peterdjones

You appear to have found some contradictions. Just as long as you weren't looking for them...

Which is to say it is no more powerful. Objectivists like Aristotelean logic because Rand used it, and she used it because she knew of no alternative. It's like doing calculations with a quill pen because that is what Newton would have done. Really? and how do you know that? I like to base my views on the best available theories. Of course they are still fallible. But better than apriorism masquerading as empirical realism. Which definition was I appealing to? "probability is subjective..it's just lack of information". Jaynes' opinions is belied by the facts. There has been considerable research into the question of (in)determinism. It just is bringing up the answer he presupposes. Apriorism, in other words.

The idea that there are Logical people and Illogical people is a standing disaster. Logic has to be learnt. There are people who have learnt in and people who haven't.

Should that be taken to mean "I have always known all the axioms by every experience I have had to date" or "I know that any experience I could have, and any experience I will have, will confirm the axioms". If the former, there could be a possible experience that would not confirm the axioms. What would that look like? If the latter, that is apriori knowledge itself. .

Rand did not exactly reject post-Fregean logic.She just didn't know about it. There is clearly still a tendency amongst O-ists to side with Aristotle, as the Binswanger quote demonstrates:- ..as it also demonstrates, there isn't much of an objective, rational critique of post-Fregean logic to be found, just a swinging I-don't-like-it-so-it's-wrong. Likewise, there isn't much of a case *for* Term logic. Term logic has well known shortcomings:- ...and modern research into it is a case of playing catch-up. Where is the real *advantage* to it? There aren't any serious suggestions to rewrite PNC specifically in the light of quantum mechanics. Electrons are where they are observed to be. They could have been somewhere else. Modal logic can handle the could-have-been ([]P & []~P is not a contradiction). It aprioristic to argue that electrons can't possibly be behvaving that way because the non-modal, bivalent logic Randians prefer can't model it. That is very loosely argued. The specific claim is that distributivity is not a feature of quantum logic. AFAIK, distributivity was not appealed to to get to that conclusion. If you know better, you should write a paper. You cannot prove that indeterminacy does not exist in reality by appealing to a definition, any more than you can prove god exists in reality be defining God as a necessarily existing being. To understand reality, one has to employ ones senses.

Are Rand's axioms apriori?

Playing devil's advocate here - why? Why could not a private company protect intellectual property rights and patents? What's a private right? What happens if multiple companies protect different rights? What happens if they decide it is more profitable to rip off the intellectual property they are supposed to be protecting?

[quote name='Johnny12' timestamp='1303504138' post='133701' I would say that whether or not tax cuts "work" to stimulate the economy is a secondary concern. The fact is that the money a company or individual is theirs and they should get to keep as much of the fruit of their labor as possible We have seen the government has a right to take what is is owed. But what *is* it owed? Libertarians and objectivists like to argue that the government has no right to steal the wealth an individual has created. Now: wealth is profit, and profit is the difference between what you sell something for and what you make it for. If you have to use raw materials to make something, you have to pay your supplier, and section of the price of the finished product is not "wealth" you have created, it is just money you owe. It is very difficult to think of a way of making money that doesn't leave you owing money -- gathering materials, such as firewood, form land no-one has laid a claim to perhaps. That sort of thing is of course particularly difficult in the modern world. Other, more sophisticated, types of enterprise require some input of materials, all about and so on, for which payment can properly be demanded. And governments of course typically do provide useful services to business, ranging from infrastructure to security. So where does the stealing come in? Objectivists and Libertarians would rather buy such services privately, but are there any services only a government could provide? Objectivists have particular respect for "men of the mind". At first, coming up with a novel idea is indeed creating something from nothing. But making money out of ideas is exquisitely dependent on government "interference". The profits of, for instance, a pharmaceutical company would be wiped out entirely if it was not for the ability to enforce patents. And intellectual property rights are not something like transport or communications infrastructue that could be supplied by a number of competing consortia, they require the monopolistic power of governments (supplemented by international co-operation).

Is there a rational basis for determinism? Good, but not good enough ..which just begs the reductionistic argument, or as he calls it, the argument from composition: that humans are made of electrons and quarks like everything else.. The argument from "composition" may not have logical necessity, but it can still have scientific validity, if it can be shown the behaviour of the wholes is generally determined by the behaviour of the parts (ie reductionism is true). Oh, and that the behaviour of the parts is deterministic.

