Dennis Hardin

To heck with skill, has he got a martyr complex? Does he like to burn himself with matches, hang from the rafters by his fingernails, or, better yet, play toss with kitchen knives? “Damn, son,” said the hockey coach. “I just saw you dive head first through that glass door and then walk back out again, just for the excitement. How are you on skates?”

Considering how stupid he is, he must have thought $100 was a bargain.

Go for it Dennis - the few-day fantasy could become a lifelong dream. Who would have thought at season start, that outside of the Canucks the one and only Canadian team in the playoffs would be the lowly Senators. I have never had eny enthusiasm for them.I spent four years in Ottawa and it is my least favourite city. But I have to root for them now, because just as most of the NHL revenue is generated by the Canadian teams and spent amongst the American ones, so is the fanblood. I don't like the excessive physicality of the playoff openers. Stopp hitting each other on the head, guys. It's interesting that although few OLers care, or even are aware of hockey, each of these few has a team in the playoffs except, well, me. I don't even have my 2nd or 3rd favourites. But I will cast off the sackcloth and ashes of the neverending Lent of Leafs Nation to salute you and the Kings, Dennis. ; Aristocrates and the Predators) he said they would make it and he was right; Ninth and his plastic rat catchers;PDS and the Wings ; Brant and the Arizona Whatstheirnames; and Adam, who gloated too soon-- but cheer up; Hillary C has bet our Foreign Minister on the series, and if worst comes to worst, you will get to see her decked out in Republican red Thanks, Daunce. Actually, I think hockey can be very entertaining to watch. I love it when everybody gangs up in front of the net and the goalie has to twist himself six ways from Sunday to keep that little sucker from getting through. Being a goalie is probably about the most depressing job in all of sports. He can stop that elusive little puck 999 times out of a 1000 and everybody calls him a loser. I often get the hockey bug around this time of year, if the Kings make it to the playoffs, which isn’t that often. Making it to the second round is unheard of in LA. If they ever won the Stanley Cup. OMG! We would have such an identity crisis, the ERs would overflow and the psych couches would be booked for a year! If you like underdogs, adopt the Kings as your substitute favorite playoff team for 2012. They’ve got to be the all time hockey underdog, and deservedly so. Some warm wishes from Canada wouldn’t hurt. They need all the salutes they can get.

I'll bite up to a point. At least to supply some fundamental syllogisms that I often find lacking in the all-or-nothing arguments that permeate this debate. Premise: In order to apply reason correctly, you must include context or axioms. Premise: Objective means being based on reason. Conclusion: Anything considered objective must include context or axioms. Or to state another syllogism: Premise: In order to apply reason correctly, you must include context or axioms. Premise: The principle of NIOF is based on reason. Conclusion: The application of NIOF must include context or axioms. If NIOF is taken as an axiom and not a principle, as David Kelley and Chris Sciabarra mentioned that several libertarians do, then context doesn't matter and the claim that reason is involved stands. But the basic condition of an axiom--that you must use it in the attempt to refute it--does not hold up for NIOF. In other words, for the axiom of existence, you must exist to refute existence, for consciousness, you must be conscious to refute consciousness, etc. That's how axioms are logically validated and context is not applicable to them. In other words, this is a correct way of using reason. This manner of thinking doesn't work with NIOF..... I'm not aware of any libertarians that view NIOF as axiomatic. Even the usual exception, Walter Block, doesn't hold that the NIOF principle is self-evident. I therefore don't know of whom you are speaking. Are these real libertarians? If not, then what is the point of discussing a position that no one defends? Ghs The libertarian creed rests upon one central axiom: that no man or group of men may aggress against the person or property of anyone else. This may be called the “nonaggression axiom,.” “Aggression”is defined as the initiation of the use or threat of physical violence against the person or property of anyone else. from For A New Liberty, Murray Rothbard, p 27 (second edition-1978) Chapter entitled “The Nonaggression Axiom” No one has the right to initiate aggression against the person or property of anyone else. This is what libertarians call the nonaggression axiom, and it is a central principle of libertarianism. from Libertarianism: A Primer, David Boaz, p. 74 From the wikipedia article on the Libertarian Party: Since the Libertarian Party's inception, individuals have been able to join the party as voting members by signing their agreement with the organization's membership pledge, which states, based on the nonaggression principle, that the signer does not advocate the initiation of force to achieve political or social goals. From a libertarian blog (technoeudaimonia): : The Problem with Axiomatic Libertarianism Many libertarians, following in the tradition of Murray Rothbard, propose that liberty is an axiom; that is, liberty is a self-evident fact. They include such thinkers as Hans-Hermann Hoppe with his libertarian version of argumentation ethics, Stephan Kinsella with his conception of estoppel, and Stefan Molyneux with his "universably preferable behavior". Non-aggression is thus singled out and separated from the rest of ethics, which leads to a separation of what is "right" and what is "good"; this is evident, for example, in many of the writings of Walter Block. From a wikipedia entry on Hans-Hermann Hoppe: In what some have described as Hoppe's most important contribution, argumentation ethics is an apriori, value-neutral justification for libertarian ethics. Argumentation ethics builds on the concept of Discourse ethics developed by Jurgen Habermas (Hoppe's PhD advisor) and Karl-Otto Apel, further on misesian praxeology and the deontological ethics of economist Murray Rothbard. Argumentation ethics argues the non-aggression principle is a presupposition of argumentation and so cannot be rationally denied in discourse. Many modern libertarian scholars have accepted Hoppe's argument, among them Murray Rothbard, Walter Block, David Gordon and Stephen Kinsella. from LewRockwell.com In Defense of Libertarian Purity, Anthony Gregory I consider myself a principled libertarian. Or a radical libertarian. I suppose there are many ways of saying it. Murray Rothbard called it "plumb-line libertarianism," and Walter Block has seen fit to embrace that terminology. I see it simply as the belief that initiating force is wrong. Evicting Libertarian Party Principles: The Portland Purge, by L.K. Samuels [Objecting to the “LP Reform Caucus” in 2006:] So what are some of the principles that they believe must go? First and foremost is the non-aggression principle, which is considered the main threat to an election-oriented populism. If Libertarians would simply throw away this ideal, explaining LP policies on taxation, the drug war, foreign policy and military intervention would no longer be a campaign embarrassment.

