peterdjones

Some scientists postulate up to eleven dimensions while humans can only directly sense a few. We may never directly view the subatomic world or other dimensions. It may be the same for personal determinism. It is outside our purview. If our lives were determined, then nihilism would be the universal norm.

if our lives are determined, they will be whatever they are determined to be. Maybe we are determined to be irrational

optimists

Thank you Michael. And I am not saying, peterdjones, that ignorance is bliss. I don't think that some day science will prove humans to exhibit a variety of "Hard Determinism." Someday, human consciousness may rise immortally like the Phoenix. When our volitional *souls* die something is irretrievably lost. A Determinist could never *feel* that. I prefer to think that the future (and humans) can be altered one way or the other, dependent upon volitional action.

Well that wasn't a bunch of subjective whims...stone cold fact there, Mr Objectivist!!

But look at what Kiekeben said.

He said that Peikoff said "only one possible action", which he did, and that Rand approved his words before publication, which she did.

"A thing cannot act against its nature, i.e., in contradiction to it's identity, because A is A and contradictions are impossible. In any given set of circumstances, therefore, there is only one action possible to an entity, the action expressive of it's identity."--LP

I get so tired of time-travel from these scientific-minded folks. They treat the future as if it were the past--as if they were God and can decree that there is only "one possible outcome." This is what I call the God's-eye view.

I wasn't aware that all scientists are determinists.

Anyone who has read Rand knows that when she talks about any human knowledge--and that means any at all--including the fundamental nature of the universe, she is talking about it from the perspective of a human being. This means that if new facts arise that a human being can grasp intellectually and validate, he will revise his statements of fact.

Or condemn the science that gives rise to them as "irrational". Objectivists are still arguing against the Big Bang 50 years down the line. To name but one.

"A solid fact is something in the past or present. That we can know with absolute certainty.

This is getting funny. Rand is supposed to be this pragmatic, open-to-correction character, and then

out she comes with "absolute certainty"

After a pattern has been identified and corroborated by countless sane, healthy human beings over centuries, this allows man to state with certainty which set of future acts will be in line with that identity. But it does not place a cap on it. On the contrary, all concepts to Rand are open-ended so that new "non-observed until then" instances can be included.

That's a contradiction. If something is ever "stated with certainty" that does put a cap on it. OTOH, of everything is open

ended, nothing is certain

The only restriction that is placed on the future is that an existent cannot act contrary to its nature.

Can its nature change?

Valid philosophy is based on actual human beings and their human being. It is not based on any pure up-in-the-clouds contrived doctrine coughed up out of conjecture. It is determinism itself that is "so much for" philosophies as philosophy is necessary for the serious choices people make and therefore determinism implicitly uses philosophy as a stolen concept.

--Brant

Rand meets Sartre!

You seem to be saying that determinism can only be argued on the basis of complete predictability. But objecivists

don't argue it that way, for a start.

Where did I say what Objectivists say? Determinism can be argued any number of ways. I find little value in any determinism argument, even my own. Why? Not enough data. Here we are. We make choices. One choice cancels out those not chosen. This appertains to free will, something we know a little more about. That human things are determined by this or that doesn't mean all things are (purely) determined but represent an admixture for obviously our nature as humans, individually and collectively, will have a lot to do with the choices we make, but none of this tells us what determinism generally speaking is. We can posit this and posit that until the cows come home and keep on positing until the end of time and all our positings will be controversial, at least out of present knowledge. Determinism is a doctrine. Free will is action. We can say it's not action, but the action will still exist. Call it something else. Determinism yes or no is yes or no words only. We can put them up or out or zip our lips. I'm sure you haven't been determined to come here about determinism. Not unless your Objectivist brother beat you with a stick when you were very young.

--Brant

So much for philosophy

Can you toss determinism and keep the Law of Causality?

Why would anyone care if you could or couldn't?

People who care about truth and consistency tend to care about that sort of thing

You'll keep it if it's important to your prognostications and toss it if not, regarding both. My basic but not immutable position--I don't know enough--is human beings are determined and then they--if they have enough freedom

How can they have freedom if they are determined? (I care about consistency)

--determine and a lot of that comes from choices they make and to say they couldn't have made other choices, only the ones they did, is to claim a mystical infallibility

You seem to be saying that determinism can only be argued on the basis of complete predictability. But objecivists

don't argue it that way, for a start.

