Roger Bissell

Comments on Rand's "The Age of Envy" in re the Frozen Abstraction fallacy by Roger E. Bissell 1973 This 1971 essay by Rand is an elaboration upon her claim that the emotional atmosphere of today's culture is one of envy or, more precisely, "hatred of the good for being the good." The experience of this emotion, Rand says, is possible only to a person who has sabotaged his/her cognitive development by avoiding mental effort and understanding. Such a person is instead pursuing whims and deception of others (thus freezing his/her mental functioning to the concrete level appropriate to childhood). Anyone who experiences this emotion as a characteristic response to the sight of his/her values, is referred to by Rand in bitterly caustic terms as a "hater," an "inhuman object," a "creature," "it," a "hating creature," an "envious hater," a "monster." In other words, if one's basic, typical response to the sight of one's real values is hatred, one is not human, one is not a man. Yet, curiously enough, even though this assertion is stated or implied numerous times in Rand's essay, there are also certain passages in which she relents and temporarily admits these "haters" back to the human race: "The hater of the good is the man who did not make this transition [from the perceptual level to the conceptual level]...[The hater has] as stagnant a mentality as a human being can sustain on the edge of the borderline separating passivity from psychosis...How does a human descend to such a state?"[emphasis added] Similarly to her treatment of slave societies, Rand first relents long enough to condemn those human beings who are haters of the good. She then denies that they are human beings, but later lapses back into referring to them as human beings (or men), after seeming to have firmly ostracized them from the human race with such epithets as "creature," "monster," "inhuman object," and "it." (!) As with her abstraction of 'society,'** Rand has frozen her abstraction of 'man' ('human being'). She excludes from it certain men whom she considers as possessing "a quality of abysmal evil." Then she fails to integrate her frozen abstraction consistently -- which would be impossible anyway, with her knowledge of man's nature -- instead allowing it to thaw out and expand again. (Coincidentally, this happens as her most intense expressions of moral wrath subside and scientific curiosity takes over.) Unless we choose to indulge in psychologizing and to speculate as to Rand's possible motives, we are left with a sense of confusion and uncertainty. Why does she present such a grossly inconsistent discussion of the concepts of 'man' and 'society'? Surely it would not be out of place to suggest that there is some carelessness here -- a subconscious confusion of conceptualization with evaluation. It certainly appears that Rand has on occasion allowed her value-responses (i.e., her emotions) to control the way she sets up and uses her abstraction. What, then, is the preferable policy? To conceive of and define 'man' as: the rational animal. This, of course, means not that man characteristically acts in accordance with reason, but that man has the volitional capacity to act rationally. Therefore, unless one contends that haters (and appeasers, who are even worse!) are metaphysically irredeemable, one must limit oneself to classifying them as (abysmally) evil men. Such a policy results in mental clarity, precision and objectivity -- with no compromise of one's moral principles. ** See "The Nature of Government" in The Virtue of Selfishness, where Rand writes, again inconsistently: "...these very benefits [knowledge and trade] indicate, delimit and define what kind of men can be of value to one another and in what kind of society: only rational, productive, independent men in a rational, productive, free society. A society that robs an individual of the product of his effort, or enslaves him, or attempts to limit the freedom of his mind, or compels him to act against his own rational judgment -- a society that sets up a conflict between its edicts and the requirements of man's nature -- is not, strictly speaking, a society, but a mob held together by institutionalized gang-rule." For a complete discussion of this issue, see my essay on the Fallacy of the Frozen Abstraction linked from this webpage: http://members.aol.com/REBissell/indexmm.html

