Two Kinds of "Induction": Important similarities and trivial differences

[BaalChatzaf]

What did I get wrong.

Bob,

Oversimplification and some forced incorrect meanings leading to gross misrepresentation, then dismissal claiming that your own erroneous speculations of what Rand meant and/or wrote are Rand's ideas. The simple fact is, you got it wrong and did a great job of getting it about as wrong as you can, too. You constantly disparage something in your own head, including your evaluation of her knowledge, not the real-deal.

Michael

On the matter of "mathematics is the science of quantity" I DID NOT speculate. I took her quote literally and verbatim (think you for providing the quote). How can I make it clearer? I took her literally and than showed major branches of mathematics in which quantity is not used (e.g. lattice theory and boolean algebra). Can it get any clearer than that. I provided a counter example (which is my specialty). My favorite method of telling philosophers that they are bare ass naked and wrong is to provide a refuting counter-example to their general statements. That is how one falsifies generalities. One produces a counter-example. Which I did. End of case. QED. I -proved- my point.

As to Rand on physics, I provided quotes from Atlas Shrugged showing that Rand either did not know, did not understand or did not care about the laws of thermodynamics. These laws are at the foundation of physics. Once again, I provided verbatim literal proof.

And you say I do not understand? I understand perfectly. I simply disagree. I understand every word Rand has published in the context she specified. On matters scientific and mathematical she is beyond wrong. She simply does not comprehend. On the matter of ethics she is wrong. Ethics is meaningful only in a social context. I alluded to the Aristotle's -Nichomachean Ethics- to show how Aristotle derived the Greatest (human) Good from Political Principles and Virtues which are meaningful only in a social context. Would you like direct quotes from the translations from the Greek. I can provide them if you like. Or just read an acceptable translation of Nichomachean Ethics for yourself.

What more can I do. I have used evidence, example and logic to make my point. I have not simply asserted a position, I have -proved it-. You dismiss my proofs as merely academic, whatever that means. The fact that I prove my case, you use as evidence of my non-understanding. That is just plain perverse and unjust.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen,

I can do it again from scratch. Here are some quotes from Popper's essay, Two Kinds of Definition. (I have left out parts that were "shocking" and, to me, intended for effect because they sound like contradictions or completely counterintuitive.)

Knowledge, or science, according to Aristotle, may be of two kinds - either demonstrative or intuitive. Demonstrative knowledge is also a knowledge of 'causes'. It consists of statements that can be demonstrated - the conclusions - together with their syllogistic demonstrations (which exhibit the 'causes' in their 'middle terms'). Intuitive knowledge consists in grasping the 'indivisible form' or essence or essential nature of a thing (if it is 'immediate', i.e. if its 'cause' is identical with its essential nature); it is the originative source of all science since it grasps the original basic premisses of all demonstrations. Intuitive knowledge consists in grasping the 'indivisible form' or essence or essential nature of a thing (if it is 'immediate', i.e. if its 'cause' is identical with its essential nature); it is the originative source of all science since it grasps the original basic premisses of all demonstrations.

. . .

Like Plato, Aristotle believed that we obtain all knowledge ultimately by an intuitive grasp of the essences of things. 'We can know a thing only by knowing its essence', Aristotle writes, and 'to know a thing is to know its essence'. A 'basic premiss' is, according to him, nothing but a statement describing the essence of a thing. But such a statement is just what he calls a definition. Thus all 'basic premisses of proofs' are definitions.

. . .

As a rule, the defining formula is longer and more complicated than the defined term, and sometimes very much so. Aristotle considers the term to be defined as a name of the essence of a thing, and the defining formula as the description of that essence.

. . .

Plato taught that we can grasp the Ideas with the help of some kind of unerring intellectual intuition; that is to say, we visualise or look at them with our 'mental eye', a process which he conceived as analogous to seeing, but dependent purely upon our intellect, and excluding any element that depends upon our senses. Aristotle's view is less radical and less inspired than Plato's, but in the end it amounts to the same. For although he teaches that we arrive at the definition only after we have made many observations, he admits that sense experience does not in itself grasp the universal essence, and that it cannot, therefore, fully determine a definition. Eventually he simply postulates that we possess an intellectual intuition, a mental or intellectual faculty which enables us unerringly to grasp the essences of things, and to know them. And he further assumes that if we know an essence intuitively, we must be capable of describing it and therefore of defining it.

. . .

'It follows from this', he [Aristotle] writes, 'that there cannot be demonstrative knowledge of the primary premisses; and since nothing but intellectual intuition can be more true than demonstrative knowledge, it follows that it must be intellectual intuition that grasps the basic premisses.'

I would love to see someone point to Rand's writings and discern any kind of idea even close to "intuitive knowledge," on which the whole essentialist structure is erected. The only thing that comes to mind is "implicit concept" or fundamental axiom, but those are completely different problems.

Even though Popper did not mention measurement, is anyone up for seeing Popper's version of Objectivist concept formation? Check this out from the same essay:

Accordingly, the definition may at one time answer two very closely related questions. The one is 'What is it?', for example 'What is a puppy?'; it asks what the essence is which is denoted by the defined term. The other is 'What does it mean?', for example, 'What does "puppy" mean?'; it asks for the meaning of a term (namely, of the term that denotes the essence). In the present context, it is not necessary to distinguish between these two questions; rather, it is important to see what they have in common; and I wish, especially, to draw attention to the fact that both questions are raised by the term that stands, in the definition, on the left side and answered by the defining formula which stands on the right side. This fact characterizes the essentialist view, from which the scientific method of definition radically differs.

