Beck and Hayek... yes, Hayek dude!

[George H. Smith]

For an excellent libertarian critique of some of Hayek's fundamental ideas, see the 1978 JLS article by Ronald Hamowy, LAW AND THE LIBERAL SOCIETY: F. A. HAYEK'S CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY .

If this article is too long for you, Hamowy wrote a much briefer critique, one that focuses on Hayek's notion of "coercion," for the New Individualist Review in 1961, while he was still in college. That article is short enough to post here:

Hayek’s Concept of Freedom: A Critique

RONALD HAMOWY*

F. A. HAYEK, in his latest book, The Constitution of Liberty (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1960), attempts a thorough exposition of the theoretical and historical foundations of individual liberty. His main thesis is that freedom may be defined as the absence of coercion: it thus becomes clear that, in order fully to comprehend what he feels to be the basis of personal freedom in society, we must turn to his definition of coercion.

Professor Hayek states: “Coercion occurs when one man’s actions are made to serve another man’s will, not for his own but for the other’s purpose.” (p. 133.) But he goes on to make explicit that such coercion can occur only when the possibility of alternate actions is open to the coerced. “Coercion implies . . . that I still choose but that my mind is made someone else’s tool, because the alternatives before me have been so manipulated that the conduct that the coercer wants me to choose becomes for me the least painful one.” (p. 133.)

Let us examine this concept more thoroughly. Firstly, the absence of coercion, in terms of the above statement, would seem to be the following: Freedom (or the absence of coercion) obtains when the possible alternative actions before me are not such that, through the manipulation of such alternatives by another actor, the least painful choice for me is that which is the most beneficial for him. Or, more simply, freedom obtains when no one else manipulates my environment in such a way that my action (or actions) benefits him. It shall be my purpose, throughout the remainder of this article, to indicate that such a concept of freedom is fundamentally incompatible with the one which forms the basis of a consistent libertarianism.

Now, the first difficulty arising out of such a definition is that of determining just what particular actions are coercive. Professor Hayek attempts to distinguish coercive acts from “the conditions or terms on which our fellow men are willing to render us specific services or benefits,” in the following way: “So long as the services of a particular person are not crucial to my existence or the preservation of what I most value, the conditions he exacts for rendering these services cannot properly be called ‘coercion’.” But it would seem that this lends little if any clarity to the distinction between coercive and non-coercive acts, since we are still left to define and make precise Hayek’s qualifications for characterizing an action as a coercive one; namely, being “crucial to . . . existence” and “preserving what one most values.”

Let us take an example which Hayek himself uses. Suppose that the condition for my being invited to a certain party, which I had previously indicated I wanted very much to attend, were my wearing formal attire. Could it be said that my host, by demanding such an action on my part, was acting coercively towards me? It would appear, and so Hayek concludes, that the answer is clearly “no.” For, although it is true that my environment is being deliberately manipulated in such a way that my “least painful choice” is that which benefits the manipulator, this situation does not satisfy the terms of either of the above qualifications: i.e., neither “being crucial to my existence” nor “preserving what I most value.” Yet, perhaps we are drawing our drawing our conclusion too hastily. It might be that I am a very social-conscious person, and not being invited to this party would greatly endanger my social standing. Further, my tuxedo is at the cleaners and will not be ready for several days. I do not have time to order a new one, and I am assured by my tailors that the fitting and altering involved will take at least a week and the party is this Saturday. Under these conditions, could it be said that my host’s action in demanding my wearing formal attire as the price of access to his home is, in fact, a coercive one, since it clearly threatens the preservation of one of the things I most value, my social prestige?

The above situation might be altered slightly to present what might more clearly appear to be a coercive act, in terms of Hayek’s definition. Suppose the price demanded by my host, in return for inviting me to his home, were a commitment from me that I wash all the silver and china used at the party. On the face of it this would seem to be nothing more than a contract relationship voluntarily entered into by the two parties to the agreement. But suppose all the other conditions concerning my attachment to social prestige still held. It then becomes the case, within the framework of Professor Hayek’s terms, that such a contract is of a coercive nature.

On p. 136, he presents a case of “true coercion” of this same type. “A monopolist could exercise true coercion . . . if he were . . . the owner of a spring in an oasis. Let us say that other persons settled there on the presumption that water would always be available at a reasonable price and then found . . . that they had no choice but to do whatever the owner of the spring demanded of them if they were to survive: here would be a clear case of coercion.” We assume that Hayek means that a contract entered into by the owner of the spring and the purchaser of water which allowed for renumeration to the spring-owner of any but a “reasonable price” would be of a coercive nature. But here we are faced with a difficult problem; namely, what constitutes “a reasonable price.” By “reasonable,” Professor Hayek might mean “competitive.” But how is it possible to determine what the competitive price is in the absence of competition? Economics cannot attribute a cardinal magnitude to any price outside of the framework of the market. What, then, can we assume to be a “reasonable” price, or, more to the point, at what price does the contract alter its nature and become a coercive one? Is it at one dollar a gallon, ten dollars a gallon, one thousand dollars a gallon? What if the owner of the spring demands nothing more than the friendship of the settlers. Is such a price coercive? By what principle can we decide when the agreement is a simple contractual one, and when it is not?

But we must face yet a further difficulty. Is the owner acting coercively if he refuses to sell his water at any price? Let us suppose that he looks upon his spring as sacred to his gods and to offer up its holy water a gross sacrilege. Here is a situation which would not fall under Hayek’s definition of coercion, since the owner of the spring forces no action on the settlers. Yet, it would appear that, within Hayek’s own framework, this is a far worse situation, since the only “choice” left open to the settlers now is dying of thirst.

LET US NOW turn to Professor Hayek’s use of the term “coercion” within the context of state activity. Here, just as many difficulties seem to arise. On p. 153, he states that “the conception of freedom under the law that is the chief concern of this book rests on the contention that when we obey laws, in the sense of general abstract rules laid down irrespective of their application to us, we are not subject to another man’s will and are therefore free.” The inference is, of course, that these abstract rules, when applied impartially without regard to person are non-coercive, despite any qualification as to their content. And Hayek himself says this: though “taxation and the various compulsory services, especially conscription . . . are not supposed to be avoidable, they are at least predictable and are enforced irrespective of how the individual would otherwise employ his energies: this deprives them largely of the evil nature of coercion.” (Italics mine).

