Two Kinds of "Induction": Important similarities and trivial differences

[Daniel Barnes]

Bill:

We are never justified in simultaneously claiming opposite theories as true.

"Simultaneously" has little, if anything to do with the issue. All it means is you are not contradicting yourself outright. A contradiction is a contradiction, regardless of when you do it. The fact that you say something is "absolutely true" one day, and then its opposite is "absolutely true" the next shows how low the bar is set for your standards of both "truth" and "absoluteness."

That this situation arises, as I have said before, is because the Randian theory is simply oxymoronic - that is self-contradictory - in the first place.

[Ellen Stuttle]

Suppose that no new facts will disprove the theory that the earth revolves around the sun.

That example is of no help to you. One could select any feature of the universe -- say a hydrogen molecule in the room where you're sitting -- as the reference point and construct a model considering the rest of the universe to be moving with respect to it, if one had the enormous amount of time and computer resources for doing the calculations. It wasn't that taking the earth as reference object for a model of the solar system was wrong; it just wasn't as conceptually and mathematically productive and useful as the heliocentric model.

We are justified in claiming a theory as true, if all the evidence supports and none contradicts.

We're justified in claiming such a theory as not disproven.

Ellen

___

Edited September 23, 2007 by Ellen Stuttle

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

[Notice she says two parts there: the essential characteristic AND the genus; thus she isn't considering the genus to be the essential distinguishing characteristic.]

Ellen,

(sigh)

Some day you will get it. The essential distinguishing characteristic is a characteristic included in the genus that can be measured, and the way it is measured is what makes it stand out from other members of the genus.

The distinguishing characteristic is the differentia, so it is obvious "she isn't considering the genus to be the essential distinguishing characteristic." Rand defined definition to consist of differentia and genus. This is getting pretty elementary.

A concept has (among other things):

1. A CDD (conceptual common denominator), which is one or more commensurable characteristics, meaning some feature or features you can measure that sets that category apart from other things that exist.

2. A distinguishing characteristic, which is measurable according to the CDD (or at least some part of it).

A definition has:

A genus that includes the CDD, (i.e., not is the CDD)

A differentia, which is the same as the distinguishing characteristic of the concept.

(See ITOE, p. 41) I admit that Rand is not clear about the relationship between the CDD and the distinguishing characteristic, but it is strongly implied. Peikoff is a bit more explicit (OPAR, p. 87).

Miss Rand proceeds to develop the concept of the Conceptual Common Denominator (for short, the CCD). The CCD is "the characteristic(s) reducible to a unit of measurement, by means of which man differentiates two or more existents from other existents possessing it."(17) For example, one can differentiate tables from chairs or beds, because all these groups possess a commensurable characteristic, shape. This CCD, in turn, determines what feature must be chosen as the distinguishing characteristic of the concept "table": tables are distinguished by a specific kind of shape, which represents a specific category or set of geometric measurements within the characteristic of shape—as against beds, e.g., whose shapes are encompassed by a different set of measurements.

[Reference footnote "17" is given as ITOE, p. 15.]

Notice the phrase, "This CCD, in turn, determines what feature must be chosen as the distinguishing characteristic..." This means that you have to be able to measure the distinguishing characteristic by the CDD or one of the standards in it.

Just for the record, in case there is any confusion on measurement, here is a quote from Will Thomas's essay Ayn Rand’s Theory of Concepts: A Brief Overview (p. 7).

Although Rand uses cardinal measurement as her paradigm examples (“length” and “table”), she intends the term “measurement” to apply to a wide variety of means of objectively comparing two or more existents. Mental states, for example, may be measured by “the scope of factual material involved in a given cognitive process and by the length of the conceptual chain required to deal with that material.” She states that “concepts pertaining to evaluation” maybe be measured ordinally, in a process she terms “teleological measurement,” which grades or ranks its objects in terms of “the degree to which they achieve or frustrate” some goal or end.

Also, "essential distinguishing characteristic" is not "essence." Here is Rand's definition of "table," in ITOE (p. 41):

An item of furniture, consisting of a flat, level surface and supports, intended to support other, smaller objects...

Genus - Furniture.

Differentia - Flat, level surface and supports, intended to support other, smaller objects.

This is not "tableness." Tableness would be an essence in essentialism.

What characteristics can be measured here? Surfaces and supports (i.e., shape), and purpose. All items of furniture have these. That would be the CDD. Will Thomas does not include "purpose" or "function" in his chart in the Appendix (p. 10) of his essay linked above, but function can be measured in ordinal terms to other furniture (supporting smaller, nor larger objects), and even teleological measurements can be made like supporting objects, not people, if "importance of things to support" is the standard.

Maybe the following from the workshops in ITOE will better show the difference with essentialism and Objectivism (ITOE, 2nd, p. 139):

Prof. A: So the Aristotelians thought there really was an attribute of blueness as such—like a kind of little banner sticking up from blue objects saying "blue." Whereas the Objectivist position is that there is a Conceptual Common Denominator uniting a red and two blues, and that the two blues are close together on the measurement range within that Conceptual Common Denominator, and that all the different shades of blue can be integrated because they fall within that range.

