Roger Bissell

I cobbled this together from two pretty decent photographs taken at Nathaniel's house in Beverly Hills in 2000. It's pretty funny thinking of me being NB's kid and Bill Dwyer being JH's. Oh my god.... Best 2 all, REB P.S. -- After the "disaster" of re-addressing URLs at the Yahoo photo site, I am now replacing the un-cropped photo with Kat's cropped version, both of which are still in my Yahoo photo folder. Kat, if you want to delete your followup post ("Like Father, Like Son"), it's no longer necessary, and thanks! reb

I heard Michael Fumento (the guy who writes in criticism of "junk science") on a local radio talk show yesterday, and he claimed that an hour (?) of exposure to second- hand smoke in an enclosed room is the equivalent to several ONE-THOUSANDTHS of the effect that a smoker gets from smoking a cigarette. Now, I know there has to be some kind of threshhold for emphysema and lung cancer, but that would seem to be way below it :!: Yes, cigarette smoke is irritating, but so are lots of things that are still legal, such as obnoxious perfumes (not to mention some people's b.o.) and the omnipresent breaking-of-wind (always a delight in closed spaces such as airplanes and dressing rooms -- not!). And I do realize that some people are hyper-sensitive to cigarette smoke. But the supposed rationale for the bans on smoking is not to help the small number of truly allergic people, but to "save" us all from lung cancer, isn't it? And if so, then the smoking bans are all a big fraud. If there were any rationale for banning smoking in closed in places, it would seem that its supporters would rest easy now that they have ended it in all public restaurants, bars, etc. in California. Yet, now they're trying to end smoking outdoors at beaches and places like lines for movie theaters :?: I don't smoke, and I don't allow smoking in my own residence (don't like smoke any better than dog fur), but for the life of me, I don't see how it's my right or anyone else's to tell people not to smoke outdoors in public. Sheesh! Oh...and cheers! REB

I don't allow dogs to come into my residence either. Nope, none, nada, nix, fuggeddaboudit. I am highly allergic to dog fur or "dander" or whatever the stuff is that they exude. My eyes water and swell up and I'm miserable until they leave. It's just about as bad as the reaction I got from reading CRAP (code for a book we all know and love :-). For this reason, I do not have a "best friend." But I do have a next-best friend, and that is my wife, Becky, who is (blessedly) as far from a dog as anyone could ever hope for. :!: My daughter's pet rat died a couple of weeks ago, and we will be getting a (read: one and only one) pet kitten for her pretty soon. For whatever reason, I don't have the same reaction to cats that I do to dogs, though I do confess to being creeped out when I visit friends who have an army of pet cats in their house. Way too much pu...well, you know what I mean. :twisted: Cheers, y'all! REB

Now, Michael, you know that one does not gain values by faking reality in any manner! Someone who truly wanted my friendship would offer condolences for looking 72. As for "robbing the cradle," you know I would never do that. I don't want to get on Linz's bad side! But there's no crime (or sin) in having someone who ~looks~ like a teenager. :twisted: Aggggh. Enough silliness. BB is starting to wear off on me, and I'm forgetting how to be serious! G'night everybody... REB

God Bless America!--an Atheist's Perspective by Roger E. Bissell (9/27/01) I don't think it's a "lose-lose" proposition to address the meaning of "God Bless America" from an atheist's standpoint. If you take the assignment on its own terms and don't turn it into a critique of religion, I think you can still accomplish a great deal. Above all, though, I think what should be avoided is any kind of strained secularization of the term "bless," along the lines of "praise," as some have suggested. This is most emphatically not what is meant by the word in the phrase "God bless America." But what does it mean, if not "praise"? First, it's obvious that word is meant to convey the sentiment contained in the song by Irving Berlin, so a good place to start is with the lyrics of that song -- and not just the lyrics of the chorus, but those in the verse that set it up: Clearly, the song is not asking God to praise America, nor is the song itself even singing the praises of America, except incidentally. The essence of the song is a call to national unity (pledging allegiance to the land of America) and a request (prayer) to God that He watch over America and guide us "through the night" (i.e., the dark period of war that lies ahead). It's my observation and impression that this is exactly how people mean it when they sing the song publicly, and when the President closes his speeches with the phrase. My Webster's New World Dictionary (3rd College Edition) gives a number of meanings for "bless," but the only one that seems to exactly fit the present context is #8: "to keep or protect from harm, evil, etc.; obsolete, except in prayers, exclamations, etc." Given this interpretation of "God bless America," the best thing an atheist can do is to remind Christians that having uttered a prayer for God to protect them does not absolve them of further effort on their own behalf. "The Lord helps him who helps himself." Applying it to the present context: if you want God to protect you from the evil Bin Laden terrorists, you must work together with your fellow Americans as effectively as you can. Which means using your mind and body in rational, purposeful action aimed at self-defense, which allows the Lord to do it through you, rather than passively sitting around, waiting for the Lord to do it for you. At this point, a good atheist would point out that the secular version of this is: "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed." If you want to accomplish your goals, you have to acknowledge reality and what it requires of you, not idly wait for it to provide what you want. And if you, and your nation, are more consistent and more effective at doing what reality requires, not only militarily but also socially, economically, legally, etc., then you are doing what you must do in order to prevail against the evil forces in the world. The nature of the world, as it operates through your actions, will protect you from harm -- far better than if you block it from doing so by cowardice, sloth, etc. It also wouldn't hurt to point out that "the light from above" is a metaphor for the illumination of what direction we should take in the coming conflict. Again, rather than passively waiting for the light to shine on us, we should exercise our own native abilities of wisdom, strength, and serenity to determine which way to go. If there were a God, that is what he would want us to do (helping us because we help ourselves). And if there is not a God, then there sure as heck isn't anyone else who's going to do it for us! In either case, we should engage in rational purposeful action aimed at self-defense. So, how should an atheist interpret or respond to "God bless America"? Pretty much the same way that everyone else does, in essence: Let us "bless" America. Let us work together to protect America from harm or evil -- and fervently hope that our efforts are enough to do the job. Now, there is nothing wrong with praising America, of course! Nor with praising whomever (and/or Whomever) you think is responsible for its being so praiseworthy. But, again, "God Bless America" is not an expression of praise for America. Instead, it is roughly equivalent to "God Save the Queen [or King]". Or, "Now I lay me down to sleep, I pray the Lord my soul to keep." It's saying that what happens to America, or the Queen, or my soul is going to be (at least partly) out of my hands, and I hope for favorable divine intervention. Obviously, atheists don't count on any such thing! But for compactness, you can hardly beat it. If I were to fully express the sentiment in my terms, but to which theists could probably agree, I'd say something benedictive like: But I fear that most people, even if they would agree to the thought, would just say "huh" if they heard it expressed in that form.

Barbara, I'm disappointed in you. Your aversion to smileys only confirms my deepest fears about your malevolent universe premise. REB, the Ironic

for 57 and 56, huh? Thanks, Kat, and Best of the Holiday Season, everyone! REB & EAB (Elizabeth Anne)

Ciro, thanks for sharing those one-liners NB wrote to you. Since they're not in print, I won't include them above, but it's nice that you shared them. Best 2 all, REB

Holiday best from me and Becky, too! Oh, and Kat, if you haven't yet seen the photo of me and Becky that I sent Michael, have him forward it to you -- and feel free to "tailor" it so it can be uploaded to this site, if you like. Perhaps we could get a virtual livingroom full of photos of singles and couples! Ding-dong, the Mystic-Altruist-Collectivist axis is dead! REB

Michael, I'm surprised no one else has commented on this. This is an enormously important and succinctly stated principle of drama writing. And it pertains to writing dramatic music, too. One of the most effective techniques composers have for creating a sense of frustration in a musical progression is to repeatedly turn away from a strongly prepared "cadence" (ending chord sequence, usually the dominant to tonic or 5-1). The first composer I'm aware of that used this technique to the hilt was Richard Wagner in (hope I got the title right) "Love's Death" in Tristan und Isolde. The first time I ever heard it, I was in a roomful of people who were all squirming uncomfortably from the tension being generated by Wagner's deliberate manipulation of our musical expectations. Talk about unrequited yearing! Gads, that is intense stuff. You know, it would have taken Rand very little study of music theory and composition to have been able to write a much, MUCH better explanation of how music works than she did in "Art and Cognition" (in The Romantic Manifesto. But instead, she used Helmholtz's study of the physiology of musical perception (she erroneously followed him in referring to our awareness of musical tones as "sensations") and thereby missed all of the juicy stuff that so neatly parallels what she wrote on characterization and plot in her literature essays. Several years later, the Blumenthals did some really good lectures on music, and they talked explicitly about how the Classical and (especially) Romantic composers developed their musical themes analogously to literary characters and plot. As an antidote to the (to me) hugely irrelevant stuff Rand wrote on music, I suggest ordering the Blumenthal tapes (CDs now?) from Laissez Faire Books and treating yourself to some really classy lectures on music theory, history, and performance. I reference them in my essay, "Art as Microcosm" (JARS, vol. 5, no. 2), which also goes into this issue at some depth. Best holiday wishes to all, REB