Yes, you are being dishonest, because there is absolutely no basis in Rand's writings to support your claim that she rejected the notion of self-ownership. On the contrary, she expressly used the idea in a passage I quoted from "What is Capitalism?" And in an embarrassing display of self-refutation, you quoted another statement by her of the same sort, viz.: All this is perfectly consistent with Rand's own definition of "ownership" -- "the right of use and disposal" -- that I quoted earlier. And in the passage that you unwittingly quoted, Rand places great stress on self-ownership, calling it the "base from which all other rights are derived." There should be no problem here whatsoever; everything is clear and consistent. But you got a bug up your butt and declared: So what evidence did you provide for this claim? Some brief verbal statement by Peikoff, made decades after Rand's death, that contradicted what Rand herself said about "ownership." You then trumped up the "metaphor" excuse, even though you yourself quoted a passage from Rand that supported my position. We are now supposed to believe that when Rand said (in your quoted excerpt) that "man is the owner of his own life," that she was again speaking metaphorically, though she goes on to explain what she meant, i.e., that "his life is his to dispose of and does not belong to anyone else" -- a usage that fits perfectly with her own definition of ownership as the "right of use and disposal." Rand goes on to stress the importance of self-ownership by noting that it is "the base from which all other rights are derived." Thus according to you, Rand formulated a metaphorical right in explaining the most fundamental of all rights. In sum, you manufactured an explanation for something that required no explanation, since there was no doubt about what Rand meant. And then you dragged in that lame statement by Peikoff that flatly contradicts what Rand said. So what's going on here? Why did you fabricate this artificial and pointless controversy? Why did you waste my time with it? I cannot say for certain, but I have a good idea. In the modern libertarian movement, the term "self-ownership" is associated with Rothbard and Rothbardian anarchists. And in your blind hatred of this group, which you know virtually nothing about, you decided to go after the notion of "self-ownership." But you stuck your foot in your mouth, because you didn't realize that Rand herself employed the concept. So, after I posted the relevant passage, instead of admitting that you may have been wrong, you concocted the "metaphor" excuse out of thin air. And you continue to stick with that dimwitted explanation. Yes, Dennis, this is dishonest. It is one of the most dishonest intellectual games I have ever had the misfortune to witness. If there had been a problem with Rand's usage, then you might have had a point. But her usage of "ownership" was not the same as Peikoff's, and her statements were absolutely intelligible and consistent. In short, there was no problem to begin with, no puzzle that required a solution. You pulled this entire controversy out of your ass. As I said before, "self-ownership"is simply a different way of saying "right to life." They mean the same thing. [i later deleted the last paragraph of this post. It was a bit over the top, even for me.] Ghs Classical liberal thinkers needed the concept of self-ownership to defend the idea of individual rights. People who do not understand Objectivism, such as George H. Smith, like to claim that Rand’s theory of individual rights is not fundamentally different from the classical view. Sadly, George thinks he understands Objectivism. He does not. Like his devotion to the frivolous cause of anarcho-capitalism, George is heavily invested in the notion that his bombastic expertise in classical liberalism enables him to speak condescendingly to all those who would suggest that Ayn Rand’s philosophy is radically different from all those historical thinkers he loves to quote. He wants us all to be impressed with his superior historical perspective, and does not appreciate it when anyone questions his authoritative brilliance. One would obviously have to be “dishonest” to take issue with the infinite wisdom of George H. Smith. George H. Smith says: "there is absolutely no basis in Rand's writings to support your claim that she rejected the notion of self-ownership." So George thinks it’s perfectly okay to attribute to Ayn Rand any theory she did not explicitly deny. And if we can find one phrase which we can interpret as meaning “self-ownership,” then we can assume she believed in the theory of self-ownership. Now he says that her reference to “owning one’s life” is the equivalent of “self-ownership.” Of course, George. What possible difference could there be between owning one’s “self” and owning one’s life? He also thinks he can reasonably attribute the statements of those who disagree with him to “dishonesty,” “blind hatred” and “ignorance.” By the way, he would also like you to believe his methods are “scholarly.” Like NIOF, the concept of “self-ownership” is an another axiomatic approach to the defense of individual rights—an approach which conveniently bypasses all that troublesome philosophical stuff about metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. Incidentally, the nonsense of self-ownership is another example of the mind-body dichotomy. Since it is nonsensical to speak of the self owning the self, the only sensible explanation for such a bizarre view is that there is a split between mind and body, so that one’s body becomes a separate piece of property controlled by the mind. That perspective was understandable in antiquity, before the advances of science provided mankind with a rational understanding of the world. When people exhibit that same disintegrated pattern in the modern era, one can only conclude that we may well have evidence of underlying pathology. (But I cannot say that for certain.)