Objectivism and gender-neutral language by Roger E. Bissell A. Gender-indefinite use of "man" and "he" (10/19/00) Some propose that a simple solution to the problem of gender reference to a generic person is to alternate between masculine and feminine usages. Others object that the generic use of terms like "man," "he," and "mankind" is perfectly clear and understood in such a context, so there is no good reason to alternate between masculine and feminine terminology. One could, however, make the same point about terms like "nigger" and "kyke" and "wop" and all the rest. The point that often seems to be brushed aside or minimized in such discussion is that many people find masculinization (or feminization) of indefinite gender references to be offensive. I think we speak too much in the third person anyway. Why not shift to speaking more in the second person? Instead of "If a person wants to come late, he is welcome to do so" (or she, or he/she or s/he etc.), why not say "If you want to come late, you are welcome to do so"? If this seems too personal, you can still say something like, "Anyone who wants to come late is welcome to do so." An example offered by those who favor gender alternation is "An author needs to maintain her perspective on the psychology of human relationships." The standard objection to this is that this is confusing and represents a "capitulation to radical feminists." What I wonder is why on earth anyone would use either "his" or "her" in that sentence? I would say: "A moral agent needs to maintain a sense of proportion." If using "her" is a "capitulation to radical feminists," using "his" is a capitulation to testosterone worship! I think there is a woeful lack of creativity and imagination being displayed in this and most previous discussions on the subject. Either it's right to avoid masculinizing indefinite gender references -- in which case, we need to suck it up and stop whining about how hard it is to find graceful ways of expressing ourselves. Or it's right to masculinize indefinite gender references -- in which case, we all ought to go out of our way to use masculine pronouns, even if we could legitimately avoid gendered pronouns entirely. (The radical feminist notion of deliberately feminizing indefinite gender references is just as bad, in my opinion.) It's really hard to get very worked up over this, because I'm still steamed about the Journal of Ayn Rand Studies having a formal policy of accepting only the spelling "aesthetics," and not the spelling Rand favored, "esthetics." (Unless quoting Rand, of course.) Now that is an issue worth fighting over. (But I wonder: if Tori Spelling married Billy Grammar, would their children be interested in our discussions?) B. Unwelcome suggestions (10/22/00) Following are comments excerpted from a letter I sent to someone about two years ago, at which time I was offering her some advice on writing style in regard to gender neutral wording. I offer them here in support of Carolyn Ray's Enlightenment project on gender language reform -- and I add my disapproval of the mono-genderization imposed by the editors of the Navigator. [2006 note: this refers to the former name of the publication of The Objectivist Center; it is now called The New Individualist...reb] "Beyond the general sorts of stylistic improvements I would suggest, I noticed a couple of stylistic quirks that are peculiar to the Objectivist movement, and which I strongly urge you to expunge from your writing: "Any time you want to talk about human beings in general, and not merely a male human being, I would very much like to see you refrain from using the words "man" and "men." I am not a flaming feminist, but I am very sensitive to the need for gender-neutral language, especially in a movement that has a long-standing problem of being heavily over-run with males. I think that I am typical of the people you will want to reach with your ideas--and most of us find the use of the generic "man" to be very irritating, if not downright offensive. An example of what I'd suggest: "_Man's_ [replace underscored with: Human] cognitive ability has been referred to as 'reason'." Another: "Reason has been used and abused _by man_ [delete underscored words]." Another: "_Man's_ [replace underscored with: The] ability to reason is a complex integration of many components." The most graceful replacement may not always be obvious, but ingenuity and perseverance will triumph--and pay dividends of good will, to boot." My correspondent did not take kindly to such suggestions, to say the least. The generic "man" was good enough for Ayn Rand, so it was good enough for her! It's interesting to speculate how Ayn Rand would have reacted to the suggestions I have made on gender-neutral language, and to whether her writing would have suffered or benefited as a result of following those suggestions. I'm confident that Rand's writing would have been at least as powerful and more effective without it. I would have been pleased to show her example after example of how her most obnoxious verbiage could have been improved. No doubt she would have rejected those suggestions -- and me, as well, I'm sure. C'est la vie. Except she ain't got no more vie, and I still do retain a "skoash"! C. Enlightening use of gender-neutral language (11/1/00) Michelle Fram-Cohen recently offered a sample of gender-neutral language flowing from her work on a project sponsored by Carolyn Ray and her Enlightenment organization. Bill Dwyer's analysis of this sample of gender-neutral language is correct but somewhat narrowly focused, in that he looked at only one of the instances of Michelle's attempt to gender-neutralize the original essay. Consequently, the "reverse sexism" in some of Michelle's editorial changes is not the sum total of the attempts she made at a gender-neutral rewrite -- and Bill's criticism is somewhat overblown and incomplete (at the same time!). Also, Bill's proposed "cure" is, as many of us argue, part of the problem. He wants to revert to traditional usage, with the masculine pronouns acting in their (to many of us) objectionable "gender-indefinite" roles. I will propose other solutions that avoid these sticking points. * * * * * Bill's claim, that the use of "she" and "her" in gender-indefinite situations is "reverse sexism", drops the context of the overall essay and the overall purpose of Michelle's re-write. I don't know whether Bill did in fact read the entire essay or is just fixating on this one passage, but the fact remains that he doesn't point out that Michelle did use "he" and "him" elsewhere in her essay -- and I'm not referring to quotes from Peikoff, but to her own words: "However, succumbing to outside pressure is not the same as willful evasion. It can be the result of conflicting values, like the case of an Atheist who decides to get married in a religious ceremony out of respect for his parents, because he respects and values them in spite of their religion." As you can see, Michelle is not engaging in "reverse sexism," but in an attempt to balance gender references in gender-indefinite situations using "he" and "his" and "him" in some cases and "she" and "hers" and "her" in others. While I agree with his critique of "reverse sexism," Bill would have been more accurate in his criticism of Michelle's re-write had he instead used the term "gender egalitarianism," for that is what Michelle is really trying to practice. While I am in principle in favor of what she is trying to do, I consider the practice rather awkward and jarring to the ear, and I think clarity and stylistic smoothness would be better served by less of "him/her" flip-flopping than more. Michelle has another stylistic device that I find quite useful and agreeable to the ear. It's more personal and motivating, which is what you want ethics to be, right? It's the use of second person pronouns, instead of third. Michelle uses this approach to very good effect elsewhere in her essay, and I suggest it here: Instead of: "Peikoff brings up an example of a poisonous food, for which a rational person would have no appetite. Anybody rational would not consider acting against her convictions, no more than she would consider eating poisonous food." I would (following Michelle's other uses of this approach) say: Peikoff brings up an example of a poisonous food, for which a rational person would have no appetite. If you are rational, you would not consider acting against your convictions, any more than you would consider eating poisonous food. Some other passages and my suggested alterations: 1. (Michelle) Emotions are invalid, however strong one's loyalty to her emotions may feel. Rewrite this as: Emotions are invalid, however strong your loyalty to your emotions may feel. Or: Emotions are invalid, however strongly loyal one may feel to one's emotions. Or: Emotions are invalid, however strongly loyal you may feel to your emotions. 2. (Michelle) Independence is not the trait of the "lone wolf" who places the rejection of other people's judgment above her own judgment, lest her judgment corresponds to theirs. IMO, this is an inappropriately written passage. "lone wolf" in nature is a male wolf, not a female, so the male pronouns are prima facie appropriate. So, if you want to break away from the male connotations of the term, you will have to do more than simply replace "his" with "her." Instead, I'd suggest expanding the passage, rather than simply replacing gender pronouns, as follows: Independence is not the trait of the "lone wolf". The lone wolf, who has an overriding aversion to making judgments that correspond with those of other people, is less motivated to make independent judgments than to reject those of others. (I also like this rewrite because it makes the value-hierarchy of the lone wolf clearer to the reader.) 3. Here is a long example that shows both the strength of the second-person construction and the problems with inconsistency in the sentences following..... (Michelle) You do not have to wait until you reach the state of moral perfection in order to allow yourself to be proud. You have to value your potential for moral perfection, in spite of your flaws, in order to keep working on yourself. Pride consists of the ability to believe in one's virtues in spite of one's flaws. Thus, there is no excuse for someone who resigns himself to his flaws. See the problem with the inconsistency between the last two sentences -- as well as between them and preceding sentences? Suggested rewrites: (1) change the last sentence: Thus, there is no excuse for one to resign oneself to one's flaws. Or: Thus, there is no excuse for you to resign yourself to your flaws. (2) change both sentences: Pride consists of the ability to believe in your virtues in spite of your flaws. Thus, there is no excuse for you to resign yourself to your flaws. [And, I might add, there is no excuse for intelligent Objectivists not to avail themselves of these gender-neutral alternatives to sexist language. Stubborn refusal to give up paleo-Randian sexist attitudes does not constitute a valid excuse.] 4. Continuing the previous passage..... (Michelle) In the section on Justice, Peikoff wrote that a person is not to be judged by his flaws as long as he did not act on them. Here, Peikoff provides the course of action one should take once one acted on them. Rewrite: In the section on Justice, Peikoff wrote that people should not be judged by their flaws as long as they have not acted on them. Here, Peikoff provides the course of action people should take once they have acted on them. * * * * * * I've said before that it just takes some effort and creativity, maybe also some ingenuity at times, to avoid sexist language. I agree with Bill Dwyer that "reverse sexism" is not a good solution. But Michelle deserves more credit than Bill is willing to give her -- and more encouragement from the rest of us who support the whole thrust of her and Carolyn's project at Enlightenment. So: back to the drawing board, Michelle, but you're on the right track! [2006 note: Since there has been no indication for quite some time that Enlightenment is still in operation, Carolyn's project on gender and language has probably fallen by the wayside. However, I think that it was headed in the right direction and that, with a little extra input and effort, it could have made a genuine contribution to Objectivist, or at least Neo-Objectivist, writing style...reb]