I've long argued this very point, and now consider the answer rather simple: Rand just doesn't know what she's talking about. She hasn't studied Hume or Kant in any detail, and doesn't really know - or want to know - the main problems involved that these men were wrestling with. Recall in the ITOE (p304-5) what she called "the big question of induction" - the problem central to Hume's critique, and therefore Kant's - she admits she "couldn't even begin to discuss - because...I haven't worked on that subject enough to even begin to formulate it...". That's right: for all her overwrought invective aimed at Hume in her writings, she can't even begin to formulate a response to what is considered his central question! Further, with breathtaking naivety she adds "...it would take an accomplished scientist in a given field to illustrate the whole process [of induction] in that field." Rand doesn't seem to realise the problem of induction is a logical problem, not something "a scientist in a given field" can "illustrate the whole process in that field." With that in mind, what more do you need to know about Rand vs Hume - and by extension, Rand vs Kant? H.W.B Joseph solved Hume's 'problem of induction' in 1916 in his ~Introduction to Logic~. I pointed this out in two essays on Popper (1996 & 1999) and reiterate it in my recent book ~Old Nick's Guide to Happiness~. Blatant plug? Absolutely! Nicholas Dykes The Problems of Induction. There are a number of aspects to induction. One is induction as methodology, or inspiration or hypthesis formation, the aspect where a pattern is noticed and some law is postulated on that basis, without regard to its truth. Another is the epistemic issue of justifying the drawing of a general conclusion from limited data. A third is the metaphyscal undepinning or explnation of epistemic induction, ie the nature of physical law. Of these, the epistemic issue is the most difficult, and itself breaks down into a number of problems. The Epistemic Problems of Induction. The epistemic problems of induction are broadly related to the process of deriving a general conclusion from a limited set of data. It is needed to give a foundation to laws, and laws are, by most accounts, needed to give a foundation to causality. Induction is needed because scientific generalisation need to hold in the future: yet any "for all" statement — any statement, therefore, including future states of affairs — cannot be emprically justified directly. Such statements have to be somehow inferred from what is known of the past. In its strongest form the problem of induction is the problem of deductively deriving a statement to the effect that "All A are F" from a certain number of examples of A which are F. It can be briefly stated that this, "strong", version of the Problem of Induction is almost certainly insoluble. That should not be taken to mean that induction is false, unnecessary or mythical. The problem of induction is essentially epistemological. A metaphysical posit, such as the Law of Identity (or the Uniformity of Nature or a number of others) can explain how]induction works, but it can't resolve the epistemic problem of reaching sure conclusions on the basis of limited evidence. We can say that it is in the nature of the Sun to rise in the east (or it is part of its identity to do so, etc), and we can reach a conclusion about what will happen tomorrow on that basis. But a conclusion is only as good as its premise. In order to reach a sure conclusion about what will happen tomorrow, a sure premise is needed. So the metaphysical posit of Identity or Nature would need to be known surely, in order to solve the epistemic problem. But how does one obtain sure knowledge of a thing's nature or identity on the basis of limited evidence? That is itself the problem of induction, or a close relative. So nothing has been resolved epistemologically. Is the metaphysical posit useless, then? As I said, it explains how induction works; without it, induction might seem magical. So a problem, that of how induction works, is addressed, but it does not solve the problem of induction, because it does not make any induction more certain than it was before. When one is talking about identity, it is tempting to think that identity is a simple concept of A=A. But such a simple concept cannot do the metaphysical work we need it to do. The fact that everything is self-identical tells us nothing: what we are actually appealing to is the idea that everything has a unique identity - A is not B is not C. (Even self-identity is complex in reality: is the butterfly identical to the caterpillar?). The unique and individual natures of things are not given by the tautology A=A, they have to be studied and learnt. So the problem of limited data is not avoided by identity.

