peterdjones

You appear to have found some contradictions. Just as long as you weren't looking for them...

The Term logic developed by Sommers in recent decades is at least as powerful as predicate logic, see "Something to Reckon With".

Which is to say it is no more powerful. Objectivists like Aristotelean logic because Rand used it, and

she used it because she knew of no alternative. It's like doing calculations with a quill pen

because that is what Newton would have done.

Electrons are where they are observed to be. They could have been somewhere else.

Really? and how do you know that?

I like to base my views on the best available theories. Of course they are still fallible. But better than

apriorism masquerading as empirical realism.

You cannot prove that indeterminacy does not exist in reality by appealing to a definition, any more than you can

prove god exists in reality be defining God as a necessarily existing being. To understand reality, one has to employ

ones senses.

Which definition was I appealing to?

"probability is subjective..it's just lack of information".

What is done in quantum theory today is just the opposite; when no cause is apparent one simply postulates that no cause exists - ergo, the laws of physics are indeterministic and can be expressed only in probability form. The central dogma is that the light determines, not whether a photoelectron will appear, but only the probability that it will appear. The mathematical formalism of present quantum theory - incomplete in the same way that our present knowledge is incomplete - does not even provide the vocabulary in which one could ask a question about the real cause of an event. Biologists have a mechanistic picture of the world because, being trained to believe in causes, they continue to search for them and find them. Quantum physicists have only probability laws because for two generations we have been indoctrinated not to believe in causes - and so we have stopped looking for them. Indeed, any attempt to search for the causes of microphenomena is met with scorn and a charge of professional incompetence and `obsolete mechanistic materialism'. Therefore, to explain the indeterminacy in current quantum theory we need not suppose there is any indeterminacy in Nature; the mental attitude of quantum physicists is already sufficient to

guarantee it.

Jaynes' opinions is belied by the facts. There has been considerable research into the question of (in)determinism. It just

is bringing up the answer he presupposes. Apriorism, in other words.

The idea that there are Logical people and Illogical people is a standing disaster. Logic has to be learnt. There are people who

have learnt in and people who haven't.

If we're to go with the colloquial definitions of a priori (knowledge preceding experience) and a posteriori (Knowledge as the result of experience) then Rand's axioms are certainly in the latter category. Axiomatic concepts are a special breed, however. One knows any single one of the axioms by experience of anything.

Should that be taken to mean "I have always known all the axioms by every experience I have had to date" or "I know that

any experience I could have, and any experience I will have, will confirm the axioms".

If the former, there could be a possible experience that would not confirm the axioms. What would that look like?

If the latter, that is apriori knowledge itself.

.

There is nothing in Rand’s definition of logic, nor in her metaphysics and epistemology taken all together, that implies her concept of logic is incompatible with all developments in logic beyond Aristotle.* There is no incompatibility between Objectivism and the modern, standard first-order predicate logic with quantification and identity. In the modern propositional logic, Objectivism may need to take issue with the standard theory of material implication; it perhaps should embrace instead a form of relevance logic (a genre of non-standard modern logic). The work needed to settle that last point one way or the other is work not yet done by Objectivist thinkers.

Rand did not exactly reject post-Fregean logic.She just didn't know about it.

There is clearly still a tendency amongst O-ists to side with Aristotle, as the Binswanger quote demonstrates:-

The problem is not merely that no book has been written to incorporate the discoveries of Ayn Rand in epistemology. Nor is the problem merely that modern errors in epistemology are present in the current logic texts. The problem is that the modern texts proceed from the linguistic, formalistic context of contemporary philosophy. As a result, the logic texts currently in print generally range from misleading to worthless; many of them are actually destructive of logical thinking.

..as it also demonstrates, there isn't much of an objective, rational critique of post-Fregean logic to be found, just a swinging I-don't-like-it-so-it's-wrong.