While we may say that the essentialist interpretation reads a definition 'normally', that is to say, from the left to the right, we can say that a definition, as it is normally used in modern science, must be read back to front, or from the right to the left; for it starts with the defining formula, and asks for a short label for it. Thus the scientific view of the definition 'A puppy is a young dog' would be that it is an answer to the question 'What shall we call a young dog?' rather than an answer to the question 'What is a puppy?'

Let's simplify this. You have a thing in front of you. You intuitively capture its "essence" and stick a word on it. Then you go about verbalizing this intuition and make a definition. (Left to right.) That is essentialism.

Now the other way (right to left). You have a thing in front of you. You observe various characteristics and form an idea of what it is. You verbalize that then you add a tag (name) to it. If we understand that Popper is not just being cute and playing word games, but actually means by the phrase "starts with the defining formula, and asks for a short label for it," something like this: starts by identifying differences and similarities to other things he already knows (young and dog for instance) and groups all of them into a category represented by a word, we have something very much akin to Objectivist concept formation.

Here is another quote from Popper's essay:

For Aristotle's essentialist definitions are the principles from which all our knowledge is derived; they thus contain all our knowledge; and they serve to substitute a long formula for a short one.

Rand derived principles from knowledge of reality obtained by observation and identification. She did not derive knowledge of reality from principles that were arrived at from intuitively grasping essences (as in Aristotle). Notice that Popper claims that Aristotle's essentialist definitions are the source of ALL knowledge of the thing, they contain ALL knowledge of it (as I stated in my previous post). That is about as far from Rand as you can get. She and Popper are rejecting essentialsm for the same reason. Essences don't exist in that manner. Knowledge does not exist in that manner.

Popper concludes the essay by talking against the usefulness of intuition for knowledge (but it is useful for poetry) and against defining terms, which of course would follow, since, to him, definition means either to describe intuitively grasped essences or to describe everything you know about something you observe.

Now, for the upteenth time, ITOE, p. 2:

To exemplify the issue as it is usually presented: When we refer to three persons as "men," what do we designate by that term? The three persons are three individuals who differ in every particular respect and may not possess a single identical characteristic (not even their fingerprints). If you list all their particular characteristics, you will not find one representing "manness." Where is the "manness" in men?

What, in reality, corresponds to the concept "man" in our mind?

In the history of philosophy, there are, essentially, four schools of thought on this issue:

1. The "extreme realists" or Platonists, who hold that abstractions exist as real entities or archetypes in another dimension of reality and that the concretes we perceive are merely their imperfect reflections, but the concretes evoke the abstractions in our mind. (According to Plato, they do so by evoking the memory of the archetypes which we had known, before birth, in that other dimension.)

2. The "moderate realists," whose ancestor (unfortunately) is Aristotle, who hold that abstractions exist in reality, but they exist only in concretes, in the form of metaphysical essences, and that our concepts refer to these essences.

3. The "nominalists," who hold that all our ideas are only images of concretes, and that abstractions are merely "names" which we give to arbitrary groupings of concretes on the basis of vague resemblances.

4. The "conceptualists," who share the nominalists' view that abstractions have no actual basis in reality, but who hold that concepts exist in our minds as some sort of ideas, not as images.

As even Popper stated, the metaphysical essences in No. 2 (Aristotle) are grasped by the mind through intuition since that stuff is "intuitive knowledge." That is what I have been referring to as "thingness" and it is not measurable. It is only describable.

However, Popper does admit that something can be identified. He gives the case of a biologist and a strain of bacteria, for example. This bacteria obviously has enough similarities and differences in relation to all else that the biologist knows that he can identify it as a kind of bacteria, and even classify it as a strain. Popper does not mention what these similarities and differences are or even how to identify the bacteria and classify it. But one presumes that it is not by essence and intuition.

That same thing Popper uses to identify and classify it is the same thing that Rand uses. She is nowhere near intuitively grasping the essence of the bacteria, then trying to define that essence by describing it. HOWEVER, she called that "same thing" by the term "essential" at times. There is where you keep getting it wrong about Rand, Popper and essence. For Aristotle, essence was one thing. For Rand it was another thing, one way too different from Aristotle's to be compared in any manner but the most superficial (like using the same word or implying identifiability).

This is also where measurement cuts through the entire controversy. Measurement is Rand's contribution to concept formation and it was not a small contribution. Intuitive knowledge cannot be measured. From the sound of it, intuitive knowledge is hard enough to describe. But observations of similarities and differences (identifications) can be measured. And they can be integrated.

If you would stop and think about all this and try to see it, you would not find my previous post gibberish, although I used different words for this. For example, I did not use the word "intuition," but instead said an essence includes all the information. (And from the angle of intuition, it does. One has to verbalize it, but the knowledge is already built in. At least in theory, that's how it is said to work.) It's a choice, though. One must choose to think.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

What more can I do. I have used evidence, example and logic to make my point. I have not simply asserted a position, I have -proved it-. You dismiss my proofs as merely academic, whatever that means.

Bob,

Really?

Here is just one example because it is easy and off the top of my head.

