Two Kinds of "Induction": Important similarities and trivial differences

[Daniel Barnes]

Alfonso:

Please help the communication here. What does it mean, in your view, to "start with some mutually agreed upon undefined terms." In what sense can we AGREED on terms while those terms are UNDEFINED?

Alfonso, GS just means that we should try to avoid our arguments resting on special definitions for our terms.

That's all it is.

If you want to get the situation clear in your mind, here's an example.

Let's say we want to study the effect of wind on a sand dune.

We ask two essentialist philosophers. They reply as follows:" Well, my philosophically unlearned friend, it is of vital importance we must define our terms before we begin our investigation, otherwise how will we really know what we're dealing with in the first place? First, we must find the proper meaning of the words "wind", "sand", and "dune", capture their very essence. (Actually, to be careful philosophers, we should really also look at "effect" too; and if we were really sticklers probably "the", "of", "on", and "a.") Anyway, to "wind." The proper definition of wind surely is "a movement of the air." Now we are ready to proceed..." But the second philosopher interrupts:"Frankly I find this sort of imprecision shockingly unprofessional. For "wind" as "a movement of the air" could refer to a breeze, a gust, a waft, a hurricane...even an unmentionable emission from one's nether regions. It's all hopelessly loose. What we need is true "wind", which is neither an enormous hurricane nor an tiny unmentionable waft, but is in fact a significant movement of air. There! I have nicely tightened up your poorly defined concept. The first philosopher replies in a polite but somewhat peeved tone: "Well, alright, have it your way. But I'm afraid you're more than a little fuzzy yourself: what do you mean by this term "significant" you've introduced out of the blue? A hurricane in Hong Kong can be significant; yet so can a tiny unpleasant waft if you are trapped in an elevator with it. Can we get a little more philosophically precise here?" The second philosopher replies: "I suppose I must accept your criticism, in the name of professional standards.Very well then. "Significant" means....""

And so on and so forth. This example is of course exaggerated, but...not by much. You will have observed that our philosophers have not even begun to address the actual problem they wish to study. In fact, as we leave them they have not yet completed "precisely defining" the first word they chose. As Popper remarks, this method, which promises precision and better arguments, in practice leads to neither. It does not work as advertised. It forces one to spend all one's time sharpening one's pencil but never writing anything. It even leads, eventually, to frustration and disillusion with even the quest for knowledge itself.

We contrast this with the scientific method. Here, nothing rests on the terms "wind", "sand" or anything else. If greater precision is required, features such as height, wind velocity, or type of sand can be simply added. The words "wind" "sand" etc are merely convenient labels, and do not aim to capture any "essential truths." Truth is a function of the theory in question, (say, does wind displace sand proportional to its speed?) not of the particular words involved.

The former approach is the remains of the Aristotelian method. The mistaken belief in its precision seems to be no more than a prejudice due to Aristotle and Plato's enormous influence.

The latter is the scientific approach. The amazing progress of science compared to philosophy in the past centuries can be attributed to the degree to which Aristotelian method has been abandoned. (It still lingers in the social sciences, regrettably)

Does that clear it up somewhat?

Edited September 25, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Daniel Barnes]

Bill:

The point I was making is that you can be justified in claiming something to be true, even if it is false, if you have no evidence that it's false.

I think you need to think long and hard about that position, BIll. Particularly this part:

The point I was making is that you can be justified in claiming something to be true, even if it is false...

Think about it.

For example, a jury can be justified in finding a defendant guilty, given the available evidence. Later, if new evidence is presented exonerating the defendant, they are justified in finding him not guilty. They are not contradicting themselves when they do this; they are simply correcting their previously mistaken judgment in light of new evidence.

Actually, they are contradicting their first judgement with their second. That is all.

[Ellen Stuttle]

The real problem is Daniel's refusal to admit what the word "essence" means in Rand's statement "epistemological essence." Merely saying "makes no difference" does not make this not have a difference and saying "essentialist method" applied to Rand's epistemological theories is to completely blank-out the role of isolating characteristics and measurements, and integration for that matter.

