Darrell Hougen

Perhaps the following quote from Easton's 1897 Bible dictionary will help to clarify things: From: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/miracle A miracle defies the law of identity by definition. There is no natural, scientific, or logical explanation of a miracle by definition. No religious person would ever accept the notion that there might be a scientific explanation for some apparent miracle because that would undermine his belief in the supernatural. Don't give the enemies of reason the benefit of the doubt. They don't deserve it. They are willfully evasive of the facts of reality because facts don't suit their need to believe in the supernatural. They would rather reject logic than to question their superstitions. I was reading a book a few years ago called, "Flim Flam," by James Randi. In it, he describes a case in which physicists undertook to study psychic phenomena at (I believe) Washington University in St. Louis. Among other things, they were trying to determine whether telekinesis --- moving objects with the mind --- is possible. In order to study the phenomenon, they placed a delicately balanced, rotating wheel under a bell jar and asked the participants to attempt to move it using their minds. I'm not sure I can remember exactly what the apparatus looked like, but the mental picture I have is something similar to a Crooke's radiometer. At any rate, most of the participants were unable to cause the wheel to move, but one day, a man was able, by placing his hands on the sides of the bell jar and (apparently) focusing his mind, to cause the wheel to move. He wasn't always able to move the wheel, but he did move it on several different occasions and the physicists were convinced that the effect was real. The problem is, that the effect wasn't real. The physicists had been hoodwinked. The experimental subject had slightly lifted up the edge of the bell jar and had blown underneath the edge so imperceptibly that the scientists watching him hadn't noticed. How did James Randi know? He had paid the man that fooled the scientists. I told that story because I think it illustrates an important point. We scientists are often naive about people's motivations. We tend to assume that everyone is being honest and are often ill-prepared to deal with flim flam, with people's attempts to hoodwink us. But part of Rand's genius was in understanding people's motivations. She knew that religious people weren't interested at finding the truth but in obscuring it. The anti-concept of miracle is an attempt to obscure the truth, plain and simple. There is no way to sugar coat it to make it acceptable to the rational scientific mind, because the purpose of the concept is to destroy the possibility of obtaining real knowledge. Don't allow yourself be duped by epistemological charlatans. Darrell

Reality does not contain contradictions. It simply is what it is. If your mental state is filled with contradictions, then comprehension and understanding of reality is impossible. Darrell

You seem to be assuming that the entity model of causation implies that entities must act under their own internal power or motivation. But, that is not at all what Objectivism is saying. It is simply saying that an apple in a gravitational field must behave like an apple in a gravitational field, i.e., fall to earth. The apple cannot act like a bird and fly away; again, a trivial point to the modern scientific mind, but again violated time and again throughout the history of religion and philosophy. This is no problem for Objectivism. It would be like stating that Objectivism cannot understand the behavior of two tether balls connected by a rope because it must view the balls as separate entities. But, this is simply false and absurd. The notion that two entities are connected is perfectly comprehensible within the framework of Objectivism. In this case, the two entities are parts of a larger entity, the composite system. Darrell

This is a complete misinterpretation of the law of identity. The law of identity states that everything is something. That is, a thing has a particular nature. It does not state that things cannot change over time. Again, you may think that the law of identity is trivial, but if you look at the history of religion and philosophy, you will find a history rife with examples in which the law of identity is violated. Any miracle demands such a violation. Darrell

Do you want to go there? That's a serious question, because I'll go there. Now, this is out of the scope of the current physics context of course, but I'll go there if you want to discuss it further.Sure. Why not? I'm always interested in learning new things. If it is not relevant to the current thread, it would be better to create a new topic and if it is not an issue of meta-physics, it would be good to post it in the appropriate location. BTW, I do believe there are some serious limitations to Objectivism (as there are in any system of thought), but I would like to know what you think they are. Darrell