Why Union Scale is Killing Our Work By Roger E. Bissell [2005 notes to the reader: As the above Branden quote is intended to suggest, I align my understanding of economics and free enterprise with the ideas he discussed in CUI. The following open letter really was a direct application of what I learned from his writing. In the intervening 20+ years since I wrote the open letter, I have changed my career focus and have been doing much less recording work than in the 1970s and early 1980s. As a result, I have been out of daily contact with the people and circumstances that informed the views and proposals below. I would very much appreciate hearing from recording musicians in the Los Angeles and Nashville area, and to learn whether conditions are any better now than they were in 1984…REB] An Open Letter to Nashville Recording Musicians September 6, 1984 After thirteen years of observing and taking part in our profession and the workings of our union, I’ve arrived at some conclusions I’d like to share with you. The most basic one is that, at this point in time, we desperately need some new ideas and a fresh approach to the problems of recording musicians. The most serious problem currently facing those of us who do jingles and phonograph records is our “scale.” It’s killing our work! (By which I mean: on-card session work.) Off-card, or “scab,” session work is flourishing. In fact, it’s practically an avalanche away from “legit” sessions to “scab” sessions.” For instance, Jay Berliner’s figures show that74%--that’s right, seventy-four percent—of all jingle work in America is now “scab,” or off-card. I don’t know what percent of three-hour, master sessions are being done off-card, but I do know some rough dollar figures. Our current scale of $180+ breaks down to over $60 per hour. By comparison, a typical “scab” session is booked, I am told, for about $40 per hour—or $120 for three hours. (It’s done for even less for some producers and in other cities.) What does that tell you? That free-market session wages are at least 33% lower than scale—in other words, that scale is 50% or more above what we could get on a supply-and-demand basis. Is it any wonder why our work is disappearing off-card??!! If that’s not bad enough, here are two more points of comparison: · On a “legit” session, you typically wait for your money not just three weeks, but two months or longer. On a “scab” session, however, you typically get your money at the end of the session! · And when was the last time you ever heard of someone getting “stiffed” for their money when they did a “scab” session? On the other hand, “legit” producers or companies all too frequently “stiff” us, because they don’t usually have to put up the money in advance (or have it there at the session). If they’re not stiffing use completely, a number of them are still stuffing their own pockets with the interest money they earn/save by delaying their payment to us. The union is supposed to be there to protect us, the working musicians. But who’s really being protected? The signatory record companies! Being signatory is a “seal of approval” from the union. “Trust these companies, they’ll treat you right.” That’s a laugh. It’s the “scab” companies that treat musicians more fairly. And why? Because they have to. How long would an off-card producer survive if he held up payment or stiffed the musicians even once? He doesn’t have a slow-moving (or non-moving) bureaucracy to act as a protective shield between him and the musicians. He doesn’t have a lenient payment system that relieves him of the pressure to pay us in a timely manner. Our payment system is too lenient in the following two ways: · There is no requirement with teeth in it that forces contractors or leaders to turn contracts in to the union (rather than sitting on them until the company gives them a green light, if ever). · There is (apparently) no procedure or system for our office to follow-up automatically on past-due contracts that are filed. This lenient payment system is a standing invitation for signatory companies to act like dead-beats and hold onto our money for as long as possible. Is it any wonder that more and more of them seem to be doing it??!! Signatory companies have a great incentive to “play it straight” by “going union.” But where’s our incentive to do so? Is it any wonder that more and more of our colleagues are spending more and more studio time off-card??!! One more, related problem: our business agents are supposed to be “out there, looking after our interests.” Yet, for the most part, what do they do? Are they out collecting past-due session money for recording musicians? No. Instead, they’re out looking for “naughty” A.F. of M. members who are working “scab.” Instead of giving us a good reason for staying on-card, where the work is shrinking and payment is uncertain at best, they want to punish us for going off-card, where the work is growing and the payment is prompt and reliable. Their approach is “all stick, no carrot.” And it has several bad effects: · It puts our livelihoods more and more in the hands of signatory companies, who pose more of a threat to our livelihoods (i.e., getting paid for what we do) than do “scab” companies. · It re-enforces the belief/perception that a business agent’s most important job is to police our behavior, rather than to help us collect money which is owned to us by signatory companies. · It chases session work out of town. (A large amount of gospel recording session work is now done in places like London, England and Pinebrook, Indiana, at rates around $25-30 per hour, due to our local’s recent efforts to enforce the excessively high recording scale.) · It impoverishes those musicians who were doing the session work (admittedly “scab”) that left town. (And yes, I do feel sorry for these people, even if they’re breaking their commitment to be “union,” for two reasons: (1) They’re not hurting those of us who “play it straight,” because that’s not work we would be doing anyway, not at the current scale level at least; they’re only hurting the people in London and Pinebrook, who would undercut us even further by working even cheaper; and (2) Good faith ought to go both ways, and the union certainly broke faith first, by refusing to budge on the excessively high scale and the dangerously lax payment system, both of which threaten people’s ability to earn/secure a living for themselves and their families.) Before I get to the solutions I’m proposing, I’ll mention, just for good measure, two other, related problems (but without a lot of detail): · String and horn players (and some percussionists) are being hurt because we don’t have a special half-session rate for “over-dub” sessions (of 1-1/2 hours/2 songs or less) to complement the special half-session rate for cutting the tracks. · We’re all being hurt because we don’t have a special rate for recording of published religious musical plays and of “custom” albums (whether country, gospel, jazz, or whatever)(you know the kind sold strictly at concerts and out of the back of the station wagon, so to speak). Note that, in both cases, the union requires that full master scale be charged, which is simply too much for most budgets. This results in widespread scabbing and/or misreporting (e.g., reporting master sessions as demos). OK, then, here are the problems, one more time, in summary form: 1. Master scale and jingle scale (including re-use and multiple-use provisions) are too high, driving work off-card. 2. Our payment/collection system is too lax, causing too much on-card work to be paid late or not at all. 3. Business agents have the wrong priorities, spending too much time enforcing the scale on those who do off-card work, and not enough time enforcing the scale for those who do on-card work. 4. The lack of a special half-session rate for overdubs drives work off-card. 5. The lack of a special session rate for published musicals and “custom” albums drives work off-card. Now the question is: what should we do about these problems? What can we do? Other than “business-as-usual,” with the widespread cheating and hypocrisy that goes with it—which, I think, will eventually destroy on-card session work and the union’s ability to help protect us in legitimate ways—I can see only two basic alternatives: · We can step up policing efforts. We can try to chase all the “scab” work out of town. And we can increase the prosecution and persecution of fellow musicians who choose to do this work. (We could even have a “Scab-Stoppers” program, where you get a reward by phoning in a report on fellow musicians who are working off-card.) · Or, we can try to alter the amount and manner in which we’re paid, in order to coax as much “scab” work as possible back on the card, keeping it here in town and “legit.” In other words, lower the scale in various ways and step up collection efforts, in order to convince our members that their livelihoods are not in jeopardy if they “play it straight.” I don’t think I have to say much about the first alternative. Various of our union officials and top-ranking session-playing colleagues like this approach, but it will destroy what’s left of the union’s legitimate power and influence even faster than “business-as-usual.” I hope the officers and board members we elect this fall will see the light and, once and for all, reject this alternative. All right, here are the specific changes I would propose, so that we can put the second alternative into effect: 1. Negotiate a 33% discount for all master session and all national or regional jingle session wages that are paid at the session in case, or that are pre-paid into the union’s “escrow” account in advance of the session. (What about unanticipated overtime, doubles, etc.? They could be paid at standard scale when the contract goes to the union, unless the employer has extra cash handy!) This could not be done (or even negotiated) officially for two more years; but unofficially, for the time being, in order to get us through this crisis, why couldn’t we start doing it now? In the meantime, we can change our local scale, or the way it’s paid, for local jingles and demo sessions, in order to start the ball rolling and to demonstrate how the setup works and the benefits there will be for national contract work. Same deal: 33% discount for cash at the session or pre-payment to the union. What do you think??? A variation on this for jingles could be an extended “buy-out,” where we allow jingle companies one or two years’ re-use for a single payment which is larger than jingle scale, but smaller than jingle scale plus re-use currently is—provided it’s paid up-front (which is, by definition, what a “buy-out” is). What do you think??? 2. Reform our payment/collection system by amending the By-Laws, as follows: (a) require all contracts to be filed by leader or contractor no later than two working days after the session, subject to fine for failure to do so; (B) inform all signatory companies and producers that they have only sixteen working days (at most) from the day of the session before late charges begin to accumulate; © set up a system, on computer, of reviewing and following-up on past-due contracts, so that they don’t become very past-due contracts, including, if necessary, an office and assistant for the business agent(s) assigned to this job, as well as a clear-cut procedure from telephone contact through personal contact through a collection agency all the way to legal action; and (this is optional) (d) a one-time moratorium on late charges for each past-due contract that is paid during the first sixty days (or whatever) of this new system. We could do this at our next union meeting, if enough people want to. What do you think??? 3. Insist—perhaps by way of a signed petition—that our business agents be directed to stop their police activities and focus on collection work. What do you think??? 4. and 5. Negotiate a special half-session rate for over-dubs and a special session rate for published musicals and “custom” albums. What do you think??? These changes, I am convinced, would largely solve our “scab” situation, without punishing those who want to work. They would shrink the number of past-due sessions and would increase the “legitimate” work opportunities for recording musicians. This would result in better income for us—and more work dues revenue for the union. If you’re still not convinced, just ask yourself: do you have so much income that you couldn’t use some more? Does the union have so much money that it wouldn’t like some more work dues revenue? (Notice I said “like,” not “need.”) Yes, there are some serious objections that can be made to these proposals. The most serious one is that proposals 1, 4, and 5 represent a form of “scale-cutting.” I admit that proposal 5 is that kind of “special deal,” but it’s for two types of recording that should be in a separate category from “commercial” phonograph records. Proposal 4 merely brings special over-dub sessions into line with special basic-track sessions. Proposal 1 is the real “fur-ball” of the bunch. Proposal 1 is a partial step toward scale-cutting—but, please notice, without the stigma of “giving back” or “retreating from the gains we’ve made in the past.” In addition to the incentive it provides to put more sessions on the card, it also offers an incentive for prompt payment that mere scale-cutting wouldn’t offer. In other words, discounting recognizes the free-market principle of offering an incentive to prompt payment—while keeping us solidly in the camp of “negotiated union scale” and “collective bargaining.” These are true benefits to working musicians, but only so long as the scale and the bargaining are realistic. And discounting would help keep them realistic. There’s one basic objection I frequently hear union officials and session players make, and no doubt some of them will make it to this proposal: “You could cut the scale back to $100 and there would be companies who would offer $65 and musicians who would “scab” for that amount. You could cut the scale back to $25, and some would still work for $15. Excuse me, but that’s just plain goofy. Economics and common sense both tell us that there is a point of “diminishing returns” when it comes to working under scale. There is a “market price” for three-hour sessions (about $120), and people are working and making a living at that level—so long as the union doesn’t drive their work off, that is. That’s why so many people are doing it, because it is a living wage, not because they want to be “naughty” or “break the rules” just for the sake of doing it. But how many people could or would work at $65 (or $15) for a three-hour session? Perhaps a tiny handful—but not in the epidemic proportions we have now. I could live with that—couldn’t you??? What we need to do, in short, is to recognize reality and act accordingly. We need to encourage industry to hire union people legitimately at a realistic wage level—and stop reciting the memorized nonsense that “self-respecting union musicians never go backward.” (I’m reminded of the song lyric, “We’re knee-deep in the muddy Mississippi, and the damned fool says to push on.”) If we don’t folks, the union is going down the tubes. The growing tidal wave of “scab” work will capsize the recording agreements. As long as the scale and payment system are not inline with reality and with the needs of working recording musicians, the amount of “scab” session work will grow. Neither policing nor “business-as-usual” will stop it. Really, there is no alternative to something like the above proposals. Agree or disagree, I’d like to hear from you. Let’s work together to solve these problems while there’s still time. And thanks for your patience and thoughtfulness in reading this long letter! Sincerely, Roger Bissell, board member Recording Musicians of America—Nashville chapter P.S.—This letter was not printed and mailed with R.M.A. funds and does not necessarily represent the views of the other board members. These are not all my own ideas, but rather than expose anyone else to the flak this letter will cause—especially if they’re not in total agreement—I’m taking responsibility for the form they’re presented in this letter. Anyone who wants to take credit for a specific proposal is welcome to do so! I just want to open the door, so we can start talking about all these things.

