What Are We?

[john42t]

Edit: Okay, so Objectivists do not deny causality, but they also do not deny that we are the source of our own choices... How, if at all, is this different from Compatibilism?

I don't think it is different from Compatibilism. Or rather Compatibilism is compatible to Objectivism.

Objectivism doesn't concern itself with the question of total causality, that's part of physics.

Objectivism is concerned with people who argue with physical arguements against free will in order to discourage the ambitious and excuse the criminal.

[BaalChatzaf]

Objectivism is concerned with people who argue with physical arguements against free will in order to discourage the ambitious and excuse the criminal.

How about people who use physics arguments to show free will is an illusion. We are physical beings and every last thing about is bounded and constrained by physical laws. We are material and physical right down to the atomic level. There is NOTHING about us that is NOT physical. Not a blessed thing.

We are meat. Plain and simple.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Dglgmut]

Selene: Isn't the "What if?" in this case simply curiosity of reality? With causality, you have to assume there's a possible explanation for everything, or there's not... until we do build a machine like that. But surely it's safer to assume that everything has a cause, as otherwise, we're castrating our own ability to reason.

Ba'al: If free will is an illusion, then we are simply experiencing action, and are not actually involved in the process. I don't see how we could possibly ask questions if we were being forced to do everything we do.

Being what you are should not be considered un-free.

And with the meat thing... We are single things, are we not? Why do you insist that, not only are we a massive group of particles, but one that is constantly changing?

[anthony]

Selene: Isn't the "What if?" in this case simply curiosity of reality? With causality, you have to assume there's a possible explanation for everything, or there's not... until we do build a machine like that. But surely it's safer to assume that everything has a cause, as otherwise, we're castrating our own ability to reason. Ba'al: If free will is an illusion, then we are simply experiencing action, and are not actually involved in the process. I don't see how we could possibly ask questions if we were being forced to do everything we do. Being what you are should not be considered un-free. And with the meat thing... We are single things, are we not? Why do you insist that, not only are we a massive group of particles, but one that is constantly changing?

Maybe, you are overlooking the fact that each of us initiates his own causality? Self-evidently.

I don't know - then the concretists are going to answer that THAT was determined. Circular.

You are never going to convince physical determinists that we are more than the sum of our parts.

Even with the recent findings in neuroscience that we can deliberately open new neural pathways of the brain.

Boring stick-in -the-muds.

Tony

[Peter]

Dglgmut wrote:

And with the meat thing... We are single things, are we not? Why do you insist that, not only are we a massive group of particles, but one that is constantly changing?. . . Boring stick in the muds.

end quote

George has a book coming out. He might appreciate some free advertising so here are a few of his Causality – Volition letters.

Peter

From: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

Reply-To: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

To: "*Atlantis" <atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: Aristotle on choice

Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2003 11:09:06 -0600

As I have noted before, one of the best treatments of "choice" ever written appears in Book III of Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics.* The following sketch of his basic points is from the translation by W.D. Ross in *The Basic Works of Aristotle,* ed. Richard McKeon (Random House, 1941).

This summary is taken from Aristotle's introductory remarks on pp. 967-71, after which he explains and defends his views in more detail -- so please don't take this as a comprehensive statement. I encourage everyone to read Aristotle's discussion in its entirety, for two reasons. First, it exerted an enormous influence on subsequent advocates of "free will." Second, it is filled with insights, distinctions, and arguments that every volitionist (including Objectivists) will find of value, even if they take exception to some points.

Summary

Choice does not pertain to what is impossible. We can wish for something impossible (e.g., immortality), but we cannot choose it. An agent chooses "only the things that he thinks could be brought about by his own efforts." Wish relates the end of action, whereas choice relates to the means. For example, we can wish to be healthy but we cannot choose to be healthy per se, because this does not lie directly in our power. Instead, we choose *means,* or specific actions, that we think will make us healthy.

Choice "involves a rational principle and thought." This means that choice is preceded by deliberation. This distinguishes the realm of choice from the realm of the voluntary. All chosen actions are voluntary, but not all voluntary actions are chosen. Something is voluntary if "the moving principle is in the agent himself, he being aware of the particular circumstances of the action." Hence if we act spontaneously from a strong passion, this action is voluntary (i.e., it was not compelled by an external agent) but not chosen per se, because it was not the result of deliberation.

The same is true of habitual actions. These are voluntary but not chosen, since to act from habit is to act without conscious reflection or deliberation. We can, however, choose means that we believe will alter our habits; and it is also the case that our habits are the result of earlier choices. This notion of indirect choice (which is my characterization, not Aristotle's) plays a crucial role in Aristotle's treatment of virtues and vices, which are essentially good and bad moral habits.

(Aristotle's distinction between the voluntary and the chosen – which he discusses in far more detail than indicated here -- is relevant to the topic of soft determinism. He would maintain that the soft determinist confuses voluntary actions with chosen actions. Suppose that all of our actions are necessitated by antecedent causes. Although these determined actions can be described a "voluntary" (because the source of action lies within the agent), they are not a matter of choice. This is because choice presupposes deliberation, and we deliberate only about *alternatives* that we regard as both possible and within our power to do or not to do. )

Aristotle asks: "Do we deliberate about everything, and is everything a possible subject of deliberation, or is deliberation impossible about some things?"

We do not deliberate about things that occur necessarily or by nature, nor about chance events. (These are other ways of saying that we do not deliberate about things that lie outside of our control.) For instance, we do not deliberate about solstices, droughts or rains, nor about the accidental finding of a treasure. Nor do we deliberate about every human action, but only about those things that "can be brought about by our own efforts."

In short, "we deliberate about things that are in our own power and can be done." This means that we do not deliberate about the conclusions of the exact sciences in which conclusions follow with logical necessity from evident premises. Nor do we deliberate about how the letters of the alphabet shall be written, for such matters have already been determined (by convention, in this case) and present no options. Deliberation is possible only when (1) alternatives are possible, and (2) these alternatives lie within our own power to do or not to do. "Deliberation is concerned with things that happen in a certain way for the most part, but in which the event is obscure, and with things in which it is indeterminate."

"We deliberate about ends but not about means." A doctor qua doctor does not deliberate about whether he shall heal, for this purpose is a defining characteristic of his profession. This end is assumed -- it is accepted as a given by the doctor qua doctor -- who deliberates only about the means appropriate to healing, when different options present themselves and a course of action is not absolutely dictated by logical necessity. (Aristotle obviously does not deny that one can deliberate about becoming a doctor, but in this case the profession is viewed as a *means* to some other end, e.g., a fulfilling way of life, a good living, or happiness.)

All deliberation is a type of investigation; to deliberate is to consider various means and to assess their relative desirability vis-à-vis a given end. And if, during the course of this investigation, we encounter an impossibility, we "give up the search" because we realize that something is not within our power. (E.g., "if we need money and this cannot be got; but if a thing appears possible we try to do it.") Deliberation "is about the things to be done by the agent himself, and actions are for the sake of things other than themselves."