AR: Exactly.

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

The distinguishing characteristic is the differentia, so it is obvious "she isn't considering the genus to be the essential distinguishing characteristic."

I'm sure glad you finally caught up to that! (See the original context in which the issue arose on the other thread.) Just to be sure, you now recognize, yes, that Rand considered "rationality [or, as she also worded that, man's 'rational faculty'] his essential distinguishing and defining characteristic," not "rational animal"?

Now if you just catch up one of these days to what Popper means by "essentialism," and you re-read the quotes from Rand in the light of that understanding, you might yet see why Rand is an example, far more like than unlike Aristotle from a Popperian perspective.

Ellen

___

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen,

I didn't "catch up to that." Rand defined it that way and everybody in O-Land knows it that way.

Think measurement.

Think range.

Think consciousness.

Think rationality as being an ORDINAL MEASUREMENT of consciousness.

Conceptual = more

Perceptual = less

(Perceptual awareness like a dog)

Consciousness and locomotion are jointly the CDD—i.e., distinctive measurable features—of "animal" according to Rand. ITOE, pp. 24-25:

Man's distinguishing characteristic, his rational faculty, is omitted from the definition of "animal"—on the principle that an animal must possess some type of consciousness, but may possess any of the types characterizing the various units subsumed under the new concept. (The standard of measurement that differentiates one type of consciousness from another is its range.)

The distinguishing characteristics of the new concept are characteristics possessed by all its constituent units: the attribute "living" and the faculties "consciousness and locomotion."

These distinguishing characteristics of the new concept are possessed by all its constituent units. The distinguishing characteristics of "animal" are omitted from the definition on the principle that the "internally generated actions" must exist in some form (including "consciousness and locomotion"), but may exist in any of the forms characterizing the various units subsumed under the new concept.

With the growth of man's knowledge, a very broad concept, such as "animal," is subdivided into new concepts, such as: "mammal," "amphibian," "fish," "bird," etc. Each of these is then subdivided further and further into narrower sub-categories. The principle of concept-formation remains the same: the distinguishing characteristics of the concept "animal" (the faculties of "consciousness and locomotion") are the "Conceptual Common Denominator" of these subdivisions, and are retained but qualified by the addition of other (anatomical and physiological) characteristics to form the distinguishing characteristics of the new concepts.

Not essentialism.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Ellen:

Now if you just catch up one of these days to what Popper means by "essentialism," and you re-read the quotes from Rand in the light of that understanding, you might yet see why Rand is an example, far more like than unlike Aristotle from a Popperian perspective.

Yes. The whole Aristotelian "ontological essence" vs Randian "epistemological essence" makes no difference. The essentialist method is the problem, not the level it is applied to.

Michael:

This is not "tableness." Tableness would be an essence in essentialism.

Actually, Rand does clearly argue for "-nesses" in a typically essentialist way.

ITOE (Chapter 2):

Rand: "Let those who attempt to invalidate concepts by declaring that they cannot find "manness" in men, try to invalidate algebra by declaring that they cannot find "a-ness" in 5 or in 5,000,000."

This is actually a famous argument against essentialism from Antisthenes ("I see a horse, Plato, but I do not see its horseness"), amusingly mangled by Rand into an argument for essentialism...;-)

Edited September 24, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Roger Bissell]

...Rand's theory...lands, contrary to the all intents and purposes of its author, in an obviously skeptical theory of knowledge.

I am not the only one to suggest this. Fred Seddon summarised Rand's position neatly as "We can know P, but P may be false."*

A simple example will suffice. It was once thought - for many hundreds of years - that the sun went around the earth. According to Objectivism, we would be fully entitled to say we knew this to be true, as this was in the context of the limited human knowledge at the time. (More than that, we would be entitled to say we would be absolutely certain of it)

Now, this theory turned out to be false. In fact, the opposite is true: the earth goes around the sun. We are now able to say, in this new context, that we know this (and are "absolutely certain" of it).

Thus Rand's theory does indeed suggest that we can know P, but P may not be true.

(One might remark in passing just how low the bar is set for both "truth" and "certainty" in Rand's "contextual" theory, in that we can claim both to an "absolute" degree for opposing theories!)

Again, with the earth/sun relationship. Oy. This is NOT helping your case, Daniel.

As Peikoff notes in lecture 1 of Objectivism through Induction, "if you observe the sun rising in the east, traveling in an arc and setting in the west a million times, and the total that you know it, it does it, and then it comes back down, and you have no clue as to why, you are not entitled to generalize from that." (emphasis added)

Got it? The ancients were basically engaging (indulging) in enumeration absent evidence of any causal mechanism, which (Peikoff claims, and I agree) is the necessary precondition of valid generalization. The ancients did not have any idea as to why the sun appeared to move in the way that it did, so they were not entitled to generalize from their observations. They could legitimately conclude that the sun looks like it is moving across the sky, but without any evidence of a causal mechanism, they could not legitimately conclude that the sun is moving across the sky. They did NOT "know that P."

