a valid ethical system." In doing so one can derive "primary political freedoms" and "secondary political freedoms."

A political standard provides the cognitive guidance to identify the political freedom put in jeopardy by a conflict. The standard will "protect ethically right egoistic action, i.e., primary political freedoms, and the standard will also protect many actions that violate the principles of ethical egoism—actions that are based on erroneous judgment or on some improper epistemological, ethical, or social principle. Although those improper actions are not directly referred to in the criterion for a political standard, analysis in this paper will indicate why many such actions, i.e., secondary political freedoms, are protected by the standard. A secondary political freedom is any action that is not a primary political freedom and does not violate any primary political freedom."

The above quotes a small portion of my paper, "A Political Standard for Absolute Political Freedom." Please see that paper in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, Vol 11. No 1. if you find the above of interest.

[anthony]

In any case, I don't see why any of this would lead us to conclude that Locke's position is inconsistent with individual rights, capitalism, or whatever. As Locke saw the matter, individuals should be free to reach their own decisions, without coercion, in the matters I have discussed. He understood that people differ, and that what makes one person happy might not make another person happy. Sounds good to me. Ghs

Ghs,

This has always sounded good to me, too.

"Laissez-moi faire!"

I can see how a rough code of "live, and let live" will evolve from it, but my burning question is this: Is classical liberalism (which I interpret the above to be) sufficient as a code of ethics?

As the foundation of Capitalism, it is unequalled - but what, in turn, is its foundation?

Tony

Edited September 28, 2011 by whYNOT

[George H. Smith]

In any case, I don't see why any of this would lead us to conclude that Locke's position is inconsistent with individual rights, capitalism, or whatever. As Locke saw the matter, individuals should be free to reach their own decisions, without coercion, in the matters I have discussed. He understood that people differ, and that what makes one person happy might not make another person happy. Sounds good to me. Ghs

Ghs, This has always sounded good to me, too. "Laissez-moi faire!" I can see how a rough code of "live, and let live" will evolve from it, but my burning question is this: Is classical liberalism (which I interpret the above to be) sufficient as a code of ethics? As the foundation of Capitalism, it is unequalled - but what, in turn, is its foundation? Tony

Classical liberalism is a tradition of political thought with many variations, so let's narrow things down by recasting your question as follows: Is individual freedom, as circumscribed and justified by a theory of rights, a sufficient code of ethics?

The answer is No. Rights tell us how we should act toward others in matters of justice, but to say that we should be free from coercive interference by others does not tell us what we should do with our freedom.

As for the foundation of capitalism: Freedom was often regarded by liberals as a kind of transcendental value in a social context. Freedom is a presupposition of the pursuit of happiness (and values generally) in a social context. Freedom, in other words, is a value that transcends any particular moral code, because man, a rational being, cannot use his reason to full effect in his pursuit of happiness without the freedom to act on his own judgment.

I frankly think this is what Rand was getting at when she wrote, "Individual rights are the means of subordinating society to moral law." Rights are "the concept that preserves and protects individual morality in a social context." (VOS, 92)

Rights, according to Rand, protect morality in a social context, not merely egoistic morality. They are "the link between the moral code of a man and the legal code of a society," not merely the egoistic moral code of a man. As Rand put it in "What is Capitalism?"

In a capitalist society, all human relationships are voluntary. Men are free to cooperate or not, to deal with one another or not, as their own individual judgments, convictions, and interests dictate. They can deal with one another only in terms of and by means of reason, i.e., by means of discussion, persuasion, and contractual agreement, by voluntary choice to mutual benefit. (My emphasis)

This is an excellent summary of the classical liberal (or libertarian) position that I have discussed previously. Now consider the following key passage:

It is, therefore, by reference to philosophy that the character of a social system has to be defined and evaluated. Corresponding to the four branches of philosophy, the four keystones of capitalism are: metaphysically, the requirements of man's nature and survival—epistemologically, reason—ethically, individual rights—politically, freedom. (My emphasis.)