The object of deliberation in a particular case is the same as the object of choice, "except that the object of choice is already determinate, since it is that which has been decided upon as a result of deliberation that is the object of choice." Again: "The object of choice being one of the things in our own power which is desired after deliberation, choice will be deliberate desire of things in our own power; for when we have decided as a result of deliberation, we desire in accordance with our deliberation."

(The term "deliberate desire" is very important. Aristotle denies that our choices are necessitated by our desires. True, we don't choose something unless we desire it in some sense, but can generate, and thereby control, our desires through deliberation, which is an intellectual process that a person has the power to initiate and direct. To put the same point in Randian terms, feelings are not a primary.)

Ghs

From: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

Reply-To: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

To: "*Atlantis" <atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: Re: Aristotle on choice

Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2003 17:21:29 -0600

Regarding my summary of "Aristotle on choice," Peter Taylor wrote:

"George, I know we are delving into the realm of psychology and psychologizing but what would Aristotle say about the consequences of thinking of oneself as a determined being? I try to imagine myself in that bizarre position and I can only imagine acting in a nihilistic manner, coming to a crossroads, and going which ever way "seems" right for me. The alternative is paranoia and waiting for the decision to be made by antecedent causality."

Aristotle doesn't discuss the free-will/determinism controversy explicitly (at least not in his extant texts). He seems to consider the power to choose freely to be an obvious characteristic of rational and purposeful human beings, one that is clearly revealed through introspection. And I think he would further maintain that a consistent empiricist should take introspective evidence as seriously as he takes extrospective evidence, especially since knowledge based on the latter *depends* on the reliability of the former. In short, if we cannot trust our internal experiences, then we have no foundation on which to base objective knowledge of anything, including the external world. .

In his classic book, *Outlines of Greek Philosophy,* Eduard Zeller writes: "Aristotle presupposes quite arbitrarily the freedom of the will and attempts to prove it by the fact that virtue is voluntary and that we are universally held accountable for our actions" (Dover, 1980). Although I wouldn't put it this way -- for one thing, I think "arbitrarily" is an inaccurate characterization-- it is certainly correct to say that Aristotle's stresses the inextricable relationship between free choice and moral phenomena. It is scarcely coincidental that Aristotle discusses "choice" in his work on ethics, where he repeatedly emphasizes that moral judgments apply *only* to actions that lie within our power to do or to forbear.

According to Aristotle, "where it is in our power to act, it is also in our power not to act, and vice versa." This power of choice originates in reason. Choice is the "efficient cause" of an action, but the cause of choice is "desire and reasoning with view to an end." This latter is deliberation, which is a function of practical (as opposed to theoretic, or speculative) reason. Depending on the context, Aristotle also describes this fusion of reason and desire as "desiderative reason" and "ratiocinative desire." Here is a summary from Mortimer J. Adler's magnum opus, *The Idea of Freedom* (vol. I, p 469):

"Beyond desiderative and practical reason, as the power by which man deliberates and chooses, there is no efficient cause of the choices he makes. When Aristotle, referring to desiderative reason, says that 'such an *origin* of action is a man,' he is attributing to a human being the power of *initiating* his own actions by virtue of his practical reason as a first or active moving principle. Just as in the speculative order (i.e., the sphere of knowing) Aristotle posits the *agent*-intellect which acts without being acted upon, so in the practical order (i.e., the sphere of doing or making) he treats practical reason as an *active* power and a *first* cause -- a first cause, that is, with respect to man's own acts, not with respect to the cosmos."

This is background information. I have yet directly to address Peter's question, viz: "what would Aristotle say about the consequences of thinking of oneself as a determined being?" I suspect he would maintain that determinism in any form flatly contradicts introspective evidence, and that it would make nonsense of our subjective experiences. There are a number of reasons for this, but the most obvious is our need for deliberation. We deliberate *only* because we believe that two or more alternatives are possible, and that it within our to choose among these alternatives. For Aristotle (as I noted above) choice presupposes "the power to act" or "not to act" in regard to particular means. .

This raises the interesting question of how Aristotle would argue against determinism. I suspect his argument would resemble his argument (in the *Metaphysics*) against a person who claims to deny the Law of Non-Contradiction (e.g., a person who claims that the same proposition can be both true and false at the same time and in the same respect). Aristotle contends that not all knowledge is strictly demonstrable, because we will ultimately encounter premises and axioms that cannot themselves be proven. Nevertheless, there is a kind of argument – which he calls "dialectical" -- that can be used here.

Unlike a demonstrative argument, which begins with "first principles," a dialectical argument begins with the *opinions* that men hold about a certain subject. The purpose of a dialectical argument is to back one's adversary into an untenable corner by showing that his opinion carries implications that even he would be unwilling to accept. As Zeller indicates, Aristotle would claim that a consistent determinist would be logically required to expunge all normative terms from his language and way of thinking, which is clearly impossible.

It is also likely (though I am obviously speculating here) that Aristotle would argue against the determinist by pointing out that deliberation itself presupposes free choice. We do not deliberate about things which we believe to be impossible. Deliberation *begins* at the point where we believe that various means are possible* for us. Hence if we truly believed that only *one* action is possible, there would be nothing to deliberate *about.* We *stop* our investigation of means *precisely* at the point where we become convinced that something is *impossible.* Hence to deliberate between different means, X and Y, presupposes that we believe that we have the power to choose *either* X or Y.

Therefore, just as Aristotle claims that a person who denies the Law of Non-Contradiction reduces himself to the intellectual status of a vegetable, so he would probably maintain that the person who implicitly repudiates the function of deliberative reason, which chooses between *possible* means in pursuit of a goal, reduces himself to the status of a lower animal or automaton, in effect, by failing to understand the proper role of reason as an efficient cause (a fundamental explanatory principle) of human action.

Ghs

From: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

Reply-To: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

To: "*Atlantis" <atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: Re: Aristotle on choice

Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2003 18:07:38 -0600

I wrote:

"(Aristotle's distinction between the voluntary and the chosen – which he discusses in far more detail than indicated here -- is relevant to the topic of soft determinism. He would maintain that the soft determinist confuses voluntary actions with chosen actions."

Bill Dwyer replied:

"On the contrary, the distinction that Aristotle makes between voluntary and chosen actions is perfectly compatible with soft determinism, for the soft determinist would say that our choice to deliberate is itself determined by our interest in deciding which alternative is most worth choosing."

The determinist might say this, but Aristotle would not. Aristotle would say that the choice to deliberate is caused by the *agent,* not his "interests."

I sometimes wonder if any philosopher has ever written anything about this subject that Bill would not claim is somehow compatible with soft determinism. In any case, I was discussing *Aristotle's* distinction between voluntary actions and chosen actions, not Bill's. Aristotle makes it *very* clear that a "choice" entails the *metaphysical* power to do or not to do a particular action. If only one alternatives is possible (and the reason for this necessity, be it internal or external, is irrelevant to Aristotle argument), then deliberation is pointless and authentic choice is impossible.