It seems to me that determinism excluding free will is something of a fallacy in that it excludes humans from a special place not occupied by other animals and purely physical forces. If our free will is an illusion, why can't we just toss it? If we do we also toss out morality and philosophy itself plus what ever else humans create. A wolf does not create the sheep it eats or a cow the grass. The pillager does not create what he pillages.

--Brant

Can you toss determinism and keep the Law of Causality?

Identical Twins should be frequently bumping into each other, or at least getting into each other’s way, according to determinism.

I don't see why. Determinism might predict that they behave the same under the same circumstances, but they are never

going to be under exactly the same circumstances because they have to occupy different volumes of space

Chaos Theory and randomness are interesting anti-deterministic concepts too.

Ay layk Ayn’s version and description of *Volition* which is that volition begins with the initial, undetermined decision to raise or lower consciousness. Even a moderate adherence to “soft determinism” will lead to psychological problems (and derision, as in: What made you say that, you ugly bag of mostly water?)

Uh-huh. Well, Rand didn't believe in determinism when it is called Determinism, but she likes it just fine when it is called

Causality.

This statement of yours above is equivalent to sticking your fingers in your ears and singing,

"La la la la la la la la la..."

No, it is equivalent to me asking you for the correction you say I need. and not getting it.

I, for one, have showed you where you are making a "mistake of interpretation"

You wrote a response to my comments. I responded to that in turn. As far as substantive debate

goes that was it. The ball was left in your court. You did not make a further response to

my comments.

You ignored the argument while you kept parroting your self-promoting opinion

What argument? Your comments were themselves contradictory. I pointed that out and you apparently took

umbrage

would wager good money (and win) that, at the time of reading this post, you don't have a clue as to what that argument was. I would further wager you don't even remember it and need to go back and see if you can find it just to be able to articulate it.

I made an effort in perfectly good faith to respond to you. If you write a sentence, and then another

contradictory sentence, as you did, I can't respond to that as if it were a cogent argument because

it isn't.

I listened to a Harry Binswanger lecture on free will many years ago, his solution had something to do with calling consciousness a kind of "field", analogous to an electric field. This is of course not far from the literal truth.

Shayne

Uh-huh. How do you know? Have you measured it?

Peter, I haven't been following this discussion very closely but upon skimming it seems like all you're doing is saying that Rand's belief in cause and effect is determinism, and then you juxtapose this with her view on free will and say it's contradictory.

It's been a while since I've read Rand on these issues, but in principle there is nothing wrong with observing that we have free will, and also observing that the nature of existents is that they behave in a causal, determined manner according to their nature. Reconciling these two things is a separate matter, and while it might be interesting to see how Rand would have done it, the fact that she didn't is no contradiction.

I have quoted Peikoff as saying FW and causality are contradictory. You seem to be proposing a kind of

null compatibilism (saying they are compatible, without offering an explanation how)). That is not

great philosophy...but the actual situation is much worse.

I would suggest the free will/determinism sequences are being mixed up a little here. If man has free will the expressions of that will become part of a general deterministic process.

If the decision making is an uncaused cause that doesn't come from the general deterministic process, determinism is false.

If determinism is true. decision making is not free of determinism.

The issue of whether decision making contributes to causality is irrelevant: the problem lies in where it comes from,

not where it goes to.

Humans do determine and are determined both, buts what's going to be determined is hard to predict even on the macro level

Ignorance is not bliss: if we are determined we are not free. Our ignorance of how we are determined does not make us

free, any more than out ignorance of how we will die makes us immortal.

Whosoever has found a contradiction in Objectivism is free to correct it and improve the philosophy

As it happens, I have my own theory of FW. However, I have no motivation to "improve" objectivism, since

I would just be up against people who think it is perfect, and that I am failing to understand it in

some unspecified way.

For the benefit of the reader, this last exchange is a great example of an epistemological problem I call the cognitive-normative inversion. A person starts out by judging, then seeks to identify--when he should start out with a knowledge-based sequence, i.e., identify-then-judge.

Notice the poster's judgment in place ("I'm right and Rand is wrong"), then notice how he seeks facts/other judgments that support it.

The pertinent point is that I found facts to support the conclusion. You cannot prove someone to be contradictory

by selective ommision, hence, whatever I am doing, I am doing nothing wrong.