Objective Self-Awareness as the Root of Wisdom by Roger E. Bissell May 7, 1999 What is wisdom and how do you get it? I certainly think that I have more of it now than I did 10 or 20 or 30 years ago. I think wisdom happens when a person lives long enough to figure out what things they can change and what things they can't. I don't think most young people are wise, but probably some of them (a minority) get wise at an early age. (And I don't mean "street wise.") Part of being able to figure out the difference between what you can and can't change requires your being willing to face the fact that there are some things you can't change--i.e., that you are not all-powerful or omnipotent. Part of getting into bad patterns of activity and relationships is from thinking you can fix whatever goes wrong, especially with another person, when actually you can fix very little about some one else. Realizing this is part of becoming wise. It took me about 40 years to (mostly) get it. But that willingness to face one's limitations is the key, which means that one has to overcome whatever arrogance and pride one may have that is just not realistic about the amount of power one has. (It's OK to be proud about what you can do and have done, so long as you acknowledge if and when you had help, as well as whatever accomplishments might have been largely a matter of luck or being in the right place at the right time.) I guess what I'm talking about is stepping back from one's self and getting some objectivity, some clear recognition of one's nature and limitations. In other words, a fresh and more realistic attitude about one's self than one perhaps started out with. The other side of it is to hang on to your true powers and abilities and not sell them out or deny them. Some people have trouble giving up their pessimism (perhaps instilled by parents) and admitting that they really can make a difference about some things. Again, an attitude must change for wisdom to be possible--this one being a willingness to acknowledge that one is not impotent, that one does have power, however limited it might be, to change things and make things better. All in all, I'd say wisdom presupposes being willing to let go of one's self-magnifying and/or self-shrinking attitudes and to see one's self as one really is. Only then, I think, will one be able to look out realistically at the world and see what is possible to one and what is not.