Likewise, there isn't much of a case *for* Term logic. Term logic has well known shortcomings:-

Predicate logic was designed as a form of mathematics, and as such is capable of all sorts of mathematical reasoning beyond the powers of term logic. Predicate logic is also capable of many commonsense inferences that elude term logic. Term logic cannot, for example, explain the inference from "every car is a vehicle", to "every owner of a car is an owner of a vehicle." Syllogistic reasoning cannot explain inferences involving multiple generality. Relations and identity must be treated as subject-predicate relations, which make the identity statements of mathematics difficult to handle. Term logic contains no analog of the singular term and singular proposition, both essential features of predicate logic.

...and modern research into it is a case of playing catch-up. Where is the real *advantage* to it?

really can't conceive of any "non-Aristotelian" logic which would make sense in the real world, if "non-Aristotelian" means to deny any of the "laws of thought". How can logic be used to refute itself? Take quantum physics; because an electron can seem both to be, and not be, in one place, is it then reasonable to reject the law of non-contradiction on the grounds that contradictions exist "in reality"? But the motivation to rewrite the law of non-contradiction is prompted by that very law! In other words, the method of reviewing one's premises in the light of apparent contradiction is a cornerstone of Aristotelian logic.

There aren't any serious suggestions to rewrite PNC specifically in the light of quantum mechanics. Electrons are where

they are observed to be. They could have been somewhere else. Modal logic can handle the could-have-been ([]P & []~P is not a contradiction). It aprioristic to argue that electrons can't possibly be behvaving that way because the non-modal, bivalent logic Randians prefer can't model it.

Ok, well my point was more about the lack of reflexive thinking which can lead to self-refuting arguments. Some commentators have suggested that the results of quantum physics imply that the 'old' logic is somehow false or incomplete, yet they are using it in order to come to that conclusion.

That is very loosely argued. The specific claim is that distributivity is not a feature of quantum logic. AFAIK, distributivity was not appealed to to get to that conclusion. If you know better, you should write a paper.

I'm curious as to what you mean by "Indeterminacy exists "in reality"". Indeterminacy is a function of our knowledge (or lack of it), but it seems to me that you're claiming that it's an inherent property of an object.

You cannot prove that indeterminacy does not exist in reality by appealing to a definition, any more than you can

prove god exists in reality be defining God as a necessarily existing being. To understand reality, one has to employ

ones senses.

Are Rand's axioms apriori?

And intellectual property rights are not something like transport or communications infrastructue that could be supplied by a number of competing consortia,they require the monopolistic power of governments (supplemented by international co-operation).

Playing devil's advocate here - why? Why could not a private company protect intellectual property rights and patents?

What's a private right? What happens if multiple companies protect different rights? What happens if they decide

it is more profitable to rip off the intellectual property they are supposed to be protecting?

[quote name='Johnny12' timestamp='1303504138' post='133701'

I would say that whether or not tax cuts "work" to stimulate the economy is a secondary concern. The fact is that the money a company or individual is theirs and they should get to keep as much of the fruit of their labor as possible

We have seen the government has a right to take what is is owed. But what *is* it owed?

Libertarians and objectivists like to argue that the government has no right to steal the wealth

an individual has created.

Now: wealth is profit, and profit is the difference between what you sell something

for and what you make it for. If you have to use raw materials to make something, you have to

pay your supplier, and section of the price of the finished product is not "wealth" you have created,

it is just money you owe. It is very difficult to think of a way of making money that doesn't leave you

owing money -- gathering materials, such as firewood, form land no-one has laid a claim to perhaps.

That sort of thing is of course particularly difficult in the modern world. Other, more sophisticated,

types of enterprise require some input of materials, all about and so on, for which payment can properly

be demanded. And governments of course typically do provide useful services to business, ranging from

infrastructure to security. So where does the stealing come in? Objectivists and Libertarians would rather

buy such services privately, but are there any services only a government could provide?