I'm not sure I understand what you think the problem is here, although it appears to be tied to point number 4 about consciousness. The main problem here appears to be the statement that, "consciousness is an irreducable primary." I would like to know who said that and in what context. Did Rand herself say that, or is that Piekoff's interpretation of Rand? The statement in question could be considered an error, depending upon how it is taken. However, it is possible to give a positive interpretation of the statement. In my view, the relationship of consciousness (or the mind) to the brain is similar to the relationship of software to a computer. Software has no existence outside of a computer or storage device. It is not a material object. It has no length, width, or height, nor any weight or charge or any other physical property. Yet it exists. Moreover, a piece of software cannot be explained by reference to a computer. The same computer can be programmed to track financial transactions, fly an airplane, or drive a vehicle across country. The only difference between the computers is the software that resides on them. A computer program specifies the state of some region of computer memory, the program memory. Other state information is used to track the progression of the program or to hold the data upon which the program operates. As such, it is a description of the state of a machine. Similarly, the contents of your mind, in some sense specifies the state of your brain. And, just as a piece of software, written in a modern programming language, is a high level description of a program, so, the state of your mind is a high level description of the state of your brain. Therefore, the mapping from your mental states to your physiological states is not obvious. In fact, there may be more than one possible mapping. Therefore, I don't think it is entirely incorrect to state that consciousness is irreducible. The state of your mind doesn't correspond to any obvious physiological state. It is an epiphenomenal description of the state of your brain. Therefore, it makes little sense to try to reduce it to some sort of low level description of brain function. However, I do not like the term, "irreducible primary," as it seems to imply that the mind has some sort of non-physical existence, though it is obvious that the existence of the mind is equivalent to the existence of the brain. If the brain ceases to exist, so does the mind (which is just a high level description of the state and behavior of the brain). Perhaps that is a point on which to criticize certain Objectivists, perhaps Rand herself, though I am not aware of her saying that. I certainly do not believe that she thought that the mind exists independent of the brain. She certainly repudiated the notion of any sort of mind-body dichotomy on numerous occasions. Darrell

At this point I don't know whether you really have questions or whether you are actually on a crusade to try to discredit Objectivism, but I will take you at your word and attempt to answer your questions one at a time. The short answer is nothing. But the form of your question is something like: everyone knows that man is an animal and that he has a rational faculty; what does it add to that to say that man is a rational animal? That is, you've started out by stating the meaning of the words, "existence exists," and then you ask what the statement, "existence exists," adds to that. Of course the answer to that question is nothing, but the question is poorly stated. The real question is whether, "existence exists," is tautological and therefore devoid of meaning. But some philosophers like George Berkeley and other solipsists have argued that: existence is merely an illusion. If that phrase has any meaning, then so does the statement that existence exists as it is the opposite of the foregoing. That is, Objectivism rejects the notion that existence is an illusion. If that assertion seems trivial to you, fine. But that is an issue in philosophy. Darrell

Bob, I'm not sure how to respond to your post. What you say is both trivially true in some respects and at the same time insulting to both Objectivism and Objectivists. It is undoubtedly true that some Objectivists, from time to time, put up unsatisfactory arguments for their beliefs or may be mistaken in one way or another about Objectivism or about reality in general. However, the same could be said of physicists. If some physicists propose incorrect or contradictory theories of physics or of reality, should we dismiss the entire pursuit of physics? Is physics as a whole to be considered invalid simply because of the incorrect or invalid theories put forth by some physicists? For you to simply dismiss and sweep aside the entire philosophy of Objectivism, which is undoubtedly correct in many important respects, would be like me dismissing the entire field physics just because of some ill-conceived ideas, some of which we have discussed in the foregoing pages. You state that, "There are so many holes, problems and contradictions that all we have to do is take a cursory look at reality to know that Objectivism is in violation of reality." Yet, you have not been able to produce a single hole, problem or contradiction in Objectivism about which we could have a meaningful discussion. You imply that the laws of identity and causality are nonsense, yet there is no evidence that the laws (if provision is made for random events, as I have been trying to do) are ever violated. It appears that you agree that reality is primary, which is the most important feature of the Objectivist metaphysics and yet you dismiss all of Objectivism and offer in its place Coherentism, which, as far as I can tell, has nothing to offer to the discussion. Darrell

My first job was driving an Acme Icecream truck and selling icecream to little kids in Fort Dodge, Iowa. It lasted for about a month, until my family went on vacation. The job was ok except that there were some mean kids that would try to steal money from the truck. Darrell