We need to distinguish between our understanding of Aristotle and how a determinist might respond to his arguments. Bill's analysis clearly runs contrary to the central idea behind Aristotle's distinction. For Aristotle, deliberation involves matters that are contingent rather than necessary, and without deliberation there can be no choice. A deliberation that is somehow necessitated by antecedent causes makes no sense within Aristotle's framework, as he made clear on many occasions.

I wrote:

"Suppose that all of our actions are necessitated by antecedent causes. Although these determined actions can be described as "voluntary" (because the source of action lies within the agent), they are not a matter of choice. This is because choice presupposes deliberation, and we deliberate only about *alternatives* that we regard as both possible and within our power to do or not to do.)"

Bill replied:

"Yes, alternatives that we regard as possible and within our power to do IF we decide they are ~worth~ doing, and as possible and within our power ~not~ to do IF we decide they are ~not~ worth doing. It is this kind of conditional possibility that is a pre-requisite for choice. The action must be within our power to do ~if~ we decide that it's worth choosing. But it does not have to be within our power to do, if we decide that it's NOT worth choosing."

Aristotle would claim that Bill doesn't understand the nature of deliberation. We deliberate in order to *decide* whether or not an action is worth doing, but before we can do this we must *first* believe that the action is *possible* for us to do. Hence if we didn't first believe that two or more alternatives are *possible* for us, we would not use deliberative reason in order to decide which is the most desirable.

For Aristotle, the *metaphysical* judgment of whether an action is *possible* precedes (and is presupposed by) the *normative* judgment of whether it is *desirable.* If we have already decided that an action is desirable, then there is no *need* for deliberation, for this means we have *already* decided on a course of action. We deliberate for the *purpose* of determining what is desirable and what is not. This is what Aristotle means in speaking of a "deliberate desire." This is a desire that follows from deliberation, and is caused by it.

I must say that Bill's arguments about what is supposedly in our power if we value or desire such and such don't make a lot of sense to me, especially when we take into account his argument from an earlier post, namely, that *all* of our choices, desires, actions, etc., were strictly determined billions of years ago (extending into infinity) by causal events which we are absolutely powerless to change. This thesis renders his circular arguments about hypothetical possibilities even more pointless. This is hard determinism that will not speak its mind.

Bill raises some additional issues that I will try to discuss at a later time.

Ghs

From: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

Reply-To: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

To: "*Atlantis" <atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: Re: Aristotle on choice

Date: Fri, 3 Jan 2003 01:35:45 -0600

[This is a continuation of an earlier post.]

Bill Dwyer wrote:

"Question: Does Aristotle believe that we choose to deliberate?"

We have no choice but to deliberate about *something* if we are to take any actions at all. This is necessary for survival. But, according to Aristotle, we can choose *what* to deliberate about and *how* we deliberate -- e.g., , which particular aspect of an goal or means we choose to focus on, how long we shall continue to deliberate, which standards of evaluation are appropriate to a given deliberation, etc, etc.

This general ability -- which Aquinas described as the power "to consider or not to consider" and which William James described as the power of "selective attention" -- is nicely summarized by Michael Maher in his Thomistic text, *Psychology: Empirical and Rational* (Longmans, 1925, p. 406):

"If I study by introspection any process of voluntary attention, such as that involved in recalling a forgotten incident, or in guessing a riddle, I observe that I *myself* deliberately *guide* the course of my thoughts. I am conscious that I do this by fostering the strength of some ideas, and starving others....I determine not only what representations, but what *aspect of those representations* shall occupy my consciousness. In such cases I am conscious of exerting *free volition.* Further, throughout this process I apprehend myself as *causing* my mental activity -- I am immediately conscious of my attention as the *exercise of free causal energy* put forth by me.".

Bill continued:

"Apparently not, if he holds that deliberation ~precedes~ choice."

Thinking is a much broader activity than deliberation, which is a type of practical thinking that focuses on a particular goal. Aristotle did not believe that we can literally choose to think from scratch, for to be conscious is already to be thinking to some degree. Indeed, as he indicates in "On Dreams," Aristotle believed that we continue to think to some extent even while dreaming. (It would take a while to explain all of this.)

Aristotle held that all actions are motivated by our "appetitive faculty," which may roughly be described as "desire." We are not motivated by pure, or "speculative," reason alone. Only when reason is blended with desire are we motivated to act. The ultimate goal of all action is "happiness" (which is the same thing as the "good" when viewed from an intellectual perspective) -- this is part of our nature that we cannot change.

But Aristotle also maintained that man is not born with an innate or automatic knowledge of the good. In pursuing the "apparent good" (i.e., that which he thinks is good), he can be mistaken. He therefore has a standing motive to deliberate about those possible courses of action that will realize his potential as a rational being and further his happiness. But this is merely an incentive, not a necessitating cause. The only necessity here is the necessity to act according to *some* judgment of the apparent good, if we are to act at all. Our *particular* deliberations, in contrast, are a matter of choice.

It would be a serious error to suppose that Aristotle equates motives with necessitating causes. Of course we have a motive to deliberate, namely, our *desire* to take actions that will make us happy. But since this motive alone does not necessitate any *specific* deliberation, neither does it necessitate any *particular* choice, which is merely the end result of the deliberative process. (Basically, when you *choose* to stop deliberating, you have made a de facto choice.)

Bill wrote:

"His view would seem to conflict, then, with Objectivism's, in which we do choose to deliberate (i.e., to think)."

No, there is no conflict here at all. Even Rand didn't maintain that we "choose to think" in the sense of moving from a literal state of unconsciousness to a state of consciousness. Rather, she meant that we increase the level, or intensity, of our awareness.

You wish to push Aristotle into an infinite regress, but this doesn't hold. If, as Aristotle believed, thinking is a natural activity of the human mind, then we are already thinking on some level *before* we choose to deliberate about a particular subject. The volitional agent can control the intensity and direction of his thinking. This is all that is required.

There are other issues involved here. For example, Aristotle would maintain that reasoning, an acquired skill, eventually becomes habitual in the form of an "intellectual virtue." This means that we don't methodically deliberate about choosing to deliberate, and so on ad infinitum, in each and every case. Rather, we frequently focus our attention as a matter of habit, when a situation presents itself that we recognize, from past experience, as one that requires our undivided attention. Aristotle somewhere notes that deliberation can occur in flash, once the procedure has become automatic. (I recall that Rand makes a similar point as well.)

Moreover, deliberation does not differ in kind from other kinds of reasoning. It is merely practical reason applied to a particular goal. As I noted before, deliberation does not jump-start itself. It is set in motion by a desire, after which we choose to think about the desire from various angles in order to decide whether or not to act upon it – and if so, how. The determinist will understand none of this, so long as he views a motive as if it were the first domino in a long line of dominos, such that after the first one falls all others must fall after it. This was of thinking was totally alien to Aristotle's approach to human psychology.