Objectivists have particular respect for "men of the mind". At first, coming up with

a novel idea is indeed creating something from nothing. But making money out of ideas

is exquisitely dependent on government "interference". The profits of, for instance,

a pharmaceutical company would be wiped out entirely if it was not for the ability

to enforce patents. And intellectual property rights are not something like transport

or communications infrastructue that could be supplied by a number of competing consortia,

they require the monopolistic power of governments (supplemented by international co-operation).

Is there a rational basis for determinism?

Good, but not good enough

"Given the importance of consciousness, and the great differences it makes to the animal's actions; and given that the brains of man and the higher animals are a vastly more complex structure than any other we know of; it is a totally fallacious use of induction to try to extrapolate from the deterministic laws discovered for other entities "

..which just begs the reductionistic argument, or as he calls it, the argument from composition: that humans are made of electrons and quarks like everything else..

The argument from "composition" may not have logical necessity, but it can still have

scientific validity, if it can be shown the behaviour of the wholes is generally determined by the behaviour of

the parts (ie reductionism is true). Oh, and that the behaviour of the parts is deterministic.

Had David Hume not lived, it is very likely that Kant, The Evil One, would be more than a minor footnote in the history of philosophy. So why not blame Hume?

I've long argued this very point, and now consider the answer rather simple: Rand just doesn't know what she's talking about. She hasn't studied Hume or Kant in any detail, and doesn't really know - or want to know - the main problems involved that these men were wrestling with. Recall in the ITOE (p304-5) what she called "the big question of induction" - the problem central to Hume's critique, and therefore Kant's - she admits she "couldn't even begin to discuss - because...I haven't worked on that subject enough to even begin to formulate it...". That's right: for all her overwrought invective aimed at Hume in her writings, she can't even begin to formulate a response to what is considered his central question! Further, with breathtaking naivety she adds "...it would take an accomplished scientist in a given field to illustrate the whole process [of induction] in that field." Rand doesn't seem to realise the problem of induction is a logical problem, not something "a scientist in a given field" can "illustrate the whole process in that field." With that in mind, what more do you need to know about Rand vs Hume - and by extension, Rand vs Kant?

H.W.B Joseph solved Hume's 'problem of induction' in 1916 in his ~Introduction to Logic~. I pointed this out in two essays on Popper (1996 & 1999) and reiterate it in my recent book ~Old Nick's Guide to Happiness~. Blatant plug? Absolutely!

Nicholas Dykes

The Problems of Induction.

There are a number of aspects to induction. One is induction as methodology, or inspiration or hypthesis formation, the aspect where a pattern is noticed and some law is postulated on that basis, without regard to its truth. Another is the epistemic issue of justifying the drawing of a general conclusion from limited data. A third is the metaphyscal undepinning or explnation of epistemic induction, ie the nature of physical law. Of these, the epistemic issue is the most difficult, and itself breaks down into a number of problems.

The Epistemic Problems of Induction.

The epistemic problems of induction are broadly related to the process of deriving a general conclusion from a limited set of data. It is needed to give a foundation to laws, and laws are, by most accounts, needed to give a foundation to causality. Induction is needed because scientific generalisation need to hold in the future: yet any "for all" statement — any statement, therefore, including future states of affairs — cannot be emprically justified directly. Such statements have to be somehow inferred from what is known of the past.

In its strongest form the problem of induction is the problem of deductively deriving a statement to the effect that "All A are F" from a certain number of examples of A which are F.

It can be briefly stated that this, "strong", version of the Problem of Induction is almost certainly insoluble. That should not be taken to mean that induction is false, unnecessary or mythical.

The problem of induction is essentially epistemological. A metaphysical

posit, such as the Law of Identity (or the Uniformity of Nature or a number of others) can explain how]induction works, but it can't resolve the epistemic problem of reaching sure conclusions on the basis of limited evidence.