As to Rand on physics, I provided quotes from Atlas Shrugged showing that Rand either did not know, did not understand or did not care about the laws of thermodynamics. These laws are at the foundation of physics. Once again, I provided verbatim literal proof.

Then when several quotes were provided that showed not only did she understand them, she even used the term "perpetual motion machine" in a derogatory manner several times. Then there were speculations (and not just from me) about how Galt's motor could have been different than you were imagining it. Result? Total blank out and repetition that Rand did not know about the laws of thermodynamics.

How can anyone take that kind of stuff seriously? I am not going to waste my time by going over the other cases. You were getting your jollies by demeaning Rand in public and that's as far as it went.

Michael

[BaalChatzaf]

What more can I do. I have used evidence, example and logic to make my point. I have not simply asserted a position, I have -proved it-. You dismiss my proofs as merely academic, whatever that means.

Bob,

Really?

Here is just one example because it is easy and off the top of my head.

As to Rand on physics, I provided quotes from Atlas Shrugged showing that Rand either did not know, did not understand or did not care about the laws of thermodynamics. These laws are at the foundation of physics. Once again, I provided verbatim literal proof.

Then when several quotes were provided that showed not only did she understand them, she even used the term "perpetual motion machine" in a derogatory manner several times. Then there were speculations (and not just from me) about how Galt's motor could have been different than you were imagining it. Result? Total blank out and repetition that Rand did not know about the laws of thermodynamics.

How can anyone take that kind of stuff seriously? I am not going to waste my time by going over the other cases. You were getting your jollies by demeaning Rand in public and that's as far as it went.

Michael

My intention is to help O'ists improve their product. O'ism will not be accepted or influential among people who would otherwise by sympathetic to it, if the intellectual and scholarly standards are inferior. Among the real Hard Core O'ists (you are not one) there is a constant opposition to quantum physics as being absurd. The late Stephen Speicher and his buddy Lewis Little did this constantly. Never mind that quantum physics predicts correctly to twelve decimal places. Quantum physics fails a philosophical test, so they say. It is based on a (mere) concept of method. In science the only philosophical test is internal consistency. The excellence of a theory lies primarily with the quality of the predictions and quantum physics gets an A+. And method consists in predicting correctly over a broad array of phenomena and effects. And Classical physics fails. It makes incorrect predictions (under certain circumstances) but it is otherwise an adequate heuristic. Hard Core Objectivists refuse to admit that Newton was wrong. He based his theory on an unsupportable notion of space and time. Every time GPS locates something to within the bounds of instrumental error it is a refutation of Newtonian gravity.

It pains me to see the only stand that is consistent with capitalism and political liberty burdened down with intellectual defects. I want to see the O'ist movement clean up its act. And it can start doing that by discarding the errors of its Founding Mother and her "intellectual heir". Science is such an important factor in modern economies and modern societies that having a "flat earth" mentality with regard to scientific (and mathematical) matters makes O'ism a laughing stock. You may find this painful, but it is true. O'ism will not ever be accepted by otherwise sympathetic intellectuals until it meets proper standards of scholarship and it surely does not.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[tjohnson]

Thus the scientific view of the definition 'A puppy is a young dog' would be that it is an answer to the question 'What shall we call a young dog?' rather than an answer to the question 'What is a puppy?'

Look at the 2 questions here.

1. 'What shall we call a young dog? ' - This denotes that WE are performing an action, WE are naming or labeling. This is a scientific way of approaching things.

2.'What is a puppy?' - This questions implies that a puppy has some "essence" independent of us, definitely a philosophical way of looking at things. Korzybski would answer this by saying 'puppy' IS a word.

This problem arises because of the indiscriminate use of the verb 'is' which was perhaps the main thrust of Korzybski's GS.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Bob,

I completely sympathize with your last post and agree with it. If that is your goal we are more than on the same page.

You are finding the main source of the problem in Rand and it isn't. There are some areas where things are not cool with her, but they are few. The real problem is in some of her followers and how they apply the philosophy—and in the nonstop bickering among different schools of Objectivism. There actually are some booby traps in the philosophy (or in the literature, to be exact) and I see people constantly fall into them, but this needs a separate discussion.

I have been looking into quantum physics a little and it is fascinating. Since my approach generally is take a look-see, think about it, then judge, I am delighted to find things that show so much promise for so many possibilities. (I personally have a speculation that we do not have enough sense organs to process all of reality, so if I am right, we cannot perceive certain things even with instruments. But we can perceive their interactions with the things we can perceive. This would be one reason why QM is so weird and my speculation is no weirder than the many worlds idea or some other goodies given here. More later on this.)

btw - If you want to see a proper application (so common-sense it hurts) on how to correctly apply Objectivist epistemology to science, and the excerpt even discusses the transition from Newton to Einstein, etc., see here: Induction and deduction work together for knowledge. This is a passage by David Kelley and Will Thomas.

I am very tired right now, having stayed up all night. I will write more tomorrow. This is important.

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

I would love to see someone point to Rand's writings and discern any kind of idea even close to "intuitive knowledge," on which the whole essentialist structure is erected. The only thing that comes to mind is "implicit concept" or fundamental axiom, but those are completely different problems.