Bill wrote:

"Indeed, according to Objectivism, our only real choice ~is~ the choice to deliberate or not to deliberate -- to think or not to think. Every other choice is consequent upon it and is, therefore, according to Objectivism, not itself a real choice (at least, not a ~free~ choice)."

First, I am not altogether convinced that this was Rand's view. Second, if it was Rand's position, then Aristotle would have disagreed with it -- and so do I. We have many, many "free" choices beyond the "choice to think." To say that this choice is fundamental is *not* to say that it is our *only* authentic choice.

Ghs

[Peter]

These might help.

Peter

NOTES From the Ayn Rand Lexicon

Volition: See Free Will

Free Will

That which you call your soul or spirit is your consciousness, and that which you call “free will” is your mind’s freedom to think or not, the only will you have, your only freedom, the choice that controls all the choices you make and determines your life and your character. Galt’s Speech, For the New Intellectual, 127.

To think is an act of choice. The key to what you so recklessly call “human nature,” the open secret you live with, yet dread to name, is the fact that man is a being of volitional consciousness. Reason does not work automatically; thinking is not a mechanical process; the connections of logic are not made by instinct. The function of your stomach, lungs or heart is automatic; the function of your mind is not. In any hour and issue of your life, you are free to think or to evade that effort. But you are not free to escape from your nature, from the fact that reason is your means of survival—so that for you, who are a human being, the question “to be or not to be” is the question “to think or not to think.”

A being of volitional consciousness has no automatic course of behavior. He needs a code of values to guide his actions. Galt’s Speech, For the New Intellectual, 120.

Man’s consciousness shares with animals the first two stages of its development: sensations and perceptions; but it is the third state, conceptions, that makes him man. Sensations are integrated into perceptions automatically, by the brain of a man or of an animal. But to integrate perceptions into conceptions by a process of abstraction, is a feat that man alone has the power to perform—and he has to perform it by choice. The process of abstraction, and of concept-formation is a process of reason, of thought; it is not automatic nor instinctive nor involuntary nor infallible. Man has to initiate it, to sustain it and to bear responsibility for its results. The pre-conceptual level of consciousness is nonvolitional; volition begins with the first syllogism. Man has the choice to think or to evade—to maintain a state of full awareness or to drift from moment to moment, in a semi-conscious daze, at the mercy of whatever associational whims the unfocused mechanism of his consciousness produces. “For the New Intellectual,” For the New Intellectual, 14.

Reason is the faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by man’s senses. It is a faculty that man has to exercise by choice. Thinking is not an automatic function. In any hour and issue of his life, man is free to think or to evade that effort. Thinking requires a state of full, focused awareness. The act of focusing one’s consciousness is volitional. Man can focus his mind to a full, active, purposefully directed awareness of reality—or he can unfocus it and let himself drift in a semiconscious daze, merely reacting to any chance stimulus of the immediate moment, at the mercy of his undirected sensory-perceptual mechanism and of any random, associational connections it might happen to make.

When man unfocuses his mind, he may be said to be conscious in a subhuman sense of the word, since he experiences sensations and perceptions. But in the sense of the word applicable to man—in the sense of a consciousness which is aware of reality and able to deal with it, a consciousness able to direct the actions and provide for the survival of a human being—an unfocused mind is not conscious.

Psychologically, the choice “to think or not” is the choice “to focus or not.” Existentially, the choice “to focus or not” is the choice “to be conscious or not.” Metaphysically, the choice “to be conscious or not” is the choice of life or death . . . .

A process of thought is not automatic nor “instinctive” nor involuntary—nor infallible. Man has to initiate it, to sustain it and to bear responsibility for its results. He has to discover how to tell what is true or false and how to correct his own errors; he has to discover how to validate his concepts, his conclusions, his knowledge; he has to discover the rules of thought, the laws of logic, to direct his thinking. Nature gives him no automatic guarantee of the efficacy of his mental effort.

Nothing is given to man on earth except a potential and the material on which to actualize it. The potential is a superlative machine: his consciousness; but it is a machine without a spark plug, a machine of which his own will has to be the spark plug, the self-starter and the driver; he has to discover how to use it and he has to keep it in constant action. The material is the whole of the universe, with no limits set to the knowledge he can acquire and to the enjoyment of life he can achieve. But everything he needs or desires has to be learned, discovered and produced by him—by his own choice, by his own effort, by his own mind . . . .

That which [man’s] survival requires is set by his nature and is not open to his choice. What is open to his choice is only whether he will discover it or not, whether he will choose the right goals and values or not. He is free to make the wrong choice, but not free to succeed with it. He is free to evade reality, he is free to unfocus his mind and stumble blindly down any road he pleases, but not free to avoid the abyss he refuses to see. Knowledge, for any conscious organism, is the means of survival; to a living consciousness, every “is” implies an “ought.” Man is free to choose not to be conscious, but not free to escape the penalty of unconsciousness: destruction. Man is the only living species that has the power to act as his own destroyer—and that is the way he has acted through most of his history. “The Objectivist Ethics,” The Virtue of Selfishness, 21.

The faculty of volition operates in regard to the two fundamental aspects of man’s life: consciousness and existence, i.e., his psychological action and his existential action, i.e., the formation of his own character and the course of action he pursues in the physical world. “What Is Romanticism?” The Romantic Manifesto, 100.

A social environment can neither force a man to think nor prevent him from thinking. But a social environment can offer incentives or impediments; it can make the exercise of one’s rational faculty easier or harder; it can encourage thinking and penalize evasion or vice versa. “Our Cultural Value-Deprivation,”

The Objectivist, April 1966, 2.

A man’s volition is outside the power of other men. What the unalterable basic constituents are to nature, the attribute of a volitional consciousness is to the entity “man.” Nothing can force a man to think. Others may offer him incentives or impediments, rewards or punishments, they may destroy his brain by drugs or by the blow of a club, but they cannot order his mind to function: this is in his exclusive, sovereign power. Man is neither to be obeyed nor to be commanded. “The Metaphysical Versus the Man-Made,” Philosophy: Who Needs It, 31.

Because man has free will, no human choice—and no phenomenon which is a product of human choice—is metaphysically necessary. In regard to any man-made fact, it is valid to claim that man has chosen thus, but it was not inherent in the nature of existence for him to have done so: he could have chosen otherwise.

Choice, however, is not chance. Volition is not an exception to the Law of Causality; it is a type of causation. Leonard Peikoff “The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy,” Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 110.