Brother- and Sisterhood by Roger E. Bissell 11/4/2000 I have been nagged and haunted by something that occurred during a discussion centering on whether the word "man" could be an appropriate gender-indefinite term, referring to all human beings (and not just males). Someone mentioned the phrase "brotherhood of man," as used by John Lennon and I, for the life of me, could not remember what song that phrase came from. I did recall the song "Brotherhood of Man" by Frank Loesser from the hit broadway play How to Succeed in Business without Really Trying, which dated from the mid-60s, a few years before Lennon used the phrase himself. Loesser's use of the phrase was much more in the traditionalist, "good old boy" club context. Meaning: "no girls allowed." It didn't seem that Lennon would have had such a paleolithic sentiment in mind when he used the phrase himself, and indeed a search on google.com (my favorite search engine) showed that the song in question was his well-known inspirational song, "Imagine," a brief passage of which I quote here: Now, as far as I know, no one can accuse John Lennon of being particularly sexist, yet there it was, in all its gender-exclusive glory, a last cultural echo of the long pattern of male-domination. To be fair, the brief, clipped style of Lennon's phrases nearly dictated something like what he wrote, so he should not be judged too harshly. (R.I.P., John.) But surely creative, idealistic songsters can do better -- and James Taylor (for one) did... How much more appropriate and powerful is this passage from James Taylor's more recent song, "Shed a Little Light." As against the wistful pondering of Lennon's song, Taylor is delivering a sermon-like manifesto and call to action, not just to "imagine" how much better the world could be, but to resolutely dedicate ourselves to making it better -- and to do so as brothers and sisters, with a spiritual bond of shared vision and commitment. You may not share Taylor's political and social values (I don't), but on a meta-level, he goes right for the ethical jugular. No mind-body dichotomy. No wistful yearning for what might be. And no "good old boy" mentality. Men and women, as equals, as brothers and sisters. What possible problem could Objectivists have with that?