We can say that it is in the nature of the Sun to rise in the east (or it is part

of its identity to do so, etc), and we can reach a conclusion about what

will happen tomorrow on that basis. But a conclusion is only as good as its premise. In order

to reach a sure conclusion about what will happen tomorrow, a sure premise is needed. So the metaphysical posit of Identity or Nature would need to be known

surely, in order to solve the epistemic problem. But how does one obtain sure knowledge of a thing's nature or identity

on the basis of limited evidence? That is itself the problem of induction, or a close relative. So nothing has been resolved epistemologically.

Is the metaphysical posit useless, then? As I said, it explains how induction works; without it, induction might seem magical. So a problem, that of how induction works, is addressed, but it does not solve the problem of induction, because it does not make any induction more certain than it was before.

When one is talking about identity, it is tempting to think that identity is a simple concept of A=A. But such a simple concept cannot do the metaphysical

work we need it to do. The fact that everything is self-identical tells us nothing:

what we are actually appealing to is the idea that everything has a unique

identity - A is not B is not C. (Even self-identity is complex in reality: is the butterfly identical to the caterpillar?). The unique and individual natures

of things are not given by the tautology A=A, they have to be studied

and learnt. So the problem of limited data is not avoided by identity.

Had David Hume not lived, it is very likely that Kant, The Evil One, would be more than a minor footnote in the history of philosophy. So why not blame Hume?

I've long argued this very point, and now consider the answer rather simple: Rand just doesn't know what she's talking about. She hasn't studied Hume or Kant in any detail, and doesn't really know - or want to know - the main problems involved that these men were wrestling with. Recall in the ITOE (p304-5) what she called "the big question of induction" - the problem central to Hume's critique, and therefore Kant's - she admits she "couldn't even begin to discuss - because...I haven't worked on that subject enough to even begin to formulate it...". That's right: for all her overwrought invective aimed at Hume in her writings, she can't even begin to formulate a response to what is considered his central question! Further, with breathtaking naivety she adds "...it would take an accomplished scientist in a given field to illustrate the whole process [of induction] in that field." Rand doesn't seem to realise the problem of induction is a logical problem, not something "a scientist in a given field" can "illustrate the whole process in that field." With that in mind, what more do you need to know about Rand vs Hume - and by extension, Rand vs Kant?

H.W.B Joseph solved Hume's 'problem of induction' in 1916 in his ~Introduction to Logic~. I pointed this out in two essays on Popper (1996 & 1999) and reiterate it in my recent book ~Old Nick's Guide to Happiness~. Blatant plug? Absolutely!

Nicholas Dykes

The problem of induction is essentially epistemological. A metaphysical

posit, such as the Law of Identity (or the Uniformity of Nature or a number of others) can explain how[/b>]induction works, but it can't resolve the epistemic problem of reaching sure conclusions on the basis of limited evidence.

We can say that it is in the nature of the Sun to rise in the east (or it is part

of its identity to do so, etc), and we can reach a conclusion about what

will happen tomorrow on that basis. But a conclusion is only as good as its premise. In order

to reach a sure conclusion about what will happen tomorrow, a sure premise is needed. So the metaphysical posit of Identity or Nature would need to be known

surely, in order to solve the epistemic problem. But how does one obtain sure knowledge of a thing's nature or identity

on the basis of limited evidence? That is itself the problem of induction, or a close relative. So nothing has been resolved epistemologically.

Is the metaphyscial posit useless, then? As I said, it explains how induction works; without it, induction might seem magical. So a problem, that of how induction works, is addressed, but it does not solve the problem of induction, because it does not make any induction more certain than it was before.

When one is talking about identity, it is tempting to think that identity is a simple concept of A=A. But such a simple concept cannot do the metaphysical

work we need it to do. The fact that everything is self-identical tells us nothing:

what we are actually appealing to is the idea that everything has a unique

identity - A is not B is not C. (Even self-indentity is complex in reality: is the butterfly identical to the caterpillar?). The unique and individual natures

of things are not given by the tautology A=A, they have to be studied

and learnt. So the problem of limited data is not avoided by identity.