Now, in a book dedicated to an investigation of the theoretical and historical groundwork of freedom, particularly within the context of a state structure, it is of the utmost importance that the boundary between coercion and non-coercion, as applied to the actions of the state, be clearly drawn. For how else are we to know when the state is exercising its legitimate functions or coercing its citizens? Hayek differentiates these two categories of actions by applying the concept of the Rule of Law. “Law,” Professor Hayek asserts on p. 149, “in its ideal form might be described as a ‘once-and-for-all’ command that is directed to unknown people and that is abstracted from all particular circumstances of time and place and refers only to such conditions as may occur anywhere and at any time.” We see, then, that the Rule of Law is the governance of society under a set of abstract rules which in no way discriminate among the citizenry and, hence, are equally applicable to all. An instance of such a law would be taxation (although not progressive taxation* ) which applies equally to all those falling under the jurisdiction of the state. Having thus been robbed of either privilege or discrimination as regards “the classification of persons which the law must employ,” such state action does not fall under the scope of coercion.

But we are forced to question the validity of this conclusion which rests on what is, in fact, a mistaken distinction between legitimate and illegitimate state actions. It would, for example, be perfectly consistent with the Rule of Law, as Professor Hayek presents it, to allow for the passage of legislation prescribing the enslavement of each male citizen for a period of two years, such enslavement to fall during the period of his prime (say, between the ages of 18 and 36). This is, in fact, the case with conscription, which Hayek explicitly states is consonant with a free society. Such a conclusion differs radically from that once made by Mr. William F. Buckley, Jr., that “conscription is the most naked form which tyranny assumes in our society today,” and appears to be inconsistent with Hayek’s own intention of laying down those principles which allow for a minimum of coercion in society.

Further, it would be just as consistent, within a free society governed by the Rule of Law, to interfere with many of our most basic freedoms—and such freedoms include economic ones as well** —provided such laws are applicable to all without distinction.

It is one of Hayek’s purposes to build up a theoretical framework from which the necessity of private property can be deduced, a conclusion arrived at from an investigation of the nature of power and freedom in society. It would clearly seem to be subverting the very groundwork of such a principle if the theoretical system upon which it rests allows for the concentration and legitimate use of such powers in the hands of the state which can result in a system the nature of which aims at the overthrow of personal liberty. Hayek says: “the recognition of private property is . . . an essential condition for the prevention of coercion.” Yet he succeeds in placing within the power of the state the very means of interfering with that right under the guise of acting consistently within the borders of its legitimate domain and consonant with the Rule of Law. Here, then, lies the main critique of Hayek’s proposed framework: that it offers a rationale for what clearly are coercive acts of the state, e.g., conscription, interference in the economy (under the principle that it is attempting to minimize personal coercion) and alteration by flat of the social structure of personal relationships which have developed spontaneously and undirected over the course of centuries.

Given that such situations as the voluntary contractualization of parties to a mutually beneficial agreement (e.g., the example cited above concerning the spring in the desert) can be classed under the heading of “coercion” within Hayek’s system, and that what appear to be clear cases of coercive governmental action, such as conscription, are deemed legitimate and in accordance with the Rule of Law, it would seem that Hayek’s position on the nature of coercion and freedom must, as it stands, be rejected.

Ghs

[anthony]

This is excellent, Ghs.

I prefer "coercion" to Initiation of Force.

Within the extent of this article, Hayek seems perfectly aligned with Ayn Rand.

Am I right?

Tony

[Dennis Hardin]

Here is my brief summary of some of the key points made by Ronald Hamowy in his article in The Journal of Libertarian Studies (referenced by George H. Smith above). I apologize for the lack of clarity in the first part of this summary, but I think the real fault for that is Hayek’s. As Hamowy says: “Hayek makes little effort to give precision to these terms and his examples are confused.” No kidding.

“Law and the Liberal Society: F.A. Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty”

Ronald Hamowy

Hayek defines ‘liberty or freedom in a manner consistent with 19th century liberal theory. “Individual or personal freedom,” he writes, is “the state in which a man is not subject to coercion by the arbitrary will of another or others”…One essential criterion for any definition of freedom…is, that my freedom entails prohibitions on others rather than positive commands. This distinction is negated in all positive conceptions of liberty…What is crucial, of course, is how we proceed to distinguish between types of force [i.e., ‘being forced’ v ‘not being able to do something’]. This is impossible without prior recourse to a theory of rights…Hayek [makes] no reference to rights…[According to Hayek] I am free when no one else manipulates my environment in such a way that my action benefits him…I find this formulation totally inadequate…Hayek makes little effort to give precision to these terms and his examples are confused… This argument implies that if being painted by a famous artist is what I most value, but he refuses to do the portrait for a less than exorbitant fee, I am coerced. …Hayek has blundered from a strictly negative concept of freedom into a positive one; I am coerced to the extent that I am deliberately denied that which I most value…[This argument means that] my freedom can require that others be forced to act in a particular way, e.g., demanding that an artist paint me when otherwise he would have refused….

Whatever Hayek is trying to say here, it would be hard to imagine a definition of freedom which has less in common with Ayn Rand’s principle of excluding the initiation of force from human relationships.

The rule of law has held a unique place in the liberal conception of a free society…Liberal legal theorists have identified its absence with despotism…Hayek’s preoccupation with the formal structure of law has led him to disregard substantive limitations on law without which personal liberty cannot be insured.. Hayek’s concept of the law is open to serious criticism on the grounds that it permits a number of seemingly voluntary actions to be classified as coercive…The rule of law, as Hayek propounds it, requires no more than that legislation be characterized by equality, generality and certainty. It would not preclude far-reaching governmental regulation of private life …The rule of law, whose presence is perhaps a necessary condition for a free society, is offered as a sufficient condition. Hayek’s concept of the rule of law permits a number of peaceful, voluntary actions to be classified as coercive, and therefore prohibited. Hayek’s frame work for the rule of law appears to allow for the concentration of power by the state which is inimical to personal freedom…

Under collectivism, the well being of the collective, the group, takes precedence over the individual. A political system based upon collectivism gives the government far-reaching control over the individual.

Hayek seems perfectly aligned with Ayn Rand’s Maginalia…

[Philip Coates]

Thanks, MSK and GHS and DH for the clarifications on the ways in which Hayek was not for Laissez-Faire. It's very helpful.

However, I still don't agree with the harshness of Rand's rebukes of the 'libertarian leaning' Hayek and Milton Friedman (to take two examples):

1. She calls them names with the implication they should have known better, were appeasers, etc. But Laissez-Faire is a difficult system to grasp and understand fully why it would be practical. Even for economists.

2. She says they are 'poison', meaning harmful to Objectivist ideas. But I've never believed that those who have ideas close to yours are harmful to you. They can be a waystation, can be allies, people to whose followers you can reach out.