The Virtue of For the New Intellectual by Roger Bissell, 8/15/01 (revised 12/5/14) It is often derisively stated that the survey of Western civiliation that Ayn Rand presents in her title essay of her book For the New Intellectual is seriously flawed and disrespectable because of her sweeping use of two quite negative metaphors to characterize the views she opposes. I'm speaking, of course, of Attila and the Witch Doctor, or what she also calls "the mystics of the muscle" and the "mystics of the mind." Because of the simplicity of this model, which was originated by her protege and publishing partner, psychologist Nathaniel Branden, it is viewed not as elegant and illuminating, but instead as simplistic and misleading -- and is taken as evidence that Rand is not a "serious" philosopher or historian. Yet, a very serious philosopher, Stephen C. Pepper, used in his classic World Hypotheses (1942) a very similar set of labels for two very similar groups of what he calls "inadequate world hypotheses." On the one hand are the "animists," who see consciousness (one or many spirits) as running the universe, and who maintain their view as infallible and impose it with authoritarian methods -- and on the other are the "mystics," who regard consciousness (viz., an overwhelming, vivid emotion) as determining what is/is not real, and who maintain their view as indubitable and advocate it in dogmatic fashion. Pepper also refers to these views as "animistic spiritualism" and "mystical intuitionism," respectively, and he even (in Rand-like fashion) points out that the animists and mystics (authoritarian mystics of the muscle and dogmatic mystics of the mind) have historically tried to join hands and brush aside their differences and contradictions, but that their alliances eventually break down, as "each group has tried to clean the other out." Great stuff from Pepper -- well worth reading for this and many other reasons. (Jeff Riggenbach has said good things about Pepper's views in an essay in the Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, and I made some applications of Pepper's ideas in an essay in that journal as well.) The bottom line of all this is that, despite her specific inaccuracies on this or that point about specific philosophers (and notably aided by Branden's creative ingenuity), Rand's vision, her grand sweeping view of the trend of human history, is right on the money. Her view of things is not an unscholarly aberration, but a well-established perspective, expressed in her own inimitable style. I treasure this essay, whatever other alleged flaws it may be said to have.

I love you, too, Michael -- and you, too, Kat. :-) You guys are awesome in your sweetness and affection for each other, and in your pride at sharing it with the rest of us. It's good to see a love that "dare speak its name." Best wishes (looks like you already have good premises :-) REB

This elephant goes into a bar, looking like he's just lost his best friend. He sits down near the piano player, who starts in on some really melancholy songs, first "My Funny Valentine," then "Angel Eyes," and the elephant starts crying, first quietly, then with louder and louder sobbing, until finally he's just bawling. The piano player asks him, "Is my piano playing that bad?" The elephant replies, "No, it's beautiful, that's not the problem." The pianist asks, "Oh, did one of the songs bring back some sad memories?" The elephant says, "No, that's not it either." So the pianist asks, "Well, why are you crying then?" And the elephant sniffs and replies, "I...I think I recognize... the white keys." reb

Here's one of my favorites: This guy walks into a night club with his dog, and he tells the manager he has a dog who talks, sings, does standup comedy, you name it, he's a wonderful entertainer. The manager tells him to get lost, no way can the dog be smart enough to do all those things, let alone even talk. And the guy says, "Oh, yeah? I'll prove to you how smart he is. I'll give him a $20 bill and have him go across the street and buy a newspaper, and he'll bring it back in mis mouth, along with the correct change, and the newspaper won't even be damp." The club manager tells him, "You're on. I've got to see this." So, the guy hands the dog the $20 bill, which the dog takes gingerly between his teeth, and he pads out the door. Ten minutes go by, then 20, finally a half hour and no sign of the dog. The guy gets worried, so he and the manager go outside and see the dog across the street mounted on a female dog and really going at it with her. The guy is outraged, and he runs across the street and shouts at his dog, "How can you do a thing like this? You've never let me down like this before!" And the dog replies, "I've never had $20 before!" REB

Michael, that's pretty outrageous, the actor at the urinal, gawking and lording it over the guy next to him. Amazing they would put that on TV :!: I have a couple of similar jokes, one I heard, the other my own elaboration on the first. They both involve racial stereotypes. 1. (Richard Pryor told this on a comedy album back in the 70s) These two black guys were walking home late at night, and they had to take a leak, so they stopped on a bridge and did it, and the one black guy said, "Man, that water's cold," and the other black guy said, "Yeah, and it's deep, too!" 2. (my elaboration) These two black guys and a white guy were walking home late at night, and they had to take a leak, so they stopped on a bridge and did it, and the one black guy said, "Man, that water's cold," and the other black guy said, "Yeah, and it's deep, too!" and the white guy said, "Huh? What are you guys talking about?" Heh-heh. That about says it all, stereotype-wise. //;-)) REB

Dragonfly, that HAS to be an error -- $30 for shipping and handling? I've never heard of that kind of charge, even on a relatively large order, let alone one for $10 or so. I'm sure that by now this apparent glitch has been noticed and corrected. If not, then they will suffer the revenge of the marketplace, including no more orders from me! [-( I use Amazon.com for nearly all of my book and music and video purchases. Their prices are very competitive. Plus -- and this is very important -- any order $25 or over gets FREE SHIPPING! If you're willing to wait an extra couple of days, this can be a huge savings, especially if you buy as many books as I do. (I read a lot of fiction.) I love books. =P~ Later! REB

Michael, I've been listening to and taking notes on Peikoff's DIM Hypothesis lectures, and I think you're right, that this "neither fish nor fowl, but instead a hybrid that transcends the two" is definitely revving up in the ARI side of the aisle. Rand started it all for the O'ist movement, but Peikoff has definitely pushed trichotomies into "turbo" mode. I've seen some discussion and application of this on Diana Hsieh's blog especially, though I don't hang out there anymore because of all the bashing of the Brandens, Kelley, etc. One interesting note, though: Peikoff breaks down the D (Disintegration) and M (Misintegration) into D1 and D2 and M1 and M2. The 1's are better than the 2's, because they retain some amount of respect for logic and causality, whereas the 2's basically fly off into floating abstractions and the arbitrary. So, in practical application, Peikoff sees not three but five categories of thinkers, writers, etc. It's really fascinating how he applies his hypothesis, and where he categorizes people like Spinoza, Locke, etc. I can't wait for the book to come out. It's muchy better, IMO, when Objectivists are willing to put themselves on the line by publishing. We can study it easier, and it is easier to assess what they have written for validity. (That may be why there is relatively little new theoretical Objectivism in print -- vulnerability of exposing one's errors!) REB