Michael,

Daniel doesn't refuse to admit what the word "essence" means in Rand's statement "epistemological essence." And describing her approach as "essentialist method" in Popper's terminology is accurately describing. He and I are both trying to explain to you that there indeed is a radical difference between Popper's views on definition and Rand's, that Popper would have considered Rand as much of an "essentialist" as he considered Aristotle, and that he would have considered what Rand describes as a "radical" difference between her and Aristotle's view of "essence" just a variant within the same general kind. Popper's views on definition have much more in common with Korzybski's than with Rand's. Rand's have much more in common with Aristotle's than with either Popper's or Korzybski's.

I refer again to the excerpts from Rand herself on the issue of definitions which I posted both on the "Scorecard" thread and above (post #25).

I'll call attention to certain key passages with which Popper, had he read them (I'm unaware of his ever having done so), would have strenuously disagreed:

All the italics used are in the original.

The truth or falsehood of all of man's conclusions, inferences, thought and knowledge rests on the truth or falsehood of his definitions.

Popper would have disagreed with the idea of (empiric) truth or falsehood pertaining to definitions, let alone with the idea of "the truth or falsehood of all of man's conclusions, inferences, thought and knowledge" resting on the definitions of the terms used in statements, propositions, theories.

An objective definition, valid for all men, is one that designates the essential distinguishing characteristic(s) and genus of the existents subsumed under a given concept [...].

Popper didn't think that there were definitions "valid for all men" or that there is an "essential distinguishing characteristic(s)" of a concept.

[...] the one and only valid definition of man, within the context of his knowledge and of all mankind's knowledge to date: "A rational animal."

Again, Popper didn't think there was any "one and only valid definition" of a category. (I said "category" instead of "concept" because he didn't think of "concepts" the way she did.)

[...] observe [...] the process of determining an essential characteristic: the rule of fundamentality. When a given group of existents has more than one characteristic distinguishing it from other existents, man must observe the relationships among these various characteristics and discover the one on which all the others (or the greatest number of others) depend, i.e., the fundamental characteristic without which the others would not be possible. This fundamental characteristic is the essential distinguishing characteristic of the existents involved, and the proper defining characteristic of the concept.

Metaphysically, a fundamental characteristic is that distinctive characteristic which makes the greatest number of others possible; epistemologically, it is the one that explains the greatest number of others.

Popper didn't think that there was such a characteristic(s) which "makes the greatest number of others possible [and] explains the greatest number of others."

It is Aristotle who first formulated the principles of correct definition.

Notice, she describes Aristotle's principles of definition as "correct." Where she says she differs from Aristotle is in how the two of them think of the "essence" of a concept:

Aristotle regarded "essence" as metaphysical; Objectivism regards it as epistemological.

Popper didn't regard it as existing in the sense in which either Aristotle or Rand did. Although Rand saw the difference as "radical," Popper would have seen in as hardly significant.

It's a shame that your source on Popper's views is that "Two Kinds of Definition" article. There's a chart and explanation he provides in Unended Quest which might make how he saw the situation clearer to you, but I don't have the equipment for scanning that in.

Ellen

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[Alfonso Jones]

Alfonso:

Please help the communication here. What does it mean, in your view, to "start with some mutually agreed upon undefined terms." In what sense can we AGREED on terms while those terms are UNDEFINED?

Alfonso, GS just means that we should try to avoid our arguments resting on special definitions for our terms.

That's all it is.

If you want to get the situation clear in your mind, here's an example.

Let's say we want to study the effect of wind on a sand dune.

(Caricature of obsessive detail in definition of wind deleted to save space)

And so on and so forth. This example is of course exaggerated, but...not by much. You will have observed that our philosophers have not even begun to address the actual problem they wish to study. In fact, as we leave them they have not yet completed "precisely defining" the first word they chose. As Popper remarks, this method, which promises precision and better arguments, in practice leads to neither. It does not work as advertised. It forces one to spend all one's time sharpening one's pencil but never writing anything. It even leads, eventually, to frustration and disillusion with even the quest for knowledge itself.

