Darrell Hougen

This shows the absurdity of your argument. In order to demonstrate my point, you require me to devise an entire system of logic, while you use arguments of exactly the same nature without even realizing it. Every fact that you spout, apart from those that are immediately observable, requires some sort of generalization. So, everything you say depends upon some kind of induction (for lack of a better word). And you use such concepts as if they were gospel in defense of your own indefensible position. Yet, when I attempt to convey facts using the same techniques, you throw up some nonsense about them not being deductively valid arguments. This is all just an attempt on your part to evade addressing the content of my arguments. Darrell

Arithmetic is valid implies all operations are valid for all elements of the domain. Division by zero is undefined. Therefore, arithmetic is invalid, by modus tollens. Darrell

I have addressed this issue in several posts. Rand's argument is not circular. The life of "man qua man" means life as a rational being. But, even that caveat is not strictly necessary because rationality is instrumental to life, so one's odds of survival are maximized by being rational. Moreover, suicide is never justified by the Objectivist ethics. Darrell

This is simply not true. Actually, this whole discussion is a distraction from the real issue, the argument for life as the standard of value. What we are having is a meta-level discussion about the correct form of logical argumentation. You are arguing that only deductive arguments are valid. I'm saying that any non-contradictory identification of the facts of reality is valid. Such identification may require various generalizations. If it appears that I have flip-flopped, it is only because I have attempted to adjust my usage of deduction to be consistent with yours. However, identifying the branch of logic to which an argument belongs is a difficult issue that I would prefer to eschew for the time being. I would therefore ask that you address the argument for life as the standard of value directly and drop this line of argumentation. If you have a specific problem with either Rand's argument or my argument, please point it out. Darrell

Rand's ideas about emergencies are a typical cop-out. It is especially in such situations that an ethics theory is to be tested. Don't forget that what we, living in wealth, comfort and peace in our western world at this moment, consider to be emergencies, is and has been in the course of the centuries the normal situation for millions of people. During the 2nd world war my mother has spent several years in a Japanese POW camp. The stories she told me made crystal clear that in such situations you really learn what the morality of your co-prisoners is. What use is an ethics theory that dismisses such situations as "not normal"? It's a fair-weather ethics.Much of the history of ethical thought has dealt with the morality of desparate situations --- war, natural disasters, etc. What is needed is a morality for everyday life. Would you argue that no fair-weather ethcs is required? Objectivism handles both situations correctly. Darrell

Which shows that there can be no such thing as an "ultimate value", it is a contradictio in terminis. That something is a necessary condition for making decisions, for example being alive, does not imply that it is an "ultimate value". There is no such thing as an "objectively best for him". Take for example what I'd call "Achilles' choice" (a variant would be "Hercules' choice"): does the person want a short but intense life, full of risks or a long and quiet life? Who determines what is best? It is a subjective choice. Dragonfly, Thank you for addressing the problem directly. I will not address your first objection because I have addressed it at length already and I dislike repeating myself. Your second objection sets up a false choice. People in the real world are not faced with the kinds of choices that Achilles and Hercules must make. Let's deal with Hercules first. If Hercules follows the path of Virtue, he will gain lasting fame and nobility, the love of friends, honor, strength, confidence, etc. If he follows the path of Vice, he will supposedly gain riches, luxury, indulgence, pleasure, etc. However, in the real world, a sloth rarely gains such things. If he is born rich, he may already have them, but he would be unlikely to keep them if he were slothful. So, it is easy to choose Virtue over Vice. Now, in the case of Achilles, the choice is to go to war or not. Now, generally speaking, when one goes to war, one does not intend to die. That may be the result, but that is not the guaranteed end. So, unless Achilles knows that he will surely die, we must look at what he stands to gain by joining the battle. If he joins, he will gain fame, honor and respect. Values that will stand him in good stead once the battle is over. Yes, he risks death by joining the battle, but failure to do so could be harmful to his life as well. He wouldn't be respected and might even be reviled. It is even possible that his side would lose the battle and he would lose everything of value to him. That is not to say that he should definitely go. Sometimes people are faced with difficult choices that involve the analysis of unknown factors, like whether one will continue to live or not. But, the simple fact that some choices are difficult, does not invalidate the Objectivist ethics. As to this notion that one person may want a short but intense life while another might want a long quiet life, that is a problem of the subjectivist, not the Objectivist. It is a problem that arises from standards such as trying to maximize one's happiness over a lifetime. Then, the question becomes, is it better to obtain a lot of pleasure (or enjoyment) in a short period of time or a little bit over a long period of time? This type of thinking is anathema to Objectivism. Objectivism seeks to maintain life. For example, consider a person trying to decide whether to engage in rock climbing. A person should ask himself whether there is anything to be gained by such activity. For an adult to persist in rock climbing is probably improper because he is endangering his life while gaining nothing. That is not to say that an Objectivist would avoid all risk taking. Children engage in risky behavior as a way of pushing the envelope on their own abilities. But, once it becomes clear what a person's abilities are in a particular area and what the value is of such abilities to a person's life, it makes little sense to continue to engage in the activity. There are, of course, other reasons for such activities. I am just illustrating the kind of reasoning involved. Darrell