[George H. Smith]

Thanks, MSK and GHS and DH for the clarifications on the ways in which Hayek was not for Laissez-Faire. It's very helpful.

However, I still don't agree with the harshness of Rand's rebukes of the 'libertarian leaning' Hayek and Milton Friedman (to take two examples):

1. She calls them names with the implication they should have known better, were appeasers, etc. But Laissez-Faire is a difficult system to grasp and understand fully why it would be practical. Even for economists.

2. She says they are 'poison', meaning harmful to Objectivist ideas. But I've never believed that those who have ideas close to yours are harmful to you. They can be a waystation, can be allies, people to whose followers you can reach out.

I agree with you; I suppose even the improbable was bound to happen, sooner or later.

I don't know of any libertarians who take Hayek's political philosophy very seriously, given what a mishmash it is. He is revered, and rightly so, for his contributions to social theory and economics. (The latter includes Hayek's invaluable contributions to the socialist calculation debate.) For example, among the many books that I have read on social theory, especially on the methodology of the social sciences, there are few if any that can rival Hayek's classic work, The Counter-Revolution of Science. This book is an intellectual treasure -- a great value to any Objectivist who wishes to understand the fundamentals of a field that Rand never discussed.

When I used to recommend Hayek's three-volume Law, Legislation and Liberty to graduate students at IHS conferences, I told them to study the first two volumes carefully (they are probably the best treatment of spontaneous order ever written) and to throw away the third (which deals with specific policy recommendations).

The best account of Hayek's philosophy that I know of is Hayek and Modern Liberalism (Clarendon Press, 1990), by the libertarian Chandran Kukathas. (Chandran I used to play a lot of chess at conferences, and since I won most of the games, we became good friends. ) Although Chandran's treatment of Hayek's ideas is sympathetic and accurate, it is also very critical. Chandran (p. 19), who reaches far deeper into Hayek's ideas than Hamowy does, succinctly identifies a fundamental conflict in Hayek's approach as follows:

The success of Hayek's argument is the primary concern of this book. The conclusion it reaches is that he does not succeed because the different arguments he presents to defend "the principles of a [classical] liberal social order" rest on philosophical presuppositions which remain incompatible, namely those of Hume and Kant.

Hayek sees himself drawing on the arguments on a liberal tradition. Yet this tradition contains many philosophies, some openly critical of their "liberal" predecessors. Liberalism's Humean inheritance emphasizes the historical nature of society, the passionate nature of man, and the artificial nature of morality. The Kantian inheritance, however, emphasizes man's autonomy, his rationality, and his equal right to freedom. One insists that all moral and political issues be approached within the framework of existing practice. The other is explicitly constructivist, maintaining that practice should be judged by the universal values of justice and freedom.

My own use of some of Hayek's ideas can be found in parts two and three of my article "Achieving a Free Society: Good News and Bad." (This article was first delivered as the keynote address at the California Libertarian Party state convention in Sacramento on February 15, 1997.)

Ghs

[merjet]

I don't know of any libertarians who take Hayek's political philosophy very seriously, given what a mishmash it is. He is revered, and rightly so, for his contributions to social theory and economics. (The latter includes Hayek's invaluable contributions to the socialist calculation debate.) For example, among the many books that I have read on social theory, especially on the methodology of the social sciences, there are few if any that can rival Hayek's classic work, The Counter-Revolution of Science. This book is an intellectual treasure -- a great value to any Objectivist who wishes to understand the fundamentals of a field that Rand never discussed.

That seems like a fair assessment.

However, to conclude that Hayek was a rampant collectivist because he didn't get everything right is ridiculous. Following that sort of thinking, I should reject everything Ayn Rand said because she made some (non-trivial) errors.

[George H. Smith]

I don't know of any libertarians who take Hayek's political philosophy very seriously, given what a mishmash it is. He is revered, and rightly so, for his contributions to social theory and economics. (The latter includes Hayek's invaluable contributions to the socialist calculation debate.) For example, among the many books that I have read on social theory, especially on the methodology of the social sciences, there are few if any that can rival Hayek's classic work, The Counter-Revolution of Science. This book is an intellectual treasure -- a great value to any Objectivist who wishes to understand the fundamentals of a field that Rand never discussed.

That seems like a fair assessment.

However, to conclude that Hayek was a rampant collectivist because he didn't get everything right is ridiculous. Following that sort of thinking, I should reject everything Ayn Rand said because she made some (non-trivial) errors.

All my assessments are fair, by definition.

I agree that to call Hayek a "collectivist" is ridiculous. But he does make comments from time to time that are maddening. For example, the first book by Hayek that I read in college was The Constitution of Liberty. When I got to this passage (p. 134), I almost threw the book across the room:

"Coercion is thus bad because it prevents a person from using his mental powers to the full and consequently from making the greatest contribution that he is capable of to the community."

The passage is sure to raises the hackles of any good Randian (and I was a very good Randian during my college years, if you don't count my anarchism), and it sure got me going. Fortunately, I didn't give up on Hayek, and over time I noticed that he sometimes makes nutty statements like this that don't mesh with, much less follow from, the theoretical core of his arguments for freedom -- which are often insightful, despite the glitches.

In the line quoted above, the "thus" would suggest that Hayek's "conclusion" is somehow connected to the preceding paragraphs. But there is no connection, not even an indirect one. The "conclusion" just hangs out there, all by its lonesome, with no anchor. Why he inserted the line is anyone's guess.

I once attended a lecture by Hayek at UCLA, after which I had him autograph a couple of his books. I have never seen anything quite like his performance, before or since. He stood in front of a microphone without a podium or so much as a single note, and he started talking. He talked effortlessly for around 80 minutes without committing a single slip or grammatical error, as if he had committed every word of the lecture to memory. And the lecture, which was quite technical, flowed smoothly and logically from one point to the next.

When reading Hayek, I sometimes get the feeling that he published first drafts, more or less, because he wrote very much like he spoke. His writings are full of mannerisms -- and even inconsistencies -- that we often associate with speaking; I would even say that they have a stream-of-consciousness quality to them.

In a lecture, I once compared Hayek's writing style to that of Mises, which is much more deliberate and systematic -- which goes to show that there is virtually nothing under the sun about which I have not formulated a theory.

I used to tell students that if you want systematic reasoning, then read Mises. But you want brilliant flashes of insight that you can use to stimulate your own thinking, then read Hayek. At its best, Hayek's thinking can take your breath away. At its worst, it can make you want to pull your hair out.

Similar things have been said about Rand.