We contrast this with the scientific method. Here, nothing rests on the terms "wind", "sand" or anything else. If greater precision is required, features such as height, wind velocity, or type of sand can be simply added. The words "wind" "sand" etc are merely convenient labels, and do not aim to capture any "essential truths." Truth is a function of the theory in question, (say, does wind displace sand proportional to its speed?) not of the particular words involved.

The former approach is the remains of the Aristotelian method. The mistaken belief in its precision seems to be no more than a prejudice due to Aristotle and Plato's enormous influence.

The latter is the scientific approach. The amazing progress of science compared to philosophy in the past centuries can be attributed to the degree to which Aristotelian method has been abandoned. (It still lingers in the social sciences, regrettably)

Does that clear it up somewhat?

It makes the problem more clear. I must respectfully differ - "wind" is not merely a convenient label. There is content there. How can we discuss wind, or the question of whether "does wind displace sand proportional to its speed" in the absence of knowing what we are talking about, at least to know that when one says "wind" they do not mean "sand?"

Wind is not merely a convenient label which might be applied to ANYTHING. So, regrettably, I do not know how we can completely avoid having to have MEANINGS for the words.

Alfonso

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen,

The original purpose was not to channel Popper and get him to agree with Objectivist concept formation, but my comparison of how both he and Rand disagreed with Aristotle's essentialism for the same reasons. And that idea is still valid, simply because I am going on what they wrote, not by what I suppose they thought.

Then you started claiming that Rand's theory according to Popper's ghost is essentialism and made some serious blunders about what is in ITOE along the way.

Rand's theory of concepts is no more essentialism than her theory of government is socialism. I have given more than enough reasons and explanations why. Carry on in your mistakes. As I said, I cannot take your views on Objectivist epistemology seriously because of the uncorrected errors and misrepresentations you insist on maintaining. I am tired of repeating the same things over and over. Maybe somebody else can explain it in a form you can understand.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Ellen quoted Rand:

The truth or falsehood of all of man's conclusions, inferences, thought and knowledge rests on the truth or falsehood of his definitions.

Yes, exactly the passage I always have in mind. If only there was a way of logically establishing "true" or "false" definitions she would have a point. But there isn't, so she doesn't. It's an inescapable error.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen quoted Rand:

The truth or falsehood of all of man's conclusions, inferences, thought and knowledge rests on the truth or falsehood of his definitions.

Yes, exactly the passage I always have in mind. If only there was a way of logically establishing "true" or "false" definitions she would have a point. But there isn't, so she doesn't. It's an inescapable error.

Daniel,

Sez you. Not sez Rand.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Alfonso:

It makes the problem more clear. I must respectfully differ -

Fine. We'll agree to disagree over it. You can consider it further yourself if you think it necessary.

[tjohnson]

It makes the problem more clear. I must respectfully differ - "wind" is not merely a convenient label. There is content there. How can we discuss wind, or the question of whether "does wind displace sand proportional to its speed" in the absence of knowing what we are talking about, at least to know that when one says "wind" they do not mean "sand?"

Wind is not merely a convenient label which might be applied to ANYTHING. So, regrettably, I do not know how we can completely avoid having to have MEANINGS for the words.

Alfonso

If you try to define all your terms you will eventually define in circles. For example, if you define 'wind' as 'movement of air' and then 'air' as 'little bits of matter' and 'matter' as 'something with mass' and 'mass' as 'a property of matter' etc. do you see how it goes on forever? But if I say to you "do you know what I mean by 'wind'?" and you say 'yes' then we can leave that and move on to learning about wind.

[Daniel Barnes]

GS

If you try to define all your terms you will eventually define in circles.

What GS said.

[Ellen Stuttle]

Ellen,

The original purpose was not to channel Popper and get him to agree with Objectivist concept formation, but my comparison of how both he and Rand disagreed with Aristotle's essentialism for the same reasons. And that idea is still valid, simply because I am going on what they wrote, not by what I suppose they thought.