Ba'al Chatzaf wrote:

I believe the reality is real and it is what it is regardless of our wishes, hopes, prayers, hallucinations and errors. Facts are hard. Opinions are sometimes vapor-ware.

end quote

Exactly. I am an Objectivist. Whatever “is proven,” *IS*. Reality is the constant feedback to the veracity of our philosophy, Mr. Jones.

Are your talking to me? I have no problem with small-o objectivism. I said nothing to indicate that I did.

Errors in phraseology are not flaws in a chain of thought linked to reality.

I don't have to believe someone has a perfect philosophy just because they say so. If you think

something has been misphrased, you need to fix the problem, not whine or ad-hom or psychologise,

or self-advertise...

This is the second time that I have asked you for this "list" of alleged contradictions in Objectivism . . . Please provide the list.

I second that wish.

And I provided the list.

Peterdjones wrote:

"Objectivism cannot be corrected until it admits it has flaws."

and Michael responded:

Do you know anyone named "Objectivism"? I don't.

Your analysis of his posts is good.

It's funny. He complains that I take Objectivism to be dogmatic and unwilling

to take correction, saying it is just a problem with some Objectivists...but he's

one of them!

In the real world preemptive war is kosher provided there is a real threat of being attacked first. As it says in the Talmud: If he comes to kill you, rise up early and kill him first.

The problem with that is the epistemology. How can you tell a threat is real before the first shot is fired? There have been

many examples of wars started in response to spurious threats. The NoIF principle seems to say that you have to wait

for a shot to be fired. That's a nice clear principle. But it doesn't work in practice. So "force" gets redefined to something

vague, and we end up back with the epistemological problem.

As to concept formation, a concept can be open ended and have a large information carrying capacity. Having a large jug does not mean it is full (yet).

Peikoff needs concepts to contain all their referents, because his strategy for collapsing the A/S distinction is to declare

that everything already has concept-containment analycity.

Well, Peter, now that you've put Objectivism into the dumpster, what have you to replace it with?

Some other realistic philosophy? Thinking for yourself? Djangology?

Zip, nada, nothing? Aren't you some kind of libertarian?

--Brant

Thinking for yourself is nothing? Someone who is some sort of libertarians shouldn't think

for himself?

Well, Peter, now that you've put Objectivism into the dumpster, what have you to replace it with?

Some other realistic philosophy? Thinking for yourself? Djangology?

Are you familiar with the Ayn Rand Contra Human Nature site? If you bash Rand and Objectivism, you will be well received there--even if you do there like you do here. To be fair to the site's owner, Daniel Barnes (who I like), he prefers intelligent statements far more than unintelligent ones. But just bashing Rand is OK too.

You might think about giving it a try.

I have hear of ARCHN. I don't think there is much to be gained intellectually by discussing things with people who basically agree with you. If I were the sort of person who takes emotional comfort in knowing that N people agree with me (whether rightly or wrongly),

things might be different.

You might consider debating and analysing the truth of the actual issue: does Objectivism have a non-contradictory heory of free will and causality? Saying, in effect, "your criticism upsets me emotionally, so you must leave" is not rational thought or intellectual engagement.

The problem is that it is not the Rand-Peikoff theory (as their comments about the metaphysical versus the man-made illustrate),. Their theory has it that only humans can perform actions that are not necessitated by causality...

This is wrong. I can find quotes if need be, but these discussions are long and life is short, so I'll just comment on the obvious for now. Anyone with elementary familiarity with Rand's ideas on philosophy knows that she considers entities to be causal agents. And a human being is an entity in her understanding.

That is so vaguely phrased it is hard to see what the objection is. Does "causal" mean "caused" or "causing"? Is the causation

in question fine grained or course-grained?