Man exists and his mind exists. Both are part of nature, both possess a specific identity. The attribute of volition does not contradict the fact of identity, just as the existence of living organisms does not contradict the existence of inanimate matter. Living organisms possess the power of self-initiated motion, which inanimate matter does not possess; man’s consciousness possesses the power of self-initiated motion in the realm of cognition (thinking), which the consciousnesses of other living species do not possess. But just as animals are able to move only in accordance with the nature of their bodies, so man is able to initiate and direct his mental action only in accordance with the nature (the identity) of his consciousness. His volition is limited to his cognitive processes; he has the power to identify (and to conceive of rearranging) the elements of reality, but not the power to alter them. He has the power to use his cognitive faculty as its nature requires, but not the power to alter it nor to escape the consequences of its misuse. He has the power to suspend, evade, corrupt or subvert his perception of reality, but not the power to escape the existential and psychological disasters that follow. (The use or misuse of his cognitive faculty determines a man’s choice of values, which determine his emotions and his character. It is in this sense that man is a being of self-made soul.) “The Metaphysical Versus the Man-Made,”

Philosophy: Who Needs It, 26.

Consciousness

Existence exists—and the act of grasping that statement implies two corollary axioms: that something exists which one perceives and that one exists possessing consciousness, consciousness being the faculty of perceiving that which exists.

If nothing exists, there can be no consciousness: a consciousness with nothing to be conscious of is a contradiction in terms. A consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms: before it could identify itself as consciousness, it had to be conscious of something. If that which you claim to perceive does not exist, what you possess is not consciousness.

Whatever the degree of your knowledge, these two—existence and consciousness—are axioms you cannot escape, these two are the irreducible primaries implied in any action you undertake, in any part of your knowledge and in its sum, from the first ray of light you perceive at the start of your life to the widest erudition you might acquire at its end. Whether you know the shape of a pebble or the structure of a solar system, the axioms remain the same: that it exists and that you know it . . . Existence is Identity, Consciousness is Identification. Galt’s Speech, For the New Intellectual, 124.

Consciousness is the faculty of awareness—the faculty of perceiving that which exists.

Awareness is not a passive state, but an active process. On the lower levels of awareness, a complex neurological process is required to enable man to experience a sensation and to integrate sensations into percepts; that process is automatic and non-volitional: man is aware of its results, but not of the process itself. On the higher, conceptual level, the process is psychological, conscious and volitional. In either case, awareness is achieved and maintained by continuous action.

Directly or indirectly, every phenomenon of consciousness is derived from one’s awareness of the external world. Some object, i.e., some content, is involved in every state of awareness. Extrospection is a process of cognition directed outward—a process of apprehending some existent(s) of the external world. Introspection is a process of cognition directed inward—a process of apprehending one’s own psychological actions in regard to some existent(s) of the external world, such actions as thinking, feeling, reminiscing, etc. It is only in relation to the external world that the various actions of a consciousness can be experienced, grasped, defined or communicated. Awareness is awareness of something. A content-less state of consciousness is a contradiction in terms. Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 37.

The first and primary axiomatic concepts are “existence,” “identity” (which is a corollary of “existence”) and “consciousness.” One can study what exists and how consciousness functions; but one cannot analyze (or “prove”) existence as such, or consciousness as such. These are irreducible primaries. (An attempt to “prove” them is self-contradictory: it is an attempt to “prove” existence by means of non-existence, and consciousness by means of unconsciousness.) Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 73.

Consciousness—for those living organisms which possess it—is the basic means of survival. “The Objectivist Ethics,” The Virtue of Selfishness, 18.

Man’s consciousness is his least known and most abused vital organ. Most people believe that consciousness as such is some sort of indeterminate faculty which has no nature, no specific identity and, therefore, no requirements, no needs, no rules for being properly or improperly used. The simplest example of this belief is people’s willingness to lie or cheat, to fake reality on the premise that “I’m the only one who’ll know” or “It’s only in my mind”—without any concern for what this does to one’s mind, what complex, untraceable, disastrous impairments it produces, what crippling damage may result.

The loss of control over one’s consciousness is the most terrifying of human experiences: a consciousness that doubts its own efficacy is in a monstrously intolerable state. Yet men abuse, subvert and starve their consciousness in a manner they would not dream of applying to their hair, toenails or stomachs. They know that these things have a specific identity and specific requirements, and, if one wishes to preserve them, one must comb one’s hair, trim one’s toenails and refrain from swallowing rat poison. But one’s mind? Aw, it needs nothing and can swallow anything. Or so most people believe. And they go on believing it while they toss in agony on a psychologist’s couch, screaming that their mind keeps them in a state of chronic terror for no reason whatever . . .

The fact [is] that man’s consciousness possesses a specific nature with specific cognitive needs, that it is not infinitely malleable and cannot be twisted, like a piece of putty, to fit any private evasions or any public “conditioning.” “Our Cultural Value-Deprivation,” The Objectivist, April 1966, 1.

Just as man’s physical existence was liberated when he grasped the principle that “nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed,” so his consciousness will be liberated when he grasps that nature, to be apprehended, must be obeyed—that the rules of cognition must be derived from the nature of existence and the nature, the identity, of his cognitive faculty. Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 110.

The hallmark of a mystic is the savagely stubborn refusal to accept the fact that consciousness, like any other existent, possesses identity, that it is a faculty of a specific nature, functioning through specific means. While the advance of civilization has been eliminating one area of magic after another, the last stand of the believers in the miraculous consists of their frantic attempts to regard identity as the disqualifying element of consciousness.

The implicit, but unadmitted premise of the neo-mystics of modern philosophy, is the notion that only an ineffable consciousness can acquire a valid knowledge of reality, that “true” knowledge has to be causeless, i.e., acquired without any means of cognition. Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 106.

Two fundamental attributes are involved in every state, aspect or function of man’s consciousness: content and action—the content of awareness, and the action of consciousness in regard to that content. These two attributes are the fundamental Conceptual Common Denominator of all concepts pertaining to consciousness . . . .

To form concepts of consciousness, one must isolate the action from the content of a given state of consciousness, by a process of abstraction. Just as, extrospectively, man can abstract attributes from entities—so, introspectively, he can abstract the actions of his consciousness from its contents, and observe the differences among these various actions.

For instance (on the adult level), when a man sees a woman walking down the street, the action of his consciousness is perception; when he notes that she is beautiful, the action of his consciousness is evaluation; when he experiences an inner state of pleasure and approval, of admiration, the action of his consciousness is emotion; when he stops to watch her and draws conclusions, from the evidence, about her character, age, social position, etc., the action of his consciousness is thought; when, later, he recalls the incident, the action of his consciousness is reminiscence; when he projects that her appearance would be improved if her hair were blond rather than brown, and her dress were blue rather than red, the action of his consciousness is imagination. Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 38.

In the realm of introspection, the concretes, the units which are integrated into a single concept, are the specific instances of a given psychological process. The measurable attributes of a psychological process are its object or content and its intensity.

The content is some aspect of the external world (or is derived from some aspect of the external world) and is measurable by the various methods of measurement applicable to the external world. The intensity of a psychological process is the automatically summed up result of many factors: of its scope, its clarity, its cognitive and motivational context, the degree of mental energy or effort required, etc.