Ghs

[Xray]

Michael,

In correspondence with Rose Wilder Lane, Ayn Rand stated that Hayek was “an example of our most pernicious enemy . . . real poison” because he “preached contradictory ideas” in defense of capitalism. For this reason, she felt he was “more harmful than 100% enemies.”

An example, from Ayn Rand’s Marginalia:

Hayek: “ This is the fundamental fact on which the whole philosophy of individualism is based. It does not assume, as is often asserted, that man is egoistic or selfish or ought to be. It merely starts from the indisputable fact that the limits of our powers of imagination make it impossible to include in our scale of values more than a sector of the needs of the whole society, and that, since, strictly speaking, scales of value can exist only in individual minds, nothing but partial scales of values exist—scales which are inevitably different and often inconsistent with each other. From this, the individualist concludes that the individuals should be allowed, within very defined limits, to follow their own values and preferences rather than somebody else’s; that within these spheres the individual’s system of ends should be supreme and not subject to any dictation by others…”

Rand: “Oh God damn the total complete vicious bastard! This means that man does exist for others, but since he doesn’t know how to do it, the masters will give him some 'defined limits' for himself. If that’s the essence, this is why individualism has failed.”

I can't see any evidence in the Hayek quote which would support Rand's inference that Hayek thinks "man exists for others".

Elsewhere in her marginalia, she refers to Hayek as a "damn collectivist," a “damn idiot,” an “abysmal fool,” and an “ass.’ She states: "He doesn't really believe in competition, in capitalism or in individualism."

How the alleged "individualist" Rand dealt with opinions not fitting her personal set of values is very telling.

Those who believe that Objectivism supports individualism: when you look at Rand's 'brave new world' depicted in Galt's Gulch - isn't that world far more collectivist than individualistic? My guess is that individualists would not want to live there even if you paid them.

According to Sciabarra and Sechrest, Roy Childs once reported that Hayek, much like Beck, “rather admired Atlas Shrugged.”

What does Beck think of Rand's atheism?

Beck is an interesting object of study. Reminds me of those television evangelists. Would calling him a "Capitalism Evangelist" fit?

Edited June 11, 2010 by Xray

[Brant Gaede]

You're really into the thin stuff now, Xray.

--Brant

punch it up! punch it up!

[Alfonso Jones]

You're really into the thin stuff now, Xray.

--Brant

punch it up! punch it up!

Brant -

If you can understand when Xray gets "really into the thin stuff" you are a connoisseur of gruel.

Bill P

[Philip Coates]

> I agree with you; I suppose even the improbable was bound to happen, sooner or later. [GHS]

I understand also that six foot snowdrifts are expected in Miami next month. In further news on the improbability front, based on your description, the Amazon reader comments, and a Freeman review, I just sent away for "The Counter-Revolution of Science".

[Dennis Hardin]

Hayek: “ This is the fundamental fact on which the whole philosophy of individualism is based. It does not assume, as is often asserted, that man is egoistic or selfish or ought to be. It merely starts from the indisputable fact that the limits of our powers of imagination make it impossible to include in our scale of values more than a sector of the needs of the whole society, and that, since, strictly speaking, scales of value can exist only in individual minds, nothing but partial scales of values exist—scales which are inevitably different and often inconsistent with each other. From this, the individualist concludes that the individuals should be allowed, within very defined limits, to follow their own values and preferences rather than somebody else’s; that within these spheres the individual’s system of ends should be supreme and not subject to any dictation by others…”

I can't see any evidence in the Hayek quote which would support Rand's inference that Hayek thinks "man exists for others".

Those who believe that Objectivism supports individualism: when you look at Rand's 'brave new world' depicted in Galt's Gulch - isn't that world far more collectivist than individualistic?

From the fact that you think the world of Galt’s Gulch in Atlas Shrugged is not fundamentally different from Huxley’s Brave New World, it would be pointless to try to explain to you how Hayek’s quote constitutes collectivism. So the following breakdown is intended for anyone else who does not grasp Rand’s reasoning here. Your comment about Galt’s Gulch is just too far removed from anything resembling logic and sanity to deserve an answer. I would be insulting the intelligence of everyone on OL to try to explain why that’s obviously not true.

Hayek proclaims the following:

The fundamental fact on which individualism is based has nothing to do with egoism (i.e., the theory that you own your life and have the right to the pursuit of your own welfare). It is based on the fact that people are incapable of acting on values beyond their private ‘system of ends.’ [The implication is that, if it were practical, totalitarianism would be justified—because the standard is accommodating the needs of the whole society.]

Everyone’s scale of values is radically different from everyone else’s. Therefore, if our goal is to accommodate the needs of the whole society, we should allow individuals to pursue their own values within strictly defined limits. Society as a whole should make the decision to “allow” individuals to be free (while strictly limiting that freedom) because this is a more practical way to accommodate society’s needs.

So, contrary to the Declaration of Independence, freedom is not based on the individual’s right to his own life. Society owns your life, but has the power to “allow” you to have some limited degree of freedom if it so chooses. Freedom is not a right of the individual but a limited privilege granted to individuals by society for practical purposes.

Admirers of Hayek can continue to say that it’s “ridiculous’ to call him a collectivist. I will continue to look at what he says.

[merjet]

Admirers of Hayek can continue to say that it’s “ridiculous’ to call him a collectivist. I will continue to look at what he says.

Yeah, right. You will look at snippets of what he said, interpret it however you please, oblivious to massive amounts of what else he said that doesn't fit your preconceived notions, e.g. all his critical analysis of central planning.

Those who believe that Objectivism supports individualism: when you look at Rand's 'brave new world' depicted in Galt's Gulch - isn't that world far more collectivist than individualistic? My guess is that individualists would not want to live there even if you paid them.

From the fact that you think the world of Galt’s Gulch in Atlas Shrugged is not fundamentally different from Huxley’s Brave New World, it would be pointless to try to explain to you how Hayek’s quote constitutes collectivism. So the following breakdown is intended for anyone else who does not grasp Rand’s reasoning here. Your comment about Galt’s Gulch is just too far removed from anything resembling logic and sanity to deserve an answer. I would be insulting the intelligence of everyone on OL to try to explain why that’s obviously not true.

You are quite correct about Xray, though. This is not the first time she has equated John Galt or Galt's Gulch with totalitarianism. More examples are here, here, and here.

I guess it just never occurred to Xray that Big Brother is a creature of government and a dictator heads a government, but there is no government in Galt's Gulch. Xray claims that categories are arbitrary. That is correct for some people; she is a prime example.