When I see a child roll a ball across the floor, I directly perceive a child pushing a ball and the ball rolling across the floor, so I am entitled to conclude that the ball is rolling across the floor and that child caused the ball to roll across the floor. This is an inference, justified by relevant similarity, from my own causal experience.

There is no relevant similarity between the sun, on one hand, and birds or bats or insects, on the other, which also appear to move across the sky, but also actually do move across the sky. The essential relevant difference between flying creatures and (most) heavenly bodies is that the former also fly in close enough proximity to us that we are able to grasp that they are creatures that move through the air by flapping their wings. We see the causal mechanism that justifies our conclusion that their perceptually appearing to move across the sky is based on their actually, physically moving across the sky. There is no similar experience/evidence that allows us to infer that the sun is actually, physically moving across the sky.

To repeat: the ancients did NOT "know that P" (where P is that the sun revolves around the earth). While the ancients were not entitled to conclude that the sun revolves around the earth, we ARE entitled, through a great deal of causally based evidence and thought, to conclude that the earth revolves around the sun. That is why we DO "know that Q" (where Q is that the earth revolves around the sun).

Do you wish to strain a bit more to come up with yet another fallacious example? Or would you like to concede the point about causally based generalization being the method of induction, and stop trying to paint Objectivism's theory of knowledge and certainty as an oxymoron?

Also, if I were you, I would stop quoting Fred Seddon. He is not very careful in his philosophizing. For that matter, neither are you, but Fred gets paid for it! :-/

REB

[John Dailey]

DB:

~ Re your post #21 re your prob of seeing contradictoriness in the ideas of 'contextual absolute' because 'absoluteness' presumably means automatically implying invariant (as though meaning 'for all people, for all time, in all of their knowledge contexts, for all additional knowledge acquired whenever later', I gather), I have to ask:

...since Aristotle accepted a distinction 'twixt absolute-'Absolutes' and relative-'Absolutes', and, the applicability (nm distinction-labeling of such) to varied areas of knowledge, as in...

'relative Absolutes'

...would you find this distinction of his...contradictory?

LLAP

J:D

Edited September 24, 2007 by John Dailey

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

One of the most refreshing things I have read (besides Roger's posts) on induction was just now in The Logical Structure of Objectivism (beta version) by David Kelley and William Thomas.

Early in the Introduction, there is mention that epistemology is concerned with identifying the factual base of knowledge, i.e., what the features of knowledge are and the method for structuring it. Then there is a wonderfully clear section called "Induction and Deduction." Here is a partial quote. I removed the example, but anyone can read the whole thing by clicking on the link.

The logical processes by which we build up the structure of our knowledge are of two broad types, which logicians call induction and deduction. Although a technical discussion of these two processes could fill a book in itself, understanding their role in the structure of Objectivism requires only that we differentiate them on the basis of essentials.

Induction is the process of drawing general conclusions from the observation of particular cases. For instance, we notice that all people age and die, that their bodies are fragile and can be fatally damaged. We generalize this observation as: All people are mortal. Deduction is the process of drawing out the implications of the general knowledge we already possess, usually by applying generalizations to specific instances of a type. Continuing our example, each of us knows that we will die some day by deducing it from the fact that all human beings are mortal.

Since our knowledge is hierarchical, resting on the base of perceptual observation of concrete things in our environment, it would obviously be impossible for us to build up our knowledge by deductive inference alone. Where would we get the generalizations on which deduction depends? For those generalizations we need inductive inference. Above the level of perception, all of our knowledge depends in one way or another on induction. In a sense, induction is like earning money: it is the process of acquiring new information. Deduction is like spending money, because it allows one to get the most out of one’s store of inductive information. In most cases, our conclusions depend on both inductive and deductive procedures used in combination, just as we normally obtain economic goods by a combination of earning and spending money. A point of particular importance is that there can be inductive support at any level in the structure of our knowledge.

. . .

Thus deduction and induction could not function apart from each other. Understanding the world in terms of generalizations allows us integrate large amounts of information in a compact form. Induction is the process of forming generalizations from the data we are aware of, but our generalizations would be useless if we failed to employ deduction to apply them to particular cases. Furthermore, deduction and induction must be employed together if we want our thinking to be robust against error. Inductive confirmation is not always necessary to establish the truth of a proposition: a conclusion that one has correctly deduced from true premises is itself true. However, when we deduce from a broad abstraction . . . to a more concrete principle, . . . there is a danger that something essential to the more concrete case may have been left out.

. . .

By looking for direct inductive evidence of the conclusions we deduce from our generalizations, we can check to make sure nothing has been overlooked or incorrectly integrated.