Thanks, Dragonfly and Glenn, those are good quotes! REB

John, you're welcome, and I'm glad you got the intended message from my piece about myself and Becky. Sometimes I feel a little down because, while all of my colleagues have houses, my wife and I can only afford an apartment. Becky reminds me that, had we gotten married the first (or even second) time around, we'd not have gone through the financial upheavals (from divorces) and financial hardships (from bad partnerships), and we'd probably have paid off a home already. And she points out all the other ways in which we truly are "rich," not financially, but spiritually. So, while only Mr. Engle can truly be Rich, I'm feeling pretty good about things these days. :D/ Best, REB

Michael, apology accepted. There's a lesson to be learned here. One of the first things I learned (?) when I got a for-real PC and went online in 1995 was "save your work." Let me repeat: SAVE YOUR WORK :!: Computers crash. Even generous friends with websites make mistakes. Save your work! I'm saying this for my own benefit, mainly, so that the less will sink in this time. (I say this, knowing that my computer crashes at least once a day, either because of driver problems or hard drive "failure," and that I have an external hard drive not yet hooked up for the purpose of saving my programs and my work, if the computer goes belly up for good.) This is probably not apropros of the thread, but it is apropos of Michael's apology, so I'll close on that note. REB

Harumph! This is a re-posting of the piece that I put up a few days ago, and which our web-meister managed to delete. Harumph. I added a great deal of material to he original version posted in 2002, and I did not save that version of the piece. So... I have a special request: did anyone download and save the original version I posted of this material? If so, please email it to me at rebissell@aol.com, and I would be very grateful. I will use it to fix what my aging memory does not remember from the original version. OK... How to Improve Objectivism (2002) by Roger E. Bissell On February 3, 2002 on the old Atlantis email list, R. Christian Ross asked: "what, if any, ought to be the goals of Objectivism? If you were CEO of Objectivism Inc. what would you do? What is Objectivism 404?" 1. Rand's Trichotomy. Starting with his lectures on Objectivism in 1975-76, Peikoff has warped the intrinsic-subjective-objective trichotomy, due to his acceptance of the need to define the concept of "objective" in terms of volition. The trichotomy needs to be re-defined, so that each of the three members has a better definition, and so that the interrelationship of the three is seen more clearly. Peikoff's wonderful earlier discussion of the metaphysical status of sense data could then be resubsumed, where it belongs, under the trichotomy. [Update: I made a decent start at this in a paper I delivered to the 2003 TOC Advanced Seminar. The paper is being updated for submission to Journal of Ayn Rand Studies.] 2. Metaphysics. The structure of the Objectivist metaphysics needs to be more clearly spelled out, showing the progression of concepts needed to arrive at the Primacy of Existence. Also, it should be more clearly explained that the existence, identity, and consciousness are inseparable correlates of all human experience, and thus are indispensable axioms of all human knowledge. It does not mean that each of them is also inseparable from reality. Existence exists, and existence is identity, whether there is any consciousness or not. If there were no consciousness, there would still be existence and identity; on the other hand, it is impossible for there to be no existence and identity. Since the ways in which consciousness and causality are involved in everything that exists are derivative and limited (not everything has been, is, or will be the object of awareness, and not everything has been, is, or will be an entity or an action), the respect in which these two concepts are a proper part of metaphysics must be carefully explained. "Consciousness is conscious of existence" is the basic axiom of epistemology, along with its corollaries: the validity of the senses and the volitional (deliberate, self-aware) ability to detect and correct one's mistakes. "Causality is the relation between an entity and its actions" is the basic axiom of the sciences. Since each of these is of more limited application in reality than existence and identity, it would (in my opinion) be better to show them as metaphysical applications to the areas of epistemology and the sciences. Above all, it is important to distinguish between what is true of everything (existence, identity, and the independence of existence from consciousness) and what is true of all experience (existence, identity, consciousness), but not necessarily of everything (viz., consciousness is only true of everything in a restricted sense: everything is independent of it). [Update: to this I would now add some related improvements in the Objectivist epistemology. In particular, I think that how Rand's unit-perspective applies to propositions and arguments needs to be made explicit, and the distinction between fact and truth needs to be clarified. Also, it should be explained how axiomatic concepts and axioms differ and clarified which is being appealed to in a given argument. For instance, when you hear someone speaking about the "axiom of volition," he is not just talking about the concept, but about the proposition that "human consciousness is volitional." Also, it should be recognized that there are three basic kinds of existents in the world, corresponding to the three levels of conceptual cognition: simple existents which are grasped by concepts, compound existents or facts which are grasped by propositions, and complex existents or reasons which are grasped by arguments. I am aware that Bryan Register has done some work along these lines] 3. The Categories. The relations between entity and attribute and between entity and action need to be integrated into Aristotle's "four causes," and that into Chris Sciabarra's dialectics. (See Total Freedom.) This material then needs to be applied to analyzing causal situations of all kinds, as well as to the nature of the relationships between knower and known (with perception as the model). [Update: I am currently at work on a paper on this subject for JARS.] 4. Mental realism and introspection. Peikoff's analysis of perceptual realism needs to be applied, in parallel, to the issue of mental realism. There is no causally efficacious entity, consciousness, that is separate from the brain, any more than there is a causally efficacious entity, a red color patch, that is separate from a red object. Once introspection is seen in the same light as perception, it will be realized that our self-awareness of our conscious processes is the form in which we are directly aware of certain brain processes, and that it is not the mind, but the brain that has causal efficacy. Better: the mind is the conscious causal efficacy that the brain has. (The brain also has non-conscious causal efficacies, e.g., to regulate hormonal production.) [Update: this topic was discussed at length in my 2003 TOC Advanced Seminar paper, and it too will be revised for submission to JARS.] 5. Frozen Abstraction Fallacy. Rand's brief description and definition of the Fallacy of the Frozen Abstraction needs to be integrated into her overall structure of valid and invalid abstractions, so that the relationship of such faulty abstractions can be seen in relation to floating abstractions and valid abstractions. Learning to spot and avoid this fallacy should be part of basic Objectivist training. [Update: thanks to the unwitting cooperation of numerous Objectivists, I continue to accumulate more and more material on this fallacy, which I intend to publish some day as a book or on the Internet as downloadable files. Also, just in case there is any confusion, frozen abstractions are not the same as floating abstractions. I seem to recall that Barbara Branden does a good job of discussing the latter in her lectures on efficient thinking.] 6. Human freedom. Volition must be explicated as conditional, epistemic freedom of choice, in contrast to the presently accepted model of categorical, ontological freedom of choice. This will be seen to be compatible with determinism of a kind that does not require predeterminism or fatalism, and that does not preclude knowledge and correction of error, moral responsibility, and individual rights. [Update: Although I still hold that human freedom is conditional not categorical, I no longer refer to "free will" per se, after reading Locke's views. I agree with Locke that what is free is not the will, but a human being. It is just as absurd to say that the will has freedom as that the mind has causal efficacy. The will and freedom are both powers of humans, just as the mind and causal efficacy are both powers of humans. It is absurd to say that "a power has a power." This insight has long been resisted by Objectivists, and it's about time that the mental block is removed!] 7. Art as microcosm. Rand's definition of "art" must be taken literally as being about re-creation of reality, i.e., the creation of a microcosm, an imaginary "world" in which the spectator is able to see an abstract view of reality embodied in discriminable figures within the microcosm. This definition is broad enough to encompass music, without falling prey to naive, simplistic theories of music as "a language of the emotions," and to explain how architecture, though also utilitarian in its function, is a re-creation of reality and thus art. (This will require loosening Rand's criterion that art be strictly non-utilitarian -- or else Objectivists will have to boycott commencement ceremonies at which "Pomp and Circumstance" is played :-) [Update: I spoke on this at the 2002 TOC Advanced Seminar, and a considerably expanded version was published in JARS Vol. 5, No. 2. I pointed out similar views in Langer and Camus in a more recent essay, JARS Vol. 7, No. 1. Both of these essays are posted as PDF files on the second webpage linked below.] This is a good start on the things that I think need changing and/or bolstering in Objectivist theory and practice. These views have gradually taken shape over 36 years of study and thought, and I hope to write about them in a more organized way at some point in the future. Best to everyone for 2006! Roger Bissell