Beyond Survival and Flourishing: The Aristotelian Tripod and the "Fullest Life" By Roger E. Bissell August 27, 2005 For some time now, I have been observing the gradual emergence of a three-tiered model of life-centered ethics—survival, flourishing, and generativity. I think it's appropriate to offer a few words in Aristotle's defense....from his foremost commentator (someone still much-too-neglected by Objectivists and too casually brushed aside for his "floating abstractions"): Thomas Aquinas. In his In Aristotelos Librum De Anima Commentarium (ed. A. M. Pirotta (3rd ed; Turin: Marietti, 1948), St. Thomas writes: Thus, according to Aristotle and Aquinas, there are not two, but three progressively richer ways in which a human (or any living being) can live a full life—through “nutritive” acts (survival), “augmentative” acts (flourishing), and “generative” acts (creation and/or production, including but not restricted to procreation and reproduction). And it's important not to take any of these in too concrete-bound a manner. Just as growth should not be narrowly construed as only or primarily physical development, but instead include various ways in which one can expand one's powers and abilities—neither should the third level or part of full living require that one engage in biological reproduction in order to be "generative," nor in general that one restrict oneself to one particular way of generativity to the exclusion of others. Generativity, in other words, must be construed more broadly and pluralistically for humans, so that it includes making things that help spread one’s ideas and values through the culture, thus causing others to be “such as one is oneself,” at least in that respect. The principle here follows the familiar Randian formulation: "must exist in some form(s) but may exist in any." In particular, generativity entails no a priori requirement to have children—or to not have them. So, we must be careful not to swing the pendulum too far either way in our discussions of how child-rearing relates to the philosophy of Objectivism. All Objectivism says (or should say, as enriched by Aristotelian insights) is that generativity must exist in some form, or one is not living most fully. Survival and flourishing—while they may be all that one can manage in some circumstances—are not enough! They, along with generativity, are the three necessary means or preconditions to the fulfillment of one's own life. These observations also apply to groups of living organisms, such as hives or nations. In regard to the latter, consider these aspects of a fully viable country or nation. First, the nation is "born" and simply tries to survive. Later, after it establishes its existence, the nation thrives, flourishes, and grows. It expands the boundaries of its being in a contiguous manner. Lastly, the nation tries to replicate or "export" itself into other areas of the world, establishing enclaves or colonies or areas of influence outside the boundaries of its contiguous territory. It seems that those are three features of the "fullest life" of nations that occur always, or for the most part, in healthy nations. In the remainder of this essay, I am going to reflect on several frequently pondered philosophical questions as they relate to generativity, in order to show the fertility of this idea as an expansion of ethical concerns beyond the survival-flourishing debate. Generativity and “the Meaning of Life” I think that the meaning of your life is what you choose to generate. There are things that would be more appropriate for you to choose to generate—e.g., if you are a world-class typist and a world-class surgeon, it would probably be better if you focused on curing a thousand cancer or cardiac patients, than to try to get in the Guinness Book of World Records for the most pages typed without stopping. But "generativity" or "legacy" is what we give to the world, what we externalize of ourselves. It can be children (and grandchildren, etc.), or books, or buildings, or poems, or performances, or many, many other things. And not just one of them, but perhaps even some of many of them. Suppose your books were threatened with non-publication, or your buildings with demolition, or your performances with non-attendance and critical disapproval, or your children with severely dysfunctional lives (or even premature death). If one or more of these were at the core of your "legacy", would you not feel that your very being, the very meaning of your life, were threatened, if they were in jeopardy? Aristotle wrote of the expanding of the self to include the other. "A good friend is like another self." (Nichomachean Ethics) Does this not apply to anything that is felt to be a core part of our selves? Would not the loss of any of these be excruciating—if not fully unbearable? People do go on in the face of crushing loss—i.e., some do—they pick themselves up and go on. They love again, they have other children or foster those who need help, they find another outlet for their creative energies. But it is clear that beneath all that, they are trying to rebuild the self. Or, rather, to expand outward again, to flourish and grow, to generate new legacies to leave the world. As noted above, Aristotle said that every living being—plants, animals, people—has three essential components of a full life: metabolism (survival), growth (flourishing), and extending oneself outside one's self (generativity). Objectivists often get hung up debating survival vs. flourishing, when it's obvious that it's both, plus generativity. I don't see how a full, healthy life can exist without all three. Where, why, and how do we obtain purpose? Can we lose it by becoming too absorbed in our reflections, or do we need to just dig deeper? Does it make any real difference what we say is the source of our purpose? Do we need to enter into a "state of forgetfulness" in order to observe ourselves and our interests and activities in such a way that we can come to grasp what our purpose is or should be? Is this prayer? Is our purpose ultimately religious? What if there was a God and He was "kind" enough to tell us how to live and spare us the anguish of having to figure out for ourselves what our lives' purposes would be? If God tried to do that to me, I'd put on ear plugs! Seriously, I want to figure it out for myself. Plus, it's really not that hard for me to see what I should be doing with my life. What's hard is stripping away all the layers of bad habits, childhood baggage, and other drags on my spirit, so that I can pursue my goals with good energy. Aquinas endorsed Aristotle's ideas above. That's more than enough religious endorsement for me! As for the methodology, I think it's contemplating, or deeply considering the profound nature of the world and of one's relation to it. You can get this in good art and in good friendship—even, by negative contrast, in bad art and bad relationships. But I think an essential part of it is to be in a frame of consciousness sometimes referred to as the "esthetic [or aesthetic] attitude", in which you set aside your real-world concerns and enter into another "reality" here and now, to see what lessons you can absorb. It's not an accident that paintings have a frame, stages have a proscenium, statues have a pedestal, etc. It's to help us get out of "regular reality" and into a symbolic mode where we can better focus on the deep issues of life contemplatively or perceptually—"prayerfully”—rather than philosophically and conceptually. Sort of trying to "get it" by being "in your soul" rather than "in your head." Spiritual, rather than cerebral. But prayer or meditation is a tool, at best, and when one gets sucked into the subculture that does it, there are risks of its good effects being subverted by the other negative stuff. A realist needs to stay connected to this reality—including the inner reality of one's mind and body, of course—and anything that takes you to an alleged other plane of existence is bogus. Generativity and the “Biological Clock”? Does the pluralistic view of generativity really work? Are the alternative forms of generativity (e.g., books written, compositions, inventions, etc.) really adequate equivalents to the having of children, and do they give the childless the same level of gratification? It depends partly on whether the childless know what they're missing. I know of numerous feminist and careerist women who aimed in the career/no kids direction for a decade or two, then in their 30s or early 40s had a reckoning with their "biological clocks." Then they had to decide whether to expand their life-projects by accommodating this urging, or instead to work through/past it and continue on their former course. I admit that I don't know that all women go through this conflict or rough spot. Maybe genetics and/or hormones have a lot to do with it. What of those who have not yet dealt with this issue? Are they warped or lying or self-deceiving narcissists, when they say “I never, ever wanted to have children”? Perhaps some are, but probably not most. And how could you argue with something they have expressed in the past tense? What is more doubtful is when a young woman says, “I never, ever will want to have children.” Wants, cravings, and desires come not only from one's volitionally chosen values and ideals but also from one's body. If a woman gets through her fertile years without such a face-off between her chosen life course and her physical nature, I think she will be the exception. But if she doesn’t, I would urge her to embrace the situation in all its wholeness and consider anew what feels like the best way to attain the generativity we all rationally and emotionally want out of life. Nobody says we have to have kids in order to be generative, but nobody says we have to have spouses, or paint, or write poetry, or do philosophy, or play music, or design websites either! And when our context of knowledge and values and passion throws an opportunity up in our faces, it is usually a time to open up our options and reconsider what we want to have done by the time we croak. A brief word in regard to one’s parents feelings about all this: some people seem perfectly content to have their little dogs or cats or birds and to not need children as more....troublesome...pets. However, it usually does not wash, when one tries to justify this choice by asking one’s mother to think of one’s cats, for instance, as “substitute grandchildren.” (Ain’t buying that one. Nope!) Nor would her mother have been very wild about the idea, had your mom decided to have cats instead of you. (Not to mention, where would you be?) It's difficult for our elders not to consider our choice not to have children as a reproach to them, and in a number of ways: (1) they take it as a statement that they have done something wrong in raising us (all too often true!), (2) they take it as a criticism of their lack of career ambition or for sabotaging their own career success by the added burden and distraction of children, (3) they take it as a judgment that they were suckers for "going along with the program" of having