You can detect this kind of attitude simply by the number of times such a person repeats the judgment (normative idea) that is in what should be the cognitive seat (in this case, that Rand was wrong).

I am not just repeating that Rand is wrong: I am quoting her contradicting herself.

This is a very common fallacy with Rand critics. But it happens when a person is on a "prove someone wrong at all costs" quest instead of a "learn what someone meant, then judge it" quest.

Am I making a mistake of interpretation? If I am, no one will say what it is. Why is that?

Like I keep saying, you have to know what something is (identify it correctly)

Like is say, I am quoting her directly.

The law of causality is the law of identity applied to action. All actions are caused by entities. The nature of an action is caused and determined by the nature of the entities that act; a thing cannot act in contradiction to its nature . . . . The law of identity does not permit you to have your cake and eat it, too. The law of causality does not permit you to eat your cake before you have it.

For the New Intellectual Galt’s Speech, For the New Intellectual, 151.

To grasp the axiom that existence exists, means to grasp the fact that nature, i.e., the universe as a whole, cannot be created or annihilated, that it cannot come into or go out of existence. Whether its basic constituent elements are atoms, or subatomic particles, or some yet undiscovered forms of energy, it is not ruled by a consciousness or by will or by chance, but by the law of identity. All the countless forms, motions, combinations and dissolutions of elements within the universe—from a floating speck of dust to the formation of a galaxy to the emergence of life—are caused and determined by the identities of the elements involved.

Philosophy: Who Needs It “The Metaphysical and the Man-Made,”

Philosophy: Who Needs It, 25.

Since things are what they are, since everything that exists possesses a specific identity, nothing in reality can occur causelessly or by chance.

Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology Leonard Peikoff “The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy,”

You are just making this up as you go along. Have you even read Rand? She nowhere espouses determinism.

She espouses determinism in the quote I have given before:

"All the countless forms, motions, combinations and dissolutions of elements within the universe, from a floating speck of dust to the formation of a galaxy to the emergence of life, are caused and determined [emph. added] by the identities of the elements involved". --AR

Likewise, Peikoff states on page 14 of The Objective Philosphy of Ayn Rand,

"A thing cannot act against its nature, i.e., in contradiction to it's identity, because A is A and contradictions are impossible. In any given set of circumstances, therefore, there is only one action possible to an entity, the action expressive of it's identity."'

I (than whom you will find no more generous poster on this forum so far as willingness to give lengthy explanations if asked) was afraid I was treating you too abruptly on the other thread. This continued baseless assertion by you makes it clear I was not.

I gave the same quotes before, so my assertions were not baseless.

Peikoff may well have said that determinism is false as well as saying it is true (not to mention

saying it is true for non humans and false for humans). He's like that.

You still have some thinking to do.

I am not going to accept that I have made any mistakes unless sombody can explain them to me.

I'm right and you're wrong" and/or "I'm right and Rand's wrong" seem to be the only intellectual message you are interested in conveying.

Yes. I am arguing that Rand is wrong since she is contradictory. Why not? The title of the thread is "objectivist contradictions".

so that is a relevant message.

I suggest you learn what Rand was saying correctly,

I have quoted her directly.

then go off on your "I'm right and Rand's wrong" crusade. Until that happens, I know I can't take you seriously.

If you are implying that no one can criticise Rand on this forum, then I don't take it seriously.

In my very layman's way of thinking, I'm guessing that your argument is based on the concretism heard from Physicists - all particles in the universe are determined; Man is composed of particles - therefore, etc., etc.

I am not arguing for or against free will. I am arguing that Rand held a mutually contradictory set of views on the subjecct

Not to distinguish between a conscious (and self-conscious) being, and inanimate matter, is ridiculous.

So you say. However, we appear to be made out of the same quarks and electrons as everything else

We are more than the sum of our parts, self-evidently.

So you say. Explaining how emergence works is not easy, and Rand doesn't.

THIS is the 'rational animal's' identity.

Within many constraints and limitations, each individual can select from a vast number of permutations and combinations to his own ends.

So you say. However, the vast array of possibilities you appeal to is contradicted by the Rand-Peikoff claims about

determinism.

In my very layman's way of thinking, I'm guessing that your argument is based on the concretism heard from Physicists - all particles in the universe are determined; Man is composed of particles - therefore, etc., etc.