Thanks Laure. Post #190 wasn't half bad either. I need you to rescue me now and then. Darrell

No I'm not. Go back and read what I wrote. The Objectivist ethics are perfectly valid in emergencies and non-emergencies. But, let's consider something more concrete. Would you say that mathematics is invalid because you can't divide by zero? Would you say that numerical analysis is invalid because operations become ill conditioned when equations are nearly linearly dependent? What I'm saying is that it is easy to trip people up by trying to pose problems that are near the boundaries of what is possible. For example, if you pose a problem in which it is nearly impossible to live, no matter what you do, it is easy to confuse people. Yes, there is a continuum of situations, but there are also singular points around which the solution is ill conditioned. The singular points represent a set of measure zero of situations that will never obtain in practice, so succeeding in tripping up people by posing such problems doesn't really prove anything. Darrell

I already dispensed with this argument in post #94. Darrell

Yes, this is the essential point that is not being addressed. Darrell

You're assuming a deterministic universe, a priori, and thereby excluding the concept of volition. To ask why a particular decision is made is to assume a deterministic cause. The point of volition is that it is not deterministic. A rational person can choose to be irrational and vice versa simply as a matter of course. It is not always possible to find a logical explanation for a particular choice. If it were, volition would not exist. By the way, you are oversimplifying my position somewhat. A person isn't necessarily fully rational or completely irrational. A person might be a good scientist and follow the rules of logic most of the time, yet base his morality on religion or whim. And, even if he bases it on religion, he might take the fact that his Christian religion places a high value on life as a starting point and reason logically from there on. In this case, his views on most subjects might be almost indistinguishable from those of an Objectivist. Such a person would be highly rational, but not fully so. This is indeed a slippery slope, and it is entered upon my not according volition to humans. Darrell

This is the BIG issue with Rand to me. Rand accused "those philosophers" (whoever they are, and I am at a loss to find them) of claiming that there is no relation at all between "is" and "ought." If people were complaining about this with Rand, I would have no problem with that. Her remark was simply out of line. Chalk up another one that needs to be disregarded (which I don't find all that serious in appreciating Rand's work). I'm not sure about this particular issue, but having had a look at Philosophy, Who Needs It? recently, I would not be surprised if Rand had such things in her Objectivist horror file. Some of the comments that she quotes are much worse than what is being asserted here. Darrell

Deriving "ought" from "is" is not the same as deriving "shall" from "is." You ought to do something if it is good for you. That doesn't mean you must do it. Just because you ought to eat your peas, doesn't mean you will eat your peas. "Ought," is a term used to express moral rightness. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ought It is not a term used to express compulsion. So, there is no conflict between the notion that "ought" can be derived from "is" and the notion that man has volition. Darrell

I would like to know the context of Rand's statements on suicide, but let me give you my take on the issue. Suicide is never justified by the Objectivist ethics. At worst, the Objectivist ethics is indifferent to the issue and it is only indifferent in extreme circumstances, circumstances in which life as a thinking being is basically impossible anyway. So, for a person dying of cancer in the last stages of life, racked by so much pain that thinking is basically impossible and so weak that no goal or value can be ever be achieved again, the Objectivist ethics would be indifferent to the choice that person decided to make. This is just another one of those annoying side issues that opponents of Objectivism like to dredge up. It is one of those marginal issues that is not integral to the philosophy itself because it involves situations in which life is about to be snuffed out and there isn't much that anyone can do about it, no matter how heroic the efforts. It is like the issue of emergencies. Emergencies are not the normal condition of human existence, so even if Objectivism were to fall completely on its face in emergency situations, which it doesn't, it would be of almost no interest to the construction of a proper ethics which handles the myriad of realistic everyday situations with which people are faced. Darrell