How about those eighth-seeded LA Kings--up 3-zip over the Canucks! Wow! Time for me to become a hockey fan for a few days. (I doubt the fantasy will last more than a few days. . .but who knows?)

The developing embryo and the mother have a unique biological relationship-the embryo is dependent on the mother for its sustenance. The fact that the mother does not have the right to destroy the embryo in the third trimester does not endow the embryo with all the rights of an independent human being. I see no reason why the mother should suddenly become the slave of the embryo after six months. Individual rights, once acquired, are inalienable. As an independent human being, her rights are paramount. She retains all the rights she would normally have, including the right to end her life if she so chooses. If the embryo’s existence should threaten her life at some point, she has every right to act in her own self-interest and destroy it. Her only responsibility is to allow the embryo to live so long as this is consonant with her own health and well-being.

Dennis, Thanks for your kind words. I can't help but notice the similarity between NIOF and dogma in general (when NIOF is believed in as an axiom). When you remove the mind, but insist on the rule, that's the definition of dogma to me. When someone believes in dogma all the way down, they say it trumps reason, they say you have to take it whole hog or nothing while saying they are not actually saying that, and they get really pissed and personal when you when challenge it at the root. I wonder what the influence of cognitive bias is on dogma... Something to think about... "while saying they are not actually saying that. . ." Exactly, Michael. They may it look like they are earnestly seeking the truth, when, in fact, there is clearly only one conclusion they will find acceptable. Their personal intellectual agenda is setting the terms of the discussion, not a quest for understanding. Otherwise, why get so bent out of shape when others disagree? Alas, reality does not accomodate personal agendas, nor does it yield to verbal intimidation. And when people begin to sense they're witnessing a con game, the jig is up. So you get lots of fireworks and no resolution. My sense is that the dogmatic defense of NIOF may well stem from the mind-body dichotomy,to some extent. I can see at least two aspects where that pattern is evident. One is theory vs. practice: So what if the anarchist model breaks down in practice? What counts is that it's a beautiful theory. We'll find a way to make it work in practice, somehow. A second is mind vs body: The physical realm--the realm of physical force--is somehow innately superior to the mental realm, so protection cannot be extended to products of the mind, only to physical actions. Proponents of NIOF take both sides of the equation--theory over practice in the first case, body over mind in the second--thus widening the gap and making cognitive integration impossible. Sounds like a fascinating project. You've obviously invested a tremendous amount of time, energy and knowledge into it. I know you'll keep us posted as you get closer to going live.

