Psychologizing

[Xray]

> Phil is gorgeous in blue and white. [Xray]

Close Enough for Government Work. (as the Japanese nuclear plant designer said to the board of inquiry.)

Phil:

No, it shows how important for truthful attributions the quote function is to the threads.

Out of curiosity, what is your aversion to using the technology that Michael and Kat provide for us here?

Adam

That would interest me too, Phil. For the quote function is very helpful, for example in avoiding confusion as to who wrote what.

Won't you at least give it a try?

Edited March 26, 2011 by Xray

[Selene]

Bulletin:

A blond man in a blue and white dress is poised on a ledge...

A multinational crowd is gathering below shouting "QUOTE! QUOTE!"

Film at 11:00

Edited March 26, 2011 by Selene

[Robert Campbell]

Along with avatars, username choices are interesting too.

Over on archn blog I have conversed with an Xtra laj[…]

Carol,

I puzzle over some of these as well.

Xtra laj I recall from the old SOLOHQ days; he's Nigerian, his first name is Abolaji, and he goes by "Laj" for short. Other implications may not have been intended.

Since Jonathan Hoenig has already called his hedge fund

http://www.capitalistpig.com/

the "Capitalist Swine" moniker comes across as especially lame.

Robert Campbell

[Xray]

Bulletin:

A blond man in a blue and white dress is poised on a ledge...

A multinational crowd is gathering below shouting "QUOTE! QUOTE!"

Film at 11:00

You are such a rascal, Selene!

I hope Phil doesn't take it to heart and focuses on the wit in your comment instead. I recall some jokes made at my expense here as well, but when the joke was good, I couldn't help laughing too.

Edited March 26, 2011 by Xray

[caroljane]

Bulletin:

A blond man in a blue and white dress is poised on a ledge...

A multinational crowd is gathering below shouting "QUOTE! QUOTE!"

Film at 11:00

You are such a rascal, Selene!

I hope Phil doesn't take it to heart and focuses on the wit in your comment instead. I recall some jokes made at my expense here as well, but when the joke was good, I couldn't help laughing too.

X, I wholeheartedly endorse this attitude.

If you haven't been joked at on here my deah, you simply haven't arrived!

Carol

not always a dunce

[caroljane]

What is the source of your nick, Daunce Lynam?

Ghs

It is an anagram. I have given some clues over on the Art Instinct thread (near the end, it is a long thread!). Lynam is my real married name.

[Xray]

Xray is entirely right about linguistic pragmatics not necessarily requiring mind reading.

The reason it doesn't is that many aspects of speech acts are themselves conventionalized.

There's a drawback, of course. A speaker can produce a speech act that, in some respect, is not in accord with the speaker's actual thinking or feeling at the time.

And if we acknowledge, as you just did, that people do say things that do not accurately reflect their intentions, then how in Galt's name can anyone possibly claim the status of "knowledge" for whatever asinine crap is inferred from an individual's "speech acts" by the practitioners of "linguistic pragmatics"?

But the issue knowledge versus belief is not primary in the topic being discussed here.

Like R. Campbell said, many aspects of speech acts are themselves conventionalized.

So when Jane enters a cold room with the window open and makes the declarative sentence "It's cold in here", possibly accompanied by a facial expression conveying discomfort, one can infer from this speech act that she wants the situation to be changed. You would infer the same. I assume you would not ruminate over it, telling yourself "I have no way of knowing definitely what Jane means to imply."

Jane could of course also have chosen a more direct speech act like "Could somebody please shut the window?"

Really, folks, is this rocket science? Or is the problem here merely the age-old one that the human animal characteristically wants to claim to know far more than s/he actually does and wants to claim the status of "knowledge" for what is really only belief?

The "no rocket science" aspect here lies in the objective fact that we humans can use a (often conventionalized) repertoire of speech acts in which for example declarative sentences convey messages going beyond the pure declaration. That's what the discussion was about.

So when Bobby Blunt, in a heated forum debate, calls his debate opponent Polly Polite a "silly goose", and Polly replies: "This is an insult", it allows the interpretation that this is a warning sign on Polly's part directed at Bobby, telling him he has transgressed a boundary of civility and that she wants him to stop. Polly could also choose the more direct "Stop insulting me!" of course, but it is not necessary for the communication process to function that Polly use the direct form. Bobby will get the message, whether it is in direct or indirect form.

If Bobby has a sarcastic streak, he could use Polly's comment to make another jab at her, pretending to take her statement literally. Bobby: "Of course "silly goose" is an insult. What do you think it is? A bunch of roses?"

Comedians often operate that way by ignoring those 'indirect messages' in declarative sentences.