Edited June 12, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[Xray]

Those who believe that Objectivism supports individualism: when you look at Rand's 'brave new world' depicted in Galt's Gulch - isn't that world far more collectivist than individualistic?

From the fact that you think the world of Galt’s Gulch in Atlas Shrugged is not fundamentally different from Huxley’s Brave New World, it would be pointless to try to explain to you how Hayek’s quote constitutes collectivism. So the following breakdown is intended for anyone else who does not grasp Rand’s reasoning here. Your comment about Galt’s Gulch is just too far removed from anything resembling logic and sanity to deserve an answer. I would be insulting the intelligence of everyone on OL to try to explain why that’s obviously not true.

You are wrong in assuming that I used the term "Brave New World" because I believe Rand's World is based on the same values as depicted in Huxley's BNW.

This would be like drawing the inference from J. Burns giving a chapter in her book the title "Big Sister Is Watching You" (a title she took from an article by W. Chambers) that Burns believes Rand shared the same ideology as the Big Brother in Orwell's book.

(J. Burns, Goddess of the Market, p. 165)

'Brave New World' was used by me as a label for a Utopia full of 'happy people'. I would also use BNW for a picture in Jehova's Witnesses Watchtower where it shows their vision of eternal paradise on earth which they believe God will give them.

A term like "Pleasantville" or "Shangri-la" for Galt's Gulch would fit as well.

The supiciously idyllic Utopia of GG where everyone sings from the same hymn sheet, where they swear oaths that will never live for the sake of another human being, with Galt having quite few traits in common with a Big Brother is Watching You (who for example has been stalking Dagny for twelve years) - anyone disgreeing with the set of values propagated by Galt has no place in that valley. For the valley is a typically closed society where no diversity by dissenters is tainting the rose-colored picture.

If you think commenting on my remark about Galt's Gulch "insults the intelligence of everyone on OL", then how do you explain that e. g. J. Stewart who interviewed J. Burns spoke of a "totalitarian state of individualists"? Quite an oxymoron, isn't it?

http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/thu-october-15-2009/jennifer-burns

Hayek proclaims the following:

The fundamental fact on which individualism is based has nothing to do with egoism (i.e., the theory that you own your life and have the right to the pursuit of your own welfare). It is based on the fact that people are incapable of acting on values beyond their private ‘system of ends.’ [The implication is that, if it were practical, totalitarianism would be justified—because the standard is accommodating the needs of the whole society.]

Everyone’s scale of values is radically different from everyone else’s. Therefore, if our goal is to accommodate the needs of the whole society, we should allow individuals to pursue their own values within strictly defined limits. Society as a whole should make the decision to “allow” individuals to be free (while strictly limiting that freedom) because this is a more practical way to accommodate society’s needs.

[so, contrary to the Declaration of Independence, freedom is not based on the individual’s right to his own life. Society owns your life, but has the power to “allow” you to have some limited degree of freedom if it so chooses. Freedom is not a right of the individual but a limited privilege granted to individuals by society for practical purposes.

Admirers of Hayek can continue to say that it’s “ridiculous’ to call him a collectivist. I will continue to look at what he says.

As for Galt's Gulch, it too has "strictly defined limits". For example, no one there is allowed to put others' needs first. For this is considered as "immoral".

Hayek's idea of individualism may differ from Rand's, but they are both advocates of prescriptive ethics and morality.

But isn't prescriptive ethics/morality a contradiction to the idea of individualism?

According to the Declaration of Independence, men's rights are god-given. Has Rand, who based her idea of individualism on the DOI, commented on the "Creator" part?

I guess it just never occurred to Xray that Big Brother is a creature of government and a dictator heads a government, but there is no government in Galt's Gulch. Xray claims that categories are arbitrary. That is correct for some people; she is a prime example.

See my above comment on J. Burns using the title "Big Sister is Watching You" for a chapter of her book on Rand.

Edited June 12, 2010 by Xray

[George H. Smith]

Hayek proclaims the following:

The fundamental fact on which individualism is based has nothing to do with egoism (i.e., the theory that you own your life and have the right to the pursuit of your own welfare). It is based on the fact that people are incapable of acting on values beyond their private ‘system of ends.’ [The implication is that, if it were practical, totalitarianism would be justified—because the standard is accommodating the needs of the whole society.]

Everyone’s scale of values is radically different from everyone else’s. Therefore, if our goal is to accommodate the needs of the whole society, we should allow individuals to pursue their own values within strictly defined limits. Society as a whole should make the decision to “allow” individuals to be free (while strictly limiting that freedom) because this is a more practical way to accommodate society’s needs.

So, contrary to the Declaration of Independence, freedom is not based on the individual’s right to his own life. Society owns your life, but has the power to “allow” you to have some limited degree of freedom if it so chooses. Freedom is not a right of the individual but a limited privilege granted to individuals by society for practical purposes.

Admirers of Hayek can continue to say that it’s “ridiculous’ to call him a collectivist. I will continue to look at what he says.

You have not understood Hayek correctly, but it would take some work to explain why. I may take a stab at this later; meanwhile, Hayek's best presentation of this subject is his classic essay Individualism: True and False .

I recommend that you read this piece before dismissing Hayek's notion of "individualism" as you have. You will not find the least hint of the claim that society "owns your life, but has the power to 'allow' you to have some limited degree of freedom if it so chooses."

Hayek's basic point is that the best social outcomes (e.g., greater productivity and wealth in a society) will be achieved when individuals are free to pursue their own goals, regardless of whether those goals are egoistic or altruistic.

This fundamental theme may be reformulated as follows: Even if you believe that you have a duty to help others, this altruistic goal can best be achieved in a free society.

Although I too would fault Hayek for not having a better moral defense of individualism, I also think that his practical defense of freedom -- to the effect that collectivism simply doesn't work, that it will not produce the outcomes that even collectivists want -- is extremely valuable. As Hayek put it in his last book, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (1988, p. 7):

"The dispute between the market order and socialism is no less than a matter of survival. To follow socialist morality would destroy much of present humankind and impoverish the rest."

There is certainly nothing anti-Objectivist about this argument; on the contrary, Rand agreed with it wholeheartedly.

Hayek was not a moral philosopher, and he rarely delves into the field of theoretical ethics. Rather, he analyzes issues from the perspective of economics, social theory, and history.

Hayek's basic point -- to repeat -- is that to leave people free to satisfy their own desires (within the rules of justice) will produce the best social outcomes, regardless of what those desires may be. Thus even the altruist will be better off in a free society. Hayek goes to great lengths to demonstrate how those altruists who advocate socialism (or some form of collectivism) shoot themselves in the foot, so to speak, by calling for a socio-economic system that cannot possibly produce the outcomes they seek.