They both disagree with Aristotle about essences being in things. But Rand herself held a theory of essences, which she thought of as epistemological. This would also have been "essentialism" in Popper's view.

Then you started claiming that Rand's theory according to Popper's ghost is essentialism and made some serious blunders about what is in ITOE along the way.

What blunders are those? I quoted to you that she does indeed talk about "essential characteristic(s)" and does indeed consider the differentia to name the "essential characteristic(s)." How this is a "blunder" on my part escapes me. I'm just repeating what the lady said.

Rand's theory of concepts is no more essentialism than her theory of government is socialism. I have given more than enough reasons and explanations why. Carry on in your mistakes. As I said, I cannot take your views on Objectivist epistemology seriously because of the uncorrected errors and misrepresentations you insist on maintaining. I am tired of repeating the same things over and over. Maybe somebody else can explain it in a form you can understand.

Her theory is "essentialism" as Popper used that term. She was an Aristotelian about definitions. Why don't you ask Roger if Roger thinks Rand was of the Aristotelian approach to defining.

What I seriously wonder is if you've bothered to read the quotes from Rand which I've provided and in which she states her theory of essences.

For sure we won't get anywhere discussing the large differences between Popper and Rand on definitions if you don't even recognize the differences. (I will say that I'm finding it a source of high hilarity being informed that I don't understand Rand's epistemological theories. Yeah, well, Ok, Michael.)

Ellen

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[Daniel Barnes]

Ellen:

I will say that I'm finding it a source of high hilarity being informed that I don't understand Rand's epistemological theories.

Ellen, clearly you don't understand her epistemological theories. After all, you disagree with them. Therefore you don't understand them...;-)

[Bill]

In replying to Daniel Barnes, I wrote,

Suppose that no new facts will disprove the theory that the earth revolves around the sun.

Ellen Stuttle replied,

That example is of no help to you. One could select any feature of the universe -- say a hydrogen molecule in the room where you're sitting -- as the reference point and construct a model considering the rest of the universe to be moving with respect to it, if one had the enormous amount of time and computer resources for doing the calculations. It wasn't that taking the earth as reference object for a model of the solar system was wrong; it just wasn't as conceptually and mathematically productive and useful as the heliocentric model.

There's more to it than that. The geocentric theory asserted that from a certain astronomical perspective, the sun actually revolved around the earth, when in fact, it did not. In any case, this is a side issue that is not relevant to the point that Daniel was making and to which I was responding. I was simply replying to his example of a newly discovered truth replacing a previously accepted falsehood. The falsehood is the idea that the sun revolves around the earth; the truth, that the earth revolves around the sun. He was arguing that it's always possible for newly discovered facts to overturn any theory that has supposedly been established as true. I was asking him if he really believed that new facts might disprove the theory that the earth revolves around the sun.

We are justified in claiming a theory as true, if all the evidence supports and none contradicts.

Ellen replied,

We're justified in claiming such a theory as not disproven.

That depends on what is meant by "evidence." If all the swans I've seen are white, is that a case in which all the evidence supports the theory that all swans are white and none contradicts it? No, because the fact that all the swans I've seen are white is not evidence that all swans are white. It is simply evidence that all the swans I've seen are white. We cannot therefore prove that all swans are white simply from observing nothing but white swans, not because we cannot prove, but can only disprove, a universal affirmative, but because observing nothing but white swans is not evidence that all swans are white. (Of course, we know now that there are indeed black swans.)

Consider the statement, "All swans have webbed feat and a long, slender neck." Here we have a universal statement for which we do have positive proof. It's not just that we are justified in claiming this statement as not disproved; we are justified in claiming it as proved, because an aquatic bird without these characteristics would not be a swan.