Interestingly, what came to mind for you was exactly the "kind of idea [in Rand's writings] even close to 'intuitive knowledge,' on which the whole essentialist structure is erected": the fundamental axioms and her idea of the "implicit concept" of "existent." Although Objectivism doesn't claim to derive knowledge from these starting points, it claims that all knowledge must rest on them (and must ultimately reduce to basic starting points which we know directly -- see, e.g., Roger's recent posts on Peikoff's presentation of induction). And Objectivists engage in quite a bit of deducing from the basic axioms -- a procedure I (and others) think of as "axiomology." Objectivists don't simply use their axioms as checks on their knowledge (as in, if you arrive at a contradiction, you know you've made a mistake), but as providing substance.

As a rule, the defining formula is longer and more complicated than the defined term, and sometimes very much so. Aristotle considers the term to be defined as a name of the essence of a thing, and the defining formula as the description of that essence.

Here is a difference, since Rand considered the definition a condensation of much more extensive knowledge, but both considered the defining formula to describe the essence (essential characteristic(s)) of a thing (remember, for Rand, "the fundamental characteristic without which the others would not be possible").

Even though Popper did not mention measurement, is anyone up for seeing Popper's version of Objectivist concept formation? Check this out from the same essay:

[skipping the quote for now to save time and space]

Let's simplify this. You have a thing in front of you. You intuitively capture its "essence" and stick a word on it. Then you go about verbalizing this intuition and make a definition. (Left to right.) That is essentialism.

Now the other way (right to left). You have a thing in front of you. You observe various characteristics and form an idea of what it is. You verbalize that then you add a tag (name) to it. If we understand that Popper is not just being cute and playing word games, but actually means by the phrase "starts with the defining formula, and asks for a short label for it," something like this: starts by identifying differences and similarities to other things he already knows (young and dog for instance) and groups all of them into a category represented by a word, we have something very much akin to Objectivist concept formation.

I see where you might get that idea from the material you quoted, though I think the difference is bigger than the similarity. I'll have to come back to that. I only have a few minutes now in which to do this and won't be back on line for many hours, possibly not until tomorrow afternoon.

Here is another quote from Popper's essay:

For Aristotle's essentialist definitions are the principles from which all our knowledge is derived; they thus contain all our knowledge; and they serve to substitute a long formula for a short one.

Rand derived principles from knowledge of reality obtained by observation and identification. She did not derive knowledge of reality from principles that were arrived at from intuitively grasping essences (as in Aristotle). Notice that Popper claims that Aristotle's essentialist definitions are the source of ALL knowledge of the thing, they contain ALL knowledge of it (as I stated in my previous post). That is about as far from Rand as you can get. She and Popper are rejecting essentialsm for the same reason. Essences don't exist in that manner. Knowledge does not exist in that manner.

Again, I don't think this is anywhere near "about as far from Rand as you can get" but instead is very like Rand.

A definition is not a description; it implies, but does not mention all the characteristics of a concept's units. If a definition were to list all the characteristics, it would defeat its own purpose [of providing an easily usable condensation]. But it is important to remember that a definition implies all the characteristics of the units, since it identifies their essential, not their exhaustive, characteristics; since it designates existents, not their isolated aspects; and since it is a condensation of, not a substitute for, a wider knowledge of the existents involved.

She further claims -- to re-re-repeat -- that the truth of all our "conclusions, inferences and knowledge" rests on our getting the definitions right. This gives definitions an immensely important role, condensing ALL our knowledge of the referents and providing the basis for any correct beliefs we might come to.

I have to break off there for now. To be continued.

Ellen

___

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

And Objectivists engage in quite a bit of deducing from the basic axioms -- a procedure I (and others) think of as "axiomology." Objectivists don't simply use their axioms as checks on their knowledge (as in, if you arrive at a contradiction, you know you've made a mistake), but as providing substance.

Ellen,

Does Rand do this? If you think so, please say where. I know of a case or two, as, for example, her idea that metaphysical male dominance impacts a woman so much that her psychology is somehow mutilated if she wants to be President, since that is the top authority role. But these cases are rare.

I do agree that a lot of Objectivist writing I have read gets matters wrong and tries to replace reality by deducing it from principles.

Here is a difference, since Rand considered the definition a condensation of much more extensive knowledge, but both considered the defining formula to describe the essence (essential characteristic(s)) of a thing (remember, for Rand, "the fundamental characteristic without which the others would not be possible").

Here is one place where the problem lies. Rand is not saying that all other characteristics in reality, i.e., metaphysically, depend on the fundamental one. She is saying that the details falling within the concept depend on it. This is because the concept refers to something that exists and we have already learned many things about it. Here is an example. "Out there" the fact that man has a thumb does not depend on him being rational. Thumb and rational are not even connected. Rand's words could be interpreted to mean this, but that is not what she is getting at.

A concept refers to something "out there." From the existent's end, the existent has no relationship to a concept. It merely is.

In order to designate that particular something "out there," the aspect that makes it different from all else, i.e., imaginable and categorizable, is what allows the mind to recall all other observations, since it locates in reality "out there" what is being talked about. If I said "the thing with a thumb," you would have no idea that I was talking about man. If I said "the thing that is rational," you know immediately that I am talking about man "out there," and that is what allows you to bring to mind all of the things you have observed or learned about man, including the fact that he has a thumb. The characteristics themselves, qua facts, are not dependent on "rational" (the differentiating characteristic). Your memory of what you have observed and learned about man is dependent on it if you are using concepts only. But there is another way. You can indicate a man by pointing and grunting. (As an aside, one instance of that will allow you to learn the detail about "thumb" but not about "rational." Many more observations and comparisons are needed for learning that detail.)