Michael, What you are stating here is not true. I apologize for not commenting earlier, but I have been trying to lead a horse to water. As I have pointed out in numerous places, the ultimate value does not require an "if." If it did, it would not be the ultimate value. The ultimate value cannot depend upon an antecedent value. By the way, I should point out that grounding an ethical system in subjective desires is not the end of the story. That is, a person can state that he did something because he wanted to do it. But, why did he want it? He can say he did it to make himself happy. But, why should he want to be happy? Simply trying to ground an ethical system in desires does not cut off the infinite regress and is therefore not a valid justification for an ethical system. To address your point more directly, the problem is not, "how to take choice out of volition." As I pointed out in post #164, there may be a difference between the values that a person actually holds and the values that are objectively best for that person. A person has no choice about what is objectively best for him or her, but he does have a choice about whether to accept those values as his own or not. So, here is a moral statement without an "if": You ought to value your life. Or, if you prefer: You ought to value your life because you are a living, thinking being. Darrell

I'm not giving a misleading impression because the reasoning that I am using is logically valid. Perhaps we are having a misunderstanding over the terminology we are using. On the one hand, you seem to be stating things like, the logic is bivalent, which means that every statement is either true or false. But, there are many statements in English that are neither true nor false. For example, "This statement is false." You asserted (or Ellen asserted) that the form of reasoning should be syllogistic in nature. Yet, how does one justify the procedure of mathematical induction on that basis? Is it considered to, "deductively valid?" And how does one justify the rules of logic themselves? This phrase should not be vague. It refers to those things that exist apart from and including consciousness. We just had this discussion on another thread. It implies (in Objectivist usage) that something exists apart from consciousness. If you think that is unremarkable, that is fine, but I don't see how such a conclusion can be deductively justified. Fine. Then I have argued deductively. But, life is not instrumental to any other value, so the method of argument that I have used is to consider all possible standards and eliminate all those that lead to irrationality and/or higher odds of death. That leaves life as the only possible standard. I am beginning to understand Victor's complaint about chewing the fat around the edges. You have not addressed my major arguments in any way, shape or form. You are simply trying to trap me in some contrived inconsistency. Darrell

I don't know if there is a name for this kind of reasoning, but, for example, the kind of argument that Rand uses to justify the statement that existence exists. The fact that existence exists is implicit in all knowledge. One cannot argue against existence without invoking existence. So, by process of elimination, existence must exist. However, there is no possible deductive argument for existence. The problem with using deduction is that you have to start with a set of premises and argue to a conclusion. There is no way to discuss the premises themselves. They are off limits. That is why existence is viewed as axiomatic. Similarly, it is impossible to argue deductively for one's standard of value because the ultimate goal is not instrumental to achieving an even more ultimate goal. However, I have argued that life is the only possible value that a rational human can possess as his ultimate value. Therefore, by process of elimination, it is his ultimate value and standard by which all other values must be measured. Darrell

Rand did indeed establish a valid logical relationship between fact and value. (Here, the term "value" refers to objective value, not subjective or chosen value.) But, the relationship she has established is not deductive. Deduction is not the only valid form of logic. That is, deduction is not the only valid (non-contradictory) means of identifying the facts of reality. Darrell

Daniel, I purposefully avoided use of the word, "derive," because it seems to be somewhat ambiguous. That is, "derive," could mean, "deductively derive," or it could be used in a broader sense. I have used it in the broader sense, but you seem to be using it in the narrow sense of, "deductively derive," so I chose to avoid using the word in this case. I believe that it is possible to use logical means to ascertain ethical principles from facts, but those logical means must include reasoning methods other than deduction. I think I have made that point abundantly clear, but I guess it doesn't hurt to repeat it here so that we can make sure we all understand each other. Another point of misunderstanding appears to be between values and decisions, or between objective and subjective (personal) values. Objective values are the values that a person should hold, while subjective values are the values that a person actually does hold. It is like the distinction between natural rights and legal rights. Natural rights are the rights that a person has by virtue of his nature as a human being. Legal rights are the rights that he holds under the law. The decision that a person makes is a consequence of the values that he actually, personally, holds. The values that he actually holds are a consequence of the choices he makes and so are his decisions. His objective values are not the result of his choices. They are the values that he should hold, based upon his nature. Objective values are objective because they can be derived from objective facts. The fact that man's life is his proper standard of value is an objective fact which can be ascertained on the basis of his nature as a human being. Whether he actually chooses to hold his life as his standard of value is his choice. Whether it is objectively his highest value is not his choice. His only choice is whether to accept or evade the fact that his life is his ultimate value. The same can be said of all subordinate values. At any one time, some things are objectively of more value to a person than others. But, it is always a personal choice whether to pursue things of higher value in favor of things of lower value or not. In that sense, decisions are not derived from facts. Decisions are personal choices. But the correctness of those decisions is not a personal choice. If you were taking a math test, you might know the right answer to a question but choose to mark the wrong answer. If the question was, "2 + 2 = ?", you could choose to write "5," but that would not be the right answer. There is an objectively right answer, namely, "4." But you can choose not to select it. So, your decision is not determined by the rules of mathematics. But, the correct answer is. Darrell