This is a crucial distinction with respect to a proper derivation of individual rights. Peikoff's comments are exceedingly ignorant. They are downright embarrassing. Ghs If anyone doubts what I said here, just read this article, "Property," that was written by James Madison in 1792. Does this sound like it was written "in the day when property rights were considered sacrosanct but life and liberty were thought of as vague abstractions." Does Madison sound like a "frightened conservative"? Peikoff should know better. He dumb remarks probably result from sustained inbreeding. Having insulated himself for so many years from outside criticism, and having grown accustomed to what I call "guru questions" ("Dr. Peikoff, what is your opinion of X?"), he has become intellectually lazy. He figures he can get away with saying almost anything, no matter how moronic. It doesn't surprise me that many ARIans hang on Peikoff's every word, but I am frankly surprised that Dennis would fall for this kind of crap. Ghs Peikoff can certainly be strongly criticized for his bizarre use of pejoratives, but his main point is that (IMO very admirable) thinkers such as Madison did not know how to derive the right to life from the facts of human nature, and that they mistakenly treated property rights as a primary. That was the point I thought was important. This quotation seems to verify that. Peikoff is dropping the historical context. I sincerely doubt that Ayn Rand would ever have spoken of post-Enlightenment thinkers in this way. She recognized that her development of the Objectivist ethics and politics required the retrospective context of the industrial revolution. There is a sense in which Peikoff's reference to "bad, frightened conservatives" might apply to those who continue to resort to property rights to defend individual rights today, but there has already been a surfeit of negativity on this thread, and I have no wish to add to it.

I never claimed that NIOF is a moral primary. I have said this repeatedly. How many more times must I say this before you get the point? You can repeat it a billion times, but until your expressed viewpoints are consistent with the premise that NIOF is not a primary, you are still using it as a primary. Of course rights must be defined first, because this is how we distinguish between the initiatory and retaliatory uses of force. After we define the relevant rights and make our determination, we then prohibit those activities that qualify as the initiation of force. I made this point as early as 1978, in the Appendix to "Justice Entrepreneurship in a Free Market." See: http://mises.org/jou...s/3_4/3_4_4.pdf. My discussion of the initiation of force begins on p. 424. My views have changed a bit since I wrote this discussion, but I still agree with the basic perspective. Ghs The various rights you discuss in this article all revolve around the issue of force (e.g., self-defense, fair trial, restitution). Other than property rights, I did not see any reference to what Rand calls "the conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival"--e.g., the right to take all those actions that are necessary, by his nature as a rational being, to sustain and protect man's life. The most basic right is the right to life, which mandates the freedom to take all those actions required by a rational being for the fulfillment and enjoyment of his life. A concomitant of that right is that the use of force is brought under objective control, and the only practical way to do that is through a government with procedural safeguards that strictly regulate the use of force. As I have been arguing consistently throughout this thread, we can therefore legitimately characterize any threat to such objective control of force as the initiation of force, and any action taken by the government to stop that threat as retaliatory force. Private defense agencies represent such a threat. You say: "After we define the relevant rights and make our determination, we then prohibit those activities that qualify as the initiation of force." Precisely. A clear definition and clarification of the right to life logically justifies the prohibition of private defense agencies because their activities qualify as the initiation of force. Glad we got that cleared up.