I've long argued this very point, and now consider the answer rather simple: Rand just doesn't know what she's talking about. She hasn't studied Hume or Kant in any detail, and doesn't really know - or want to know - the main problems involved that these men were wrestling with. Recall in the ITOE (p304-5) what she called "the big question of induction" - the problem central to Hume's critique, and therefore Kant's - she admits she "couldn't even begin to discuss - because...I haven't worked on that subject enough to even begin to formulate it...". That's right: for all her overwrought invective aimed at Hume in her writings, she can't even begin to formulate a response to what is considered his central question! Further, with breathtaking naivety she adds "...it would take an accomplished scientist in a given field to illustrate the whole process [of induction] in that field." Rand doesn't seem to realise the problem of induction is a logical problem, not something "a scientist in a given field" can "illustrate the whole process in that field." With that in mind, what more do you need to know about Rand vs Hume - and by extension, Rand vs Kant? H.W.B Joseph solved Hume's 'problem of induction' in 1916 in his ~Introduction to Logic~. I pointed this out in two essays on Popper (1996 & 1999) and reiterate it in my recent book ~Old Nick's Guide to Happiness~. Blatant plug? Absolutely! Nicholas Dykes The problem of induction is essentially epistemological. A metaphysical posit, such as the Law of Identity (or the Uniformity of Nature or a number of others) can explain how[/b>]induction works, but it can't resolve the epistemic problem of reaching sure conclusions on the basis of limited evidence. We can say that it is in the nature of the Sun to rise in the east (or it is part of its identity to do so, etc), and we can reach a conclusion about what will happen tomorrow on that basis. But a conclusion is only as good as its premise. In order to reach a sure conclusion about what will happen tomorrow, a sure premise is needed. So the metaphysical posit of Identity or Nature would need to be known surely, in order to solve the epistemic problem. But how does one obtain sure knowledge of a thing's nature or identity on the basis of limited evidence? That is itself the problem of induction, or a close relative. So nothing has been resolved epistemologically. Is the metaphyscial posit useless, then? As I said, it explains how induction works; without it, induction might seem magical. So a problem, that of how induction works, is addressed, but it does not solve the problem of induction, because it does not make any induction more certain than it was before. When one is talking about identity, it is tempting to think that identity is a simple concept of A=A. But such a simple concept cannot do the metaphysical work we need it to do. The fact that everything is self-identical tells us nothing: what we are actually appealing to is the idea that everything has a unique identity - A is not B is not C. (Even self-indentity is complex in reality: is the butterfly identical to the caterpillar?). The unique and individual natures of things are not given by the tautology A=A, they have to be studied and learnt. So the problem of limited data is not avoided by identity.

Are your talking to me? I have no problem with small-o objectivism. I said nothing to indicate that I did. I don't have to believe someone has a perfect philosophy just because they say so. If you think something has been misphrased, you need to fix the problem, not whine or ad-hom or psychologise, or self-advertise... I second that wish. And I provided the list. It's funny. He complains that I take Objectivism to be dogmatic and unwilling to take correction, saying it is just a problem with some Objectivists...but he's one of them!

The problem with that is the epistemology. How can you tell a threat is real before the first shot is fired? There have been many examples of wars started in response to spurious threats. The NoIF principle seems to say that you have to wait for a shot to be fired. That's a nice clear principle. But it doesn't work in practice. So "force" gets redefined to something vague, and we end up back with the epistemological problem. Peikoff needs concepts to contain all their referents, because his strategy for collapsing the A/S distinction is to declare that everything already has concept-containment analycity.

Some other realistic philosophy? Thinking for yourself? Djangology? Zip, nada, nothing? Aren't you some kind of libertarian? --Brant Thinking for yourself is nothing? Someone who is some sort of libertarians shouldn't think for himself?

Some other realistic philosophy? Thinking for yourself? Djangology?

I have hear of ARCHN. I don't think there is much to be gained intellectually by discussing things with people who basically agree with you. If I were the sort of person who takes emotional comfort in knowing that N people agree with me (whether rightly or wrongly), things might be different. You might consider debating and analysing the truth of the actual issue: does Objectivism have a non-contradictory heory of free will and causality? Saying, in effect, "your criticism upsets me emotionally, so you must leave" is not rational thought or intellectual engagement. This is wrong. I can find quotes if need be, but these discussions are long and life is short, so I'll just comment on the obvious for now. Anyone with elementary familiarity with Rand's ideas on philosophy knows that she considers entities to be causal agents. And a human being is an entity in her understanding. That is so vaguely phrased it is hard to see what the objection is. Does "causal" mean "caused" or "causing"? Is the causation in question fine grained or course-grained? It is easy enough to re-quote passages showing that Rand did not subscribe to your Revised Theory:- The problem is that the Revised theory only requires entities to refrain form behaviour that is contrary to their natures. It is not contrary to the nature of a river to flood, and it is not contrary to the nature of a river not to flood, so, by the Revised Theory, the flood is not inevitable. But Rand thinks it is. Therefore, Rand does not hold to the Revised Theory. That is false. I have carefully argued my points with appropriate textual references in previous postings, and I have done so here. It is noticeable that you object to me the most when my arguments are at their strongest. Readers can judge for themselves whether I am "just bashing".