Watch your mail, buddy, here it comes! :-) Probably. Both he and Barbara listened to mine, so your chances are pretty good, I'd say. Nah-nah-nah-nah-nah, nah-nah-nah-nah, nah-nah-nah, nah-nah-nah, nah-nah-nah-nah. (Actual song lyrics -- not mine.) REB

Oh, you're right, Dragonfly, and thanks for the reminder. (Why is there no emoticon for chagrin?) reb

Why is a retired German military man the best person to go to with your sick dog or cat? (scroll down for answer after trying to solve riddle) Because he's a veteran Aryan! :-) reb

Rich, I appreciate your solidarity in the CD-offer matter. Peikoff had absolutely nothing to lose except perhaps 5 or 10 minutes of his time in opening and playing a cut or two from the CD. And he would have heard some of the most wonderful, creative jazz piano playing there is. (Not to mention my own not-too-shabby efforts. :-) However, I do agree with the other person (can't click back to see who without losing what I've typed) whose comments (re: Art Tatum, etc.) suggested to me that Peikoff's taste in jazz piano players might be so narrow that my partner's style would have turned him off, too. Rand was right. To each his own. And I can't get inside Peikoff's mind to know whether he was simply saving himself from hearing something in all likelihood he would not enjoy -- or just being an unadventurous, narrow-minded dolt. I'll continue to enjoy (and criticize) his fine lectures, and he'll continue not to hear my music. Fair enough. Happy New Year, everyone! REB

Michael, you're terrible! What's worse, you're probably right! :cry: Jonathan, there are no concrete plans for a second CD at this time, but Ben and I have played together on three CDs in the past 2 years, backing up an old fellow who sings standards and dixieland and novelty tunes. We are joined by a rhythm section and a trumpet and sax/clarinet player, and our solos are definitely secondary in importance (though not quality) to the guy's singing. My personal plan is to lay out at least one CD project this year and execute as much of it as I can -- but I haven't yet decided whether it will be a jazz nonet (9-piece) project or a trombone + orchestra (mostly synthesized plus several live assistant soloists) project. I am particularly eager to get some of my original songs recorded, even if just as instrumentals -- and I have some really pretty arrangements of other people's songs already written -- so the material is there. I just have to gird up my loins, so to speak, and do the work! My wife has agreed that we can consider the previous project closed and "paid for," and that we can push forward on another project, so it's really not a matter of lack of finances. Just time and energy and gumption. (That's what conditional freedom/teleological determinists call willpower. :-) So, stay tuned! REB