On the other hand, accurate abstractions, connected by deductive inferences, can put an enormous amount of information at our disposal in a concrete form.

The next section is called "Context" has some comments I cannot resist quoting either.

A common source of error in generalization is a failure to base one’s conclusions in the full context of evidence. Our knowledge is contextual in virtue of its hierarchical nature. It does not consist in isolated bits of data, each with its own, self-contained meaning, each with its own separate relationship to reality. The meaning of any conclusion, and its relationship to reality —i.e. its truth or falsity— depends on its relationship to the network of other knowledge by which we derived it. Hierarchical knowledge is contextual because each item of knowledge is grounded in some particular evidence, in the awareness of certain types of things, a certain range of experience. In this sense, the context of knowledge is like the different places that the pylons of a building’s foundation come to earth: the structure depends on many sources of support coming together. As the support changes, the superstructure of knowledge may change as well.

The meaning of a principle, in the Objectivist view, is determined by tracing the process by which it connects to reality. This means, among other things, establishing the context that a person integrates by means of concepts. A failure to attend to this is one reason why people discussing abstract ideas often “talk past” each other: they are using the same words, but they don’t mean the same things.

. . .

The contextual nature of knowledge is also significant because one’s context of knowledge changes over time. As individuals we become aware of new evidence and facts. Even the cognitive context of society as whole expands with exploration and new scientific discoveries. As one’s context changes, the meaning of one’s principles can change as well. For instance, in the 18th century, generalizations about “fish” integrated information about all creatures that swam, including whales and porpoises. This categorization was not a mistake: there are valid reasons for regarding swimming creatures with fins as similar. However, by the 20th century, marine biology was better understood, and the term “fish” came to be applied to a more narrow class of animals. The old knowledge about “fish” was not false; it is still true in terms of aquatic creatures. But now we have knowledge about fish, e.g. that fish are cold-blooded, that would not have applied to the old manner of classification.

Because one’s knowledge is contextual, it can be expanded to apply to a wider range of circumstances as one actively expands it by investigating new evidence and information. One model of the development of knowledge from one context to the next is the transition from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics. Newton’s mechanics accurately described the motions of bodies moving at low velocities relative to the speed of light, which was the context of evidence to which Newton had access. Centuries after Newton, Einstein was aware of a broader context of evidence, including improved astronomical observations, and the discovery that the relative velocity of light was constant from all perspectives. Einstein’s theory addresses that broader context, but in addressing Newton’s original context, it replicates Newton’s findings. Newton was not falsified by Einstein in the context in which his laws were solidly confirmed, indeed, he could not have been. On the other hand, the common assumption of the 18th Century, that Newton’s mechanics would describe the motions of all objects at all times in all places, turned out to be in error.

As can be seen here, if we can get past the verbiage and efforts to prove that Popper trumps Rand (or vice-versa), we can see that they both actually have quite a lot in common.

That was a wonderful phrase about people talking past each other because they ignore each other's respective contexts: "they are using the same words, but they don’t mean the same things."

Ain't that the truth?

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Roger:

Again, with the earth/sun relationship. Oy. This is NOT helping your case, Daniel.

I don't see why, but let's see what you have to say.

As Peikoff notes in lecture 1 of Objectivism through Induction, "if you observe the sun rising in the east, traveling in an arc and setting in the west a million times, and the total that you know it, it does it, and then it comes back down, and you have no clue as to why, you are not entitled to generalize from that." (emphasis added)

Got it? The ancients were basically engaging (indulging) in enumeration absent evidence of any causal mechanism, which (Peikoff claims, and I agree) is the necessary precondition of valid generalization.

This seems both internally confused and factually in error. Firstly, as to the factual part. The Greeks, for example, did have a causal mechanism in mind which explained the sun's movement, which was both teleological and based around the allegedly divine nature of the circle. Further, they did not arrive at this theory through "enumeration" absent causal assumptions. This is a very odd claim to make. In fact their astronomical theories were, like everything else in their science, constantly deduced from first-causal principles with conflicting empirical evidence explained away in an ad hoc fashion. (Later on, following the Greek example in Mediaeval times, this was called "saving the phenomena").To claim otherwise as you do above is quite wrong.

Secondly, it is hard to see exactly what you think counts as "evidence." The Greeks made observations, which they combined with their conjectures as to the causal mechanism. Newton did exactly the same thing. Yet you seem to be arguing that they did not have any "evidence" for their causal views. This seems merely arbitrary. The ancients had suprisingly detailed evidence, they just drew the wrong conclusions from it. So what? So did Newton.

The internal confusion seems to be this: Peikoff is claiming that you are not entitled to generalise from your observations (no matter how many) unless you have some "clue as to why". Well, the Greeks had a clue alright - they were able to make predictions good enough to navigate by at least. How much of "a clue" are you allowed? We could, by Einsteinian standards, say that Newton didn't have "a clue" as to the cause of the phenomena he studied. This critieria of yours and Peikoff's - in fact his argument above - seems itself to be merely ad hoc. And that is interpreting it fairly generously. Strictly speaking, it could even be circular. Because it's saying that you have to have a valid causal explanation - a "clue as to why" - before your can make a valid "inductive" generalisation about a certain set of facts. But this "induction" is the very method by which you are supposed to establish a causal explanation!!