First, I have NEVER stated that, "the combination of objective facts and objective logic is insufficient to derive an ethical system." I don't know where you arrived at that conclusion, but that is not and never has been my position. My position, and that of Objectivists, is that objective facts and logic are sufficient to arrive at an ethical system. Second, the subject of morality is not primarily about how one person treats another. It is about an individual's goals and values. I made that abundantly clear in post #98 and other people have made the point too on this thread and on the previous one. Third, you are confusing personal goals with subjectivist ethics. Although a personal goal might be called a subjective goal (under one meaning of the word "subjective"), it need not be subjective in the ethical/philosophical sense. Here is the explanation of ethical subjectivism given in the Wikipedia (under the heading, Ethical Subjectivism): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjectivism Now, every person has his or her own personal goals, and if everyone were rational, his standard of value would be his own life. That is an objective standard held by an individual person. If his goal was to enjoy himself, that would be a subjective personal standard because it is based on his emotions rather than on facts. Now, back in post #98, I stated: Therefore, Objectivism provides an objective (fact based) reason for behaving in an ethical manner towards others. But, that is not an ethical primary. It is a consequence of the relationship of other rational people to your own objectively rational goals or values. Your need for morality doesn't depend upon the existence of other people. The manner in which you treat other people is a consequence of your moral code. The value that you place on other people is a consequence of the value that you place on yourself. Just to illustrate the point: Suicidal people are very dangerous. Why? Because they don't value themselves. If they did, they wouldn't be contemplating suicide. Now, because they don't value themselves, they don't value other people either. If you don't place a positive value on your own life, it is impossible to rationally place a positive value on the lives of others. That is why suicidal people sometimes strike out and kill other people before killing themselves. Darrell

Come on, Darrell: it's more to the point, and more realistic, to say that he might simply kick back and be lazy. And that would be just as objectively wrong.That works too. I just used the example that came to mind. Darrell

Victor, You are not correctly representing the Objectivist view on this subject and I certainly do not agree with the above derivation. Hume and Popper are correct in saying that the past is sometimes a poor predictor of the future. Their argument cannot be easily dismissed. I would like to have a discussion of Popper at some point. I have read his essay (that was linked) and it is very interesting. However, I will be out of town all next week and may not check in, so I'll have to defer my participation in any discussion until I get back. Darrell

If you are conceding that there is a relationship between fact and value, then the situation is indeed promising. Darrell

She did solve the problem. It is not necessary to derive decisions from facts in order to base ethics on facts. Not all decisions or alternatives are questions of value. So, why do you want peace and freedom? What if I want war and subjugation? Darrell

Rand didn't fail and you're misunderstanding what I'm saying. She did not say that an "is" implies only one "ought," nor do I think that Hume was asking for a one-to-one mapping. From an ethical standpoint, it may be that there are several or many equally valid choices that one can make. All of them may lead equally to the maintenance or achievement of one's values, to the preservation and enhancement of one's own life, etc. And, often it is difficult to tell a priori, which is the best choice. Within the level of existing uncertainty, all of the choices may be equal. If so, then, within the bounds of a set of equally valid choices, the selection is no longer an ethical choice. Take the situation of the typical starving college student. The student may be faced with difficult choices between, for example, continuing to be a student full time and sometimes going hungry, working part time and taking longer to finish college, quitting college and working full time, or, like the main character in Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment, murdering the lady next door and taking her money. The first three choices are all ethically proper and equal choices because it is difficult to know, a priori, which course of action is best. Killing the neighbor is not proper because it is of provably lower value. So, choosing among the first three possibilities may be a subjective choice, but the fourth option is objectively worse. That is what Rand was saying and that is what I am saying. Darrell