Objectivism rejects the entire notion of "self-ownership" as the basis of the right to life. The acceptance of this idea is one more example of the failure to appreciate the underlying philosophical basis of rights. Oh, really? So why did Rand write the following (in "What is Capitalism?"): Since according to you and Peikoff, "ownership is a concept which implies a relationship between you and an external object," Rand could not possibly have defended the absurd position that "man is a sovereign individual who owns his own person, his mind, his life," etc. Since this is not even possible, I guess Rand wanted to defend the only alternative, i.e., that man is "the property of the tribe (the state, the society, the collective) that may dispose of him in any way it pleases...." Rand was speaking metaphorically, not theoretically. Yeah, right. Whenever Rand said something that doesn't fit into your preconceived notion of what you think she should have said, simply chalk it up to to her speaking metaphorically. This is a very dishonest method of interpretation. There is no evidence whatsoever that Rand was speaking metaphorically. On the contrary, her statement is entirely consistent with her definition of "ownership," which I also quoted. Ghs And when she says things that don't fit your "preconceived notion of what you think she should have said," just chalk it up to "something we already knew, namely, that Rand sometimes did not apply her own principles consistently." (Ghs) So I'm being "dishonest" to point out that people frequently use metaphors in communication? I doubt Peikoff in his worst moments of mindless, vitriolic dogmatism would accuse someone of beng dishonest because he observed that people often use metaphors, and that this says nothing about any implied endorsement of a given theory. Despite your expressed contempt for his "embarrassing" viewpoints, you remind me and more of Peikoff all the time.

Peter, I don't believe you are correct with respect to the position of "orthodox" Objectivists on abortion. I'm sure George will be delighted to discover that his position is shared by ARI and Leonard Peikoff. I regard their positon as equally insane. It's exactly the sort of dogmatic nonsense that helps to marginalize Objectivism as a lunatic fringe. Here is a link to a podcast by Peikoff on this issue dated 10-20-08. The fact that Peikoff and ARI completely ignore Ayn Rand's reservations about abortion in the latter stages of pregnancy is more evidence that their alleged faithfulness to the "official" viewpoints and writings of Ayn Rand is a sham. (The last time I checked, the commentaries on ARI related to abortion concurred with Peikoff.) Thanks for bringing the position of The Atlas Society to my attention. I was not aware that they had adopted a viewpoint similar to mine. I have many disagreements with The Atlas Society on other topics, but the position taken by William R. Thomas here is a welcome breath of fresh air. As I said in my response to George, I think abortion should be legal until the point of fetal viability (i.e., the third trimester). But Thomas' position is drastically more reasonable than that of ARI or Peikoff.

Objectivism rejects the entire notion of "self-ownership" as the basis of the right to life. The acceptance of this idea is one more example of the failure to appreciate the underlying philosophical basis of rights. Oh, really? So why did Rand write the following (in "What is Capitalism?"): Since according to you and Peikoff, "ownership is a concept which implies a relationship between you and an external object," Rand could not possibly have defended the absurd position that "man is a sovereign individual who owns his own person, his mind, his life," etc. Since this is not even possible, I guess Rand wanted to defend the only alternative, i.e., that man is "the property of the tribe (the state, the society, the collective) that may dispose of him in any way it pleases...." Rand was speaking metaphorically, not theoretically. The important issue is the part of Peikoff's quote which you ommitted: This is a crucial distinction with respect to a proper derivation of individual rights.

As with the passages I quoted previously, this shows the fundamental role that freedom and physical force play in Rand's ethics, and not merely in her political theory. The pursuit of objective values, according to Rand, presupposes freedom of choice and action. And rights (as I explained earlier) then become the conceptual method by which we define and sanction this freedom of action. On at least two occasions that I can recall, Dennis said that rights make a "moral existence" possible for man. (I believe this is the term he used.) I checked my "Objectivism Research CD-ROM." Rand only used "moral existence" twice in her published writings -- and in neither case did she use this expression in the same context that Dennis did. Nevertheless, I don't especially object to Dennis's use of "moral existence," provided we understand this term properly. "Moral," in this context, should be understood in contrast to "nonmoral," not to "immoral." As indicated in the passage quoted above, objective values themselves cannot even exist outside the context of uncoerced choices, so freedom (as defined by rights) is an essential precondition of a moral, as opposed to a nonmoral, existence. But we cannot slide from this reasonable assertion, as Dennis is prone to do (e.g., in his comments about abortion), into the false assertion that rights do not apply to actions that are manifestly immoral. One has the perfect right to commit immoral actions, so long as one's actions do not violate the rights of other people. Yes, rights have a moral foundation, but this doesn't preclude us from distinguishing between immoral actions that violate the rights of other people and immoral actions that do not violate rights. When I distinguish between morality and justice, I mean by "morality" what every philosopher has meant by this distinction, i.e., personal moral judgments that do not violate the rights of other people. I am almost embarrassed to call attention to this elementary distinction, but, again and unfortunately, it is necessary when discussing these matters with Dennis. Ghs In certain primitive cultures, the "shaming code" is very effective as a tool for shaping unwanted behaviors. In modern Western society, however, we tend to just laugh that crap off, and that's what I'm doing here. Your embarassment is your problem, whatever the real source happens to be. The passage quoted above is similar to the one in your prior post: These two quotes essentially make the point that force and mind are opposites, but they do not, obviously, provide anything resembling a theory of what constitutes a right. Here are two passages which do provide the essence of such a theory. First, here is Rand's definition of "the right to life" (from "Man's Rights"): the right to engage in self-sustaining and self-generated action—which means, the freedom to take all the actions required by the nature of a rational being for the support, the furtherance, the fulfillment and the enjoyment of his own life. And here is her expanded explanation (which I quoted previously): Look at those two quotes and tell me where there is a reference to the initiation of physical force. Rand does not define rights in terms of force at all. She defines rights in terms of what man requires for a human (or moral) existence. It is only after she has clarified what man requires that we are in a position to say what constitutes the initiation of force. I just thought perhaps we should clear that up, in case those other quotes from Rand were your idea of a "theory of rights." Now, you refer to the distinction between morality and justice, and you say we must differentiate between "immoral actions that violate the rights of other people and immoral actions that do not violate rights." Evidently this is supposed to support your claim that it's perfectly consistent with the rights of everyone involved to exterminate a baby just seconds before it sees the light of day for the first time. You truly do not see that the mother or doctor who did such a thing would be guilty of the crime of murder. Until it's outside of her, it's just immoral. Now there I would say you do have something to be embarassed about, and you have my sympathy.