kids to please their elders. Be that as it may, it's their problem. My only suggestion is that one just try to avoid aggravating their disappointment with…uh…"catty" remarks. Egocentricity as an Impediment to the “Fullest Life”? I particularly disdain the parents who warehouse their kids in daycare as soon as they can, so both Mom and Dad can pursue their careers. Lots of yuppies out here in California go that path. However, what I really think is going on in a lot of folks—men and women both—is a growing tendency (exacerbated by a trend toward more bad parenting 20 years ago) for young adults to be overly "egocentric." That is to have fairly rigid personal boundaries, which makes them less able to expand their sense of self to include other persons. That translates into either having kids but being relatively detached from them—or to avoid even having them at all. There is a real difference between being a genuine egoist and being egocentric. An egocentric person is one who has not matured psychologically in relation to other people. A person who is still a child emotionally does not make a good parent—and if such a person recognizes that fact, on some level, and decides to remain childless, I guess we should applaud that fact, rather than criticize them. One might ask: isn't the Generativity idea a "social nicety" that we use so we don't have to confront childless couples with our view that their lives are lacking? Well, it may be a nicety in relation to egocentric, immature adults who could have kids but (fortunately) choose not to—but it’s more of a compassionate consolation to those mature, healthy egoists who can't have kids but would love to. It's my own amateur opinion that emotionally mature people naturally want a loving intimate relationship with another adult and a loving parental or mentoring or otherwise supportive relationship with children. However, I would never take it as prima facie evidence of emotional immaturity if a fertile couple chose not to have kids. Nor would I claim all people who have kids are emotionally mature! So, are production and reproduction equivalent? Are creation and procreation basically the same thing? No, not entirely. I'm saying they function similarly, in the same category. But I'd also say that being involved with children (whether or not one actually makes them oneself) is to the other kinds of generativity what romantic love is to the other kinds of flourishing. You can build magnificent skyscrapers and that could be part of your developing your inner talents and powers (flourishing) and creating your outer legacy (generativity). But I think the deepest embodiment of both "fullnesses" is in the people that are encompassed when we expand our sense of self outward. People, not things. And people that represent not just our intellectual or cultural values, but our deepest personal view of life and ourselves as sexual beings that are part of the "Great Chain of Life." (Thus, romance and kids.) Sometimes discussions in economics or social theory talk about the "atomistic individual" or "homo economicus," looking at people more as things that plug into the market when it suits their needs, but which are "really" better understood in Robinson Crusoe terms. ("I am a rock, I am an island.") Well, I think we are better understood as social beings, which means we need people. And that we are better understood as biological beings, which means that we got here by being the children of others, as well as the students or beneficiaries of the wisdom and generosity of others. Part of our human animal potentialities include the power to participate in that Chain of Life, to experience fully what it means to be part of nature, rather than "rationally" alienated from it. Generativity and Suicide? This is another area in which I think Objectivism needs to be modified (or clarified). In my opinion, a more complete view of the proper motivation for human action is that it further one's fullness of life, which includes not only pure survival, and not even survival plus flourishing, but those two factors plus generativity. Aristotle and Aquinas identified the three essential factors in the full life for any living organism as being metabolism or survival, growth or flourishing, and generativity. One maintains one's life, one expands one's powers and abilities, and one creates embodiments of one's values outside oneself. Working out the best relationship or balance between these three factors can be a real challenge for self-aware beings like us, and it is not at all cut and dried that survival is the prime value—or flourishing either, for that matter. We've all heard or read the arguments about whether one would give up one's life for one's freedom or one's true love. Well, extend the point on into the third area, too, for that is a vital part of the best life, the fullest life for human beings. There can be no just reason for requiring another person to follow through on a contract (or any legal obligation) if it requires that person to forfeit his or her life. It may or may not be in a given person's interest to give up his/her life in order to fulfill a voluntarily taken legal obligation. That is for that person to decide, not government or anyone else. I very well might have some motive for laying down my life for a legal obligation—or even something less than a legal obligation—if the situation provided me an opportunity to preserve a value (such as one of my children) that I regarded at that point in time as being more contributory to my self-interest than even my own survival. Ensuring one's generativity, one of the three legs of the brand of egoism I think worth defending (the other two being survival and flourishing), may in fact require one's own demise. Yet, this should be the decision of the individual involved, not other people. Note that this has a clear application to any (if any) pregnancies that cannot be completed without fatal risk to the mother. Even granting (as many Objectivists do not) that at some point in the pregnancy, the mother is carrying a living human person with rights, the mother cannot rightly be forced to continue the pregnancy if her life is at stake. It is her decision whether or not there is some value, egoistic or otherwise, to be gained by continuing to put her life on the line. Surely this is something that nearly all Objectivists could agree to, since even many nasty old conservatives concede the point! Further Thoughts August 31, 2005 1. In a certain sense, one is flourishing if one is living well, but I tend to use the term more narrowly. Here's a simple example to argue for this: consider the lilies. (Har-har.) Lilies grow and develop—and, in time, they also create new lilies. We generally only use the term "flourish" to describe the former activity, while for the latter we instead use the term "reproduce" or (if they create many new lilies) "proliferate" Both terms refer to an increase of fullness, a burgeoning outward, of the life process of the lilies—in the former, expanding themselves, in the latter, spilling outward into the environment. So, and to generalize, within the broad concept of "living well," I see the need for a distinction between flourishing (including physical growth and development, learning, character development, etc.), which is creating or producing value within oneself—and generativity (including child-bearing and supporting, art, commerce, earning a living, etc.), which is creating or producing value outside of oneself. And since one's values are an aspect of oneself, then by creating or producing them outside of oneself, one is reproducing an aspect of oneself in the world. There are important existential and psychological reasons for regarding both flourishing and generativity as rational virtues and, particularly, as means to happiness (which is one's ultimate moral purpose). It is good to learn (an aspect of flourishing) and to produce material goods (an aspect of generativity), because educating and supporting oneself are ways one exercises one's rational faculty so that it functions as one's means of survival (and happiness). It is also good to build one's moral character by virtuous actions (an aspect of flourishing), because this is how one enhances one's self-esteem, which is one's sense that one is worthy and capable of living, another precondition of one's happiness. It is also good to inject one's values into the world (an aspect of generativity), because this is how one makes ones values real and open to one's direct observation, as a reminder that the universe is benevolent, that man is capable of achieving his values (and being happy) if he acknowledges and adapts to the nature of reality. 2. It is true that people, especially those who have not had children, often explore other avenues for generativity in their later years. This phenomenon is sometimes called the "legacy" urge or motive. It is because one's achievements during one's earlier years may not have left much of a discernable trace in the world that some yearn for a more visible, concrete representation of their presence on earth. However, it should be acknowledged that anyone who has led a productive life has already projected much into the world. For further details, see "Mr. Holland's Opus." 3. I think most childfree-by-choice are not particularly opposed to children—as long as they're someone else's children! Seriously, I do think that there is something important missing from the lives of those who eschew all dealings with children. There is plenty of opportunity for the childfree-by-choice to teach, mentor, or otherwise help children, if that is how they would prefer to interact with children. Uncles and aunts, "Big Brothers" (and Sisters), etc., have a welcome role to play, too. There is a flip side to the including of children in one's life, whether in one's household or in one's schedule. That leaves less time for other things. Just to name two areas of my own values: I know I could have read and written more essays and books, and I could have played and recorded more jazz music, had I chosen to remain childless. But I wouldn't trade the quality of life I have had, and the very special pattern of generativity (kids and career and hobbies) I have had, for a more one-track and prominent stack of achievement. My legacy will be a patchwork quilt, it seems. 4. My friend Michael Stuart Kelly commented that “generativity,” while an accurate term “is a bit cumbersome,” and that he “would like to see a more attractive term that is easier to communicate. If you say ‘generativity’ is one of the meanings of life to a normal factory worker, for instance, his eyes will glaze over.” True enough! Sometimes a single word, however accurate, is just too wordy for some people. OK, how about, “give value for value to the world”? Or maybe simply “give” or “share”? (I can hear the anti-altruists sharpening their knives now! 5. In conclusion, I would summarize my perspective with these three injunctions: a. Be all that you can rationally be (flourish). b. Make all that you can rationally make (be generative). c. Prioritize!