Predicate logic generally refers to quantified statements of propositional logic. Propositional logic is a set of formal statements such as (A and (B or C)) <=> ((A and B ) or (A and C)), which in English means that if A is true and either B or C is true then either A and B are true or A and C are true and vice versa. There are several basic statements that capture all of the fundamental ways in which propositions can be combined. All other statements of propositional logic can be derived from those. A statement in predicate logic (or predicate calculus) is of the form, forall x, A(x) => B(x). That is, for all values of x (in the domain of consideration), if A is true for x, then be is true for x. Predicate logic inherits all the statements of propositional logic and adds variable quantification, e.g., "for all" or "there exists" to those statements. To state that a logic is "formal" is to state that the the set of logical operations that can be performed on a set of statements depends only upon the form of the statements and not upon the meaning of any of the symbols. Therefore, "true" and "false" are also content free notions. A statement is "true" if it can be derived from a set of initial "axioms" that are taken to be true. It is "false" if its negation can be derived. If neither the statement nor its negation can be derived, then the statement is neither "true" nor "false." I have used the term "mathematical logic" relatively loosely. If we are discussing the formal logic of arithmetic, then "mathematical logic" refers to predicate logic with a set of mathematical axioms designed to capture the basics of arithmetic. So, formal arithmetic logic is a superset of predicate logic. I have also use the term "mathematical logic" to refer to the general process of reasoning about mathematics, whether based upon formal axiomatic systems or not. It is in this process that new notions are sometimes added to mathematics that could not be derived from any existing sets of axioms. It is in this process that mathematicians attach meaning to the symbols of mathematics or, conversely, the introduce symbols for the concepts that they wish to capture. In this process, the activities of physicists and other scientists also overlap those of mathematicians. So, to restate what I have stated previously, formal mathematics does not depend upon external reality because it doesn't say anything about external reality. The "truth" or "falsehood" of statements depends only upon formal relationships between symbols. Such statements may extend to numbers and therefore may be an exception to what I said previously, since numbers are meaningful and yet can be manipulated in purely formal ways. However, I did give an example of a possible universe, though clearly not our universe, in which numbers were of limited use because there was never more than one of anything. Darrell

Bob, For the sake of being argumentative and drawing this out as long as possible --- just kidding --- I must point out that you seem to be trying to have it both ways. The statement, "In reality our philosophical systems are dictated by reality and not vice versa," is, in essence, a statement of the primacy of existence. It is a statement that existence exists and that our philosophy (and science) is knowledge of reality and must be consistent with reality. But that is the Objectivist view and the view that I have been arguing for since the beginning. In addition, the quoted statement is a fundamental philosophical statement that underpins all knowledge. Yet, later you state that, "philosophy is simply not as fundamental as some would have us believe." So, which is it? Is it possible to make sweeping philosophical generalization about the source of all knowledge, as you have done above? Or, is philosophy simply not that fundamental? If I have exaggerated the import of the one statement that I quoted, additional support comes from your statement, "Science, observation, and reality can and should be used to change philosophical ideas just as much or perhaps more than philosophy affects science." Although this statement is not clean, the first part of the statement again admits that existence exists and that man's means of knowledge of existence is through observation. These are again sweeping philosophical statements consistent with Objectivism. I really don't understand why you think that the Objectivist view, that existence exists and that man's means of knowing existence is through observation, is either constraining or debatable. Finer points of the philosophy, such as the nature of causality, may be debatable, and the original intention of my initial post was to debate them. To that extent, I agree that science can inform philosophy in important ways. Darrell

Lol. I can't follow jokes like those. Thanks, Stephen, for the reading suggestions. Darrell