But in everyday situations, we are usually pretty good at decoding the messages the communication partner wants to convey.

Of course there also exist situations, as R. Campbell has pointed out, where the speech act is not in accord with a speaker's actual thinking. Lies fall into that category.

But the fact that people can lie need not make us so suspicious to a point of automatically questioning any communication process as possibly being "inauthentic".

Suppose your friend tells you he's going to pick you up by car at 8 pm, I assume you won't rack your brain in doubt and say "I have no way of knowing whether what he said is true."

Edited March 28, 2011 by Xray

[jriggenbach]

Xray is entirely right about linguistic pragmatics not necessarily requiring mind reading.

The reason it doesn't is that many aspects of speech acts are themselves conventionalized.

There's a drawback, of course. A speaker can produce a speech act that, in some respect, is not in accord with the speaker's actual thinking or feeling at the time.

And if we acknowledge, as you just did, that people do say things that do not accurately reflect their intentions, then how in Galt's name can anyone possibly claim the status of "knowledge" for whatever asinine crap is inferred from an individual's "speech acts" by the practitioners of "linguistic pragmatics"?

But the issue knowledge versus belief is not primary in the topic being discussed here.

Like R. Campbell said, many aspects of speech acts are themselves conventionalized.

So when Jane enters a cold room with the window open and makes the declarative sentence "It's cold in here", possibly accompanied by a facial expression conveying discomfort, one can infer from this speech act that she wants the situation to be changed. You would infer the same. I assume you would not ruminate over it, telling yourself "I have no way of knowing definitely what Jane means to imply."

Jane could of course also have chosen a more direct speech act like "Could somebody please shut the window?"

Really, folks, is this rocket science? Or is the problem here merely the age-old one that the human animal characteristically wants to claim to know far more than s/he actually does and wants to claim the status of "knowledge" for what is really only belief?

The "no rocket science" aspect here lies in the objective fact that we humans can use a (often conventionalized) repertoire of speech acts in which for example declarative sentences convey messages going beyond the pure declaration. That's what the discussion was about.

So when Bobby Blunt, in a heated forum debate, calls his debate oponent Polly Polite a "silly goose", and Polly replies: "This is an insult", it allows the interpretation that this is a warning sign on Polly's part directed at Bobby, telling him has transgressed a boundary of civility and that she wants him to stop. Polly could also choose the more direct "Stop insulting me!" of course, but it is not necessary for the communication process to function that Polly use the direct form. Bobby will get the message, whether it is in direct or indirect form.

If Bobby has a sarcastic streak, he could use Polly's comment to make another jab at her, pretending to take her statement literally. Bobby: "Of course "silly goose" is an insult. What do you think it is? A bunch of roses?"

Comedians often operate that way by ignoring those 'indirect messages' in declarative sentences.

But in everyday situations, we are usually pretty good at decoding the messages the communication partner wants to convey.

Of course there also exist situations, as R. Campbell has pointed out, where the speech act is not in accord with a speaker's actual thinking. Lies fall into that category.

But the fact that people can lie need not make us so suspicious to a point of automatically questioning any communication process as possibly being "inauthentic".

Suppose your friend tells you he's going to pick you up by car at 8 pm, I assume you won't rack your brain in doubt and say "I have no way of knowing whether what he said is true."

I'm impressed by your determination to believe what you want to believe and by your invincible refusal to see the point. My hat is off to you.

JR

[Robert Campbell]

Of course there also exist situations, as R. Campbell has pointed out, where the speech act is not in accord with a speaker's actual thinking. Lies fall into that category.

Xray,

Yes, obviously lies do.

But so do "infelicitous" speech acts; for instance, in which the speaker intended one meaning and the audience understands a different meaning.

Robert Campbell

[Robert Campbell]

I'm impressed by your determination to believe what you want to believe and by your invincible refusal to see the point. My hat is off to you.

Jeff,

That depends on what your point was.

We human beings have ways of mutually characterizing a situation, without having to check whether I know that it's this kind of situation, you know that it's this kind of situation, I know that you know that it's this kind of situation, you know that I know that it's this kind of situation, I know that you know that I know, you know that I know that you known, and so on, layer upon layer, ad infinitum.

The way we habitually do this may not meet your criteria for knowledge.

A lot of what cognitive psychology studies may not either.

Robert Campbell

[jriggenbach]

We human beings have ways of mutually characterizing a situation, without having to check whether I know that it's this kind of situation, you know that it's this kind of situation, I know that you know that it's this kind of situation, you know that I know that it's this kind of situation, I know that you know that I know, you know that I know that you known, and so on, layer upon layer, ad infinitum.