This is a very powerful argument for a free society. Should it be our only argument, as Hayek sometimes seems to think? No, of course not, but it is still a good argument, and we are indebted to Hayek for his thorough defense of it.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

There is a contradiction in Rand regarding individualism. In the formal sense she advocated individualism, but it was contradicted to a great extent in her life and much of her work. It had to do with her need to be in control in her novels, especially Atlas Shrugged, and how it back-washed into her own life. The essential trick is not to go into Atlas and say these aren't individuals being individualistic, but to take the novel as a whole and recognize it as the individualistic expression of one person to other individuals, the readers. Where you the reader sacrifice your individuality is when you inject yourself into that world and try to live there as such. Rand was always throwing people out who couldn't conform to that existence which meant acknowledging Rand herself, the author--the creator--as being essentially sovereign over you.

--Brant

Edited June 12, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[Brant Gaede]

The basis of individualism is not egoism; egoism is merely an expression of it. The basis is found in the basis of the philosophy itself, its axioms. (Note, this is merely my understanding; I am not a teacher of any philosophy's catechism.) You start with the physical person. He or she is not attached to anyone, not physically. You then recognize through introspection that you have a consciousness not attached to any other consciousness. So by reference to the metaphysics and epistemology of Objectivism you find the basis of individualism. This then travels throughout the philosophy and that which seems to contradict it is the illusion created by not keeping things in their proper place in regard to the basic principles (and principals).

--Brant

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I have mulled the individual versus collective problem for years. I finally came to a conclusion that might piss some people off.

I think individual versus collective is a false dichotomy.

Everyone reading this post is both an individual and a member of the human race, which is the most fundamental collective in human existence.

A person cannot be an individual without being a member of the human race, and he/she cannot be a member of the human race without being an individual. One cannot be without the other.

Politically, people make this dichotomy in order to structure their arguments for power over others (or remove it). So to that extent, it is a good rallying cry. And it is a very good standard for specific applications, such as property ownership, the freedoms, etc.

But when one is removed in an all-or-nothing manner, I keeps seeing distortions arise--like the brutal sacrifice of individuals on one hand and moral sanction of depraved indifference to suffering on the other.

So I keep mulling.

As I have stated earlier, I am inclining toward a greater part-lesser part division (like 80%-20%) in the use of individual versus collective standards. This is because I have accepted that ethics must derive from human nature (and politics from ethics). As I cannot divorce the individual human being from the human species, then it follows that being a member of the human species is part of human nature. Thus both have to be reflected in ethics to some extent.

Michael

[anthony]

There is a contradiction in Rand regarding individualism. In the formal sense she advocated individualism, but it was contradicted to a great extent in her life and much of her work. It had to do with her need to be in control in her novels, especially Atlas Shrugged, and how it back-washed into her own life. The essential trick is not to go into Atlas and say these aren't individuals being individualistic, but to take the novel as a whole and recognize it as the individualistic expression of one person to other individuals, the readers. Where you the reader sacrifice your individuality is when you inject yourself into that world and try to live there as such. Rand was always throwing people out who couldn't conform to that existence which meant acknowledging Rand herself, the author--the creator--as being essentially sovereign over you.

--Brant

Brant,

You are right about the contradictions, but despite it, she has given three or four generations of people the vision that they, and only they, are sovereign over their own lives... and why.

Who of us can forget that first dawning of full independence?

(It's the secular equivalent of Moses presenting the Law, and the Israelites entering the Promised Land, imo. )

Isn't everything - every thing - else, concerning her life secondary to that?

Tony

[anthony]

I have mulled the individual versus collective problem for years. I finally came to a conclusion that might piss some people off.

I think individual versus collective is a false dichotomy.

Everyone reading this post is both an individual and a member of the human race, which is the most fundamental collective in human existence.

A person cannot be an individual without being a member of the human race, and he/she cannot be a member of the human race without being an individual. One cannot be without the other.

Politically, people make this dichotomy in order to structure their arguments for power over others (or remove it). So to that extent, it is a good rallying cry. And it is a very good standard for specific applications, such as property ownership, the freedoms, etc.

But when one is removed in an all-or-nothing manner, I keeps seeing distortions arise--like the brutal sacrifice of individuals on one hand and moral sanction of depraved indifference to suffering on the other.

So I keep mulling.

As I have stated earlier, I am inclining toward a greater part-lesser part division (like 80%-20%) in the use of individual versus collective standards. This is because I have accepted that ethics must derive from human nature (and politics from ethics). As I cannot divorce the individual human being from the human species, then it follows that being a member of the human species is part of human nature. Thus both have to be reflected in ethics to some extent.

Michael

Michael,

I've taken much from your position that ethics must derive from human nature, and strongly agree.

In the rational-realistic explanation you make for there being no dichotomy between collectivism and individualism, this too is self-evidently true - at one level.

I'd like to add some more. (Just to warn you, it's not concise!)

It's in the 'advocacy' of collectivism (or individualism) where great harm (or good) can result.

I have a broad observation of people - that they are by choice or default in two camps : one group wants, demands, or needs, authority to come from 'somewhere' else (God, government, society or any other authority in this world and out). Further, they depend on control, and power, as victims, or, some of them, as wielders, of it;

the second, much smaller group, is composed of those who desire no more than to take responsibility for themselves primarily -they are 'self-authoritative', or self-empowered.

Some of the first group advocate or enforce, to greater or lesser degree, their views on the 'masses'; the other resists, and refuses to see anyone (themselves especially) as anything but a single valued entity. They don't seek power over others for its own sake.

They know that they originate from a group and long lineage of Man - that's a fact of life. But they seek a morality and ethics that reinforces each person's 'rightness' in the World. They do not bow down to any authority but the one they have painstakingly developed for themselves.

In their identification of a man as individual, they do not have it in them to cause pain, or pass their own pain and insecurity onto any other, gratuitously. The buck stops with each of them.

The gang - the collective - is where all man-on-man suffering stems from. Merely because, to them, all other men are to be used, and are replaceable.

It is the Advocacy of altruism that does the real damage, imo. Instances of helping another person, are human, and often good.

Implementing it as each man's obligation to any random other man, is anti-life and wrong. This is the glue that holds collectivism together.

So, if there is no collective/individualist dichotomy in our basic Nature, there is certainly a collectivist/individualist split in our choice of morality.

It's late, and I hope my ramblings make sense.

Tony

[Brant Gaede]

It's not "individual versus collective." It's individualism versus collectivism. Individualism is not living like a hermit. Individualism is what makes human social existence most tolerable to most individuals--those who have that possibility.