This is it. --Brant Okay. I continue to be impressed by my perspicacity. Where am I going wrong here?

The need to quote passages like this is depressing in a way, since Rand said the same thing many times, without equivocation. But Dennis's bizarre reading of Rand, according to which she defended the initation of force by government, has made this necessary. As I said earlier, Dennis, having drilled holes in the Randian boat with many supposed exceptions to the NIOF principle, is now attempting to patch up his own holes by distinguishing between cases of the "existential" initiation of force that Rand supposedly approved of, but did not regard as "technical" cases of the initiation of force. The problem here is that Dennis does not understand Rand, or he does not take what she said seriously. Rand meant exactly what she said, over and over again, viz., that a proper government "may use force only in retaliation and only against those who initiate its use." Ghs Have you had your glasses' prescription checked lately, George? I corrected myself in post #336. Evidently the subtlety of my observations taxed your beleaguered brain beyond its limits, so I'll repeat the essence of what I said here: Once it has been determined that a person is entitled to certain actions by right, interfering with that right is an act of aggression, and government action to stop such interference is retaliatory.

Here as elsewhere, Rand stresses the NIOF principle as an essential limitation on government. If we concede, as Dennis has, that a government may legitimately initiate force, then we have conceded the principle of statism, and the rest is just a matter of time. (I devote nearly an entire chapter to this issue in Themes in the History of Classical Liberalism, forthcoming from Cambridge University Press later this year, or perhaps early next year.) Ghs I corrected myself on that and acknowledged my error. As I now understand the issue, as long as the government is acting to protect individual rights, it is not initiating force. That is why it is crucial that rights be clearly defined. Once we have objectively established, theoretically, what man has the right to do in the service of his own life, his rights can only be violated by the initiation of force, and the government's role is restricted to the use of retaliatory force. I have cited several examples already, but one more might be illustrative here: intellectual property rights. It may appear that the government is initiating force when it takes action against a publisher for copyright infringement, but once the right to intellectual property has been established, this is not the case at all. Once it has been established by objective law that a person has the right to the products of his own mind, interference with that right constitutes aggression, and the government's action to stop such aggression is retaliatory. Once again, this is why a theory of rights is fundamental to political theory, and why the NIOF principle cannot be taken as a fundamental. Until rights are clearly defined, it is impossible to know what constitutes the initiation of force.