Note well that Rand claims that individual rights, not egoism per se, are one of the "four keystones of capitalism." Now we come to what I have long regarded as Rand's most important statement on this topic:

Force invalidates and paralyzes a man's judgment, demanding that he act against it, thus rendering him morally impotent. A value which one is forced to accept at the price of surrendering one's mind, is not a value to anyone; the forcibly mindless can neither judge nor choose nor value. An attempt to achieve the good by force is like an attempt to provide a man with a picture gallery at the price of cutting out his eyes. Values cannot exist (cannot be valued) outside the full context of a man's life, needs, goals, and knowledge.

In this highly significant passage Rand links freedom to values as such, not merely to egoistic values. This is essentially a metaethical argument for rights, or what I previously described as a transcendental argument.

Recall an earlier post in which I quoted some early Christians who claimed that faith has moral value only when it is voluntary. Recall also the argument of some liberals that charity can have moral value only when it is voluntary, because coercion destroys the moral essence of such actions.

This recurring theme is identical to Rand's argument that "Force invalidates and paralyzes a man's judgment, demanding that he act against it, thus rendering him morally impotent." Rand doesn't just claim that force renders the egoist morally impotent; she applies her principle to all moral values.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

In any case, I don't see why any of this would lead us to conclude that Locke's position is inconsistent with individual rights, capitalism, or whatever. As Locke saw the matter, individuals should be free to reach their own decisions, without coercion, in the matters I have discussed. He understood that people differ, and that what makes one person happy might not make another person happy. Sounds good to me. Ghs

Ghs, This has always sounded good to me, too. "Laissez-moi faire!" I can see how a rough code of "live, and let live" will evolve from it, but my burning question is this: Is classical liberalism (which I interpret the above to be) sufficient as a code of ethics? As the foundation of Capitalism, it is unequalled - but what, in turn, is its foundation? Tony

Classical liberalism is a tradition of political thought with many variations, so let's narrow things down by recasting your question as follows: Is individual freedom, as circumscribed and justified by a theory of rights, a sufficient code of ethics?

The answer is No. Rights tell us how we should act toward others in matters of justice, but to say that we should be free from coercive interference by others does not tell us what we should do with our freedom.

As for the foundation of capitalism: Freedom was often regarded by liberals as a kind of transcendental value in a social context. Freedom is a presupposition of the pursuit of happiness (and values generally) in a social context. Freedom, in other words, is a value that transcends any particular moral code, because man, a rational being, cannot use his reason to full effect in his pursuit of happiness without the freedom to act on his own judgment.

I frankly think this is what Rand was getting at when she wrote, "Individual rights are the means of subordinating society to moral law." Rights are "the concept that preserves and protects individual morality in a social context." (VOS, 92)

Rights, according to Rand, protect morality in a social context, not merely egoistic morality. They are "the link between the moral code of a man and the legal code of a society," not merely the egoistic moral code of a man. As Rand put it in "What is Capitalism?"

In a capitalist society, all human relationships are voluntary. Men are free to cooperate or not, to deal with one another or not, as their own individual judgments, convictions, and interests dictate. They can deal with one another only in terms of and by means of reason, i.e., by means of discussion, persuasion, and contractual agreement, by voluntary choice to mutual benefit. (My emphasis)

This is an excellent summary of the classical liberal (or libertarian) position that I have discussed previously. Now consider the following key passage:

It is, therefore, by reference to philosophy that the character of a social system has to be defined and evaluated. Corresponding to the four branches of philosophy, the four keystones of capitalism are: metaphysically, the requirements of man's nature and survival—epistemologically, reason—ethically, individual rights—politically, freedom. (My emphasis.)

Note well that Rand claims that individual rights, not egoism per se, are one of the "four keystones of capitalism." Now we come to what I have long regarded as Rand's most important statement on this topic:

Force invalidates and paralyzes a man's judgment, demanding that he act against it, thus rendering him morally impotent. A value which one is forced to accept at the price of surrendering one's mind, is not a value to anyone; the forcibly mindless can neither judge nor choose nor value. An attempt to achieve the good by force is like an attempt to provide a man with a picture gallery at the price of cutting out his eyes. Values cannot exist (cannot be valued) outside the full context of a man's life, needs, goals, and knowledge.

In this highly significant passage Rand links freedom to values as such, not merely to egoistic values. This is essentially a metaethical argument for rights, or what I previously described as a transcendental argument.

Recall an earlier post in which I quoted some early Christians who claimed that faith has moral value only when it is voluntary. Recall also the argument of some liberals that charity can have moral value only when it is voluntary, because coercion destroys the moral essence of such actions.