This is a whole other kettle of fish than what Aristotle was talking about. This is not dependent on intuitively grasping the essence of man, then deciding it must be rationality and so on. It is looking and seeing what is similar and what is different and measuring these aspects. It is a mental operation of comparing things, not a mental operation of revelation.

When you compare, you measure.

This is why Rand said the essence is epistemological, not metaphysical. And this very essence (in Rand's meaning) is precisely what allows Popper to use the word "bacteria" in his example. He is referring to a thing that appears in a certain manner and he is noticing the details of that appearance, assigning more importance to some and less to others. The only difference is that he does not use the word "essence" for this and he makes no provision for measuring within this process of identification.

She further claims -- to re-re-repeat -- that the truth of all our "conclusions, inferences and knowledge" rests on our getting the definitions right. This gives definitions an immensely important role, condensing ALL our knowledge of the referents and providing the basis for any correct beliefs we might come to.

Of course we have to get our definitions right, otherwise we can be talking about two different things "out there." One confusion is on the word "condense." A definition does not condense all the knowledge about a referent in metaphysical terms. It merely signals the main difference so you can bring to the mental image everything you have seen or observed (i.e., in your memory). It implies this information. Rand used the word "condensation" in the following description, but in this case, she was talking about a mental process and not a metaphysical fact (like an essence in the Aristotelean sense). Her choice of the word "condensation" here was not her finest moment, since it confuses more than it explains. ITOE, p. 42:

A definition is not a description; it implies, but does not mention all the characteristics of a concept's units. If a definition were to list all the characteristics, it would defeat its own purpose: it would provide an indiscriminate, undifferentiated and, in effect, pre-conceptual conglomeration of characteristics which would not serve to distinguish the units from all other existents, nor the concept from all other concepts. A definition must identify the nature of the units, i.e., the essential characteristics without which the units would not be the kind of existents they are. But it is important to remember that a definition implies all the characteristics of the units, since it identifies their essential, not their exhaustive, characteristics; since it designates existents, not their isolated aspects; and since it is a condensation of, not a substitute for, a wider knowledge of the existents involved.

Without memory of observations and learning, there is no such "condensation." I think Rand could have used a different word here, since one could interpret this to mean that the essence somehow makes all the details spring forth as metaphysical facts—that the details are "condensed" in it.

An example makes this clear. If a person had never seen something before, say a coffee maker—and I actually did see this once with a Brazilian maid from a very poor region who had recently arrived in the big city—there is no way that simply defining the item for her as "an electrical appliance designed to automatically brew coffee" will allow her to know that it is made of plastic, etc. That kind of detail (knowledge) needs further observation and learning. What that definition will allow her to do is realize that the thing "out there" is the one that makes coffee and not the one that vacuums. It actually allows her to focus on the thing and learn more details about it, even if she sees another coffee maker at the neighbor's house. (This is the open-ended aspect of concepts.)

The "essence" in this meaning does not condense the details. It merely refers to something "out there" where learned details (measurable ones at that) can be recalled and new ones learned. It puts these details into a mental file folder so to speak and now there is a place to store new details as they are learned. But these details in the concept spring from observation and thinking (comparing), not from any revelation about the thing itself.

The way it refers to that something "out there" in a manner so we know what is being mentioned is through setting a standard of measurement that is different for that thing than is for all other things. This is the distinguishing characteristic. ALL distinguishing characteristics are measurable.

I have a long-standing observation about Rand's writing that she often used the same word with different meanings in passages that are close together without specifying the difference, thus causing confusion. You have to get which meaning she is using from the context. (Rand debunkers like to latch onto these instances with glee and try to impose the first meaning of the word on its use in the second context, where the meaning actually changes but the word stays the same, as proof that she contradicted herself.) This discussion is providing me with some other words: essence, characteristic, etc. She is using them in a metaphysical sense one minute and an epistemological sense (where memory is needed and mental processes are the real issue) the other.

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

Michael,

This is just a note to say that I read your most recent reply and I hope to write a "summing up thus far" sort of post. After that, I'll need to take a break from any heavy elist participation until after Thanksgiving (traditional impending "Thanksgiving Seminar" with many other events/activities to go to/attend to between now and then).

I've sketched "in my mind" (wherever/whatever that is) the gist of what I want to say, but I'll need a good two-three hours' time in which to say it, and I don't expect to get that before Sunday at earliest.

I think I'm seeing sources of the big differences between us in reading not only Popper but Rand herself. I don't anticipate "reconciliation" of these differences, but some stating of them might help with mutual understanding.

Later (with a little bit of luck).

Ellen

___

[tjohnson]

"Out there" the fact that man has a thumb does not depend on him being rational. Thumb and rational are not even connected. Rand's words could be interpreted to mean this, but that is not what she is getting at.

Actually, I think an argument could be made that the thumb and rationality ARE connected. The evolution opposing thumb led to man being able to make and use tools which had a direct effect on the evolution of his cerebral cortex, the place where his "rationality" resides.

[merjet]

Here is one place where the problem lies. Rand is not saying that all other characteristics in reality, i.e., metaphysically, depend on the fundamental one. She is saying that the details falling within the concept depend on it. This is because the concept refers to something that exists and we have already learned many things about it. Here is an example. "Out there" the fact that man has a thumb does not depend on him being rational. Thumb and rational are not even connected. Rand's words could be interpreted to mean this, but that is not what she is getting at.