The way we habitually do this may not meet your criteria for knowledge.

At lot of what cognitive psychology studies may not either.

No, I'm not much impressed with many of the ways human beings try to ground their extravagant claims to knowledge they don't really have and in many cases couldn't possibly have.

And, as a methodological individualist who regards statistical analysis in pretty much the way Ludwig von Mises did, I've always been strongly drawn to Thomas Szasz's observation that "there is no psychology; there is only biography and autobiography."

JR

Edited March 27, 2011 by Jeff Riggenbach

[Brant Gaede]

I say what I mean and mean what I say. I don't get this linguistics stuff. Am I dumb or simply out of the loop? If somebody says "The room is cold!"--as if I don't know it's cold--and expects me to infer from that statement what I should do, I'm likely to say something nasty for that's controlling behavior. I don't get the courtesy of, "Brant, this room is cold. Could you close the window please?" No, I'm supposed to grind my mind away on useless trivia and go through life wondering if I'm figuring her statements out correctly so she doesn't rip me a new one: "Oh, boo, hoo, hoo. If you loved me you'd have understood what I meant when I said what I said." Now if I say one thing and mean another what does that say about me? If I say water is wet and the audience thinks I said water is dry, what does that say about the audience?

Am I missing the point of this discussion?

--Brant

no psychology means I can't be a psycho--yeah!!

[Robert Campbell]

Robert,

Given the number of first hand reports on record of Ayn Rand's own psychologizing (in the 'motive' sense), one has to conclude that her admonitions against it were "Do as I say, not as I do."

Up to a point, fair enough. Few people can be as clearsighted as she was, and as consistently.

Additionally, I have been considering 'psychologizing' as being predominantly induction as applied to the psycho-epistemology of a person: taking in a vast amount of data and 'tells' about someone, and drawing a general conclusion.

Rand was the master of inductive thinking,imo, and normally could also back it up with brilliant deductive logic and empiricism. But when it comes to judging a person, obviously there are pitfalls, for her and anyone else. Not allowing benefit of the doubt, dogmatically adhering to first impressions, (then rationalizing further data to 'fit') - and other injustices.

When she got it right - whether on principles, or about a person - she was devastatingly right. The few times induction let her down - in her judgements on aesthetics, for example (though the core concepts are an original work of genius), or more often with individuals - were the exceptions that prove the rule.

What do you think? Am I off-base with these thoughts?

Tony

Tony,

This is kind of complicated.

Rand's judgments about other people, like her views on human psychology in the abstract, weren't all one way or the other.

She could be spot-on or grossly clueless about other people, depending on who it was and what the context was.

Her more abstract thinking about human psychology was a mixture of profound insights and not-so-great ideas.

Her article on "psychologizing" is one that puts some not-so-great ideas on display.

For instance, she wanted to demarcate philosophy (as pertaining to conscious thinking) from psychology (as pertaining to subconscious functioning). This way of dividing things doesn't work, not least because psychology can't avoid being concerned with conscious thinking.

On the other hand, she helped to revive Ancient Greek moral psychology; that wasn't such a bad project.

Some of her insights about psychology show up where you might not expect them—in her lectures about writing. There she is hindered by her discomfort with talk of instinct or intuition or "just knowing," but she still comes up with sayings worthy of Yogi Berra. If only there were unbowdlerized presentations in print of those two informal courses...

Even there, she tends to read the structures of formal logic into the functioning of the human mind. It's most unlikely that our subconscious minds are actually populated with premises, as she was so fond of saying. The consequences for her theory of emotion were straightforward and not all of them so good. She ended up with an impoverished version of what's called the "appraisal' theory, emphasizing the dependence of our emotions on our prior cognitions, but leaving a bunch of other stuff out.

In her fiction, her tendency to see people as embodiments of ideas normally worked well. It was her world that she was making; they were her characters. I think this is also why she was so good at satire (most evident in The Fountainhead); she could mercilessly project people who were unswervingly motivated by bad or foolish attitudes. In real life, none of this worked out nearly so well.

Psychological theory and generalization are risky, as the full-time practitioners will all tell you. There's no shame in getting particular generalizations wrong. It's when you get pointed in the wrong direction, and you work to convince others to follow you, that your claims are in need of calling out. Rand's views on psychology sometimes pointed in the right direction, sometimes in quite wrong directions.

Robert Campbell

[Robert Campbell]

I say what I mean and mean what I say. I don't get this linguistics stuff. Am I dumb or simply out of the loop? If somebody says "The room is cold!"--as if I don't know it's cold--and expects me to infer from that statement what I should do, I'm likely to say something nasty for that's controlling behavior.