This recurring theme is identical to Rand's argument that "Force invalidates and paralyzes a man's judgment, demanding that he act against it, thus rendering him morally impotent." Rand doesn't just claim that force renders the egoist morally impotent; she applies her principle to all moral values.

Ghs

Sure, because you are being forced to do x you are not free to do anything else or be yourself; you are not free to think or choose--you have no more moral agency than a goose being force fed for force de grass.

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

Sure, because you are being forced to do x you are not free to do anything else or be yourself; you are not free to think or choose--you have no more moral agency than a goose being force fed for force de grass.

Maybe this isn't what you intended, but you write as if this insight is so simple as to be virtually self-evident. It is not. On the contrary, the principle involved here and its implications took centuries to develop. A major obstacle that needed to be overcome was what Augustine called "righteous persecution," or what Rand (in some contexts) called "altruism." This consists of coercing people for their own good.

Augustine gives the example of people in a burning building. If you rush in to help and find one person who refuses to leave, you would be justified, according to Augustine, in carrying that person out against his will; and if you did this,he would probably thank you later. Augustine then applied this reasoning to using coercion against heretics, who will (he believed) suffer eternal torment in hell without such intervention.

This type of argument was not easily rebutted, and it is still widely accepted in secular matters, e.g., drug use. In "The Righteous Persecution of Drug Consumers and Other Heretics" (in Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies), I discuss the many parallels between Augustine's arguments for religious persecution and the modern arguments in favor of drug laws.

Ghs

[anthony]

Sure, because you are being forced to do x you are not free to do anything else or be yourself; you are not free to think or choose--you have no more moral agency than a goose being force fed for force de grass. --Brant

I'm thinking in metaphors too, while trying to get things straight in my head.

What comes first - goose, or egg?

Freedom, personal liberty, individual rights, are pre-conditional to making the choice of ethics you value. Certainly.

But will any morality will do, then, as long as it is by choice? Can liberty/individual rights then become a beginning and an end in itself?

Even a code of ethics?

Sounds 'floating abstraction-ish', and shaky in the long term.

Conversely, starting with what is a proper ethics for man - rational egoism - the cart of freedom and rights have a powerful horse to pull them. Even (and necessarily) if it is only the minority that advocate egoism.

Tony

(George, I appreciate you walking me through an argument you must be a little tired of, and excuse any 'dumbing -down' from me.)

[George H. Smith]

(George, I appreciate you walking me through an argument you must be a little tired of, and excuse any 'dumbing -down' from me.)

I don't view myself has having dumbed-down anything, and I have appreciated your comments and questions.

During the many years that I defended the same positions that I have defended on this thread, I have always found that stating and restating the essentials have invariably helped to clarify my own thinking.

After I published Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies in 1991, I took flak from quite a few O'ists for a number of my comments about Rand, such as the following (p. 205):

The least original part of Rand's philosophy is her political theory. Indeed, she says little that was not said many times over by Classical Liberals -- advocates of natural rights, free markets, and limited government -- during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Here, more than anywhere else, many parallel quotations could be place alongside passages from Rand.

Here is one of many examples that I gave:

Rand condemns the initiation of force or the threat of force in human relationships:

The precondition of a civilized society is the barring of physical force -- thus establishing the principle that if men wish to deal with one another, they may do so only by means of

reason

: by discussion, persuasion, and voluntary, uncoerced choice.

Auberon Herbert, like Herbert Spencer and many other nineteenth-century Liberals, made exactly the same point:

Nobody has the moral right to seek his own advantage by force. That is the one unalterable, inviolable condition of a true society. Whether we are many, or whether we are a few, we must learn only to use the weapons of reason, discussion, and persuasion.

In the same essay ("Ayn Rand: Philosophy and Controversy"), after calling attention to the similarities between Rand and some previous philosophers, I wrote:

...I believe that Rand originated most of her ideas; that is, she worked them out for herself, unaware that they had been previously worked out by others. She reinvented a number of wheels, so to speak. Whether this kind of originality is especially praiseworthy is an open question, but it at least demonstrates a remarkable ingenuity.