Jody, I wish you and your bride all the happiness and love your hearts can hold. You have a very nice website for your pictures &c, and I signed in with similar wishes there. Best always, REB

Mistaken Identity: Long’s Conflation of Dialectics and Organicism A Reply to Roderick Long by Roger E. Bissell The principal criticism Roderick T. Long (2001) makes of Chris Matthew Sciabarra’s dialectical thesis is a complex one. He says that Sciabarra fails to clearly draw certain important distinctions (metaphysical vs. epistemic categories, logical vs. causal relations, and abstraction vs. idealization) and, as a result, fails to “extricate himself from internalism.” As consequences of the latter, Sciabarra overstates his cases (a) against Rothbard’s version of libertarianism, (B) for the closeness between Hayekian-Randian dialectics and Hegelian-Marxian dialectics, and © for the overall applicability and usefulness of dialectics (406). This brief essay will not address all of these points, but will instead focus on what seems to be the linchpin of Long’s case: the allegation that Sciabarra fails to sufficiently distance himself from internalism. The roots of this supposed failure (not drawing certain distinctions clearly enough) and the further results of this failure (misjudging Rothbard, Hegel-Marx, and the scope of dialectics) are thus outside the scope of these remarks. The aim here is merely to show that Sciabarra has maintained a consistent position regarding internalism from the very outset, and that Long has failed to read Sciabarra carefully enough to detect that consistency. Vindicating Sciabarra’s Dialectics To start at the present and work backward: in Total Freedom: Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism (henceforth abbreviated as TF), Sciabarra (2000) defines dialectics as “an orientation toward contextual analysis of the systemic and dynamic relations of components within a totality” (173; emphasis added). Compare this with Long’s claim that dialectics is one-sided because it is integrative and synthetic, lacking the balance provided by analytic philosophy with its differentiative (distinction-drawing) and analytic nature (426–27). In other words, Long says, dialectics isn’t truly dialectical—nor can it be! Because of its one-sided integrative, synthetic emphasis, it is not a “full blown methodological orientation” (426) and can only become so by giving up its identity and forming a hybrid approach that also uses the “precise conceptual tools of analytic philosophy” (427). Long has not accurately portrayed Sciabarra’s view. The definition just cited includes analyzing how components are related within a totality. In other words, Sciabarra defines dialectics as being both synthetic (of one-sided perspectives into a fuller, less distorted perspective) and analytic (of relations among components of a totality). Also, Sciabarra thoroughly discusses the truly one-sided perspectives in regard to synthesis and analysis and in regard to internal relations and external relations, and he identifies these as “strict organicism” (synthetic, internal relations) and “strict atomism” (analytic, external relations). Thus, it is not the Sciabarran dialecticians, but the organicists (aka Absolute Idealists) who embody what Long objects to as a one-sided focus on internal relations and synthesis. It is these latter with whom Long and the analytic community (aka Realists) must pool perspectives, in order to transcend their respective limited viewpoints and arrive at something approximating Sciabarra’s model of dialectics. In both Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical (1995b; hereinafter RR) and TF, Sciabarra explicitly disavows an internalist view of relations. He says that whether a given relation is external or internal depends upon context, and that an exclusively internalist (or externalist) commitment rests on begging the question, cosmologically speaking (RR, 59–61, 175–76; TF, 182). Yet, Long (2001) says, Sciabarra earlier seemed to suggest that dialectics was essentially “wedded” to the doctrine of internal relations (398). In support of this claim, Long first quotes from Sciabarra’s Marx, Hayek, and Utopia (1995a, henceforth MHU): “A dialectical perspective . . . focuses not on external connections between static elements, but on dynamic internal relations. . . . Dialectical analysis views things as internally related. Dualism views things as externally related” (24). Unfortunately, Long overlooks a crucial distinction, possibly because of the ambiguity in the word “as.” It is true that dualism and atomism view things as being externally related, rather than internally related. However, it should also be noted that organicism and monism view things as being internally related, rather than externally related. Dialectics, by contrast, views things insofar as they are internally related—and it also views things insofar as they are externally related. In the context specifically of Sciabarra’s comparison of dialectics and dualism, then, the relevant point is that dualism fails to acknowledge internal relations, while dialectics acknowledges them. In a contrast between dialectics and organicism (or monism), the appropriate relevant point would be that organicism fails to acknowledge external relations, while dialectics acknowledges them. Long, in his haste to categorize dialectics as a synthetic, integrative, internalist doctrine, misses this point entirely. Indeed, as Long notes in his reference to RR, Sciabarra sees internal relations as contextual, as an aspect of something’s nature, which also includes its being externally related to certain other things. Second, Long quotes Sciabarra’s 1995 interview with Full Context (1995c): “[Dialectics has] an emphasis on Internal Relations. . . . [A]s a consequence of all of this, dialectics rejects formal dualism [which] stresses not integration and organic unity, but separation and opposition between spheres, and external relations between parts” (5). What Long misses here is the reason for the stress on internal relations: it is to correct the atomistic and dualistic tendency to view parts as being non-integrated and separate from the whole of which they are parts. In other words, Sciabarra is not saying that external relations do not exist, but rather that characterizing parts as being externally related (rather than internally related) is simply incorrect. External relations are relations between wholes, considered as objects of focus or inquiry, not relations within wholes, considered as “totalities” or structured unities—i.e., not between the parts of wholes, that have been identified through analytical investigation.1 Speculating as to How Long Went Astray Any of the above misinterpretations by Long of Sciabarra’s dialectics could be explained by itself as a simple, though regrettable, misunderstanding. As a consistent pattern, however, they indicate that a deeper influence may be at work. One suggestion that grows out of an appreciation of Sciabarra’s writings is that Long has fallen prey to the tendency to confuse methodological orientations with ontological or cosmological models of reality. Sciabarra carefully and consistently avoids the pitfall of inappropriately cosmologizing the various approaches to investigating fields of academic study.2 Rather than delving into the ontological implications of the dialectical approach in a way parallel to that of the dualist or monist or strict atomist or strict organicist orientations, Sciabarra remains steadfastly epistemological or methodological throughout his works. And he does so precisely because of the pitfalls suffered by the other orientations as they each attempt to establish their models not just as a useful method of explaining the nature of reality, but as the fundamental explanation of the nature of reality. This hegemonistic tendency of particular cosmologies to elevate themselves to explanatory preeminence is thoroughly explored by Stephen C. Pepper in his classic, World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence (1942). It might well have been subtitled “The Limits of Cosmology,” for that is precisely what Pepper seeks to clarify. Each world hypothesis or cosmology is explored in depth and compared with the others, and what emerges is a thorough parallel on a grand scale of the parable of the four blind men and the elephant.3 Each of the four “basically adequate” world hypotheses has strong points to recommend it, and they all have their serious shortcomings. Pepper’s solution to the impasse arrived at is thus to strive for, as he puts it, “rational clarity in theory and reasonable eclecticism in practice” (330). We should acknowledge that the “four alternative theories . . . supply us with a great deal more information on the subject than any one of them alone could have done,” and thus that we should make our judgments “in the most reasonable way possible . . . sensibly acting on all the evidence available” (331).4 The four world hypotheses that Pepper compares are Formism, Mechanism, Contextualism, and Organicism. Formism (Pepper’s name for “realism”) is connected with Plato, Aristotle, the Scholastics and Neoscholastics, the Neorealists, and the modern Cambridge realists—and, it would appear, Roderick Long. Mechanism (or “materialism”) is associated with the atomists and various early modern philosophers including Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Contextualism (or “pragmatism”) is connected with Peirce, James, Bergson, Dewey, and others. Organicism (or “absolute idealism”) is associated with Hegel, Bradley, and others (141–42). Pepper groups these four cosmologies in two basic ways. First, he distinguishes between analytic and synthetic world theories, viewing Formism and Mechanism as analytic and Contextualism and Organicism as synthetic. Secondly, he distinguishes between theories that have “inadequate scope,” which he labels as integrative and theories that have “inadequate precision,” which he labels as dispersive—the integrative theories being Mechanism and Organicism and the dispersive (Pepper’s term) or differentiative (Long’s term) theories being Formism and Contextualism (142). With this twofold classification scheme in hand, Pepper is able to characterize Organicism as an integrative, synthetic theory (146)—which is precisely how Long attempts to describe Sciabarra’s dialectics—a description that more appropriately applies to strict organicism as Sciabarra defines and discusses it. Also, consider the fact that Pepper characterizes Formism as a dispersive, analytic theory (146). If we then take “dispersive” as equivalent to “differentiative,” and if we further acknowledge other clear signs that Long places himself squarely within the Platonic/Aristotelian realist tradition, there can hardly be any doubt that Long’s view is a version of the world hypothesis Pepper calls Formism. Thus, it would appear that Long has engaged in a cosmologically tinged and overly narrow critique of Sciabarra’s position. He under credits the Pepperian “rational clarity . . . and reasonable eclecticism” in Sciabarra’s approach and sees it instead as harboring the specter of (strict) organicism—the narrower, synthetic-integrative arch rival to his own analytic-differentiative, Formist approach. As I have shown, however, it’s a case of mistaken identity, pure and simple. Conclusion As one reads Sciabarra’s growing body of thought, one can discern a consistent, continuous thread, running from MHU through RR to TF. Dialectics, as Sciabarra conceives it, encompasses and transcends the more limited perspectives of the synthesis-oriented organicists and monists and the analysis-oriented atomists and dualists (including Long’s own analytic perspective). It is certainly true, as Long states, that more understanding can be reached by pooling the valuable techniques and insights of each perspective—and he generously admits that his own perspective is enriched by the complementary efforts of the synthetic, integrative approach.5 Where Long errs, however, is in assuming that Sciabarra and dialectics are on the other side of the fence from the analytic tradition. On the contrary, Sciabarra the dialectician has consistently sought to transcend the limiting perspectives of the analysts and the synthesists, while incorporating their strengths into his dialectical “bag of tricks” for use when apropos. Notes 1. I draw here on Sciabarra’s distinction discussed in TF (173, 176). 2. It is instructive to compare Sciabarra’s position with that of Ayn Rand (1997). In remarks written in 1958, Rand firmly insists that “[c]osmology has to be thrown out of philosophy,” because “a metaphysical attempt to establish the literal nature of reality . . . usurps the domain of physics and proposes to solve the problems of physics by some non-scientific, and therefore mystical, means” (698). This kind of “rationalizing from an arrested state of knowledge,” she says, takes “partial knowledge as omniscience” and is the pathway to all sorts of “fantastic irrationalities of philosophical metaphysics” (698, 699). 3. Sciabarra himself mentions this parable in RR, 380. 4. The similarity between Pepper’s and Sciabarra’s surveys of alternate views and their own preferred solutions is striking. 5. There is at least one significant discrepancy between the ways that Long and Pepper view the potential for cooperation between the synthetic, integrative approach and the analytic, dispersive/differentiative approach. Whereas Long is laudably gracious in calling for peaceful coexistence and sharing of research results and perspectives, Pepper sees Formism and Organicism as being “especially hostile to each other. There is nothing that an organicist so enjoys as devastating the ‘linear’ or ‘atomic’ logic of the formist, nor anything a formist so enjoys as tearing down and into small pieces the ‘muddled’ and ‘psychologized’ logic of the organicist” (147–148). References Long, Roderick T. 2001. The benefits and hazards of dialectical libertarianism. The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 2, no. 2 (Spring): 395–448. Pepper, Stephen C. 1942. World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence. Berkeley: University of California Press. Rand, Ayn. 1997. Journals of Ayn Rand. Edited by David Harriman. New York: Dutton. Sciabarra, Chris Matthew. 1995a. Marx, Hayek, and Utopia. Albany: State University of New York Press. ___. 1995b. Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. ___. 1995c. Interview. Full Context 8, no. 1 (September). Available at <http://www.nyu.edu/projects/sciabarra/about/fc.htm>. ___. 2000. Total Freedom: Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. [This essay was published in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 3, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 351–57.

How to Win a Man by Roger E. Bissell 1989 The way to a man's love Is through his deepest values.

Letting Go by Roger E. Bissell 1989 Here's you, there's me. We two can't be. Not here, not there. No love to share. Letting go now, Hardly knew how, 'Til the moment When I saw clearly. Here's me, there's you. No us, we're through. Not here, not there. Not anywhere. Heartache mending, Nearly ending. Now it's time for parting. New life starting.

Unhooked by Roger E. Bissell 1982 Go on your merry way. How was I to know You would ever say you had to leave? You and I are dead. Never did believe All those things you said, like "Forever." Never did ring true, when you told me "I love you." But always thought that we'd work out somehow. Guess that I was wrong. Obviously we're through. We just don't belong to each other now. Guess it's time to go on our sep'rate ways. Now it all must end. Now you'll never know you were my best friend. Go, if you really must. But you ought to know You were more than just a pretty face. You and I were good. How can I retrace All the steps we took down life's hallways? Always kept in mind that true love is hard to find. But never entertained the thought that we'd ever come unhooked. Guess that I was wrong. Obviously we're through. We just don't belong to each other now. Guess it's time to go on our sep'rate ways. Now it all must end. Now you'll never know you were my best friend.