Consider also the statement, "Some swans are blue." Are we justified in claiming this statement as true if all of the evidence supports it and none contradicts? Or are we only justified in claiming it as not disproven? What would it mean to "disprove" the statement, "Some swans are blue"? To disprove it, one would have to prove that no swans are blue. But how does one prove that no swans are blue? Of course, it's impossible to prove that no swans are blue, because the failure to observe a blue swan does not mean there aren't any. But it's easy to prove that "Some swans are blue." All that's necessary is to observe at least one blue swan. So in this case, as well, one can say that the statement is true if all of the evidence supports it and none contradicts. In other words, one can prove the statement true. What one cannot do is disprove it.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

How this is a "blunder" on my part escapes me.

Ellen,

I know it escapes you.

Measurement.

Let's see if it escapes again this time.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Now, returning to Merlin's previous suggestion:

Merlin:

Then Popper's position, too, which he calls as "modified essentialism", must be part of the problem.

I think no, but it is easy to see how this confusion might arise. Popper's "modified essentialism" is outlined in his essay "The Aim of Science" (p194-6, "Objective Knowledge") He distinguishes between three views of human knowledge (pace his essay of the same name): essentialism, instrumentalism, and his own, which he calls "modified essentialism."

Essentialism he describes as the doctrine that science must seek ultimate explanations in terms of essences (for example, the cause of gravity).

Instrumentalism, in contrast, he describes as the doctrine that scientific theories have nil explanatory power; they are merely instruments for prediction.

Between these "ultimate" and "nil" views of explanatory power he places his "modified essentialism."

He relates his version to the essentialism of Plato, not the essentialism of Aristotle. For Plato's theory of essential Forms at least provided an explanation for the problem of universals (or simply, "Why are different things similar?") that Aristotle's attempt completely failed to do. (Aristotle's version, with the essences in the individual things, had no answer to why there might not be just as many essences as things, which suggests he did not quite grasp the problem in the first place)

However, Popper modifies Plato's doctrine "in a radical manner." He rejects the idea that his modified essences are "Platonic ideas outside the world" and instead nominates "explanations in terms of the universal laws of nature" to replace them. "Laws of nature" he writes, "are conceived, rather, as (conjectural) descriptions of the structural properties of nature - of our world itself."

"Here then is the similarity between my own view...and essentialism; although I do not think that we can ever describe, by our universal laws, an ultimate essence of the world, I do not doubt that we may seek to probe deeper and deeper into the structure of the world or, as we might say, into properties of the world that are more and more essential, or of greater and greater depth."

At any rate, whatever the merits or demerits of Popper's view, it is clear his "modified essentialism" is, along the lines of the division outlined in my earlier post, metaphysical, not methodological. He makes this doubly clear in his footnote on p195:

"The term "modified essentialism"...should not be construed as a concession to the doctrine of "ultimate reality" and even less as a concession to the doctrine of essentialist definitions (my italics). I fully adhere to the criticism of this doctrine which I have made in my Open Society Vol 2, Chapter 11 (esp note 42) and in other places."

It is this doctrine of essentialist definitions (i.e. the methodological essentialism) that Rand adopted wholesale from Aristotle that we have been criticising so far (even if it is off topic for this thread).

Thus hopefully it is now clear what Popper meant by the "modified essentialism" that you cite. As it is not the methodological version, Popper's not part of the problem.

Does that help clarify?

Edited September 25, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Ellen Stuttle]

How this is a "blunder" on my part escapes me.

Ellen,

I know it escapes you.

Measurement.

Let's see if it escapes again this time.

Michael

AND... "Plastics." What is your point? Please don't go again through the whole long bit about CCD's and measurement-omission in Rand's theory. All this is quite beside the point of whether or not her definitional method is what Popper was objecting to in the Aristotelian approach.

The passage picked up on by Daniel in his post #56 is, if you will, an epitome statement of that with which Popper disagreed:

Ellen quoted Rand:

The truth or falsehood of all of man's conclusions, inferences, thought and knowledge rests on the truth or falsehood of his definitions.