I do think that Rand was original in a more fundamental sense. A philosophy is (or should be) more than unconnected theories and arguments bundled together by a common name. A philosophy is an integrated and organized system of theories and arguments. Therefore, even if many elements in Objectivism can be found in other philosophers, this does not mean that Objectivism, considered as a philosophical system, is unoriginal.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

Tony, if you want people to repair to your cause--liberals, conservatives, libertarians--the commonality has to be the concrete moral force of individual rights, not a new philosophy centered on a morality of rational self interest or egoism or atheism based on a certain metaphysics and epistemology. Then you are privileged to say, because your audience hasn't evaporated, that, BTW, Objectivism is the general philosophy I use because its epistemology and metaphysics are shared with science and the ethics do not contradict but support and overlap the ethics right there in individual rights. Instead Objectivism simply blew off the conservatives and libertarians practically out of hand preferring to be a Rand-Branden then Rand centered cult--unto this day. The liberals seemed most amenable to wholesale conversion--only a few of them though--if we think of such people as Edith Efron as being one-time liberals.)

--Brant

[Brant Gaede]

(George, I appreciate you walking me through an argument you must be a little tired of, and excuse any 'dumbing -down' from me.)

I don't view myself has having dumbed-down anything, and I have appreciated your comments and questions.

During the many years that I defended the same positions that I have defended on this thread, I have always found that stating and restating the essentials have invariably helped to clarify my own thinking.

After I published Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies in 1991, I took flak from quite a few O'ists for a number of my comments about Rand, such as the following (p. 205):

The least original part of Rand's philosophy is her political theory. Indeed, she says little that was not said many times over by Classical Liberals -- advocates of natural rights, free markets, and limited government -- during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Here, more than anywhere else, many parallel quotations could be place alongside passages from Rand.

Here is one of many examples that I gave:

Rand condemns the initiation of force or the threat of force in human relationships:

The precondition of a civilized society is the barring of physical force -- thus establishing the principle that if men wish to deal with one another, they may do so only by means of

reason

: by discussion, persuasion, and voluntary, uncoerced choice.

Auberon Herbert, like Herbert Spencer and many other nineteenth-century Liberals, made exactly the same point:

Nobody has the moral right to seek his own advantage by force. That is the one unalterable, inviolable condition of a true society. Whether we are many, or whether we are a few, we must learn only to use the weapons of reason, discussion, and persuasion.

In the same essay ("Ayn Rand: Philosophy and Controversy"), after calling attention to the similarities between Rand and some previous philosophers, I wrote:

...I believe that Rand originated most of her ideas; that is, she worked them out for herself, unaware that they had been previously worked out by others. She reinvented a number of wheels, so to speak. Whether this kind of originality is especially praiseworthy is an open question, but it at least demonstrates a remarkable ingenuity.

I do think that Rand was original in a more fundamental sense. A philosophy is (or should be) more than unconnected theories and arguments bundled together by a common name. A philosophy is an integrated and organized system of theories and arguments. Therefore, even if many elements in Objectivism can be found in other philosophers, this does not mean that Objectivism, considered as a philosophical system, is unoriginal.

Ghs

She did come with a complete system integrated apropos its basic principles addressed to the public at large mostly in one great novel. Her best idea was the impotence of evil, but just what that means requires a more sophisticated understanding of human being and interactions than she had because of gross deficiencies in her liberal arts education, and even knowing this I still haven't quite got my own brain around the idea.

--Brant

Edited September 28, 2011 by Brant Gaede

[anthony]

In the same essay ("Ayn Rand: Philosophy and Controversy"), after calling attention to the similarities between Rand and some previous philosophers, I wrote:

...I believe that Rand originated most of her ideas; that is, she worked them out for herself, unaware that they had been previously worked out by others. She reinvented a number of wheels, so to speak. Whether this kind of originality is especially praiseworthy is an open question, but it at least demonstrates a remarkable ingenuity. I do think that Rand was original in a more fundamental sense. A philosophy is (or should be) more than unconnected theories and arguments bundled together by a common name. A philosophy is an integrated and organized system of theories and arguments. Therefore, even if many elements in Objectivism can be found in other philosophers, this does not mean that Objectivism, considered as a philosophical system, is unoriginal.

Ghs

Ghs,

That is a remarkably generous assessment of her originality. It took me a bit by surprise.