I am not arguing for or against free will. I am arguing that Rand held a mutually contradictory st of views on the subjecct

Not to distinguish between a conscious (and self-conscious) being, and inanimate matter, is ridiculous.

So you say. However, we appear to be made out of the same quarks and electrons as everything else

We are more than the sum of our parts, self-evidently.

So you say. Explaining how emergence works is not easy, and Rand doesn't.

THIS is the 'rational animal's' identity.

Within many constraints and limitations, each individual can select from a vast number of permutations and combinations to his own ends.

So you say. However, the vast array of possibilities you appeal to is contradicted by the Rand-Peikoff claims about

determinism.

Peter,

Hi. btw - Welcome to OL.

Thankyou

I am a conceptual thinker, not so much a semantical one (unless I am doing poetry or something like that).

All thinkers have toe express themselves in words. To the listener there is no discernible difference between

wonderful concepts expressed poorly and poor concepts expressed well. Hence being non-semantic is nothing to

pride yourself on.

The problem with thinking semantically without concepts fundamentally behind it is that you take a word like "outcome" as applied to the future of one existent and try to apply it to another with a different nature, then go around claiming some kind of contradiction.

That isn't a problem in this case because Rand and Peikoff say causality/determinism is universal and applies to all existents.

I say if anyone thinks that way, they are wrong. The law of identity and all...

The LoI is precisley what is held up as making determinism applicable to everything. If you want to

say humans are an exception (as Peikoff sometimes does, when not contradictorilly saying causality is exceptionless), you cannot consistently hold that determinism is a corollary of the LoI.

Specific to volition, the "determined outcome" part of volition concerns its nature--what it will do in the future qua volition, not a spatial outcome like a ball rolling from one place to another.

I have no idea what that is a reference to. Either its future choices are determined or not.

Whether they are "spatial" is irrelevant. Do you think minds are outside of space.

An "outcome" for a volitional being is that it chooses. What it chooses is not the outcome based on its nature. That it chooses is. This nature is so "determined" that the volitional being can choose to choose and choose to not choose--but it all boils down to choosing.

Of course the outcome of a specific act of choice one one occasion is a specific outcome, and on another occasion another choice and another

outcome. It is hard to see what you are objecting to here. You might be saying that causality/nature/identity things

doesn't involve to events, including events of choosing. But a notion of causality that doesn't include

events is useless for science: we can no longer say that a ball starts rolling when pushed, because being

pushed is an event. Moreover, if determinism only applies to things an not events, we cannot say future events are fixed..but that is just what Rand does say:

"All the countless forms, motions, combinations and dissolutions of elements within the universe, from a floating speck of dust to the formation of a galaxy to the emergence of life, are caused and determined [emph. added] by the identities of the elements involved".

It cannot do otherwise.

You just said "it can choose to choose, or choose not to choose". Make your mind up.

This is the only possible outcome, which is how you defined determinism.

So now you are saying there is only one possible outcome for all entities, in contradiction to your previous claim that

there is more than one for volitional entities.

In your formulation, though, the outcome of any particular choice must be applied to the faculty itself of volition.

I think that if all events are determined, the mental event of choosing is determined. If you think choice is some sort of causeless cause, the you are simply denying one of the Rand/Peikoff claims.

(With the odd idea that your formulation proves that Rand engaged in some kind of contradiction.)

In the case of the ball, the ability to roll and an actual instance of rolling are two different things--or better yet, two different facets of the same thing. Can you imagine something rolling without having the capacity to roll? If there is no capacity to roll, there can be no determined outcome from rolling.

I fail to see what relevance it has. Determinism has it that one event causes another, and if it applies universally it must

apply to the kind of event that is an act of choice. That you need to have a faculty of choice to

choose has no bearing on that

Ditto for volition and choosing. You can't isolate a particular choice from the ability to choose.

Who is doing that? Obviously to make a choice you need the faculty of choice as a precondition. And equally obviously,

the specific details of a choice made under a particular set of circumstances aren't determined by the general

possession of the faculty, they are determined by the background assumptions of the individual,

the factors weighing up the choice many other fine details. But so what? How does any of this

show that you can make free choices in a determined universe?

Rather than proving that free choice does not exist, or only free choice exists, this fact shows clearly that both determinism and free choice are part of volition.