Could you clarify that with an example, Brant? I'm sorry. I don't get your meaning.

hissy fit noun. A sudden outburst of temper, often used to describe female anger at something trivial. I suspect we both know who is throwing the hissy fits around here. My own theory is that fetal viability should serve as the brightline test that determines when the unborn can no longer be routinely exterminated. It is no longer dependent on the mother at that point, and can survive on its own outside the womb, so the mother no longer has the right to end its life. I realize the matter is debatable. I don't happen to think it's reasonable to kill a viable fetus moments after the woman's water breaks, just because it still happens to be inside her. I call that unconscionable. I remember when Tom Snyder interviewed you on his "Tomorrow" show years ago. I wonder how he would have reacted if you had said to him, on national television: "Sure. It's okay to kill the baby seconds before it's delivered. What's wrong with that?" My guess is that they would have had to cut to a commercial break while he regained his composure. It's crazy, George. I'm sorry. It really is insane. I'm not going to say anything more in the way of defending my position. It would be like defending my belief that the earth is round. Good fucking grief. Animals do not have rights, so I don't see any relevance to this bit of silliness.

Once again, you seem to want to deny that you are using NIOF as a primary, while you continue to use NIOF as a primary. The rights that individuals have are the rights to live the life proper to a rational being, including all of that which is entailed—e.g., the right to the products of one’s mental effort, the right to be free from the threat of force, the right to the value of the reputation one has earned, the right to the free, mutually agreed contractual exchange of goods and services, the right to not be deliberately and (from the victim’s standpoint) unknowingly placed in harm’s way in one’s daily activities. All of these may, in certain circumstances, entail the existential initiation of physical force—e.g., to stop copyright infringement, to enact a restraining order against stalking or intimidation, to exact compensation for damage to one’s reputation, to obtain civil damages for contractual violations or injuries related to endangerment. The first overt act of physical force may, in some cases, be initiated by the victim. There is simply no way to just look at the situation existentially and say whether or not the force was justified or who actually initiated the force. The issue of rights must be defined first. In every one of these cases, a convincing argument can be made that the force was initiated by the guilty party—that the guilty party engaged in a form of force to deprive the victim of a value he had rightfully earned—and that the legal action is therefore retaliatory. The same is true of the anarchist, who has deprived everyone of the right to objective, institutional control of force. This is gobbledygook. All acts of force, whether initiatory or retaliatory, are "existential," i.e., they are acts that, once undertaken, actually exist. To say that a given act is existentially the initiation of force but "technically" not the initiation of force is a needless and self-contradictory distinction. Rand said nothing like this. You are merely venturing out farther on thin ice in an effort to defend an interpretation that had no basis to begin with. You imply that the distinction is artificial and unnecessary, since all acts of force are equally overt and existential. If that were true, I’m inclined to think we might not need a theory of rights. The point I'm making is that force is often used in ways that are not always obvious and self-evident. If we concretize these situations, it is clear that there are major differences, and that overt force may be necessary to stop covert force. It’s the difference between stalking and actual physical constraint of the perpetrator (via a restraining order).. It’s the difference between inducing the fear of potential assault and the members of the gang being arrested by the police and taken to jail. It’s the difference between indefinitely delaying payment that is due and physically extracting that payment from a freeloader’s wallet. It’s the difference between politely inviting someone to do something one knows to be hazardous and, later, using legal means to raid the perpetrator’s bank account to pay for your broken neck. It’s the difference between lying (as in the case of fraud) and being forced to pay for the consequences of a lie. In each case, the victim may be unaffected physically, but the physical impact on the perpetrator is overt. I am simply extending this mode of analysis to apply to private agencies which want to enagage in the use of force: you do not have the right to create an institution which interferes with the principle of keeping force under objective control, because it poses a direct threat to everyone’s right to live a proper human existence. Hmmmm. That’s what I have been saying all along. So now you are acknowledging that NIOF cannot be your theoretical starting point politically. It can't serve as your "foundation." You need a theory of rights first. The issue of force alone is not enough. It will be interesting to see where this leads us. You can repeat this catechism as often as you like. But until you explain how a government acquires a legitimate monopoly on force that permits it to use force against other agencies that are doing the same thing that it does, you are pissing in the wind. Ghs Because placing the use of force under objective control is a “condition of existence required ny man's nature for his proper survival," and there is no other practical way to accomplish that. And taking overt action to stop you is justified as retaliation against the covert threat of uncontrolled violence. NOTE: I tried to post this several hours ago, and got a message back that seemed to say OL had shut down due to an overload of incoming data. As pissed off as I was, I took that as a compliment.

Tony, I like your comparison to naval battleships. However, I keep thinking of another kind of war. . . "I want Balboa! I want Balboa!" P.S. What round is this? I lost count.