Brant,

When someone asks you "Do you know the time?" and you do, are you inclined to answer "Yes"?

Robert Campbell

[kiaer.ts]

[Brant Gaede]

I say what I mean and mean what I say. I don't get this linguistics stuff. Am I dumb or simply out of the loop? If somebody says "The room is cold!"--as if I don't know it's cold--and expects me to infer from that statement what I should do, I'm likely to say something nasty for that's controlling behavior.

Brant,

When someone asks you "Do you know the time?" and you do, are you inclined to answer "Yes"?

Robert Campbell

Nice touch, Robert. Yes, I am inclined to say "Yes, I do." It's me being funny. Being funny defuses my minor irritation at the question. I do get your point, though, but this is just verbal, conversational shorthand. I still feel over my head in this discussion, so I'll read it all again.

--Brant

drive on the parkway, park in the driveway (not my gem)

Edited March 28, 2011 by Brant Gaede

[caroljane]

Tony - "exceptions that prove the rule" is maybe a whole other topic. In fact it may be the majority of the content on this whole forum.

I was taught that "proving" means "testing to the utmost extent"and showing the rule to hold good. But some of Rand's rules, to me, do not bear the weight of such testing. And often in regular conversation the exceptions are seized on as examples of the arguer's particular biases, rationalizations of shaky premises, or irrelevant deviations.

Carol

possible irrelevant deviationist here

[anthony]

Tony - "exceptions that prove the rule" is maybe a whole other topic. In fact it may be the majority of the content on this whole forum.

I was taught that "proving" means "testing to the utmost extent"and showing the rule to hold good. But some of Rand's rules, to me, do not bear the weight of such testing. And often in regular conversation the exceptions are seized on as examples of the arguer's particular biases, rationalizations of shaky premises, or irrelevant deviations.

Carol

possible irrelevant deviationist here

Carol,

I take your point.

Also,as you say, the majority of discussion is around 'exceptions.'

Followed by interpretations, I'd add.

Then, practical applications ("bearing the weight of testing") and degree, context, and significance (hierarchy).

Concepts in action. I suppose if you disagree with the basic principles of a philosophy, then any expansion of it (the outer concepts) will seem arbitrary.

The "exceptions that prove the rule", was overly lax of me :'Begging the question', I guess.

You'd enjoy the topic? Me too. Go ahead, make my day! B)

Tony

Edited March 28, 2011 by whYNOT

[Xray]

Of course there also exist situations, as R. Campbell has pointed out, where the speech act is not in accord with a speaker's actual thinking. Lies fall into that category.

Xray,

Yes, obviously lies do.

But so do "infelicitous" speech acts; for instance, in which the speaker intended one meaning and the audience understands a different meaning.

I think in infelicitous speech acts, the speaker believes his speech acts are in accord with what he wants to convey, but the audience decodes a different meaning.

I say what I mean and mean what I say. I don't get this linguistics stuff. Am I dumb or simply out of the loop? If somebody says "The room is cold!"--as if I don't know it's cold--and expects me to infer from that statement what I should do, I'm likely to say something nasty for that's controlling behavior.

Brant,

When someone asks you "Do you know the time?" and you do, are you inclined to answer "Yes"?

Robert Campbell

Nice touch, Robert. Yes, I am inclined to say "Yes, I do." It's me being funny. Being funny defuses my minor irritation at the question.

Brant,

But if you conceive of your reply as funny, this already shows that you know of course what the speaker intended by the question.

Re "funny": while you think of your reaction as funny (from your perspective), do you think it is funny for your communication partner as well?

He/she would think of it as rude because it rejects this person's appeal to help by pretending to ignore it.

Suppose you asked e. g. Robert C. on OL: "Can you help me to find the source of the quote?" and he merely replied "Yes, I can." and that was it, with no action of helping you find the quote following. Same situation as above.

I do get your point, though, but this is just verbal, conversational shorthand. I still feel over my head in this discussion, so I'll read it all again.

The simple point of the discussion is that certain forms of speech acts can convey certain intentions, and that a competent speaker of a language usually has no difficulty in correctly decoding the intention, despite the surface structure of the sentence often being non congruent (that is, a sentence in the form of a question may be no real question, a declarative sentence can be a veiled request, etc.).

Thus, in specific situations, questions can be decoded as an implicit request (as in "Do you know the time?")

Declarative sentence can also be interpreted as an implicit request (as in "It's cold in here").

"You can't do this or that", which on the surface has the structure of a negative declarative sentence, can be used for an intense request coming close to an order.

"But you can't storm into your boss's office and tell him he's an incompetent dunce!" Billy Blunt's wife is trying to calm her husband down. Of course, technically speaking, Billy "can" storm into the office and "can" say these things to the boss. He'd better not try it out though in his wife's opinion.