Metaphysics. She accepts both free will and determinism (the law of causality) but rejects compatibilism. Epistemology: There is no apriori, but there are axioms., which look and behave exactly like apriori knowledge. Concepts are formed by the mind yet in a finite space of time, yet somehow contain vast amounts of information about the sum total of their referents. Politics: Initiation of Force is always wrong, but pre-emptive military strikes are OK. Ethics: People should behave as if they are selfless, but only for selfish reasons.

I am a naturalistic libertarian on free will. That has nothing to do with whether or not Rand contradicted herself. Objectivism cannot be corrected until it admits it has flaws. You can judge for yourself how objectivists react to having problems pointed out to them.

Who, Peikoff and Harriman? If you’ve spent much time on this site you’ll have read a great deal of criticism of both. I suspect you’ve come to the wrong place. BTW, where does your quote come from? Please give an example of an Objectivist who has decided that Rand was wrong about something on the basis of scientific evidence Kind of true. I was thinking more of physics and cosmology.

I agree my response lacked substance, but so did the comment, your comment that I was replying to. If you want to get a reputation as hypocritical board administrator who doesn't play according to his own rules, go right ahead...

Just the dozens I have communicated with over the years.

Who, Peikoff and Harriman? If you’ve spent much time on this site you’ll have read a great deal of criticism of both. I suspect you’ve come to the wrong place. BTW, where does your quote come from? Please give an example of an Objectivist who has decided that Rand was wrong about something on the basis of scientific evidence

If he is trying to express strict determinism, he is perfectly clear. It is only unclear as an expression of what you think he ought to be saying. Another possible get out is to adopt the view that the Law of Identity and Law of Causality only render certain actions impossible, whilst not rendering any single action inevitable. This view, call it the Revised Theory, is attractive because it retains the identity-causality link, and renders volition compatible with the (revised) Law of Causality. In many ways, it is a good theory. The problem is that it is not the Rand-Peikoff theory (as their comments about the metaphysical versus the man-made illustrate),. Their theory has it that only humans can perform actions that are not necessitated by causality, whereas the Revised theory makes it quite possible for any entity to behave indeterministically so long as it is in its nature. The question of whether an entity behaves deterministicalyl or randomly or volitionally could only be decided by careful study of the entity in question. Rand is in no position to declare from her armchair that humans are the only volitional beings in the universe. Likewise, the Revised theory would allow some entities to behave randomly. For instance, an electron could be in a spin-up state, or spin-down, but no other state is possible to it. The standard quantum mechanical behaviour o of funamental particles is quite in line with the Revised Theory — a fact that that would seem advantageous to some,. But not to Rand and Peikoff remain very much opposed to it, for the usual aprioristic, armchair reasons:- --LPThe Revised Theory has the methodological implication that you cannot tell whether a specific entity is random, determined, or volitional without knowing anything about that entity. However, Rand and Peikoff reject randomness (as opposed to volition) in all its forms, and insist that a uniform causality applies to all non-human beings. Therefore, they do not hold to the Revised Theory. But you just quoted a number of passages where Rand and Peikoff state very clearly that there is only one action available to (non human) entities, and they mean that to be a specific-fine grained action, not a mere category of actions such as a choice.

"...Objectivists only pay lip service to the revisability of Objectivism. In practice, where science conflicts with Objectvism, the science in question is condemned on some ad hominem grounds." Case in point: LP (of course)

I was talking about Rand. ...who approved Peikoff's words. Stop evading. Are they? No: but you were writing some simplistic boo-hurrah stuff which made it look that way. What's the point? The point of my comment was that Objectivists only pay lip service to the revisability of Objectivism. In practice, where science conflicts with Objectvism, the science in question is condemned on some ad hominem grounds. Funny? That's funny. Maybe it helps to be British So you say. Maybe it helps to be an English speaker. In your world, I suppose. If that's a "no" (and not just another evasion), determinism can be founded on the unchanging natures of entities, and thereby made acceptable to Objectivism.