I'm getting so many responses to my posts, that I can't respond to them all individually. However, let me try to clarify things a bit. There are numerous features of reality that are (perhaps blindly) incorporated into the logic that we use, which is fine until we run up against cases in which it turns out that the features upon which our reasoning was dependent are just approximations. In predicate logic, there is a subject, which may be universally quantified, and a predicate that is taken to be true of that subject. Now, if we look closely, there are several features of reality that are reflected in predicate and mathematical logic For example, there are individual entities (or actions), each with an identity. If reality was an amorphous mass that could not be divided into individual entities, the notion of a subject would be meaningless. There are classes of objects that may be grouped together. For example, all oranges are members of the class of oranges. If there were no similarities between objects that existed, then no classifications could be formed. And, if no classifications could be formed, it would be useless to count things because there would never be more than one of anything and quantification would be virtually useless as well. Space has a metric character in that measurements of distances are ordered and may be non-integral. Those notions are incorporated into our real number system. Each of the above examples illustrates the manner in which some aspect of reality has been incorporated into our mathematical logic. The rules, and not just the symbols governing the relationships between mathmatical quantities, are dependent upon the nature of reality. The only universal element of logic that can be said to be independent of reality is the notion that no contradictions can be allowed into any logical system. But, even that is an admission of the primacy of existence as no contradictions can exist in reality. When a new feature of reality is discovered that cannot be adequately explained using our existing notions of math and logic, new mathematical axioms must be added to our systems. Now, once we have a set of axioms, there is nothing inherently wrong or invalid about studying the system itself and attempting to determine its properties, irrespective of any application, present or future. The system itself is an interesting object of study. But that does not imply that the system is somehow divorced from its roots in existence. Notice, for example, that the axioms of integer arithmetic are not sufficient to explain the real number system. Nor is any finite set of axioms sufficient to predict all mathematical truths. Notice also, that mathematical logic is an abstraction of what goes on with respect to real objects. For example, the statement, "All men are mortal," may have to be modified in the next few years or decades or centuries if the aging problem is solved. It will still be true that men may die of gun shot wounds or car accidents, but they will no longer die of old age. Similarly, any other concept of existing things may have exceptions or may have to be interpreted within a specific, limited context. Darrell

First, I'm not supporting a realist position. you are. The Platonic realist states that ideal forms exist independent of observation which is exactly what you're claiming. In the realist position, there is no explanation for how these ideal forms come to be associated with observations. This leads to the notion that God puts the ideals in people's minds as they are unable to do it themselves. There is a nice discussion of the historical and philosophical reasons for this in OPAR. Next, your definition of logic is one possible definition, but is not the most useful definition. The reason that mathematical reasoning, for example, appears useful is because it deals with numbers (among other things) and we know that numbers of things exist, e.g., two cows, three oranges, six billion people (give or take a few). But, imagine what would happen if we started with the symbols, "!@#$%^&*()_-+=~," made up some axioms governing them (e.g., if @ and #, then $) and then began to reason about them. It would be possible, but the excercise would be meaningless. So, I'm not stating that purely abstract, formal reasoning is not possible, simply that it is meaningless if there is no connection to reality. A computer (as such exist today) can do formal symbol manipulation, but cannot understand its existence or the existence of anything else. BTW, you should go back and read what I wrote about Gödel's proof. Gödel proved that in any formal system of sufficient power, there are infinitely many true statements that cannot be proved from any finite set of axioms, no matter how numerous. So, you should ask yourself how the truth of such statements is to be proved. Clearly, it must be with reference to reality. Darrell

It might be, though now that you mention it, I discovered that I've been misspelling the word this entire time. It should be "solipsist."

That is begging the question, as you start with demanding correspondence to reality, which is not a condition for logical consistency.To be logically consistent means to be consistent with evidence or observation. Essentially, to arrive at a logical conclusion means to make a prediction about the existence of some piece of evidence. If that evidence exists, then the conclusion is confirmed, otherwise it must be rejected and the process of reasoning must be checked or modified. It may be that some concept used in the reasoning process was not thoroughly understood, for example. What you are talking about is the way that logic is often described in mathematics, the process of starting with a set of assumptions and applying rules to deduce a conclusion. However, the mathematical version of logic is just an abstraction of the process of reasoning about reality. Moreover, it is only reasonable and its conclusions are only meaningful insofar as they can be related back to actual facts of reality. It is no accident that mathematics deals with numbers and quantities and geometric shapes, because those are things that either exist or are similar to things that actually exist, e.g., a circular object. However, you are attempting to invert the process by claiming that mathematical reasoning is valid, a priori, i.e., in the absence of anything that exists. I'm saying that you're putting the cart before the horse. Darrell