Once in Every Lifetime by Roger E. Bissell 1978 Once in ev'ry lifetime, someone comes along, Someone who makes love a song that knows no ending. Someone you're at home with, someone who is real, Shows you how she really feels without pretending. Arms to lose yourself in, when the day's been long. Hands to help you find the way, when ev'rything's gone wrong. So, when you find your someone, never let her go. Let her know she's the one you've waited for.

That's the Price You Pay by Roger E. Bissell 1976 If freedom has a bitter taste From all the facts you finally faced, And all the years that went to waste, Then that's the price you pay. And if it seems too great a cost For all the losing dice you tossed And all the precious time you lost, Then that's the price you pay. The good times never seem to last. You're haunted by a chance you passed. Tomorrow seems to come too fast. Yes, that's the price you pay.

A Kinder, Gentler Friendship by Roger E. Bissell 1989 As I look into the private sector of your soul, A thousand twinkling points of light let me know That my hungry spirit will never again have to wonder Where its next meal is coming from.

Illumination by Roger E. Bissell 1989 In the darkness of the night, As I formulate my messages And prepare to send them to you, I remember your shining eyes, I see again your glowing smile, And they provide the light By which I am able to see What I want to say.

My Spirit's Home by Roger E. Bissell 1989 Like a beacon in the night, The sparks from your soul send out their light And help me not to lose the sight Of my spirit's home. Brighter than a sunlit day, The sparks from your soul wipe out the gray And help me not to lose the way Back to my spirit's home.

Conditional Morality and Rational (?) Enablement by Roger E. Bissell November 15-17, 1997 Here's a thought that seems to get at an interesting parallel about morality and life. Since life is conditional and not automatic or guaranteed, why shouldn't morality be conditional and not categorical? In other words, Rand was right in "Causality versus Duty." People sometimes want to pin down Objectivism into saying that you should value life, when all they really mean is that they want you to, because valuing life is good for you. (Thanks, Mom!) I think it's really a sign of emotional and psychological maturity to let go of the crusade to drum categorical imperatives into people's heads and give them the rope with which to hang themselves. Skeptics, altruists, etc., need to be allowed to experience reality, instead of being propped up and enabled by those who allow themselves to give the benefit of the doubt to their arguments. In the present case, it means to stop trying to convince skeptics that they should value life, only to show them that if they want to live, they should do certain things, but that it's their life to live or forfeit as they choose. No one is going to make them live or pressure them into living. If there's one thing I learned in the 12-Step meetings of groups like Al-Anon, it's that people who are deprived of excuses to rebel against the pro-life ("your pressuring me to do it made me not want to do it" etc., ad nauseum and aggravateum) are more likely to come around and get in line with life and reality. Also, since the ultimate value is the basis for obligation or what people ought to do, it is begging the question to say that one ought to value it. Just as you cannot try to prove the laws of logic without question-begging, for they are the basis of proof. To try to deny long-range either life as the ultimate value or the laws of logic requires one's continuing to exist, which requires that one smuggle them in and use them, even if in unacknowledged fashion. In regard to answering error with rational argument, there are excellent reasons for "hanging in there," at least up to a point. As the saying goes: If not now, when? If not us, who? How long to persevere, and when to throw in the towel, however--those are important considerations. Although the amount of material out there that needs answering shows no sign of slacking off, it's very much a matter of "Choose Your Issues," as Rand said in The Objectivist Newsletter. In other words, selectivity and discernment are vital. We can't answer everything, nor should we even try. As my wise friend, Douglas Rasmussen, told me recently, when I was seeming to fall prone to going overboard with crusader zeal: I have printed this out in large font and posted it on my bulletin board, so that I can read it every time I sit at my computer. I keep reminding myself: balance, balance, balance! I am not just a thinking machine for the Objectivist movement, but also a musician, a husband, a father, a person who loves listening to Frank Sinatra and Eddie Daniels (among many others), a person who loves reading Tom Clancy and James Hogan and Orson Scott Card (among many others), and a person who loves personality theory and genealogy (among many other pursuits). These things are all important parts of the complete "me," who feels off-kilter when any of them is missing for too long. But that also includes philosophizing! So, remembering my limitations, I try to carefully select what I will put my time and effort to, in hope that I am maximizing my efforts and perhaps spreading the seeds of understanding and positive change to others who are in a position to help them grow to full flower. It's a very abstract process, one which usually shows results in unexpected ways, often some time after I have forgotten about the particular thing I wrote. Trickle-down influence is very much a reality, as nebulous or hard to pin down as it may seem at times. So, as Dagny kept telling herself--under what were surely more trying circumstances than we face!--"Don't let it go."