Do you wish to strain a bit more to come up with yet another fallacious example?

The fallacies do not appear to be on my part so far.

Also, if I were you, I would stop quoting Fred Seddon. He is not very careful in his philosophizing.

No kidding. You should read my critique of his work....;-) But even in a piece as poor as that, there is sometimes something of value, as in this case.

For that matter, neither are you, but Fred gets paid for it! :-/

Well, I can only say that I hope you and Peikoff are not getting paid for your knowledge of early astronomy...;-)

Edited September 24, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Daniel Barnes]

JD:

...would you find this distinction of his...contradictory?

Possibly, I hadn't thought about it. I'll have a look. (It may be a translation ambiguity)

[Ellen Stuttle]

[...] the earth revolves around the sun.

If you're thinking of the situation as a 2-body problem, we could say that the earth and the sun mutually revolve around the center of mass of the system. ;-)

Roger,

My point about implicit enumeration is an issue of the idea of all relevant information confirming and none disconfirming. Looks to me like there's an extrapolating from "some" observations to a generalization about "all" involved there. How could you ever know what the full scope of "all" relevant information is and when you have enough information to conclude you have enough confirmation? Same problem Rand described in the epistemology workshop as being "the problem of induction." (See her last response in the quoted exchange.) Peikoff apparently thinks he's avoiding the difficulty by claiming that we directly perceive causal connection and that we get causal generalizations by the same procedure according to which Objectivism says concepts are formed. But (see, e.g., Bob's post which I copied as post #3 on this thread), the answer is going to come back from the sceptical respondent, oh, no, you didn't perceive "omething's making something happen"; you perceived something happening and inferred a causal hypothesis. How do you know the hypothesis is true? And we're back with the same problem which pertains when trying to argue that observations confirm the truth of a theory.

Ellen

___

Edited September 24, 2007 by Ellen Stuttle

[Roger Bissell]

[...] the earth revolves around the sun.

If you're thinking of the situation as a 2-body problem, we could say that the earth and the sun mutually revolve around the center of mass of the system. ;-)

Roger,

My point about implicit enumeration is an issue of the idea of all relevant information confirming and none disconfirming. Looks to me like there's an extrapolating from "some" observations to a generalization about "all" involved there. How could you ever know what the full scope of "all" relevant information is and when you have enough information to conclude you have enough confirmation? Same problem Rand described in the epistemology workshop as being "the problem of induction." (See her last response in the quoted exchange.) Peikoff apparently thinks he's avoiding the difficulty by claiming that we directly perceive causal connection and that we get causal generalizations by the same procedure according to which Objectivism says concepts are formed. But (see, e.g., Bob's post which I copied as post #3 on this thread), the answer is going to come back from the sceptical respondent, oh, no, you didn't perceive "omething's making something happen"; you perceived something happening and inferred a causal hypothesis. How do you know the hypothesis is true? And we're back with the same problem which pertains when trying to argue that observations confirm the truth of a theory.

Causal inferences about other objects are extrapolations from our own personal causal experience, in much the same way that the veridicality and usefulness of visual information is an extension from the veridicality and usefulness of our tactile information that we correlate with our visual information. The sense of touch and the experience of direct contact with other objects is the basis of our visual perception in general and of our visual perception of causality in particular. We thus have a very secure basis, right from the start of our perceptual experience of the world, for our grasp of causality, and it is more than constant conjunction, Bob's and Daniel's continued Humean blathering notwithstanding.

Babies grasp at a very early age, and in a way that seems utterly mysterious to those enmired in Humean sensism, that causality exists--that the world is not just a realm of one event following another, but instead a realm of things making other things happen, i.e., of things interacting with one another. (I opined a few years back that all action is interaction, and got nothing but the electronic equivalent of glazed stares from the Objectivists I was...interacting...with.) If babies are doing anything remotely like hypothesis-formation, it is in a laboratory that is extremely close to their skin and extremely personally relevant. No, it is the causal efficacy of their response to what they perceive, and the perception of the effects of their response, that provides the foundation for their grasp of causality--and for our later formation of philosophical and scientific inductions. They grasp that the world is a lawful place not merely by the number of repetitions of Mother's appearance in their room, but what they experience as having made happen by their cries and coos and other responses.

Observations do two things, neither of which is confirmation of a theory per se: 1. they illustrate a theory, and 2. they provide material for analysis into the causal mechanism underlying the phenomenon observed. If you observe enough examples -- and two might be enough -- you may start seeing indications of what is the causal mechanism involved. But it is not the enumeration itself that helps to flesh out and confirm the theory, but that which the enumeration occasions: the analysis into the causal nature of the phenomenon. (Coffey goes into this in his book on logic, where he discusses the Aristotelian and Scholastic understanding of causal explanation.)