How do you know? Do you believe you have intuited the essence of Rand's ideas?

A definition is not a description; it implies, but does not mention all the characteristics of a concept's units. If a definition were to list all the characteristics, it would defeat its own purpose: it would provide an indiscriminate, undifferentiated and, in effect, pre-conceptual conglomeration of characteristics which would not serve to distinguish the units from all other existents, nor the concept from all other concepts. A definition must identify the nature of the units, i.e., the essential characteristics without which the units would not be the kind of existents they are. But it is important to remember that a definition implies all the characteristics of the units, since it identifies their essential, not their exhaustive, characteristics; since it designates existents, not their isolated aspects; and since it is a condensation of, not a substitute for, a wider knowledge of the existents involved.

Combining these two claims, the essential characteristics implies all the characteristics of the units. Ergo, in the case of man and contra MSK, 'rational' or 'animal' implies a thumb.

I believe "a definition implies all the characteristics of the units" is far overstated. A correct formula seems to be that the definition refers to the units, and the reference is to all the units' characteristics, not just the ones condensed into the definition. Essential characteristics can't imply contingent characteristics, e.g. the definition of 'boat' doesn't imply it has sails.

[tjohnson]

If a definition were to list all the characteristics, it would defeat its own purpose

Not only would it defeat it's own purpose, it's impossible. One could list characteristics of an object forever.

A definition must identify the nature of the units, i.e., the essential characteristics without which the units would not be the kind of existents they are.

Objects don't have "a nature" or "essential" characteristics, we attribute those to them. Objects don't exist independent of an observer. Anyone who denies this must produce an object in COMPLETE isolation, which is obviously impossible.

[BaalChatzaf]

If a definition were to list all the characteristics, it would defeat its own purpose

Not only would it defeat it's own purpose, it's impossible. One could list characteristics of an object forever.

A definition must identify the nature of the units, i.e., the essential characteristics without which the units would not be the kind of existents they are.

Objects don't have "a nature" or "essential" characteristics, we attribute those to them. Objects don't exist independent of an observer. Anyone who denies this must produce an object in COMPLETE isolation, which is obviously impossible.

How do we discover new, never before seen objects, unless the objects preexist being observed?

You are right about the so-called essential properties. -We- designate which properties are essential and which are not. Where nature operates, all inherent properties are equal. They are what they are. And Nature does not give one good god damn about what we humans think is essential. That is because Nature does not give damns good or not.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[tjohnson]

How do we discover new, never before seen objects, unless the objects preexist being observed?

Pre-exist? That's a contradiction in terms. The first time a man ever looked in a microscope and saw a bacteria was the first time they existed for him.

[Dragonfly]

You are right about the so-called essential properties. -We- designate which properties are essential and which are not. Where nature operates, all inherent properties are equal. They are what they are. And Nature does not give one good god damn about what we humans think is essential. That is because Nature does not give damns good or not.

Indeed, essence is in the eye of the beholder.

[BaalChatzaf]

How do we discover new, never before seen objects, unless the objects preexist being observed?

Pre-exist? That's a contradiction in terms. The first time a man ever looked in a microscope and saw a bacteria was the first time they existed for him.

That particular bacteria is not as old as the human who saw it. Bacteria do not last long. Their either die or split and become new bacteria.

Are you saying there is nothing in nature that has come into existence recently?

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited September 29, 2007 by BaalChatzaf

[tjohnson]

That particular bacteria is not as old as the human who saw it. Bacteria do not last long. Their either die or split and become new bacteria.

Are you saying there is nothing in nature that has come into existence recently?

Ba'al Chatzaf

I'll say it again, there is no such thing as an object in perfect isolation, at the very least there needs to be an observer. I said at the very least, in the sense of if nothing else, not that an observer was necessary. Do you imagine that a bacteria can exist by itself with nothing else in the universe? The important point is that when we DO observe and speak about objects we must never forget about this interaction between observed and observer.

The concept does not exist for the physicist until he has the possibility of discovering whether or

not it is fulfilled in an actual case.... As long as this requirement is not satisfied, I allow myself to be

deceived as a physicist (and of course the same applies if I am not a physicist), when I imagine that I

am able to attach a meaning to the statement of simultaneity. (I would ask the reader not to proceed

farther until he is fully convinced on this point.) (150) A. EINSTEIN

Einstein, in thus analyzing what is involved in making a judgment of simultaneity, and in seizing

on the act of the observer as the essence of the situation, is actually adopting a new point of view as

to what the concepts of physics should be, namely, the operational view. . . if we had adopted the

operational point of view, we would, before the discovery of the actual physical facts, have seen that

simultaneity is essentially a relative concept, and would have left room in our thinking for the

discovery of such effects as were later found. (55) P. W. BRIDGMAN

Edited September 29, 2007 by general semanticist

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Combining these two claims, the essential characteristics implies all the characteristics of the units. Ergo, in the case of man and contra MSK, 'rational' or 'animal' implies a thumb.

Merlin,

Contra? I thought I said precisely that.

A definition does not condense all the knowledge about a referent in metaphysical terms. It merely signals the main difference so you can bring to the mental image everything you have seen or observed (i.e., in your memory). It implies this information.