That isn't remotely clear. That a a faculty of volition (or anyhing else) is a necessary precondition of

something has nothing to do with determinism. Necessary preconditions are compatible with a situation

having more than one outcome. Rolling the die is a precondition, but any of 6 numbers can come up. The incompatibility

between determinism and free choice comes in with the claim that a situation has only one outcome, and

that is a claim that has been made by Rand and Peikoff. If you think that causality doesn't mean that, but

just means necessary

preconditions, you have a better theory than them, and you have a different theory than them, and they

are still contradictory as I said!

The nature of volition results in a determined future outcome and there can be no other--it chooses.

That's a blunt assertion of a contradiction.

If people choose, their actions aren't determined; and if the future is fixed, so are their future decisions, and they

therefore have no free choice.

What it chooses is the free choice part,

That contradicts your own statement: "The nature of volition results in a determined future outcome"

And don't forget, a volitional being does not have the same nature as a rolling ball, at least mine doesn't...

Don't forget the causality is a corollory of identity, and applies to everything.

All things have both form and content--you cannot remove one without destroying the thing. The same reasoning applies to volitional beings, and goes even further. What they can do is determined, but within the confines of such limitation (including a vast array of possibilities), they have free choice. For example, man can walk to the right or to the left. Which one he does is caused by his volition. Man cannot stand naked, flap his arms and fly. That part is determined and no amount of volition will make it happen.

This is pretty obvious to me, but I see it come up all the time with people who try to play gotcha with Rand.

Determinism means that there is only one possible outcome to a situation, not that there are a number of

impossible outcomes. That is what it means in the general debate on free will, and that is what it means

in Objectivism: ""A thing cannot act against its nature, i.e., in contradiction to it's identity, because A is A and contradictions are impossible. In any given set of circumstances, therefore, there is only one action possible to an entity, the action expressive of it's identity."' OPAR

Inasmuch as this is about understanding the correct use of words, it is very properly "semantics".

[

The relevant verb is not can but will.

So you say. But I don't believe you.

'random' (an epistemological concept)

So you say.Asserted without proof.

your body has the faculty of volition. It's freedom doesn't result from its being the result of random rather than predictable efficient causes.

It's freedom from determinsim can only be freedom from determinism.

I did not and do not advocate compatiblism in the conventional materialist reductivist sense. Your objections are based on a host of such preconceptions.

Rand's contradiction lies in asserting determinism and volition and incompatibilism. You may have achieved a non-contradictory

stance by dropping incompatibilism, but that does not free Rand form contradiction.

If you really care to understand the Objectivist position then you need to understand the Objectivist view of entity causality.

Doesn't work. Entities perform particular actions at particular times because of particular events within them.

You seem to have misunderstood me on both counts. I said you were right on one count, but do not know it - not that you were wrong. Second, I didn't say that I wouldn't or could explain to the readers of my words. Just not to you.

"I can explain it, just not to you" will not work either

The issue is now whether an action is caused or uncaused but whether the agent himself caused it or some other factor was determinative.

The issue is whether all events are caused, including mental events that bring about actions. If all events are

deterministically caused, then there is no basis for saying that events that lead to actions are free. If agents

are just another stage in a deterministic chain, then the claim that they exert some special causality is merely

honorific.

The notion that a person does not have free will if the chemistry of his body caused something is based on the irrational idea that you are not your own body.

We are not un free because we are material. However, if we are material AND determined, we do not have incompatibliist free will.

Free will is not will that is free from reality.

Incompatiblisis free will is free from determination

It is morally free will - the will of a mature healthy person in possession of his faculties and free from external coercion.

That is compatibilism, which Rand rejected.

Thanks. And there is actually a valid criticism of a certain concept of Rand's lurking unspoken here - but I am not feeling charitable enough towards Peter to express it for him - others can send me a private message if they are curious.

Just to make things crystal clear: I am not going to accept that my criticisms are invalid until I see a good clear argument to that

effect.

"I have Wonderful Proof, but the margin is too small to contain it" will not work.

"I can argue against that, but it's below my pay grade/I'm too busy making $$$$" will not work.

"I don't the argument against that, but some unspecified person does" will not work

"It's in the books somewhere, but I don't know where" will not work.

And none of the other standard evasions will work either.