I don't take the fact that 50,000 Objectivists believe something to be confirmation that it is true, nor the fact that only (say) Bill Dwyer and I believe it to be disconfirmation. :-) It all boils down to: who is grasping the full explanatory context in a non-contradictory fashion, and who is not.

One more note: Peikoff's view of induction is not just that it is an extension of concept-formation. Valid concepts are "green lights" to induction, as he says, but there were several rules of induction he gave, including something like Mills' Methods of Induction (esp., Difference and Agreement), which were, by the way, already known in some form to Aristotle and the Scholastics, as Coffey notes.

REB

[Ellen Stuttle]

Roger,

Thanks for the detailed reply in the post above (also for the material you quoted earlier from Coffey and Joseph; I haven't had time to read those quotes yet, but I noticed them in trying to get a bit caught up). I think I'm starting to see how Peikoff is putting the picture together. I'm going to need some time for mulling before I get back to you. Part of what Peikoff said in that lecture I heard was something I'd thought of long before -- the part he was led to because of something Greg Salmieri [sp?] had asked, pertaining to our ideas of cause coming initially from our own direct experience of feeling an intention to move our own bodies followed by motion. But I greatly mistrust the further argument. Also, I think that something like hypothesis formation is constantly involved in the very process of perception. I differ radically from Objectivism on that.

More later, I expect, though possibly not this week (a rather hellacious schedule looming for the next several days).

Ellen

___

[Roger Bissell]

Roger:

As Peikoff notes in lecture 1 of Objectivism through Induction, "if you observe the sun rising in the east, traveling in an arc and setting in the west a million times, and the total that you know it, it does it, and then it comes back down, and you have no clue as to why, you are not entitled to generalize from that." (emphasis added)

Got it? The ancients were basically engaging (indulging) in enumeration absent evidence of any causal mechanism, which (Peikoff claims, and I agree) is the necessary precondition of valid generalization.

This seems both internally confused and factually in error. Firstly, as to the factual part. The Greeks, for example, did have a causal mechanism in mind which explained the sun's movement, which was both teleological and based around the allegedly divine nature of the circle. Further, they did not arrive at this theory through "enumeration" absent causal assumptions. This is a very odd claim to make. In fact their astronomical theories were, like everything else in their science, constantly deduced from first-causal principles with conflicting empirical evidence explained away in an ad hoc fashion. (Later on, following the Greek example in Mediaeval times, this was called "saving the phenomena").To claim otherwise as you do above is quite wrong.

Not quite.

Both the recourse to gods and divine nature and the recourse to teleology are the product of over-generalization, which is an error of induction, whether due to reliance on enumeration or simply going beyond the context of evidence. The ancients had no justification for extrapolating purpose to inanimate nature. They knew, through observation, that living beings move for reasons in order to obtain ends. They did NOT have a warrant for assuming that non-living entities move in the same manner. Again, they did not have evidence to support their application of the mechanism of "final causation" to the motions of inanimate objects. There is no appearance of purpose in such entities to "save" by ad hoc arguments; only the error caused by over-generalization.

Secondly, it is hard to see exactly what you think counts as "evidence." The Greeks made observations, which they combined with their conjectures as to the causal mechanism. Newton did exactly the same thing. Yet you seem to be arguing that they did not have any "evidence" for their causal views. This seems merely arbitrary. The ancients had suprisingly detailed evidence, they just drew the wrong conclusions from it. So what? So did Newton.

Don't confuse observational data with evidence. The Greeks had plenty of observational data of the motions of inanimate objects, but they had no evidence for the conjecture that inanimate objects move according to final causation, pursuit of ends. Newton had plenty of observation data of the motions of inanimate objects, and he also had evidence for the conjecture that there is a sort of action-at-a-distance by which inanimate objects attract one another gravitationally. The fact that this is not the correct mechanism to explain gravitational attraction does not mean that Newton had no evidence for it. There are objects separated by a distance, and they are attracted to one another. By contrast, the Greeks had NO evidence for their supposition that inanimate objects move according to purpose/natural end.

The internal confusion seems to be this: Peikoff is claiming that you are not entitled to generalise from your observations (no matter how many) unless you have some "clue as to why". Well, the Greeks had a clue alright - they were able to make predictions good enough to navigate by at least. How much of "a clue" are you allowed? We could, by Einsteinian standards, say that Newton didn't have "a clue" as to the cause of the phenomena he studied. This critieria of yours and Peikoff's - in fact his argument above - seems itself to be merely ad hoc. And that is interpreting it fairly generously. Strictly speaking, it could even be circular. Because it's saying that you have to have a valid causal explanation - a "clue as to why" - before your can make a valid "inductive" generalisation about a certain set of facts. But this "induction" is the very method by which you are supposed to establish a causal explanation!!