When I use the term "out there" or "metaphysical" in this context, I mean the actual existence of something, irrespective of the observing agent. Without the observing agent, nothing can be implied. "To imply" is a mental operation. That is why I said "mental image" and mentioned memory and information in the above quote, not characteristic per se.

I believe "a definition implies all the characteristics of the units" is far overstated. A correct formula seems to be that the definition refers to the units, and the reference is to all the units' characteristics, not just the ones condensed into the definition. Essential characteristics can't imply contingent characteristics, e.g. the definition of 'boat' doesn't imply it has sails.

This is more along the lines of my thinking and understanding of Rand's idea. You only know that a boat sails because of everything you have learned about boats. The thing is, everybody else has learned the same stuff, too (reality being immutable), so when you use that concept with other people, you rely on their memory and everybody talks about the same kind of existent.

The essential characteristic (in the concept, i.e., in the mind) is a category divider and memory jog. "Out there" the essential characteristic is just another characteristic among oodles of the existent's characteristics. It certainly is not an all-encompassing essence. "In here" (in the concept) the essential characteristic is a form of shorthand (among other things).

Michael

[Dragonfly]

I'll say it again, there is no such thing as an object in perfect isolation, at the very least there needs to be an observer. I said at the very least, in the sense of if nothing else, not that an observer was necessary. Do you imagine that a bacteria can exist by itself with nothing else in the universe? The important point is that when we DO observe and speak about objects we must never forget about this interaction between observed and observer.

The concept does not exist for the physicist until he has the possibility of discovering whether or

not it is fulfilled in an actual case.... As long as this requirement is not satisfied, I allow myself to be

deceived as a physicist (and of course the same applies if I am not a physicist), when I imagine that I

am able to attach a meaning to the statement of simultaneity. (I would ask the reader not to proceed

farther until he is fully convinced on this point.) (150) A. EINSTEIN

Simultaneity isn't a physical object, however. It is a human construct that connects two different events. Einstein showed that it isn't absolute, i.e. for one observer two events may be simultaneous that are not simultaneous for another observer moving relative to the first one. But the existence of physical objects doesn't depend on an observer; we can't observe anything outside the light cone, and that includes a lot of stars and galaxies, but if we wait long enough they may become observable when they enter the light cone. Of course we may infer the existence of a particular object only when we can observe it (directly or indirectly), but most physicist are realists in the sense that they don't say that those objects don't exist if we wouldn't be there. That would imply that the world of the dinosaurs never existed, because we weren't there to observe them.

[tjohnson]

Of course we may infer the existence of a particular object only when we can observe it (directly or indirectly), but most physicist are realists in the sense that they don't say that those objects don't exist if we wouldn't be there. That would imply that the world of the dinosaurs never existed, because we weren't there to observe them.

I'm sorry if I implied this, I didn't mean to. This started when I was arguing against the idea of objects having properties etc. that were independent of the observer. My original point was that any properties we speak about are a result of the interaction between observer and observed.

[Dragonfly]

I'm sorry if I implied this, I didn't mean to. This started when I was arguing against the idea of objects having properties etc. that were independent of the observer. My original point was that any properties we speak about are a result of the interaction between observer and observed.

This is a bit semantic quibbling (well, what can you expect with a general semanticist...). I'd say that the objects do have properties that are independent of the observer, for example an electron has the property that it has a negative charge. Now the concept "negative charge" is of course a human construct, but that doesn't mean that it doesn't correspond to the thing "out there". Physics works while our measurements in general give consistent results, and that leads us to postulate that there is something "out there", independent of our consciousness. We may construct concepts that represent various properties of things out there (for example the concept "charge"), which means that we can give a recipe: if you do A and B and... then X will happen and we'll say then that Y has a positive charge (for example). When this happens consistently, we may conclude that it is likely that there is something out there that does have that property. But it would also have that property if we didn't do the check (applying the recipe), only we wouldn't know it.

Now there is in fact no real distinction between an object and its properties; if you accept the reality of the object, independent of our consciousness, then you'll have to accept also the reality of all its properties. So in the era of the dinosaurs electrons also had a negative charge, even if there was no one who'd defined it or measured it at the time. If a Martian applied the same recipe, he'd get the same results, although he'd use different terms. It is such invariant behavior what leads us to postulate an external reality and makes it sensible to talk about properties that are independent of the observer, although we have to define the properties we're interested in (i.e. finding useful recipes that give consistent and interesting results) and we only can know about them by observing, but knowledge is not the same as reality. There is something out there that 'knows' how to respond to the recipe we invented, and this is what we call a certain property (that corresponds to our recipe) of the object.

[tjohnson]

Physics works while our measurements in general give consistent results, and that leads us to postulate that there is something "out there", independent of our consciousness.

We may construct concepts that represent various properties of things out there (for example the concept "charge"), which means that we can give a recipe: if you do A and B and... then X will happen and we'll say then that Y has a positive charge (for example). When this happens consistently, we may conclude that it is likely that there is something out there that does have that property. But it would also have that property if we didn't do the check (applying the recipe), only we wouldn't know it.

Here is another way to look at it. Physics and science works because the people involved have AGREED on the their observations and the language they use to describe what is happening. This can be done without ascribing properties, but rather by thinking operationally, as you said "if you do A and B and... then X will happen". This is a descriptive statement of fact that does not ascribe any properties to objects. "We SAY it has a positive charge" is different than "it HAS a positive charge". Our language has a structure which we PROJECT upon events and this structure gets updated periodically as science progresses. This makes the notions of 'true' and 'false' obsolete, they are replaced by 'more similar' or 'less similar'.