Our posts crossed, but in fact I answered this point already in my previous post. That the solipsist has to use words from our loaded language which imply an independent reality, but that doesn't prove him wrong. The argument of the "stolen fallacy" is not valid. On another forum I wrote: "What is wrong with the idea of the stolen concept fallacy: even if someone uses a concept in a way that denies its genetic roots, this doesn't necessarily invalidate his use of the concept. It merely means that the concept is no longer the same as the original concept. This may be perfectly valid, for example nowadays the concept 'time' is no longer the same as the concept 'time' before 1905. On the other hand is it of course possible that the new concept is not valid, but the point is that you can't prove that by merely pointing out that it denies the validity of its genetic roots. The SCF in itself doesn't prove anything, it's therefore only a rhetorical device without any real meaning." A stolen concept is more than just a stolen word. It is an attempt to use the meaning of the word while ignoring the its referents in reality. The shift in the meaning of the word time is valid because new referents for its meaning have been provided in the form of experimental evidence justifying the new usage. No such justification is possible for the concepts stolen by the solopsist. Certainly not. A mathematical argument can be strictly logical without having any correspondence to reality. This is true only in the most vacuous sense, in the sense that the mathematical symbols don't mean anything. In other words, it is meaningless to state that if A relates to B in some way, then B relates to C in some other way, if A, B and C cannot utlimately be related to some existents that relate in the manner hypothesized. Without referents, the statements have no conceptual content. They simply amount to formal symbol manipulation in which the "symbols" don't symbolize anything. Darrell

Consciousness is an epiphenomenal description of the activity of the brain. The activity of the brain does not merely "impact" consciousness, it is consciousness. Consciousness is a description of the activity of the brain from the perspective of a person looking inward at his own mental states. Therefore, the properties or features that one can perceive are those mental states. For example, a person can perceive his (her) emotional state, e.g., happy, sad, angry, etc. Therefore, consciousness does have measureable properties. A person may be very angry, for example. Would it make sense to say that a person is infinitely angry? I've never heard a person describe his mental state in that manner. Sometimes people say that their love has no bounds, but they still end up getting divorced some years later. Darrell

If you wish to label the universe as a singular thing, then there would have to be an exception for it. However, I would prefer to think of it as a collection of things. In some sense, the axioms are empirical. They are implicit in all knowledge. So, if our observations revealed that reality did not have the structure asserted, the axioms would be falsified. However, let us consider the implications of them being false. If, for example, an infinite quantity of something could exist, would it be infinitely long? Or infinitely massive? Would it have infinite charge? Would it occupy an infinite volume? Are any of those things physically possible? That does not appear to be the kind of universe in which we live. Everything has a specific nature which means a finite, quantifiable nature. The example of the line doesn't cut it. Lines don't exist as physical objects. And, as in my example of storing all of the information in the Library of Congress on an aluminum block illustrates, real objects are not infinitely divisible. I don't view a point particle as violating the identity axiom. I'm sorry that I can't give a clear and concise definition of how the principle is to be applied. However, it does seem to have quite wide applicability. For example, is it reasonable to assume that it is possible to build a machine capable of storing an infinite amount of information? I don't think so. Is it reasonable to imagine that some person or other being could be infinitely intelligent? I don't think so. Darrell