Barbara, you wrote: I'm not sure where Rand said what you quoted her as saying. I do know that she said man's consciousness is volitional in Galt's Speech, "The Objectivist Ethics," etc. I also know that Peikoff in OPAR says in one place that volition is a corollary of consciousness,but in another place that it is an axiom. It's not clear whether he's really talking about axioms (propositions) or axiomatic concepts, but he's clearly confused. (He makes the same error in re causality and validity of the senses, calling them both axioms and corollaries. As he defines "axiom" and "corollary," they cannot be both. Hence some really confusing verbiage for folks to puzzle over. Insofar as it exists, volition is an attribute of human consciousness. We can state this as a proposition, but that does not make it an axiom of metaphysics, as far as I can tell. Metaphysics identifies what is true of all existence, of Being qua Being, as Aristotle put it. And as Peikoff pointed out in OPAR, existence and identity are everywhere, but consciousness is only here and there. So, neither the fact that man is conscious nor the fact that man has volition can be axioms of metaphysics. However, insofar as it is unique and essential to human consciousness and the gaining of knowledge, it is a starting point, and thus an axiom, of epistemology. I believe Ron Merrill said this in his Objectivity essay on axioms. He also said that consciousness (i.e., that man is conscious) is an axiom of epistemology, and he included in this that the senses are valid (which I think should be a separate axiom of epistemology). So, what I want to acknowledge is this: without man's being conscious, there is no knowledge; without man's basic form of awareness, perception, being valid, there is no knowledge; and without the power to regulate his consciousness and check for errors in his conclusion, there is no knowledge. The last of these is my understanding of what volition is; if we want to engage our minds and check our thoughts for error, we are free to do so. Does that qualify me as an advocate of volition? Even though I also hold that we must (i.e., are determined to) do what we most want to do -- which, on a given occasion, may in fact not be to engage our minds and correct errors, etc.? This is what I get from reading John Locke, who argued that it is absurd to say the will is free, but that human beings are free. It may just be that I will have to toss the term "Lockean Objectivist" into the ring, as a counter-weight to "Randian Objectivist." His explanation of human freedom to act and think being conditional makes more sense to me than anything I have read by Peikoff or Binswanger or Kelley or NB. And these are bright guys, so it's not like they haven't tried! (I'm not saying Locke agrees with Rand on everything other than free will. Just that several of his ideas make more sense to me than what Rand et al have said, and that his view of freedom to act and think is one of them. And it is consistent with the rest of her philosophy. An Open System Objectivism would at least entertain these various challenges from Locke, without writing them off as non-Objectivist. (All I hear from the main Objectivists about Locke is either that he is so eclectic that he's not worth considering, or they misinterpret him as being a proto-Randian in re volition. He is neither! Either Rand's say-so forever forecloses what is Objectivist, or there has to be some wiggle room for considering that some of the corollary ideas could be understood in a way that makes more sense and still agrees with our experience. Here's a comparison that might be helpful. When I first read Mortimer Adler's works, I viewed him as, like Rand, an Aristotelian who was saying what Aristotle said better and clearer than Aristotle, and correcting his mistakes. They both agreed with Aristotle's foundational ideas, including his view of an independent reality, reason for knowing it, etc., but at certain points they diverged from his line of reasoning. Does that make them not Aristotelians? Of course not. If he were alive, they would tell him, "I agree with your starting points, your basic premises, so I'm in your camp, but I disagree with this argument and the things that follow from it, so I'm suggesting this correction in your philosophy." If he didn't see their point, they would argue and probably be kicked out of his school of philosophy over it. But since Aristotle's dead, what happens if various of his followers disagree about an implication from his foundations that he did not satisfactorily address himself? Does one group get to define the other group out of the school of philosophy? That's what ARI and their mentality want to do in re Objectivism. Or do they schism into rival sub-schools of Aristotelianism? That's what TOC has done in re Objectivism. Since I don't have a "gang," and I don't have a major reputation, what exactly am I? Do I have to start my own obscure little cult? (a la Bissellianism?) Can I hyphenate my philosophical allegiance? (a la Lockean-Objectivist?) I'm not asking permission, because I'll do what I think is best. But I'd like some clarification from you or anyone who can take a fresh, non-dogmatic, non-authoritarian look at all this. Oh, and thanks for your thoughtful remarks. You really do think carefully and deeply about things. Best, REB P.S. -- It may amuse or interest you to know that some people are now referring to me as a "confused volitionist," since I argue that humans are governed by final causation and teleological determinism, and are conditionally free (to act and think) if that's what they most want to do. Would that make me a confused Objectivist?