--Brant

I have mulled the individual versus collective problem for years. I finally came to a conclusion that might piss some people off.

I think individual versus collective is a false dichotomy.

Everyone reading this post is both an individual and a member of the human race, which is the most fundamental collective in human existence.

A person cannot be an individual without being a member of the human race, and he/she cannot be a member of the human race without being an individual. One cannot be without the other.

Politically, people make this dichotomy in order to structure their arguments for power over others (or remove it). So to that extent, it is a good rallying cry. And it is a very good standard for specific applications, such as property ownership, the freedoms, etc.

But when one is removed in an all-or-nothing manner, I keeps seeing distortions arise--like the brutal sacrifice of individuals on one hand and moral sanction of depraved indifference to suffering on the other.

So I keep mulling.

As I have stated earlier, I am inclining toward a greater part-lesser part division (like 80%-20%) in the use of individual versus collective standards. This is because I have accepted that ethics must derive from human nature (and politics from ethics). As I cannot divorce the individual human being from the human species, then it follows that being a member of the human species is part of human nature. Thus both have to be reflected in ethics to some extent.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Tony,

Your "ramblings" make sense. I have had similar ones for years.

Like I said, I mull at this stage more than preach.

One question: are the two groups in your mind mutually exclusive? In other words, if a person advocates altruism, does he never advocate selfishness? And vice-versa? I mean on a fundamental level.

I'm not talking about jargon, either. I'm talking about the concepts behind the jargon.

To my mind, you would be hard pressed to find anyone like that. You will find people giving lip service when there are clear moral rules, but when you look at their lives, you will see a mix of individualism and fitting in with some collective or other as fundamental values. I'm talking about the way they live, not just the way they preach.

I'm coming more and more to the conclusion that bullying is a fundamental evil, deeper than anything I see in our neck of the woods--altruism, force, etc. You can bully others by altruism and you can do some good with altruism. You can bully others with selfishness and you can do some good with selfishness. You can bully others by force and you can bully them psychologically. You certainly can bully children both ways. Any adult can do it easily if he/she is the guardian.

The government can bully and so can a thug. And so can a leader or insider of any tribe on earth--even intellectual tribes. Even Objectivist ones...

And individuals qua individuals can bully if they are big enough or nasty enough.

The opposite of bullying and being bullied is thinking for yourself and letting others do the same. And allowing that to have expression in action. That means growing and giving space for that growth, too. That, to me, is the starting point of ethics and that is what using the mind means to me. Not prohibiting force. Not prohibiting altruism. Not even promoting reason at all costs, if that means carved-in-stone principles. These can be very good things, but not starting points. If reason means each person doing his or her best effort at thinking, then that is what I support as a starting point.

Reality is absolute. I hold this to be true.

Principles are not absolute since they depend on an agent that is not absolute to formulate them. Not only are human beings not absolute knowledge-wise (we would have to be omniscient to be that), we are temporary, not eternal.

(I believe the fundamental axioms are the interface between absolute reality and contextual human knowledge, i.e., in this context, principles.)

Take an Objectivist principle that many regard as absolute, that altruism is evil. Is it? It certainly can be evil. But there are times I find what some would call altruism to be a mark of good character (helping old ladies cross the street, for instance), and there are times I see it used to manipulate the guilt feelings of people. I wonder, if withholding help from others can induce guilt, isn't that because this emotion is part of human nature already?

I once read a criticism of Rand's ethics that said her ethics suffered from a universal application problem because the principles do not cover the entire human experience. In other words, in my wording, they do not cover all of human nature, merely part of it. (I hold that they cover that part extremely well, though.)

What is the part left out? Try this for one part. We come into the world depending on others and if we are lucky enough to live to an old age, we leave it depending on others. We get sick or damaged and depend on others to nurse us back to health. We all have phases in our lives where we depend on others. Pure selfishness--within a society--does not work for those phases. Otherwise we would not be able to practice our own morality in those phases, only in phases when we were healthy productive adults. Also, it would be moral for our lives to be discarded by others when we are down. It would not be nice, but it would be perfectly moral.

But doesn't that take the principle and impose it on existence rather than derive the principle from existence?

The traditional Objectivist view is that if you start musing in this direction, you start thinking about enslaving others in order to provide care for the down phases. I used to see it that way, myself, but not anymore. The more I look at this, the more I think my 80-20 (or 90-10 or 85-15 or whatever) split idea is the correct one since it is based on reality. The governing principle is not either-or since neither can be eliminated. The governing principle is to find the correct balance.

Balance is a beautiful principle and it is found all over nature--including human nature.

(Think even about the political principle of our brilliant Founding Fathers: checks and balances.)

On a health level, I don't think the extreme view that I have seen expressed by several people in O-Land (starting with Rand), that you have to reprogram your subconscious to get rid of emotions you don't approve of, is healthy. Look at the logic, say with altruism. One premise is that altruism is evil. One reality is that withholding help (in certain circumstances) makes us feel guilty. So to fit the premise, you have to change the reality on an existence level. You have to eliminate a human emotion. I ask, is it really a healthy thing to distort our interior prewired life in order to fit a principle?

I'm not talking about training. To educate that guilt is one thing. But to try to eradicate it from the scope of your own human emotions because you disapprove of the way you came out of the box is another altogether.

Is this healthy? I don't think so.

Isn't it far better to define with precision the situations in which helping others is a fundamental good (and pure selfishness for that matter) and when it is being used as a tool of manipulation and bullying, i.e., a fundamental evil?

I now lean in that direction.

And I muse...

Michael

[George H. Smith]

I have mulled the individual versus collective problem for years. I finally came to a conclusion that might piss some people off.

I think individual versus collective is a false dichotomy.

Everyone reading this post is both an individual and a member of the human race, which is the most fundamental collective in human existence.

A person cannot be an individual without being a member of the human race, and he/she cannot be a member of the human race without being an individual. One cannot be without the other.

Although I don't think your use of the word "collective" is quite appropriate here, the point you are making was also made by the Scottish philosophers, such as Francis Hutcheson, Lord Kames, and Adam Smith, whom I have discussed in the "Christianity and Liberty" thread.

In emphasizing benevolence as a natural inclination in human beings, these philosophers were responding in large measure to the "selfish system" (psychological egoism) of Thomas Hobbes, according to whom man is motived solely by self-interest and so requires the coercive hand of a strong government to keep his selfish passions in check.