Michael, fact is, you aren't understanding Popper (and I'm not seeing reason to believe that you've even understood Rand's views on "essential characteristic(s)"). I very much recommend that you pause to rethink, to re-read the Popper material you have available in the light of the quotes from Rand I've provided and of Daniel's posts, especially, on Popper's views. The two of them, Rand and Popper, had a quite different approach to the nature of definitions and the role of definitions in attempting to find out what's true. To use a biological-classification analogy, the difference isn't like that between two members of the same genus (two species of Canis, for instance) but more like that between phyla.

Ellen

___

[Ellen Stuttle]

There's more to it than that. The geocentric theory asserted that from a certain astronomical perspective, the sun actually revolved around the earth, when in fact, it did not. In any case, this is a side issue that is not relevant to the point that Daniel was making and to which I was responding. I was simply replying to his example of a newly discovered truth replacing a previously accepted falsehood. The falsehood is the idea that the sun revolves around the earth; the truth, that the earth revolves around the sun. He was arguing that it's always possible for newly discovered facts to overturn any theory that has supposedly been established as true. I was asking him if he really believed that new facts might disprove the theory that the earth revolves around the sun.

"[F]rom a certain astronomical perspective" (taking earth as the reference object) the sun does revolve around the earth. From a 2-body-problem perspective, they mutually revolve around the center of mass of the system. Bill, Copernicus still thought in terms of "epicycles," which Kepler finally (after many attempts) abandoned**. Copernicus' model wouldn't be considered quite true today, any more than the Ptolemaic model. I think you'd be well advised to try a different example.

Ellen

** See for a couple quick sources:

http://front.math.ucdavis.edu/0107.7009

http://farside.ph.utexas.edu/syntaxis/syntaxis/node6.html

Thus, Kepler embarked on an epic new series of calculations which eventually lead him to the conclusion that the planetary orbits are actually ellipses, rather than eccentric circles. Kepler published the results of his research in Astronomia Nova (New Astronomy) in 1609. It is interesting to note that had Tycho's data been a little less accurate, or had the orbit of Mars been a little less eccentric, Kepler might have settled for a model which was kinematically equivalent to a perfected version of the model described in the Almagest. We can also appreciate that, given the far less accurate observational data available to Ptolemy, there was no way in which he could have discerned the very small difference between elliptical planetary orbits and the eccentric circular orbits employed in the Almagest.

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Edited September 25, 2007 by Ellen Stuttle

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Please don't go again through the whole long bit about CCD's and measurement-omission in Rand's theory. All this is quite beside the point of whether or not her definitional method is what Popper was objecting to in the Aristotelian approach.

Ellen,

No it is not beside the point and what you are writing is a knee-jerk because I keep saying "measurement," not "measurement omission." You have to have measurements before you can omit them.

Michael, fact is, you aren't understanding Popper (and I'm not seeing reason to believe that you've even understood Rand's views on "essential characteristic(s)"). I very much recommend that you pause to rethink, to re-read the Popper material you have available in the light of the quotes from Rand I've provided and of Daniel's posts, especially, on Popper's views.

On the contrary. I suggest you pause and rethink. "Universal law" and "commensurable attribute" refer to the the same thing in different jargons. Look at the quote below.

However, Popper modifies Plato's doctrine "in a radical manner." He rejects the idea that his modified essences are "Platonic ideas outside the world" and instead nominates "explanations in terms of the universal laws of nature" to replace them. "Laws of nature" he writes, "are conceived, rather, as (conjectural) descriptions of the structural properties of nature - of our world itself."

"Structural properties of nature" (universal laws) can be measured.

"Structural properties of nature" (commensurable attributes) are what a CDD is made of. Distinguishing characteristics are measurable by them, otherwise, they are not "distinguishing characteristics." Just because something is not "fundamental" does not mean it is not measurable or not part of the concept. There is a way to arrive at what is fundamental through measurement and I admit, it is not all that clear in the literature. Yet it cannot be otherwise from what is written.