There is no exact method of measuring the intensity of all psychological processes, but—as in the case of forming concepts of colors—conceptualization does not require the knowledge of exact measurements. Degrees of intensity can be and are measured approximately, on a comparative scale. For instance, the intensity of the emotion of joy in response to certain facts varies according to the importance of these facts in one’s hierarchy of values; it varies in such cases as buying a new suit, or getting a raise in pay, or marrying the person one loves. The intensity of a process of thought and of the intellectual effort required varies according to the scope of its content; it varies when one grasps the concept “table” or the concept “justice,” when one grasps that 2 + 2 = 4 or that e = mc2. Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, p. 39

[Peter]

What are we? Is Volition Axiomatic?

“We are an impossibility in an impossible universe.”

Ray Bradbury

Very poetic Mr. Bradbury, but would it not be more precise to say, “We are a reality in a fascinating universe?”

Or is this any better?

“The only way of finding the limits of the possible is by going beyond them into the impossible.”

Arthur C. Clarke

But Arthur, once known, we know it is possible.

Does this quote pertain to this topic?

“Change your thoughts and you change your world.”

Norman Vincent Peale

Enough with the fun quotes. Is Volition Axiomatic? When you wake up in the morning do you initiate thinking or do you wake up thinking? I wake up thinking. Sometimes, I am still in the logic of a dream. As the dream dissipates I start going through “thinking options,” and then I may choose to rouse up and think.

If volition is axiomatic it must be "perceived or experienced directly, but grasped conceptually." And volition is perceived and experienced directly, but grasped conceptually.

Yet, in ITOE, Chapter Six, Ayn Rand named only three axiomatic concepts, Existence, Identity, and Consciousness. She discussed their nature, role, and importance in establishing the foundations of an objective epistemology in general and in her Objectivist Philosophy specifically. They are "irreducible primaries . . . . perceived or experienced directly, but grasped conceptually. They are implicit in every state of awareness, from the first sensation to the first percept to the sum of all concepts."

end quote

Thinking may be our normal and natural state when we leave the "sleep state." To *not* think may require an act of will, IF our subconscious has been programmed to initiate thinking upon waking. Consider thinking at this sleepy level as natural to our evolutionary nature as creatures who might be killed and eaten at any moment, if we were not wary. Sleep is necessary, but surrendering our consciousness to regenerate our bodies and minds, is enough to cause nightmares. So, sleep lightly little primate.

The closest a human can come to this primordial state might be in any “escape from harm” or in an armed conflict when we wake up in the morning - looking without moving - straining to hear a sound - sniffing the air - before we move a muscle.

But beyond the subconscious musings of our mind and its ability to program our initiation of thought upon waking, we then advance further up the slope of reason. Let me ramble some more.

Proponent of Axiomatic Volition Ellen Moore once wrote:

"Volition is the human attribute that regulates the precondition of actions that achieve conscious awareness in order to think - either keenly in focus, or lowered in passivity, or in evasion . . . . The human method of acquiring conceptualization is the work of reasoning by means of applying volitional actions to abstract awareness, thought and logic."

Would you agree with this formulation? Ergo:

1) Existence exists. (Existence)

2) I am conscious and experience existence, As a Human. (Consciousness)

3) As a Human, I raise my awareness beyond the sensory, perceptual level. (Volition)

4) My volitionally raised mental state Identifies existents within existence. I am I. A is A. (Identity)

Contrarily: as George H. Smith has observed the validity of Volition hinges on both philosophical and scientific claims. Does this removes it from axiom status?

On page 55 of "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology," Ayn Rand writes that axiomatic concepts are:

"The identification of a primary fact of reality, which cannot be analyzed, i.e., reduced to other facts or broken into component parts. It is implicit in all facts and in all knowledge. It is the fundamentally given and directly perceived or experienced, which requires no proof or explanation, but on which all proofs and explanations rest."

end quote

So, in a sense, if someone disagrees with a proposed axiom and it requires further explanation, or you cannot point to it and say, "There it is," then it is not an axiom. It that sense, volition and causality MAY not be axioms, but could be corollaries.

Before I give demonstrations or examples for Causality and Volition, I want you to remember the Dictionary, the Randian, and Ellen Moore's definitions of Volition. Perhaps Dgig can supply us with a Scientific definition of Volition and always let us know if he is using it.

the dictionary definitions:

"Volition:

1) an act of making a choice or decision,

2) the power of choosing or determining: Will."

Volition, in the most common Objectivist definition, as Barbara Branden recently said, means that we can raise or lower our level of "conscious awareness," at will.

Ellen Moore provided this Objectivist definition:

"Volition - a primary attribute of human consciousness given the power to initiate and sustain actions and operations regulating functions of awareness."

A demonstration for each position might be:

Causality: A bright light shines and twinkles, and a tiny bell rings, just above a baby's crib, as a newly installed mobile revolves just within the babies reach. The baby watches the phenomena and is fascinated with the light and sound. Eventually the baby reaches up to touch it. The twinkling, ringing, revolving light causes the baby to be aware of the object. The baby was caused to reach for the light during an act akin to that of somnambulism (an abnormal condition of sleep in which motor acts are performed.) When the agent causing the act of awareness and reaching, is removed from the baby's sight, the baby resumes a sleepy, twilight state of awareness. This is a basic simulus / response seen everywhere in the animal kingdom.

Volition: A bright light shines and twinkles, and a tiny bell rings, just above a baby's crib, as a newly installed mobile revolves just within the babies reach. The baby watches the phenomena and is fascinated with the light and sound. Eventually the baby reaches up to touch it. The twinkling, ringing, revolving light causes the baby to be aware of the object, but now the baby is grasping at the light and sound and thinking about it. Thought is a Volitional activity. Now, perhaps two mobiles are presented to the baby, and the baby chooses one of the objects to focus on or grasp. Then, the baby has used the dictionary's definition of choosing between alternatives. What if both mobiles are now taken away from the baby, and the baby cries. You, the parent / scientist try to figure out what the baby wants. Eventually, through an "informed" trial and error (not hungry, not wet, does not want to be held) you realize the baby wants the mobiles placed above it again. When they are again placed above the baby, the baby stops crying. The baby has now Volitionally chosen a stimulus. The baby chooses and plays with one of the mobiles. It volitionally raises its consciousness and thinks about how this object is different from the other mobile and different from all the other objects it has seen.

From OPAR:

"Thought is a volitional activity. The steps of its course are not forced on man by his nature or by external reality; they are chosen. Some choices are obviously better - more productive of cognitive success - than others. The point is that, whether right or wrong, the direction taken *is* a matter of choice, not of necessity.

The choices involved in performing a thought process are different in an important respect from the primary choice. These higher-level choices, as we may call them, are not irreducible. In their case it is legitimate to ask, in regard both to end and means: *why* did the individual choose as he did? What was the *cause* of his choice? Often, the cause involves several factors, including the individual's values and interests, his knowledge of a given subject, the new evidence available to him, and his knowledge of the proper methods of thinking.