It is easy enough to re-quote passages showing that Rand did not subscribe to your Revised Theory:-

"Any natural phenomenon, i.e., any event which occurs without human participation, is the metaphysically given, and could not have occurred differently or failed to occur; any phenomenon involving human action is the man-made, and could have been different. For example, a flood occurring in an uninhabited land, is the metaphysically given; a dam built to contain the flood water, is the man-made; if the builders miscalculate and the dam breaks, the disaster is metaphysical in its origin, but intensified by man in its consequences. To correct the situation, men must obey nature by studying the causes and potentialities of the flood, then command nature by building better flood controls. "

The problem is that the Revised theory only requires entities to refrain form behaviour that is contrary to

their natures. It is not contrary to the nature of a river to flood, and it is not contrary to the nature

of a river not to flood, so, by the Revised Theory, the flood is not inevitable. But Rand thinks it is.

Therefore, Rand does not hold to the Revised Theory.

In essence, this poster's line of argument is to keep saying "Rand was wrong"

That is false. I have carefully argued my points with appropriate textual references in previous postings, and I have done so

here. It is noticeable that you object to me the most when my arguments are at their strongest. Readers can judge for

themselves whether I am "just bashing".

Peter Jones:

This is the second time that I have asked you for this "list" of alleged contradictions in Objectivism.

Please provide the list,

Adam

Metaphysics. She accepts both free will and determinism (the law of causality) but rejects compatibilism.

Epistemology: There is no apriori, but there are axioms., which look and behave exactly like apriori knowledge.

Concepts are formed by the mind yet in a finite space of time, yet somehow contain vast amounts of information about the sum total of their referents.

Politics: Initiation of Force is always wrong, but pre-emptive military strikes are OK.

Ethics: People should behave as if they are selfless, but only for selfish reasons.

Interesting. So Mr. Jones is NOT a hard determinist? And he recently used the word "evasion." And he has spoken to numerous Objectivists over the years. And he may like to hang out with us. I hope peterdjones in particular would be a bit more forthcoming with HIS THEORIES of human consciousness. Do you agree with other aspects of the Objectivist Philosophy? Show us how to correct Objectivism, if you can.

Peter Taylor

I am a naturalistic libertarian on free will. That has nothing to do with whether or not

Rand contradicted herself. Objectivism cannot be corrected until it admits it has flaws.

You can judge for yourself how objectivists react to having problems pointed out to them.

Objectivists only pay lip service to the revisability of Objectivism.

Who, Peikoff and Harriman? If you’ve spent much time on this site you’ll have read a great deal of criticism of both. I suspect you’ve come to the wrong place. BTW, where does your quote come from?

Please give an example of an Objectivist who has decided that Rand was wrong about something on the basis of scientific evidence

Kind of true. I was thinking more of physics and cosmology.

Dennis,

I'm not too sure, but this guy's style and opinions (and overgeneralized sloppiness) are very close to those of Kimmler, but without the detours into weirdness.

Maybe he's Kimmler's brother or cousin?

btw - The quote came from a post of his I threw into the Garbage Pile.

Michael

I agree my response lacked substance, but so did the comment, your comment that I was replying to. If you want to get a reputation as hypocritical

board administrator who doesn't play according to his own rules, go right ahead...

Peter,

When you say something like, "Objectivists only pay lip service..." are you talking about all Objectivists?

Inquiring minds and all...

Michael

Just the dozens I have communicated with over the years.

Objectivists only pay lip service to the revisability of Objectivism.

Who, Peikoff and Harriman? If you’ve spent much time on this site you’ll have read a great deal of criticism of both. I suspect you’ve come to the wrong place. BTW, where does your quote come from?

Please give an example of an Objectivist who has decided that Rand was wrong about something on the basis of scientific evidence

I admit when Peikoff says "there is only one action possible to an entity, the action expressive of its identity," this is not his finest hour in terms of clarity.

If he is trying to express strict determinism, he is perfectly clear. It is only unclear as an expression of what you think he ought

to be saying.