James and Barbara, I appreciate very much what you have said in the followup comments to James' essay. The issue of preserving or repairing one's "emotional thread" is very, very important. It points to a kind of integrity, but it is deeper and more vital even than moral integrity. It is a more primitive form of psychic or personal unity -- kind of similar to self-acceptance (as more primitive in relation to self-esteem). I haven't read Nathaniel's Six Pillars recently or carefully enough to know if he goes into this. If he has not, it would be a good topic for him to do a book on. It occurs to me that this personal integrity or continuity of one's "emotional thread" sounds a whole lot like sense of life. Sense of life and sense of self are correlates, and either one or both can be damaged if you go off course emotionally and morally. I think I spent the better part of 20 years mangling my "emotional thread," and I've spent the past 15 years carefully repairing it. Thanks to Al-Anon, my wife Becky, the computer, Chris Sciabarra, and the Internet (to name the 5 probably most important factors), I'm feeling fairly well together these days. It also occurs to me that two of the things I wanted most when I was a boy, but didn't have, was an affectionate family and enough books so that I'd never run out of stuff to read. Whatever other aspirations I've had to let go over the years, I've managed to satisfy those two particular goals in spades. Even after two broken marriages, I have four grown-up kids, two grown-up step-kids, and an 11 year old who all have hugs and "I love you"'s for me, and that feels damn nice. And between Amazon.com and Borders, I'm continuing to fill up our apartment with things to read...some day. :-) Well, it felt good to say that. Thanks for "listening." Lots of love, all REB

To begin with, here's an amusing little quote from Ayn Rand Answers to chew on: Considering Rand’s remarks (which I had actually heard way back in the 70s, when I rented and hosted the “Philosophy of Objectivism” lecture course they appeared in) to be a decent guideline for gift-giving, and considering the fact that I knew Leonard Peikoff was a fan of jazz music, I decided to offer him a copy of my jazz duo CD by approaching him in the following manner: November 15, 2005 leonard@peikoff.com Dear Dr. Peikoff: Allow me briefly to introduce myself: Professionally, I have been a trombonist and musical arranger since finishing my M.A. in 1971, and I have been working 5 days a week at Disneyland since 1985, playing a combination of marches, ragtime, show tunes, Disney tunes, and Dixieland jazz. I also tour several weeks a year with a jazz group called the Side Street Strutters, who regularly play at Disneyland. (My own assignment is the Disneyland Band.) I have been a fan of your lectures and books since the 1960s, and I most recently have been enjoying the DIM Hypothesis lectures and your DVD "In His Own Words." From the latter, I learned that you like jazz music, so I would like to offer you a copy of my jazz duo CD, "The Art of the Duo." It was recorded in 1992 with my piano player, Ben Di Tosti, and it contains a number of swing and easy listening tunes, including an original of mine. I think you would find it quite enjoyable. Let me know if you would like a copy, and where I should send it. Best regards, Roger Bissell, musician-writer AchillesRB@aol.com P.S. -- In case you don't wish to receive the CD and/or are curious as to its contents, you can hear brief clips from the CD at this web address: http://www.gemtone.com/art_of_the_duo/ Much to my mixed delight and chagrin I received the following reply Date: Mon, 05 Dec 2005 11:06:11 -0800 To: AchillesRB@aol.com From: Leonard Peikoff <leonard@peikoff.com> Subject: Re: Message from web site viewer Dear Mr. Bissell, Thank you for your comments on my work, and for your kind offer to send me your CD. The fact is, however, that I really only enjoy jazz on the piano, and so am not really a suitable audience for your work. Best wishes, Leonard Peikoff (Dictated but not read) Gee, too bad about that extra instrument (trombone), cluttering up what would have otherwise been a perfectly acceptable piano jazz CD. Sheesh. No matter that it contains some of the finest jazz piano playing you’re ever going to hear anywhere. Double sheesh. A friend of mine, with whom I shared the above, had the following cryptic comment: “HOLY SHIT! ” To which I replied: “What, that I actually got a reply? Or that the reply was such B.S.? :-)” And he clarified: “Just that you got a reply. But what a farce to not take your CD, given that he only likes piano. I guess I'll have to write him now and tell him I'd like to send him a Bill Evans CD. LOL ” Double . And farce is right. REB P.P.S. -- my CD is still available from the above-mentioned gemtone.com website, as well as from www.cdbaby.com. Or you can save several bucks and mail a check for $12 to me at Roger Bissell, P.O. Box 5193, Orange, CA 92863. But be forewarned, the CD contains trombone playing. :roll:

The Intelligent Design Controversy in the Libertarian-Objectivist Media Reported by Roger E. Bissell The Orange County Register, which has been my newspaper of preference ever since moving to Southern California in 1985, frequently carries columns and op-ed pieces by Libertarian and Objectivist spokesmen, such as Tibor Machan. During the month of December, 2005, two very good pieces were published on the controversy swirling around the current form of creationism known as “intelligent design.” One centered on the philosophical aspect of the controversy, the other on the political aspect. Both did an excellent job of focusing on the fundamental issues involved. Keith Lockitch, a fellow at the Ayn Rand Institute in Irvine, wrote a rebuttal to an atheist who critiqued Lockitch’s recent public speech about Intelligent Design. Lockitch’s talk, which my wife and I attended in November, 2005, is available on DVD from the Ayn Rand Book Store. Lockitch wrote (Dec. 11): Shortly after the December 20, 2005 federal court ruling against the teaching of Intelligent Design in the public schools, Andrew Coulson, director of the Cato Institute’s Center for Educational Freedom, weighed in on the deeper political issues involved. (The Cato Institute has on occasion participated in functions with The Objectivist Center, a rival organization to the Ayn Rand Society.) Under the heading “Government schools perpetuate conflict,” Coulson wrote (Dec. 23):

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I especially like the two I sequestered from your quote, Kat. The first one reminds me that there must be some mode of awareness, that operates by some physical means, for our internal world. The second reminds me not to slip into the crazy patterns of the past that only brought me suffering and misery. I'll be posting some more to my above list soon, and I'll include your suggestions from that book when I do, Kat. Thanks! Best, REB