Michael, Your identification of the connection between the reductionist interpretation of NIOF and the mind-body dichotomy is superb. I agree completely. I want to do some more thinking on that topic before commenting further. Thanks for your insight on this. I'll look forward to your essay on Napoleon Hill. That little gem of a book has always been an inspiration to me.

The NIOF principle is not the fundation of her political theory. Her derivation and explication of rights provides that foundation. And it is only after rights have been clarified and defined that the NIOF principle can even be properly understood or applied. Objectivism rejects the entire notion of "self-ownership" as the basis of the right to life. The acceptance of this idea is one more example of the failure to appreciate the underlying philosophical basis of rights. In this case, I think Peikoff is totally accurate his analysis. This strikes me as a very strained analysis, to say the least. To begin with, it’s a false dichotomy. When you compel someone to act in a way they would not have chosen (i.e., “constraint”), you are also restraining that person from doing those things they normally would have done (“restraint”). To compel someone to act differently is also to stop someone from acting normally. For instance, fraud, breach of contract and extortion—Rand’s basic examples of “indirect force” in The Nature of Government--are all forms of stealing. Both constraint and restraint apply to acts of stealing. First, you compel someone to do something they would not otherwise have done by choice—you obtain a material good they would not have otherwise given you. At the same time, you prevent them from having that good and using it. The difference is, in the case of both fraud and breach of contract, deception and/or false pretenses are being used. In the case of extortion, a threat of force is being used. The same is true of other examples of indirect force---e.g., stalking, gang intimidation and bomb threats. You compel the victims to act otherwise than they would have chosen and you prevent them from pursuing their values in the way they normally would have done.

Rather, I would say that in making a good-faith effort to delineate the particulars of her NIOF principle, Rand made a mistake in regard to IP. The result of this error, if enforced, would result in the initiation of force, in my judgment, but this is an unintended consequence of Rand's position. In no way did she sanction (i.e., approve of, support, or encourage) the initiation of force per se. Ghs Rand clearly recognized that intellectual property would involve the initiation of physical force on an existential level. And that is simply one more piece of evidence to show that she did not regard the NIOF principle as representing any sort of guide to the definition of rights. The delineation of rights must come first, philosophically, before we can assess what constitutes the initiation of force.

So, tell me, George. At what point does the fetus become an "independent moral agent"? Is it okay for the woman to bash the baby's head in moments before bringing it to full term? It's her body. She can do what she wants while it's still part of her body, right? She can use a coat hanger to pulverize the little parasite to her heart's content. Right? That's not "initiating force." As long as the baby is inside her--or even partly inside her--it doesn't have any rights. Since your thinking is obviously so vastly superior to mine, please use your "basic political principle" to clarify when the fetus can no longer be slaughtered by the mother. You've dispensed with all of my nonobjective, muddled thinking about the conditions of a moral existence. NIOF is all you need. Right? I would be happy to clarify your muddled thinking on this matter. The fetus acquires independent rights at the moment when it becomes an independent being, i.e., at the moment of birth. Until that moment, it is part of the woman's body and falls within the jurisdiction of her self-ownership. A woman cannot lose her right to self-ownership merely in virtue of becoming pregant. Pregnancy is not an aggressive act. You ask: "Is it okay for the woman to bash the baby's head in moments before bringing it to full term?" No, this is not "okay" in a moral sense. On the contrary, I would condemn this as a morally reprehensible act (in most situations). But the woman's action, though highly immoral, would not be unjust. Ghs So the baby, moments before delivery, is not yet an "independent moral agent," and can be rightfully killed by the mother. You think that would be "immoral," but "just." I suppose that's the sort of brilliant, subtle reasoning one would expect from someone who takes the NIOF principle as his starting point in the definition of rights. Thanks for allowing us to bear witness to your genius. From my "muddled" perspective, this is insane. FYI, not that I think you will give a rip, Ayn Rand questioned the legitimacy of abortion after the first trimester. "Never mind the vicious nonsense of claiming that an embryo has a 'right to life.' A piece of protoplasm has no rights—and no life in the human sense of the term. One may argue about the later stages of a pregnancy, but the essential issue concerns only the first three months. To equate a potential with an actual, is vicious; to advocate the sacrifice of the latter to the former, is unspeakable.Ayn Rand, The Ayn Rand Letter, A Last Survey--Part I ,Vol. IV, No. 2 November-December 1975 But then, Rand held that rights were an extension of morality, not a license to kill.