So here "You can't do X" is decoded as "I don't want you to do X" without any dfficulty by a competent speaker.

No, I'm not much impressed with many of the ways human beings try to ground their extravagant claims to knowledge they don't really have and in many cases couldn't possibly have.

But what "extravagant claim of knowledge" do you see in correctly interpreting a question like e. g. "Can you tell me the time?" as a request?

For the discussion here is not about anyone claiming "knowledge" of the moon being made of cheese or claiming "knowledge" of a god's existence. In such cases, your outrage about people being unable to separate belief from knowledge would certainly be justified. But as for decoding a speaker's intent in some (mostly conventionalized) speech acts, I fail to see why you would get so worked up about it. (?)

And, as a methodological individualist who regards statistical analysis in pretty much the way Ludwig von Mises did, I've always been strongly drawn to Thomas Szasz's observation that "there is no psychology; there is only biography and autobiography."

There seems to exist in you a veritable barrier against psychology. But with that barrier, don't you cut yourself off from any new research in that field, neurological research for example, with e.g. its discovery of mirror neurons and their possible relation to empathy?

And just curious: does that barrier comprise linguistics as well?

Edited March 28, 2011 by Xray

[Philip Coates]

> I still feel over my head in this discussion, so I'll read it all again.

Brant, whatever you do, please, please, please don't go and read the -entire thread- again! I wouldn't inflict that on my worst enemy - I'd rather sit through another screening of American Beauty or get whipped by a cat o' nine tails.

[anthony]

]

Tony,

This is kind of complicated.

Even there, she tends to read the structures of formal logic into the functioning of the human mind. It's most unlikely that our subconscious minds are actually populated with premises, as she was so fond of saying. The consequences for her theory of emotion were straightforward and not all of them so good. She ended up with an impoverished version of what's called the "appraisal' theory, emphasizing the dependence of our emotions on our prior cognitions, but leaving a bunch of other stuff out.

Psychological theory and generalization are risky, as the full-time practitioners will all tell you. There's no shame in getting particular generalizations wrong. It's when you get pointed in the wrong direction, and you work to convince others to follow you, that your claims are in need of calling out. Rand's views on psychology sometimes pointed in the right direction, sometimes in quite wrong directions.

Robert Campbell

Thank you, Robert.

Quite a bit for me to chew on here.

Tony

[FullColor]

I've opened the window for some fresh air relief. Imagine a newbie happening to land on this thread and reading about posters on a philosophy forum praising The Virtue of Flatulence.

... This is where I landed...and that is my story.

Ghs

So glad I somehow stumbled onto this place, I sigh with relief over thinking I've finally found other people that project an ability to think Honestly, reasonably and rationally. (Mark I said honestly, yes I said that, as that is what I believe is connected as well)

Don't get me wrong, I'm in no way wishing to portray myself as a smart ass, or even at the same level as other here, but at least I know I got the right intentions towards truth. Or to but it more wisely, and promptly: Love for the truth, that I have. Therefore I sigh of relief having found a possible place yet to be explored by me that seems to have like minded people. All in All, I feel less alone in the world. And will find it easier having to deal with so much of the grim sickening foolishness the world has to offer. (ofc you can substitute world for people)

I would value the virtue of the spirit and character of man more than my so called blood and bones i.e. familiy.

p.s. Haven't read your article yet, but I'll see if I get time to do so at some time.

[George H. Smith]

I had completely forgotten about this thread, which I started over two years ago. I reviewed the thread, and most of it is pretty interesting. Unfortunately, I permitted the Phil Factor to throw me off track, so I guess I never finished other things I wanted to say, whatever those might have been.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

George,

Heh.

I doubt Phil will come back to OL, although he is not banned.

One day he made about 15 nagging posts or so all bashing OL, OL members and so on. He was derailing every discussion on the board that day. I told him enough already. Pipe down. I had already thrown several of his posts in the Garbage Pile (which took a lot more work back then than it does now).

But he kept on, so I simply deleted a couple (they were nothing but the standard Phil-nagging). I was fed up. When he found out, he said I had crossed a line he always knew I would cross, which was one of the reasons he was always so reluctant to post, yada yada yada.

And he left. (Whew!)

Then came the crazy lady.

I don't know what I did back then, but I sure felt like I pissed off something extraterrestial. Like the saying goes, I may not believe in God, but I've already met the Devil. Even shook hands with him.

Michael

[Jonathan]

Phil is still Phil. Check out the comments section:

http://www.atlassociety.org/as/photos-atlas-summit-2013

J