Here is how this plays out with "man":

"Man" is a rational animal. The CDD for "animal" that Rand gives is jointly "consciousness and locomotion." Rationality, the distinguishing characteristic, has no locomotion properties, but it does have a commensurable relationship to consciousness as being more advanced than a perceptual awareness. Rationality is merely one type of consciousness on a sliding scale. This could be called "range of awareness" or something like that. Rationality arises out of one of the elements in the CDD (consciousness).

This is why "thumb" is not an essential distinguishing characteristic for man, although it is for, say, primates in general. It has nothing to do with locomotion or consciousness. It is not part of the CDD in the genus in animal so it cannot be fundamental (although it is a measurable part of prehensile extremities in mammals). "Thumb" is a part of man, but not the essential (distinguishing characteristic) part of the concept. It did not arise out of the CDD and cannot be measured by anything in the CDD.

It it not fundamental for that reason—the CDD—in addition to observation, of course. But observation as the only standard of fundamentality is only applicable to primary level concepts. This is equivalent to ostensive definition. On a higher level (concepts abstracted from abstractions), the CDD comes from other concepts, but the same principle of connecting fundamental measurable characteristics is involved. The fundamental measurable characteristics of a higher level concept arise out of the fundamental ones of its constituent abstractions and have commensurable relationships with them.

ALL of these commensurable relationships are "universal laws of nature" in Popper-speak.

ALL the "universal laws of nature" in Popper-speak can be measured.

Let me repeat.

Measurement.

"Manness" cannot be measured. "Manness" is a concept according to essentialism.

Here's an ironic thought about measurement omission. The only way Rand's theory of concepts can be considered anywhere near classical essentialism is if measurements are omitted altogether from the theory. But then, that wouldn't be Rand's theory anymore, would it? But that's exactly what you are doing and calling it Rand's theory. That is a blunder.

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

[...] what you are writing is a knee-jerk because I keep saying "measurement," not "measurement omission." [....]

Ah, is that so? (You might want someday to re-read AR's "Psychologizing" article. Although I've known many of her admirers who became royally mixed up over the difference between legitimate psychological analysis and what she called "psychologizing" and eschewed the former, you have a frequent habit of engaging in the latter.)

On the contrary. I suggest you pause and rethink. "Universal law" and "commensurable attribute" refer to the the same thing in different jargons. Look at your quote below.

However, Popper modifies Plato's doctrine "in a radical manner." He rejects the idea that his modified essences are "Platonic ideas outside the world" and instead nominates "explanations in terms of the universal laws of nature" to replace them. "Laws of nature" he writes, "are conceived, rather, as (conjectural) descriptions of the structural properties of nature - of our world itself."

"Structural properties of nature" (universal laws) can be measured. [....]

I leave Daniel, should he care to do so, to untangle your depiction. I merely call your attention to the fact that it was Daniel, not I, you quoted.

"Beware of this and that" -- an injunction framed on the desk of the editor-in-chief at the Young Readers division of Lippincott.

Ellen

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[Daniel Barnes]

Ellen:

I leave Daniel, should he care to do so, to untangle your depiction.

Mike, we're criticising essentialist methodology as it relates to Rand, not essentialist metaphysics. The "universal laws" etc in Popper relate to the latter not the former. See my reply to Merlin here and then here, and of course Popper's "Two Kinds of Definition" which this thread is named after.

Now can we get back to induction?

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

[...] what you are writing is a knee-jerk because I keep saying "measurement," not "measurement omission." [....]

Ah, is that so? (You might want someday to re-read AR's "Psychologizing" article. Although I've known many of her admirers who became royally mixed up over the difference between legitimate psychological analysis and what she called "psychologizing" and eschewed the former, you have a frequent habit of engaging in the latter.)

Ellen,

Let me make it clear for you. You write like you are not reading my posts and are merely latching on to catch phrases to dismiss them. Except in this case, I have been talking about measurement for some time, and you presumed that I must be a beginner enthralled with Rand's measurement omission theory or something like that.

Knee jerk.