If anyone - and you have shown us, and analyzed a bunch of earlier thinkers - would know how often the wheel was invented, you would.

Consequently, I was already moving in the direction of Rand having done vast amounts of reading up on the political philosophers, but yeah, I guess she was a stubbornly independent person who'd have to construct it all herself.

A high accolade of her.

Tony

[George H. Smith]

In the same essay ("Ayn Rand: Philosophy and Controversy"), after calling attention to the similarities between Rand and some previous philosophers, I wrote:

...I believe that Rand originated most of her ideas; that is, she worked them out for herself, unaware that they had been previously worked out by others. She reinvented a number of wheels, so to speak. Whether this kind of originality is especially praiseworthy is an open question, but it at least demonstrates a remarkable ingenuity. I do think that Rand was original in a more fundamental sense. A philosophy is (or should be) more than unconnected theories and arguments bundled together by a common name. A philosophy is an integrated and organized system of theories and arguments. Therefore, even if many elements in Objectivism can be found in other philosophers, this does not mean that Objectivism, considered as a philosophical system, is unoriginal.

Ghs

Ghs,

That is a remarkably generous assessment of her originality. It took me a bit by surprise.

If anyone - and you have shown us, and analyzed a bunch of earlier thinkers - would know how often the wheel was invented, you would.

Consequently, I was already moving in the direction of Rand having done vast amounts of reading up on the political philosophers, but yeah, I guess she was a stubbornly independent person who'd have to construct it all herself.

A high accolade of her.

Tony

When I first met Roy Childs in the early 1970s one thing that drew us together was our common interest in finding philosophers who anticipated some of Ayn Rand's ideas. We were excited by our discoveries because we believed these sources could be used to reinforce Rand's theories. These sources were especially useful in rebutting the common criticism that Rand's ideas were screwball notions that no respectable philosopher would ever use.

Only later did I discover that many O'ists had the opposite reaction. They didn't want to hear about any pre-Rand precedents because these would vitiate their belief that Rand was original in virtually every respect -- a belief that was very important to them. I have never understood this reaction.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

In the same essay ("Ayn Rand: Philosophy and Controversy"), after calling attention to the similarities between Rand and some previous philosophers, I wrote:

...I believe that Rand originated most of her ideas; that is, she worked them out for herself, unaware that they had been previously worked out by others. She reinvented a number of wheels, so to speak. Whether this kind of originality is especially praiseworthy is an open question, but it at least demonstrates a remarkable ingenuity. I do think that Rand was original in a more fundamental sense. A philosophy is (or should be) more than unconnected theories and arguments bundled together by a common name. A philosophy is an integrated and organized system of theories and arguments. Therefore, even if many elements in Objectivism can be found in other philosophers, this does not mean that Objectivism, considered as a philosophical system, is unoriginal.

Ghs

Ghs,

That is a remarkably generous assessment of her originality. It took me a bit by surprise.

If anyone - and you have shown us, and analyzed a bunch of earlier thinkers - would know how often the wheel was invented, you would.

Consequently, I was already moving in the direction of Rand having done vast amounts of reading up on the political philosophers, but yeah, I guess she was a stubbornly independent person who'd have to construct it all herself.

A high accolade of her.

Tony

When I first met Roy Childs in the early 1970s one thing that drew us together was our common interest in finding philosophers who anticipated some of Ayn Rand's ideas. We were excited by our discoveries because we believed these sources could be used to reinforce Rand's theories. These sources were especially useful in rebutting the common criticism that Rand's ideas were screwball notions that no respectable philosopher would ever use.

Only later did I discover that many O'ists had the opposite reaction. They didn't want to hear about any pre-Rand precedents because these would vitiate their belief that Rand was original in virtually every respect -- a belief that was very important to them. I have never understood this reaction.

Ghs

I sort of had this reaction first coming on to her, but it sloughed off me over the years. I can understand somewhat why people start out this way if they are young, but not why they then get an intellectual freeze-up. Maybe it had a lot to do with the it's us against a hostile culture 50 years ago, give or take a few--like in a war. I can do these speculations all day long and to no knowledgeable point.