Another possible get out is to adopt the view that the Law of Identity and Law of Causality only render certain actions impossible, whilst not rendering any single action inevitable. This view, call it the Revised Theory, is attractive because it retains the identity-causality link, and renders volition compatible with the (revised) Law of Causality. In many ways, it is a good theory. The problem is that it is not the Rand-Peikoff theory (as their comments about the metaphysical versus the man-made illustrate),. Their theory has it that only humans can perform actions that are not necessitated by causality, whereas the Revised theory makes it quite possible for any entity to behave indeterministically so long as it is in its nature. The question of whether an entity behaves deterministicalyl or randomly or volitionally could only be decided by careful study of the entity in question. Rand is in no position to declare from her armchair that humans are the only volitional beings in the universe. Likewise, the Revised theory would allow some entities to behave randomly. For instance, an electron could be in a spin-up state, or spin-down, but no other state is possible to it. The standard quantum mechanical behaviour o of funamental particles is quite in line with the Revised Theory — a fact that that would seem advantageous to some,. But not to Rand and Peikoff remain very much opposed to it, for the usual aprioristic, armchair reasons:-

Philosophy certainly has a veto power over any subject if it violates principles established philosophically. So, if Heisenberg says for instance in the principle of uncertainty that causality is a myth or has been overturned on the subatomic level, you can throw out Heisenberg's theory on that grounds alone. And the same is true for the idea of something proceeding out of nothing. In other words, that is something proceeding causelessly, because there was nothing before it and it violates the very meaning of nothing....

The Revised Theory has the methodological implication that you cannot tell whether a specific entity is random, determined, or volitional without knowing anything about that entity. However, Rand and Peikoff reject randomness (as opposed to volition) in all its forms, and insist that a uniform causality applies to all non-human beings. Therefore, they do not hold to the Revised Theory.

If you keep in mind the standard, it becomes clear. So let me paraphrase Peikoff like I did myself to include the standard: between an entity acting according to its identity and not acting according to its identity, there is only one action possible to an entity, the action expressive of its identity.

That means only one kind of action from among the two. Not one specific predestined action from among all actions imaginable.

But you just quoted a number of passages where Rand and Peikoff state very clearly that there is only one action available to (non human) entities, and they mean that to be a specific-fine grained action, not a mere category of actions such as a choice.

"...Objectivists only pay lip service to the revisability of Objectivism. In practice,

where science conflicts with Objectvism, the science in question is condemned on some ad hominem grounds."

Case in point:

Now, if you consult Dave Harriman's course, you will see that quantum mechanics, the theory of everything,

string theory, is riddled with contradictions and is arbitrary, 'cause it reflects the corrupt epistemology dominant in the

intellectual world. So you cannot decide that that is the standard by which to judge philosophy. Put it another way -

science is not what scientists say. Science is what scientists say if they use a rational methodology, but scientists, even in their capacity

as holding chairs at universities, can be - and a great many of them are - as irrational, dishonest and corrupt as in any other field.

"

LP (of course)

He said that Peikoff said "only one possible action", which he did, and What Rand approved his words before publication, which she did.

I was talking about Rand.

...who approved Peikoff's words. Stop evading.

I wasn't aware that all scientists are determinists.

Are they?

No: but you were writing some simplistic boo-hurrah stuff which made it look that way.

Or condemn the science that gives rise to them as "irrational". Objectivists are still arguing against the Big Bang 50 years down the line. To name but one.

What's the point?

The point of my comment was that Objectivists only pay lip service to the revisability of Objectivism. In practice,

where science conflicts with Objectvism, the science in question is condemned on some ad hominem grounds.

This is getting funny. Rand is supposed to be this pragmatic, open-to-correction character, and then

out she comes with "absolute certainty"

Funny? That's funny.

Maybe it helps to be British

That's a contradiction. If something is ever "stated with certainty" that does put a cap on it. OTOH, of everything is open ended, nothing is certain.

So you say.

Maybe it helps to be an English speaker.

Can its nature change?

In your world, I suppose.

If that's a "no" (and not just another evasion), determinism can be founded on the unchanging

natures of entities, and thereby made acceptable to Objectivism.