And it has nothing to to with psychologizing. It has everything to do with me seeing that you are not paying attention and comprehending properly what you are reading before dismissing it.

I leave Daniel, should he care to do so, to untangle your depiction.

There is nothing at all to untangle. This is just another indication that you are either not reading it or are not comprehending correctly. "Universal law is measurable" is not rocket science and falls well within your capacity to understand.

I merely call your attention to the fact that it was Daniel, not I, you quoted.

I saw that before I posted, but as it is late, I forgot to correct the "your" on revision. I will do so now. Thanks for mentioning it.

"Beware of this and that" -- an injunction framed on the desk of the editor-in-chief at the Young Readers division of Lippincott.

I have no idea of how this bears on epistemology or getting Rand's theory of concepts correct instead of classifying it incorrectly.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Mike, we're criticising essentialist methodology as it relates to Rand, not essentialist metaphysics. The "universal laws" etc in Popper relate to the latter not the former.

Daniel,

I read your posts to Merlin already. Whatever words you wish to use for the business of "universal laws" with Popper, the parallels to Objectivist epistemology are as I said.

Michael

[tjohnson]

Consider the statement, "All swans have webbed feat and a long, slender neck." Here we have a universal statement for which we do have positive proof. It's not just that we are justified in claiming this statement as not disproved; we are justified in claiming it as proved, because an aquatic bird without these characteristics would not be a swan.

So what do you call the thing that is born from a male and female swan with birth defects that has a short, fat neck and no webbing on it's feet? What difference does it make what we call it? We know that mutations occur in nature and we know that natural selection weeds out the ones that lead to non-survival and this is what is important about the structure of a swan or any living thing.

All A's have B

C does not have B

C is not an A

Astounding. What is the point of this? It's about the same level as this;

To prove A=B, let A=B, then A=B.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Now can we get back to induction?

Daniel,

Just an added thought. On Popper's "universal laws," how can he possibly arrive at them except through induction? How can he even use the word "universal" without arriving at it through induction? From what I see, he is merely calling induction "(conjectural) descriptions of the structural properties of nature."

Testing and confirming (or falsifying) such "(conjectural) descriptions" through deduction is part of the reasoning process. Kelley and Thomas laid this process out in my post here.

I may start a new thread with that post because the complementary action between induction and deduction is very important and this got lost in the present discussion (which is much more specific as, from what I am able to gather, it is focused on an attempt to discredit Objectivism by claiming that its form of induction is different than the rest of the world).

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Mike:

Just an added thought. On Popper's "universal laws," how can he possibly arrive at them except through induction?

Well, he doesn't, using the standard version of "induction" (eg the wiki's example). Popper's model uses imaginative conjecture, followed by testing by argument (logic) and experience (experiment, trial and error)

How can he even use the word "universal" without arriving at it through induction?

What, is looking words up in the dictionary now "induction" too?...;-)

From what I see, he is merely calling induction "(conjectural) descriptions of the structural properties of nature."

No, that's what you're now calling it. Popper never says anything of the sort. Integrative-generalisation, looking up in the dictionary, conjectural descriptions of structural properties...boy, "true induction" sure covers a lot of bases...;-) Popper's induction is merely enumerative generalisation. (Actually, so is Mill's. As I seem to recall, he admits somewhere that all his variants boil down to enumerative generalisation. I will have to look it up for the ref.)

I may start a new thread with that post because the complementary action between induction and deduction is very important

Well, what would be good to hear from the start is the rules you "true inductivists" are using.

I'm hearing a lot of typically deductive terms, like "premises", "conclusions", "inferences" "validity" etc being used to refer to "true induction".

But I'm not hearing how the rules of "true induction" work, or even what they are.

Could someone state (on the other thread maybe) 1)the basic principle of "true induction" and 2)the rule for drawing a valid inference in "true induction."

(PS: i've amended the term for Objectivist induction slightly to "true induction" rather than just induction, as there still seems to be some lingering confusion. Hume's remains "enumerative generalisation")

Edited September 25, 2007 by Daniel Barnes