[BaalChatzaf]

Physics works while our measurements in general give consistent results, and that leads us to postulate that there is something "out there", independent of our consciousness.

We may construct concepts that represent various properties of things out there (for example the concept "charge"), which means that we can give a recipe: if you do A and B and... then X will happen and we'll say then that Y has a positive charge (for example). When this happens consistently, we may conclude that it is likely that there is something out there that does have that property. But it would also have that property if we didn't do the check (applying the recipe), only we wouldn't know it.

Here is another way to look at it. Physics and science works because the people involved have AGREED on the their observations and the language they use to describe what is happening. This can be done without ascribing properties, but rather by thinking operationally, as you said "if you do A and B and... then X will happen". This is a descriptive statement of fact that does not ascribe any properties to objects. "We SAY it has a positive charge" is different than "it HAS a positive charge". Our language has a structure which we PROJECT upon events and this structure gets updated periodically as science progresses. This makes the notions of 'true' and 'false' obsolete, they are replaced by 'more similar' or 'less similar'.

Wrong! Physics works because it correctly describes the way the world IS.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Alfonso Jones]

Physics works while our measurements in general give consistent results, and that leads us to postulate that there is something "out there", independent of our consciousness.

We may construct concepts that represent various properties of things out there (for example the concept "charge"), which means that we can give a recipe: if you do A and B and... then X will happen and we'll say then that Y has a positive charge (for example). When this happens consistently, we may conclude that it is likely that there is something out there that does have that property. But it would also have that property if we didn't do the check (applying the recipe), only we wouldn't know it.

Here is another way to look at it. Physics and science works because the people involved have AGREED on the their observations and the language they use to describe what is happening. This can be done without ascribing properties, but rather by thinking operationally, as you said "if you do A and B and... then X will happen". This is a descriptive statement of fact that does not ascribe any properties to objects. "We SAY it has a positive charge" is different than "it HAS a positive charge". Our language has a structure which we PROJECT upon events and this structure gets updated periodically as science progresses. This makes the notions of 'true' and 'false' obsolete, they are replaced by 'more similar' or 'less similar'.

This is very worrisome.

How do you AGREE on the observations and language used to describe, without ascribing properties? Will you not use or allude to properties to say "X will happen?" I do understand the difference between "it has a positive charge" and "the best we say with our current level of knowledge is that it behaves in ways, as far as we understand, identical to those we would expect if it had a positive charge." But do talk about that means that we can discuss the PROPERTIES associated with positive charge, and the consequences thereof.

I don't think the artifice of saying you aren't ascribing properties to objects works, once the first question is asked.

Alfonso

[Daniel Barnes]

Clearly the issue at hand (which is a digression anyway) is not well understood by at least two significant participants in this discussion. Firstly we have Roger Bissell, who writes:

I really don't know what the controversy is about....Some seem mystified about what it can mean for a definition to be true. A definition is a proposition. So is a designation of an essence. Propositions are statements of fact, and thus can either correspond to reality and be true, or not correspond to reality and be false.

Roger, from this it is quite obvious what you've overlooked here. To make it clear, let's look at your earlier example of an "invalid" or false definition:

Capitalism=predatory robber-barons with government-granted monopoly privileges.

You claim this is an "invalid" definition. Yet this statement corresponds to reality; for "predatory robber-barons with government-granted monopoly privileges" exist. So once again, according to your above criteria you would now have to say this is a true definition after all.

And so forth. You can now see, hopefully, why your argument above does not help. For the whole point is that there are any number of true defining statements we might attach words too.

You might reply that this definition of capitalism does not grasp the "essence" of capitalism. You have observed reality, and found the correct "essence." But I might reply it does and that I have observed reality too, and you have grasped the wrong "essence." Stalemate. The situation is not logically resolvable, so we can either dogmatically cling to our definitions (conversation then is over), or make a mutual agreement (or convention) as to the term's meaning. Thus the doctrine of one "true definition" of any word breaks down, leaving convention (in various forms) as the only functional alternative. (This in turn entails certain criteria for successfully communicating; for example, relying as little as possible on jargon and "special definitions" for standard words, and trying to make your point using language as simply as possible).

OK? I apologise for the digression, it's off topic, and I would prefer to get back on this process of induction, rather than the meaning of words. (If you want to read the essay in question, Popper's "Two Kinds of Definitions"), go here and scroll down.

While he seems dead keen to pursue this digression, Michael K does not yet have his head around it.

He writes:

The game is actually simple. It goes like this:

Aristotle was an essentialist. He believed things have metaphysical essences.

Popper called this nonsense. Laws of the universe exist, but not essences.

Rand tried to call this nonsense, but she use the word "essence" in her writing so she contradicted herself.

Popper is superior and Rand is a fool.

I have already written a rather lengthy explanation that the problem is the consequences of Aristotle's essentialist method of definition, not his essentialist metaphysics. Plus a further elaboration. I've already pointed this out to you. Plus its the whole point of the "Two Kinds of Definitions" essay in the first place.

The argument is not about whether Rand believed in metaphysical essences or not. Never has been! Get with the program....

Edited September 30, 2007 by Daniel Barnes