[This is an early version of my essays in Journal of Ayn Rand Studies entitled "Music and Perceptual Cognition" and "Art as Microcosm." These essays are posted on my website at: http://members.aol.com/REBissell/indexmmm.html ===================================== Thoughts on Musical Characterization and Plot: the Symbolic and Emotional Power of Dramatic Music by Roger E. Bissell It was Aristotle who first spoke of the similarity between our experiences of music and drama. In the Politics, he referred to music as the most "imitative" of the arts: ". . . music produces by its sounds the same effects that nature produces by human character in action. A good poem or a good song arouses in us the same feelings and emotions as do the actions of a man." More recently, German physiologist and physicist Hermann Helmholtz held that music can imitate and express not only overt physical motions but also "the mental conditions which naturally evoke similar emotions, whether of the body or voice . . ." Unfortunately, the insights of Aristotle and Helmholtz have not had a great influence upon modern music esthetics, which view music as wholly emotive with no base in reason, or wholly mathematical and formalistic, devoid of emotion. But in fact music can be grounded in realist and representational esthetics. Dramatic music (meaning music with a plot structure, music that builds to a climax and seeks resolution) has emotional power specifically because its musical characterization and plot symbolize a world in which human life is purposeful. Such music arouses emotions by setting up an aural microcosm in which one can view and respond to an image of human experience and goal-directed action. In general, symbols are concretes that stand for and thus bring to mind some idea. Linguistic symbols (language), can be used to symbolize any and all ideas. Music and the other arts, by contrast, are comprised of esthetic symbols, which are radically different from linguistic symbols. They do not rely upon conventionally accepted and memorized meanings, but instead present images or feelings that are automatically seen as embodying a meaning. As such, the greatest usefulness of esthetic symbols lies in their ability to stand for certain deep abstractions about reality and human existence -- and thus to symbolize a world or microcosm that exemplifies that abstraction. Music can also present a microcosmic view of human experience and goal-directed action. It does so, in striking parallel to great literature, by employing musical characterization and musical plot. In order to effectively utilize musical characterization and plot, the composer must organize the musical "events" so that the listener can perceptually integrate them. An arrangement of tones of varying intervals, pitches, durations, articulations, etc., becomes a melody. A multilayered progression of melody and harmonic-rhythmic accompaniment becomes a musical form. Musical characterization, then, is the composer’s means for inducing listeners to experience a melody as if it were a single dynamic musical entity behaving in a certain way and/or having things happen to it -- and musical plot is the composer’s means for inducing listeners to experience a musical form as if it were a single dynamic musical process, an intricate system of means and ends (or causes and effects) aiming at a certain musical goal(s). Both of these elements are present in dramatic music, and a listener is able to fully benefit from its symbolic and emotional power by engaging with these elements. This is done by adopting what John Hospers calls "the esthetic attitude:" detaching from one’s own real-world concerns and absorbing oneself in the "world" of the musical piece. In this manner, listeners are thus able to "identify with" the musical entity (melody), its physical behavior, and its goal-directed action -- much as they do when reading about or viewing a dramatic character. They can then evaluate the things that happen to the melody and in the musical form (and, vicariously, to themselves and in their lives) as good or bad, and respond accordingly -- again, as in their experience of literary or theatrical drama. Presuming, then, that dramatic music is often experienced as presenting analogies to human experience and goal-directedness, how is it able to do this so effectively? The explanation lies partly in the fact that underlying these purposive analogies is a more basic physical one: our perception of musical tones as having a location, and being in motion. It is sometimes thought that our awareness of musical sounds is a process not of perception but of sensation. Helmholtz himself speaks of "sensation" and so gives the impression that music is a matter of raw sense -- following philosopher William James, a chaotic, undifferentiated, "bloomin’, buzzin’ confusion." This could not be more unlike our experience of music. Although sound waves are physically mixed together, we are capable of perceptually singling out a given physical sound. By suppressing the physiological effect on our hearing apparatus of the other sound waves, we thus experience it as a sound (e.g., a chirp, tweet, rattle, buzz, honk, voice, tone, etc.). Since we definitely hear musical sounds as discrete, differentiated units of awareness, musical awareness is clearly a form of perception, not sensation. Our perception of tones, or sounds of definite pitch, is particularly important to music. While we have little or no auditory awareness of the actual spatial location of a sound wave or the entity emitting it, tones can present a striking metaphor or analogy to location and motion. This analogy is experienced in relation to the tonal attribute of pitch. Pitch is not experienced as a quality similar to color, even though both are correlated with frequency of energy waves. Instead, we experience tonal pitch as having a definite spatial location, one experienced as being in a vertical dimension. Tones of greater frequency are heard as "higher" in pitch, and tones of lesser frequency as "lower." We further experience change in pitch as being along a vertical dimension and in a forward direction, analogous to actual spatial motion. But what is moving? An entity? Is a single tone an entity? If so, then why is a melodic succession of tones not perceived as a succession of discrete entities, but instead as one entity extended in time and moving through musical space? Or, if a single tone is not an entity, how does its combination with other tones allow it to be perceived as one? The analogy to motion in music is due to an aural version of the phi-phenomenon. This is the process whereby the brain integrates into a single unit a series of events sufficiently similar and close enough in space and time. This is why we experience a semblance of motion in television and movies, which as we know are made up of many single picture frames. Thus, because musical awareness is not the sensation of a single tone but rather the perception of a complex of overtones built around a single tone (and because changes in pitch are interpreted as motion) we, in effect, perceive music as entities in motion. Yet, the mystery about music is not how it symbolizes motion, but how it symbolizes e-motion. Motion as such doesn’t reliably convey emotion in literature -- we don’t weep merely at being told someone opened a door, or shown it on a stage -- so how can it do any differently in music? It doesn’t. Even though music often symbolizes motion of perceivable entities, there is no strictly musical reason why perceiving a musical image of entities in motion should have value significance. The answer lies in how music builds on the image of motion and location to achieve a further image of human experience and goal-directed action. In theatrical drama, we are presented with suggestions of the emotional states of the characters. These emotions are not usually suggested by verbal description but instead by inference from gestures, posture, facial expressions, and so on. We associate these with certain feelings and moods from real-life experience. Then, seeing them on the stage, we infer the presence of those feelings and moods in the dramatic characters. In this sense, staged gestures and expressions, can suggest an emotion. The actress stands bolt upright, turns in surprise, goes forward, hesitates, then resumes her motion with a rush. "Yes," we might say, seeing her stance and expression, "that's a convincing expression of that emotion. That actress looks like she would if she were really feeling that emotion." (Which, depending on her method, she may or may not be.) Through the medium of body language, this can take place without even a single word of dialogue being uttered. By analogy, the same can be true in music. This mode of suggesting emotions in music rests on the analogy to motion and position in space, conveyed mainly by the elements of melody and rhythm. The sense of motion and position evoked by a given combination of tones bears striking analogy to gestures and postures accompanying an emotion in real life. A master of this gestural aspect of music was Franz Liszt, particularly in his Hungarian Rhapsodies, put to particularly effective use in numerous mid-20th century cartoon sound tracks. This factor is a basic reason why music can so naturally be combined with dance. Abrupt changes in the range of pitch spanned by the harmony, sudden melodic changes in pitch, etc., all have direct counterparts in choreography--and in human emotions. Tchaikovsky’s ballets The Nutcracker Suite and Swan Lake come to mind here, the former playing a prominent role in the classic Disney animated feature, Fantasia. As somewhat of an historical irony, Liszt was a prominent proponent of this practice in music, prefixing passages of explanatory material (programmes) to his symphonic poems. There was a 300-year tradition of such programme music preceding him -- which continues today in concert notes and liner notes for recorded music -- but Liszt could well have dispensed with the literary appendages and allowed the emotional directness of his music to speak for itself. Literature -- and art in general -- usually is much more effective when it portrays emotional states indirectly by conveying physical concomitants. This approach leaves it to the reader to infer in a personal manner what emotional state is intended to be conveyed. In this way, literature -- no less than acted-out drama and music -- becomes a "language of the emotions," not just talk about emotions. More precisely, each of the dramatic arts can function in its own peculiar way (verbal reference, acting out, or aural analogy) to convey an impression of the physical concomitants of emotions. However, the essential characteristic they all possess is: the suggestion of emotions by conveying an impression of the physical concomitants of those emotions. How they convey those impressions is a result of their sensory differences, but this relationship between music and the emotions exists on the concrete level of music, i.e, the short-range level of musical events and emotional experiences. Another mode also connects music to the emotions, and it, too, bears close similarity to the one operating in literature and drama, but it functions on more abstract levels of music -- i.e., higher levels of perceptual integration. Neither (meaningful) dramatic music, nor literature, nor drama is merely a series of events in temporal succession, like beads on a string, with no significance beyond the range-of-the-moment. In all of these, there is a principle at work which allows the events to be viewed as connected in a progression. The progression, moreover, is not merely a concrete-level one; it builds up around a central point of climax, in much the same manner as a goal-directed series of events in real-life. In a goal-directed progression, events on one level are related as means to events on a broader level, which are the ends. In turn, these ends serve as the means to events on the next higher level. And so on, up the hierarchy of events, to the ultimate goal of that given progression. The mental process one uses to grasp such a multi-level progression -- whether projecting it, viewing it, or carrying it out in real life -- is very similar to that involved in grasping a literary, dramatic, or musical progression. This process -- technically known as identification -- is the means by which one temporarily suspends one’s own personal context and puts oneself in the place of other persons: whether in real life, characters in drama, and music. On this level, as on the concrete level, emotions are suggested by virtue of music’s presenting not the emotion itself, but one of its concomitants. One grasps a progression of events and has an emotional response to it -- the perceived events -- rather than the music alone. Theme, melody, and harmony shape the musical progression, and conflict typically is found in all three. One cannot construct a very interesting plot by arranging for an undistinguished, humdrum, non-dissonant march straight to the musical goal; this would convey the impression that there are no obstacles, no excitement in life. Instead, the musical plot dramatizes goal-directedness by employing conflict -- whether in the implied goals of a single melodic idea, or between two or more melodic ideas, or in the corresponding harmonies, or in other ways. The analogy of plotful music to literature and drama is profound and vivid. The seminal figure in music history for this aspect of the composer’s craft was Beethoven. The first movement of his Fifth Symphony (referred to during World War II as the Victory Symphony, for the similarity of its opening motif -- da-da-da-daaaah -- to the Morse Code symbol for the letter "V") is a perfect example. The way in which he delays and then unexpectedly resolves the first movement presents the listener with a suspenseful, intense conflict of the first order. Beethoven was a master at using smaller structural units as building blocks, joining them together into a logical succession by the common rhythmic and melodic features they shared, and then using them to develop toward points of climax and resolution in his musical works. The kind of perceptual structure Beethoven provides the attentive listener is the basis of the analogy to goal-directedness in music. Because of how the system of musical relationships develops, one expects certain events to follow others, one's expectations are fulfilled or denied, and one responds accordingly. The music strains to rise, falls, rises again; it surges forward, pauses, clashes, swoops and soars. The core of goal-directedness in music, then, is our perception of entities as being in motion and our expectation that these entities will find an appropriate point at which to resolve their motion. The resolution of a chord progression and the resolution of a literary plot are fundamentally similar -- enough so that it is altogether reasonable to extend the concept of plot to apply to progressions of musical events. We may postulate, if music is to function as a "language of the emotions," it must follow the same general procedure as literature and theatrical drama at their most effective. The pattern of motions, gestures, and stances implied by the musical intervals in a melodic motif or melody, and the sequence of value-judgments implied by the conflicts in a purposeful musical progression, act together to determine the emotional tone of such music and, hence, its emotional theme. Concrete-level emotions are suggested in music by a musical impression of the physical accompaniments of the emotions. This works well because emotions are motivational, they have implications for physical motion such that, in retrospect, motion of a certain character is taken to imply a certain kind of emotion. (As another example of this point, consider the music for the dance scenes in Bernstein’s West Side Story.) Abstract-level progressions of emotions are suggested in music by a series of musical events that generate, develop, and resolve (or thwart) the listener’s expectations. This works so well because emotions are a response to value-judgments, and value-judgments are the basis of purposeful action, as symbolized by plot -- in music, as in literature. (Much of the continuing popularity of Shostakovich’s Fifth Symphony probably lies in the power of its Finale movement, which works in just this way. The way in which certain melodic fragments are developed in the first three movements should not be overlooked, however, for they are the seeds of the full-blown theme of the Finale.) By means of musical characterization, the melodic-rhythmic aspect of dramatic music symbolizes physical motion and arouses empathetic feelings appropriate to the character and durations of the musical intervals used. By means of musical plot, the harmonic-rhythmic aspect of dramatic music symbolizes goal-directedness and arouses emotions appropriate to the way the progression develops and resolves. This does not imply that all worthwhile music must have goal-directed action, but it does suggest that one’s response to dramatic music is not just a knee-jerk and does have a rational basis in form. Such music does not mean just anything the listener or composer wants it to mean; the meaning arises from the events. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- This essay appeared in ART Ideas, Vol. 5, No. 1, and is copyright 1998 by Roger E. Bissell. To order a copy of the magazine in which this essay appeared, write to American Renaissance for the 21st Century, Inc., FDR Station, P.O. Box 8379, New York, NY, 10150.