The principle of causality does not apply to consciousness, however, in the same way that it applies to matter. In regard to matter, there is no issue of choice; to be caused is to be necessitated. In regard to the (higher level) actions of a volitional consciousness, however, "to be caused" does not mean "to be necessitated." OPAR

Adding Volition as an axiom, means I can point to myself thinking as an example of my volition, or I can view the affects of an act of volition, such as fluffing my pillow to my satisfaction, before I become non-volitional for a few hours.

I don't know. It’s debatable. I guess Volition is a corrolary of Consciousness.

Semper cogitans fidele,

Peter Taylor

[Dglgmut]

Thanks Peter.

I'll have to go over all that when I have more free time; I got through the first letter, though.

I think what needs to be addressed here is the question: Do people control what they know?

You could say they have control over whether or not they seek knowledge... but I think that is pretty automated. When a human first gains consciousness, where is the option to think, "Nope, not even the slightest bit curious about what's going on here..." At what point do people deliberately choose ignorance?

They must have some "knowledge" that influences them to think the truth is either not worth knowing, or completely unknowable. What must be taken into account is that beliefs are concidered knowledge by the believer...

Objectivists may not like me saying this, but it's impossible to disregard one's own beliefs. Not only that, but beliefs help form new beliefs.

George/Aristotle used the word deliberation, and separated it's meaning from volition, saying that choice is not the same as volition, as choice is preceded by deliberation.

And deliberation is preceded by...?

[BaalChatzaf]

.

And with the meat thing... We are single things, are we not? Why do you insist that, not only are we a massive group of particles, but one that is constantly changing?

And what ismeat made of?

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Dglgmut]

A piece of meat IS the particles that make it up. It's not really a single thing, but a group of things. However, I am not a group of things. My body certainly is, but I have only one perspective, and when I act, my deliberation comes from a single place, regardless of how many particles were involved in carrying out my will.

Regardless, if we were the group of particles that made up our brains, you could say we've been in existence forever.

[anthony]

A piece of meat IS the particles that make it up. It's not really a single thing, but a group of things. However, I am not a group of things. My body certainly is, but I have only one perspective, and when I act, my deliberation comes from a single place, regardless of how many particles were involved in carrying out my will. Regardless, if we were the group of particles that made up our brains, you could say we've been in existence forever.

Ha! Good answer, Calvin.

[Dglgmut]

We have to be what we are.

We are constantly defining ourselves, because we are the cause of our actions.

You can look at your life and what you've done, and that's who you are. You can think, "I'd like to change some things," but that doesn't mean you can become something else. You can start defining yourself in a new way, but really, it's just you in a different situation. Memories of your past impact your experience in the present, so there's no real reason to believe that we could possibly have done something different than we have.

What's illogical about saying that anyone re-experiencing an identical situation will react in the same way as the first time?

[anthony]

We have to be what we are. We are constantly defining ourselves... What's illogical about saying that anyone re-experiencing an identical situation will react in the same way as the first time?

Memory, is one. Further cognitive experience, another. Ongoing development of character, too.

Mostly, however, I think it's self-consciousness at the exact moment of action.

I sense you're moving in the right direction, Calvin. I can't put my finger on it exactly, but I think you are not taking into account 'time'. It's as though you are trying to freeze everything.

Does that make sense?

Tony

[Dglgmut]

Well, when I talk about a situation, I'd include the entire state of the universe. So yes: the moment, exactly as it happened.

Memory and imagination are the two facets of thought... When we think, we "re-experience" bits of memories, which are often completely manipulated by our imagination.

For example, we can imagine a shape that we've never seen, but I don't believe we could have done that if we hadn't ever seen lines or curves.

The question which is confusing the hell out of me is about context...

An experience is usually not complete without context... which, as I understand it at the moment, is primarily the emotion we feel as we receive sensory information.

A determinist may argue that will is nothing more than an experience... However, I can't isolate the experience of willing... can anyone? I can't isolate the experience of any emotion. I can remember an experience, and say, "I felt happy, then," but in the present, there is no "feeling".

So, from one angle, I look at an experience and include context as part of the situation. I was in a certain state of mind, and that should be included in what was going on at the moment.

However, when I focus on the present moment, the question that comes up is: What context?

Okay, just theorizing here: It may be that experience has no context, but thought does... To think is to focus, not on something of which we are aware, but of something we're not.

Here's a question I find interesting: Why do I think?

Maybe emotion is not an experience, but another facet of thought. Emotion is the guiding force behind thought... It is not experienced, but it can be uncovered by analysis of thought.

Also, I'd say that maybe logic is emotional... Logic is importance/value placed upon truth... If one sees no value in truth, one is illogical. Does that make sense? ...Someone could be incredibly intelligent, yet completely illogical, because they don't place enough value on the truth.

[anthony]

Logic is importance/value placed upon truth... If one sees no value in truth, one is illogical. Does that make sense? ...Someone could be incredibly intelligent, yet completely illogical, because they don't place enough value on the truth.

Logic is the most important tool to rationality, but it is not reason itself.

It is a critical distinction - but, yes, if you replaced all "logic" references above with "rational", "irrational", I would totally agree with you.

" ...incredibly intelligent, yet completely irrational, because they don't place enough value on the truth."

This could be one of the most incisive statements I've seen of yours.

It is apparent all around us, and i've been puzzling over it for a long while. Does high intelligence and a working knowledge of logic, enable distortion of, and escape from reality (irrationality) - if that is their intention? These are usually the most dishonest people, without any excuses for being so.

Why, often, does a more modest intelligence, but a strong desire for the truth, make for some of the most rational people? They are the especially honest ones.

Tony

[BaalChatzaf]

Here's a question I find interesting: Why do I think?

1. Because you have a brain.

2. Because you are alive and awake.

Try not thinking. See how well you succeed. My record is 8 minutes without a verbalized thought.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Dglgmut]

I don't think you can manipulate your own beliefs, you can only decide to keep digging or stay where you are. There aren't many reasons I can see for someone choosing not to learn, but people make that choice all the time... Maybe it's because they're satisfied with what they believe, and they don't see any reason to go out of their way to change their perspective... or they honestly believe they know everything that's worth knowing.

I guess it's the nature of consciousness to cling to truth. Maybe the value of truth is so high we cannot bear to accept when we are wrong, and we protect our irrational beliefs in order to maintain our confidence in our capacity for reason. If we admit we are wrong, we admit that truth may be unattainable by our imperfect minds.

[anthony]

I don't think you can manipulate your own beliefs, you can only decide to keep digging or stay where you are. There aren't many reasons I can see for someone choosing not to learn, but people make that choice all the time... Maybe it's because they're satisfied with what they believe, and they don't see any reason to go out of their way to change their perspective... or they honestly believe they know everything that's worth knowing. I guess it's the nature of consciousness to cling to truth. Maybe the value of truth is so high we cannot bear to accept when we are wrong, and we protect our irrational beliefs in order to maintain our confidence in our capacity for reason. If we admit we are wrong, we admit that truth may be unattainable by our imperfect minds.