--Brant

Edited September 29, 2011 by Brant Gaede

[George H. Smith]

When I first met Roy Childs in the early 1970s one thing that drew us together was our common interest in finding philosophers who anticipated some of Ayn Rand's ideas. We were excited by our discoveries because we believed these sources could be used to reinforce Rand's theories. These sources were especially useful in rebutting the common criticism that Rand's ideas were screwball notions that no respectable philosopher would ever use. Only later did I discover that many O'ists had the opposite reaction. They didn't want to hear about any pre-Rand precedents because these would vitiate their belief that Rand was original in virtually every respect -- a belief that was very important to them. I have never understood this reaction. Ghs

I sort of had this reaction first coming on to her, but it sloughed off me over the years. I can understand somewhat why people start out this way if they are young, but not why they then get an intellectual freeze-up. Maybe it had a lot to do with the it's us against a hostile culture 50 years ago, give or take a few--like in a war. I can do these speculations all day long and to no knowledgeable point. --Brant

My interest in parallels (between Rand and other philosophers) came in very handy during my college years. I would frequently mention Rand in various papers for philosophy classes, and not once did I get a bad reaction from a professor. This is because I would always cite or quote Rand along with other (more "respectable") philosophers who defended similar points.

I also used this method when writing ATCAG. If you look at my discussion of "The Contextual Nature of Knowledge" (beginning on page 134), you will see that I quote a number of philosophers -- including the highly respected linguistic philosopher J.L. Austin -- before I mention Rand at all.

Over the years I have heard many students complain that they dare not mention Rand in their philosophy classes. I have responded by suggesting that they use the same tactic I did.

Ghs

[anthony]

Tony, if you want people to repair to your cause--liberals, conservatives, libertarians--the commonality has to be the concrete moral force of individual rights, not a new philosophy centered on a morality of rational self interest or egoism or atheism based on a certain metaphysics and epistemology. Then you are privileged to say, because your audience hasn't evaporated, that, BTW, Objectivism is the general philosophy I use because its epistemology and metaphysics are shared with science and the ethics do not contradict but support and overlap the ethics right there in individual rights. Instead Objectivism simply blew off the conservatives and libertarians practically out of hand preferring to be a Rand-Branden then Rand centered cult--unto this day. The liberals seemed most amenable to wholesale conversion--only a few of them though--if we think of such people as Edith Efron as being one-time liberals.) --Brant

Brant,

I had to stop and think about this (for a change, heh.)

Nowadays, I have pulled in my horns a lot about relating - off-forum that is - my personal philosophy. Of course, I am always happy to discuss ideas with anyone genuinely interested. Finding common ground with many is a pleasure.

Conversations usually begin with politics (obviously), which is the perfect entree to capitalism, then on to individual rights.

And how these are so misunderstood or falsified.

By which time, if my "audience hasn't evaporated", I *gently* introduce morality.

So yes, your advice is solid and good; however it is only with my closest friends, and on OL, that I am so insistent (and persistent) about the significance of rational egoism.

Tony

(I don't think this is straying off-topic, but I must add a point that makes comparison between our respective countries. You over there still have a deep self-identity with individualism and individual rights - which I sense, as the pendulum starts to swing back from its recent apogee, will be the saving grace of America.

I have given up on my country, mostly, excepting of course several fine people I know exist here. Collectivist-altruism is so embedded in our identity that the Statist pendulum is accelerating daily in one direction. With an O'ist background it's quite simple to spot the terrible fallacies and their probable outcome.

All this hopefully explains my loathing of any tamed society, beaten down by the State, and why I cannot help but go 'over the top' sometimes for a rational, objective ethics.)

T.

Edited September 29, 2011 by whYNOT

[anthony]

When I first met Roy Childs in the early 1970s one thing that drew us together was our common interest in finding philosophers who anticipated some of Ayn Rand's ideas. We were excited by our discoveries because we believed these sources could be used to reinforce Rand's theories. These sources were especially useful in rebutting the common criticism that Rand's ideas were screwball notions that no respectable philosopher would ever use. Only later did I discover that many O'ists had the opposite reaction. They didn't want to hear about any pre-Rand precedents because these would vitiate their belief that Rand was original in virtually every respect -- a belief that was very important to them. I have never understood this reaction. Ghs

I know something about the syndrome. It's called "I only dance with the one that brung me".

(Apologies and thanks to Carol.)

Self evidently, most of us had our first taste of philosophy with AR.

The historical perspective only arrives much later.

Tony