I know I responded to this point already, but before I leave the topic, I want to point out that the solopsist view depends upon any number of stolen concepts. A stolen concept is a concept that was developed to cover some collection of facts (which ultimately can be traced back to perceptions) but is now being used in a manner in which the context has been dropped. That is, the antecedent facts that gave rise to the original concept are now being ignored. Consciousness is properly defined as the faculty of perceiving that which exists. Solopsism steals the concept and uses it while dropping the context of existence. So, the question becomes, "Conscious of what?" The same is true of experience; "Experience of what?" Imagination is another stolen concept as used by the solopsist. Imagination is a volitional process of creating mental pictures of what reality could be if it were changed in some manner. For example, a rational use of imagination would be to picture what your life would be like if you started a business of a particular kind. But, in the solopsistic view, both volition and reality are dropped. Mental images come at a person from an unknown and unknowable source. They are meaningless, disconnected images with no referents. Imagination depends upon mental images of real objects that are used as points of departure. But solopsism takes imagination as a primary and ignores the antecedent perceptions that form the starting point of the process. The final coup de grace is the theft of the concept of logic. Properly, a statement is logical if it corresponds to reality. Similarly, a chain of reasoning is logical if it corresponds to reality and therefore is free of conradictions. Logical reasoning is the non-contradictory identification of the facts of reality. In order for a chain of reasoning to be consistent, it must be consistent with observational facts. Solopsism drops the context of existence and asserts a kind of self consistency. However, self-consistency is completely vacuous. Words have meanings only because of their relationship to that which exists. Aristotle introduced the logical syllogism as an abstraction of the reasoning process. A syllogism is of the form, All A is B, C is A, therefore C is B. For example, All humans are mortal, I am human, therefore I am mortal. However, if the words have no referents in reality, I might as well say, All red is green, yellow is red, therefore yellow is green. The point is that the structure of logic itself is dependent upon the nature of reality. Consistent reasoning is a process that is learned by noting the kinds of relationships that exist among objects in the world. If there are no actual existents, consistency is meaningless. Solopsism turns the process on its head by divorcing logical consistency from any external frame of reference. It takes logical consistency as a primary and attempts to build an imaginary world around it. The actual effect is to render logical consistency impossible. Under solopsism, logic is the ultimate stolen concept. Darrell

I'm not saying that space has to have the same characteristics, just that it must have some characteristic. What does it mean for something to exist if it has no measureable properties, features or attributes? The gas is not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about an external reference frame in which electromagnetic waves were supposed to propagate. Physicists did conceive of it as having fluid like properties in which electromagnetic waves were to be formed. Otherwise, what is waving? In fact, the Michelson-Morley experiment was apparently originally conducted for the purpose of establishing the existence of such a medium. However, the experiment failed. Nothing was discovered. Darrell

That existence exists independent of consciousness is a fact implicit in all knowledge, but it cannot be proven in the ordinary sense and therefore can neither be established nor rejected on the basis of any scientific test. I agree that we could argue about this endlessly. It is a fact that cannot be proven in the ordinary sense and because I do not have access to your consciousness, there is nothing I can do to prove it to you. I can merely appeal to your reasonableness. However, in the case of QM there are certainly interpretations that are consistent with the axiom (as there must be). Darrell

The solopsist's view may be completely self consistent (in some sense), but is it factual? That things exist outside of one's own consciousness is a self evident fact. The knowledge that things exist apart from consciousness comes from an honest assessment of the content of one's own consciousness and of one's perceptions. In the Objectivist view, it is not even sensible to talk about the logical consistency of the solopsist view, because the ultimate test of logical consistency is correspondence to reality. If there is no reality, then no correspondence can be established and consistency is meaningless. BTW, if the solopsist view is correct, then there is only one true consciousness and that consciousness is mine. Darrell

If space has its own nature, what is it? It doesn't have any size or mass or energy or momentum. It is not an aspect of consciousness. It has no properties because it isn't anything. At one time, physicists hypothesized the existence of an either, a background (to use your term) that served as a reference frame to which measurements of position and velocity, for example, could be related. Then, the Michelson-Morley demonstrated that the speed of light is independent of the intertial motion of the platform upon which it is measured. That result effectively demolished the theory of the ether. The Earth is orbiting the Sun and rotating on its axis and is therefore moving at high speed along a complex path. Yet, the speed of light is independent of whether its direction is East-to-West or West-to-East or North-to-South, etc. Moreover, if the speed of light is measured on a moving train, it is the same as for a stationary observer. Many such experiments have been carried out and none has ever shown an effect of inertial motion on the speed of light. The conclusion is that there is no static frame of reference that has preference over any other. Such observations also form the basis of Einstein's Theory of Special Relativity. Darrell

Perhaps, but the original question was whether the universe could be said to be finite, a priori, i.e., without evidence. My response should have been that the universe is the set of all things which is a mental abstraction. The universe itself is not a thing. Now, it may turn out that the quantity of things in the universe is finite, but that does not alter the original definition. Consider infinite series in mathematics. We can conceive of an infinite series by ascribing a finite set of properties to it, but we cannot conceive of every member of the series nor can such a thing exist as a singular entity in reality. Darrell