Calvin,

Yes, there's something of all this - complacency, arrogance, narrow-mindedness, fear..

Admitting that "truth may be unattainable by our imperfect minds", is well answered by Objectivism, which holds that all knowledge is knowable, but none of us individually can be omniscient. (Basically)

That was a breakthrough for me when learning it. It sort of takes the pressure off that scary thought that you "can't know it all", so might as well just give up.

One can only know what one does right now, and keep moving ahead integrating fresh truths up to the end ... but Man as an entirety can know it all, and will.

The "imperfect mind" concept originated with Plato, I believe, and is still flourishing - incredibly.

Tony

[Dglgmut]

I guess there's two kinds of beliefs: Those that instill self-esteem and those that undermine it... both are likely pretty vicious cycles.

With a belief system that instills self-esteem, we are inhibiting any opportunity of replacing beliefs that prove irrational... We can't let them go, obviously, because they are the reason we believe we are capable of knowing anything!

And with a belief system based around the idea of, "I can always be wrong," we will be incredibly open minded, but never building on beliefs because none of them can serve as a solid foundation.

I think there's a delicate balance... If you value the truth, you can't let self-esteem take priority over open mindedness...

Ba'al: The question, "Why do I think?" was meant as a form of introspection. How can I choose to think, before I've thought? I'm theorizing that the emotion, curiosity, I guess, comes before reason. You don't need a reason to be curious.

[Xray]

I guess there's two kinds of beliefs: Those that instill self-esteem and those that undermine it... both are likely pretty vicious cycles.

With a belief system that instills self-esteem, we are inhibiting any opportunity of replacing beliefs that prove irrational... We can't let them go, obviously, because they are the reason we believe we are capable of knowing anything!

And with a belief system based around the idea of, "I can always be wrong," we will be incredibly open minded, but never building on beliefs because none of them can serve as a solid foundation.

I think there's a delicate balance... If you value the truth, you can't let self-esteem take priority over open mindedness...

Ba'al: The question, "Why do I think?" was meant as a form of introspection. How can I choose to think, before I've thought? I'm theorizing that the emotion, curiosity, I guess, comes before reason. You don't need a reason to be curious.

In case you are you referring to the Objectivist 'choose to think' here - this is to be interpreted as 'choose to think rationally'.

(The same goes for "selfishness" regarded a virtue - it is always to be interpreted as 'rational' selfishness.

You don't need a reason to be curious.

Curiosity is biologically hardwired in us humans and other higher developed animals because in order to survive, we need to be aware of what is happening around us.

But as for being curious about something in a specific case - there always is reason why, without exception.

Example: you hear an unkown noise and are curious to find out what it is about

[Dglgmut]

Example: you hear an unkown noise and are curious to find out what it is about

And why do you care?

You can say things like, "It's hardwired into us," to simplify the issue, but it doesn't take into account why you follow that instinct. If you are implying that you are being forced, then we don't need to waste anymore time talking about volition, deliberation or choice anymore.

And I wasn't referring to anything other than what the words I chose are normally interpreted as meaning.

+ Without memory we have nothing but sensory information. However, I believe, like very simple living organisms, we could function without memory.

The context of experience, which I was talking about, may just be the relation between memories and sensation. It may be that emotion is an automatic response to experience, and is not experienced itself.

To want something is not to feel desire, it's something we do. If you were asked to isolate the "feeling" of emotion, you would only be left with sensory information that wouldn't point you to anything, other than your physical body.

Memory, and the context we create for our present situation, adds to the complexity of our experience, and leads to our emotional response.

Understanding, for example, of how a physical process occurs, is just memory. I can "understand" gravity, because I remember, vividly, how objects fall to the ground. I remember how they accelerate, and so I can imagine it/recreate the sensations (how it looks).

Memories are the only thing that we "create", and nobody can explain how we do that.

[Xray]

You can say things like, "It's hardwired into us," to simplify the issue, but it doesn't take into account why you follow that instinct.

Here we go again for the umpteenth time on the epistemological roundabout:

The answer has already been provided: you follow the instinct because it is biologically hardwired. Where's the problem?

If you are implying that you are being forced, then we don't need to waste anymore time talking about volition, deliberation or choice anymore.

Who speaks about being forced? Following one's instinct is something entirely different from being forced.

[anthony]

Here we go again for the umpteenth time on the epistemological roundabout: The answer has already been provided: you follow the instinct because it is biologically hardwired. Where's the problem ? If you are implying that you are being forced, then we don't need to waste anymore time Who speaks about being forced? Following one's instinct is something entirely different from being forced.

Here we go again on the biological carousel.

Determined, instinctive, and hard-wired 'morality'.

Instinct offers no alternatives. Without those, there is no choice. No choice, no morality.

If determinism by instinct is not force, then what is it?

[BaalChatzaf]

Here we go again for the umpteenth time on the epistemological roundabout: The answer has already been provided: you follow the instinct because it is biologically hardwired. Where's the problem ? If you are implying that you are being forced, then we don't need to waste anymore time Who speaks about being forced? Following one's instinct is something entirely different from being forced.

Here we go again on the biological carousel.

Determined, instinctive, and hard-wired 'morality'.

Instinct offers no alternatives. Without those, there is no choice. No choice, no morality.

If determinism by instinct is not force, then what is it?

When person A uses force (or the threat of force) on Person B, he is asking A to make a choice: A obeys B and avoids the threat or A does not obey B and suffers the damage that B does upon him. So "force" used in the context of threat or undue influence assumes the capacity to choose.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[anthony]

Here we go again for the umpteenth time on the epistemological roundabout: The answer has already been provided: you follow the instinct because it is biologically hardwired. Where's the problem ? If you are implying that you are being forced, then we don't need to waste anymore time Who speaks about being forced? Following one's instinct is something entirely different from being forced.

Here we go again on the biological carousel. Determined, instinctive, and hard-wired 'morality'. Instinct offers no alternatives. Without those, there is no choice. No choice, no morality. If determinism by instinct is not force, then what is it?

When person A uses force (or the threat of force) on Person B, he is asking A to make a choice: A obeys B and avoids the threat or A does not obey B and suffers the damage that B does upon him. So "force" used in the context of threat or undue influence assumes the capacity to choose. Ba'al Chatzaf

AR said something like there can be no morality at gun-point.

IOW, whatever one has to do while under complete coercion, is not immoral.

When normal conditions return, only then can morality.

But I wasn't talking about force as wielded by others - lack of choice in one's ideology, is also force, I think.

To be extreme, imagine the existence of a single system of behavior for men: Only one course of action is open to you at all times, i.e., 'forced'.

Given that condition, there is also no morality possible, and every choice and outcome is neither moral, or immoral.

Animals live by such a forced system of behavior, called instinct.

Tony