The Scots, in contrast, argued that man is naturally a sociable creature who can acquire true happiness only by interacting benevolently with his fellow men. Coercion is not needed to accomplish this; on the contrary, coercion would be counter-productive.

The Scots thus agreed with your thesis that there is no real conflict between the individual and society, since individuals can lead fulfilling lives only through benevolent -- and voluntary -- social interaction.

Ghs

[anthony]

Michael,

Yes, let's say on a 95-5 split, I agree.

And no, I don't think by any means that the two groups are mutually exclusive.

Without meaning to sound like the copy line in an advertisement, is it not fundamental to each human to "be the best you can be."?

I thought for a while that this drive entailed 'rising above' one's nature, but the more I look around at men's strivings - religions, social systems, creations, and philosophies, etc., ; and the more introspection - the more apparent it is that this is inherent in each of us.

IOW,I think it's derived from our nature, too.

For me, the "starting point" you mention is, if not quite everything, hugely critical. It's the core, the conscious choice, upon which all those characteristics, actions, and emotions, including interplay with other humans, are layered.

For Objectivism to have full value, it should leave room for the individual's growth and development far beyond the basic principles; and as we get down to the fine details - like with your degrees of "split" - allow for personal departures.

I'm happy to say that it does, I am certain.

Tony

[Xray]

I have mulled the individual versus collective problem for years. I finally came to a conclusion that might piss some people off.

I think individual versus collective is a false dichotomy.

Everyone reading this post is both an individual and a member of the human race, which is the most fundamental collective in human existence.

A person cannot be an individual without being a member of the human race, and he/she cannot be a member of the human race without being an individual. One cannot be without the other.

Well said. It is "both - and". Every philosophy/ideology propagating an "either-or" here disregards this fundamental and true premise.

Although I don't think your use of the word "collective" is quite appropriate here, the point you are making was also made by the Scottish philosophers, such as Francis Hutcheson, Lord Kames, and Adam Smith, whom I have discussed in the "Christianity and Liberty" thread.

Imo it is because the word "collective" has this strong political/ideological connotation that you have the feeling it is not quite appropriate. Which term would you suggest instead for "collective" used by Michael? I personally have no problem calling it "collective", but to avoid possible misunderstandings, maybe we can think of another, less connotatively 'loaded' one. The only one I can think of is "group", but maybe we can find a better one.

Ghs: In emphasizing benevolence as a natural inclination in human beings, these philosophers were responding in large measure to the "selfish system" (psychological egoism) of Thomas Hobbes, according to whom man is motived solely by self-interest and so requires the coercive hand of a strong government to keep his selfish passions in check.

The Scots, in contrast, argued that man is naturally a sociable creature who can acquire true happiness only by interacting benevolently with his fellow men. Coercion is not needed to accomplish this; on the contrary, coercion would be counter-productive.

The Scots thus agreed with your thesis that there is no real conflict between the individual and society, since individuals can lead fulfilling lives only through benevolent -- and voluntary -- social interaction.

In acknowledging that benevolence as a natural inclination has its roots in the very fact that we are group animals biologically programmed to cooperate for survival, with the group being an essential agent to ensure the survial of each of its members, everything falls into place, without it being necessary to establish an either-or dichotomy.

On a health level, I don't think the extreme view that I have seen expressed by several people in O-Land (starting with Rand), that you have to reprogram your subconscious to get rid of emotions you don't approve of, is healthy. Look at the logic, say with altruism. One premise is that altruism is evil. One reality is that withholding help (in certain circumstances) makes us feel guilty. So to fit the premise, you have to change the reality on an existence level. You have to eliminate a human emotion. I ask, is it really a healthy thing to distort our interior prewired life in order to fit a principle?

Imo in trying to accomodate one's psyche to fit a false premise, one does not actually change reality - one denies reality in trying to repress it.

This self-denial can lead to severe psychological problems. In his work after the break with Rand, N. Branden commented on the dangers which lie in encouraging repression:

Nathaniel Branden: http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=6799&st=980&p=97684entry97684, # 984

"I wrote The Disowned Self to address myself to this problem. In a way, that book is written in code. On one level, it's a book about the problem of self-alienation and a deeper discussion of the relationship of reason and emotion than I had offered in The Psychology of Self-Esteem. But on another level, it's a book written to my former students at Nathaniel Branden Institute, an attempt to get them to rethink the ideas about the relationship of mind and emotion they might have acquired from Ayn Rand or me, and thereby I hoped to undo some of the harm I might have done in the past when I shared and advocated Rand's views in this matter. If you read the book that I wrote with my wife Devers The Romantic Love Question and Answer Book, you will find that approach carried still further.

In the days of my association with Ayn Rand, we heard over and over again the accusation that we are against feelings, against emotions. And we would say in all good faith, "What are you talking about? We celebrate human passion. All the characters in the novels have powerful emotions, powerful passions. They feel far more deeply about things than does the average person. How can you possibly say that we are against feeling and emotion?"

The critics were right. Here is my evidence: When we counsel parents, we always tell them, in effect: "Remember, your children will pay more attention to what you do than what you say. No teaching is as powerful as the teaching of the example. It isn't the sermons you deliver that your children will remember, but the way you act and live." Now apply that same principle to fiction, because the analogy fits perfectly. On the one hand, there are Rand's abstract statements concerning the relationship of mind and emotion; on the other hand, there is the behavior of her characters, the way her characters deal with their feelings.

If, in page after page of The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged, you show someone being heroic by ruthlessly setting feelings aside, and if you show someone being rotten and depraved by, in effect, diving headlong into his feelings and emotions, and if that is one of your dominant methods of characterization, repeated again and again, then it doesn't matter what you profess, in abstract philosophy, about the relationship of reason and emotion. You have taught people: repress, repress, repress.

If you want to know the means by which they were taught, notwithstanding all the celebrations of passion in Ayn Rand's books, study the scenes in The Fountainhead that deal with Roark's way of responding to his own suffering, study the ruthlessness toward their own feelings and emotions exhibited by the heroes and heroine of Atlas Shrugged, and study also consistent way in which villains are characterized in terms of following their feelings. And understand the power of role models to shape beliefs.

When admirers of Ayn Rand seek my services professionally, they often come with the secret hope, rarely acknowledged in words, that with Nathaniel Branden they will at last become the masters of repression needed to fulfill the dream of becoming an ideal objectivist. When I tell them, usually fairly early in our relationship, that one of their chief problems is that they are out of touch with their feelings and emotions, cut off from them and oblivious, and that they need to learn how to listen more to their inner signals, to listen to their emotions, they often exhibit a glazed shock and disorientation."

Edited June 13, 2010 by Xray