Oh, Kant rare! A clue and the suspicion of a theory that it raises is most assuredly needed before you can frame a theory proper. Before you can obtain a conviction in a court of law, you must first have "probable cause" -- and probable cause is not, yet, an established explanation.

Newton had "clues" as to gravitational attraction -- seeing objects separated by a distance being attracted to one another. The Greeks had NO "clues" as to natural teleology. I think Einstein would agree with this. He would acknowledge that the Greeks were clueless, while Newton was a giant on whose shoulders he stood.

REB

[Roger Bissell]

Roger,

Thanks for the detailed reply in the post above (also for the material you quoted earlier from Coffey and Joseph; I haven't had time to read those quotes yet, but I noticed them in trying to get a bit caught up). I think I'm starting to see how Peikoff is putting the picture together. I'm going to need some time for mulling before I get back to you. Part of what Peikoff said in that lecture I heard was something I'd thought of long before -- the part he was led to because of something Greg Salmieri [sp?] had asked, pertaining to our ideas of cause coming initially from our own direct experience of feeling an intention to move our own bodies followed by motion. But I greatly mistrust the further argument. Also, I think that something like hypothesis formation is constantly involved in the very process of perception. I differ radically from Objectivism on that.

More later, I expect, though possibly not this week (a rather hellacious schedule looming for the next several days).

Ellen

___

You're welcome, Ellen. I'm glad that what I'm posting is some help in clarifying Peikoff's perspective (and mine). Take your time. This problem has been around for a long time, like free will/determinism, and it often seems more a springboard for divisiveness than for understanding.

I'm going to be (more or less) out of touch with the discussion starting on Wednesday for about 5 days. I go to the Pacific Northwest for a jazz band tour of Washington, Idaho, and Oregon. I hope the weather is nice. Our summer here has been brutal.

REB

[Daniel Barnes]

Roger:

Both the recourse to gods and divine nature and the recourse to teleology are the product of over-generalization, which is an error of induction, whether due to reliance on enumeration or simply going beyond the context of evidence.

All theories, ancient or modern, go beyond the context of the evidence, Roger.

This is because any fact or set of facts can support an infinite number of theories.

Similarly, every generalization in this sense is an over-generalization. This is what Hume tells us.

They did NOT have a warrant for assuming that non-living entities move in the same manner.

Oh? Who is in charge of issuing these "warrants?"...;-) This is itself an ad hoc argument.

Don't confuse observational data with evidence.

Likewise, where is it written that "observational data" doesn't count as evidence??? This seems a similarly arbitrary assertion.

The Greeks had plenty of observational data of the motions of inanimate objects, but they had no evidence for the conjecture that inanimate objects move according to final causation, pursuit of ends.

The Greeks, like all humans, viewed the facts in light of their theories. Theories broke down when they encountered logical or factual obstacles that could not be overcome (like the Pythagorean number cosmology, which was destroyed when irrational numbers were discovered) and new ones had to be invented. This was not caused AFAICS by "overgeneralisation via enumeration."

Newton had plenty of observation data of the motions of inanimate objects, and he also had evidence for the conjecture that there is a sort of action-at-a-distance by which inanimate objects attract one another gravitationally....There are objects separated by a distance, and they are attracted to one another.

...a fact which he got by observation too. This is what I mean about these ad hoc distinctions, Roger. Newton's got "observation data" of the motions of bodies, which is supposedly not proper "evidence" and which he's not allowed to generalise from, but observations of action at a distance suddenly are admissable as evidence and he is allowed to generalise from.

I confess the supposedly critical distinction completely escapes me. It seems merely arbitrary.

A clue and the suspicion of a theory that it raises is most assuredly needed before you can frame a theory proper.

Now, of course here we agree. Theory, even of the most faint and suspect type, precedes observation.

I think Einstein would agree with this. He would acknowledge that the Greeks were clueless, while Newton was a giant on whose shoulders he stood.

This rather reminds me of that scene in "Annie Hall" with Woody Allen and Marshall McLuhan. That is, I suppose if you are going to imagine what Einstein might have said on a topic, you may as well imagine him agreeing with you....;-)

Edited September 24, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[BaalChatzaf]

This rather reminds me of that scene in "Annie Hall" with Woody Allen and Marshall McLuhan. That is, I suppose if you are going to imagine what Einstein might have said on a topic, you may as well imagine him agreeing with you....;-)

That is so.... choice.

Ba'al Chatzaf.

[merjet]

Yes. The whole Aristotelian "ontological essence" vs Randian "epistemological essence" makes no difference. The essentialist method is the problem, not the level it is applied to.

Then Popper's position, too, which he calls as "modified essentialism", must be part of the problem.

Please tell us your solution to what you deem the relevant question to be.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

"Essentialism" used in too broad a meaning is ALWAYS going cause "the problem" with everyone, including Popper. The moment you say apples are different than oranges, you can be accused of essentialism. But strictly speaking, noticing differences and similarities, establishing rules for measurement, grouping them accordingly and making concepts our of them is not essentialism.

The real problem is Daniel's refusal to admit what the word "essence" means in Rand's statement "epistemological essence." Merely saying "makes no difference" does not make this not have a difference and saying "essentialist method" applied to Rand's epistemological theories is to completely blank-out the role of isolating characteristics and measurements, and integration for that matter.

He acts like he has Rand on a huge "Gotcha!" and tries to categorize the entire corpus of her writing on that one incident. This is the same epistemological process as the stolen concept. The trouble is that is is wrong. It misrepresents her ideas.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Merlin.

Then Popper's position, too, which he calls as "modified essentialism", must be part of the problem.

Well, it may well turn out to be. Popper was always keen to find common ground with his opponents where it existed, even exploring the similarities between Hegel and Plato - the two philosophers he most heavily criticised - and his own ideas. He believed his modifications avoided the issue, but perhaps he blundered. I will outline what they are tonight and we can decide.

Suffice to say for now, in his OSE chapter on Aristotle he distinguished between metaphysical essentialism and methodological essentialism, and likewise metaphysical nominalism and methodological nominalism. He declares he is not a metaphysical nominalist, but a methodological one. He then outlines the logical and practical problems with methodological essentialism, which lead him to methodological nominalism as his preferred alternative. (Incidentally, he dropped the "methodological" from his nominalism later, as he said it was too unwieldy)

It appears to me that with her focus on the importance of precise definitions, and her belief that it is the philosopher's role to define terms, Rand is at least a methodological esssentialist (and she is hardly alone in this). The problems of verbalism and scholasticism as outlined by Popper emerge in her philosophy too as a result - probably more so, as her debt to Aristotle is more overt than most. (As you probably know, in the bigger picture I offer this unproductive scholasticism as a competing theory for Objectivism's apparent lack of progress in the wider world)

Of course, the same verbalist case might always be attempted to be made against Popper. In fact it has been, by the late David Stove. However, after some examination I feel certain that Stove's criticism does not succeed.

Please tell us your solution to what you deem the relevant question to be.

Don't argue over the meanings of words if you want to have a productive discussion (though of course if a term is used confusingly - for example, contrary to common usage - it's reasonable to point this out) . The truth is hard enough to find as it is without starting out from a logically irresolvable situation. Instead focus on problems, theories, statements etc.

Edited September 24, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Daniel Barnes]

The real problem is Daniel's refusal to admit what the word "essence" means in Rand's statement "epistemological essence." Merely saying "makes no difference" does not make this not have a difference and saying "essentialist method" applied to Rand's epistemological theories is to completely blank-out the role of isolating characteristics and measurements, and integration for that matter.

I confess the real problem may be my apparent inability to sensibly parse statements like the above....;-)

[tjohnson]

Don't argue over the meanings of words if you want to have a productive discussion (though of course if a term is used confusingly - for example, contrary to common usage - it's reasonable to point this out) . The truth is hard enough to find as it is without starting out from a logically irresolvable situation. Instead focus on problems, theories, statements etc.

I heartily agree with this statement, we must start with some mutually agreed upon undefined terms.

[Alfonso Jones]

Don't argue over the meanings of words if you want to have a productive discussion (though of course if a term is used confusingly - for example, contrary to common usage - it's reasonable to point this out) . The truth is hard enough to find as it is without starting out from a logically irresolvable situation. Instead focus on problems, theories, statements etc.

I heartily agree with this statement, we must start with some mutually agreed upon undefined terms.

Please help the communication here. What does it mean, in your view, to "start with some mutually agreed upon undefined terms." In what sense can we AGREED on terms while those terms are UNDEFINED? What did we agree on? Only that we will not attempt to define the terms? What is the use of this, as a starting point?

Alfonso

[Bill]

Bill:

We are never justified in simultaneously claiming opposite theories as true.

"Simultaneously" has little, if anything to do with the issue. All it means is you are not contradicting yourself outright. A contradiction is a contradiction, regardless of when you do it. The fact that you say something is "absolutely true" one day, and then its opposite is "absolutely true" the next shows how low the bar is set for your standards of both "truth" and "absoluteness."

That this situation arises, as I have said before, is because the Randian theory is simply oxymoronic - that is self-contradictory - in the first place.

The point I was making is that you can be justified in claiming something to be true, even if it is false, if you have no evidence that it's false. Later, when you discover evidence falsifying it, you are justified in claiming that it is false. Thus, you are justified initially in claiming it as true; then later, in claiming it as false. You are not contradicting yourself when you do this. You are simply correcting your initial judgment.

For example, a jury can be justified in finding a defendant guilty, given the available evidence. Later, if new evidence is presented exonerating the defendant, they are justified in finding him not guilty. They are not contradicting themselves when they do this; they are simply correcting their previously mistaken judgment in light of new evidence.

- Bill